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## In My View

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# IN MY VIEW . . .

## Chinese Intentions

Sir:

In “Calculating China’s Advances in the South China Sea” (*Naval War College Review*, Spring 1998), Lieutenant Michael Studeman provides a refreshingly comprehensive analysis of the nationalistic and economic forces behind China’s push into the South China Sea.

His article helps explain why China has laid the groundwork for a military modernization that emphasizes improved naval capabilities, including the purchase of newer submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also is focusing on ways to achieve “crippling attacks” on an enemy’s information systems, and is pursuing anti-satellite, anti-radar, and anti-stealth techniques designed to complicate the United States’ ability to operate close to the Asian littoral.

The sea lanes that run through the South China Sea carry one-half trillion dollars of long-haul interregional sea-borne shipments each year. Overall, 25 percent of worldwide merchandise and 56 percent of northern Arabian Gulf oil pass through these sea lanes.

Although the PLA Navy currently lacks the ability to sustain interdiction operations in Southeast Asia’s sea lanes, China’s strategic penetration of the region and PLA modernization could lead to such a capability in the future. That is why the United States must maintain its military-technological lead over all potential adversaries in the region and a robust forward presence. This means investing in advanced naval surface and especially undersea warfare capabilities

like the New Attack Submarine, along with theater ballistic missile defenses like the Airborne Laser.

Whether you attribute China's advances to a "defensive" strategy as Lieutenant Studeman suggests, or an offensive one, as many of China's neighbors interpret them, a superior U.S. military presence continues to be a critical component of regional stability.

Merrick Carey  
Chief Executive Officer  
Lexington Institute

### **"To Bomb Or Not to Bomb"**

Sir:

The Spring 1998 issue of the *Naval War College Review* has come to my hand, and I have had the chance to read Dennis Giangreco's review entitled "To Bomb Or Not to Bomb." You should know that this review received wide exposure and was read with much interest by those of us who served in the Air Force in World War II.

This was a masterly take-down of some publications that have been used as tilting forces toward the revisionist point of view vis-à-vis United States military operations in World War II. The shallowness of the revisionist research is fully exposed in the review of the books by Newman, Chappell, and Skates.

A fair number of us did battle with the Smithsonian over the planned exhibit at the Air and Space Museum, which proposed to use the *Enola Gay* as a tool for drawing visitors to an exhibit that was dreadfully flawed in its original concept. We saw the dismal research on which the exhibit originally proposed was based. Mr. Giangreco effectively brings this shallow research to light in his review. It is stimulating to us to see this piece published in such a creditable journal as yours.

William A. Rooney

### **The African Crisis Response Force**

Sir:

I read Captain Derek J. Christian's article (*Naval War College Review*, Summer 1998) on the African Crisis Response Force with interest. Having served in two operations in West Africa in 1996, I understand the need to empower African nations to take charge of crises in the region. I believe African nations will be more receptive to taking ownership of their crises if we train them not only in dealing with armed insurgencies but to take possession of the humanitarian disasters that usually follow. African military personnel need to be

## 110 Naval War College Review

trained in field medicine, preventive medicine, “buddy aid,” and primary medical care not only to care for their troops serving on a peacemaking or peacekeeping mission but also to deal with the flux of refugees that overwhelm a neighboring nation.

During a 1996 noncombatant evacuation operation in Liberia, refugees overwhelmed the nation of Sierra Leone. This led our amphibious forces to establish a field medical treatment facility in Sierra Leone to treat troops as well as deal with refugees. African forces need to have the ability to maintain themselves medically and thereby increase their combat effectiveness in the field. They also need to be able to set up medical tents and treatment units as a focus for starting a refugee processing center. The measure of success for the African peacekeeping force should be based on lives saved and how well they integrate with nongovernmental organizations like the International Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. African peacekeepers need to be educated on how to aid victims of suffering without becoming caught in the power struggles of the local despots. An exception to this would be if the UN wished African forces to go into a nation to support an insurgency or democracy.

My vision is of an Africa that is stable, and an African military dedicated to teaching basic literacy and hygiene in rural areas. This would occupy the military in constructive nation building instead of political intrigue and gain. Military operations other than war have brought medical issues to the forefront of contingency planning, both for the care of troops in the field and the victims they have been assigned to protect.

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Great Lakes, Ill.

### The Dardanelles and Littoral Mine Warfare

Sir:

What a relevant, powerful and timely article—Dr. E. Michael Golda’s “The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Warfare” in the Summer 1998 issue of the *Naval War College Review*. It is definitely a must read for all naval and Marine officers.

“The Dardanelles Campaign” is indeed relevant, because this nation as the superpower of the 21st century is gearing up for littoral warfare “anytime, anywhere.” A major part of littoral warfare is mine warfare, particularly mine countermeasures. In fact, our CNO, Admiral Jay Johnson, has made mine warfare a core competency for the entire Navy along with strike warfare and amphibious warfare. In addition, the CNO is leading the Navy’s charge for

development of organic mine countermeasures (MCM) wherein battle groups will have integral MCM systems to do MCM in stride, to go “anytime, anywhere” when performing battlespace dominance and power projection.

