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World Politics and the Evolution of War

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and continental commitments. Thus a unified Great Britain developed a global strategy that achieved the Elizabethan dream of dominance of the seas and a military balance of power on the continent.

The Making of Strategy also examines the strategy-making process in the United States. Peter Maslowski states that by mid-1865 the United States had achieved the essential elements required for great power status. The Civil War demonstrated conclusively that the federal government would endure as a single entity characterized by unparalleled economic strength, abundant natural resources, and a large and enlightened population. Eliot Cohen continues the examination of factors affecting American strategies by questioning the assumption that innocence and naiveté were the hallmarks of strategic thought in the interwar period. Colin Gray then concludes that the American army is a direct reflection of the society that produces it. In short, the American way of war is a direct reflection of this nation's ethos, its institutions, and its resources.

In summary, *The Making of Strategy* is a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship between strategy and policy. This excellent book is likely to be the definitive historical study of strategy making for the current generation. Though the editors and contributors view as futile any search for prescriptive theories to guide strategists, they see the study of history as useful to identify patterns from the past. The future, however, remains elusive, and the great challenge for makers of

modern strategy in war and peace is to balance the vital interests of the nations they serve with the changing conditions that affect the development of strategy.

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Weltman, John J. *World Politics and the Evolution of War*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995. 263pp. \$38.50

As the title implies, this work addresses geopolitical issues from a historical perspective—and for that the author deserves some credit. Given the relative brevity of the text, Weltman has achieved at least part of his objective of linking history to geopolitical policy.

As a prelude to our understanding of history's connection to military-political grand strategy, Weltman surveys theories underpinning the causes of war, suggesting that grand strategy is merely a political instrument used to achieve political ends. To advance his point, the author depends most heavily upon the writings of eighteenth-century soldier-authors Jomini and Clausewitz, notably contrasting the relatively scientific notions of Jomini (a popularly read product of French and Russian military systems) with those of Clausewitz, who somewhat more abstractly used his Prussian background to theorize about warfare, on the basis of his observations of Napoleonic successes and failures.

Weltman begins with the question of what role war might play in the post-Cold War era. For example, will we usher in the new millennium with a

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period of unprecedented peace or with multipolar, nationalistic conflicts like those brewing in the Balkans?

Taking the ancient historian Thucydides as an exemplar, the author suggests that there are three fundamental causes for war. First, as advanced by Saint Augustine, human nature might prompt war, perhaps when a magnetic persona, such as Napoleon or Hitler, emerges. Second, organizational reasons might be offered for war—for instance, during the rise of certain Marxist or fascist states. Finally, as we have learned from our readings of Hobbes and Locke, war might begin because of a strategic imbalance emerging as nations scramble to protect turf in order to survive.

Weltman tells us that the French Revolution was a watershed in our understanding of warfare, for prior wars had been fought more for a cause than a state. Indeed, those who joined the Grand Armée fought as much for the flag as for the storied triad of Liberty–Equality–Fraternity.

One must conclude that since the 1860s and 1870s, when Bismarck cleverly expanded the German empire, the price for accepting battle has continued to rise with the advance of tools for increasingly horrifying destruction. Thus by the time nuclear weapons were introduced, we must remind ourselves, the abstract “theory” of Clausewitzian absolute war had become chillingly real. Therefore, Weltman suggests that strategies toward the employment of nuclear warheads take on the more concrete implications, as stated by Jomini.

Weltman races through several other theoretical watersheds in the advancement of warfare, but in closing he poses

the ultimate question: Is war now obsolete as a means to achieve political goals?

We are offered the rather safe bet that limited war of a relatively small scale is likely, since the weapons are increasingly distant from the targets. We are reminded that it is one accomplishment to capture and perhaps annex a province, but quite another to win over an entire nation, not to mention a continent.

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Toner, James H. *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*.
Lexington, Ky.: The Univ. Press of
Kentucky, 1995. 202pp. \$25

James H. Toner is professor of military ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. In this excellent volume, he has drawn together the many threads of military ethics into a work readily accessible to military professionals, chaplains, and perhaps even undergraduates in courses that concern themselves with ethics and warfare.

Toner argues for the pivotal importance of ethics for the military professional. He surveys a number of distinct sources for this concern and reviews the sociological literature regarding the nature and function of professions—for example, Huntington’s classic analysis of the military profession. This provides him with the occasion to develop a functionalist account of the place of ethics in allowing the military profession to