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Beyond the Economy Internal Factors Affecting the Future of the Russian Military

A. James Melnick

SINCE THE BREAKUP OF THE Soviet Union, many factors have been reshaping the new Russian military. The economy is of course the dominant factor in that process. Financial difficulties have been so severe that, according to a Russian deputy defense minister, as of early August 1993 “more than 60% of servicemen [had] not received their pay for July . . . [and] many units and subunits [had] not received it for June. People [were] refusing to carry out their duties, including alert duty.”¹ Thus it is not surprising that, at least since the failed August 1991 coup and the collapse of the USSR, Western analysis of the Russian military has concentrated on the impact of a crisis-ridden economy. Some of its effects on the armed forces have been direct, others indirect; some are historically rooted, others are of more recent vintage. They include corruption, *dedovshchina* (oppression of new recruits), desertions, extreme housing shortages, inadequate pay, high inflation, severe reorganizational dislocations, and unclear new regulations.

The negative results of these problems are legion and will continue to hinder the development of the Russian military for some time. However, we should not be blinded to the other changes—processes, in fact—which are occurring that may have a more long-lasting impact on the military. These processes include the emergence of a new national will, military democratization, the development of a new military ethos and sense of professionalization, and a rediscovery of

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military tradition. If and when the Russian economy becomes more stable, these processes will become more evident than they are today. Though they influence, and are influenced by, Russia's new military doctrine, their effects will not be limited by it.² Also, they will serve as powerful domestic factors in the formulation of policy for the military, and they will shape in part the strategic direction of the armed forces.

The "New Factors"

Underlying these processes are a host of factors affecting the future of the Russian military: the impact of the veterans of the war in Afghanistan on the policy process; "alternative service," contract service and the creation of a volunteer force; paramilitary forces, such as the Cossacks; inter-ethnic and semi-independent regional influences on a "federative" military; Russian nationalism of various stripes; "new structures" and new regulations; the role of political activity in the armed forces; the influence of religion; and a yearning for a return to regionally and ethnically based regiments. Additionally, pre-Soviet military roots, the *perezhitki* (remnants) of the communist era, and recent societal trends set in motion by Russian reformers will define the fundamental shape of the Russian military that emerges in this decade, regardless of near-term political outcomes and whatever faction rules in Moscow. Even if a highly conservative and nationalistic regime takes power, it will be compelled to deal both with these factors and with the reality of what Russian society (and so the military) have already become.

The "Afgantsy." As the veterans of the "Great Patriotic War" (World War II) pass from the scene, the role of the *afgantsy*, the Afghan War veterans, will grow. Their influence on military and political policy will be characterized mainly by a high sense of patriotism and dedication to the nation, a commitment among many to democratic ideals, a concern for the welfare of servicemen, and—as in the U.S. military in the post-Vietnam era—a strong desire to keep Russia from becoming unnecessarily entangled in military "adventures" leading to "other Afghanistans."³ The *afgantsy* represent an important new phenomenon in Russian politics at the national, regional, and local levels. They are highly politicized, or at least very politically aware, a fact highlighted during the September–October 1993 constitutional crisis. As one example, representatives of the Union of Afghan Veterans, a huge *afgantsy* group, met on 25 September with Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev to express their support for Boris Yeltsin in his struggle with the Russian Supreme Soviet.⁴ After the attack on the Russian White House, Grachev credited *afgantsy* with having assisted the military at a crucial stage of the crisis.⁵

In the future, however, *afgantsy* are likely to play other roles as well. Many will oppose policies that place Russians in harm's way without a clear national purpose and safeguards of some kind. They remember too many needless deaths of comrades in Afghanistan to countenance a steady flow of Russian soldiers to die in lonely, distant places like Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, the Dniestr region of Moldova, Tajikistan, Ingushetia, and elsewhere—unless Moscow can define causes there that are crucial to Russia's security. On the other hand, some *afgantsy* see themselves as a corps of professional veterans who can provide needed military experience when Russia needs it. For example, in August 1993 a group of *afgantsy* volunteers from the Tula region left to serve under contract on the Tajik-Afghan border, which has been the scene of fighting between Russian forces and Tajik-Afghan *mujahidin*.⁶ Their comrades remaining in Russia can be expected to press the authorities either to disengage from some of these struggles or to use sufficient force to resolve them.⁷ These veterans know that the Soviet government lied to them and that future Russian governments could do the same. Collectively they are neither as ignorant nor as passive as their parents' generation, nor are they as submissive and politically powerless as the peasant-conscripts of old. They can be expected to be a significant factor leading the military to become a professional, volunteer force.

Alternative Service. "*Al'ternativnaia sluzhba*" is slowly becoming accepted as a possible solution to Russian force planning problems in the rear services, where recent cutbacks in personnel have apparently been especially severe. Alternative service as a concept was codified in defense legislation in September 1992.⁸ Though it has yet to be fully developed and implemented, it does appear to be a very important policy. Article 4 of the new law on defense stipulates that alternative service will be a form of government service "substituting for military service," primarily for conscripts who object for religious reasons to bearing arms.⁹ One officer, writing favorably about the potential impact of alternative service on the missions of the rear services, observed in March 1992 that "rear service units have already been reduced to such an unthinkable degree that many tasks, which should be fulfilled by soldiers, are being performed by officers and warrant officers. The paradox is that these units are being cut back even more. . . . If this keeps happening, then the rear services generally will not be able to maintain support for combat preparedness at even a minimal level."¹⁰

An alternative service option has much to offer a professional, volunteer military. If it is set up to improve the ability of the rear services to perform their mission, it could be a positive factor overall for morale and unit performance. However, to be attractive, the pay for alternative service must be commensurate with the civilian world, especially in light of the fact that the defense ministry

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proposal stipulates a service time 50 to 100 percent longer than that of regular conscripts.¹¹

Contracts versus Conscripts. Military policy will be strongly affected by the coming demise of the conscription system.¹² Although conscription has been an essential part of the Russian military system since the time of Peter the Great and was retained in the defense law passed in September 1992, its end or at least severe reduction seems inevitable.¹³ The average Russian family is much more aware than its Soviet counterpart of a decade ago of the draft-related problems its sons could face.¹⁴

Implementation of the first phase of a new, partly contractual force began in late 1992.¹⁵ According to Ministry of Defense plans, some 50 percent of both the army and navy are to be contractual by the year 2000.¹⁶ It is hard to believe, however, that such a hybrid can last that long—absent, that is, a major threat to the state, which, Russia being a nuclear power, seems unlikely. There will be growing pressure to make the force all-contractual as soon as economic conditions permit. However, contractual service will have to be well paid if it is to compete with groups hiring Russian mercenaries.¹⁷

A force-wide contract system appears inevitable, barring extraordinary and unforeseen developments. It is already in use among Russian forces in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁸ The positive results will be manifold: an increase in military prestige, professionalism, volunteer spirit, and greater identification (both at the leadership level and among the rank and file) with Western volunteer armies. In any case, as Russia continues to fail to fill its military draft quotas, its conscript system will eventually cease in effect to exist, whatever the desires or timetables of national-level policy makers.

