Naval War College Review

Volume 49
Number 1 *Winter*

Article 5

1996

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Recommended Citation

Adkins, Arthur A. (1996) "Doctrine for Naval Planning: The Once and Future Thing," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 49 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol49/iss1/5

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Doctrine for Naval Planning
The Once and Future Thing

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Adkins, U.S. Marine Corps

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OFFICERS do not look at planning in the same way. Marines approach it from the point of view of good, honest staff work—and as something, like any other job, that if they do well enough someone may notice and keep them in mind for some future command selection board. Naval officers see billets in which they are expected to perform planning duties as "holding patterns," places to mark time until they can go to a ship or squadron and do something worthwhile, like command it. Under no circumstances would they want to earn a reputation as a "good staff officer" or of being a "good planner." All "good" naval officers are operators. They don't often say "administrator" and would probably misspell it should they ever have occasion to write it down.

The Navy and Marine planning processes are different too. The Marine process is a sequential listing of command and staff actions required to decide on and implement a course of action to accomplish an assigned mission. When the Navy talks about the "process" of planning, it is usually referring to the decision-making process associated with selecting the course of action—that is, the *commander's* job; after the course of action has been selected, "the staffers" scurry around and iron out all the irritating little details, if they absolutely cannot avoid it. After all, they're only commanders-in-waiting, not really staff officers—certainly not planners.

Of course a large part, or at least much (*some*, anyway), of what I've just said is misconception, half-truth, and exaggeration. As with many such sweeping and

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Naval War College Review, Winter 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 1

inflammatory statements, however, there is a little truth buried in there somewhere. It really does seem that naval officers, on the whole, take the art and science of formal planning less seriously than do their Marine counterparts.

That is not to say that the Navy cannot or does not plan well, or that it has no planning methodology—naval officers don't talk or write about it as much as they used to, up through the end of World War II, but it is there, and it is written down. On the other hand, Marine officers routinely laminate posters of the "15 Steps of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation" and plaster them on their walls, *at home.*

The Naval Warfare Publication *Naval Operational Planning*, known as NWP-11, is the sister document to the planning portion of the Marines' Fleet Marine Force Manual *Command and Staff Action*, FMFM 3-1. If anything, NWP-11 probably explains the process of arriving at the commander's decision (or course of action) better than FMFM 3-1 does. Anyone really interested in planning should read both. A *real* difference, though, between Navy and Marine Corps planning is that Marines read and use FMFM 3-1 extensively. Just finding a copy of NWP-11 may not be as easy as you might think; it is not a classified document, but it has a long history of being hidden away as if it were.

So, regardless of the differing attitudes, regardless of the similarities or differences between the two "processes," regardless of the availability of the manuals, there is *Navy* planning and there is *Marine* planning. If the two are simply put in close proximity to each other, does it automatically add up to *naval* planning? Once upon a time . . . the answer might have been yes. The Pacific campaigns of World War II proved that the Navy and Marine Corps could, in fact, plan and operate as a tremendously effective team. Formal, *naval* operational planning was a critical element of nearly every major American military success of World War II. Naval planning, however, is no longer what it used to be.

The basics are still there, but widely disparate attitudes toward formal planning in the Navy and Marine Corps make it difficult to say that naval planning is as good as it once was (and, we may hope, will be again). The newly created Naval Doctrine Command is wrestling with the formidable task of translating the broad strategic guidance contained in ". . . From the Sea" and "Forward . . . From the Sea" into working naval doctrine. The Naval Doctrine Publication *Naval Planning*, NDP-5, is the portion of that project dealing with formal operational planning in the United States naval service.

In fact this process has taken place before; NDP-5 is not "new technology." We are close to "reinventing the wheel"—if not quite. Why do we need NDP-5 today?

