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Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922-1933

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a Fellow of Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, and an accomplished author.

Horner does not write a chronological history in the strict sense of the term: this is not a complete history. What he does is provide segments of the history of decision making at the highest level in Australia's World War II effort. The book does begin at the beginning, and it ends at the war's end; however, the account strings together incidents, specific problems, and even particular days. The reader gains a picture of how the political bodies functioned, the role of their players (both permanent civil service and political), and what influences, especially American and British, played upon their deliberations.

Horner delves into a variety of recently opened sources. The chief papers employed are those of a little-known but influential figure, Sir Frederick Shedden. While the political decision makers might change with elections and the military chiefs shift with changes of command, civil servants like Shedden maintained the steady and consistent continuity so necessary for the running of defense matters. The minutes kept, the papers reviewed, and the discussions are all here. In an appendix are samples of the papers the author used to reconstruct events; even biographies of these unknown civil servants are provided. The paper trail becomes the cement that holds the story together.

Besides the organizational treatment of the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council, there are many tidbits that show the role Australia played in the war: discussions of just what Australia would commit where, and how much control Britain and the United States would have over Australia. As the war progressed, Australia shifted its contribution from Europe to the Pacific War. As its involvement declined in Europe, so did its influence there. It would be the

same story in the Pacific; as MacArthur's forces built up and the tide of war moved to western New Guinea, the Australian role and leverage decreased. Horner shows the political leadership's debates over what role to play in these circumstances. Another interesting discussion concerns problems of intelligence and security, especially the leaks from Australia to Japan. At first the blame was laid at the Nationalist Chinese door, but later it was discovered that the Russians were supplying Japan with the contents of the Australian weekly intelligence review.

The student of the Second World War will find many other issues, such as the "Germany First" debate, deployments into Indonesia at the war's outbreak, the problem of manpower in a small population, MacArthur's role, and the role of women. Biographies of the women who served as stenographers during the war are supplied. Once a stenographer married it was grounds for severance; in the archive files one can detect the changes in stenographers from their individual styles of writing. *Inside the War Cabinet* has many such jewels between its covers.

David Horner has done a fine job of showing the roles, mechanisms, and personalities at work during this period of Australia's history, and of showing non-Australians how the war was viewed from the "down under" perspective.

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Fanning, Richard W. *Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922-1933*. Lexington, Ky.: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1995. 224pp. \$35

In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in pre-nuclear arms control.

The interwar arms control experiments, both those confined exclusively to the naval powers of the period of the book and the more general conferences under the auspices of the League of Nations, offer fertile ground for enriching our understanding of arms control. These studies are a welcome counterpoint to the burgeoning literature that developed over the course of the Cold War and that focused predominantly on bilateral negotiations between the superpowers.

Fanning contributes to our understanding of the interwar arms control process, particularly the role played by peace groups in raising the consciousness of political leaders and public opinion to the importance of disarmament. Fanning is a historian, so his study follows the arms control process chronologically, from the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922 to a brief treatment of the failed London Naval Conference of 1935–1936. He is most interested in the period from 1927–1930, and especially the failure of the Geneva Conference of 1927, because it was this failure, he argues, that mobilized peace groups to action on behalf of disarmament.

In his introduction, Fanning tells the reader that he will focus on the cultural underpinnings of the disarmament movement, particularly the effects of public opinion on the policy-making process. He really focuses, however, on social groups and their access to political elites on the one hand, and their ability to mobilize public opinion on the other. He claims to employ a comparable-cases approach to assess the relative impact of pressure groups on the arms control process in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. In Chapter Two, Fanning presents his theoretical framework, the domestic structure approach. It holds that the influence of different social groups on the foreign policy process varies with the political system's degree of openness or closure (how much access

social groups have to elites in the policy process) and with the system's weakness or strength in dealing with social groups (how easily the executive can reject alternative viewpoints). Fanning argues that "domestic structure has a great deal to do with the probable success or failure of various social groups vying for influence." With an open, weak system, U.S. policy makers should be highly susceptible to social group pressure. With an open, strong system, British elites should be able to co-opt and assimilate policies advocated by social groups. With a closed, strong system, social groups in Japan in the period should have few avenues of access and less opportunity for influence.

