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Forward Presence & Engagement

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Historical Insights into the Problem of "Shaping"

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AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY and military strategy emphasize the role of forward military presence and peacetime military engagement in "shaping" the post–Cold War international environment, creating conditions conducive to realizing American foreign policy goals of enhanced security, increased prosperity, and expanded democracy. Unfortunately, our knowledge of how this peacetime "shaping" process works is rudimentary at best. No one knows exactly how and in what ways overseas military operations during peacetime contribute to the political outcomes and political evolution the United States seeks. Our understanding of basic issues, such as what kinds of "shaping" have historically proved possible and what types of military power have been useful to great powers in their "shaping" efforts, is severely limited.

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As a consequence, political and military decision makers find them-
selves relying on common sense and gut instincts rather than on more
carefully developed models as they pursue national strategy. What
types of military forces are necessary if the United States is to convince
a sometimes skeptical world that violence is unacceptable, that open
markets and free trade are mutually beneficial, and that democracy and
human rights are to be embraced and cherished? How should these
forces be deployed and operated? How should military presence be
integrated into larger national policy and linked to economic and
diplomatic efforts? Given budgetary pressures on today's defense estab-
lishment, the drain on personnel and materiel caused by forward de-
ployment, the global nature of American commitments, the sweeping
goals of American foreign policy, and the long-term consequences of
investment decisions, an improved understanding of how peacetime
presence and engagement influence the political environment is crucial.

This article reports the findings of a major exploratory study of for-
ward military presence and peacetime political "shaping." Our concern
in this study was with understanding the ability of great powers to en-
gage in peacetime "shaping"—to use their military preponderance to
shape regional peacetime political environments in ways consistent
with their desires. We looked at six very different cases in which demo-
cratic powers attempted to influence and stabilize political realities in
regions in which they enjoyed military predominance, asking in each
case the same questions about the great power's military capacity, the
other resources available to it, constraints on its actions, and outcomes
achieved. Clearly, such a study cannot offer definitive answers to all of
our questions about "shaping." It can, however, help us discover gen-
eral patterns and suggest preliminary propositions that, after further
analysis, could serve as guidelines for policy.

Research Design

In selecting cases from which to draw lessons, we sought historical
situations that are in some important respects analogous to the one
currently facing the United States. First, the great power should have
enjoyed predominant military power in the region. Next, the great
power should have been a democracy, subject to whatever constraints
on the use of military power democratic institutions might impose.
Third, the great power also should have been dealing with other

sovereign states—that is, we avoided colonial cases, in which key regional actors lacked formal sovereignty. Fourth, the great power should have had clearly identified goals. Finally, we looked for cases involving different great powers and different regions, in which great powers pursued a variety of objectives and had a range of resources, to help distinguish between idiosyncratic and general findings.

In examining the cases selected, we employed focused-comparison techniques—that is, for each case we asked the same set of questions—making it possible to lay the answers to particular questions literally side by side, comparing across the six cases. The questions fell into three general categories:[*]

- What was the great power's military capability—what were the principal attributes of its military power—in the region?
- What other resources were at the great power's disposal, and what political constraints may have affected its behavior or influence in the region?
- How successful was the great power in shaping the peacetime political environments in ways consistent with its preferences?

For each case, the historical material allowed answers to a list of specific questions and subquestions.

What were the great power's military capabilities? What was the overall *regional military balance* between the great power and regional powers? What was the degree of the great power's effective *technological superiority* over regional powers? ("Effective" here implies not merely possession of technology but also the training and institutional capacity to maintain and employ it.) How constant was the great power's *presence* in the region, with what kinds and levels of forces? What was the *speed* of great-power response? What *military options* were available to the great power? Did the great power have the *ability to intervene in domestic political affairs* (for instance, to save or topple governments)? Did the great power have the *ability to conduct humanitarian and peacekeeping operations*?

