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In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army

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labor issues surprising. There is one anecdote concerning two hundred tire-cord workers in New Bedford, Massachusetts, that provides a vivid example of labor's periodic unwillingness to cooperate in the war effort. The failure of national resolve was a source of great frustration for Patterson, and he was critical of Americans at home who were not willing to sacrifice for the war effort. He believed the reason for their behavior was a failure of leadership in the government to "stand up to pressure groups."

The economic ramifications of massive defense spending included domestic shortages, especially for small businesses, who were the first to suffer. This segment could have benefited from additional coverage, consistent with other areas discussed.

As Allied forces gained victories and the ultimate outcome of the war became more certain, different problems arose. Manufacturers jockeyed to be first to convert from wartime to peacetime production. Patterson's management skills met the new challenges of reducing the military from eight to two million, and the accompanying shift to a peacetime economy. However, quoting George Washington, he cautioned against "false hopes and temporary expedients."

Robert Patterson emerges as an unpretentious man of high standards, a real hero and role model for government service. His contributions to victory were equated with those of the Army chief of staff and the president. Eiler does him justice.

The book's appendices include explanations of abbreviations and a selected chronology of World War II, plus

sixty-three pages of explanatory notes for the serious scholar. The book will thus appeal to all, but especially serious World War II historians.

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Drea, Edward J. *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1998. 299pp. \$45

This volume gathers together twelve of Edward J. Drea's essays that deal with various aspects of the imperial Japanese military. Nine appear in print for the first time. Their primary focus is on the war years from 1937 to 1945, but the author locates institutions and ideas of the World War II era in a larger historical context stretching back to the Meiji period of 1868 to 1912. The essays can be divided into three groups, on the basis of their subject matter and perspective. Chapters 1 through 7 offer an inside view of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), based largely on Japanese sources, while chapters 8 through 11 provide an outsider's view of Japanese capabilities and intentions from the perspective of Allied signals intelligence. The final chapter, by far the longest, is a penetrating examination of the Shōwa emperor Hirohito as a war leader, exploring his relationships with military subordinates, his strategic preferences, and the extent of his influence on military decision making.

The author is one of a handful of American historians of World War II with the language skills to make effective use of Japanese sources. For this

work, he has drawn not only on the vast Japanese secondary literature on the IJA but also on materials in Japanese archives. As the author of *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), Drea is also eminently qualified to address the role of signals intelligence in the Pacific War.

The first seven essays explore many different aspects of the IJA, ranging from equipment and minor tactics to operational doctrine and the training of soldiers and officers. Nonetheless, they constitute a coherent whole by virtue of their shared concern with two questions that cut to the heart of the Japanese military experience in World War II: how can we reconcile the tactical excellence of the IJA with its stunning strategic and operational failures? How are we to explain the combat motivation of the Japanese soldier, especially his willingness to fight to the death? The answer to the first question, according to Drea, can be found in military training and doctrine that emphasized infantry tactics and spiritual intangibles at the expense of intelligence, communications, and logistics. Japanese officers were not adequately prepared to command large units, and a cultural admiration for perseverance translated into a fatal proclivity for reinforcing failure. With regard to the second question, Drea's answer downplays vulgarized notions of *bushido* while emphasizing basic societal values that were deliberately reinforced by the military. These included respect for hierarchy,

loyalty to family and community (with the Army representing a surrogate family), and a conviction that the interests of the group took precedence over those of the individual.

The second cluster of essays (chapters 8 to 11) revisits terrain that Drea first explored in *MacArthur's ULTRA*. One essay gives us a picture of a single Australian radio-intercept unit at work in New Guinea, another essay looks at the influence of signals intelligence on critical decisions at Leyte, and the last two focus on Japanese preparations for the defense of the home islands in 1945. Both in this section and in the final chapter, on Hirohito, Drea contributes to several debates. In response to Gar Alperovitz and others who maintain that Japan was ready to surrender in the summer of 1945 and that the atomic bombs detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki therefore served no military purpose, Drea argues that the massive military buildup in southern Kyushu detected by Allied signals intelligence convinced American leaders that Japan was determined to continue fighting. His presentation on this point is extremely persuasive. In chapter 10, Drea appears to accept the notion that most Japanese servicemen and civilians were willing to fight to the bitter end, with bamboo spears if need be. Since Operation OLYMPIC never took place, any argument about what would have happened must remain in the realm of speculation. Nevertheless, there is a fair amount of evidence that Japanese civilian morale was beginning to crack, as John Dower has demonstrated from the files of Japan's Special Higher Police (the "thought police"). Drea himself

mentions low morale in chapters 11 and 12, which would seem to undercut his remarks in the previous chapter.

Historians have long debated Hirohito's role in the Pacific War and the extent of his influence on Japanese decision making. Was he the mastermind of Japanese aggression or a constitutional monarch with pacifist leanings but no real influence over policy? Drea reasonably positions himself between these extremes. The emperor was briefed in detail on military affairs and could "influence the shape of the emerging consensus" by questioning his service chiefs. On the other hand, the military leaders often gave evasive answers or simply ignored their emperor's wishes. With elegant parsimony, Drea maintains that Hirohito's behavior throughout the Pacific War was driven by the desire to win a "decisive victory" that would enable Japan to conclude a negotiated peace and thereby preserve the imperial line. His argument is well supported with specific evidence, including passages from the recently rediscovered "Shōwa emperor's monologue," which Hirohito dictated to imperial household officials in 1946.

Drea's book should be read by anyone who wishes to understand why the Japanese armed forces and their leaders acted as they did during World War II.

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Alden, John D. *Salvage Man: Edward Ellsberg and the U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 352pp. \$37.50

To this day, I keep and treasure battered copies of Commander Edward Ellsberg's books *On the Bottom*, *Men under the Sea*, and *Under the Red Sea Sun*—books I read and read again as a teenager. I devoured these stirring accounts of deep-sea salvage, reading by flashlight under the blanket after lights-out, an environment not unlike the tunneling under the sunken S-51 so vividly described by Ellsberg. I often wondered who this "Commander Ellsberg of the Navy" was. Now, thanks to John Alden's sterling biography, I know.

Born in Colorado in 1891, Ellsberg graduated from Annapolis in 1914, at the head of his class academically but low in military efficiency. In his career he was a "can do" engineer, salvage master, inventor, writer, lecturer, and public figure both in the Navy and in civilian life.

Author of thirteen popular books on marine salvage and countless articles for the technical and popular press, Ellsberg became well known for his technical commentary on maritime and naval engineering matters. He left the Navy twice, frustrated by its bureaucratic ways and its displeasure with his public stature. Twice he returned when the Navy needed him.

The salvage and raising of the submarine S-51 first brought national recognition. The S-51 had been rammed off Block Island, Rhode Island, in September 1925, losing all but three hands. At the time, the Navy had no deep-water salvage capability and was dependent on maritime contractors. Ellsberg convinced the commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard that he could raise