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Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century

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Angelo Codevilla

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final section on "Associated Underwater Warfare Systems" discusses ancillary technology considerations, such as acoustic analysis, hydrographic surveys, acoustic ranges, training, and simulation.

The conclusion is an extensive series of tables, which can serve as points of departure and reference. There is a complete sonar listing by country, designation, description, and manufacturer; a torpedo table with characteristics including warhead, type of guidance, speed, and range; mines and depth charges, with information similar to the sonar table; and, similarly listed, acoustic and electronic countermeasures. Next is a contractor's table, which is of considerable value to those entering the field, complete with addresses, telephone, and fax numbers. The last table is a listing of all manufacturers mentioned, with page numbers for their respective products. Finally, there is a comprehensive list of all equipment covered in the book—an impressive number of entries.

Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, a breakoff from *Jane's Weapons Systems*, is a good unclassified summary of much of the world's underwater technology. It does not have it all, but nothing compares at this price. It is ideal for those entering the field, and it makes an excellent reference. The closest publication to it in the U.S. is *World Naval Weapons Systems*, published by the Naval Institute Press, which, with its 1993 supplement, is less expensive and, in the same warfare area, less complete.

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Codevilla, Angelo. *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century.* New York: The Free Press, 1992. 491pp. $24.95

Angelo Codevilla's book, *Informing Statecraft*, should be required reading for policy makers, military commanders, and all intelligence professionals. Codevilla has produced a very readable, informative work on the intelligence business, intended to enlighten and guide the restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community for the twenty-first century. He begins his preface by stating that conflict is an "ineradicable part of international affairs. Knowledge of friends and enemies can be decisive in conflict. In statecraft such knowledge is called 'intelligence.'" This simple opening sets the tone for his book, which is a back-to-basics approach that examines all aspects of intelligence, particularly the areas of collection, counterintelligence, covert action, and research and analysis. He discusses successes and failures, draws on lessons learned from history, and then, in the end, offers some principles to use as a basis for fixing the "system."

Codevilla's primary aim is to remove intelligence from the "grip of the bureaucrat." He charges that the bureaucratization of intelligence has largely contributed to the inability of the United States to respond to crises, and he also claims that bureaucrats often view intelligence largely in terms of how it benefits their agency.

Codevilla is an academic, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, California. Although

he defines himself as an outsider to government, his work has often placed him on the inside. He served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy (both at sea and at Fleet Intelligence Center, Atlantic) before returning to civilian life to pursue his doctorate. He then taught international conflict and political philosophy. During this period he continued to serve in the Naval Reserve, receiving training in counterintelligence investigations and counterinsurgency. Codevilla's first civilian intelligence assignment was as an analyst in the Bureau for Intelligence and Research in the U.S. Foreign Service. He was later selected to the staff of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, serving as a personal representative to Republican Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming. In 1985 Codevilla returned to academic life, but he still remains involved in intelligence issues.

Codevilla, therefore, comes to the task as a credible source. He does not show any bias toward a particular agency or program; indeed, no agency escapes his stinging criticism. The flaw in this approach is that in his zeal to expose the dirty little secrets of the intelligence community, he sometimes comes across as a religious crusader with a mission. (Occasionally, the reader is left wondering if he is trying to avenge old scores.) There are no "leaks" here (if you're concerned that this is another example of U.S. classified information being compromised); in fact at times there appear to be no new revelations. Do not be put off by this, however. He does highlight several areas that most

people are not regularly privy to and adds freshness to the more familiar tales.

The core of the book is Part II, in which Codevilla issues a scathing indictment of the intelligence community's lock-step way of doing business and describes failures of the most embarrassing kind. While reading of U.S. bumbling in areas of sensitive diplomacy, this reviewer was alternately appalled and dismayed. Chapter Three, on "spying," covers both human and technical collection. He focuses on the CIA, discussing its organization, its training apparatus, and how the agency recruits and "runs" agents. Codevilla worries that the young case officers currently being recruited, intended to be the backbone of the force in the 1990s, will be ill prepared to handle the unique intelligence problems posed by the Third World. He views these new recruits as representing the upper-middle-class, white "Everyman" who has not studied any foreign cultures or languages and is certainly not a person who can easily initiate a conversation with a farmer in rural Colombia. When discussing technical collection, he is not as harsh. Yet, while impressed with some U.S. capabilities, he believes that high-technology "collectors" are not being modified as quickly as the technology they are collecting against. (Although, in the post–Cold War world, as the United States shifts more of its technical collection away from the former Soviet Union and toward the Third World, one may wonder if this criticism is still valid.)

Chapter Five deals with research and analysis; here, the author identifies bureaucratic tendencies that he claims are

characteristic of all agencies—bridging gaps in data with personal opinion, taking into account only what can be formally accounted for or identified, and dealing with uncertainty by using what you know about your own side to make up for what you do not know about the other.

He also states that national-level intelligence products are guilty of "aggressive ignorance," that is, ignorance of basic facts coupled with a lack of curiosity. Finally, Codevilla charges the policymakers with the responsibility of stressing integrity in the analysis process, even if it tells them what they do not want to hear.

In Part III, Codevilla recommends fixes for intelligence problems and makes suggestions for restructuring for the 1990s. Just when the reader has lost all hope for the intelligence community, he is assured that the system can be fixed and made worthy of the superpower-type policies it must support. Codevilla brings the reader back to the fundamentals and offers basic guidelines for research and analysis, collection, counterintelligence, and covert action.

All in all, Codevilla's book is one of solid scholarship. I can find fault in only one regard—on occasion he shows his political bias and makes sweeping generalizations. In a discussion of CIA involvement in South Vietnam, he states that the "liberals in America," when in charge of "government at any level," are likely to hire "likeminded folk and exclude others." Surely, most readers would agree that liberals and conservatives alike are guilty of that—that's politics. He expresses utter disapproval of the McNamara era by saying that where military officers before McNamara were the type to get the job done first and discuss it later, all since McNamara have been reduced to systems analysts. The Colin Powells, William Crowes, Norman Schwarzkopfs, and James Stockdales probably would take issue with that. Regardless of political persuasion, once such a bias emerges, readers feel a vague unease as to whether they are getting the "straight scoop" elsewhere in the work. Although minor, this fault should have been caught in the editing process.

Overall, Codevilla's *Informing Statecraft* is an excellent work. It reads like a novel, yet it is sure to become one of the most useful reference books in the libraries of anyone who works with or benefits from intelligence. I will return to it again and again. Read it at your first opportunity.

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Kennedy, William V. *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 167pp. $45

Few in the military consider reporters qualified to cover military affairs. Though a reporter for the past seventeen years, William Kennedy shares that view. In *The Military and the Media*, Kennedy argues that the press does not invest enough in the defense beat for accurate assessment of military affairs. Reporters, he says, "begin the Pentagon assignment innocent of any prior contact with or instruction about the