

Naval War College Review

Volume 47
Number 2 *Spring*

Article 9

1994

In My View

Vladimir Kozin
Russian Foreign Ministry

R. T. Jackson
Royal New Zealand Navy

James H. Patton Jr.
U.S. Navy (Ret.)

W. J. Holland Jr.
U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Kozin, Vladimir; Jackson, R. T.; Patton, James H. Jr.; and Holland, W. J. Jr. (1994) "In My View," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 47 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol47/iss2/9>

This Additional Writing is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

IN MY VIEW . . .

“Informative and Analytical”

Sir:

I regularly get *Naval War College Reviews* from you. They are very informative, highly analytical and extremely interesting for understanding US policy and views on naval matters. Thank you very much, indeed. Once I promised to make some comments on the articles published in *NWCR*. In doing so, I'd like to tell you that:

The article by Lt.-Cmdr. Rex M. Takahashi, USCG, in the Autumn 1991 *NWCR* issue [“The Kuriles: Passage or Obstruction to Regional Peace?”] portrayed many aspects of the dilemma of the “Northern Territories” in Russo-Japanese relations. I think it might be interesting for him to know a contemporary Russian's view on the issue, such as was partly expressed in my own article published by *Moscow Times* on October 13, 1993:

The long-standing issue between Moscow and Tokyo—the Kuril Islands—might well be settled due to different approaches by the two sides. But not now.

Departing from Moscow to Tokyo for the first Russian-Japanese summit since the abortive coup in August 1991, President Boris Yeltsin underscored that he hoped the territorial issue would not be raised during his trip to the Japanese capital.

In the opinion of many Russian experts who are involved in the decision-making process the reasons why the Russian leader made such a statement are quite clear. . . .

Nevertheless, the problem is there—it is recognized by both sides. How to settle it?

Peacefully, gradually, on the basis of the international law. Russians will welcome a policy of non-linkage between political and economic issues from Tokyo. A peace treaty should be signed.

The visit of the Russian president to Tokyo, as a Japanese Government official put it before the trip started, “will be an opportunity to lay the basis for friendly ties” between the two nations. Such visits must help to remove obstacles en route to such ties between Moscow and Tokyo. The Kuril Islands dilemma can be solved. But not now, unfortunately. [*The Moscow Times*, Wednesday, 13 October 1993, by permission.]

While reading the very analytical article by Captain Dan Moore, “The New View from Russia” (Summer 1992), I thought it would be reasonable to add that in contrast to the former Soviet Union, Russia is not pressing for naval arms limitation talks (NALT), but rather it is in favour of expanded naval cooperation between the major naval users of the World Oceans.

There are three main reasons for that: (1) there is no need for NALT—because the major powers are downsizing their fleets unilaterally; (2) a special, quite pragmatic and constructive mechanism of various consultations and talks aimed at stronger naval ties and enhanced mutual understanding at sea between major naval powers has been set up; (3) there is no confrontation at sea or on the ocean between the former adversaries.

Though the article written by Sergei Fedorenko in the Spring 1993 issue [“Russia and Arms Control: The Trials of Transition to a Post-Soviet Era”] appears quite substantial, it nevertheless lacks a precise answer as to Russia’s stance on specific, key, arms control issues, which has been stated on many occasions. It would have been expedient in this respect to mention the national concept already approved earlier in 1993, “Basic guidelines on arms control and disarmament,” which set up clear-cut priorities in this area. Some arms control aspects were also specified in the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (1993).

Though the “Basic Guidelines” have limited circulation and are therefore not easy to get, the “Foreign Policy Concept” was published in full in *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* (Diplomatic Herald), in Moscow, Special Edition, January 1993 (ISSN 0234-0038)—see chapter 2, “Arms Control and International Security,” pp. 8–9. A comprehensive presentation of Russia’s stance on arms control is also available in earlier statements: by Boris Yeltsin, in “Russia’s Policy on Arms Limitation and Arms Reductions” (published in full in *Rossiyskaya gazeta* [The Russian Gazette], 30 January 1992); and in Boris Yeltsin’s letter to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on Russia’s view on arms control

and international security (published in full in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 31 January 1992).

Looking forward to a continuation of our cooperation,

Vladimir Kozin
Senior Counsellor
Arms Control Department
Russian Foreign Ministry

Anzus: "This Sorry Saga"

Sir:

The article "An Alliance Unravels" by Professor Wallace J. Thies and James D. Harris in the *Naval War College Review* of Summer 1993 provides a good overview of ANZUS and the different public attitudes to alliance membership in Australia and New Zealand. In the case of Australia, the 1983 political push to review the alliance led to Prime Minister Hawke effectively strengthening the relationship with the US—a relationship that continues under the Keating Labour government.

