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### What "... From the Sea" Didn't Say

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## What “. . . From the Sea” Didn’t Say

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Captain Edward A. Smith, Jr., U.S. Navy

**A**LTHOUGH MUCH HAS BEEN SAID AND WRITTEN about the white paper “. . . From the Sea,” there has been considerably less discussion of how and why its strategic concept evolved. What assessment of the potential problems and requirements of a new age drove naval planners to conclude that a shift in focus from blue-water to littoral operations was necessary or even possible? How much did the changed requirements reflect the collapse of the Soviet Union? How much were they simply a response to the pressures of Congress and budget? The answers to these questions were not reflected in the final and much-abbreviated document published in September 1992. Nonetheless, they were central to the deliberations that led to the drafting of that paper, and they are central today to understanding the direction our maritime strategy is taking.

The discussions that led to “. . . From the Sea” occurred over a six-month period, from October 1991 through April 1992, in a forum with the uninspiring name, the “Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort.” The NFCPE was an effort to create a new strategic concept, and it began in response to a directive from Secretary of the Navy H.L. Garrett III to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps: they were to assess the naval capabilities the

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Captain Smith, who earned his undergraduate degree at Ohio State University, holds a doctorate in international relations from The American University. After commissioning he served as a surface warfare officer in the destroyer USS *Holder* (DD 819) and as an intelligence officer in combat in Vietnam. Subsequent assignments included duty at the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office, as intelligence briefer to the Secretary of Defense, on the staff of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and as assistant naval attaché in Paris. He was the assistant chief of staff for intelligence of Battle Force Sixth Fleet, participating in the *Achille Lauro* and Gulf of Sidra contingencies, and he made a primary contribution to “. . . From the Sea” while in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ultimately as Deputy Director for Intelligence). Captain Smith is currently a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel.

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United States would need as it entered the next century. The timing of the NFCPE was significant, inasmuch as the study took place amid the death throes of the Soviet Union, in the months after hard-liners attempted but failed to overthrow the government of Mikhail Gorbachev. It was obvious to all NFCPE participants that the old world order was dying and that the United States naval service would have to change. However, the Secretary's instructions were to go beyond simply reacting to the immediate effects of the Soviet collapse, to create "a new zero-based plan for naval forces spanning the next fifteen to twenty years"—to provide, in effect, an entirely new strategic concept for the naval forces of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

The NFCPE was carried out in three phases.<sup>2</sup> During the first, from October through December 1991, soon after the Persian Gulf War, the working group assessed what had and had not changed in the national security environment and what the implications of the changes were for the roles and missions of naval forces. In so doing, the group was to postulate planning assumptions about the future environment for use in later deliberations and to produce a clear vision of the future role of naval forces. The implicit starting point for the first phase was an emphatic "zero": what was it, the analysts were to ask—if *anything*—that naval forces did for the national good that justified the money taxpayers spent to build and maintain them?

During the second phase, from January through April 1992, an expanded group including fleet representatives built upon the assessments of what had and had not changed. It was to develop a new strategic concept, to define the capabilities required to pursue a new maritime strategy, and to complete the first draft of a white paper explaining the new concept. To this end, the group was required to tackle a long list of touchy questions. How could future national security needs in the maritime arena be met at the least possible cost? How could the naval service use its forces more flexibly and better integrate Navy and Marine Corps capabilities? Could the naval service relinquish some of its historical roles? Could the infrastructure at home and abroad be slashed? Finally, and given the declining Soviet threat, what kinds of forces would the United States need for the future? Providing answers to these questions involved wrestling with complex issues of future Navy roles in presence, crisis response, and deterrence, and of the size and character of the force that would be required to fulfill these roles.

The final phase, that of defining the force structure required to provide effective naval capabilities for a new age, began even before the publication of the final white paper, ". . . From the Sea." In effect, it continues today, in the activities of groups such as the Resources Requirements Review Board.

The first two phases of the NFCPE involved discussions of great magnitude and complexity, but it was clear that the final white paper needed to be simple,

direct, and concise if it were to have any value. Therefore the paper could not incorporate in any detail the extensive underlying debate on the issues; rather, it had to limit itself to describing the new strategic concept and the capabilities that it demanded. Today, as the naval service implements “. . . From the Sea” and, at the direction of a new Secretary of the Navy, begins to formulate on that basis a new, formal, maritime strategy, it is useful to revisit some of the NFCPE’s discussions and thereby put the white paper into context.

### What Had Changed?

The decision of the Department of the Navy to undertake the NFCPE was clearly a reaction to a myriad of changes in the country and the world. However, the problem confronting the NFCPE was to identify which of those changes would be decisive for the future of U.S. naval forces—that is, which would have the heaviest impact on future naval requirements. The working group proceeded from two critical assumptions: first, that naval forces would continue to be charged with the defense of American territory, lives, and property; and second, that the United States would continue to exercise a leadership role in the world. These assumptions established a continued requirement to maintain some measure of military force at sea, and a continued need for something more than purely continental defense.

Even using these assumptions, the candidates for consideration as definitive changes were many and varied; they ranged from domestic and global demographic shifts, through ecological and environmental concerns, to problems of budget and prospects for the domestic and world economies. Almost all would certainly affect either the nature of the naval service or the frequency and types of crises it would be called upon to handle. As each candidate was considered, the list gradually narrowed to a small number of broad transformations that were judged to be the most far-reaching and salient for assessing naval roles and missions in the next century. What emerged was a set of three fundamental “sea changes” in the world environment: the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it the Cold War national security order; the rise of global economic interdependence; and the accelerating pace of technological change. These headings were never intended to encompass the totality of ways in which the world of the twenty-first century was likely to be different from that of the twentieth. Rather, these phenomena were deemed essential elements bearing upon the core questions of why and how naval forces would be called upon to do things differently in the future.

***Collapse of the Soviet Union.*** The disintegration of the Soviet Union was an obvious starting point; it had, after all, been the impetus of the entire effort. Its

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importance for the NFCPE stemmed not so much from the loss of a defining naval adversary as from the fact that the collapse signaled a fundamental shift in the world system within which navies would be used. Here was a transformation that evoked parallels to 1815 and the end of the protracted Anglo-French and Napoleonic wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These historical parallels, in fact, gave rise to discussions of how the Royal Navy had dealt with its changing roles and missions and of the pitfalls it had encountered in the first half of the nineteenth century. The focus of the NFCPE discussion, however, was on two specific aspects of the overall Soviet collapse that had altered fundamental aspects of the national security system: the change in the nature of deterrence, and the shift from alliance to coalition as the basis for international security cooperation.