Paramilitary Forces and Cossacks. In February 1993, Viktor Barannikov, then chief of the Russian Security Ministry, denounced the existence in some parts of Russia of what he called “paramilitary structures which can trigger local upheavals.”¹⁹ This charge was leveled at those military personnel who reportedly have links with organized crime and at certain paramilitary elements that may pose problems for the military and interior forces.²⁰

One example of the latter is the Cossack units, which, long ago disbanded as obsolescent, have re-emerged and are being reintroduced into the Russian armed forces.²¹ Some reportedly have been fighting in such conflicts as that between Georgia and Abkhazia.²² However, the Cossacks’ reliability in following orders is questionable. During the 1992 fighting in Moldova, some were involved “in numerous confrontations with local residents, including the ethnic Russians they had come to defend.”²³ Though not all the Cossacks present were implicated, these incidents undoubtedly resurrected images from Russian history: “The

presence of Cossacks in a theater of war often did more harm than good, for they wasted the resources of the countryside, and their reputation for infamy was likely to cling to the army as a whole."²⁴

This reputation continues to be reinforced. A 1993 Moscow newspaper article stated that "sometimes the Cossacks take actions that run counter to the constitution, provoke destabilization, and infringe on the interests of the non-Cossack population."²⁵ It will be difficult to integrate Cossack formations into the Russian armed forces in a way that will support overall unit cohesion and mission accomplishment. They may, however, serve a useful function as forces committed to past traditions, and this is a role that should not be discounted. However, if Moscow desires to integrate Cossack units fully in its force planning, it must first break their autonomy. The challenge will be to reinvigorate some of the Cossacks' traditions while controlling their independent spirit; success seems unlikely, judging by the 1992 Moldovan conflict. On the other hand, Moscow might find it useful to retain Cossack paramilitary units loyal to it but having a deliberately murky relationship to the formal chain of command. Such groups might perform missions that regular forces would be unwilling to do. If an authoritarian regime should come to power, it may view that option favorably.

Russia's Internal Ethnic Regions. The Russian Federation's twenty-one autonomous republics (now called simply "republics") are: Adygea, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Chechenia, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Gorno-Altay, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Karelia, Kakhassia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, North Ossetia, Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan, Tuva, and Udmurtia.²⁶ Each has its unique set of problems and its own special relationship to the Russian Federation. Many of the ethnic problems that faced the USSR now confront Russia itself; Bashkortostan, North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Ingushetia, and Sakha (as well as other parts of Siberia) come especially to mind. Many of these regions have asserted varying degrees of independence from Moscow, and they are likely to continue to do so, including as to whether, and to what extent, they will participate in a Russian Federation force.²⁷ Notwithstanding, the new Russian armed forces must have at least a veneer of being a *vse-rossiiskiy* ("all-Russia") force—that is, a "federative" or "federal" military of "all the Russias," not just ethnic Russians from "Great Russia." Therefore, the former autonomous regions and the various ethnic groups within them must somehow, eventually, be integrated into Russian force planning. It is unknown how much planning (if any) to that end has already occurred.

These are dramas that have yet to play themselves out. Moscow may well compromise, however, in such areas as military participation in order to hold the Federation together. If so, in practical terms, its military will remain

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overwhelmingly Russian in ethnic composition, with token participation by certain republics of the Federation and various non-Russian ethnic groups. Some autonomous republics might establish “national guards” that would have a loose affiliation with the Russian armed forces. In any event, the unclear situation in these regions generally, and the need to anticipate future potential ethnic problems and challenges, will of necessity impose a largely internal focus upon Russia’s force planning and strategy. Keeping Russia together as a unitary state will far outweigh most other strategic concerns short of a threat of a major attack on the nation itself.

Russian Nationalism. This phenomenon has both positive and negative aspects with regard to the military. “Military leaders have attempted to use Russian nationalism as a means of building esprit de corps, a policy that is likely to bring positive results but could have less salutary effects.”²⁸ Russian nationalism alienates many non-Russian citizens of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, it is at the core of what the military will probably become: a primarily *Russian* force defending Russian territory and what might be defined as Russian values. Nationalism will shape the force in various ways. Numerous right-wing extremist groups are vying for the loyalty of Russians—although many of these suffered serious setbacks in the failed October 1993 communist-fascist (“red-brown”) coup attempt, in which they were in league with the former Supreme Soviet.²⁹ An exception was the neo-fascist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, which kept aloof from the struggle between Yeltsin and the parliament. One example of an attempt by Russian nationalist groups to have an impact on the military or military policy arose during the 1992 fighting in Moldova. The ultra-nationalist newspaper *Den’* (The Day) trumpeted that Russian soldiers (Cossacks and others) were fighting and dying in the Dniestr conflict “for Russia” (though the Dniestr region in Moldova is nowhere near Russia).³⁰ Most Russians probably reject the idea of spilling much blood to regain “the Empire,” either Soviet or tsarist. Nevertheless, they are sensitive to the need for protection of Russian minorities living in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, the so-called “near abroad,” of which the Dniester region in Moldova is a prime example. If the Russian nationalist-extremists are seen as being in the forefront of efforts to defend Russians’ rights, there will be greater pressure on the armed forces to legitimize that mission and thereby wrest it from disreputable reactionary elements.

