

Naval War College Review

Volume 49
Number 2 *Spring*

Article 17

1996

Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George

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Recommended Citation

Struble, Dan; Caldwell, Dan; and McKeown, Timothy J. (1996) "Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 49 : No. 2 , Article 17.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol49/iss2/17>

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author has provided descriptive frameworks for appreciating the mechanics of policy formation, its history through case studies and examples, and conditions that explain the dynamics of its evolving nature.

GARY E. MONELL
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Caldwell, Dan and McKeown, Timothy J., eds. *Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993. 322pp. \$65

Nearly four hundred years ago, Francis Bacon stated in his *Essays* that some books "are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested." While that early proponent of the scientific method would have approved of the approach that the contributors to this book take, he would probably also agree that this book is not for everyone. Even within the national security community, those who do read it should do so only in part.

This collection of articles is dedicated to Alexander George, a scholar who frequently managed to "bridge the gap between the ivory tower of research and the world of people, power, and politics." The book begins with a short preface on George's impact on political science and ends with a biography of his unclassified publications. The editors and most of its contributors are among George's many former students, collaborators, and admirers in the academic world. They do a commendable job of explaining their theoretical orientation (one that relies on a full explanation of

decision processes and leaders' attitudes) and contrasting it with systemic approaches that minimize those considerations in favor of analyses of the dynamics of the state system. The body of the book comprises four parts: "The Beliefs of Publics and Elites," "Leaders and Central Decision-making Groups," "Interest Group and Bureaucratic Politics and Processes," and "Diplomacy and the Use of Force." Each part begins with a short summary followed by three articles relating to some aspect of its title.

Many of the contributing authors—most notably Larry Berman, Charles Hermann, Margaret Hermann, Ole Holsti, Robert Keohane, and Bruce Russett—are renowned within the academic fields of international relations and political science. However, they all share a commitment to the empirical study of international relations and also to theory building, although their approaches vary from the highly quantitative (statistical analysis of survey data), to modelling, to the focused comparison of case studies.

This book covers a wide variety of topics. Holsti demonstrates how American leaders' attitudes toward the Soviet Union changed over time, and Alexander Dallin gives an interesting interpretation of the erosion of Soviet optimism. Margaret and Charles Hermann offer decision-making models in two separate articles, both using decision trees to illustrate their analyses. Two of the twelve articles offer prescriptions for specific approaches to political issues (Herbert Abrams addresses presidential disability and Keohane uses a multilateral approach to

deal with foreign policy). Of more than passing interest to readers of the *Naval War College Review*, Joseph Bouchard, the former commanding officer of the USS *Oldendorf* (DD 972), describes methods of direct and indirect political control of naval operations during four regional crises.

Researchers may find particular articles useful, but few will benefit from a complete reading of this book. It is not for the general reader.

DAN STRUBLE
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Maas, Peter. *Killer Spy*. New York: Warner Books, 1995. 243pp. \$21.95
In this, one of many books about the Aldrich ("Rick") Ames spy case, the author focuses on the lengthy FBI investigation of Ames prior to his arrest in February 1994 on charges of espionage. Maas is no newcomer to nonfiction writing. His earlier works include *The Valachi Papers* and *Serpico*, both noteworthy for their credible detail and authenticity. However, although this book provides some interesting details, it is not of the same caliber.

The FBI's cooperation with Maas is obvious from the many anecdotal and personal details of the investigators, which could have been derived only from interviews. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a work that lacks balance. It portrays the FBI in glowing terms, ignoring or passing over many mistakes made during the investigation leading up to Ames's capture. For example, the investigation actually began in 1985 after several CIA and FBI

Russian sources disappeared, but it was not until 1994 that Ames was arrested.

The FBI's painstakingly slow efforts to develop an airtight case against Ames demonstrates how different are the organizational objectives of these agencies. The FBI works toward a conviction, while the CIA concerns itself with identifying spies, determining what has been compromised, and stopping their activity. As Maas points out, these objectives are often in conflict.

It seems that one problem associated with writing about espionage is that there is always a price to pay for the cooperation of the investigating agency. Without "inside" cooperation, an author is left only with information that has already been made public. The price, of course, is that the author must create a good image of the cooperating agency, deserved or not. This is demonstrated in Ronald Kessler's *Moscow Station* and *The Spy in the Russian Club*, and in John Barron's *Breaking the Ring*.

However, with this understood, *Killer Spy* is worth reading because of its accurate portrayal of the difficulties and stringent evidentiary requirements inherent in trying to prove a case of espionage, even after a spy has been identified. In spite of Ames's blatantly excessive spending and his access to sensitive information, it was almost two years before he was arrested. A case was finally opened specifically on Ames in May 1993, but even then the investigation proceeded slowly and methodically.

In Maas's closing paragraphs, he explains the meaning of his title. Because Ames effectively compromised CIA sources to Russia, he was more than a