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The United States and Changing Approaches to National Security and World Order

Inis L. Claude, Jr.

BEFORE WE CAN MAKE SENSE of the emerging changes in approach to national security and world order, we must understand the changes that have recently taken place in the scope and focus of the field of international relations. That understanding requires that we first note some basic features of traditional international relations.

So long as there have been states, they have interacted with each other. Indeed, the term "international relations" is a historically established misnomer, for it has always referred to relations not among nations but among *states*. Its domain has been the external behavior of states, their impingements upon each other. It has included the cooperation and alliance patterns developed among states, and it has been even more concerned with their frictions, disputes, and clashes. The major focus of international relations has been on wars among states and on their efforts to prepare for, prevent, win, terminate, and recover from those struggles.

In this tradition, the domestic affairs of states, their internal conditions and arrangements, have constituted a separate and distinct realm, excluded in principle from the sphere of international relations. The concept of sovereignty has reinforced this tradition, serving states as a sort of "No Trespassing" sign, an assertion of an international right to privacy. A fundamental rule for states has been *mind your own business*—govern your own people, control your own territory, manage your own external affairs, look after your own security, and stay out of the domestic affairs of other states. The rule of nonintervention, albeit frequently violated, has been regarded as a basic norm of the international legal

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system. Twentieth-century developments have extended that norm to prohibit multilateral as well as unilateral intervention; domestic jurisdiction clauses in both the League of Nations Covenant (Article 15, paragraph 8) and the United Nations Charter (Article 2, paragraph 7) acknowledged that the internal domain of member states is off-limits to those organizations. Such prohibitions have reflected not only the sense that states have a right to conduct their domestic affairs without interference but also the view that the task of managing the external relations of states is quite big enough without the addition of their internal affairs.

In recent years, the traditional exclusion of domestic affairs has been substantially modified; the new international relations increasingly includes within its scope both the external and the internal affairs of states. The internal problems of states have gained prominence on the international agenda as they have become more numerous, more difficult, and more far-reaching in their ramifications.

We can identify two major sources of the epidemic of domestic crises that is sweeping the world today. First, there is a glut of failed states that have emerged in the last generation from colonial status, the products of premature and ill prepared decolonization. This is the time to remind ourselves of the fallacy of the "Rip Van Winkle theory" of the United Nations, the notion proclaimed at the end of the Cold War that the United Nations had been asleep throughout that struggle but could now be awakened to function as its founders had intended. In fact, far from being dormant during the Cold War, the United Nations had been operating and evolving in ways that significantly affect the nature and scope of international relations today. Among other early developments, the organization had been converted into an instrument of the "Freedom Now" movement, contributing to the rapid replacement of the colonial system by a plethora of newly independent states. The incidence of domestic turbulence in states of what we have called the Third World is in large part a legacy of the demand for independence, "ready or not." The failure of the ideal of trusteeship, mainly attributable to its rejection by potential clients too impatient and mistrustful to wait for the building of the foundations of statehood, is one of the tragedies of the twentieth century.

A second major source of today's intrastate difficulties is the failure of the concept of the multinational state. Always an anomaly in a world obsessed by the ideal of the national state, the notion of a state comprising two or more nations in equal partnership has seemed to some a noble ideal and to others a hopeful expedient for dealing with situations of exceptional demographic complexity. Our experience with the multinational state has not been uniformly negative—witness the case of Switzerland—but we need only cite the recent

debacles of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to make the point that multi-nationalism has not been a great success; even that exemplary entity, Czecho-slovakia, could not sustain the experiment.

We now note an instance of the reversal of a trend set in motion by the Cold War United Nations. In the era of decolonization, the principle of national self-determination was effectively converted into the right of *colonial* self-determination, and the UN megaphone was used to proclaim that colonies, not nations, were eligible to invoke that right. Since the termination of the Cold War, however, nations have turned with a vengeance to the restoration of the doctrine of *national* self-determination. The demolition of multinational structures, the explosion of ethnic animosities presumably long pent-up by Cold War disciplines, and the outbreak of secessionist and irredentist struggles have become major contributors to the turmoil of our times, as efforts are made to create national states where multinational ones once stood.