Average Russians of draft age and former servicemen who care deeply about these issues, however much offended by the extremism of Zhirinovskiy and those like him, are likely to be attracted to such “solutions” if Moscow is slow or reluctant to take action. The government may then be compelled to move further to the right to defend its citizens in other CIS countries than it otherwise might

have. Yeltsin, in fact, issued a political trial balloon in February 1993 asking for international and U.N. authority for Russian forces to intervene in "ethnic conflicts" in other countries of the CIS.³¹

In any event, Russian rightists of various stripes will probably have a formative influence on the character of the military, making it more nationalistic than it might otherwise have been and thereby affecting strategy. Though many of their views are extremist, their general notion of upholding the concept of a "Russian nation" will find resonance in the military, regardless of what kind of government rules in Moscow.

"New Structures" and New Regulations. Inherent in the major reorganization of the Russian military now contemplated is the concept of *novye struktury* ("new structures"). It holds that a new military requires new organization—an idea that can be unsettling to traditionalists but could help breathe life into a force becoming smaller and more professional. Over the short term, the concept of "new structures" (which is still only vaguely defined) could be somewhat divisive; but over the longer term, if new military organizations are carefully integrated, it could be a unifying and stabilizing factor.³²

A 24 October 1992 article in *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star) indicated that the new provisional army regulations which took effect on 1 January 1993 "would promote a strengthening of discipline and order and a revival of the best traditions of the Russian Armed Forces."³³ Although the new regulations are temporary (final drafts will not be ready until after 1 March 1995), they appear to go a long way toward removing the "legal vacuum" in which many Russian servicemen have found themselves.³⁴ An important provision of the regulations removes surviving references to the USSR, sets out the duty work-week and "duty time regulation," acknowledges that a commander is no longer responsible for subordinates' crimes if he had no control over or connection to the offenses, and gives regimental commanders authority to terminate new enlisted contracts as a form of punishment.³⁵

An "Armed Forces Regulation Commission" has been set up to deal with suggestions and grievances that arise before March 1995.³⁶ There are problems already. For instance, a December 1992 article in the independent military newspaper *Armiia Rossii* (Army of Russia) lamented the fact that some parts of the new regulations appear to contradict others—"Who prepared these regulations? What kind of minds?"³⁷ In general, the new regulations may be seeking to achieve too much too fast, to solve too many problems at once. On the other hand, institutional tension arising from the implementation of new and untested regulations is natural.

Religion. Religion will likely emerge as an important cohesive factor in the new Russian military. Though Russian Orthodoxy predominates, freedom of religion in

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the military is enshrined in Russian Federation law. As many Russians searched for a new identity in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup, religion found a role in the military in rebuilding a morality that had been destroyed by the communists. Following the demise of mandatory atheistic indoctrination, both the Russian military and the educational establishments opened wide their doors to religious groups, both domestic and foreign.³⁸ The benefits of religious influence in the military will become more permanent if plans for a military chaplaincy are firmly established.³⁹

“Zemliachestvo.” Freely translatable as “a friendly association of people from the same area”—from the Russian *zemlia*, “the earth”—in a military context the term connotes service with people from one’s own region or ethnic group. *Zemliachestvo* could eventually be a positive factor in a new, professional, volunteer Russian military under a contract system. It has strong roots in the rich pre-revolutionary regimental system, wherein territorial units developed a “degree of pride on the part of the members in the regimental history and traditions, [which] gave each regiment a distinctly individual character.”⁴⁰ A sampling of regimental histories reveals a remarkable number of battles fought and medals won over a two-hundred-year period.⁴¹ One Russian author writing recently in the *Military History Journal* speaks favorably about *zemliachestvo* in Peter the Great’s army, asserting that it “was conducive to mutual aid, competitiveness and making for an easier adaptation of recruits to the service. . . . Soldier cooperatives and *zemliachestvo* strengthened solidarity, soldierly fraternity, lessened desertions and completely excluded anything similar to the semi-criminal *dedovshchina* [brutality toward more junior soldiers] of the twentieth century.”⁴²

The Soviet armed forces practiced the opposite of *zemliachestvo*—“extraterritoriality,” which “precluded the development of regional military formations drawn from the local population.”⁴³ The Bolsheviks eventually abrogated the principle of territorially based units.⁴⁴ Part of their purpose was to destroy regional loyalties in the armed forces and to turn them into a training ground for socialism and the so-called “new Soviet man.”

In fact, the extraterritorial principle has been written into the new defense law in connection with the proposed semi-conscript, semi-volunteer system.⁴⁵ However, territoriality and *zemliachestvo* are likely to appear in some form in the new Russian military. While extraterritoriality may be applied to conscripts for the short term, it is possible that contract volunteers will be offered “territorial incentives” (i.e., service within a specific area or unit).

A More Stable Military

There may emerge from the present prolonged crisis a Russian military that is a significantly stabilizing institution for the Russian state. While it is still too

early to say what kind of government will ultimately arise, even should a more authoritarian regime eventually come to power, it will probably find that these fundamental factors preclude the military from responding freely to extreme or destabilizing commands. Further, the events of August 1991 and October 1993 suggested that a new military mentality and loyalty may have emerged. Contrary to the stereotype of a military that was merely the tool of the Communist Party, the actions in 1991 of Soviet military personnel indicated an instinctive loyalty to the people, and the response of the Russian military in 1993 revealed a commitment to law, order, and professionalization.

This new ethos is a loyalty to the nation itself, to *narod*, the people, rather than to one leader or political party. This concept is still taking form but is likely eventually to become deep-rooted and to continue to mold the military despite imperial breakup, "downsizing," constitutional crises, and reorganization. While the present period is a difficult one for the Russian military, that molding process might also be a positive one over time, in much the same way that a large, "fat," noncompetitive corporation may become "leaner" and more competitive as a result of painful but necessary budget cuts.

The Russian minister of defense has spoken candidly about the outlook: the Russian military will be in transition for *at least* ten years.⁴⁶ Only then will the armed forces find their true place in a "reformed Russia"; meanwhile, the military needs "a new change of clothes." The new military doctrine and planned reorganization, Grachev believes, provide the basis for this process, in four ways: by establishing organizational and personnel structures in tune with the times; by switching to state-of-the-art technologies; by introducing new methods of training, operating, and fighting; and by creating a new image for Russian servicemen.⁴⁷

By 1995, the Russian armed forces were scheduled to be reduced to 1.5 million personnel.⁴⁸ However, Minister of Defense Grachev has recently remarked that the 1.5 million figure is too low.⁴⁹ In any event, when reductions occur, it will "be possible to abandon the division of troops among military districts . . . [and to replace them with] four to six Armed Forces strategic commands with a geographic designation."⁵⁰ Then will follow a switch from "army and divisional force structures to a predominantly corps and brigade structure, which will enable the number of combat-ready combined units to be increased."⁵¹

Whatever psychological trauma the military is presently undergoing, these organizational goals do provide specific and concrete direction. Grachev seems clear about the desired end-state of the Russian military and is under no illusions about how long it may take to get there. His path toward reorganization seems clearly marked, at least as far as public pronouncements are concerned, and the idea of a smaller, more professional force does not appear to be a matter of great

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controversy between factions of the right or left. Disagreement centers on how much national trauma must be endured in the process.