Domestic structure may in fact be critical to understanding the relative influence of social groups across cases, specifically the weakness of the Japanese disarmament movement relative to its American counterpart. However, this is not the same as arguing that social groups had a significant impact on the course of arms control. In this respect, Fanning's analysis is less than convincing. In the United States, where social group influence should be greatest, we see that in the mid-1920s there were also strategic and economic reasons that made disarmament attractive to political leaders. Moreover, the fortunes of arms control seemed to ebb and flow with the interests and determination of different presidents. Calvin Coolidge was cool toward arms control; Warren G. Harding and Herbert Hoover were more enthusiastic, particularly when there were domestic payoffs in dealing with Congress and directing domestic legislation. In the case of Japan, where one would expect little influence for peace groups, we see, in fact, that peace advocates indeed failed to exert much power at all, but again there were confounding factors, such as the civil war in China, which threatened Japanese economic

and political interests in Manchuria. In both cases, it is difficult to divine the impact of social groups. The Geneva conference is important for Fanning because its failure created a window of opportunity for peace groups in the United States to motivate elites and educate the public. They seem to have had moderate success, providing some impetus for the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But their influence at London in 1930 was modest. The treaty did not reflect the reductions and consultative pact that peace groups were championing.

Fanning sums up by saying that when arms control succeeded, it was due less to the influence of social groups than to the memory of war or the desire for economy. In the conclusion he reiterates a host of economic, technological, and domestic political factors to account for the early success of arms control and its failure in later years. As a historian, Fanning cannot be faulted for acknowledging the complexity of the process and for offering a rich explanation. But given this, it is perhaps misleading for him to claim to execute a comparable-case strategy with an eye toward discerning the causal impact of the social-group factor. Fanning's great contribution is to provide insight into how these peace groups function. This reviewer would have preferred a more focused analysis that explored more closely what Fanning only mentions in passing in his conclusion, namely, the reasons why peace groups could not translate their awareness of the importance of disarmament into international agreement. This would be of immense policy relevance.

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Robinson, Charles M., III. *Shark of the Confederacy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 212pp. \$25

To a considerable extent, the story of the Confederacy at sea is that of the CSS *Alabama* and its famous commander, Raphael Semmes. In a period of twenty-two months, the English-built raider traveled some sixty-seven thousand nautical miles without ever touching a Confederate port and accounted for sixty-four of the two-hundred-odd Northern merchantmen destroyed by Confederate raiders.

The *Alabama's* first year at sea was so destructive that it precipitated the sale of many of the nearly five hundred American ships that changed flags in 1862 and 1863. Raphael Semmes, who was energetic, imaginative, and implacably hostile to the North, was probably the ablest commerce raider of the nineteenth century. He skillfully threw off pursuit, sometimes by spreading false information in his ports of call, sometimes by passing off his vessel as a Federal warship. Using captured ships to dispose of his prisoners, Semmes kept the *Alabama* in busy sea lanes, where fresh victims were to be found. Raphael Semmes was the only commander on either side of the U.S. Civil War to fight two battles at sea, and when he sank the *Hatteras* in January 1863 he became the only Confederate captain to defeat an enemy warship in single combat on the high seas.

In *Shark of the Confederacy*, Robinson has provided a short account of the Confederate raider's cruise and eventual defeat at the hands of the USS *Kearsarge*. He provides a good account of the intrigue that surrounded the *Alabama's* construction in the John Laird yards on the Mersey River. The Confederacy had already purchased one cruiser, the *Florida*, in England, and Federal authorities were properly suspicious of the sleek vessel known only as "No. 290." Thanks to