What were the great power's other resources, and what constraints on its behavior existed? What was the great power's *economic leverage*? What was

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[*] The first category represents the relevant independent variable, the impact of which is to be examined. The second category represents control and intervening variables. The third category, the outcome, represents the dependent variable of the study.

the great power's *political penetration* of regional actors? How much freedom of action did the great power have, given *domestic political constraints?* What *international regimes and institutions* existed that either supported or worked against the great power's objectives? Were *other great powers* active in, or capable of intervening in, the region? What realistic options did *regional states* have to put pressure on the great power? Did regional states and the great power share *common objectives?*

Was the great power able to shape the peacetime environment in a way consistent with its preferences? To what extent was it able to *deter unwanted conflict* in the region? How well could it *control the outcome of such conflict, reassure aligned states,* and *protect its economic interests* in the region? Could it *ensure that regional states pursued foreign policies it desired?* To what extent could it *further domestic developments* in the region that were consistent with its values and preferences (such as democratic development, economic development, or procapitalist economic policies)?

The six cases we selected for investigation were:

- Britain in the eastern Mediterranean during the Concert of Europe period (1816–52)
- Britain in the eastern Mediterranean during the interwar years (1919–37)
- Britain in South America between 1850 and 1890
- The United States in the Caribbean between 1903 and 1920
- France in West Africa between 1960 and 1970
- France in Central Africa between 1970 and 1995.

Case Summaries

Three of our cases are drawn from British experience—two in a region geographically vital to Britain (the eastern Mediterranean) and one in a region of economic significance but of only peripheral political importance, South America. In the first of the eastern Mediterranean cases, British presence in the region was largely military, with little political entanglement; in the second, Britain was deeply enmeshed in the domestic affairs of several key countries in the region, enjoying the benefits and experiencing the discomforts of a history of imperial involvement. Significant too is the fact that in the second eastern Mediterranean case Great Britain was a declining power, facing increasing challenges from other great powers.

Our fourth case is drawn from American history: U.S. efforts at the beginning of the twentieth century to influence political developments in the Caribbean basin, aimed at stabilizing the region and promoting democratic government. Perhaps what is most striking about this case is the amount of power the United States could bring to bear. Our fifth and sixth cases examine French efforts in francophone Africa. They are remarkable for the extent of France's postcolonial penetration of the region and the degree to which sovereignty was blurred, giving France enormous leverage in influencing political outcomes. Taken together, these six historical cases suggest some general lessons about the problem of political "shaping."

Case 1, Sea Power and International Order: Great Britain in the eastern Mediterranean, 1816–52. In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, Britain aimed to stabilize the eastern Mediterranean region, prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of other great powers' influence in the area, protect British commerce and communication routes, and encourage free trade and Western-style social progress.[1] Though peripheral to the continental European theater, the eastern Mediterranean was geographically critical to Britain.

British naval forces maintained a consistent presence in the eastern Mediterranean, operating from forward bases at Malta and in the islands of the Ionian Sea. In its dealings with regional actors, the Royal Navy enjoyed a qualitative edge—an edge that at times proved critical and that rested not on better technology but on the superior training and professionalism of its sailors and officers.[2] In fact, given the weakness of the post-Napoleonic British army, the Royal Navy represented the only effective military tool at Britain's disposal.[3] Nonmilitary sources of power or influence were also quite limited—British trade and financial ties offered little leverage, and political penetration of regional governments was negligible.[4] (In Egypt, for example, British political presence was less than France's; even in Constantinople, British counsels frequently went unheeded.)

