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The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era

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Stevenson's command of the facts and his intuitive understanding of the whole of Somalia make him well qualified to tell us how the U.S. experience there should guide the nation in the future, and he does so in the last few chapters of the book. His lessons run the gamut, from gentle reminders of things that should be obvious ("Military Intervention Is the Last Resort" and "Establish Tight Command and Control") to the less obvious ("Know Your Enemy" and "Keep Vietnam in Perspective"). He also has extensive sections on the U.S.-UN relationship and the moral impetus of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world—which the United States may or may not want to have.

What makes this book so compelling is the author's ability to link the United States' poor performance in Somalia to such factors as ignorance and a fear of repeating the past. It is also compelling because of its timing. This book was published just as the United States was deciding to become involved in the Bosnia crisis. One can only hope those involved with Bosnia, either militarily or politically, had a chance to read this book before they took any action.

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The Aspen Institute. *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Publications, 1995. 289pp. $10.95

A product of the Aspen annual summer conference conducted in August 1994, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era* joins a mushrooming body of literature on intervention. This volume asks the right questions: When and how should the United States intervene in international situations that threaten global security or stability? What policy guidelines should underwrite decisions on intervention? What limits should constrain intervention? How should U.S. decisions be influenced by other countries and international organizations?

The debate on these issues in the United States is sharp because only that nation possesses the wherewithal to choose when, where, and to what extent to intervene. No other state in the world today has such interventionary capability. Consequently, struggling with the issues has become a major spiritual problem for America—the flesh is strong, but the spirit is hesitant.

The essays have been penned by first-class analysts, and their overall quality is comparatively high. The special strength of the book derives from its middle three essays; comprehensive and thought provoking, they focus on the constraints placed on intervention by the Congress, the executive branch, and the press. They are written by, respectively, James M. Lindsay, professor of political science, University of Iowa; Jane E. Holl, executive director of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; and Andrew Kohut, director of the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, with his associate, Robert C. Toth. Lindsay's "Congress and the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era" is the most complete and readable chapter on the subject that has recently appeared in print.

The book's weakness stems from its having been edited anonymously. While Bruce Berkowitz of the Aspen Strategy Group composed a useful introduction (indeed, the key to selecting other chapters to read), no editorial responsibility has been assigned. One result, among others, is that there are glaring inconsistencies across the chapters, even in such straightforward issues as agreement on terminology. For example, the essay by Richard Haass, "Military Intervention: A Taxonomy of Challenges and Responses," forces the reader to warp backward in time to when "peacemaking" meant imposing peace and the term "peace enforcement" did not exist. Haass maintains a death-grip on the old terminology, even though the military, most analysts, and other government departments have adopted the language introduced by Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 pamphlet *An Agenda for Peace.* He even cites Boutros-Ghali and offers an analytical footnote explaining why he refuses to adopt Boutros-Ghali's terminology. An engaged editor would have resolved this problem of language, which will confuse those readers who are not versed in the fine points of the debate over "peacemaking" as a purely diplomatic activity and "peace enforcement" as the use of force to establish and maintain a state of peace.

Presumably an editor would also have established quality control over the material. Some articles are riddled with typographical errors, while others are proofed, parsed, and punctuated perfectly. Most of all, an editor would have appreciated the great contribution a bibliography would have made to the appeal of the book—it is not a difficult exercise.

Three essays at the end of the book provide contemporary insights about the British, French, and Russian perspectives on intervention. Of the three, Sergei Karaganov's "Military Force and International Relations in the Post–Cold War Environment: A View from Russia" is by far the most enlightening. It is also the only essay that remotely considers the conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used, which in itself is food for thought. However, one is left to puzzle why such essays were included, given the title and orientation of the book.

The United States and the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era offers a useful roundup and generally evenhanded discussion of the key aspects of intervention. However, to obtain a more detailed and less abstract grip on the central issues, one should read *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post–Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses*, edited by Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, published in 1994 by W.W. Norton & Co., New York.

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Denoon, David B.H. *Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post–Cold War Era.* New York: Westview, 1995. 230pp. $55

Dr. Denoon, a professor of politics and economics at New York University, discusses