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Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor

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is particularly insightful. Eisenhower's "aim was to avoid all wars, not simply to deter nuclear war. . . . The only protection was to compel Soviet leaders to see that there could be no advantage in ordering the use of even one. The way to do that was to make the Clausewitzian abstraction of 'absolute war' seem as real as it could be."

This work challenges the conventional wisdom on the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis. Nikita Khrushchev viewed John F. Kennedy's Bay of Pigs debacle as evidence of the president's determination to overthrow the only Marxist revolution in the Western Hemisphere rather than as a sign of weakness. He deployed the missiles primarily to safeguard the Cuban regime and secondarily to redress U.S. strategic nuclear superiority. Khrushchev, moreover, got the idea for using missiles to defend Havana from Eisenhower, who deployed U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Gaddis shows that—as long suspected—"a private promise to pull out the Jupiters accompanied J.F.K.'s public pledge not to invade Cuba."

Gaddis has created an important historical foundation for others to stand upon as they reflect on the Cold War and dig deeper into the Eastern archives. His study should humble even the most confident of statesmen, policy makers, and scholars. Only now with painstaking research, analysis, and the benefits of hindsight are we able to understand more fully the origins of the Cold War. Rivalries between major powers have not ceased with the end of the Cold War, however. Statesmen and policy makers must remember the pitfalls of imperfect information as they work to

keep major power relationships within peaceful, if not always cordial, bounds. Gaddis has done an invaluable service by reminding us of this stubborn reality in international politics.

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* The views expressed are solely those of the author.

Kugler, Richard L., with Marianna V. Kozintseva. *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996. 297pp. \$20

The events of 1996–1997 underscored the unique influence of Russia and its strategic concerns on Nato's expansion to the east. Richard Kugler, assisted by Marianna Kozintseva, has tackled this complex subject. He, as primary author, is well qualified, having undertaken several strategic and fiscal analyses of Nato expansion since 1994.

The first part of the book deals with Russia's emerging foreign policy of "statism," which emphasizes strategic priorities, not "lofty visions or values." The authors conclude that statism represents the most feasible and effective approach for ensuring Russian security in a turbulent world. They predict that the imbalance of military power between Russia and the West, and the continuing instability of the former's southern and eastern neighbors, will force Russia's leaders to engage the West as it seeks to enlarge to the east. Based largely on Russian sources, this discussion provides novel insights into

the sources of and constraints on Russia's recent foreign policy conduct.

The book becomes more theoretical when it addresses the implications of Russian statism for Western expansion. The authors argue that Western leaders need to agree on a strategic endgame and process for eastern enlargement. They identify five ideal strategic outcomes for enlargement: a single community solution, collective security, the institutional web, open-door enlargement, and a two-community solution. Although Kugler and Kozintseva do not endorse any one of these outcomes, they conclude that the two-community solution has much to recommend it. This endgame would involve European Union (EU) and Nato expansion to the Visegrad states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) and perhaps to Bulgaria and Romania. The Baltic states would be brought into the EU but not into Nato. Ukraine would remain outside both organizations.

While interesting on a theoretical level, this section may frustrate Western policy makers searching for concrete guidance. Its discussion of the modalities of enlargement is vague, and the authors fail to acknowledge that long-term strategic thinking has proven extremely difficult in practice for the West. Moreover, their theoretical framework presumes a unitary West, not a collection of sovereign states whose differences over EU and Nato expansion are not likely to diminish soon. Finally, the book, notwithstanding its title, focuses as much on EU expansion as on Nato's and frequently treats both as parts of a single process. In practice, the requirements and consequences of EU

enlargement differ from those of Nato expansion, and the role of the United States in shaping the former is indirect at best.

The most useful section of the book deals with the military aspects of Nato expansion and the need for a military endgame in Eastern Europe. Forging this endgame involves three components: fashioning defense arrangements with new Nato members, force modernization and weapons sales, and arms control. With respect to the first component, the authors argue that economic realities and the need for minimizing provocation of Russia point to a power projection strategy. Under this alternative, new Nato members would provide most of the combat power for self-defense, but the rest of the alliance would keep powerful combat forces available for prompt deployment eastward. They also argue convincingly that modernization and arms sales driven solely by market forces could yield both political instability and military ineffectiveness. Finally, Kugler and Kozintseva concede the need for a modification of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty but caution against deep cuts in conventional force structure.

It is difficult to write conclusively about such a rapidly changing subject as Nato enlargement. Some of the book's analyses have been rendered moot by Nato's decision to restrict the first round of expansion to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. However, many of its predictions, particularly with respect to Russia's attitude toward Nato expansion, have been borne out by last year's events. In addition, many key decisions about the military structure of

the enlarged alliance and the force posture of new members have yet to be made. For this reason, U.S. and other Western participants in these decisions could profitably read *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor*, especially its analysis of alternative defense arrangements and the shape of an arms sales regime in Eastern Europe.

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Swaine, Michael D. *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking*. Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND, 1997. 89pp. \$15

Michael Swaine, a top analyst of Chinese security affairs at RAND Corporation, provides in this revised version of his short book a comprehensive report of research supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The nature of this work and of Swaine's analysis does not make for easy reading, but he reminds us on page 1 why we may wish to pursue the topic: "China's rise as a major power constitutes one of the most significant strategic events of the post-Cold War period." China's emergence and the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are worth the attention of those who hope to understand, or even influence, this all-important transformation. This work is a significant addition to the growing body of literature (as reflected in its superb bibliography) on China's previously obscure security-policy process.

The opening summary may be skipped. Its ideas are largely lost in verbiage befitting Beijing's convoluted bureaucracy. For example, Swaine mixes reflections on universal human interactions with analysis of government processes (which is useful, however, in that it affirms that a changing China is not immune to bureaucratic foibles).

Some readers may be troubled by the inability of even the best of China specialists to pull back all the silk curtains. For example, if China were an open society, the recitation of its national strategic objectives might appropriately be viewed as a valuable window on the intentions of the leadership, as implied in this work. However, that presumes that the objectives are indeed formulated guides to the implementation of foreign and defense policy. These orotund objectives may instead just as well be seen as propagandistic reflections or by-products largely stemming from whatever laudable activities (ignoring others) the country has undertaken, and the directions China has for diverse reasons taken in national development—rather than the other way around. To illustrate, the stated national objective "to ensure continued national prosperity" simply mirrors the success of Deng Xiaoping's bold economic reforms and overtures to the outside that are making China prosperous; of course almost all Chinese, including the national and military leaders, want to jump on that bandwagon. Put bluntly, prosperity, even "continued prosperity," clearly does not derive from the formulation of this grandiloquent "strategic objective." This designedly tedious example demonstrates that at times the scope of the