The change in deterrence seemed to affect future requirements for naval forces on several planes. "Deterrence" in its Cold War and Soviet context had always carried an understood, if unstated, prefix—"strategic nuclear." The collapse of the USSR had removed the "strategic nuclear" and "Soviet" blinders and revealed a much more complex problem in which deterrence was no longer exclusively nuclear—or even nuclear, biological, or chemical—in character but was and would remain a core element of military strategy at all levels.

To begin with, the massive nuclear arsenal created by the Soviets continued to exist. Even the most optimistic assessment estimated that the successor states would need years to dismantle it—if they did so at all. Therefore, as during the Cold War, there would continue to be states able to destroy this nation and, thus, some form of "strategic nuclear" deterrent would be required. To be sure, the nature of post-Cold War strategic nuclear deterrence had changed. The deterrence problem had been characterized then by the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction," by which tens of thousands of nuclear warheads on each side were tightly controlled by a single hair trigger but with little likelihood that either side's trigger would actually be pulled. The problem posed by Soviet disintegration was one of multiplied but possibly less reluctant nuclear triggers—that is, an increased likelihood that a smaller number of warheads might be loosed. This continuing, if altered, threat demanded that some form of strategic nuclear forces remain an operative part of the national security equation even as a drawdown in such forces was undertaken by all sides.

However, this relic of Cold War deterrence was overshadowed by new deterrence problems. Far more pressing was that of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence estimates indicated that a growing number of countries would come to possess some form of nuclear, biological, or chemical capability over the next two decades. That prospect seemed to make it dramatically more likely that some regime or non-state actor would actually use a weapon or device, either against its neighbors or against the U.S.—a problem

very different from that of Cold War strategic nuclear confrontation. Here again, the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the Cold War system of client-state relationships was a factor. The Russians were no longer in a position to discourage acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by former Soviet clients or to offer credible security guarantees against neighbors who did acquire them. Further, the Persian Gulf wars had underlined the utility and limits of such weapons for threatening neighbors or deterring outside intervention.

Such a spreading nuclear, biological, and chemical threat posed two additional questions for naval planners. How could naval forces arrest, or at least discourage, the proliferation of such capabilities? What constituted an effective deterrent to their use? The latter in particular provoked vigorous debate over the usefulness

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*"The implicit starting point for the first phase was an emphatic 'zero': what was it, the analysts were to ask—if anything—that naval forces did that justified the money taxpayers spent to build and maintain them?"*

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of a massive nuclear deterrent in dealing with regional states that had only a small arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The NFCPE concluded that potential opponents presumed that any such attack on United States territory would provoke a strategic nuclear response and that therefore a massive U.S. nuclear counterattack under those circumstances was still credible. Similarly, nuclear or biological attacks on United States forces, wherever located, would make a nuclear response almost mandatory and therefore believable as a deterrent.

In other situations—attacks on allies or on non-nuclear states, or threats to use or acquire nuclear and biological weapons—the likelihood (actual and perceived) of the U.S. using its nuclear arsenal to respond became more and more tenuous. The debate concluded that if Americans themselves questioned whether they would actually use their strategic arsenal to retaliate against anything less than a direct attack with weapons of mass destruction on U.S. territory or forces, then, almost by definition, that arsenal's credibility as a deterrent was uncomfortably open to question by others. Further, as the working group deduced, precision guided munitions, which the U.S. had already demonstrated it would use, were probably a far more credible and thus effective deterrent for these "lesser" threats.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pointed to yet another aspect of how deterrence had changed, for the focus of twenty-first-century deterrence was likely to be second and third-tier states rather than the former Soviet Union. This shift implied a considerable broadening in the scope of deterrence, from the highly specific task of deterring global thermonuclear war to the far more extensive one of deterring regional crisis and conflict. To make matters worse,

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projected demographic changes in second and third-tier states, a widening economic gap between haves and have-nots, and an already evident resurgence of religious, ethnic, and tribal hatreds promised no lack of strife for the future.

During the period of Cold War bipolarity, deterrence of such regional conflict had been part of both sides' overall strategy, in the framework of preventing inter-superpower confrontations that could escalate to global war. That same bipolarity had permitted regional actors to balance off one superpower against the other, making possible actions—such as Egypt's attack on Israel in 1973—that might otherwise have provoked superpower intervention. In the absence of an exploitable superpower bipolarity but with continued potential for U.S., U.N., or coalition intervention, these local powers were now left to their own devices in deterring extra-regional involvement. In practice, they had to obtain some means of deterring the United States, without whose participation extra-regional intervention would generally be impossible. As even major local powers lacked the force to defeat the United States militarily, they would have to threaten political rather than military defeat—that is, losses that were politically unacceptable within the United States. Not only was this prospect a clear departure from the parameters of Cold War deterrence, but it implied, with equal clarity, a major change in what naval forces would be called upon to do and how they would do it.

The second major impact of the Soviet collapse was on the system of formal, long-term alliances that had become a constant of international security cooperation. The NFCPE took as given that alliances last only as long as the threat that led to their creation. The question posed by the Soviet collapse was, therefore, how security cooperation would function in the absence of any overarching threat at all. It was problematic whether Nato, the core alliance, would find a new *raison d'être*. In fact, the Gulf War had made it apparent that even a rejuvenated Nato would operate in new modes of cooperation; it would be much more like a coalition—that is, like an informal, temporary alignment of powers to meet a single, transitory threat. For Nato members at least, the alliance structure did evoke habits of cooperation and a base of communication, credibility, and interoperability. However, future operations were likely to be focused outside the Nato area and to involve coalition warfare transcending historical alliance relationships. The problems of setting up and operating a multinational effort to undertake effective military or other national security action would have to be solved on an *ad hoc* basis. In effect, each coalition contingency would require the establishment of Nato-like cooperation, communication, credibility, and interoperability, without the benefit of the alliance's forty-plus years of experience. The successes of Desert Storm, however, invited

the false assumption that a coalition could readily be put together and, despite some difficulties, confidently be expected to function well in combat.<sup>3</sup>

Again, these discussions led the NFCPE to more questions. What difficulties would the United States face in coalition operations not drawing on the legacy of Cold War cooperation? What actions would the U.S. have to take to ensure that future coalitions could be formed and then operate successfully? These questions were particularly relevant since the trends wrought or released by the demise of the Soviet threat all militated against the fundamentals of cooperation that brought success in Desert Storm. Nato military forces themselves were declining precipitately in size and capability. U.S. bases and forces overseas were in steep decline, as were the level and frequency of exercises. These problems and the altered world security structure implied not simply that the old naval mission of "presence" needed updating but rather that it would gain a critical new dimension, that of laying the groundwork for potential multinational efforts. The Desert Storm experience indicated that essential elements had to be in place *before* a coalition became necessary. Long-term (if not necessarily continuous) interaction with potential partners was called for by whatever U.S. or other Nato forces could be brought to bear. However, as overseas bases declined in number, this kind of long-term, preparatory presence and interaction would fall increasingly to naval forces deployed to critical areas.