Threat Perceptions. Future Russian military strategy is predicated in part on changing threat perceptions. Substantial increases in the apparent threat could overwhelm social and political forces. Altered threat assessments, however, will affect primarily the timing, not the direction, of changes within the Russian military.⁵² Current concerns include, among others, the People's Republic of China, Japan, Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Islamic fundamentalism on Russia's borders.⁵³ The new military doctrine lists the following conditions as possible sources for future conflict: "aspirations of states (or coalitions of states) for world or regional hegemony; the stationing of powerful armed formations near Russia's borders to secure a military-strategic advantage; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; political or economic pressure on, or blackmail of, Russia; violations of the rights of Russian citizens in the former republics of the USSR."⁵⁴ These issues have different dimensions for different domestic policy groups—"democratic-internationalists" (i.e., Westernizers), "conservative-nationalists" (Slavophiles, Eurasianists), or "chauvinists" (communist revanchists and reactionary nationalists).⁵⁵ Concern about ethnic Russians in the "near abroad" is probably at the top of the list of concerns at present.

Nevertheless, none of the actual or perceived threats appears substantial enough to justify grave Russian concern, or at least not enough to cause considerable variations in military strategy even if the domestic political leadership does change. There is no immediate external threat to Russia's territorial integrity or security sufficient to warrant massive mobilization or a whipping-up of the populace for large-scale military action; even if serious border flare-ups should occur, they will probably be localized or of short duration. In any case, the Russian people themselves, after more than seventy years of communist mobilization and indoctrination, are too demoralized to wish to enter into military adventures.

A threat more palpable for Russian defense ministry planners is the one posed to Russian internal stability, namely, the possible dissolution of the Russian Federation itself. Current trends toward independence in some of the former autonomous republics and other regions of the country threaten Federation unity and may require deployments of various magnitudes, at least as shows of force.

Current and Likely Commitments. In assessing Russia's future strategy, it must be kept in mind that Russian forces are today already active in, withdrawing from, or under fire in many parts of the former Soviet Union: North Ossetia, Georgia (Abkhazia, Adzharia, and South Ossetia), Ingushetia, Moldova, the Baltic States, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. This is not a force simply at rest while

“downsizing”; Russian citizens have been attacked, harassed, taken as hostages, or killed in these places. Although these conflicts have received little coverage in the Western press, they are topics of very high interest to the Russian media. Under the heading of regional peacekeeping operations alone—and peacekeeping itself is only one kind of action to which Russian forces are now committed—four different sublevels can be identified. In the view of Susan L. Clark, of the Institute for Defense Analyses, these include peacekeeping under U.N. auspices (Russian forces in former Yugoslavia), under arrangements of the CIS itself (Tajikistan), within the Russian Federation (North Ossetia), and under bilateral arrangements with entities not in the CIS charter (Moldova).⁵⁶ These are commitments already in effect, and they are creating pressures on the military. Thus, even if a more authoritarian Russian regime should soon emerge eager, for example, to increase assistance to Serbia, it probably could not sustain a major expansion of troops there without seriously hampering its ability to deal with existing and potential “near abroad” crises. The latter are far more crucial to Russia’s immediate interests and identity.

Moreover, Russian reformist politicians have not so far been prepared to use overwhelming power to resolve these small “bleeding wounds” on Russia’s periphery. Quite the contrary—force has been limited and often half-hearted. The reasons are manifold: a real desire to avoid bloodshed; a new commitment to diplomacy and to the West; a wish not to be perceived as merely the successors of the communists in repressing an empire; and an inward focus resulting from the economic crisis. All of these aspects play a role and will continue to do so.

However, even if a border skirmish with Ukraine or one of the Baltic states should arise, what possible benefit would Russia find in prolonging it? The negative repercussions would be enormous. Rather, Russia would most likely seek to resolve the issue as quickly and as peacefully as possible (unless, at least, the dispute was economic, in which case antagonisms have often been strong and rancorous). Russia might feel compelled to use limited force on behalf of ethnic Russians in former Soviet republics, if only to demonstrate determination to protect those citizens. However, even these actions would be strategically defensive, not offensives designed to win back territory. In the future, internal Russian Federation problems and potential CIS and U.N. peacekeeping will keep the military fully occupied.

Some of the current operations are both difficult and ill-defined. Such deployments have already evoked widespread concern in the Russian military press. Critics are demanding legal safeguards for Russian military forces deployed to these areas; some denounce the lack of such safeguards as a betrayal of the military, as turning it into a “political pawn.”⁵⁷ “Safeguards” can be broadly defined as legal protections, such as status-of-forces agreements or protections offered under international law. For example, the legal status of a Russian soldier

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serving in Bosnia as a U.N. peacekeeper is different from that of one serving in Abkhazia or Tajikistan.

Deploying forces within Federation territory and around Russia's periphery will accelerate the movement of the military in the direction of a volunteer force. For example, peripheral struggles will be "lose-lose" propositions if they result in extensive casualties among Russian conscripts. Thus, small forces will probably be used for the most part, primarily in hostage rescues and similar campaigns; any spectacular failures will also probably further accelerate the use of professional, well trained, highly disciplined units for such operations.

Internal Political Crises. At one point in the March 1993 constitutional crisis, it was speculated in the Western press that the military might forcibly take sides;⁵⁸ in fact, some parliamentary deputies did want the military to become actively involved. But the Russian armed forces remained emphatically neutral.⁵⁹ Minister of Defense Grachev reaffirmed that position in the September–October 1993 crisis, until the opposition sanctioned violent attacks on the Ostankino television station and the Moscow mayor's office.⁶⁰ Until that moment, the military sought an apolitical, non-intrusive role. When it did move, its action was limited and professional, and, as Grachev has emphasized, was for the "security of the state" and to prevent "the unleashing of civil war in Russia."⁶¹ The military did not attempt to take control of the government; it merely fulfilled the orders of the commander in chief.

