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We Claim the Title

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In a brief concluding section, Hemingway argues that similar units have a potential that should be considered by military planners for future U.S. low-intensity conflicts, but he does acknowledge that the Vietnam experience was very mixed—the Marines never came near to pacifying the countryside.

These oral histories are the book's core, and their ring of authenticity compensates for the author's rather lackluster analysis. Yet despite its limitations, this work has obvious value for both the military historian and the military professional.

JACK SHULIMSON
Marine Corps Historical Center

Anderson, Burton, F. *We Claim the Title.* Aptos, Calif.: Tracy Publishing, 1994. 428pp. $14.95

Korea, 1950 to 1953. Is it "the Forgotten War"? I think not. While not nearly as well publicized as World War II, which preceded it, or Vietnam, which followed it, the Korean War is nonetheless well represented in hundreds of books, dozens of which cover the major battles and developments of the war quite nicely. With few exceptions, however, most of those books are about grand strategy and the overall conduct of the war—precious few have managed to capture the essence of small unit actions or the stuff of war in foxholes. *We Claim the Title* does exactly that. It stands as an important contribution to the literature of the Korean War.

Korea is often cited as America's first *limited* war, at least in the modern era. It was limited geographically to the Korean Peninsula, limited in terms of American national commitment (the U.S. maintained a very cautious watch on developments in Europe during the entire conflict), and limited in the use of weapons (most notably the U.S. decision not to employ the atomic bomb). However, for the U.S. fighting man in a foxhole, and particularly the more than 103,000 who were wounded, nearly four thousand who were taken captive, the two thousand still unaccounted for, and the more than 54,000 who gave their lives, Korea was indeed a *total* war in its most brutal sense.

Anderson reconstructs that sense of brutality through the exploits of D ("Dog") Company and other small units of the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, from March through September 1951, the second year of the war. This timeframe is notable in that it marked the end of the "war of movement" and the beginning of the "static war" of position. The armistice talks officially began in July 1951 at Kaesong and moved to Panmunjom in October, by which time it was perfectly clear to both sides that a negotiated settlement would be hammered out along the existing battle lines (more or less astride the 38th parallel, the prewar demarcation line between North and South Korea)—hence the decision to "dig in" and wait out the talks. Artillery duels, small unit actions, patrols, and some very heated battles for hills and ridges occurred during the last two years of the war, but overall, Korea became a battlefield reminiscent of World War I trench warfare. And just as in the earlier

war, Korea too would take its toll in casualties to the very end.

At his request, Anderson's family saved many of the letters he wrote home from Korea. Forty years later he would fulfill his quest to document his "rite of passage" as a combat Marine in Korea. The title of the book was inspired by the last line of the Marine Corps hymn, "We are proud to claim the title of United States Marine."

This work is as much about being a Marine as it is about the war in Korea. Early chapters chronicle a unique and emotionally powerful process—the transition from civilian to "boot" to Marine. Anderson's close ties to his boot camp experiences were reinforced during the reunion of "Platoon I-65," which he chronicles at the end of the book. The reunion, bringing together a number of individuals bonded in combat, undoubtedly added fuel to Anderson's burning desire to write this book. I believe this is a book that Anderson had to write. It is a book that other Korean vets will want to read, and it is a book that those of us who were not there *should* read.

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Legro, Jeffrey W. *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995. 255pp. $35

War is violence pushed to the extreme. It is a time when nation seeks to destroy nation, the destruction of the enemy is paramount, and moderation is illogical. Why is it then that warring nations cooperate and agree to refrain from using certain types of violence?

Jeffrey Legro is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In this new book he presents an academic analysis of the dynamics of violence-restraint exhibited during World War II. Despite the perception of World War II as a total war, it offered remarkable examples of restraint between combatants.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, all the major powers had strong negative views about the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare. However, after the war began, restraint and cooperation took some surprising forms. In spite of Hitler's desire to avoid provoking Britain, he unleashed the German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Although the British could have done the same, they did not. The United States launched its own unrestricted submarine warfare campaign against the Japanese, yet the Japanese never considered doing the same. Excepting some isolated incidents, Legro claims the Germans did not use strategic bombing during the war. Yet the British, although outnumbered and more vulnerable, initiated strategic bombing against Germany as early as 1940. The restriction against the use of chemical warfare was observed by all major combatants throughout the war. Why?

In his analysis, Legro applies the three theories of cooperation—realism, institutionalism, and organizational culture—to determine which is most influential on national