For the United States naval service, therefore, a twofold effect of the Soviet collapse was seen: it would expand the requirements for effective deterrence from a strategic nuclear context to one far wider in nature, scope, and scale; and it would place renewed emphasis on the traditional roles of presence and crisis response—albeit without the earlier requirement to guard against uncontrolled escalation of local crises into global confrontations. These changes were related, in that any attempt to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction in second and third-tier states, much less to deter crisis and conflict, would rely heavily on the presence and forward deployment of forces.

***Global Economic Interdependence.*** The second major "sea change," the rise of global economic interdependence, was less obvious than the Soviet collapse, but the NFCPE group had little doubt that it would profoundly alter the world. The choice of this issue as a critical one had a major influence on the entire direction of NFCPE discussions, in that it led directly to the core question of what, if anything, the naval service did that made it worth the money taxpayers spent on it. Equally important, the choice was also an implicit recognition that the post-Cold War world would be defined in economic terms far more than in political or military ones. Hence the initial focus of deliberation became the role naval forces would play in protecting the economic security of the United States during the twenty-first century. As the discussion of the nature of economic



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interdependence proceeded, however, two questions became central. What were the national security interests, economic and otherwise, that naval forces would be called upon to defend overseas? How might naval forces support the application of U.S. and allied *economic* power?

The idea of global economic interdependence implied an expanding network of interests and trade that would constitute an increasingly important element of American national economic strength. The military and naval connection to national economic security, however, was not made clear in contemporary policy or academic writings. That interdependence meant an inextricable linkage of the U.S. economy to a widening circle of other economies had gone largely unstated, as had the fact that the preservation of a stable global environment conducive to peaceful economic growth had in turn become essential to the long-term welfare of the United States itself. Thus, “global economic interdependence” was really a set of interlocking *dependencies* that would make even a continental-scale economy like the American one vulnerable to crisis and conflict abroad. This linkage between economic interests and a stabilizing security strategy indicated that the traditional missions of crisis deterrence and response would take on a new economic significance, but it also pointed to other “economic” roles—some familiar, some not—that military forces might be expected to play in the future.

The traditional Cold War concern with maintaining access to overseas resources and markets remained, but in a globally interdependent world it had changed in emphasis. Economic interdependence meant that the Navy would still be concerned with ensuring access to resources and markets, but not, as previously, with doing so specifically in time of war. Therein, however, lay a problem, for while the military requirements of wartime access were relatively clear, securing peacetime access carried unsavory connotations of the gunboat diplomacy of the nineteenth century, something that would have no place in the twenty-first. What was called for was recognition that a subtler “presence” could help ensure that American interests, economic and otherwise, were taken into account abroad. Similarly, the long-standing task of protecting American lives overseas took on a new economic meaning in connection with the dispersion of commercial and technological talent that enabled the U.S. to compete in the global economy. The picture which began to emerge was one of a complex network of interests on which naval forces would have perhaps an indirect, but nonetheless important, impact.

The working group attempted to collect American economic interests around the world in a manageable and straightforward list suitable for contingency planning. This effort was unsuccessful, because it demonstrated the opposite—that there *was* no limited set of economic interests or, accordingly, of countries or contingencies in which the United States would be compelled to act. Further,

as operations in Liberia, Haiti, and Somalia underlined, no list of economic interests and related contingencies could by any means define all possibilities. Indeed, the message of economic interdependence seemed to be that despite an occasional wistful yearning toward isolationism on the part of some Americans, the future would be one not simply of global economic interdependence but rather of global interdependence pure and simple. In that future, political and economic national security would be increasingly entwined and, from the standpoint of naval planning, indistinguishable.

Perhaps more important than the attempt to define individual economic interests and related naval missions was the NFCPE's recognition that *potential* American interests in an interdependent world were truly global and that therefore the range of regional instabilities that could affect U.S. national interests was very broad indeed. This universality did not suggest that American naval forces would be called upon to be global policemen—they had neither the resources nor the willingness to assume any such role. It did suggest, given the inability to forecast future crises accurately, that the naval service could not hope to plan forces or capabilities on the basis of any limited geographic list of concerns either now or (especially) over the long term. Inevitably, it was noted, the crisis that actually arose would be number twenty-one on a list of twenty—if it had been put on the list at all. This factor was particularly acute for naval forces, as they must expect to become involved in the smaller and less predictable crises. The upshot was that one had to be able to deal with whole categories of problems, anywhere, rather than be ready for only the "most likely" contingencies.

While the idea of global economic interdependence did little to delimit or identify the objectives of naval operations in the future, it did point to increasing reliance on economic pressure to deter or contain conflict and crisis. That is, the greater the economic interdependence, the more numerous the external trade dependencies and, at least theoretically, the more acute the susceptibility to outside economic pressures.<sup>4</sup> Present and future sanctions-enforcement operations might differ very little from those of the nineteenth century, but, as the very idea of global economic interdependence suggested, the trade they now sought to interdict was substantially different in scope and complexity from that of the earlier age. That consideration suggested a reason for the limited success of recent efforts to enforce sanctions—that naval forces could no longer act independently in this role but required close interaction with other agencies of national and international economic power. In effect, it appeared, only when specific and targetable vulnerabilities were identified and the trade to be interdicted was reliably tracked could naval forces effectively enforce sanctions. A corollary to this inference was that whereas sanction enforcement could be

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highly resource-intensive, the better its focus and direction, the fewer the ships needed.

The lessons the NFCPE drew from its assessment of the impact of global economic interdependence upon the naval service were, then, two: that naval forces could not usefully plan to meet only a limited list of contingencies but would have to prepare to react anywhere on the face of the globe; and that operations in support of economic sanctions would need to be taken into account and would require an unprecedented degree of intra- and inter-governmental coordination.

***Accelerating Technological Change.*** The problems posed by the accelerating pace of technological change were the subject of much discussion within the NFCPE—not as to what changes and technology might confront the United States but on how to deal with a constant and rather unpredictable state of technological change. Two aspects of this permanent state of technological transition were of concern in planning for future naval capabilities. The first had to do with technologies the military would face or to which it would have access; the second was the role an increasingly instantaneous mass media would play in the conduct of future naval operations.