While future military involvement in Russian politics cannot be entirely ruled out, the actions of the armed forces during these crises were an indication that their ultimate goal is professionalization, not political control. Grachev and many other defense ministry officials have sought to emphasize this apolitical approach and to discourage political activity in the officer corps regardless of whether officers espouse the right or left.⁶² In this respect at least, history is repeating itself: in 1905, Emperor Nicholas II signed War Department Order No. 804 banning military participation in politics of any kind, even activities that supported the monarchy.⁶³

Along with the drive to keep the military as much as possible out of politics, there is also the issue of transcendent values—matters that are *above* politics. Although within the military there are strongly differing political views, the idea of the nation and the military as institutions over and above the fray has mitigated the prospect of armed conflict either within the military itself or against other sectors of the polity. This is a very significant point. Rather than take up arms, the military has become its own interest group, a fact underscored by the rise of the officers' assemblies and numerous military advocacy organizations.

The military's reluctance to implement its own agenda by force or to take sides in political disputes does not mean that it does not have deep concerns.

Pro-military spokesmen of both the right and left have spoken bitterly of what they see as the betrayal of the military at the hands of politicians.⁶⁴ Desertions have “reached proportions that neither the pre-revolutionary Russian army nor the Soviet army ever saw”; one-third of Russian officers in 1992 were in a “poverty situation”; and housing for tens of thousands of officers and servicemen has been nearly non-existent.⁶⁵ One Strategic Rocket Forces officer observed in late 1992 that it was “simply laughable” that highly skilled specialists having control over nuclear weaponry should receive the equivalent of a mere \$25 per month and have “difficulties in obtaining basic goods. . . . I know all this not by hearsay but because I myself have received such a salary for my labors, and I myself have gone for a long time without having my own place.”⁶⁶

Despite all these problems, however, the Russian military has remained intact. Why? The answer may lie in the growing professionalization of this new Russian force, a process that is going forward notwithstanding, and even in spite of, the military's day-to-day troubles. One Western observer of the post-Soviet scene, Peter Reddaway, claimed in early 1993 that “serious decay” was occurring within the Russian military.⁶⁷ Such a phrase conjures up the image of an institution tottering on the edge of collapse. Moreover, for students of Russian history the word “decay” has ominous implications—the Imperial Army's “decay” on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution helped plunge Russia into civil war. However, the idea of “decay” must be distinguished from “crisis”—the institution of the Russian military is presently in serious difficulty, but it is not about to disintegrate. New values emerging at the core of the Russian military, and traditional ones reemerging, are likely to prove to be more enduring and pervasive than the present extended economic and constitutional crisis.

The new factors examined here reflect those new core values. They are far more valuable for analysis than sensational pronouncements based on stereotypes. The latter can obscure, especially in time of crisis, underlying institutional changes. The Western media during the 1993 constitutional troubles painted a picture of a military that would soon either take sides in a Russian civil war or be used as an instrument of repression by an authoritarian regime. That picture is a stereotype that the West badly needs to discard. While a regime more authoritarian or nationalistic than Yeltsin's could indeed emerge in Russia (one need only look as far as the former Russian vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoy, or Vladimir Zhirinovskiy), the post-Soviet Russian military is not and cannot become again the institution that once served the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The momentum of change and the sweep of history are propelling it in an entirely different direction. The Russian military has by no means shrugged off all the relics of its Soviet past, but the genie is certainly out of the bottle.

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Notes

1. ITAR-Tass, 9 August 1993, quoting Russian Deputy Defense Minister Konstantin Kobets.
 2. In this connection I take a position somewhat different from but not necessarily contradictory to that of my colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Susan Terranova, who recently wrote that the new "military doctrine governs the direction of the armed forces in Russia." (Susan Terranova, Abstract, "Evolving Russian Military Doctrine: Force Structure and Capabilities of the Armed Forces," Naval War College, Advanced Research Project [Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, March 1993], p. ii). Though the new doctrine will provide a "guiding hand," the other factors examined in this study will set the parameters of what is possible and feasible, regardless of doctrinal considerations.
 3. As for democratic ideals, according to discussions by the author in early 1992 with *afgantsy* from various regions in Russia, many are at the forefront of local reform politics, often opposed by elderly communist holdovers.
 4. *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red star), 28 September 1993, p. 1. The chairman of the Union of Afghan Veterans, Aleksandr Kotenov, sought the meeting with Grachev also to dispel the impression that *afgantsy* in general supported the rebel parliament. ("Red Star" is the defense ministry daily.)
 5. "Radio Slavyanka" Program of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Radio Mayak, Moscow, 9 October 1993.
 6. Radio Mayak, Moscow, 1 August 1993. Afghan "armed militants" and Tajik "opposition guerrillas" are fighting the Tajik regime in Dushanbe in a civil war. Russian forces have become involved in peacekeeping operations to protect the Tajik-Afghan border under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States agreement. (ITAR-Tass, Moscow, 4 March 1993, "Official Presents Peacekeeping Operations Documents at UN," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Central Eurasia* (hereafter *FBIS*), 4 March 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-041, p. 13. For background on recent clashes, see ITAR-Tass, Moscow, 8 February 1994, in *FBIS*, 8 February 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-026, p. 49; and Interfax, 12 February 1994, *FBIS*, 14 February 1994, FBIS-SOV-094-030, p. 58.)
 7. Even during the September-October 1993 constitutional crisis, such concerns were voiced in the aforementioned meeting between Union of Afghan Veterans representatives and the Russian Minister of Defense. According to *Krasnaia zvezda*, Grachev sought the Union's assistance in establishing contacts that would help "normalize the situation" in current crises in "Georgia, Abkhazia, Armenia and Azerbaijan." See *Krasnaia zvezda*, 28 September 1993, p. 1.
 8. Article 3, "Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob oborone" [Law of the Russian Federation on defense (hereafter Law on Defense)], in *Voennyi vestnik* (Military herald), No. 11, 1992, p. 3.
 9. *Ibid.*, Article 4 (*Voennyi vestnik*, p. 3).
 10. Lt. Col. N. Eroshovich, "Inogo puti net" (There is no other way), *Tyl vooruzhennykh sil* (Rear of the armed forces), March 1992, p. 12.
 11. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 20 January 1993, p. 1.
 12. Conscription is already in serious trouble. There is continuing "anti-military sentiment among much of the draft-age population." See Stephen Foye, "Rebuilding the Russian Military: Some Problems and Prospects," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL) Research Report, 6 November 1992, p. 51. The commander of the Urals Military District stated in October 1992 that up to 70 percent "of all young men in Russia were [then] avoiding military service." (This percentage could be a combination of both draft evasion and draft deferments.) See also "Military and Security Notes," RFE/RL Research Report, November 1992, p. 60.
 13. For a brief history of conscription see Ellen Jones, *Red Army in Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 33-8.
 14. Can a "zinc-coffin army" attract volunteers in the post-Soviet era? One of the worst hallmarks of the Soviet and Russian military is *dedovshchina* (the "tyranny of the grandfathers"), which involves extreme brutality and bazing of more junior conscripts, sometimes resulting in death. See Douglas J. Brown, "Dedovshchina: Caste Tyranny in the Soviet Armed Forces," *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, March 1992.
- The best known symbol of *dedovshchina* is the closed zinc coffin once used to transport the mutilated remains of Afghan combat fatalities—but also to hide the distinctive marks of death by hazing or personal vengeance at the hand of fellow soldiers. The question is, what place, if any, can *dedovshchina* have in armed forces made up even partly by volunteers? The answer is, little or none. A professional Russian noncommissioned officer corps will probably eventually emerge, replacing the outmoded "elder conscript" system in which the savage *dedovshchina* rituals have been pervasive.
15. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 9 December 1992, p. 1. For readers of Russian, the rules and regulations regarding contracts in the Russian armed forces—as well as a sample contract—are published in *Voennyi vestnik* (Military herald), November 1993, pp. 7-15.