The employment of British naval power was not significantly constrained by domestic opinion: foreign secretaries were typically able to manipulate public opinion; they were seldom compelled to tailor their actions to it or to parliamentary pressure. Public and parliamentary opinion did, however, constrain British defense spending, a serious overall limitation on British policy, and at the extreme public and

parliamentary opinion may have kept foreign secretaries from pursuing policies that would have precipitated great-power war.[5]

While not unchallenged (France and Russia were both able to intervene in the region), Britain clearly dominated the eastern Mediterranean, thanks to its naval power. Although great-power interests frequently collided, particularly with regard to the Turkish Straits, British objectives were generally consistent with international regimes—the 1815 Concert of Europe, which had in broad terms endorsed the status quo, and the antislavery regime, which reflected British notions of prog-

> *Maximizing military presence for "shaping" outcomes in the short run may... undercut the long-term goals that prompted great-power involvement in the first place.*

ress.[6] Because of Britain's interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire, its goals and those of the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) were frequently, though not always, congruent; for that reason, however, British and Egyptian goals were often in direct conflict.

Britain's capacity to shape outcomes in the region appears to have been principally based on its ability to use its naval power to foreclose Egyptian options and, to a lesser extent, French and Russian ones. Naval power offered Britain a range of options. However, few extended farther inland than the reach of the Royal Navy's guns. Frequently the speed of British reaction, made possible by the presence of Royal Navy warships in the region, seems to have been important in deterring adversaries, reassuring friends, preventing undesired faits accomplis, and achieving the goals of British policy.[7]

Britain's overall success in shaping outcomes in the eastern Mediterranean (with a few notable exceptions, such as the Ottoman turn toward Russia in 1833) must be seen in light of the distinctly modest British goals, which were limited in two regards. First (and with such exceptions as eventual support for Greek independence), the British generally sought to prevent or defeat challenges to the status quo. That is, British policy was essentially a holding action, aimed at foiling those who sought change. Second, the British did not seek to transform the domestic politics or conditions of the region's nations. Given their liberal political ideology and commitment to progress, this is perhaps surprising, but the British seem consistently to have defined progress in terms of foreign policy, not domestic transformation. Thus Britain

sought to stem the slave trade and encouraged freer international trading, but it did not actively further constitutional government in the eastern Mediterranean.[8]

In sum, within the distinct limits set by successive governments, British policy was largely effective in stabilizing the eastern Mediterranean. By and large, the British were able, by means of the sustained presence of thoroughly trained naval forces, to foreclose the military and diplomatic options of regional actors and other great powers. By doing so, they deterred, limited, or ensured satisfactory outcomes in regional conflicts, and they limited political penetration by other great powers, protected British trade and commerce, and encouraged the emergence of a progressive international order based on free trade and antislavery norms. Though the evidence is less than definitive, it appears that the achievement of these goals depended on the presence of forces able actually to prevent or defeat challenges by anti–status quo powers that were quite prepared to pose such challenges. That is, the Royal Navy's role was more than symbolic, and these other powers (at varying times Egypt, Russia, and France) were at least sometimes highly sensitive to the actual capabilities of forward-operating elements of the Royal Navy.

Case 2, Hegemony in Decline: Great Britain in the eastern Mediterranean, 1919–37. In the interwar years, as during the period of the Concert of Europe, Britain sought to stabilize the eastern Mediterranean region, maintain the status quo, preserve British primacy, and deter conflict. The region remained a key one for British foreign policy because of its strategic position on the route to India and Singapore as well as the oil reserves in Iraq.[9] Britain's policy in the eastern Mediterranean was both facilitated and complicated by its colonial role and by its presence and influence in the postcolonial states. Unlike in the earlier period, British ability to stabilize the region was thus intimately linked to its ability to ensure domestic order, not just to influence the international environment. The aims of British policy with respect to the eastern Mediterranean were thus substantially greater than in the preceding century: to deter great-power aggression; limit the spread of great-power influence; limit the economic inroads of other powers, particularly in key sectors like oil; and maintain domestic order while preventing an anti-British political backlash in the Arab world that would jeopardize London's continued control or influence there.

