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In My View

Robert P. Fairchild
Army National Guard

Bruno Gruenwald

Bradd C. Hayes
U.S. Navy

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IN MY VIEW. . .

The National Guard and the Constitution

Sir:

In his review (*Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1994, pp. 138–9) of Robert B. Sligh's *The National Guard and National Defense*, Major Gary A. Trogdon writes that the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 "would resolve" the state–federal "dilemma" over control of the National Guard. Assigned to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at that time, I vividly recall the lawsuit by Governors Perpich of Minnesota, Dukakis of Massachusetts and others, which led eventually to a Supreme Court ruling on overseas deployment training of the National Guard. (The immediate context involved unit training in Honduras and elsewhere.)

But the 1990 Supreme Court never really "resolved" control of militia forces in any final sense. The U.S. Constitution, which we have sworn to defend, quite explicitly distinguishes and limits the powers of the United States and "the States respectively" (Article I, Section 8).

This power-sharing enshrined in the founding documents of our Republic was intended by the founders to limit the power and authority of the central government. The Constitution has been amended twenty-six times since 1787, but never Article I, Section 8, a fact which attests to the adequacy of that Section.

Otherwise, Major Trogdon wrote a fine book review, for which I thank him.

Robert P. Fairchild
Lt. Col., Army National Guard

Russian National Interest

Sir:

In my view, Captain First Rank Potvorov makes a policy statement in his essay entitled "National Interests, National Security, and the Russian Navy" (*Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1994). The policy statement addresses Churchill's "key" sought for within his famous "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."

Before making the policy statement, Potvorov, as a preamble, makes several points of a defensive nature, i.e., it is "impossible to deny that changes in Russia cause changes throughout the world," the need to "define what Russia's national interests are," etc. A semantic exercise about national interests follows. Then, with a hint of arrogance, he sends his message under the subject of national security.

Although the Warsaw Pact is now history, he cautions that Nato should not broaden, possibly should even "lock its door," and that the UN, for the moment at least, should be the authority in international security affairs. The fact that Russia is a member of the Security Council is purely coincidental.

The three circle narratives too are revealing. Circle I counsels, perhaps admonishes, former republics to form alliances with Mother Russia, particularly military alliances. Identical historical interests and "family, ethnic, and social ties" are among the reasons. Circle II contains, as noted earlier, the admonition "nor should Nato expand its membership," and Circle III an observation, "Even in the post-confrontational world, Russia and 'Circle III' are still very different. . . ."

Potvorov is correct when he says that Russia is neither East or West. That is the enigma—it wants to be both and neither at the same time.

As Russia regains her momentum, "the essence of Russia's military doctrine lies not only in contributing to global and regional stability but also in ensuring that *no state's* armed forces gain such superiority. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

While a great deal more may be said analysing the essay, one detects a return to former attitudes. John M. Collins, in his *Grand Strategy*, prefaced his discussion on national interests with the following: "'Cheshire puss,' she began rather timidly, . . . 'would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' 'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the cat."

Potvorov may be telling us where Russia wants to go. (As an exercise I wonder how an article for a Russian journal written by a U.S. Navy captain on the subject would read, absent having read Potvorov's essay.)

Bruno Gruenwald
Lebanon, Pennsylvania

What They Didn't Say

Sir:

I very much enjoyed reading Captain Ed Smith's article entitled "What ' . . . From the Sea' Didn't Say" (*Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995) and believe he captured the essence of the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort. One might get the mistaken impression from his measured words, however, that the NFCPE group was fairly homogeneous and that its discussions were mostly dispassionate and analytical (with a little "vigorous debate" thrown in). In fact, the debates were many and generally extremely pointed and passionate. The group wrangled for days over the exact nature of the "product" it was supposed to generate. In the end, I believe ". . . From the Sea" provided a long-range focus which was badly needed by the naval service.

It should therefore come as no surprise that I take exception to your implication (in footnote 7, an editor's note) that the NFCPE's view of the role of navies and Frank Uhlig's (which are contained in his article, "How Navies Fight, and Why," in the same issue) are at variance. Mr. Uhlig lists five enduring naval roles, all of which are found within the concepts described in ". . . From the Sea." Mr. Uhlig then asserts there are three purposes for navies, two absolutes and one conditional. "The absolutes are to ensure first that friendly shipping can flow and second that hostile shipping cannot. Once the flow of friendly shipping is assured . . . navies can risk landing an army on a hostile shore, supporting that army with fire and logistics." Although ". . . From the Sea" only briefly discusses "the absolutes" and concentrates on the conditional purpose for the Navy, it does so because no serious threat to America's ability to control the flow of shipping on the high seas exists for the foreseeable future. (See Sean O'Keefe, "Be Careful What You Ask For," and Bradd C. Hayes, "Keeping the Naval Service Relevant," in U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January and October 1993).

What Captain Smith "didn't say" in his article is how far the Navy and Marine Corps have yet to go to reach the vision of an integrated Service presented in ". . . From the Sea." The naval service has yet to develop new integrated command structures, define the make-up of a Naval Expeditionary Force, or expand the integration of Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft. ". . . From the Sea" remains an excellent road map for the future. The greatest testament to this fact is that the naval service's follow-on paper, "Forward . . . From the Sea," adds little to concepts first introduced in its predecessor.

Captain Bradd C. Hayes, U.S. Navy
Assistant Director, Strategic Research Department
Center For Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College