For most of the Cold War, military and civilian technologies had been largely separate, with the military technologies more heavily funded and generally more advanced than those of the civilian sector. With few exceptions, the situation was now reversed. Constant technological change was likely to mean that the civilian sector, especially in such areas as information technologies, would be better funded and would grow at geometric rates. For their part, military technologies tended to be subsumed into large, highly complex systems, and they were tied to a lengthy and often cumbersome acquisition process—a combination that condemned them to, at best, arithmetic rates of growth. As sophistication of military technologies increased, so too did the time required to develop and field new weapons. The drawdown in defense budgets in the United States and elsewhere only compounded the problem by lengthening lead-times and reducing margins for error. Finally, technological change in the future might be so far-reaching as to make any naval forces planned now obsolescent before they entered service. Short of wartime, it was assessed, the gap between military and civilian technology would not be closed, and the challenge for military planners would be to exploit quickly and efficiently the technological advances of the civilian sector. From this perspective, then, a permanent state of accelerating technological change confronted military planners with the dual problem of how to maintain sufficient flexibility in both hardware and

the acquisition process to take advantage of "off the shelf" civilian technology as it became available, and of how to deal with opponents who could do likewise.

The former was a formidable but tractable problem. The latter, however—essentially a question of dual-use technology proliferation—posed a more difficult challenge, one whose scope could not be bounded sufficiently to permit rational long-term planning. If a system could be bought on the open market without the expense of the military research and development normally required, then any state, or even non-state, might obtain and use it. The threat of technological surprise took on wider meaning in such circumstances, and military technological superiority became a matter of scale and operational adaptability rather than of aggregate system capabilities. Indeed, given an opponent who needed only to inflict damage on a force, not defeat it, a high-technology arms race became possible in which small but critical acquisitions by a potential opponent could compel substantial efforts to produce an effective deterrent.

The core problem of the accelerating pace of civilian and military technological change was that of adaptation, whether to the opportunities or the threats presented by new advances. The corollary was a mounting need to monitor technological change, to understand its military potential, and to track its proliferation—a new, urgent aspect of the old problem of technological surprise.

The second major impact of technological change was seen in the development of instantaneous mass media—in the NFCPE's shorthand, "the CNN factor." It was apparent that the success of future military operations, particularly in crisis response, would be defined in political as well as military terms and that political success in turn would be heavily dependent on media response. The implications were that the media could no longer be excluded from operations and that planning needed to consider how results would be reported in the press. Desert Storm coverage had underlined a whole range of relevant factors: casualties and damage to own forces, immediacy of response, proportionality of means, and collateral damage, to name a few. The Iraq experience also highlighted the degree to which both parties to a conflict are "served" by reportage; Central Command planners had had to consider not only how actions would be portrayed to the American public, whose continued support was needed for success, but also what problems and opportunities the same coverage would present to Saddam Hussein.

The direction of technological change was clearly toward further increase in the simultaneity of media coverage and, more interestingly, toward its ever more rapid global dissemination. This development seemed likely to have only a limited impact in the information-saturated West, but it stood to play a major

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role in countries of the second and third tier, where control of the media was tantamount to control of the state.

**Assessing Threats.** An undercurrent throughout the discussion of the three “sea changes” was uncertainty as to exactly how they would affect the size and nature of the threats naval forces would face. Indeed, the 1992 National Military Strategy, with which the NFCPE group worked, had defined the threat itself in terms of uncertainty and of the risk of being caught unprepared.<sup>5</sup> Planners and intelligence analysts in the NFCPE concluded that they were confronted with a threefold problem:

- for the short term, of assessing how rapidly the old Cold War military threats were declining, so as to be able to draw down forces rationally;
- for the middle and longer term, of determining what the residual military threat would be, so as to be able to plan the right force structure for the naval service; and,
- for beyond the foreseeable future, of defining what manner of military threat might force the U.S. to reconstitute all or part of the military-industrial base the nation was now planning to dismantle.

With respect to the third issue, the NFCPE working group was careful to note that the narrow margins of security being assumed in planning for the middle-to-long term rested on the superiority of American military technology in a number of critical areas. Thus, a hypothetical threat that could compel reconstitution had to be envisioned in terms not only of some new global adversary that would cause a general, massive rearmament, but also—and perhaps more importantly—of lesser opponents with access to advanced systems that undercut a technological advantage underpinning the margin of security. An example would be a potential enemy’s acquisition of an effective counter to stealth or to cruise missiles.

To make matters worse, the ambiguities of the military threats that forces were to face would be compounded over time. The further into the future the NFCPE attempted to project, the more uncertain became the supporting threat assessments provided to it and the greater were the risks of wagering scarce resources on the wrong programs. Yet there was no way to avoid crucial decisions on programs that might take ten or fifteen years to enter service and might remain at the core of naval capabilities for thirty or forty years beyond that. In effect, the NFCPE was being asked to map out, for the first half of the next century, strategy and structure to address a series of unknowns. To gauge those unknowns, to discern something of the size and nature of the military threat therefore became critical, with respect to both what navies could do to deal with the new world and what they would need to do it.

In these deliberations, the working group accepted from the start that it was not possible to predict any specific crisis, threat, or weapon system that U.S. naval forces might face twenty, thirty, or fifty years hence. At the same time, the group recognized that a purely "generic" threat was insufficient even for planning, much less for convincing a reluctant public to pay for what one hoped would be adequate forces. Fortunately, intelligence analysts supporting the NFCPE were able to be specific enough to provide some indication of the scale and sophistication of forces that might be encountered. It was vital therefore to distinguish carefully between what intelligence could and could not know.

Intelligence could not predict future intentions. Thus one could not know how much specific countries would spend on defense or which weapons and systems they would buy over the next decades. By extension, therefore, it also could not be known what the orders of battle would be in 2010 and beyond, or what specific weapons and military capabilities U.S. naval forces would face.

On the other hand, intelligence *could* know, with an acceptable margin of error, what a given country's population and general economic situation probably would be from 2010 to 2020 as well as, again in general terms, its economic and educational infrastructure and its technological and industrial base.

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From these relatively reliable outlines, analysts could extrapolate what a nation's military potential might be, should it decide to exercise a military option.

One result was a rough measure of the scale of military forces a country might generate and sustain; the measure used as an index the maximum number of men who could be sustained under arms and postulated Iraq as the standard for a major regional power. Similarly, the maturity of a state's domestic technological and industrial base and its ability to buy expensive military technology in the international arms market (which was assumed to be fairly open) provided an index of the likely level of sophistication of its military forces.

Using these parameters, very rough indices of scale and sophistication of military forces were established. Countries were assessed simply as able to generate either small, medium, or large-scale forces and of being able to produce (or procure and then maintain) either low, medium, or high-technology systems in suitable quantities. Nations were then grouped by region. In most regions, all countries fell into the small-to-medium category as to scale and into the low-to-medium one for technology. However (the vestigial but still formidable Russia aside), two regions—Northeast Asia and the Middle East—contained

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countries with both the demographic and economic wherewithal to raise and maintain large-scale forces and to equip them with modern, if not state-of-the-art, technology. Likewise, both areas not only encompassed economic and security interests of the United States but would be affected by direct products of the postulated "sea changes": access to weapons of mass destruction, insusceptibility to deterrence, released ethnic hatreds, and technological proliferation. The implication was that even in the absence of a Soviet threat there remained the potential for regional challenges supported by formidable arrays of military force.

