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Congress and Nuclear Weapons

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declared bias helps the reader to pose a few "what if?" questions that might reflect another bias.

While the purist would wish for more precise references to primary sources, Nuechterlein has again provided a book that is informative and serves as a methodological tutorial for the use of a tool that will aid an educated observer to understand events and their potential implications.

This work does not explicitly address "pariah" nations or how America should view the economic warfare that some feel is accelerating against us, but perhaps the author will address this subject in his fourth book. A subtitle might be "the paradox of military power and economic impotence."

There is an increasing opinion which suggests that the statement of interest (#4) in promoting the free market system should be replaced with "preservation of American dominance in the international marketplace." After World War II, The Bretton Woods and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arrangement had this agreeable feature until the Japanese (and others) learned the rules and turned the tables on us. This is one illustration of the potential difficulties with the paradigm, with its subjective definitions of national interest.

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS
Charlottesville, Virginia

Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991. 205pp.
(No price given)

This book is more about Congress than nuclear weapons. Readers of the *Naval War College Review* who expect to learn about congressional input regarding the use, policy, and strategy of nuclear weapons will find that the author, a political scientist, uses nuclear weapons as a means to measure congressional actions in that specific area of defense policy: used here, "nuclear weapons" means "nuclear weapons acquisition policy."

Lindsay's premise is that congressional actions can be categorized into three types, or lenses: deferential, parochial, and policy. Using these categories, the author examines four major nuclear weapon programs as examples to support his argument: the MX missile, Trident missile, Pershing II missile, and the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) of the Anti-Satellite (Asat) program.

An example of the deferential lens is that when Congress does not possess the massive amount of information available to the Department of Defense (DoD), it must defer to military expertise concerning questions of nuclear weapons force structure and modernization.

This was business as usual through the 1960s for both the House and Senate committee chairmen. It enabled them to keep junior members quiet and in line or out of the decision loop entirely. But after Vietnam, especially with the growth of the subcommittee system in the 1970s, Congress did not hesitate to speak its

Lindsay, James M. *Congress and Nuclear Weapons*. Baltimore: Johns

mind or ask hard questions concerning the nuclear weapons systems it was expected to fund. Yet, never has a major nuclear weapons system been cancelled. In spite of the occasional congressional uproar, DoD and the executive branch usually receive the requested funding.

The parochial lens is the generally accepted role of Congress as provider of the pork barrel for constituents. The author cites numerous examples of legislators who, because of personal policy beliefs, voted against programs with potentially large payoffs (such as the MX missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)); he states that the impact of parochialism on nuclear weapons acquisitions is minimal. Interestingly, military base closures is the one place where parochiolism is strongest.

According to Lindsay the most important of the three lenses is policy. Congress votes its personal preference for what it considers the advancement of the public good. The three policy camps are: doves, who usually vote for "minimum deterrence"; hawks, who vote in favor of "counterforce and new weapons systems"; and moderates, who swing with the logic of the arguments presented to them.

Lindsay carefully notes that the three lenses appear in different degrees in different kinds of votes, and that therefore none can be ruled out. But the policy lens dominates nuclear weapons acquisitions.

This is an excellent, well documented study based on numerous interviews with congressmen and their

staffs, and it includes data from previous studies of Congress' voting habits and policy leanings. The book is easy to read, and Lindsay makes his point logically and succinctly. This work will prove useful to students of political science and will serve as an excellent primer for personnel heading to the Pentagon.

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Arnett, Eric; Kirk, Elizabeth; and Wander, W. Thomas, eds. *Critical Choices: Setting Priorities in the Changing Security Environment*. Washington, D.C.: American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science Press, 1991. 291pp. (No price given)

Critical Choices is a compendium of the 1990 Proceedings of the Fifth Annual American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Colloquium on Science and International Security. As is the case with many books of this genre, it is an eclectic mixture of panel discussions, luncheon addresses, question and answer periods, and specialized sessions.

The AAAS committee succeeded in bringing together a group of some of the most well known individuals in the field, including, among others, Dov Zakheim, Edward Luttwak, Lawrence Korb, and Ronald O'Rourke. A typical chapter in the book captures a several-page statement by each panelist in a particular area of interest,