Formal naval operational planning originated around 1900 and evolved in both theory and practice through the end of World War II. During the Cold War era, theory and practice went their separate ways—for reasons we shall

explain—and an entire generation of naval officers grew up without the benefit of, or the perceived need for, instruction in formal operational planning. NDP-5 is needed to frame and focus a dialogue that will eventually lead us back to a comprehensive, written, and effective naval planning doctrine. Such a doctrine, however, is not the kind of thing that, because it is written down in a book, immediately becomes gospel. It did not happen that way the first time, and it won't now. Doctrine takes time; it has to evolve (again). The process might be accelerated a little by keeping it in the forefront, by discussing naval planning as if it were one of the most important things professional military people can do during war or peace—which, of course, it is.

Once upon a Time

The history of naval operational planning is almost as rich and diverse as the history of the United States naval service itself. Firmly rooted in early nineteenth-century rationalism, naval operational planning and the military planning process as a whole have been the bases for sound military decisions and successful operations from well before World War I through post–Desert Storm crises.

Until relatively recently in the history of warfare, however, military planning was assumed to be the exclusive province of a few with special gifts of genius and charismatic leadership. Outcome in war was held to be solely dependent on brilliance in generalship, which could not be taught. In 1806, however, Prussia's defeat by France (due to the presence of Napoleon and the conspicuous absence of Prussian genius) prompted Prussia to explore the revolutionary concept that military planning—obviously associated with the mysterious art of military command—might be taught to fairly ordinary men. To this end the first war college, the Kriegsakademie, was established in Berlin in 1810, and the Prussian General Staff thereafter became the world's model of the systematic approach to planning for, and waging, war.[1] Of course, a genius, when available, was still the first choice, but a well educated senior officer corps now appeared to be the most promising alternative.

The United States Naval War College was founded in 1884 at Newport, Rhode Island, under the leadership of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. The Civil War, less than a generation removed, was still terribly fresh in the hearts and minds of most Americans, reinforcing their belief that war was an aberration.[2] Regardless of what was going on in Europe (or perhaps because of it), Americans did not (and still do not) believe that future wars are inevitable, and they certainly did not want to waste time thinking about or planning for them. If they absolutely had to go to war, they would fight and win as they always had—with inspired amateurs led by Washington-like geniuses, who would undoubtedly appear in time of need. Luce, of course, disagreed and was eventually successful

in establishing the first American institution of higher learning dedicated to the study of war, but it was not an overwhelmingly popular project at the time.

A problem Luce had to consider almost immediately was the scarcity of literature useful for teaching professional military men about their career. The one exception was a fairly extensive body of instructional material compiled by the Kriegsakademie in the area of military planning. Collectively referred to as "the System" or "the Estimate of the Situation," it was already very popular throughout Europe. What is generically referred to today as "the military planning process," what NWP-11 and FMFM 3-1 call "the Commander's Estimate of the Situation," is directly descended from nineteenth-century Prussian military instruction.[3]

As early as 1895, the Naval War College was drafting actual war plans, utilizing an early form of the estimate process. In 1907, in conjunction with the General Board in Washington, the College faculty prepared the first series of "War Portfolios."[4] The Naval War College continued to create actual war plans for the General Board until the Chief of Naval Operations, or CNO, assumed those duties in 1915; before that time, no other agency in the Navy had appeared capable of completing this type of staff action.[5] After 1915, although no longer doing actual war planning, the College maintained exclusive control over development and articulation of naval planning methodology, a situation that survived until 1948, when Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, as its president, advocated moving that responsibility also to the office of the CNO.

The College had officially introduced the planning discipline into its curriculum in 1910, in the form of a lecture entitled "The Estimate of the Situation" given by Commander Frank Marble to twenty-six officers of the summer class. The lecture relied heavily on two pamphlets prepared at the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The first, *Field Orders, Messages and Reports*, had been written in 1906 by Major Eben Swift, USA, and the second, *Estimating Critical Situations and Composing Orders*, by Captain Roger S. Fitch, USA, in 1909. In Newport, several officers were heavily involved in the preparation of the first "Estimate" presentation. A young Marine major, John H. Russell, worked out map exercises (to be used by students for practical-application problems) from a translation of Kriegsakademie pamphlets recently acquired by the Naval War College.[6] When the lecture was finally delivered, Commander Marble, perhaps a little blunter than Naval War College platform speakers of today, began by assuring his audience that "no amount of education and training would assure success to some, but no one can deny [that] careful and assiduous training is vastly beneficial, even to the stupid."[7]