16. The initial implementation of the contract system ("Phase One") was to have cost some 6 billion rubles. See *ITAR-Tass*, 3 November 1992, in *FBIS*, 3 November 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-213, p. 43.

17. The prospect of the contractual service having to compete with mercenary employers is illustrated by a soon-to-be discharged Mi-24 helicopter pilot quoted as saying that one of his reasons for considering mercenary service is that his family now lives in a "stinking 12-square-meter rat-infested room." *Armiia Rossii* (Army of Russia), November 1992, p. 2, in *FBIS*, 9 December 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-237, p. 12.

18. Susan L. Clark, "Russia in a Peacekeeping Role," Draft Paper (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses), p. 1. The paper forms part of a book, *Emerging Security Doctrine of the New Russia*, forthcoming from the U.S. Institute of Peace.

19. Viktor Barannikov, "Security Ministry Sounds the Alarm: Russia Is Ringing with Crime and Espionage," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (The independent newspaper), 12 February 1993, in *Federal News Service—Kremlin Package*, 16 February 1993.

20. For links to organized crime, see, generally, Mark Galeotti, "Red Mafias and National Security," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1993.

21. According to a report in the newspaper *Kommersant* (Businessman) of Moscow, Boris Yeltsin signed an edict in March 1993 directing that the major Russian ministries "approve a list of Cossack units and set up departments for Cossack affairs at the ministries' staff. The president also tasked the Russian government with drawing up a regulation on land relations with the Cossacks who serve in the armed forces. . . ." *Kommersant*, 14 August 1993, p. 5, in *FBIS*, 14 August 1993.

For the history of Cossack forces see Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks: Five Centuries of Turbulent Life on the Russian Steppes* (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 1970).

22. *Kuranty* (Chimes), Moscow, 3 August 1993, p. 3.

23. Stephen R. Bowers, "The Moldovan Military," chapter of manuscript book, *The New Russian Armed Forces*. Bowers cites the following sources: *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 31 March 1992, p. 2; *Rompres* (Bucharest), 24 June 1992; and *Trud* (Moscow), 30 June 1992.

24. Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700-1800* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 163.

25. *Kommersant* (Moscow), 14 August 1993, p. 5, in *FBIS*, 14 August 1993.

26. These twenty-one republics vary greatly in size, population, and in the percentage of ethnic Russians who live on their territory. For example, in the 1989 census, Dagestan had a population only 9.2 percent of which was made up of ethnic Russians, while Adygea had 68 percent. (L.V. Smirnyagin, "On the Right of Nations to Privileged Statehood. A Cradle for Each Nation?", *Segodnia* (Today), 22 June 1993, p. 3). The republics extend from tiny Khabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia on the Georgian border to the huge Republic of Sakha (formerly Yakutia) in Siberia, which is nearly as large as Europe. An autonomous republic or autonomous *oblast'* (region) in the former Soviet Union was a territorial unit, within a republic, that had its own national group. During the Soviet period, an autonomous republic had its own parliament and miniature government similar to that of an actual republic, while an autonomous *oblast'* did not; both, however, could send deputies to the former Soviet of Nationalities. See Andrew Wilson and Nina Bachkatov, *Russia and the Commonwealth, A to Z* (New York: Harper, 1992), pp. 21, 188-9. At the time of the dissolution of the USSR, Russia had sixteen autonomous republics on its territory. Four autonomous *oblast'*s (Adygea, Gorno-Altay, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) were later upgraded to the status of autonomous republics. Chechen-Ingushetia has since split into two republics, Chechnya and Ingushetia, making twenty-one. In more recent political usage, the word "autonomous" has dropped off, and these entities are now referred to as simply "republics" of the Russian Federation. Under the new Russian constitution adopted in December 1993, a republic in the Federation has its own constitution and legislation, while an autonomous *oblast'* or autonomous *okrug* (district) has its own charter and legislation. (Article 5 [2] of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, *Rossiyskaia gazeta*, 10 November 1993, pp. 34-6.) Under the new federal structure, the country is now divided into republics, *krais*, *oblast'*s, cities of federal significance, autonomous *oblast'*s, and autonomous *okrugs* (Articles 65 and 66). There is only one autonomous *oblast'* left, the Jewish Autonomous *Oblast'*, otherwise known as Birobidzhan, on the Chinese border. It is the product of a failed communist experiment that sought to persuade large numbers of Soviet Jews to settle that far-off region instead of seeking to emigrate to Palestine.