In contrast, the paper clearly details how many years of influence by the New Zealand "peace" movement caused the NZ Labour Party to repudiate New Zealand's part in ANZUS, rather than face a political battle within the party. In New Zealand, short term political gain triumphed over the "national interest."

The dilemma that New Zealand's defence and foreign policy officials now face is how to revive what should be a logical relationship between two natural allies. The events of 1984–87 have transformed New Zealand's public opinion towards the military alliance. Neither major political party is likely even to consider amending the anti-nuclear legislation of 1987, which became the last straw for US policy makers. And every minor party has the same populist position of supporting our "nuclear-free" status. It is just too easy for politicians to adopt the nationalistic, environmental and emotive positions where the nuclear-free legislation is some kind of icon.

The veterans of the "peace" movement are not resting, however; they are continuing to tackle New Zealand's other military relationships. At present they are targeting New Zealand's part in the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Singapore, Malaysia, Britain and Australia. [See Captain Lee Cordner's "Regional Resilience," in this issue.] Withdrawal from FPDA has become an issue for some in the Labour Party during our 1993 elections.

An indicator of the actual defence attitudes of the NZ Labour Party can be found in New Zealand's lack of response to the UN-mandated maritime blockade against Iraq in August 1990. Up until that time, arguments about the value of the ANZUS alliance had always drawn soothing remarks from our

Labour politicians that collective security and UN peacekeeping operations would provide a better mechanism for New Zealand's security and that New Zealand would contribute to those operations.

But when Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided a clear case of an aggressive power invading a smaller nation and led to a series of Security Council resolutions, New Zealand's government of that time chose to do nothing. The enormous irony was that despite all their rhetoric, the Labour politicians of 1990 were not as "internationalist" as they had claimed. Part of the difficulty for the government of the day was that the appropriate response would have been to send a frigate with the Australian task group—but since the bitter and long-drawn-out debate in 1988–89 about the Royal New Zealand Navy's replacement frigate project, it seems that the anti-frigate faction in Cabinet could not actually stomach the fact that New Zealand's frigates would vindicate their existence by deploying to the UN-mandated blockade.

Ultimately a conservative government, elected in October 1990, sent transport aircraft and medical teams from New Zealand to the Gulf War. But the anti-military, anti-American, anti-alliance feeling is still being fostered within New Zealand. Why has the "peace" movement gained so much influence? First, there is a generational factor—the Vietnam war protestors of 1968 are now in key positions both in politics and throughout society. The obstruction, by many in the teaching profession, to school visits by defence force recruiters was one example of the knee-jerk anti-militarism that had become so widespread during the 1980s.

Then there is the immense impact on the public mind of the [July 1985] *Rainbow Warrior* affair. The French government's operation to mine and sink the Greenpeace ship in Auckland harbour has made an impression on New Zealanders that is similar to the emotional impact of Pearl Harbor for an American. Irrespective of the outcome of the *Rainbow Warrior* affair—France eventually paid massive compensation for the action—the event served to sour further New Zealanders' attitudes to large powers, including Britain and the US (they were both alleged to have failed deliberately to warn New Zealand).

Finally, there is the environmental factor—the word "nuclear" is now so laden with emotional, environmental overtones that nuclear power is almost beyond rational discussion in this country.

The changes in the global scene since 1990 have, in fact, answered all the concerns of New Zealanders, as they were expressed in 1984. There are no nuclear weapons at sea in the types of ships likely to visit New Zealand; the Soviet Union is no more, so our ports are not "nuclear targets" if an American ship visits; and the safety record of American nuclear-propelled ships remains unblemished. Yet the emotive factors described above are still being exploited to prevent a renewal of the alliance. So the goalposts have in fact been shifted

106 Naval War College Review

by the “peace” movement, and thus our other military relationships are now under attack.

There are lessons for other small powers in this sorry saga. First there is the need to keep the public well informed of the benefits of an alliance relationship. As well, the costs of unilaterally ending a relationship must be brought home to policy makers. And the role of the armed forces in peacetime must also be clearly explained. In the Cold War environment, defence professionals could take their purpose as self-evident, but now the armed forces of small nations must be able to assess and explain their purposes in new terms.

Can the impasse with New Zealand be solved? New Zealanders themselves have yet to acknowledge properly the immense changes since the 1980s. But two steps by the United States could help address New Zealand public opinion—ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (the Treaty of Rarotonga) and an end to the US Navy’s apparent reluctance to send nuclear-powered vessels into New York City. It seems to me that ratification of SPNFZ could answer those critics who believe that the US is still dependent on global deployment of nuclear weapons. The port visit issue in New Zealand, an emotional suspicion about nuclear-powered vessels, could be addressed if the USN was itself consistent about domestic port visits.