In 1915 a pamphlet, *The Estimate of the Situation*, was written by the president of the College, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight; it was also published as an article in the United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*. The pamphlet was routinely

revised by each succeeding president until 1926, when the estimate was combined with standard formats for written orders into one planning manual, *The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form.* Other revisions continued to appear about every two years (the typical tour of a Naval War College president) until 1933, when a companion booklet was published, *The Study and Discussion of the Estimate of the Situation.* It prompted Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, who became president in 1934, to observe that if the Estimate of the Situation pamphlet were written clearly and logically, it would not need such a supplement.

Although the effort took him two separate terms (1934–1936 and 1939–1941) as president of the Naval War College and involved three distinct published versions, Admiral Kalbfus expanded a pamphlet of about fifty pages into a 243-page book.[8] *Sound Military Decision* was intended to be an authoritative treatise on naval warfare, in the vein of Clausewitz's *On War.* While the *Estimate* pamphlets had been dedicated to simplicity, Admiral Kalbfus's version was anything but simple. It was difficult to read and comprehend, and it dedicated very few pages to the actual process of preparing a plan.[9] In fact, because of its length, ponderous style, and complexity, it became the center of a broad controversy, particularly in the Navy, but to a lesser degree in the Marine Corps as well. *Sound Military Decision* was, however, the official, definitive document on naval operational planning during World War II, and it was employed extensively.

Rear Admiral Charles J. ("Carl") Moore, who served on Kalbfus's staff at the College and later as Admiral Spruance's chief of staff in the Central Pacific Force and the Fifth Fleet, relied heavily on the book but summed it up in this way: "I believe, and I always have believed and I still believe, that the book is sound, that everything that he has said in it is correct. But to get what you want out of it is extremely difficult."[10] Admiral Spruance, who had also served under Kalbfus at Newport, had been very direct in his criticism of *Sound Military Decision* from the very beginning. In his opinion it was too long and convoluted to meet the needs of the service.

When Spruance returned as president of the College in 1946, armed with his extensive wartime planning experience and his considerable intellect, he immediately initiated the production of a "simplified and reduced" version of *The Estimate of the Situation.*[11] Insisting that the manual not be subject to the whims of Naval War College presidents, changing every two years or so, he strongly recommended that *The Estimate* be issued under the imprint of the Chief of Naval Operations.[12] Also, World War II had not only clearly demonstrated the utility of the formal naval operational planning process but had underscored the requirement that it function in the joint arena. Under Admiral Spruance's direction and supervision, his revised *Estimate of the Situation* was carefully

compared to the most recent joint documents prepared by the War Department. It was determined that the basic steps it laid down for estimating were completely compatible with joint and other service procedures.

In 1948, the Chief of Naval Operations published the first doctrinal manual on naval operational planning, basing it on an original draft submitted by Admiral Spruance. The *Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948*, was forty-eight pages long and, with surprisingly few substantive changes, survives today as *Naval Operational Planning*, NWP-11, and also as the planning portion of *Command and Staff Action*, FMFM 3-1. Its foreword explained:

> Following the adoption of standard planning forms for use in Joint schools and in all agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the President of the Naval War College to prepare a manual containing these standard forms and such amplifying instructions as necessary in order to adopt these forms as standard throughout the Navy.
>
> *The Naval Manual of Operational Planning* has attempted to combine, in the clearest and simplest terms, the various existing instructions in effect for planning Naval operations.[13]

This foreword, promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld (and presumably drafted, or at least approved, by Admiral Spruance), would seem to indicate that naval operational planning was not only correctly codified by this document but was also completely compatible with joint doctrine. At this point, then, the evidence suggests that the United States naval service had a working, written, comprehensive, "joint-compatible," and effective doctrine for naval operational planning.

What happened?