Since the naval armaments that would be operational through at least 2010, if not 2020, were for the most part already in existence or being built, planned, or developed, the NFCPE team could also project what kinds of technologies might be available on the international arms market. That analysis, in turn, would characterize the systems that would be on the market, or at least the levels of sophistication represented, as well as when they might be offered, at what cost, and in what numbers. A "trickle-down" effect was assumed that in turn implied a hierarchy of sophistication. That is, "high-technology" militaries might be expected to have at least a substantial quantity of the most modern equipment available; "medium-technology" forces would possess hardware one or two generations old; and "low-tech" militaries would be limited to weapons more than two generations removed from the "state of the market."

This analysis gave a concrete enough idea of who and what might pose a military threat to allow the group usefully to ask what kinds of military threats U.S. future naval forces might have to deal with and how widespread each kind might be. The latter provided an important clue for U.S. force planning; it suggested that relatively small numbers of older, less sophisticated naval units would suffice to operate in most parts of the world but that in two or three regions large and higher-technology forces would still be required.

Taken together, the process of bounding the future threat "picture" and isolating the three fundamental worldwide "sea changes" delineated some radical changes in the operational environment of naval forces. It seemed to the NFCPE, nevertheless, that much in the roles and missions of the future would resemble historical, traditional models more than they did those of just the last fifty years. The next step, therefore, was to examine something that appeared not to have changed fundamentally: what navies did.

### What Had Not Changed

Because the mandated starting point for both the first and second phases of the NFCPE was "zero," its members were forced to grapple with a number of basic questions about what navies in general, and the U.S. naval service in

particular, did. How did naval forces contribute to the national good? How had they done so in the past? Would those functions differ in the future given the end of the Cold War and the presumed absence of a blue-water threat? If so, how? What roles might naval forces be expected to play in the unfolding world scene? This analysis involved an attempt, using universal or legislatively mandated functions for the armed forces as well as a broad historical perspective, to reduce what naval forces did to a set of "constants." These constants could then be considered in light of changes in the world environment to see how the new core missions would differ from the Cold War paradigms.

***Why Does a Nation Need Naval Forces?*** The answer was boiled down to two quintessential functions: keeping peace and waging war. These two functions were seen not as entirely distinct but rather as broad, overlapping spheres of activity. Further, they were envisioned as lying on both sides of the threshold of violence, with, for example, peacekeeping sometimes involving the violent application of force and warfare sometimes stopping short of it. Taken together, the possibilities formed a continuum, with routine peacetime operations at one end, global war at the other, and contingency campaigns and various levels of regional conflict between.

Within this schema, the wartime function of naval forces, whether in regional or global conflict, was by far the easiest to define and understand: "prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea"—or *from the sea*.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the whole focus of those parts of U.S. Code and Defense Department directives outlining military responsibilities was on war. Disagreement aside as to the scale and nature of the forces required for them, the roles themselves were well understood and accepted by the naval officers in the NFCPE study group, and they were familiar to the public at large.<sup>7</sup>

Such ready understanding was emphatically not the case with regard to "peace operations," either in the aggregate or the particular. First, the concept itself was unclear. It implied peacemaking and peacekeeping—that is, producing or enforcing a cessation of hostilities—but it might equally extend to vaguer notions of "nation building." Routine peacetime naval activities in and near potential crisis areas were obviously involved, as matters of forward presence and deterrence, but there was little agreement as to how they entered the equation or on what scale.

Second, while within the Navy there seemed to be at least a visceral understanding of forward peacetime operations and overseas presence, there was less appreciation of such operations outside the service—as a succession of visitors to the NFCPE made abundantly plain. Indeed, most non-naval visitors seemed to view peacetime operations as a matter solely of training or of being in position to react to a crisis—a function, they assumed, that U.S.-based air forces would



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be as well, or better, placed to fulfill. There was no broad understanding even within the naval service of the peculiar capabilities maritime forces brought to an unfolding crisis or, indeed, of why they often seemed to be the instrument of choice for political leaders dealing with crises overseas. Finally, and again even within the Navy, appreciation of the deterrent role of naval forces was hobbled by the habitual association of “deterrence” with the phrase “strategic nuclear.” Any broader sense of the word that encompassed the idea of “crisis deterrence” was ill defined and lacked concrete connection to peacetime operations or forward presence. Indeed, there was a vigorous debate even among the naval officers in the NFCPE group over how, if at all, presence contributed to deterring crises.

The naval role in peace operations seemed clearest both to NFCPE analysts and outside visitors in the area of crisis response. It was generally conceded that navies had historically played a leading, if not predominant, role in crisis response, but there was considerable ambiguity both as to how that role had now changed in the absence of superpower competition and how it was defined in the context of peace operations. To appreciate the overall concepts of peace operations and warfighting, and to identify the “constants” in these traditional naval missions, the NFCPE reviewed the roles naval forces had played in crises over the preceding forty years.

**Naval Forces in Crises.** It was evident that many analysts outside the Navy were assuming that “navies fight navies” and that, absent a blue-water Soviet threat, the necessity for U.S. naval involvement in crises would decrease. To the contrary, the working group found that the history of U.S. military responses to crises throughout the post-World War II period indicated otherwise.

At the request of the NFCPE, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) updated a 1978 study, *Force without War*, by Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan.<sup>8</sup> This update found that from 1946 to 1991 there had been 325 instances in which U.S. military forces of some description had responded to a crisis—more than seven per year. Of these, only about 12 percent had involved *any* Soviet military reaction, and for the last ten years, none at all. Of course it could have been argued that U.S. military actions had been motivated by the *potential* for Soviet involvement, but there had been about five military responses to crises per year since the effective end of that possibility. Apparently there was some “normal” frequency of crises, not related to Cold War rivalries, that—barring a decisive shift in national security strategy—the U.S. would continue to meet with military force in the future. What, then, were the parameters of naval involvement in “normal” crises?

It was immediately apparent that most crisis responses by the United States military were not on the scale of Desert Storm. Most, indeed, were rather minor

incidents, involving a wide variety of security problems and falling far short of violence, much less organized conflict. Since the late 1970s, the most frequent reason for U.S. military reactions had been threats to American citizens, followed closely by internal wars and revolts, and then by invasions or cross-border threats. The majority of crises, 63 percent, had occurred in the Middle East. Most responses had been on a very limited scale and had used only forces available in the immediate area—due at least in part to the fact that there had often been little or no warning from intelligence. Reactions tended to be brief, more than half lasting thirty-five days or less, one in five less than ten days. Time had been a factor in the small scale of responses, as it had effectively limited the ability of the United States and allies to bring forces to bear.