The New Interventionism

The main business of international relations today has to do with turbulence within states. The world remains, of course, admirably supplied with problems of the more conventional interstate variety, and it is confronted as well with problems that do not fit neatly into either category but exhibit aspects of both. But those idealists who have long proclaimed both the unmanageability of a pluralistic state system and the promise of guaranteed order in a world topped by a single government should be inspired to reconsider their certitudes by the fact that the crises of our time are attributable less to the absence of government over the world than to the failure of governments of many individual states to work effectively and decently. Increasingly, the task of international relations is to repair the damages and remedy the deficiencies for which the governments of states are responsible.

This enlarged scope and altered focus of international relations entails a new phenomenon significant enough to deserve capitalization: the New Interventionism. We are seeing the near-total eclipse of the standard doctrine of nonintervention, with its distinction between the realms of domestic sovereignty and international jurisdiction. The decline of deference to the sovereign assertion of domestic jurisdiction began early in the development of twentieth-century international organization, when in 1923 the Permanent Court of International Justice enunciated the doctrine of the "movable fence," holding that the line between domestic and international jurisdiction shifts to enlarge the latter and diminish the former whenever states make a particular matter the subject of treaty provisions. At the founding conference of the United Nations in 1945, this juridical doctrine of the growth of the international domain at the expense

of domestic jurisdiction was joined to a political proposition that we might label the "doctrine of international repercussions": the notion that domestic affairs cease to be domestic when they appear to threaten international peace. These two doctrines have combined to support a considerable array of United Nations involvements in intrastate affairs that arguably have interstate consequences, pertaining to such matters as colonial rule, apartheid and other manifestations of racism, and human rights in general. More recently, the premise that the world must not tolerate the denial or the disruption of democracy within states has inspired the conviction that intervention is permissible, perhaps even mandatory, to promote democracy where it is absent, protect it where it is endangered, and restore it where it has been lost or stolen. Indeed, the popular motif of interdependence implies the justifiability of intervention—after all, if conditions within every state have a substantial impact upon all other states, then those conditions are the proper business of all other states. When everything is public, nothing is private.

Today, we may well ask whether the fence separating the international and domestic domains has been not merely repeatedly moved but entirely dismantled. In the United Nations, debate about domestic jurisdiction is almost as passé as debate about states' rights in the United States. The wisdom and practicability of particular UN interventions are questioned, but the organization's authority to intervene at all is rarely a serious concern; the United Nations is more likely to be indicted for evading its responsibility than for exceeding its authority. Unilateral intervention without the blessing of the United Nations remains somewhat questionable. We can sense the change in the global mood, however, if we reflect upon the fact that only some twenty-five years ago, the almost universal criticism of American action in Vietnam rested in part on the view that the United States was intervening in a civil war, whereas today it is widely faulted for failure or reluctance to become involved in situations whose civil-war aspects are much more pronounced than was true in the case of Vietnam. Clearly, the New Interventionism represents a major change in international relations.

Multilateralism

Another important alteration in the conduct of international relations is the vogue for multilateralism, which has gone far toward modifying the traditional individualism of states that was epitomized in the doctrine of sovereignty. This change is another product of the operation and development of the United Nations during the Cold War. Throughout that period, the General Assembly gradually came to the fore, as the result of the political incapacitation of the Security Council and the vast increase, brought about by decolonization, in its

own membership. That organ acquired the image of the Voice of Mankind, the Head of the International Community, and the Central Global Authority. It developed the function of collective legitimization, dispensing approval and disapproval, granting or withholding authorization to member states in the name of the United Nations. Gradually, unilateralism—action taken without reference to the United Nations—has become widely regarded as improper conduct, whereas resort and deference to the United Nations are taken as evidence of international virtue. Such deference may provide a pretext for inaction or serve as a convenient pretense of action, but it has also taken on the connotation of a "politically correct" respect for constituted authority.