27. For example, in late 1993 the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet examined "the problem of Tatar citizens serving in the Russian army." *Kommersant*, 25 November 1993, p. 4.

28. Foye, p. 51.

29. *Den'* has billed itself as the "spiritual opposition" to the reformers. It was widely distributed on Moscow streets and in subways until banned in the wake of the October 1993 coup attempt. *Den'* actively supported many of the anti-Yeltsin rallies that occurred in the city and which, curiously enough, usually included both disaffected "reds" (communists) and "browns" (fascists). On the other hand, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy of the Liberal Democratic Party has been rejected by *Den'* and some other Russian nationalist groups. Zhirinovskiy is virulently anti-American and during the Gulf War organized a "force" of a few Russian volunteers to go to

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Iraq to support Saddam Hussein. Although Zhirinovskiy's positions are viewed as extremist even by many other Russian nationalists; nevertheless his rhetoric sometimes finds its mark. Zhirinovskiy's extremism, however, does make it "safer" for some Russian nationalists to express opinions which might be viewed as "beyond the pale" if Zhirinovskiy did not exist to outdo them.

[Editor's note: It will be useful for readers to know—as reflecting favorably on this analysis—that in an October 1993 draft of this article the author drew specific attention to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (then unknown to the general Western public) as exemplifying the forces of Russian neo-fascist nationalism, and also to the nature of his appeal.]

30. "Russkiye na Dniestre srazhaiutsia za Rossiiu" (Russians on the Dniestr are battling for Russia), *Den'* (The day), 12–8 April 1992, p. 1.

When the Soviet republic of Moldavia—which, as a whole, is ethnically Romanian—declared its independence from the USSR, the local majority of ethnic Russians living east of the Dniestr River began a violent campaign to break away, in turn, from the new state. Moldova, as it is now called, is geographically separated from the Russian Federation by Ukraine.

31. Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin Suggests Russian Regional Role," *The New York Times*, 1 March 1993.

32. *Armiia* (The army), July 1992. In February 1994, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, reaffirmed that "all forms of the armed forces of Russia without exception will be subjected to internal reorganization aimed at reducing them in the near future." ITAR-Tass, Moscow, 28 February 1994, *FBIS*, 1 March 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-040, p. 32.

33. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 24 October 1992, p. 1, in *Joint Publications Research Service* (hereafter *JPRS*), 25 November 1992, JPRS-UMA-92-042, pp. 1–2.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 24 October 1992, p. 1.

36. *Ibid.*

37. S. Kirovskiy, "Obraz zhizni po prikazu" ("A way of life according to the order"), *Armiia Rossii* (Army of Russia), no. 2, 1992, p. 10.

38. For example, Russian military leader Major General Nikolai Stoloyarov recently "had 300,000 Bibles printed and distributed to Russian military officers." (*Russia Link*, Report of the Christian College Coalition "Russian Initiative," Fall 1993, Washington, D.C., p. 5.)

39. Discussions of the author in 1992 in Washington and Moscow with both Russian and American representatives involved in these plans.

40. A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Introduction to M. Lyons, *The Russian Imperial Army: A Bibliography of Regimental Histories and Related Works* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1968), p. xiv.

41. For an example, V.I. Genishta and A.T. Borisevich, eds., *Istoriia 30-ogo Dragoonskogo Ingermanlandskogo Polka, 1704–1904* (History of the 30th Dragoons Ingermanland Regiment, 1704–1904), Part I (St. Petersburg: "Berezhlivost'," 1904).

42. V.A. Artamanov, "Petr I i reguliarniia armiia" (Peter I and the regular army), *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Military history journal), no. 9, 1992, p. 5.

43. Foye, p. 53.

44. See Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 3; and Scott R. McMichael, "National Formations of the Red Army, 1918–1938," *Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, December 1990, pp. 611–44. McMichael discusses how the communists first used and then discarded the concept of territorial forces, or "national formations." They eventually came to the conclusion that the national formations "posed a threat to the Soviet regime. . . . The Soviet High Command also exercised control of the national units by invoking the principle of extra-territoriality, which held that any Soviet citizen could be recruited to join and fight with units on any part of the front, not just in one's home republic" (pp. 627–9). See also in the same issue, "Documents, On the Territorial-Militia System, 1925–1935," pp. 652–700.

45. Law On Defense, Article 12, p. 7.

46. Pavel Grachev, "Minister's Position," *Rossiyskie vesti* (Russian herald), 4 January 1993, p. 4, in *FBIS*, 6 January 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-003, p. 24.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

49. Minister of Defense Grachev stated in February 1994 that a "Russian army capable of carrying out all the tasks allotted to it should number 2–2.1 million." He claimed that the figure of 1.5 million by 1995 set out in the defense law is insufficient to guarantee Russia's security. (ITAR-Tass, 4 February 1994, *FBIS*, 7 February 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-025, p. 32). On 7 February, Grachev asserted that the two-million mark was "the final figure." (Moscow, Interfax, 7 February 1994, in *FBIS*, 8 February 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-026, p. 30).

50. Grachev, "Minister's Position."

51. *Ibid.*

52. As to the prospects for a changed threat assessment, the former Russian ambassador to the U.S., Vladimir Lukin, stated that there is an element within the Russian foreign policy-making establishment which fears that a "new encirclement" against Russia is forming. See Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1992, pp. 60–1.

53. *Ibid.* It is worth noting how dramatically threat perceptions have changed since the fall of the Soviet Union. For comparative purposes, see the 1991 study by David Glantz, *Soviet Military Strategy in the 1990s: Alternative Futures* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991), pp. 9–12; Glantz examines the "threat variants" the former Soviet Union faced, or perceived that it faced, just three years ago.

54. Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFE/RL, v. 1, no. 40, 9 October 1992, p. 45.

55. See Lukin, pp. 65–6.

56. Clark, p. 1.

57. Aleksandr Zhilin, "Skol'ko mozhno predavat' armiiu!?" (How much more can they betray the army?), *Armiia Rossii* (Army of Russia), December 1992, p. 3. Probably in response to this sort of criticism, First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin has tried to put a positive political "spin" on the problem. Kokoshin stated in a 6 January 1993 interview on Russian television that Russian and CIS military personnel serving in peacekeeping operations in Moldova and South Ossetia are "professionals who . . . have long known how difficult it is to organize and provide the back-up for these operations and how much courage and endurance they require from those officers and soldiers directly involved in them." (Moscow, Russian Television, 6 January 1993, FBIS, 7 January 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-004, p. 27).