Throughout the Cold War period and up to the year of the NFCPE, it had been maritime forces that had most frequently responded. About 83 percent of all U.S. military responses from 1946 to 1991 had included naval forces, with about half the reactions being solely naval. Since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, with its emphasis on joint operations, fewer operations had been exclusively naval in character, but a far greater proportion, 95 percent, had at least involved naval units. Of the naval responses since 1977, around 70 percent had involved aircraft carriers, around 59 percent had involved Marines, and 17 percent surface combatants only.

Two underlying constants accordingly suggested themselves. First, in crisis response, sea-based forces are chosen to counter a wide variety of local *land*-based forces; the focus is littoral, not “blue-water.” That is, naval forces are not used simply to counter other naval forces; very few who instigate U.S. reaction have any real maritime capability of their own. Second, it is an intrinsic quality of naval units, whether in combination with other armed forces or without them, that makes them an instrument of choice. Their repeated use over forty-five years reflects more than simply a predilection of individual decision makers toward the Navy.

These points were significant not because of any inclination in the NFCPE to believe that “naval forces can do it alone”—they cannot—but because they emphasized that any future joint strategy had to take into account the inherent usefulness of sea-based forces in responding to crises. The question of what it was that maritime forces uniquely brought to the table was central to the NFCPE assessment of where they fit into overall U.S. requirements across the spectrum of conflict.

The history of post-Second World War crises indicated that most of the unique qualities of maritime forces arise from the fact that they operate in and from an environment of almost universally accepted international character—the high seas; further, the importance of this fact is linked to the politics and timing of crisis responses. This political context and the requirement for precise

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orchestration in turn helped the group define some important distinctions between military requirements for peacetime operations and those for wartime. It observed that the use of military forces in peace and crisis is far more constrained by politico-diplomatic considerations—and thus timing—than is true in open combat. In slightly different terms, peacetime operational requirements stress tight control over the visibility of military action, particularly in the sensitive early stages. Thus, the potential utility of military forces as an instrument of policy tends to vary according not only to what the forces can do but also to the degree to which the conspicuousness and timeliness of their action can be managed.

In crisis reactions, the timeliness of a military option was seen to be a function both of how quickly a force can be brought to bear and of how long it can be sustained. Both are factors in how avoidable and credible a potential response is perceived to be—that is, how valuable as a deterrent it is. For example, a threatened action that all know cannot unfold within the probable time frame of the crisis or that might be forestalled by diplomatic or political action will probably not be very credible. Likewise, a single act that demonstrably cannot be sustained or repeated invites the opponent to “ride it out”—again limiting its utility as a deterrent.

The NFCPE saw a similar situation with respect to the question of visibility. If United States policymakers seek to calm a situation or avoid a crisis, military actions are likely to be kept low-key; anything requiring permission of third countries and thus high-profile diplomatic action tantamount to coalition-building or involving significant publicity is unlikely to be of much use. This interdependence of visibility and timeliness is prominent in the mechanics of crisis development and resolution. Further, the NFCPE observed, as a contingency develops and a political decision is made either deliberately to raise military

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visibility or simply to accept the consequences of it, a tradeoff arises with timeliness: the greater the profile of the military reaction required, the greater the likelihood of delay in obtaining any required foreign approval. In practical terms, therefore, forces that take longer to get to the crisis area but require no diplomatic preliminaries and can therefore assume lower visibility early on, might actually be the first units on the scene once a political decision is made to take decisive action.

This visibility-timeliness tradeoff indicated to the working group that forward seaborne forces might well remain the core of the U.S. military reaction far into a crisis. In terms of both crisis and transition to war, there appeared a strong likelihood of heavy reliance on the sea-based elements of joint forces to provide initial capability on the scene and to secure the initial entry into the area, such as by seizing ports and airfields needed to disembark and sustain the (usually heavier) follow-on forces.

Finally, the NFCPE perceived that as a crisis winds down, visibility again becomes a political consideration. It noted that the political objective shifts in the post-crisis period from resolving the problem to enforcing the measures by which it has been resolved, achieving controlled de-escalation, and restoring regional stability—implying a sharply different set of military force options. Supporting such political objectives may mean retaining substantial forces on station—but out of sight—throughout the denouement, however protracted. A further complication is the strong likelihood that foreign or coalition support will diminish more quickly than the residual threat, leaving on-scene U.S. forces exposed and with a declining base of local support.

The questions of timing and visibility, together, suggested to the NFCPE group one intrinsic quality that made maritime forces the centerpiece of crisis reactions: their ability to operate *from* the sea. The implications of this ability became more apparent as the roles of these forces for presence, surge, and deterrence were traced across the spectrum of conflict: from peacetime operations (including presence) to low-intensity conflict (including law enforcement, anti-terrorism, peacekeeping, contingency operations, and peacemaking), to regional conflicts, and finally even to global war (with its attendant requirements for reconstitution).

***The Spectrum of Conflict.*** For the NFCPE, peacetime operations were characterized by a duality of objectives and effects. Activities in themselves routine, such as training and maintenance, the analysts perceived, clearly can fulfill another operational purpose as well, depending on where and how they are conducted. Thus, “upkeep,” that is, maintenance, in a foreign port, might equally exercise U.S. access to those facilities, ensuring their continued availability on a low-profile, apparently routine basis in incipient crises. Similarly, training with the forces of other nations quickly becomes a military-to-military tie, establishing the credibility of U.S. forces and enhancing interoperability with potential coalition partners. This point suggested to the NFCPE that such ordinary activities are in fact a fundamental aspect of peacetime operations and that they have a place in the “peacetime presence” part of the spectrum of conflict.

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For naval forces, such peacetime operations were seen as essentially global in scope, limited only by the extent of the high seas and the time-honored diplomatic regime for navies. They seemed to embody an “enabling” function applicable to a number of strategic objectives. Diplomatically, a highly visible presence like a pattern of port visits helps to develop links with local leaders and citizenry, shows continued U.S. interest and commitment, and, indirectly, ensures that its interests are taken into account. From the standpoint of national security, operations and exercises with local forces demonstrate U.S. capability and lay a groundwork for meaningful cooperation as coalition partners, should that later be necessary. These activities and objectives—which do not differ in substance from those of navies for the past two centuries—had been an underlying, if unstated, aspect of the Cold War, but it was clear that they met the requirements of a changed world order as well.