British military resources were markedly overextended, both on land and at sea.[10] British garrisons in its Arab protectorates and mandates were modest, even for the limited task of maintaining local order. They did, however, represent a consistent presence ashore in the southern and eastern parts of the region, although this presence could be projected only with difficulty into sparsely populated areas. As the Chanak crisis with Turkey illustrated, Britain was also hampered by the fact that while its forces in the region might be sufficient to deter conflict briefly, a major war would require mobilization, which would be time consuming and probably unacceptable politically.[11] Still, British naval power was regionally dominant, however stretched globally. The Mediterranean represented the center of gravity for the Royal Navy; roughly half the British fleet was deployed there during the interwar period, with major bases at Malta and Alexandria.[12]

British technological superiority played an important role in how policy makers dealt with at least one of their many problems: how to police sparsely populated areas, maintaining order and preventing the coalescence of anti-British political movements. Here, airpower proved effective. The system of air policing devised by Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, chief of staff of the Royal Air Force, appears to have been generally a success.[13] Two important observations need be made, however. First, the Trenchard system did not rest on bluff or reflect hesitation to use violence; rather, it appears that the coercive effectiveness of aircraft was predicated on the considerable British record of actual air bombardment. Second, the effectiveness of air policing reflected the unusual geographic and sociopolitical conditions of the Arab hinterland. In urban areas, maintenance of order required some combination of "boots on the ground" and political penetration, in particular a mastery of divide-and-conquer approaches to political manipulation.[14]

While British economic leverage vis-à-vis regional actors was, as in the earlier period, limited, in the interwar years British policy in the eastern Mediterranean relied heavily on political penetration, formal and informal, especially in the Arab zone.[15] The presence of British advisors and administrators was as vital as that of British soldiers to ensuring that the foreign and domestic policies of the Arab states remained consistent with British aims. This political resource, however, waned as the period advanced, and its decline presented British policy makers with a no-win dilemma: whereas continued political presence tended to promote Arab nationalist opposition, retrenchment

would weaken London's ability to control the local elements that were pushing for further British withdrawal. In general, British military presence remained able to cope with violent expressions of nationalism or anti-British sentiment, but only at increasing cost.[16]

At home, antiwar sentiment, domestic preoccupations, and budgetary concerns all constrained British policy in the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere in the world.[17] Again, however, these domestic constraints tended to set overall bounds rather than sharply limit freedom of action in particular crises. These constraints were at least at the margin reinforced by the international naval arms control regime of the period, although it is difficult to know how much more Britain—or its rivals—would have spent in its absence.[18]

British goals tended to be consistent with the aspirations of the League of Nations (indeed, Britain was the essential power in the organization); had League norms been more effective, they probably would have assisted British policy, especially with respect to Italy.[19] The Italian invasion of Abyssinia represented a direct challenge to—and defeat for—British policy.[20] Other challenges tended to be more chronic in nature, however. The rise of Arab nationalism, the increasing ability of regional players like Turkey to play off the great powers, and the deepening economic penetration of the region by firms from other nations all posed long-run dilemmas for which the British had no long-run solution.

The overall picture that emerges is thus mixed. Using a combination of extensive political penetration (the legacy of British occupation and of colonial or mandated control) and military presence both at sea and in dispersed garrisons ashore, the British were able to retain their dominant position in the eastern Mediterranean and, with the conspicuous exception of Abyssinia, to shape regional developments in ways roughly consistent with their preferences. This said, however, British ability to control or influence the two resolutely independent states of the region, Turkey and Greece, was limited—as demonstrated by Turkey's successful opposition to Anglo-Greek policies in the 1920s, the Greek turn away from Britain, and worrisome Turkish engagement with both Germany and the USSR.[21]

Perhaps even more significantly, Britain's ability to shape regional developments was clearly waning and unsustainable, however London strove to achieve economies. Three contributory factors can be identified. First, Britain's decline relative to other great powers, coupled with

ideological and domestic constraints that made it unwilling to act pre-emptively against emerging challengers like Italy, progressively re-duced its ability to deter great-power involvement or intervention in the eastern Mediterranean. Second, long-term economic developments were bringing other powers, most conspicuously the United States, into the region. Third, Britain was unable to control nationalist politi-cal developments there. Britain's co-optation of elites and manipula-tion of domestic politics in the Arab world was at times masterful, but its political and military presence does not appear to have contributed to the development of institutions and norms that would have allowed that presence to continue indefinitely.

