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We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History

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This reviewer would have welcomed an attempt by McMichael to draw on his copious material and assess how much of the mishandling of Tailhook was set up by unbalanced—that is, principally criminal—proceedings instead of a commander’s investigation. A number of fundamental issues arise.

What is the real integrity issue highlighted by the Tailhook incident and its aftermath? In at least one case, the Navy penalized, with a letter of admonition and a stiff fine, a lieutenant for lying to investigators but threatened court-martial and prison for the uninvited “laying on of hands” at the convention. (The officer was eventually offered immunity for the latter offense for his testimony.) Many investigators were convinced that lying to investigators was commonplace. Defending attorneys argued that their clients were not required to incriminate themselves—but avoiding self-incrimination does not require lying. Is the Navy saying that lying to investigators is a minor offense? Does this suggest weak emphasis on integrity?

What is the appropriate role of civilian control and congressional oversight? Politicizing promotions is debilitating to professional military competence. Congressional committees clearly have asserted the authority to do anything they wish with the careers of individuals serving in the U.S. military. When that authority is used in what appears to be a capricious manner, to overturn judgments properly and carefully reached by military commanders, the damage to the organization can be severe. McMichael’s description of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s role in the

Tailhook aftermath is an excellent example. Is there any hope for reasonable bounds on such practices?

The excellent foreword by Professor Charles Moskos balances some of the shortcomings noted in this review. Moskos describes some of the key issues for the profession of arms that are brought into sharp focus by the Tailhook incident. One example is the author’s discussion of the potential shambles caused by outside pressure on military institutions to achieve specific results in disciplinary processes, investigations, personnel selections, and promotions.

To hope for both lively exposition (which McMichael provides) and compelling assessment (which he does not) in one volume may be too much. Perhaps a reader of McMichael’s book will take on the second part of the challenge.

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Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997. 425pp. \$30

The dean of American diplomatic history, John Lewis Gaddis, has taken on an important subject in the history of international relations and American foreign policy—the causes of the Cold War. Gaddis, armed with recently available archival material from Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, and China, begins to lift the secrecy that shrouded Soviet foreign policy deliberations, and he makes fresh insights on the first third

of that rivalry. Gaddis demonstrates, as he has consistently done in previous work, a remarkable ability to synthesize from the study of history lessons that are potentially relevant to future challenges in statecraft.

Although he acknowledges the importance of geopolitical factors that propelled the United States and the Soviet Union into competition, Gaddis's research of newly available evidence reinforces his earlier view that Stalin bore the lion's share of responsibility for starting it. As Gaddis observes of Stalin, "He alone pursued personal security by depriving everyone else of it: no Western leader relied on terror to the extent that he did. He alone transformed his country into an extension of himself: no Western leader could have succeeded at such a feat, none attempted it. He alone saw war and revolution as acceptable means with which to pursue ultimate ends: no Western leader associated violence with progress to the extent he did."

Gaddis views the Cold War as a competition between "empires." The United States maintained one empire, based on an association of the willing, while the Soviet Union maintained another based on an association of the coerced. The empire of democracies was inherently stronger, because "it quickly became clear—largely because of differences in the domestic institutions of each superpower—that an American empire would accommodate far greater diversity than would one run by the Soviet Union: as a consequence most Europeans accepted and even invited American hegemony, fearing

deeply what that of the Russians might entail."

The Cold War in Europe had its origins in the struggle for power on the Continent, while the competition in Asia stemmed from missteps. Gaddis judges that "what is immediately apparent, when one reviews what happened in east Asia between 1945 and 1950, is how little control over events officials in Washington and Moscow actually had, and how uncalculatingly—which is to say, how emotionally—they responded to the surprises they encountered in that part of the world."

The author recalls the emotions that fueled the Cold War in the Third World. He writes that "it is easy now to sit back and say that the United States and its allies never had much to worry about in the 'third world'—that there was *no* prospect that Marxism-Leninism would catch on there. But the failure of fears to materialize does not establish their immateriality." Gaddis cautions that "it would be the height of arrogance for historians to condemn those who made history for not having availed themselves of histories yet to be written."

He pays close attention to the role of nuclear weapons, which "forced, slowly but steadily, the emergence of a new kind of rationality capable of transcending historical, cultural, ideological, and psychological antagonisms of the kind that had always, in the past, given rise to great power wars. The new rationality grew out of the simple realization that as weapons become *more* devastating they become *less* usable." His analysis of Dwight D. Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear weapons in defense policy

is particularly insightful. Eisenhower's "aim was to avoid all wars, not simply to deter nuclear war. . . . The only protection was to compel Soviet leaders to see that there could be no advantage in ordering the use of even one. The way to do that was to make the Clausewitzian abstraction of 'absolute war' seem as real as it could be."

This work challenges the conventional wisdom on the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis. Nikita Khrushchev viewed John F. Kennedy's Bay of Pigs debacle as evidence of the president's determination to overthrow the only Marxist revolution in the Western Hemisphere rather than as a sign of weakness. He deployed the missiles primarily to safeguard the Cuban regime and secondarily to redress U.S. strategic nuclear superiority. Khrushchev, moreover, got the idea for using missiles to defend Havana from Eisenhower, who deployed U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Gaddis shows that—as long suspected—"a private promise to pull out the Jupiters accompanied J.F.K.'s public pledge not to invade Cuba."

Gaddis has created an important historical foundation for others to stand upon as they reflect on the Cold War and dig deeper into the Eastern archives. His study should humble even the most confident of statesmen, policy makers, and scholars. Only now with painstaking research, analysis, and the benefits of hindsight are we able to understand more fully the origins of the Cold War. Rivalries between major powers have not ceased with the end of the Cold War, however. Statesmen and policy makers must remember the pitfalls of imperfect information as they work to

keep major power relationships within peaceful, if not always cordial, bounds. Gaddis has done an invaluable service by reminding us of this stubborn reality in international politics.

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* The views expressed are solely those of the author.

Kugler, Richard L., with Marianna V. Kozintseva. *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996. 297pp. \$20

The events of 1996–1997 underscored the unique influence of Russia and its strategic concerns on Nato's expansion to the east. Richard Kugler, assisted by Marianna Kozintseva, has tackled this complex subject. He, as primary author, is well qualified, having undertaken several strategic and fiscal analyses of Nato expansion since 1994.

The first part of the book deals with Russia's emerging foreign policy of "statism," which emphasizes strategic priorities, not "lofty visions or values." The authors conclude that statism represents the most feasible and effective approach for ensuring Russian security in a turbulent world. They predict that the imbalance of military power between Russia and the West, and the continuing instability of the former's southern and eastern neighbors, will force Russia's leaders to engage the West as it seeks to enlarge to the east. Based largely on Russian sources, this discussion provides novel insights into