That language will not be sufficient to placate Zhilin or other critics of official policy for long. The issues of Russian soldiers' legal rights abroad will have to be resolved, probably sooner rather than later.

58. Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin and Rivals Are in a Standoff in Power Struggle," *The New York Times*, 24 March 1993, p. 1. "The dispute," observes Schmemmann, "at least for the moment, was confined to words and arguments. Despite considerable fear over the weekend here and abroad that the Russian military and security forces might somehow become involved, there was no sign that they had been drawn into the crisis."

59. Minister of Defense Grachev said at the time that "the army minds its own business." See "Legislators Clash with Yeltsin," *The New York Times*, 22 March 1993, p. A8.

60. According to Radio Rossii, on 1 October 1993, two days before the attacks, Grachev "stressed . . . that the Army will not take part in a political confrontation. On the contrary, the Russian Army and Fleet are controllable under these extreme circumstances as never before."

61. Grachev also pointed out that "on October 3, having discussed at the [Military] Collegium the situation that had been created and after talking to and consulting district and naval commanders, we concluded unequivocally that action to organize a civil war had begun. People came to the conclusion . . . that the Army could no longer remain silent. My views were also reported to the President, the Commander-in-Chief. . . . Then, in order to prevent the unleashing of the carnage of civil war, we decided to use some of the sub-units of the armed forces in Moscow. . . . Only a small number of troops were brought in, 1,300 in total. . . . Now I can say in all confidence that over the past few days the Army has indeed become more united, firm and manageable. That is the main thing. This is a guarantee of a united, democratic, and, we believe, in the future, a mighty and prosperous Russia." Interview with Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, "Radio Slavyanka" Program of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Radio Mayak, Moscow, 9 October 1993.

62. The former commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, viewed this potential problem with some concern long before the March 1993 crisis. In April 1992 he told the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies that "the question is, should a military man be a deputy at all? I think not. . . . In the overwhelming majority of civilized states such a practice does not exist, just as there is no palpable advantage to the armed forces from having deputies who are servicemen. If a serviceman wants to become a deputy, he should leave the armed forces and become a politician." Radio Rossii, 7 April 1992. For his part, Pavel Grachev also has been very concerned about the impact of politics on the military through the independent officers' assemblies, which have been very powerful during this transition period. He has taken steps to ban them above the regimental level. (*Kuranty*, 20 May 1992, p. 1.) In addition, the new law on defense includes a provision to ban "political campaigns of any kind, including election campaigns, on Armed Forces military unit, combined unit, or establishment compounds." (*Rossiyskie vesti*, 29 October 1992, p. 2, FBIS, 2 November 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-212, p. 44.) The independent military press and some representatives of the officers' assemblies view Grachev's actions in trying to limit, control, or co-opt the assemblies as possibly violating the new Russian constitution. (Kirovskiy, p. 10.)

63. See William C. Fuller, Jr., "The Officers and Politics, 1906–1913," *Civil-Military Relations in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 192–4, 209–11. However, like many of their counterparts in the officers' assembly movement today, some officers in the Imperial Russian Army were

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outraged by the tsar's order. They asserted that it was "impossible and undesirable to isolate the officer corps from politics." (Fuller, citing *Voennyi golos*, 9 January 1906.)

64. One military hard-liner, writing in *Pravda* in late 1992, claimed that Russian officers "have nothing more to lose, having already reached their limit." (Lt. Col. Sergei Rodinov, "The Soviet Army: The Tragedy of Its Collapse," *Pravda*, 5 December 1992, pp. 1-2.)

On the other hand, even those who support strong military reforms are disturbed by what they view as "corrupt politicians." The head of the Coordinating Council of the Officers' Assemblies, Rear Admiral Aleksandr Mochaikin, states that "everyone who feels like it wipes their feet with our army as with a floor-cloth." He is bitter that Russian military forces are being used in conflicts where, he says, "our boys are not provided with any sort of laws providing for their self-defense." As a result, "Russian soldiers and officers now cannot understand who they are supposed to be: representatives of the armed forces of their nation with full legal rights, or the hostages of corrupt politicians. . . ." Editorialist Aleksandr Zhilin wants Russian soldiers who serve outside Russia to have the full force of the Russian state behind them. (Zhilin, p. 3.)

65. For desertions, see ITAR-Tass, 31 October 1992, in *FBIS*, 3 November 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-213, p. 45; for poverty, *Voennyi vestnik* (Military herald), September 1992, p. 9. As for housing, the deputy chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Major General D. Tarmak, observed in 1992 that there were "201,000 families of servicemen in Russia in need of housing, 121,900 of which [do] not have apartments. . . . We calculate that there [will] be 130,000-140,000 servicemen without a roof over their head by the beginning of the year [1993]." *Krasnaia zvezda*, 18 August 1992, in *Central Eurasia: Military Affairs*, 26 August 1992, JPRS-UMA-92-032, p. 29.

66. Major A. V. Duganov, "The Strategic Rocket Forces of Russia: Serving the Cause of Peace," Unpublished manuscript, October 1992. Manuscript obtained through correspondence between Major Duganov and American authors writing a chapter for an unpublished book on the new Russian armed forces.

67. Peter Reddaway, "Russia Comes Apart" (Op-Ed), *The New York Times*, 10 January 1993, p. 23.

Ψ

This Issue's Cover

ARA *Libertad* was launched in 1956 at the Rio Santiago Naval Shipyard at La Plata, Argentina, and was commissioned into the Argentine Navy in 1963. Her 1966 world speed record involved a run from Cape Race to the English Channel in eight days, twelve hours. She has also won, several times, the Sail Training Association's "Boston Teapot" trophy, awarded each year to the vessel making good the longest day's run under sail with at least half of its crew in training.

Ship-rigged and steel-hulled, the vessel is 340 feet long overall and forty-five in beam, draws almost twenty-one feet, and displaces 3,765 tons at full load. Two diesel engines driving two shafts give a maximum speed of 13.5 knots under power. *Libertad* operates from the Argentine Naval Academy at Buenos Aires, carries twenty-four officers and 187 petty officers and seamen, and can embark 150 midshipmen.

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