Unilateralism, of course, is far from dead. All states, and perhaps especially great powers, are reluctant to abandon their ultimate freedom of action. But the United States, among others, has shifted notably toward acceptance of the multilateralist position. This was evinced in the Gulf war of 1990–1991, when President George Bush took care both to secure United Nations authorization for every step leading to military action against Iraq and also to respect the limits of the UN mandate. For Bush, the authorization of the United Nations seemed as important as (and, perhaps, essential to) the authorization of the Congress. His successor in the White House appears at least equally concerned to have multilateral cover, avoiding naked unilateralism if at all possible. Moreover, Nato has acknowledged dependence upon the multilateral authority exercised by the United Nations. Writing about Nato's actions in the former Yugoslavia, the chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, said that "the military responses that are possible are, of course, determined by the terms and conditions of the relevant UN mandates which provide the essential international legal basis" for operations.* Statesmen increasingly look to multilateral agencies, almost invariably the organs of the United Nations, not only for legal authority but also for political support, moral backing, and the promise of load-sharing in ventures that may prove difficult and costly. In the post–Cold War era, the UN is likely to be involved in some way in most activity dealing with the challenges of disorder and instability that plague the world. Multilateralism has joined interventionism as a prominent feature of the new international relations.

We turn now to the substantive tasks of maintaining national security and promoting world order in the new circumstances of our time. We face changed and changing requirements, and we have at our disposal an evolving roster of approaches to problems.

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* Sir Richard Vincent, "The Brussels Summit—A Military Perspective," *NATO Review*, February 1994, p. 10.

Types of Disorder

Let us first note the various types of situation that may be thought to warrant or require reaction by "outsiders"—parties not initially or directly involved, ranging from the United States to the United Nations. The potential agenda for upholders of world order may be broken down as follows.

Full-scale wars between or among states. These are the staples of traditional international relations and the target of Wilsonian collective security theory. There is no reason to assume that such wars will not occur, even though they no longer dominate the global agenda.

Sporadic, limited interstate violence. The armed forces of states sometimes engage in actions that are better described as clashes than as campaigns—that is, raids, forays, border incidents, and other short-of-war encounters.

Threats of interstate war, conditions of dangerous tension between states. These are posed by such actions as the pressing of inordinate demands, the issuance of ultimata, the breaking of diplomatic relations, the flaunting of armaments, or the drive to acquire nuclear weapons. One thinks of the tensions engendered in recent years by North Korea's intransigence and apparent intent to become a nuclear power.•

Terrorist campaigns. They are instigated or supported by governments or by organized groups having political aspirations and operating within or across national borders.

Civil wars or rebellions involving systematic combat between organized military forces. These may be struggles over secession, in which the structure of the state is at issue, or they may be contests for control of the governing apparatus of the state, pitting would-be governments against each other or against an incumbent regime.

Chaotic violence of the sort associated with literal anarchy. In these cases society seems to have disintegrated, effective government is lacking, and the struggle is too disorganized to be dignified by the label of civil war, being more akin to a Hobbesian state of nature. The situation in Somalia in 1992 appeared to fall into this category.

Domestic tyranny that is characterized by violent resistance and bloody repression, and that often spawns an outflow of refugees. The case of Haiti comes to mind.

Totalitarianism too cruelly effective to permit any hope of serious resistance, producing the peace of the prison. This might be considered a situation in which there ought to be, but cannot be, a civil war.

Combinations of two or more of the above categories. Obviously, some of the situations of turbulence in today's world are too complex to be confidently

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•   Those tensions have been relieved, but not entirely dissipated, by agreements reached between the United States and North Korea in August and October 1994.

assigned to any one of these pigeonholes, and in many cases our knowledge of conditions within or among the states involved is so uncertain or inadequate that we can only recognize the trouble spots, without understanding the exact nature of the troubles.

Missions, Mandates, and Methods

Our next requirement is to examine the range of activities that have been undertaken, considered, or at least suggested as responses by outsiders to situations of the various types just described. These actual and potential missions, mandates, and methods constitute the approaches, old and new, of today's world to the daunting task of creating and maintaining order and stability.

