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"Both Swords and Plowshares: Military Roles in the 1990s" and "The U.S. Military: Ready for the New World Order?"

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The author recommends drastic changes to Pentagon organization, significantly reducing civilian defense agencies and turning the Joint Chiefs into a general staff. This reviewer, for one, remains unconvinced that this is necessary and fears the impact that Odom's recommendations would have on civilian control of the military. Also, his discussion of the industrial base is rather cursory; he is more successful at identifying problems than solutions.

This work is most effective in broadening the defense debate and putting military issues in a larger context. In this respect it is a welcome addition to the literature. For the Navy and the other sea services, however, it should be a call to action. It is a sign that we still have not done enough to educate and convince the defense community about the real and lasting role of naval forces in both peace and war, of the importance of freedom of the seas, and of the significant role naval forces will have in shaping the world's future.

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Miller, Paul David. *Both Swords and Plowshares: Military Roles in the 1990s*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1992. 58pp. \$7.50

Peters, John E. *The U.S. Military: Ready for the New World Order?* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. 176pp. \$49.95

Both Swords and Plowshares was derived from Admiral Paul David Miller's

presentation at the "Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy" conference organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The title page reminds us that Paul Miller is Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and, in the Nato structure, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and it contains no disclaimer. The book is a high-level vision of the future.

Miller's major messages are that America's basic national interests, objectives, and leadership role have not changed; that elements of our national power, including military, can be used to shape the future; that in building a consensus on a new national security strategy, the military must be proactive and involve all interested parties, including the American public; that core competencies, deterrence, crisis response, and war fighting should form the basis for programming American general forces; and that "jointness is the name of the game." Free from service parochialism, the book is evidence that Goldwater-Nichols is working at the higher levels of military leadership.

This work is a welcome addition to the professional's bookshelf. As more serving naval officers make such public contributions, the debate over the emerging national security, military strategy, and naval doctrine will be strengthened. This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees with the author that "we now have the rare chance—a window of opportunity that opens only once in two or three generations—to

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restructure our military forces fundamentally.”

The author of the second book under review is also an active-duty officer, but one of vastly different seniority and background. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Peters, U.S. Army, is a published author who has substantially cut down his 1990 doctoral dissertation in *The U.S. Military: Ready for the New World Order?* This thoroughly documented work clearly establishes Peters's credentials to enter the debate as a serious contender with his own views on how to restructure fundamentally our military forces.

Peters first examines the concerns that make change in the military probable and necessary: the new international security environment, limits on the deterrence of subconventional war, emerging threats, the impact of technology, the budget, arms control, and domestic attitudes towards defense. After examining these elements, he concludes that the redirection of the budget away from defense will affect military programming more than any other factor. Peters might have concluded that the emerging post-Cold War national security strategy is in fact budget-driven, rather than stuck to the alternative paradigms of goal-oriented (active) or threat-based (reactive) strategies.

This reviewer agrees with Peters that in the absence of the Cold War, future crises will not automatically solicit urgent or specifically military responses from the United States and that a fire brigade-type “central reserve of forces” can largely substitute for forward-based combat-capable forces.

Peters's conclusion that the U.S. should focus more attention on the Asia-Pacific region is refreshing, and unusual for a serving Army officer.

He includes four illustrative case studies to help describe the Department of Defense's deliberate program planning process. His assessment is that the existing system “seems marginal at best” and “that the current strategic planning process is unlikely to produce the optimal force structure” that the nation requires for the future. Peters recommends a small professional National Defense Staff and a new strategic planning system, as well as a force structure that has an active army smaller than Les Aspin's “C” force but a reserve component that exceeds George Bush's Base Force. (Miller, however, supports the ongoing military reform efforts, which are not reflected in *The U.S. Military*.)

Whereas *Both Swords and Plowshares* was updated to reflect the rise in Bill Clinton's fortunes in November 1992, John Peters was probably too busy as a working action officer to do more than give a modest updating (threats and Desert Storm) to research that was largely completed in early 1990. Unfortunately this means that *The U.S. Military* does not reflect the Bush speech at Aspen; the 1991 and 1993 *National Security Strategy of the United States*; the 1991 Nato “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept”; the 1992 *National Military Strategy of the United States*; the 1992 *New York Times* and *Washington Post* leaks of the post-Cold War Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) scenarios; Representative Les Aspin's 1992 “An Approach to Sizing

American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era"; and a host of primary and secondary sources describing the 1990–1991 defense review that resulted in the major changes Peters feared would never be made.

The U.S. Military is really a book about the United States Army. But in spite of its emphasis on Army matters, Peters does manage to present an objective case and even to gore the ox of the Army Corps of Engineers by suggesting that "such functions may be better performed by the U.S. Department of the Interior or by private enterprise." On the other hand, his original dissertation recommended an Army Contingency Corps of five divisions in the continental United States, which is increased to seven in the book.

Neither book devotes serious attention to offensive or defensive strategic nuclear forces. In Miller's case this is understandable, given the purpose of the original conference presentation. However, in the case of *The U.S. Military*, it exemplifies the separation of nuclear and general strategic planning typical of the armed forces—a bifurcation that this reviewer disagrees with strongly. Neither does either work truly address the Bush administration's redefinition of overseas presence (to include virtually anything) or the implication of the fact that reduction in forces requires host-nation support and alliances or coalitions at the operational level of warfare. It is not surprising, however, that the authors pay serious attention to reconstitution against a "resurgent-emergent global threat."

Both books advocate a particular future rather than deal with the regionally focused defense strategy first defined by George Bush and later modified by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. By failing to rework his initial research and address the development of the Bush strategy, Peters lost the opportunity to revise his overly pessimistic view of the strategic planning process. Had he done so, he would have had to conclude that the "system" had devised an "off-line" way to produce a radically new military strategy—one fairly in line with what he recommended.

Both books are valuable contributions to the literature and serve to document the depth of the ongoing debate. Neither is the last word on the subject, but both are welcome.

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Rosati, Jerel A. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*. Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993. 621p. (No price given)

This volume by Jerel Rosati, a former research associate in the Congressional Research Service and currently associate professor of government at the University of South Carolina, is an ambitious undertaking. He cites four goals in the preface: "to be comprehensive in topical coverage, to address central themes in U.S. foreign policy, to provide a strong sense for the actual workings of politics, and to be accessible and interesting to the reader." The author succeeds in all but one; he falls