In the short and medium terms, British successes seem to have re-flected the presence of well-tailored military forces (a navy dominant at sea, garrisons of lightly armed soldiers ashore, and RAF aircraft to po-lice the hinterland) closely tied to and informed by a network of colo-nial or postcolonial administrators. This politico-military presence seems to have been designed with an eye to deterring or defeating the particular challenges the British faced. With it, Britain attempted to walk the fine line between appearing weak and thus inviting attack, on the one hand, and on the other, provoking nationalist outbursts through displays of power.

In its own terms, Britain's "shaping" policy should probably be re-garded as successful. Its goals, as enunciated, were modest. So too, though, was its success—and time was not working in Britain's favor.

Case 3, "Masterly Inactivity": Great Britain in South America, 1850–1900. The British experience of "shaping" in South America in the second half of the nineteenth century supports one of the themes suggested by the previous two cases: a great power that sets its sights low enough is likely to achieve its goals. Britain's aim in South America was clear and consistent, but modest: to ensure a free trade regime. Since the nations of the region already embraced the free trade norm, the only real threat was the reestablishment of European empires. British policy was not to attempt to exclude other great powers from South America but to block any attempt to recolonize it. While Britain assumed that free trade would ultimately lead to peace and progress, in general it did not actively attempt otherwise to bring these about more directly, prevent regional conflict, or influence domestic political developments. Lon-don rarely involved itself in the region's quarrels, even when British

property and investments were threatened. Not surprisingly, Britain's policy has been described as one of "perfect indifference," or "masterly inactivity." Since the British objectives of free trade and, as a corollary, preservation of South American sovereignty were broadly shared by political elites across the region, its indifference and inactivity—coupled with underlying reassurance that Britain would not permit the norms of sovereignty and free trade to be violated—were sufficient.[22]

Although the period marked the height of British naval mastery, Royal Navy presence in South America, though continuous, was essentially negligible—a handful of obsolescent warships operating out of facilities controlled by host states. In numbers and technology, these warships were typically inferior to those of regional actors (though, as the engagement between Peruvian and British forces in 1877 suggests, superior training may have offset these inferiorities).[23] The importance of the British naval presence thus seems to have been largely symbolic—a reminder of the naval might that was potentially on call and of British commitment to sovereignty and free trade. However, it is worth recognizing that as a practical matter, given its limited objectives, the token size of its naval squadron probably did not deny Britain options it might have wanted to exercise: Britain was unlikely even to perceive a need to join in regional squabbles, intervene in domestic fighting, or step in to protect investments.[24]

The British Empire lacked not only military instruments in South America but economic and diplomatic ones as well. Britain's commitment to free trade undermined the credibility of economic threats, and its diplomatic presence in the region was maintained only at the lowest levels. Britain did, however, possess two important, if intangible, resources. The first was local respect for Britain, particularly for the Royal Navy, an attitude that dated back to its support in the wars for Latin American independence. (This may help explain why the distinctly second-rate quality of Royal Navy forces in the region did not undermine British prestige.) The second, and more critical, factor was the intellectual commitment of South American elites to British-style economic liberalism. In this regard, Britain can be described as exerting something like Gramscian hegemony, having convinced ruling elites in the region that their interests and Britain's were at least generally consistent.

As in Cases 1 and 2, it is possible that parliamentary and public opinion restricted the broad outlines of British policy even if it did not

constrain immediate responses to crises. It seems doubtful that a British government could have found political support had it wanted to increase British presence in South America, much less intervene. The limited British policy in the region, in fact, seems to have been broadly popular.

Several important observations derive from this case. First, when the interests of regional states and a great power are perceived by regional states as being the same, purely symbolic forces may be sufficient. Large deployments, or even operationally effective units, may be unnecessary.