The Cold War Era

Throughout the 1960s, '70s, and '80s (that is, during the Vietnam War and throughout the Cold War), naval forces, particularly ships at sea, concentrated almost entirely on two missions, self-defense and fire support. There were no high-seas fleet engagements or major amphibious assaults during these years; Leyte Gulf (1944) and Inchon (1950) had been (and have been to date) the last of their kind. "Self-defense" meant countering "the threat," mainly from the USSR, and it was focused much more on identifying enemy capabilities than on selecting and executing courses of action. Once the threat was identified, the response—the course of action—was almost automatic. Naval gunfire support and air strike missions did not often require an extensive formal planning process either. The result in general was what became known as "threat-based," as opposed to the classic "mission-based," planning. In the latter, the commander (or his planner) identifies the mission and then works backward through

intermediate or enabling objectives, addressing all the associated decisions and details, which, when correctly orchestrated and executed, produce the best chance of accomplishing the goal. By contrast, "threat-based" planning begins with these matters presumably settled but with enemy action underway to interfere with friendly operations. Much less is required of planners conceptually in reacting to threats.

In reality, for this era the differences between these two seemingly opposite "types" of planning were probably matters more of style and streamlining than of fundamentals. For what the United States Navy was doing on a day-to-day basis during this period—identifying the threat and devising standard operating procedures to counter it—was probably a perfectly acceptable way of solving the specific military problems at hand. But daily routine seemed to eclipse the larger planning picture, that of major contingencies or global war with the USSR. "Big picture" planning was done by joint staffs, and most lower-echelon naval officers never made the connection between what they were doing in "the real world" and anything joint staffs did or were supposed to do.

For their part, Marine missions did not change during this period, so neither did basic Marine planning procedures. They still have not. The operative title changed a few times, from *expeditionary* to *amphibious* back to *expeditionary*, but what Marines did before and during World War II is the same thing they did during the Cold War (and is the same thing they do today). Planning was then, just as it is today, the key to success—formal, detailed, exhaustive, step-by-step planning, as time permitted. (This does not mean, as we shall see, that Marines too do not now have some adjusting to do.)

If the Navy made a mistake during this period, it was one of omission. Everything learned through 1945 about planning processes, procedures, and methodology seemed to have been discarded, because it did not offer the easiest and quickest way to solve the current, lowest-level, tactical problems. A large part of the service seemed willing to ignore altogether the requirement for formal planning—and for formal planning education.

At the Naval War College, the *Estimate of the Situation* and the military planning process maintained an honored spot in the curriculum during the Cold War era, although certainly not as the same "hot topics" they had been between the two world wars. In point of fact, however, many "front running" naval officers did not attend the Naval War College and were less likely than those who had gone to Newport to be exposed to formal planning instruction. It could be argued that during the middle and later Cold War years, specifically during the Reagan-era buildup toward the six-hundred-ship fleet, *most* of the Navy's "best and brightest" did not attend the College, certainly not until after their first command tour. Even then it was not considered a particularly career-enhancing assignment.[14]

By itself, however, this propensity of the Navy's senior leadership to bypass formal planning education at Newport might have had much less overall impact on contemporary attitudes had naval officers been routinely exposed to NWP-11. They were not, and still are not. While, as noted above, FMFM 3-1 is known and used extensively throughout the Marine Corps, NWP-11 has never been widely read in the Navy, and the main reason is that it is poorly distributed. Here too, traditional Navy attitudes played a big part. Since 1748, when Frederick the Great wrote his version of *The Principles of War* and held each of the fifty copies strictly accountable, it has been generally accepted that letting the enemy know how you "think about war" is not a good idea. (Predictably, one of Frederick's officers was eventually unlucky enough to be captured with the book, which was soon copied, translated, and distributed throughout Europe.) In 1936, Admiral William H. Standley, as CNO, decided that Admiral Kalbfus's *Sound Military Decision* should be classified, because, in Rear Admiral William S. Pye's words, "to deny that such a guide to naval thought would be a distinct asset to a foreign nation is to deny the usefulness of the publication itself."[15] Admiral Spruance's 1948 manual was also classified, as "Restricted." NWP-11 today is unclassified, but old habits die hard, and the Navy still holds many such publications close to the vest. Considering also that the Naval War College has always retained administrative control of, and reviewing authority over, NWP-11, one can understand why few naval officers became familiar with the book.

