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A Different Equation: Naval Issues and Arms Control After 1991

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arena by strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Van Ham advocates invigorating the IAEA with the challenge-inspection mandate granted the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and perhaps with its own (and thus unbiased) intelligence gathering capability. Some in the U.S. intelligence community will find this last proposal controversial, while others will see it as merely quixotic. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, though, such an initiative would clearly increase the credibility of the IAEA, even if the actual capability was limited to analysis of information from open sources and other agencies rather than independent collection.

These points are clearly presented and well argued. However, the reader, and especially the military reader, must bear in mind that while van Ham clearly presents the urgent need for preventing proliferation, he does so strictly within the context of international diplomatic and economic control mechanisms, or "regimes." The final option of internationally sanctioned or unilateral military action is not addressed in detail, nor is the increasing evidence of organized international criminal activity and freelance smuggling on the supply side. Furthermore, some key points have been overtaken by events since publication, an unavoidable scholarly risk in the field of international relations since 1989. For instance, the author cites CoCom, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, a cornerstone of Western Cold War supply-side policy, as a useful proliferation control regime desperately in need of

realignment from East-West to North-South. Its members, however, have decided otherwise: CoCom was disbanded in March 1994. These are minor points. The tone of *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s* is scholarly and never strident, but it speaks with a quiet urgency to all who work and serve to foster security and stability in an increasingly chaotic world. We would do well to appreciate the author's reasoning, consider his ideas, and heed his warnings.

CHARLES C. SWICKER
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Lacy, James L. *A Different Equation: Naval Issues and Arms Control After 1991*. Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-2768, December 1993. 183pp. (No price given)

A Different Equation is an Institute for Defense Analysis technical report prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Conventional Arms Control and Compliance) in late 1992. In February 1993, the acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Conventional Forces and Arms Control Policy requested that the report not be released for six months. The report itself is dated December 1993, but it was not distributed until March 1994.

The official reason given for the delay was that there were "a number of policy issues raised by the report that are particularly sensitive at this time and that will require review by the new Administration." Given this fascinating introduction, the reader surely must

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wonder, exactly which policy issues were so sensitive? Since there are no obvious differences between the October 1992 version of this paper and the final product distributed one and a half years later, the reader must also wonder what impact the study had on the new administration. The revised preface provides no real clues, which is particularly distressing since there have been many changes in the international environment that might have been addressed had the study been continued.

The study first discusses the status of naval arms control, circa 1992, identifying those issues that might again surface in the post-Cold War era. James Lacy takes issue with those who have argued that naval arms control is dead; he uses confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) as the centerpiece for his set of policy issues that are still on the table. The author argues that the U.S. is concerned about the potential growth of regional navies and might therefore find regionally oriented CSBMs and various cooperative frameworks to be of benefit. He also states that many operations other than war will logically grow into CSBMs. Lacy thus provides a good overview of incremental naval arms control that might evolve despite efforts to the contrary.

Probably the only really controversial issue raised in this study is where to draw the line, as the U.S. Navy finds itself enmeshed in a series of measures that are the stepping-stones to more restrictive regulations. The line is not clearly marked; tables would have helped. The issue of where to draw it certainly qualifies as "particularly sensitive," although perhaps it was the entire

subject itself that the administration found contentious. However, there have been many more polemical recommendations in articles, chapters, books, and at conferences that make Lacy's findings and suggestions seem pretty tame.

The author does make a strong case that safety and environmental regulations, and expanded involvement in "nontraditional" pursuits by navies, will likely lead to more CSBM-like activities. It appears obvious that these type of activities will occur in the future. If Lacy is correct that the U.S. Navy views naval arms control as a subject to be avoided, then it may be in the best interest of the Navy to perform comprehensive damage-limitation. On the other hand, perhaps Lacy is trying to tell us that it will be virtually impossible to stop the creeping incrementalism of CSBMs and that true believers in naval arms control need only bide their time before the great U.S. Navy is finally harnessed.

James Lacy is no stranger to naval issues and arms control. Indeed, it is a tribute to his abilities that he has managed to complete this interesting technical report, after having previously published four others at the RAND Corporation in 1990 and 1991 for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In some ways, Lacy's new report is disappointing, in that it is so modest in its recommendations. Of particular use to the specialist, this study also contains an excellent distribution list, invaluable for any new researcher seeking the names and addresses of the 227 government officials, military officers, and

scholars the author thought would wish to read his report.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Naval Doctrine Command

Snyder, Frank. *Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries*. Washington: National Defense Univ., 1993. 167pp. (No price given)

There seems to be an assumption today that since technology precipitates changes in doctrine and tactics, astounding technological advances beget revolutionary leaps in military capabilities. This logic underlies a series of recent articles extolling "Revolution in Military Affairs" or "Military Technical Revolution." Corresponding theses proclaim entire new warfare doctrines, such as Space and Electronic Warfare (Navy), Command and Control (C2) Warfare (the Joint Staff), and Information Warfare (Secretary of Defense). Even the most committed technowork, however, must wonder whether we are truly experiencing a discontinuity in the tactical continuum stimulated by extraordinary developments in digital electronics, or merely suffering from hubris in thinking that our times are unique.

Into this swirl of hype and hyperbole comes *Command and Control*, a concise but profound book that is the product of a joint collaboration between the U.S. Naval War College, Harvard University, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Frank Snyder is a professor emeritus at the Naval War College, where for many years he held the Raymond A.

Spruance Chair of Command and Control. Snyder has produced a jewel of a guide to this complex world. It is a Baedeker for military and civilians alike who either are part of the command and control process or involved in C2-associated systems.

This book was meant to serve as a textbook in a ten-session course of instruction. In that worthy endeavor it falls short, but not for lack of effort. Because command and control is an inseparable joining of humans and technology, the topic is so rich that, to paraphrase Aristotle, the more one learns the more one realizes how little one really knows. However, Snyder's book succeeds in a far more useful way—as an almanac of clear definitions, cogent insights, and pertinent readings within each of the ten principal areas of command and control.

The initial emphasis of Snyder's work is on establishing a framework in which to define, first, command and control itself, and then C2 systems. The official Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 definition is used, which places equal emphasis on the function of command, the supporting significance of systems, and the commander's use of those systems to control forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preference for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer systems (C4) establishes the boundary of supporting C2 systems, one that contrasts with the Navy, Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association (C4I), and Marine Corps (C2I2) inclusion of intelligence systems. The central focus, however, of both the