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Killer Spy

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deal with foreign policy). Of more than passing interest to readers of the *Naval War College Review*, Joseph Bouchard, the former commanding officer of the USS *Oldendorf* (DD 972), describes methods of direct and indirect political control of naval operations during four regional crises.

Researchers may find particular articles useful, but few will benefit from a complete reading of this book. It is not for the general reader.

DAN STRUBLE
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Maas, Peter. *Killer Spy*. New York: Warner Books, 1995. 243pp. \$21.95
In this, one of many books about the Aldrich ("Rick") Ames spy case, the author focuses on the lengthy FBI investigation of Ames prior to his arrest in February 1994 on charges of espionage. Maas is no newcomer to nonfiction writing. His earlier works include *The Valachi Papers* and *Serpico*, both noteworthy for their credible detail and authenticity. However, although this book provides some interesting details, it is not of the same caliber.

The FBI's cooperation with Maas is obvious from the many anecdotal and personal details of the investigators, which could have been derived only from interviews. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a work that lacks balance. It portrays the FBI in glowing terms, ignoring or passing over many mistakes made during the investigation leading up to Ames's capture. For example, the investigation actually began in 1985 after several CIA and FBI

Russian sources disappeared, but it was not until 1994 that Ames was arrested.

The FBI's painstakingly slow efforts to develop an airtight case against Ames demonstrates how different are the organizational objectives of these agencies. The FBI works toward a conviction, while the CIA concerns itself with identifying spies, determining what has been compromised, and stopping their activity. As Maas points out, these objectives are often in conflict.

It seems that one problem associated with writing about espionage is that there is always a price to pay for the cooperation of the investigating agency. Without "inside" cooperation, an author is left only with information that has already been made public. The price, of course, is that the author must create a good image of the cooperating agency, deserved or not. This is demonstrated in Ronald Kessler's *Moscow Station* and *The Spy in the Russian Club*, and in John Barron's *Breaking the Ring*.

However, with this understood, *Killer Spy* is worth reading because of its accurate portrayal of the difficulties and stringent evidentiary requirements inherent in trying to prove a case of espionage, even after a spy has been identified. In spite of Ames's blatantly excessive spending and his access to sensitive information, it was almost two years before he was arrested. A case was finally opened specifically on Ames in May 1993, but even then the investigation proceeded slowly and methodically.

In Maas's closing paragraphs, he explains the meaning of his title. Because Ames effectively compromised CIA sources to Russia, he was more than a

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traitor; he was a killer. Maas puts the betrayal into proper perspective—Ames was personally responsible for the deaths of at least twelve people, probably more. This is an important point that is often overlooked when discussing espionage. It is why this book is a valuable addition to the many written about Aldrich Ames.

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Bin Sultan, Khaled. *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. 492pp. \$35

This is the first book written by a member of the Saudi royal family about the Gulf war. It is largely a descriptive account of the conflict and its coalition forces, containing little real tactical or strategic information on the war.

The author delves into the initial stages of the Iraqi invasion and the desperation of the Saudi government (its forces were unprepared—only eight thousand troops were guarding the northern frontier) as Saddam Hussein's troops threatened the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia.

Khaled offers a well written analysis of the circumstances leading Saddam Hussein to his decision to invade Kuwait, from the Rumaila oil field dispute to threats of unemployment and social unrest arising from the demobilization of Iraq's armed forces after the Iran-Iraq conflict. Only after many failed attempts at diplomacy did King Fahd fully understand that "if Saddam were allowed to get away with the seizure of

Kuwait, the independence of Saudi Arabia, and indeed of the whole Arab Gulf, would be threatened." It was then that the King turned to the United States for help.

The author follows with a glorifying history of the Al-Saud family, which includes his own experiences at Sandhurst Military Academy and his rise to head of Saudi Arabia's Air Defenses. What is noteworthy, however, is his description of the development of the Saudi air defense system, his dealings with Raytheon, and a glimpse into the internal command structure of the Saudi forces.

Khaled also attempts to set the record straight on a variety of issues concerning General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's account of the war. One important issue was that Khaled understood early on that "American troops could not serve under Saudi command; equally, Saudi troops—and other Arab forces, for that matter—could not serve under American command. A novel formula was required. The idea of a parallel command was sufficiently flexible to accommodate these difficulties. I was not seeking to compete with Schwarzkopf or downgrade his importance. But I wanted Schwarzkopf to understand that it was necessary to assure Saudi and Arab opinion that we [Saudi Arabia] were exercising control over these Westerners arriving in the heart of Islam. Without such Saudi control, it would have been seen as an invasion by stealth, an occupation by the backdoor, an overturning of our most cherished values. Hence, the need for people to see that I was up there with the American commander in a parallel