Prevention of War. Given the fact that the basic rationale for the creation of international organizations in this century has been the hope of maintaining world peace, it should surprise no one that a major purpose of parties external to troubled situations is to prevent the outbreak, or the resumption, of war—to assist those involved in controlling and reducing tensions. This mission has frequently entailed the deployment of peacekeeping forces, a type of operation invented during the Cold War by the United Nations. Because this label has in recent years been applied almost indiscriminately to operations of quite diverse natures, it seems essential to describe the type of mission under discussion here as *traditional* peacekeeping. Its prototype was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) organized by the United Nations as a means of defusing the Suez Crisis of 1956. Such an operation requires a relatively small number of personnel, usually drawn from the military forces of states deemed by the Secretary-General to be sufficiently disinterested to be accepted as trustworthy by all the involved parties. The entire mission is subject to the consent of the conflicting parties, and it is intended to assist all of them, impartially, in realizing their presumed objective of avoiding the degeneration of their relationships into violence. When parties need and desire help in keeping the peace, the United Nations obliges. The work of the peacekeeping force is not to fight but to stabilize a situation by its very presence and its monitoring of developments. This is a neutralizing role, to be played by neutrals.

Another means of preventing war is the deterrent prepositioning of forces, the provision of a tripwire of the kind pioneered by Nato. One might cite the current example of the American troops stationed in Macedonia to discourage the spreading of the Balkan conflict into that territory. There has been recurrent discussion of the idea of a standing United Nations force that might be used, upon warning of the imminence of conflict, to deter attack. This type of war-preventing effort differs from peacekeeping, in that it presumes that one of

the parties involved has, or may develop, aggressive rather than peaceful intent; and it represents a commitment to engage in combat if that is required to resist attack. Ideally, peacekeepers go home if one of the parties opts for war; tripwire troops stay on to fight the aggressor, or their deterrent effect is nullified.

Defeat of Malefactors. This introduces a second variety of mission for outside forces, which is to defeat, or assist in defeating, the party that is judged, typically by the vote of a United Nations organ, to be the primary offender in the situation at hand. Aggressors, racists, flagrant violators of human rights, oppressors, anti-democratic forces, or rogue regimes of other descriptions, they are judged guilty of, or deemed intent upon, behavior that is considered illegal, immoral, or otherwise in violation of current international standards. We might note that the Wilsonian ideal of collective security, which was enshrined in both the League of Nations and the United Nations but never considered a practicable scheme by either of those organizations, contemplated the much more modest task of restraining aggressors; how ironic that a world that was intimidated by the prospect of dealing with the occasional aggressor purports now to accept the responsibility of coercing all manner of malefactors scattered across the globe.

When the offending party is actively engaged in armed conflict, the mandate of outsiders is to prevent its achieving victory or, if it has already won, to reverse that victory. A classic example, again, was the Gulf war, when a coalition authorized by the United Nations overturned the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait. When the offense consists of unacceptable but non-warlike behavior—oppressive rule, persecution of minorities, and the like—the external reaction may be to initiate a military effort to punish or overthrow and replace the offending regime—that is, to launch aggression justified by its objective of remedying intolerable injustice. The UN of the Cold War era laid the groundwork for this sort of mandate by exempting struggles against apartheid and recalcitrant colonialism from its otherwise sweeping condemnation of aggression and intervention. The undertaking to depose the *de facto* government of Haiti in favor of previously elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, with the endorsement and participation of the United Nations, illustrates the vast expansion of the notion of just war since the Wilsonian doctrine of collective security proclaimed that legitimate violence was limited to resistance to aggression. Today's international society accepts the propriety, if not the obligation, of military initiative to right serious wrongs within states as well as in the relations among states.

Efforts to restrain or defeat violators of international standards may, however, take forms other than military coercion. For instance, one-sided arms embargoes and economic sanctions may be imposed upon the condemned party. Such action may be ineffectual, amounting to a mere wrist-slapping pretense of

resistance and betraying a lack of will to mount serious opposition, but in some cases it has substantial effect upon the outcome of a struggle. As we shall see below, there are still other ways in which outsiders may interfere with the efforts of evildoers to achieve their purposes.

Limitation of Violence. A third objective that may be adopted by outside elements with reference to a violent struggle, intranational or international, is to limit the violence and mitigate its effects—to prevent the conflict from spreading, control the intensity of the fighting, and minimize its impact upon the affected population. These efforts may include the imposition on all parties of a ban on arms shipments and of general economic sanctions, measures designed not to determine which side will win but to control the level of violence. Other measures that are becoming increasingly familiar are the designation of and efforts to enforce respect for "safe areas" for civilians, as in Bosnia, and the provision and protection of humanitarian relief programs for the care and feeding of innocents who are deprived and endangered by the fighting, as in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other places. This kind of activity would seem to be the appropriate function of disinterested states and of such an organization as the United Nations—neutral and compassionate actions to cope with the evils unleashed by the tragedy of violent conflict.