Indeed, future peacetime operations were deemed likely to differ from those of the Cold War in only three respects: the increased necessity to seek out opportunities for local overseas interaction, increased reliance on routine overseas naval presence as the most acceptable and least intrusive means of maintaining contacts, and a new ability to arrange U.S. naval operations strictly with regard to local needs and not to having potentially to deal with Soviet forces in the area. The NFCPE group was quick to note two significant effects of the last point on forces and capabilities. First, it was also no longer necessary actually to be everywhere all the time, but simply to be *able* to be anywhere at the right time, with the forces needed. Second, the carrier battle group no longer needed to be the common denominator. These two points were thought particularly significant in that they suggested that considerable economies of force might be safely obtained by precisely tailoring the forces to situations.

The operative aspect of peacetime operations, then, was regarded as the ability of naval forces to take advantage of the international character of the high seas to remain non-intrusive and non-threatening while operating in a given region. Nonetheless, participants readily recognized that “presence” went well beyond the essentially diplomatic and coalition-building functions of peacetime operations, extending to low-intensity conflict. The nature of these activities had much influence on the capabilities required for effective presence. The NFCPE analysts divided low-intensity conflict into two general realms, *law enforcement* and *conflict deterrence*.

Law enforcement operations were distinguished by the fact that they were aimed at individuals and groups rather than state actors. They would include the traditional naval function of deterring piracy but extend as well to antiterrorist operations, such as the reaction to the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, and to counter-narcotics. In each case the forces required, at least for individual operations,

would be small, but the standing presence required would be more or less continuous and might in the aggregate involve substantial numbers, as in the case of counternarcotics patrols. Conflict deterrence, on the other hand, was a broad category that encompassed *counterinsurgency*, *peacekeeping*, *peacemaking*, and *contingency* operations. In contrast to law enforcement, it would be directed against actual or would-be state entities, and the forces required would be larger, potentially requiring a surge capability. However, continuous presence would not be required (with the caveat that limited time might be available to respond to some events, such as threats to U.S. citizens).

Contingency operations, in which there was a particular need for large forces close at hand, was further broken down into *shows of force*, *non-combatant evacuation operations* (NEO), and *raids*, or reprisals. The first and second were largely self-explanatory and (with such exceptions as opposed NEOs) seemed unlikely to cross the threshold of violence. The raid, however, was a limited-war proposition; as such it evoked a special set of requirements and became the subject of particular investigation and discussion in the NFCPE.

The concept of a raid, or contingency strike, in the NFCPE construct illustrated in many ways the overlap of peacetime and warfighting functions. Unlike peacetime "presence" operations, the geographic scope of a raid would be very narrow, generally limited to specific targets. Also, it would be of extremely short duration; for the most part, raids would involve action "across the beach" followed by a rapid withdrawal once objectives were achieved. Second, a raid would emphatically not be a "campaign." It would be preemptive and either retaliatory or demonstrative in nature and sharply circumscribed as to time frame and area, though it might be very intense. Also, the success of a raid would hinge on detailed planning. In practice, the upshot was that a given raid might have to be a single-service effort, depending on what forces were immediately available. Whatever joint capabilities could be usefully brought to bear would be used, and especially the national intelligence support on which targeting would heavily rely.

Finally, and to a degree not matched by other forms of wartime or peacetime operations, success of a raid would be judged in political and media-reaction terms. Planning would therefore tend to focus on avoiding losses, producing visible results but only "acceptable" (i.e., limited in amount and type) collateral damage, and minimizing delay between provocation and response. These latter considerations, particularly speed of response, also implied that a raid would probably be a unilateral American action.

In the realm of warfighting—that is, *lesser regional conflict*, *major regional conflict*, and *global war*—interesting relationships with other parts of the spectrum emerged. The term "lesser regional conflict" had been discounted in most

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Defense Department discussions (in favor of acknowledging a range of such conflicts), but it offered the NFCPE group some distinctions useful for the “gray area” between the raid and major regional conflict. For example, like a raid, a lesser regional conflict would be limited geographically, usually to a single country or border area, but its military operations would no longer take place “across the beach” but rather both off and on shore. Also, and unlike the raid, the lesser regional conflict *would* be a campaign and, therefore, of indeterminate duration—a factor that would drastically affect the issues of visibility and timeliness. In further contrast to the raid, a lesser regional conflict could not be handled solely by forward-deployed “presence” forces but clearly would require reinforcement and sustainment. Nonetheless, unlike major regional or global conflicts, it would involve little or no mobilization of reserves. In another distinction from low-intensity raid operations, some damage and loss was to be expected and, within limits, would be accepted by the public and media; the criterion here would be to minimize losses while winning the campaign. Finally, this form of conflict could not be unilateral but must involve at least one local ally—the aggrieved party—or, where possible and perhaps after a period of time, a coalition.

The NFCPE envisioned the next point on the spectrum, major regional conflict, as retaining many aspects of lesser regional conflict, but again the group noted important differences. First, the geographic scope of major regional conflict might be expected to be larger, potentially extending to the entire region and the contiguous seas. Therefore, there might be a blue-water naval component; at a minimum, however, the conflict would stretch beyond the immediate offshore area and involve substantial ground and air elements, which would in turn require sustainment from the sea and therefore uninhibited control of the sea lines of communication. Also, and unlike lower levels, major regional conflicts would be increasingly likely to involve at least the presence of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction, and even in their absence there might well be conventionally armed tactical ballistic missiles. On the other hand, like a lesser regional conflict, any major regional conflagration would be not a single operation but a campaign, perhaps more than one. It might, however, be of longer duration than a lesser regional conflict, its military operations probably far larger, more intense, and more complex. Therefore, it would require a range of capabilities necessitating a large-scale mobilization of reserves and at least a partial mobilization of the economy to obtain materiel and convey it to the theater.

While public and media support would remain crucial to the long-term success of the conflict, the emphasis in the major regional conflict would be on sustaining that support and winning the conflict. The implication for the NFCPE

was that while campaign planners would have to avoid major or protracted losses, moderate losses had to be expected and more or less accepted. Further, large-scale reinforcement and sustainment would be critical to the success of any major regional conflict, limited only by hedges against a second major conflict. Finally, this level of regional conflict would be likely to require not only the full range of American military capabilities but also significant coalition support, potentially to the degree that unilateral U.S. action without it would be risky or even, over the short term, impossible.