Dr. Golda’s article graphically brings out how relevant and critical mine warfare is to littoral warfare. He offers the British and French naval campaign in the Dardanelles as a powerful example of how strategically great (or bad) the resulting outcome can be—in this case, the subsequent disaster at Gallipoli. He presents this powerful example of the “show stopping” potential of mine warfare because, as he explains, the battles of Mobile Bay and Wonsan—while they involved mine warfare—were not at all “show stoppers” for our Navy. DESERT STORM did call attention to the importance of mine warfare in littoral warfare. However, since the land and air campaigns went so well and so quickly, the fact that the planned naval amphibious landing did not take place has not received the visibility or impact it *should* have had on our nation. And, although USS *Princeton* and *Tripoli* did hit mines, fortunately no lives were lost and, due to heroic damage control efforts, they did not sink.

Dr. Golda’s article is extremely timely because it provides the needed powerful and graphic historic event that demonstrates clearly that mine warfare must be a core competency of *all* naval and Marine Corps officers—not just the very few full-time professionals in the Mine Warfare Command at Ingleside, Texas. It is timely because it provides just the dramatic example needed to reinforce the CNO’s ongoing “Fleet Integration Strategy” to “mainstream” mine warfare into the core competency of all seagoing sailors and Marines.

Because this article is so relevant, powerful, and timely, it should be read and discussed by the students and faculty this fall at the Surface Warfare School, the Submarine Officers School, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Naval War College. Dr. Golda’s article with all its substance and 21st-century relevance should generate a lot of “food for thought” and an awakening in each reader’s mind of how necessary it is to learn and practice mine warfare as a professional sailor or Marine.

As a former Commander Mine Warfare Command who spoke to each graduating class of the Naval War College from 1979 to 1984, I certainly wish I had been able to use Dr. Golda’s example of the Dardanelles campaign to get across the fundamental relevance of mine warfare to those “bright eyed” graduating officers!

Charles F. Horne III  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Ret.  
Charleston, South Carolina

## 112 Naval War College Review

## Inchon and Command Relationships

Sir:

Your reprint of the 1967 Colonel Bob Heintz lecture on Inchon in the Spring 1998 *Review* is timely in view of the increased emphasis on expeditionary and littoral warfare. Heintz credits Inchon's success primarily to fully qualified amphibious and landing forces in being using well-formulated, well-tested, and commonly understood doctrine. But his observations on Navy-Marine Corps command relationships are also worth repeating.

In the Joint Task Force 7 organization (p. 130, Figure 4), the commanders of the attack force (Phib Gru 1—RADM Doyle) and the expeditionary troops (Army X Corps—MGEN Almond) were on the same command level under CJTF 7 (7th Flt—VADM Struble) with the commanders of the carrier, covering, logistic, and patrol forces. However, as Heintz points out, X Corps had no amphibious capability or function, and it would engage only after the battle ceased to be amphibious. "To get around the amphibious impotence of X Corps, jointure of command did not take place until one level lower—that of the attack force under Admiral Doyle and the landing force (Marines) under General Smith." The Tactical Air Command (1st Marine Aircraft Wing) was placed directly under the command of the supported unit.

In Admiral Doyle's lecture to the Naval War College in 1974, he also points out that the command "line from the X Corps directly to the landing force, 1st Marine Division, is not a solid line until after the 1st Marine Division commander has landed and reported to me that he has assumed command ashore." He also mentions that because of the differences in doctrine and control between the Navy and Air Force, CJTF 7 decided that air tasks centered around Inchon would be performed by the Navy and Marine Corps.

But leaving wiring diagrams aside, Doyle reminds that "the Naval Attack Force Commander can only go so far in his plans and then he must have the troop commander because he has to make his plans and they have to fit together." Further, "Now that General Smith, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, and his staff were on hand, the two staffs—his and mine—worked together. I think that's an important point. The members of both staffs spoke the same language. We, of the Navy, knew what we required but we also knew what the landing force required. And this worked both ways."

We read a lot these days about information superiority (which we did not have at Inchon); network-centric warfare; tiered grids for command and control, engagements, and sensors; flat organizations; speed of command; empowering the warfighter; and business models. Information technology may eventually provide *reliable* new tools to improve command and control, share data, assist in the targeting process, and facilitate coordinating engagements.

The fleets and Marine Expeditionary Forces are experimenting. But I doubt that technology will replace the planning and execution process by skilled professionals experienced in their warfare areas that is described above. Whatever Navy–Marine Corps command relationship emerges from the current debate, it must provide for flexibility to organize the professionals at the optimum level and in a relationship best suited to accomplish the expeditionary and amphibious warfare mission at hand. And don't neglect fundamental and tested doctrine for planning and execution, as well as a point of departure for innovation.

James H. Doyle, Jr.  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

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***National Security Studies Quarterly***

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