We must note, however, that such impartially intended and humanely motivated programs—if they are significantly successful, which experience suggests is unlikely—may have the effect of both tilting against one of the parties and prolonging the agony. To prevent attack upon major cities set aside as safe areas (Sarajevo, for instance) and to assert the right to supply such centers of population is to deny to one party the option of siege warfare and the possibility of gaining its ends by conducting a war of attrition and attempting to undermine civilian morale. We shall see other ways in which neutral and humanitarian efforts may produce unneutral and perhaps inhumane results.

Termination of Fighting. The most commonly asserted purpose of outsiders in reaction to violent conflicts in recent years has been to stop the fighting—to insist that the war be terminated, even if one or conceivably all of the parties are intent upon continuing. This approach reflects the widespread conviction that war is an absolute and unmitigated evil, devastating to the populations immediately involved and intolerably threatening to world order. While this "call off the war" pressure is invariably linked to the hope that the parties can and will substitute a diplomatic settlement of the issues at stake for the military resolution that they are being pressed to renounce, it is not necessarily dependent on the possibility of an agreed settlement. The United Nations increasingly deplores

armed conflicts, insists that almost any settlement is preferable to continued fighting, and flirts with the "peace at any price" mentality.

The standard formula for ending a conflict consists of a cease-fire and negotiations. Outsiders strongly urge—perhaps even demand—that the parties stop fighting and start talking. The United Nations or another agency may work out with the parties, or dictate to them, the details of a formal cease-fire arrangement, offer to monitor compliance, and facilitate the opening of negotiations between or among the parties. Externally provided third parties may actually participate in the talks, even to the extent of proposing the terms of settlement and pressing for their adoption. This kind of pacific settlement activity is a traditional role of international organizations, elaborated in the constitutional documents of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, and in those of most regional organizations. It should be noted, however, that the conventional theory of pacific settlement requires such efforts early in a dispute, before fighting breaks out, in order to prevent war; as a means of interrupting, rather than avoiding, a war, they are much less likely to prove effective.

Clearly, the ideal outcome of the war-stoppage mandate is a settlement freely agreed to and genuinely acceptable to all the parties involved in the conflict. To this end, outsiders sometimes not only participate in the negotiations but also offer to assist in carrying out the terms of settlement. Given the inevitable climate of mistrust among the parties, having a neutral agency perform such functions as policing borders and demilitarized zones, vouching for arms reductions, and monitoring or even conducting elections or referenda may be indispensable to the reaching of an agreed settlement. More and more, the United Nations finds itself engaged in such implementation.

The involvement of outside elements becomes more intensive and takes on a different character when their mission shifts from helping to implement an agreed settlement to the more onerous responsibility of guaranteeing and enforcing its terms. This involves a commitment to fight any transgressors—in effect, to act against aggression. One thinks of the United States–Nato pledge to defend the integrity of a Bosnian settlement, if and when the parties reach agreement on its terms. A meaningful international guarantee means taking sides, and acting forcibly if necessary, whenever any party to the agreement demonstrates bad faith. At this point, the pretense of "peacekeeping," with its implication of impartial and non-coercive involvement, breaks down, and a military bias against treaty violators takes its place.

This would be even more dramatically the case if, as impatient outsiders have sometimes suggested with reference to Bosnia, a multilaterally sponsored effort were made to impose and enforce a settlement against the will of one or more of the parties. To carry out a dictated settlement would entail a quasi-permanent "receivership" and military occupation, with the prospect of facing armed

resistance. This would be peace-enforcement with a vengeance—and with no strong likelihood of success.

