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Arms Control toward the 21st Century

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The five considerations informing Sanderson's vision are prescient and particularly relevant. First, the values and ethos of the Australian Army are key to its success. Both must be maintained, and the standards that define the culture of the force can and should be raised. Second, there must be an "economy of effort" attempt to enhance jointness, minimize interservice rivalry, and exploit the complementary capabilities of the sister services, as well as the potential contributions of the civilian community. Third, mobility may well be the enabler of an effective future army—mobility that permits maneuver over great distances at great speeds to concentrate forces at the decisive point and time. Fourth, "discrimination and precision" are critical fundamental concepts of a future force. The ability to discriminate between targets and then to attack with great precision will obviously enhance force effectiveness. These same notions may well enable effective and adaptive logistical operations. Finally, alliances will be as vital in the future as they are today; coalition operations will be "the generator of international power."

This book is a work of significance. Well written, interesting, and comprehensive, it chronicles a landmark effort to understand the future and to define a vision that breeds "certainty and confidence" in a world of uncertainty. It is must reading for those who will lead us into the future, even if that future is at best only dimly perceived.

STEPHEN KIRIN
Colonel, U.S. Army

Larsen, Jeffrey A., and Gregory J. Rattray, eds. *Arms Control toward the 21st Century*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 348pp. \$55

Interest in arms control has risen and fallen in the twentieth century. The idealism that led to a flurry of arms control initiatives after World War I was shattered by the scope and brutality of World War II and the intransigence of the two superpowers early in the Cold War. A more realistic and cautious approach to arms control, which seemed to bear more fruit, emerged in the latter half of the Cold War. It emphasized strategic weapons

and viewed arms control as just another tool in the national security toolbox. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the perceived diminished threat of global nuclear war resulted in diminished interest in the subject. With the approach of the new century, new security challenges and opportunities have arisen. These, in turn, justify a reexamination of the role of arms control in U.S. national security.

In *Arms Control toward the 21st Century*, Jeffrey Larsen and Gregory Rattray have compiled a diverse and balanced series of essays that

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accomplishes such a reexamination. Part One delineates the underlying principles of arms control, beginning with an excellent discussion by Kerry M. Kartchner, "The Objectives of Arms Control"; it also includes articles on the arms control process by Trevor Taylor ("The International Context") and Jennifer Sims ("The U.S. Domestic Context"). Part Two consists of four articles covering the history and continuing impact of Cold War arms control; it includes a thorough review of "Strategic Defensive Arms Control" by Sidney N. Graybeal and Patricia A. McFate. Parts Three and Four focus on current trends: proliferation control regimes, and regional arms control efforts. In Part Three, Jo L. Husbands enumerates the obstacles to successful conventional arms control, in "Preventing the Spread of Arms: Delivery Means and Conventional Weapons"; and Peter R. Lavoy provides a more optimistic, if guarded, picture regarding the prospects for control of nuclear weapons in the South Asian subcontinent, in his essay "Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia."

In Part Five, Larsen draws the book to a close by identifying the key and recurring themes of the collected articles. He concludes that bilateral negotiations, focused on U.S.-Russian strategic balance, are no longer the key component of arms control activity. Nonetheless, the control and dismantling of these strategic weapons will remain salient issues. He contends that the most active and potentially the most productive areas for future arms control will be proliferation-control regimes and efforts to limit regional conflicts. Larsen maintains that further efforts to

control weapons proliferation will, unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty, require significant reciprocal efforts by the major powers rather than just concessions by lesser powers. He also argues that despite increasingly intrusive verification measures now being accepted by the nations, it will be more difficult to confirm compliance for the regimes anticipated in the future. He asserts that the U.S. public no longer feels arms control is necessary for national survival, but that nonetheless the process has become institutionalized and legitimized in the public eye. Finally, he concludes that the formerly discredited concept of disarmament may reappear as an objective of future arms control efforts.

This book provides a balanced and thorough review of the complex topic of arms control. While one may take issue with particular authors, the articles are well researched and well written, and they lead to logical conclusions. One legitimate criticism is that this book, like many in the field of arms control, is somewhat ethnocentric. Other than the section on regional arms control, it clearly looks at arms control from the U.S. perspective. While focus on U.S. national security concerns is understandable, in arms control there is another side (or many other sides) involved. Can one truly understand the arms control process if one does not understand the objectives, concerns, and processes, of the other parties as well?

Despite this omission, this book is worthwhile reading for either the arms control novice or for those with some knowledge of arms control who are

trying to move beyond our Cold War conceptions.

JON A. GREENE
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Gartner, Scott Sigmund. *Strategic Assessment in War*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1997. 177pp. \$32.50

One of the most vital yet difficult tasks a wartime commander must perform is strategic assessment. Are his actions working? Is he winning? Scott Sigmund Gartner, a political scientist at the University of California, approaches this problem from an interesting angle. He argues that during peacetime, military organizations devise certain quantitative measures of merit that will be used to assess the effectiveness of a given strategy. Once war breaks out, the strategy will be continuously evaluated against these criteria and adjusted as necessary. This is not a remarkable finding. However, Gartner then hypothesizes that the key measures of merit—what he calls the “dominant indicators”—will be watched most closely for the rate at which they change. In other words, if things are going badly, a commander or an organization will not necessarily change strategy unless the situation seems to be getting worse at an accelerating rate. Until that time, a commander will tend to muddle through. This is an important insight. In addition, organizations generally do not change their dominant indicators, partly because it would appear self-serving. As a result, even if a military organization chooses the wrong criteria for measur-

ing its effectiveness, it is more likely to stick with them rather than change its strategy. Finally, Gartner notes that these dominant indicators may vary between organizations within the same country. This is crucial, because it means that two or more organizations can view the same situation, examine the same data, and arrive at totally different conclusions regarding the success of a war strategy—because they are using different measures of effectiveness. Gartner tests his hypothesis in several case studies: the submarine campaigns of World Wars I and II, the ground campaign in Vietnam, and the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran in April 1980.

For the first three years of World War I, the Royal Navy eschewed the use of convoys to protect merchant shipping from German submarines. Despite heavy losses, and despite pressure from the British government, the Admiralty refused to change its strategy from one of offensive patrols. Even as shipping losses continued to mount and the government of David Lloyd George called ever more loudly for change, the admirals continued to resist until April 1917, the worst month of the war. At that point, so conventional wisdom goes, the tonnage sunk by German submarines was so great that even the mossbacks of the Admiralty were forced to recognize the need for change and finally ordered the use of convoys. Gartner, however, sees a different story.

The Royal Navy's chief measure of effectiveness was not the tonnage lost to enemy submarines (the criterion used by the government) but the number of German submarines