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The Mother of All Hooks: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Tailhook Scandal

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bear much weight. And if they did the conclusion of the argument would be not that we individuals can kill other (invading) individuals but that the state can, somehow, threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the attacking state. Notice how, in the conclusion, the analogy suddenly ceases to be an analogy: since something analogous to me is having something analogous to its life threatened by something analogous to you, I can kill you.

Retreating (analogously) from the self-defense analogy, the champion of defensive war occupies the venerable redoubt of just war theory. Norman pursues. He challenges the theory as insufficiently supported (assertion, even by St. Thomas, is not enough). And he argues further that even on its own terms the theory (almost always) fails to justify resort to armed force.

Even where the other requirements of *jus ad bellum* are met, "last resort" rarely is. It was not met in the Falklands/Malvinas War, nor in the Persian Gulf War. Alternatives to war are often ignored or dismissed. "There is no other choice" is often just false. Even when and to the extent that it is true, it is true because we have prepared no other choices. The financial and intellectual resources devoted to pacific dispute resolution and to passive defense are an infinitesimal fraction of those devoted to preparation for war.

The central component of *jus in bello* is noncombatant immunity. But this is rarely observed in practice. Further, it is unsupported in theory. Most uniformed "combatants" are innocent, if innocence has any moral significance. How can we be justified in killing soldiers?

They are not the ones who start wars. What coherent moral view makes it justifiable to kill World War II Wehrmacht conscripts but not "civilian Nazi gauleiters"?

Norman's final considered position is not an absolute pacifism, but it places an exceptionally heavy burden of justification on those who would make war, even defensive war.

Norman's prose is clear, he is never dogmatic, and he never preaches. But you will never think of these matters in quite the same way again.

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McMichael, William H. *The Mother of All Hooks: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Tailhook Scandal*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997. 337pp. \$32.95

The first agency directed to look into the Tailhook episode was the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), which did criminal investigations. The failure of this first approach led the Secretary of the Navy to give the task to the Department of Defense Inspector General, an organization profoundly unsuited for command-quality investigations. Experienced commanders know that most misconduct of military members falls well short of criminal conduct but still calls for disciplinary action. Judging fairly where on the scale of seriousness an act of misconduct lies requires finesse, experience, and a balanced investigation.

160 Naval War College Review

This reviewer would have welcomed an attempt by McMichael to draw on his copious material and assess how much of the mishandling of Tailhook was set up by unbalanced—that is, principally criminal—proceedings instead of a commander's investigation. A number of fundamental issues arise.

What is the real integrity issue highlighted by the Tailhook incident and its aftermath? In at least one case, the Navy penalized, with a letter of admonition and a stiff fine, a lieutenant for lying to investigators but threatened court-martial and prison for the uninvited “laying on of hands” at the convention. (The officer was eventually offered immunity for the latter offense for his testimony.) Many investigators were convinced that lying to investigators was commonplace. Defending attorneys argued that their clients were not required to incriminate themselves—but avoiding self-incrimination does not require lying. Is the Navy saying that lying to investigators is a minor offense? Does this suggest weak emphasis on integrity?

What is the appropriate role of civilian control and congressional oversight? Politicizing promotions is debilitating to professional military competence. Congressional committees clearly have asserted the authority to do anything they wish with the careers of individuals serving in the U.S. military. When that authority is used in what appears to be a capricious manner, to overturn judgments properly and carefully reached by military commanders, the damage to the organization can be severe. McMichael's description of the Senate Armed Services Committee's role in the

Tailhook aftermath is an excellent example. Is there any hope for reasonable bounds on such practices?

The excellent foreword by Professor Charles Moskos balances some of the shortcomings noted in this review. Moskos describes some of the key issues for the profession of arms that are brought into sharp focus by the Tailhook incident. One example is the author's discussion of the potential shambles caused by outside pressure on military institutions to achieve specific results in disciplinary processes, investigations, personnel selections, and promotions.

To hope for both lively exposition (which McMichael provides) and compelling assessment (which he does not) in one volume may be too much. Perhaps a reader of McMichael's book will take on the second part of the challenge.

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Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997. 425pp. \$30

The dean of American diplomatic history, John Lewis Gaddis, has taken on an important subject in the history of international relations and American foreign policy—the causes of the Cold War. Gaddis, armed with recently available archival material from Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, and China, begins to lift the secrecy that shrouded Soviet foreign policy deliberations, and he makes fresh insights on the first third