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*"[It] was no longer necessary actually to be everywhere all the time, but simply to be able to be anywhere at the right time, with the forces needed."*

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With regard to global war, the NFCPE saw that the likelihood of a "bolt from the blue" nuclear holocaust was greatly diminished, but it noted the potential for "multiple major regional conflicts" short of nuclear annihilation. (One participant observed that World War II had been, in essence, "just" two simultaneous major regional conflicts.) The idea of such a "limited" global conflict offered some useful nuances with respect to other levels of conflict (some of which may reinforce its improbability). To begin with, concern in such a global conflict would necessarily focus on the use of weapons of mass destruction, whether directly against the United States, as in a missile or terrorist attack, or in regional contexts. As in the earlier concept of global thermonuclear war, the duration of the conflict would in effect equal the rate of escalation: if the rate of escalation could be controlled, the conflict could devolve into a World War II-style war of attrition; if not, it could escalate into the classic holocaust nightmare. In the latter case, though mass destruction might be limited to a single region, the ecological impact would be global. If uncontrolled escalation did not occur, the conflict would entail a series of campaigns probably on a continental scale, possibly involving significant action on the oceans. Finally, in view of the potential scale of these operations, full military and industrial mobilization would be required. Unlike the case of major regional conflict, however, the focus here would be on allocating forces and materiel, as they became available, among a variety of fronts.

The short and mid-term probability of such a war seemed to the NFCPE remote, to say the least. It was thought worth noting, however, that there were gradations of "global" conflict and that its characteristics could be seen at a level far below the total nuclear holocaust to which the Cold War had conditioned thinking. In fact, it required only a sharply marked diminution of U.S. and Western forces, and a sharp increase in the capability of—and access to weapons of mass destruction by—two or more regional powers or coalitions. Global



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conflict, in essence, could be engendered by little more than the simultaneous outbreak of two Desert Storms.

### The Real Effort Begins

The NFCPE's review of crisis response and the use of military force across the spectrum of conflict indicated that the central functions of naval force had not altered substantially as a result of the "sea changes" at the end of the Cold War. What was different, rather, was the effort needed to exert effective military force at various levels of conflict. It was obvious that considerably less military force would be required to avoid global thermonuclear war.<sup>9</sup> Less obvious, and much debated, was the rise in the magnitude of effort needed to deal with major regional opponents, either to provide credible presence and reaction forces or to act decisively in conflicts, particularly in the two or three regions where long-term, large-scale, and well-equipped opposition was likely. That shift in relative scale of effort was the result of a narrowing of the margin of superiority over regional powers that the U.S. and its allies had enjoyed during the Cold War. That convergence, in turn, reflected both deep cutbacks in Western defense spending and the continued or expanded outlays of some regional powers. The NFCPE observed that much of the current American margin of superiority had been built on the technological fruits of the Cold War and was, therefore, vulnerable not only to post-Cold War budget cuts but also to the sale of critical dual-use technologies on the world market. Compounding the effect of this problem was the fact that in adopting a littoral strategy the U.S. naval service was committing itself "to go in harm's way" where regional powers would be strongest—and the fact that, in the wake of Desert Storm successes, it would be expected to do so with few or no losses.

In its ultimate product, the white paper ". . . From the Sea," the Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort provided a strategic concept—not a force plan, a new maritime strategy, or a naval doctrine. The NFCPE defined the post-Cold War need for a flexible littoral strategy, outlined the types of capabilities naval forces would require to implement it in a joint context, and called for development of appropriate naval strategies and tactics. In short, the real effort began only when the NFCPE's work ended. ". . . From the Sea" was and will remain a challenge for force planners, strategists, and tacticians. Given fixed or falling defense budgets, the force planner's dilemma in implementing the concept will be troubling: how to provide naval forces in sufficient quantity and quality to deal with the crises and conflicts of the present while maintaining critical margins of technological superiority for the

future. This delicate orchestrating of strategy, tactics, requirements, and capabilities—amid periodic changes in budgetary rudder and the constant danger of misstep—continues today.

### Notes

1. Secretary of the Navy, H.L. Garrett III, memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)/Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), 20 November 1991.

2. During the first phase, working group participants were primarily officers in the grade of commander, captain, lieutenant colonel, and colonel drawn from the staffs of the CNO, CMC, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MC.CDC). The effort was chaired by Vice Admiral L. W. Smith, USN, and Lieutenant General H. C. Stackpole, USMC, through a six-member flag steering group headed by Rear Admiral Ted Baker and Major General Matt Caulfield. This structure was maintained in the second phase, but the working group was broadened to encompass a full spectrum of operational expertise and fleet representation. Over the course of the study the working group conducted a series of very frank and not-for-attribution exchanges with a stream of visitors, who included the Secretary and Undersecretary of the Navy, CNO, CMC, warfare area sponsors, intelligence personnel, civilian and military planners, senior congressional staff members, and other defense thinkers from both inside and outside the government. The group also took advantage of a growing body of published material that included President George Bush's Aspen address and also speeches and articles by Senators Sam Nunn and John McCain and Congressman Les Aspin. Some of this material was later provided to three and four-star participants in a February 1992 seminar-type wargame.

3. That assumption ignored the fact (clear to the working group) that the basis for the success of the Desert Storm coalition had been built during and because of the Cold War. Cooperation and communication were possible because, in most cases, the partners either were Nato members and continued to use Nato procedures or had established Cold War ties to Nato members. The credibility that made regional states willing to join the coalition had been established by forty years of Cold War operations in the area—such as by the U.S. Middle East Force, which had demonstrated both the nation's capability to fulfill its promises, and the constancy of its commitment. Finally, the basic compatibility of coalition military forces derived from repeated exercises together, the use of Nato doctrine, and incorporation of alliance standards in the Western military equipment with which most forces were equipped. Even then, the process of forming and operating the coalition was time-consuming, arduous, and imperfect. (For an amplification of this important point, see the article by Commander Juan Carlos Neves, Argentine Navy, in this issue—Ed.)

4. This principle seems to be borne out by the repeated use of sanctions, embargoes, and quarantines in post-Cold War international security efforts—not that they have had any striking, immediate success. These measures have involved both unilateral and multilateral naval operations, often over protracted periods of time, a portent of future requirements upon the U.S. Navy.

5. Colin Powell et al., *The National Military Strategy* (Washington: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992).

6. Title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 5062–3.

7. For a different view, see Frank Uhlig's "How Navies Fight, and Why," in this issue—Ed.

8. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978), with additional information from Adam B. Siegel, *The Use of Naval Forces in the Post War Era: US Navy and US Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990* (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1991); Philip D. Zelikow, "Force without War, 1975–1982," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1984; U.S. Air Force Air Staff, *The United States Air Force and US National Security: A Historical Perspective* (Washington: USAF Historical Office, 1991); and U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, "Crisis Response," unpublished paper, 1992. Dr. Thomas Barnett of CNA worked with the individuals and offices concerned to update the data through the end of 1991 and to ensure compatibility.

9. However, it should be noted that the potential future Russian threat and the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons were by far the greatest points of unease for the working group.