Instead, the formal planning process became linked to the academic world of the College—while the top-notch officers were getting on-the-job planning experience out in the fleet, where the Soviet threat was much more than an interesting classroom topic. As a result, the formal naval operational planning process, however well tried, proven, and established, was sidetracked for several decades after World War II, away from the "real" operational world of ships at sea.

Today, the Soviet threat has dissipated, and the U.S. naval service has officially changed course from the high seas to the littorals; but while the Marines still look upon planning as a generally worthwhile endeavor, the Navy remains skeptical. In this field, Marines have a book, they read it, and they generally consider themselves "above" any "upstart" naval doctrine on planning. Sailors have a good enough book; but they do not read it, and they are not at all sure they want to "sign on" to any doctrine whatsoever. It was to counter this conundrum that the Naval Doctrine Command has published *Naval Planning*, NDP-5. The real solution to the problem, however, is not publication of NDP-5; that is just the first step.

Attitude Adjustment

Planning is an essential and inherent function of command. As a discussion item, that assertion generates little debate; the disagreement comes when the conversation turns to the who, when, and how. For many naval officers, the phrase "formal planning process" carries unpleasant connotations of anonymous, unaccountable, non-tactical, and self-important staff officers "crunching numbers," preempting decisions, setting in motion giant cogs, and thereby severely restricting the sound judgment, common sense, and freedom of action of the people who should be in charge, the commanders. Lower-echelon tactical commanders (and their staff officers) harbor a certain skepticism about the abilities, professionalism, and motivations of higher echelons. This wariness increases exponentially the farther away the senior staff is from the "pointy end of the spear." This is particularly true when one crosses the service boundary into the "joint" arena, where such process "nightmares" as the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) enter the picture.[16] At the tactical level, particularly in the Navy (but also, to a lesser extent, in the Marine Corps), skepticism about motivations and people at higher echelons has somehow been translated into distrust of the processes they use, which in turn has generated a degree of doubt as to the need for formal planning in general. Such understandable (even if generally unfounded) reservations have soured the attitude of two entire generations of naval officers toward the art and science of formal planning.

At the same time the Navy was loosening its ties to formal planning, Marines were going the other direction. At some point Marines had taken the "planning" ball and started running with it by themselves; somewhere along the line, they had stopped considering themselves as under the purview of "naval" planning. In Quantico, Virginia, at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, the logic of the formal planning process was being institutionalized through education.[17] During his or her career, nearly every Marine was (and still is) exposed to planning education, beginning at the non-commissioned officer level. Perhaps more importantly, this approach has fostered an attitude throughout the Marine Corps that planning, at all levels, is serious business.

In recent years, few Marines believed that NWP-11, *Naval Operational Planning*, had anything to do with them. Unfortunately, they were right; it did not. But now the *Naval* Doctrine Command is in business, and if its product, NDP-5, *Naval Planning*, is to be effective, it must apply to both Marines and sailors. Because Marines consider their own planning process to be graven in stone, this fact may cause more than a little consternation.

So here we are, back to the original dilemma. The Navy does not trust or believe in—much less admire—formal planning, planners, JOPES, joint staffs, or

anything remotely connected with staff work. The Marine Corps does not feel that the latest discussion concerns it—Marines already know how to plan. Thus, Navy planning and Marine Corps planning do not currently add up to effective *naval* planning, and NDP-5 will do little to remedy the situation unless all approach it with a different attitude than they have had toward formal naval operational planning for the last few decades.

NDP-5 and the Future

The Naval War College has long been, as noted, the reviewing authority for NWP-11. When the Naval Doctrine Command sought assistance in drafting a new document on the subject, the College was the natural choice. The initial draft of NDP-5 was completed there and was sent to the Doctrine Command for review, editing, more review, and publishing. The finished book took more than two years to produce, and its success or failure will be to a large extent determined by how widely it is read and discussed outside the Naval War College and Doctrine Command.