But in the new world of ethnic warfare in the Balkans and failed nation-states in Africa, does New Zealand matter to the United States? It should, if only to show other small democracies that the United States can respond to other points of view and that it is not the “bully” that it was perceived to be during the ANZUS dispute.

R.T. Jackson

Commander, Royal New Zealand Navy

“No, the SSN Is Not a Dinosaur. . . .”

Sir:

Dr. John Hanley [author of “Implications of the Changing Nature of Conflict for the Submarine Force,” *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1993, pp. 9–28] is an accomplished and respected geo-military-politician who, in his youth, dabbled at being a submariner. I, on the other hand, am a retired submariner who, only recently, has tried to dabble a bit in Geo-Mil-Pol issues—John’s area of expertise. John is also a friend, to whom I would loan garden tools and would feel free to ask for similar small favors.

All things considered, it is not surprising that John and I often experience an “impedance mismatch” in our views and agree to disagree.

His recent article, for instance, raises a basic issue. The first 13 pages of John's 18-page essay are as good and concise a "Geo-Pol-Mil 101" summary of the next decade or two as could be imagined. I know of no one who could have done it better. The "quid erat demonstratum" of the next 5 pages, however, where the ". . . therefore SSNs are an unaffordable and unnecessary luxury" theme is developed, is another matter. Hazarding a guess, most other operationally inclined naval officers with command-level experience would also share my difficulties here—particularly in light of the rather extraordinary services SSNs have been providing in response to new challenges conceived by Battle Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups and Special Forces in the last year or so.

John may have succumbed to a not-uncommon misconception that antisubmarine warfare is the principal characteristic of an SSN rather than the most expedient scenario-specific mission appropriate during the Cold War. This is "old-think," and not even entirely accurate for most of that period. In fact, if a "principal characteristic" of U.S. submarines were to be identified at all, it would be that they have traditionally excelled in areas and missions for which they were not designed or for which little prior doctrine and training had been developed. It is unlikely, at the present juncture, that one could essentially conclude that "we would love to have them play, but there's nothing they can do now that someone else can't do better!"

In bullet format, similar to his "Implications for the SSN Force" on page 22, it is submitted that Stealth, Mobility and Endurance, coupled with a broad, deployed selection of weaponry in a moderately sized magazine, is particularly valuable:

- When commercial availability of surveillance information and proliferation of advanced and affordable guidance systems such as GPS [the Global Positioning System] make "observable" warships subject to targeting by theater ballistic missiles in the littoral;
- When it is desirable to have a credible (and defensible) military capability resident in a single unit without an extensive logistic tail;
- When it is desirable to demonstrate continually and inexpensively—the submarine is the least expensive major warship to operate, its operation no more expensive than ownership—a globally obvious U.S. naval presence through remote deployments and frequent port visits;
- When it could be politically beneficial to have presence unannounced or, on the flip side, announce presence when you don't have it yet;
- If, with a policy of dispersed deployment of a nominally sized force (25 percent of 50–60 units constantly deployed throughout world's oceans), it would be of strategic value always to have the first U.S. warship within about two days' steaming of any littoral;

108 Naval War College Review

- If, as proved to be so effective with the Soviets, it would be politically attractive to cultivate a mindset among all the peoples of the world that the “oceans are full of U.S. SSNs!”—a comforting thought for friends, but unsettling to those who would contemplate aggression.

No, the SSN is not a dinosaur, and more roles and missions under the “New Security Environment” will become readily apparent when, as in the past, they prove to be the only readily adaptable “answer” to one, or many, as yet unidentified “questions.” The recent apparent national decision for “continued low-rate production” of SSNs to maintain an irreplaceable industrial base is the correct one. In spite of the “gridlock” of conflicting pro and con arguments between such people as John and me, there are some things, even around the house or in the garage, for which reasoned intuition directs—although one is not always entirely sure why—that they must not be thrown out.

James H. Patton, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Sir:

Dr. Hanley's thesis has the same narrow focus as that of the primary work on which it was based, Martin Van Creveld's *Transformation of War*. In reviewing their common thesis, it is important to bear in mind the history and circumstances in the Middle East at the time Van Creveld, a professor in Jerusalem, proposed it. Israel had been successful in a series of major wars since its founding, classic wars between nation states. But after the forces opposed to Israel had failed in every attempt to win, they either began to acquiesce in Israel's victory or they shifted the contest to irregular or guerrilla warfare based upon tribal entities along Israel's borders. In his book, Van Creveld generalized what he saw happening along the Jordan and in Gaza into a universal model.