We note again that efforts to promote peace, albeit neutrally motivated, may have decidedly unneutral consequences. Nothing could appear more humane and evenhanded than mobilizing pressures to stop an armed conflict, so as to save all the peoples involved from its ravages. However, such termination-under-pressure is likely to serve the political interests of one side or the other, depending upon the relative military positions and prospects of the parties at the time. Peace is a noble ideal and a value of immense importance, but it matters greatly when and under what circumstances a war is interrupted. The world, confronting a nasty struggle, must face the issue: Who wins if we stop it now? Should a war of aggression be stopped when the aggressor sits astride his victim? Should World War II, say, have been called off when Hitler occupied France, or the fighting ended in the Gulf area after Iraq completed its conquest of Kuwait? Should a civil war be terminated when secessionists have gained control of the territory that they claim, or when their opponents are clearly winning? The point, too often forgotten by avid promoters of peace, is that the parties to armed struggles are serious about their goals; they fight to get or to keep something that they believe to be highly important—indeed, worth dying for—and they are not likely to be disposed to tolerate interruption of or interference with their efforts, so long as they think they have a chance of success. They fight not for peace but for victory. Moreover, it may be entirely fitting that the world prefer the success of one side rather than the other in a given conflict and at the least spare that side the frustration of being required to terminate the struggle before achieving victory. Imposing a cease-fire upon parties still determined to fight may not be desirable and certainly will not be easy; it is virtually sure to arouse the hostility of at least one party and thereby to require a substantial measure of military coercion.

Indeed, there may be a conflict between the urge to interrupt a war and the aim of achieving its genuine termination. I suggest the hypothesis that there is a time for war and a time for peace—that war, like the common cold, has a natural and not readily alterable life span. Perhaps it has to run its course; it is over when it is over, but not before then. Such historic dates as 1648, 1815, and 1945 remind us that even major protracted wars of the modern era have finally reached definitive endings. The implication of this line of thought is that struggles prematurely ended tend to break out again, until they reach genuine conclusion. A possible confirming example is the global conflict of the twentieth century, usually labelled World Wars I and II. That war was interrupted in 1918; it was finished in 1945. Moreover, it was rather obvious in 1918 that the conflict had not been finished, whereas one could sense in 1945 that it had been. Scholars have often argued that war causes war: World War I sowed the seeds of World

War II. They have blamed bad peace treaties: Versailles caused World War II, while the intelligent treatment of the defeated powers in 1945 contributed to the ending of the cycle of conflict. Perhaps we should consider the proposition that premature cease-fires function as a cause of subsequent conflict. Our humanitarian impulses rebel at the thought of letting antagonists fight to the death. Our political instincts may tell us, however, that if the future is to hold stable peace rather than sporadic conflict, it is necessary, and sensible, to let them fight their way to a resolution of the matters at issue. The world may learn that the short-term stoppage of fighting is sometimes inimical to the long-term enjoyment of peace and order.

Rehabilitation. The final entry on my list of external responses to disorder has to do with post-conflict rehabilitation. When the fighting has subsided and some sort of settlement has been put in place, the work of reconstructing the affected society or societies must begin, and it frequently appears that the task is hopeless without the infusion of massive assistance. Particularly in the aftermath of internal disorders, the "nation building" task is a daunting one, requiring such activities as constructing or rebuilding economic infrastructure, providing basic public services, devising new political and economic institutions, training public officials, and enforcing law and order until indigenous forces can be relied upon to assume that responsibility. The ideal regularly endorsed in the United Nations is to transform societies that have been reduced to chaos into stable, well governed, and democratic political communities, a mission that amounts to a new kind of international trusteeship. Such instances as those of Cambodia and Somalia warn us of the difficulties and risks of failure. As the world contemplates such an undertaking in Haiti, it should be prepared for a long, costly, sometimes bloody, frustrating, and possibly fruitless effort.* Nevertheless, it is a fact of life that the managers of international relations now define their mission as including the enormously ambitious task of promoting and upholding justice and order within states.

Leadership for World Order

Such a challenging agenda for world order requires the services of an extraordinarily capable and strongly committed leader. The world clearly looks to the United States to play that role; there is global consensus on the United States as the indispensable leader, the only possible leader, in this enterprise. In truth, the U.S. has been—however unwillingly and unreliably—the world's "designated driver" since World War I; both the League of Nations and the

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* The U.S. occupation of Haiti began on 19 September, immediately following the settlement with the junta brokered by Jimmy Carter, Sam Nunn, and Colin Powell.