The Navy and Marine Corps both need NDP-5 to succeed. Like it or not, accept it or not, believe it or not, the United States naval service is embarked on a new course. Whether that course has been adequately or conclusively articulated in ". . . From the Sea" or "Forward . . . From the Sea" is yet to be determined; but it is a new course. For the foreseeable future, there will be no major, high-seas, fleet engagements. Such traditional missions as the defense of sea lanes remain, but shallow-water mine countermeasures receive much more attention today than does the open-ocean defense of aircraft carriers. Words and phrases like "littoral," "adaptive force packaging," and "naval expeditionary forces" have become prevalent. What it all really means is that the Navy and Marine Corps are going to be working even more closely together in the future than they have in the past. It also means they need to plan more closely together than they have in the last few decades, and for that they need a truly *naval* planning doctrine.

NDP-5 could be a good start. To be successful, however, it must be read, argued over, used, and improved out in "the real world." It has the potential to prompt a great deal of good discussion. Where does naval operational planning fit within the larger arena of national security and joint operational planning? How is formal tactical planning to be conducted? How are Navy and Marine Corps planning to become *naval* planning? What is the difference between planning itself (processes, procedures, steps, and phases) and its products (plans, directives, orders, etc.)? *Naval Planning* is a "round in the air," and probably a good one, but all it can be is a "marking" round—something to adjust *from*.

NDP-5 is not perfect. It will not satisfy everyone, and it is bound to have anomalies. In the draft review process there were, inevitably, compromises along the way, and the solutions to some issues were, at best, just adequate. Problems arose from trying to conform to the "parent" (next-higher echelon) document, *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5.0. Even proper English took a back seat to standardization. For instance, the adjective "operational" does not appear in NDP-5; the reader will see "naval *operation* planning." That is how Joint Pub 5.0 gives the term, which is not to be confused with the "operational" level of war (or planning at that level).

Also, NDP-5 spends little time either defending or criticizing JOPES. That system has evolved, and it will probably evolve into something else, but it is in place now, and the basics need to be understood—which is not really very difficult. JOPES is employed at the "operational" level and above, addresses somewhat different details than do the Navy or Marine Corps tactical planning processes, and connects with them at various points. The most obvious interface is the mission: commanders and their planners need one to start "mission-based" planning, and JOPES essentially translates political guidance into that mission. Thereafter missions are passed to successive subordinates until the lowest-level tactical commanders know what their units have to do and can start their own planning processes. Not, of course, that the matter is quite that simple and clear-cut: all sorts of adjectives are set in front of "planning" ("adaptive," "concurrent," "sequential," "preliminary") as if to confuse things. Even so, JOPES is not beyond understanding; the hardest part is changing attitudes. Contrary to popular belief, JOPES is not a monster out of its cage, devouring all common sense, judgment, and freedom of action of on-scene commanders. JOPES and its successors will pose no insuperable obstacles to well developed naval planning.

Lastly, NDP-5 is not a "how to " manual on planning. For that, NWP-11 and FMFM 3-1 are perfectly good. They may now need some refining, updating, and integrating, but all the information is there. They share the same remarkable bloodlines. They just need to be used, and together. NDP-5 works one level above them. Its real purpose is to set forth doctrine, not procedures: it talks about planning, not *how* to plan. Those who helped write it hope that it will assist Marines and sailors understand their jobs better and see where they fit into national security. It will help "real world" naval officers, in particular, tie together their plan of the day, their stacks of messages, the Cable News Network, and the national security strategy. Navy ships and Marine units do not just randomly wander the globe. If one looks hard enough, every movement, deployment, training evolution, or visit can be traced back, through a joint operations plan or order, to a national security issue. What can be more important in peacetime than thoroughly understanding how to plan for future missions?

NDP-5, *Naval Planning*, represents a great deal of work on the part of many people, but however good it may be, if it does not (at least eventually) generate enough interest to change current attitudes toward formal planning, it will have failed. If, as Navy and Marine officers, we do not respond to this challenge, then we are not the professionals our predecessors were.

