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General MacArthur and President Truman: The Struggle for Control of American Foreign Policy

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security. The best chapters of the present book, and the authors' most important contributions, are the careful discussions of Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech and the development and statement of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

The authors' methodology is to identify "language-events," such as Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, that name events and create a common vocabulary. When they occur at "generic moments," such as the early post-World War II years, perception and rhetoric join to create policy. Finally, when language events become fixed in the popular mind, they become part of what unites the community. Once rhetorical realities are established in the culture, they have profound impact; we become predisposed toward some policy options and foreclose others.

Both authors are professors of communication studies and have distinguished reputations among their peers. Hinds is at West Virginia University and Windt, who has previously published a number of books, is at the University of Pittsburgh.

There are occasional small lapses, such as "Archeson" on page 47, and when the authors use language that is "rhetorical" instead of "analytical" (on page 226, "hysteria" carries forward an "enraged" Richard Nixon). Further, the authors lean toward Henry Wallace, who led the left-idealist opposition to Truman's policies, as opposed to those who were to the right of the developing reality and that came to dominate American thinking; in fact, Wallace later recanted his own position. Such

shortcomings are minor and should not detract from the insights provided.

It is important today that we understand the linguistic lens through which Americans viewed the world during the decades of the Cold War—if we are to free ourselves fully from its effects, and if we are to understand what is at stake as opinion leaders shape a new rhetorical reality.

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Rovere, Richard H. and Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. *General MacArthur and President Truman: The Struggle for Control of American Foreign Policy*. New Jersey: Transaction, 1992. 359pp. \$19.95

Originally published in 1951 in the wake of the congressional hearings surrounding the relief of Douglas MacArthur, *General MacArthur and President Truman* remains the classic examination of civil-military relations. This current edition, with a new introduction by Schlesinger (his co-author died in the mid-1980s), was republished, in Schlesinger's words, not only to provide a first-hand portrayal of the hysterical reaction to MacArthur's dismissal and the calming influence of the senate hearings, but also because the book represents a style of political writing that hardly exists any more.

According to Schlesinger, he and Rovere sought to bring out the historical context and to submit geopolitical issues to scrupulous analysis. Shaped in their approach by Walter Lippmann and H.L. Mencken, the authors sought

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to write analytical history with urbanity and wit.

The resulting text remains focused, however, on the basic constitutional issue—civilian control of the military. Still, in his new introduction Schlesinger laments that if the book recorded the fairly definitive settlement of one constitutional issue, it virtually ignored another—the warmaking power of the president. Indeed both authors regretted that they did not examine Truman's position as critically as they had that of MacArthur, and they charge the former president with assuming unwarranted power and establishing a dangerous precedent of ignoring Congress and regarding war as a presidential prerogative.

MacArthur emerges from these pages as a tarnished hero, characterized as "the greatest military expatriate," in rebellion against a European-oriented foreign policy as well as American civilization as a whole. Highly critical of MacArthur, the authors assert that the roots of the civil-military dispute with Truman originated in September 1950, long before the Chinese intervention, when MacArthur took a public stand against Truman's stated policy of no military aid to Nationalist China. The subsequent intervention of forces of the People's Republic of China only exacerbated a rapidly deteriorating situation and made the conduct of foreign policy extraordinarily difficult.

As the reader sees, examining the public statements and the minutes from the Wake Island meeting between the president and his senior military commander, the clash be-

tween Truman and MacArthur was inevitable.

For Truman, the purpose of containment was not to win a war but to contain communism without global war. MacArthur, on the other hand, proposed a new unilateralism, characterized by a United States strategy to "go it alone" and to meet force with maximum counterforce until decisive military victory was achieved. Faced with a military commander in direct opposition to his own concept of limited war, Truman had no viable alternative but to call for the legendary officer's dismissal.

In retrospect, this book, republished in its original form save for Schlesinger's introductory essay and a few minor tense changes, illustrates why the Founding Fathers entrusted the chief executive with power over the nation's military forces. In that regard, its lesson is timeless. The civilian authority makes the policy; the field commander develops the military strategy to achieve the head of state's political objectives.

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Kohn, Richard H., ed. *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989*. New York: New York Univ. Press, 1991. 449pp. (No price given)

This collection of constitutional essays takes its place alongside Louis Henkin's *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* and also *The Constitution and National Security* (edited by Howard E. Shuman