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## The Soviet Military and the Future

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While inherently valuable as one of the few authoritative works on the subject, the book suffers from a number of flaws and constraints. Its methodology proves unsatisfactory in its simplistic assessment of the contribution of intelligence to the overall process, as being either positive or negative during each phase. Also, the few maps prove wholly inadequate, there are no supporting tables of organization or orders of battle, and careful editing might have eliminated considerable repetition. Further, a number of interesting issues simply lie beyond Glantz's ken. Those seeking a definitive explanation of the strategic intelligence failure of June 1941 must await revelations yet to come from Moscow. Little information is provided on scientific and technological aspects of Red Army intelligence collection and processing or on the organization of military intelligence functions at the center (i.e., in Moscow). Glantz's sources also preclude either a comprehensive discussion of the value of Ultra intelligence or speculation on Soviet code-breaking efforts. Readers will want to consult other sources, notably F.H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Volume 2, (London:HMSO, 1981) to understand how little we know of these aspects.

In the final analysis, this book does not entirely stand on its own merits but should be read in conjunction with Glantz's other works on the subject, *Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War* and *Soviet Military Intelligence in War* (London: Cass, 1989 and 1990). The deluge of memoirs and revisionist analyses appearing in Russian military journals and the imminent prospect of

limited access to Defense Ministry archives will allow military historians to redress some of the deficiencies addressed above. In the meantime, we are fortunate to have a guide as qualified as Colonel Glantz to prepare the way.

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Blank, Stephen J. and Kipp, Jacob W., eds., *The Soviet Military and the Future*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1992. 328pp.\$49.95

Stephen J. Blank of the U.S. Army War College and Jacob Kipp of the Command and General Staff College offer a timely compilation of essays on the future of the Soviet military in the aftermath of the U.S. victory in Desert Storm and the failed coup in Moscow in 1991. Drawing from the works of individuals in government service, research organizations, and universities, *The Soviet Military and the Future* examines not only the ground, air, and naval forces but also the roles of the defense economy, "sufficiency," new threats, and ethnic issues in shaping the direction of the armed forces. Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen states has overtaken much of its discussion, the book highlights problems experienced by the Soviet military that have only been exacerbated in the Russian armed forces today.

Phillip A. Peterson, Senior Research Fellow at the Potomac Foundation, and Joshua B. Spero, of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, note that reform must cover

many aspects of the military, including technical, social, economic, legal, and political aspects of military life. There was an equality of poverty in the former Soviet Union, and the military today must be concerned with issues that were never part of its agenda in the past, e.g., ecology, sovereignty, and economic arrangements. The solution lies in a "real market economy and democracy."

John Erickson, professor emeritus at the Defense Studies Center, Edinburgh University, discusses how Soviet military leaders were thinking during the periods of reform and restructuring—concepts which are not to be used interchangeably but need now to occur simultaneously if the Russian military is to be effective. If Russia cannot move into a three-dimensional defense—involving latitude, longitude, and aerospace—it will be outdated and outclassed.

On this matter, Mary C. FitzGerald of the Hudson Institute points out that aerospace strategy has long been incorporated into the operations of all branches of service. That is, it has never been thought of as operating in a vacuum. The U.S. aerospace operations in the Gulf War reminded the Soviets of the value of space as a theater of operations.

The essay by Michael Checinski, professor at the U.S. Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany, considers the impact on the military of the transition from a war-oriented to a consumer economy. The remnants of the Soviet war economy have been major impediments to reform. According to Checinski, the command economy of the past provided the Soviet military

with modern technology and equipment with some development financed through arms sales. The decline in the current export market was followed by a decline in funding for research and development. The current transition economy is unable either to meet the needs of the military or satisfy the greater demand for consumer goods. To this extent, arms control agreements to which Russia is a signatory are helpful in redirecting some resources from the military to the civilian sector.

Jacob Kipp and David M. Glantz, also of the Command and General Staff College, examine the role the Gulf War played in reshaping the Soviet view of war, especially among members of the Soviet General Staff. Desert Storm illustrated the deficiencies in Soviet capability vis-à-vis Nato that needed to be addressed as the Soviet Union, on its way into the twenty-first century, faced a changing geostrategic landscape. It brought out among other things, the necessity for precision-guided weapons and systems for command, control, communications, and intelligence. While the Soviet Union had been pursuing an end to the arms race through political means, the United States was ending the arms race through technological improvements.

Stephen Blank outlines the debate over the roles and missions of the Soviet Navy. Some thought it should be confined to the role of coastal defense. Others believed it should be used to project power. Here it is pointed out that it is far too costly to build up a navy capable of defeating the United States Navy. In the future, naval forces may be included in treaty negotiations with the

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United States, so any buildup in the Russian fleet now would be overtaken by forced reductions at a later date.

Early on, says Stephen J. Cimbala of Pennsylvania State University, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the security of the Soviet Union could no longer be unilaterally guaranteed by force. Multi-lateral arrangements, emphasizing negotiated settlements, would be the key in the future. This is most likely a precursor to one of the basic tenets of the new doctrine—that Russia views no sovereign state as her enemy. Graham Turbiville, Jr., Senior Analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, further argues that some of the greatest threats to the Soviet Union were from within, such as drugs, crime, and arms sales. Today, reform of the military cannot begin in earnest until these issues are addressed. Finally, the ethnic issue will not go away. Although part of the dilemma has been mitigated by the establishment of armies in the independent states, conscription is down, and there appears to be a refusal to enforce draft requirements on ethnic Russians.

*The Soviet Military and the Future* captures the Soviet forces in the middle of their decline. It is an interesting and important work.

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Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich. *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev*. New York: Pantheon, 1993. 369pp. \$27.50

As second secretary to Mikhail Gorbachev in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1988, Yegor Ligachev was considered a looming threat by supporters of Gorbachev's reforms. A "conservative" and elderly (born 1920) Politburo member responsible for ideology and personnel matters, he held enough power to usurp (and potentially oust) his younger boss. At the time, many in the West saw him as Gorbachev's alter ego—a gray, inflexible *apparatchik* likely to reverse the domestic thaw and kick-start a return to Cold War tension.

Despite his poor relations with Gorbachev, their association evidently tainted Ligachev in the eyes of the conservative rank-and-file. Such strains precipitated his shuttle into retirement at the 28th Party Congress. Yet Ligachev has resurfaced recently as an elder statesman urging the unification of the fragmented Russian left.

Ligachev's book is remarkably candid, and it is perhaps the first genuine memoir by a high-ranking Soviet leader since Trotsky. Selective and often self-serving, Ligachev shows that he emerged unrepentant from the Soviet Union's collapse. Yet the book offers a fascinating look from a hardliner's perspective at the Soviet Union during its final time of troubles.

Ligachev argues that *perestroika* in its original form represented the necessary progression of the reforms attempted by Yuri Andropov during his short tenure as General Secretary. He expresses "joy" in recalling "the country's spiritual élan in the first years of *perestroika*. . . ." But the author's idea of *perestroika* remains Andropovite, and