United Nations were conceived largely as vehicles for American leadership, and much of the world—including even states aligned with the USSR—regarded the United States as the essential bearer of global responsibility during the Cold War.

Why is the United States singled out in this fashion? Today at least, the assignment has to do with its status as the sole remaining superpower. In every area of life, status carries with it duties and responsibilities. We expect certain things of parents, teachers, military officers, and judges because of the positions they hold. So it is with the most powerful state in the global system. Nobody regards the United States as being free to act as if it were Australia, or Switzerland, or Paraguay. Secondly, the explanation lies in inertia; the world has become accustomed to relying on America to carry the burden of leadership, and many Americans have come to take that obligation for granted. The world's dependence on the United States also reflects the latter's uniquely varied military capability, including especially the ability to project power rapidly wherever it may be required. Finally, the demand for American leadership appears to rest upon the notion that the U.S. is an uncommonly evenhanded, fair-minded, trustworthy, and decent great power. "American exceptionalism" is not entirely an American conceit; although the world is frequently disappointed, it expects more and better of the United States than of other major powers.

The question inevitably arises: Why should not the United Nations, rather than the United States, be seen as the essential leader of activities aimed at world order? The temptation is strong, particularly for Americans, to treat the United Nations as a Great and Good Somebody to whom onerous responsibilities may be shifted. But the United Nations is an entity to be led, not a leader; its usefulness depends upon its being used by states, and it can achieve success in missions of the kind we have discussed only if states provide the resources, including leadership. American leadership is as essential in the United Nations as elsewhere.

The first task of leadership has to do with making decisions about when and where to act and not to act: the prudent selection of cases for intervention. Some voices deny the propriety of selectivity. One hears echoes of the basic doctrine of collective security that all acts of international aggression must be squelched, and the analogy of the hospital emergency room is invoked to insist that the United Nations has an irrevocable obligation to rescue every society that falls victim to tyranny or disorder. The realities of our turbulent world, however, pose the inescapable necessity of choosing among the numerous international and domestic crises, setting priorities, and rationing resources. Decisions are not dictated, as they tended to be during the Cold War, by a widely acknowledged overriding security concern, and no formula is available for easy application. The luxury of invoking absolute principles must be sacrificed in favor of the uncertainties of the effort to make wise judgments about the relative importance

and urgency of cases, their impact upon the general security and stability, their humanitarian aspects, and the feasibility and cost of dealing effectively with them. These decisions will inevitably be difficult and controversial, but they must be made, and strong leadership in making them is of vital importance. The world requires assistance in facing up to its possibilities and its limitations.

Another crucial task of the leader is to promote clarity regarding the various types of mission that may be undertaken, insisting upon accurate labelling. Resistance is overdue to the habit of designating all missions associated in some way with the United Nations as "peacekeeping missions" or "peace operations." It is essential to stress the differentiation of the various roles that outsiders may attempt in situations of disorder, and in particular to distinguish neutral from side-taking missions, those that require evenhandedness from those that involve tilting, offers of assistance from threats of coercion, and combat from noncombat operations. Serious problems stem from the confusion of peacekeeping and coercive efforts and also from ill considered slippage from the former into the latter. It is manifestly unfair to all concerned with peacekeeping operations—the states playing host, the states supplying troops, and the troops themselves—to permit the alteration of their mission from that of providing assistance to all parties to that of taking enforcement action against a particular party. To bill such a coercive undertaking as a peacekeeping mission is likely to tarnish the United Nations' most valuable asset, its reputation for helpful evenhandedness, and thereby to jeopardize the future of the peacekeeping function itself. Moreover, the danger in taking sides while maintaining the illusion and pretense of continuing in a neutral peacekeeping mode—that is, without facing squarely the fact of having undertaken a military engagement—is that the participating states may approach their military task halfheartedly and with ambivalence. That is a recipe for "quagmire," which is a feature not so much of a situation as of one's approach to it. International leadership today has no more important task than that of promoting clarity, honesty, and steadfastness with regard to the nature of the missions that are undertaken in the name of crisis management.

