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## King George V Class Battleships

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(CV 13) on 13 October 1944. In fact, that glancing flight-deck strike was by a damaged Betty medium bomber; Arima flew his intended suicide mission, in a dive bomber, on 15 October.

Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki is a fascinating character who left in his diary a historical gem. Sadly, this book does neither the man nor his legacy justice.

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Tarrant, V.E. *King George V Class Battleships*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1991. 288 pp. \$39.95

*King George V Class Battleships* is an attempt to marry a popularly written operational history with comprehensive photographic coverage and with a design and development analysis based on archival research. The result is essentially successful. Victor Tarrant has produced a book that will be of general interest to historians and enthusiasts of the Second World War at sea and, perhaps just as important, to those who study the impact of strategic and financial policy upon warship design. Tarrant's analysis of the *King George V* class (known as the *KGVs*) in action leads logically to a discussion of the design deficiencies that were revealed in each unit. Particular emphasis is given to the less-than-successful quadruple fourteen-inch turrets, an attempt to beat the 35,000-ton treaty limit by mounting as many weapons as possible—an attempt that was defeated by the over-complicated machinery the installations required. Tarrant also says much, although his analysis is less

sophisticated in this area, about engineering, endurance, and habitability limitations. The *Prince of Wales* proved grievously unprepared for tropical service during her ill fated 1941 deployment to the Far East, particularly by comparison with contemporary American designs.

Tarrant's work suggests questions about the quality of ship and engineering design in the Royal Navy between 1919 and 1939, questions which are now also being raised elsewhere. It is likely that historians will come to agree that the Royal Navy was rather better prepared in its intended tactics for a war with Japan than it was in other areas. Tarrant makes it quite apparent that despite the years of preparation for the "Main Fleet to Singapore" strategy, the design implications were in no way addressed in the *KGVs*. The irony—perhaps a result of the widely differing approaches to officer training and careers—is that there is equal evidence, some of which is apparent in this book, that the United States Navy's performance was quite the reverse. Even in Arctic operations, the much greater endurance of USS *Washington*, a design developed under similar (though perhaps less strictly observed) constraints, came as an unpleasant surprise to the commander in chief of the Home Fleet. The Royal Navy would learn a lot more about U.S. naval engineering in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945.

The illustrations in the book are generally well chosen, although there are a few errors in the captions. It would have been useful had a few more postwar photographs been included, together with more

narrative concerning the employment of the ships of the class in their short, semiactive postwar lives. These are, however, minor criticisms. Tarrant's work is, as Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach notes in his foreword, "a balanced work of absorbing interest, technical accuracy and which is highly readable." *King George V Class Battleships* says little that will be wholly new to the deep specialist, but it is a lively and sensible account that will satisfy many tastes.

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Royster, Charles. *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans*. New York: Knopf, 1991. 523pp. \$30

This well written book is a dual biography as well as a history of the Civil War and its effect on American society. With a biography of Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and William T. Sherman, Royster shows that the military origins of the destructive nature of the Civil War lay with both armies. This argument stands in contrast to that of historians who contend that while the North sought victory through a destructive and brutal strategy of exhaustion, the South strove to validate its independence through maneuver and elegant, decisive battles. It is by adding an assessment of the third party, the American people, that Royster's work makes its most unique contribution.

The author argues for the existence of a relationship between generals like Jackson and Sherman and the people, whereby public opinion directly contributed to the escalating level of violence.

Royster uses the relationship between Jackson and the civilian populace of both sides to prove that the seeds of a destructive war were present from the very beginning. The author then contends that the public's desire to share vicariously the experience of war combined with Sherman's growing realization that the South's will had to be destroyed through attacks on its resources and population. The net effect was to bring "soldiers and civilians together in joint determination to make a successful society by force—[this] became the destructive war."

One of the book's greatest strengths is Royster's ability to portray the burning of Columbia, South Carolina, and the near-hopeless Federal assault up Kennesaw Mountain. The author asserts that the American people sought to live the war through their soldiers' experiences in order to understand what the war meant for their country. It appears that Royster intends for us to live the war vicariously too, through startlingly clear images. In making his case, Royster offers us proofs of historical relationships between American society and its armed forces that are of use to both Civil War historians and the national security community.

Perhaps the author's most provocative argument begins with the assertion that the public's desire to share the war with its soldiers did not extend to the war's confusion, horror, pain, and