The history of formal naval operational planning is long and colorful, and its evolution culminated, once, in a process more than capable of handling the formidable challenges of World War II. Some of the most impressive military operations the world has ever seen were conducted on the basis of it. Navy planning and Marine planning were one, single thing, *naval* planning, and it was well codified. During the Cold War era, the Navy turned to "threat-based" planning aimed essentially at countering the tactical problems presented by the monolithic Soviet threat. Naval planning was no longer what it used to be, so the Marines went ahead on their own.

The Navy and Marine Corps must get naval planning back. Naval forces are embarked on a new course, and the two need to work and plan together as closely as they once did. This essentially amounts to changing attitudes toward formal planning; NDP-5 should be a step in that direction.

Naval operational planning—something the Navy and Marine Corps once did very well and must do well again.

Notes

1. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, eds., *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins 1993), p. 811.

2. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 46, 55.

3. Charles W. Cullen (Lt. Cdr., USN), "From the *Kriegsacademie* [*sic*] to the Naval War College: The Military Planning Process," *Naval War College Review*, January 1970, pp. 6–18, esp. p. 9.

4. The General Board of the Navy was created in 1900. Similar to a general staff of senior naval officers, the Board provided the Secretary of the Navy professional advice on naval operations, policy, war plans, naval bases, building programs, ship characteristics, personnel legislation, etc. *Encyclopedia of the American Military*, John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, eds. (New York: Scribner, 1994), vol. I, p. 253.

5. Cullen, p. 13.

6. General John H. Russell served as Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1934 to 1936.

7. Cullen, p. 14.

8. John B. Hattendorf, *Sailors and Scholars* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), p. 328.

9. Kalbfus dedicated only eight pages to the actual writing of an operational plan or order. Depending on which side of the controversy one was on, the rest of the book was an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual discussion of naval problem solving and decision making. See Thomas B. Buell (Cdr., USN), "Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Naval Planner's 'Holy Scripture': *Sound Military Decision*," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1973, p. 38.

10. Oral History of C.J. Moore (Rear Admiral, USN, Ret.), Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., pp. 594–5.

11. Buell, pp. 38–9.

12. Frank M. Snyder, introduction to *Sound Military Decision* (1942 edition), reprinted in Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. xxiv.

13. One of the original copies of ***Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948*** is today in the Naval War College Library.

14. There were 173 regular line admirals on active duty at that time. Of those officers, according to the Dean of Students office of the Naval War College, thirty-three attended either the on-campus junior or senior course. That equates to less than two of ten Navy flag officers (19 percent) having attended either the College of Naval Warfare or the College of Naval Command and Staff. For Marines the percentage is about double, at twenty-seven of sixty-nine (39 percent). See U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1994 ("Naval Review" issue), p. 177.

15. Rear Admiral William S. Pye worked for Admiral Standley at the time. It was he who actually informed Admiral Kalbfus of the decision to classify the manual, in his 1 December 1936 letter. Letter, Rear Admiral William S. Pye, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, to Rear Admiral Kalbfus, 1 December 1936, NWC Archives, RG 2.

16. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national and theater-level commanders and their staffs. JOPES includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. It is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations.

17. The organization is now known as the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).

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The Nautical Research Guild
1996 Essay Award

The Nautical Research Guild, established in 1948, promotes the scholarly study of all facets of past and present maritime endeavor. Its focus includes naval and merchant shipbuilding and boat building, naval architecture, fishing, yachting, and the equipment of vessels. To encourage new and deeper research, the Guild announces a 1996 Essay Award; a First Prize of $500 and a Second Prize of $250 will be offered, and winning essays will be published in the 1997 volume of the *Nautical Research Journal*. The deadline for receipt of entries is 1 September 1996. Winners will be announced 19 October at the 1996 NRG Conference in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

The Guild anticipates that winning essays will demonstrate research with primary materials, be well illustrated, and be between three and six thousand words in length. For Conditions of Entry and a style guide, contact Eugene L. Larson, NRG Essay Award Chairman, 9223 Presidential Drive, Alexandria, Va., 22309, tel. (703) 360-2111.