Another major function of the United States as world leader is to develop and promote understanding of the appropriate roles of multilateral agencies, especially of the UN, in dealing with disorders. This poses the preliminary requirement of distinguishing between the two United Nations. The first is the United Nations viewed as an entity headed by the Secretary-General, an organization consisting of a bureaucracy and supported by the member states. The second is the United Nations conceived as the collection of most of the states of the world, led mainly by the United States, and supported by the Secretariat. Let me suggest a rough division of labor for these two entities. It seems to me that the first one, the United Nations Organization, is the appropriate agency for the neutral, non-coercive missions that we have

described, those devoted to promoting the pacific settlement of disputes and to the conduct of peacekeeping operations. That organization will, of course, use states in these undertakings, but its stature as the preeminent international agency makes the organization itself the ideal performer of these activities. The essential resource for this role is not power but a reputation for impartiality and disinterestedness; the first United Nations has the potential to be, say, a synthetic Switzerland.

The second United Nations, constituted by the assembled states and operative when leadership is provided by the United States, is the suitable choice for the conduct of those missions that entail military coercion, actions intended to uphold the position of one party and oppose that of another in a situation of conflict. In this respect, theorists of balance of power and collective security had it—and still have it—right: for enforcement activity, "there's nobody here but just us states." The United Nations as an organization may play an important supporting role, but the essence of the task falls to states, acting individually and jointly.

The prospects for effective and reliable leadership by the United States in the management of the world's turbulent areas are clouded by its own and the world's ambivalence and deficit of political will. Human beings dearly wish for big government with low taxes, effective deterrence without genuine commitment, and victory without casualties. Our passion for immaculate coercion, for easy and cheap results, tempts us to rely upon symbolic action—posturing, finger-shaking, wrist-slapping, and multilateral buck-passing. Decisive and timely responses to challenges that appear to warrant or demand such reaction must survive the complexities of consultation and consent, a process that involves, for the United States, various components of the executive branch, the military hierarchy, the pluralistic entity called Congress, the media, the general public and various interest groups, the academic and intellectual community, numerous foreign governments, and the organizational apparatuses of Nato and the United Nations. Moving through such a labyrinth to reach decision and take action can never be easy.

In international affairs, leadership is not primarily a matter of inducing others to act and directing their activity. Rather, it means doing much—perhaps most—of the work oneself, arranging for as much assistance as possible but expecting an abundance of free riders and less help in carrying the burdens than one would wish. The international leader must be willing to lead from out front—that is, from an exposed position. This implies rejection of the comfortable refuge of multilateralism and the piety of obedient response to United Nations directives. Effective multilateralism starts with resolute unilateralism; the mission of the leader is not respectful deference to the majority but determined pulling and hauling at it.

All this suggests that international leadership is almost certain to prove a thankless task. The United States can expect to be criticized, on the one hand, for excessive unilateralism and neglect of the United Nations, and on the other, for improper exploitation and manipulation of the organization. What is almost unthinkable is that the United States should receive credit for loyal service to the UN. It will be condemned for exercising and for withholding its power, for arrogance and for timidity. This kind of reaction should surprise no one who is familiar with international history, for it is the normal treatment of major states. Great-power status entails the obligation to bear heavy responsibilities and the certainty of criticism for whatever one does or refrains from doing in the discharge of that obligation. If the United States is to take the lead in dealing with the world's trouble spots, it should do so not in the expectation of honor or gratitude but in the awareness that America can flourish only in a setting of stable world order.

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To Our Navy, Marine, and
Coast Guard Subscribers

*For a number of years, the **Review** has been mailed for the most part in clear, sealed plastic wrappers. Becoming belatedly aware that, for compelling environmental reasons, plastic packaging should no longer be sent to ships, we arranged with our distribution contractor to wrap in paper, beginning with the Winter 1995 issue, all copies in these categories of our mailing list that would, or might, involve afloat addresses.*

*All did not go well. An alarming number of empty wrappers and wrapperless journals were returned to us as "found loose in the mail"; too many **Reviews** that did arrive at their destination did so in bedraggled condition. Upon investigation, it developed that inadequate grades of paper and tape had been inadvertently substituted by our distribution contractor in some fraction of the mailings. The Spring 1995 issue, we are assured, was mailed in the intended stock; if the problem has not been solved, however, we will persevere until we find a suitably durable paper for the approximately 1,990 subscriptions, both command and individual, that are affected.*

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