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Security Studies for the 21st Century

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Shultz, Richard H., Jr., Roy Godson, and George H. Quester, eds. *Security Studies for the 21st Century*. Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 1997. 446pp. \$49.95

At first glance, *Security Studies for the 21st Century* does not appear relevant to many in the *Naval War College Review* readership. As explained in the book's introduction, "Its purpose is to provide instructors and curriculum planners of security studies programs with model curricula and model courses that address traditional shortcomings and reflect . . . changes in the contemporary international environment." Consequently its target readers appear limited to those who design security studies curricula. For them, the book is an impressive collection of essays, syllabi, and critiques, obviously worth the costs of acquiring and reading. However, this work is more than it professes to be; it has value for the military professional and any other student of security studies.

There are eleven chapters, each of which consists of three essays. The first essay, written by a prominent professor or other authority, lays out and justifies the syllabus for a graduate-level course in security studies. Included with each essay is an extensive collection of notes, essentially a bibliography. The second and third essays of each chapter are scholarly critiques of the proposed course structure and content, with notes again provided. These critiques are written by peers of each chapter's primary author, and they provide the reader with provocative analyses, insights, and opinions on the subject under discussion.

A selection from chapter six, "Economics and National Security: The

Evolutionary Process," provides a good example. Here, Richard Rosecrance, professor of political science and director for international relations at UCLA, poses what is becoming a common idea in discussions, how the global economy will affect international order. He offers as part of his premise that "among developed countries, it is possible that economic competition will replace military conflict in the years ahead, and the traditional role of the state in shaping national strategy may be challenged by economic forces, particularly multinational firms." Rosecrance builds and documents the logical underpinnings of his arguments and clarifies his assertions, all which makes for informative reading.

However, he does not have the final word. Instead, the editors offer as a counterweight the opinions of Robert Gilpin, the Eisenhower Professor of International Affairs and faculty associate at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. As part of his counterargument he states, "While men and women continue to give their utmost loyalty to the nation-state and are willing to die for it, few individuals, to the best of my knowledge, have made an equivalent sacrifice for the European Community or for a business enterprise. Despite Lee Iacocca's rantings against his Japanese rivals, I seriously doubt that even he would give his life for the greater glory of Chrysler Motors. For better or worse, the state still holds a virtual monopoly on human loyalty. Talk of a borderless world is a conceit of individuals living in prosperous nations with secure borders!"

It is the interplay between informed assertion and considered critique that

154 Naval War College Review

makes reading this work informative and thought provoking. A related strength lies in the intellectual nudging provided by the notes in each chapter. A quick search on the internet spurred by an intriguing note or cited source can reveal a previously unknown body of thought and become a catalyst for further interest and reading.

In addition to having ready access to the internet, potential readers would be well advised to keep a good dictionary nearby, since the book is replete with words that fall outside common usage. If a tendency for verbal complexity can be considered a drawback, a related complaint is that many will find portions of the book very dry. These two factors will probably keep those outside its target audience from reading the book. This would be a shame, because this work rewards the reader handsomely for the time and trouble required.

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Hillen, John. *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*. Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 1998. 305pp. \$26.95

This book undertakes a rigorous examination of the military aspects of UN peacekeeping missions and offers a persuasive analysis of why some succeeded while others failed. For this task the author is highly qualified. John Hillen fought as a U.S. Army officer in the Persian Gulf War and studied as a Fulbright scholar in England, receiving his doctorate from Oxford in international relations. He is currently the

Olin fellow for national security at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The author groups UN missions into four general types: observation, traditional peacekeeping, second-generation peacekeeping, and enforcement. Using the "prisms" of force structure, command and control, and military objectives, Hillen analyses each type both generically and through detailed case studies, supplementing published accounts and documentary sources with interviews of prominent participants. At the price of some repetitiveness, he builds a convincing edifice of evidence and logic.

The main conclusions may be summarized in a few sentences. Despite the UN's lack of authority or well developed structures for planning and executing missions, it has succeeded when its objectives have been predominantly political, when the scale of operations has been relatively small, and when indigenous elements have cooperated—conditions generally characterizing the first two types of operation listed above. The UN has also "succeeded" when it has "contracted out" to a powerful nation (the United States) or a tested coalition (Nato) the conduct of operations whose objectives were largely military, that required large, heavily armed forces, and that faced violent opposition—conditions generally prevailing in the latter two types of missions. The UN has failed, sometimes catastrophically, when it has undertaken such missions itself, as in the Congo in the early 1960s, the concluding phase of operations in Somalia, and the United Nations Protection Force experience in Yugoslavia. In cases like these, shortcomings in command and