Dr. Hanley applies this model to the submarine but his argument applies to all high technology systems and forces, e.g., stealthy airplanes, space-based sensors, cruise missiles, missile defenses, etc. The ultimate conclusion of this argument would limit forces to spies and light infantry to deal with revolutions, riots, terrorism, interventions, border skirmishes and humanitarian missions.

Borrowing from Van Creveld's prophesy about “a break-down of the structure of war,” Hanley frames his arguments limiting consideration to just these less-than-national conflicts. But the invasion of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf campaign, the Falklands war, the India-Pakistan war, major conflicts in the past twenty-five years, were all classic wars between nation states, “trinitarian” wars in Van Creveld's lexicon. In hindsight, it is now evident that the Vietnam War became a trinitarian war, and one of the reasons the United States lost was its

failure to fight it as such. Hanley's argument that future conflicts will be between peoples and not nation states is weakened further by the fact that the majority of the peoples on his list of those who "no longer consider war the province of the state" (p. 11) are peoples who aspire to statehood.

The recent adventures in Bosnia and Somalia demonstrate the limits which exist on US intervention in these non-trinitarian episodes. Assertions that "ethnic conflicts emerging from the rubble of the Cold War and the former Soviet Union demand immediate attention" (p. 12) fall on newly deaf ears. Future American intervention is likely only where vital interests are evident, where the Administration is ready *and able* to sell the US public on such vital interests and to construct appropriate coalitions, and where the probability of winning in a reasonable period exists. After Mogadishu, these conditions are likely to prove hard to meet except in cases of trinitarian war.

Hanley's argument that the "security concerns of the United States are much broader than trinitarian war" (p. 13) may be true but does not mean that trinitarian war is no longer a concern. In looking to the future, better answers lie in history than in prophecy. But the history used must not be selective. Looking only at Korea and the Gulf, Dr. Hanley's assertion (p. 19) that the absence of attack submarines "would not affect the general concepts of operations" is similar to assertions about submarines in the 1930s. However, in any scenario which included naval forces, such a statement would be ludicrous. The Falkland campaign, a short decade ago, was not the last naval war. In this regard, Dr. Hanley's thesis violates the principle of considering capabilities, not intentions, by conveniently ignoring the Russian attack submarine force, a major military force which has the capability to jeopardize seriously any U.S. military operation overseas.

Similar shortsightedness lies in Dr. Hanley's suggestion that eventually the ex-Soviet ballistic missile submarines be treated like the French ones. These ships contain weapons which are aimed at targets in the United States—weapons which can destroy this country in about an hour. The Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their land-based companions are the *only* forces in the world which directly and immediately threaten this country. To suggest they be granted immunity and the US cooperate in waterspace management to prevent collisions dangerously limits the necessary operations which attempt to limit the threat.

Finally, contrary to Dr. Hanley's suggestion, the price of a new submarine should not be a major consideration for her builders. The McCain Amendments opposed the whole idea of further submarine construction—the price will never be low enough to placate such critics. Senator Dodd will be in favor of the construction no matter what it costs, Senator McCain will be against it unless the price is trivial, an obvious impossibility. The builders of low-rate-production

110 Naval War College Review

ships of whatever type should pay attention to new capabilities including ease of manufacture, not proven capabilities and cost.

“To justify building attack submarines” (p. 25) under Dr. Hanley’s analysis is difficult. Using this analysis, it would be difficult to justify any expensive or highly technical system. But there are other scenarios, other analyses and other arguments. Dr. Hanley sums these up and contradicts his own conclusions when he says, “If our submarine forces decline to a point where the opportunity for a genuine challenge emerges, we will have made a fundamental mistake” (p. 25). This is a clear argument to research, design, build and field the best new submarines in the world.

W. J. Holland, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Ψ

**U.S. Naval Institute
Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest**

General Powell hopes that this first annual contest will attract not those who wish to “‘toe the policy line,’ but those who are devoted to the security of this great nation.” Essays should be about combat readiness in a joint context—persuasive discussions of issues involving two or more services. Entries may be heavy in single-service detail but must have joint application. The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of \$2,500, \$2,000, and \$1,000. Maximum length is 3,000 words, but shorter pieces (typically 2,000-word technical arguments) are also welcome. Essays must be original and not previously published; direct them to the Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Ave., Annapolis, Md., 21402-5035, postmarked on or before 1 April 1994. For more information contact Bert Hubinger, (410) 268-6110.