Second, and most interestingly, in such a situation increased military presence may not only be unnecessary but distinctly undesirable: as one British diplomat observed, "Consuls without cannons had little impact, yet the use of warships had often inflamed local feelings and been counter productive."[25] The logic at work here is not difficult to discern. More than token British presence would have manifestly given Britain the ability to intervene whenever its interests diverged from those of particular South American states. Thus, while eliminating the Royal Navy presence might have left South American states feeling vulnerable to other European powers, increasing it would have created or exacerbated fears that Britain intended to intervene on behalf of its nationals, support factions in civil conflicts, or take sides in regional disputes. Presence was necessary, then, but less was more. Indeed, this lesson may have been driven home by the unsuccessful and unpopular British effort in the 1840s to topple Argentina's Rosas regime by blockading the River Plate.[26]

Third, while British policy was vastly successful in its own narrow terms—Britain was able to ensure free markets across South America—it was a failure in broader ways. An essential assumption underlying British policy, at least when Liberal governments were in power, was that free trade would result in peace, prosperity, and political progress. This proved wrong. The positive consequences (other than markets for manufactured goods) that Britain expected from its support for free trade simply did not develop.

Case 4. Progressive Intervention: The United States in the Caribbean, 1903–20. In a number of significant ways, the U.S. experience of "shaping" the Caribbean in the first decades of the twentieth century represents the reverse of that of Britain in South America in the late

nineteenth century. Where British objectives were narrowly defined, American ones were sweeping; where Britain employed only limited forces, America committed major resources—military, economic, and political; where Britain avoided domestic involvement, America plunged in. The United States had two principal goals in the Caribbean. The first, driven by realpolitik, was to prevent another great power from gaining influence in the region. With the decision to construct an isthmian canal, this factor became critical to American security. This security concern with great-power presence, though, also elevated U.S. interest in the region's internal affairs. Because instability and inability to repay debts would justify and invite European intervention in the region (as the Venezuelan debt crisis of 1902 and the subsequent Hague Court decision underscored), this realpolitik objective logically dictated what became known as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine—that the United States itself would intervene to prevent misgovernment. The second goal, which led to the same conclusion as the first, reflected the internal logic and moral imperative of Progressivism, which in those years informed American political ideology: by Progressive reckoning, America had a duty to use, and a self-interest in using, its power to establish stable, liberal, eventually democratic governments in the region. The widely shared Progressive ethos of action, service, and charity, as well as of the expansion of democracy, informed American foreign policy decision makers from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson. Very few American elites questioned this moral imperative of Progressivism.[27]

The U.S. naval construction program that began in 1890, realities of geography (the Caribbean was close to U.S. bases but far from Europe), and a balance of power in Europe that kept European fleets close to home combined to give the United States an ability to deploy decisive naval power in the region. Bases at Guantanamo, San Juan, and Culebra (a small island east of Puerto Rico) supported the standing Caribbean Squadron and major units conducting training exercises. The United States possessed essentially all the naval power it could imagine using: in every instance during the seventeen years embraced by this case, the U.S. Navy found it possible to dispatch immediately a warship to the trouble spot identified by the State Department. Equally important, the United States possessed in the Marine Corps, which was dramatically expanded during this period, a professional, disciplined force that

could intervene ashore with what by local standards amounted to over-whelming force.[28]

In sum, no regional state could resist American military power, either at sea or ashore. As was repeatedly demonstrated, American military power was sufficient to intervene, restore order, prevent the overthrow of governments, ensure the success of antigovernment movements, impose truces on warring parties or bring them to the peace table, and even undertake major civic construction projects. Both at sea and ashore, U.S. military forces possessed a huge technological advantage over those of regional states. Forward deployment and state-of-the-art communications technology permitted the United States to respond in a timely fashion to developing situations. At least as relevant, however, was the superior professionalism and discipline of its armed services, which permitted small American forces to restore order or decisively influence events in the face of much larger numbers.[29]

American power was not only military, of course. In contrast to the three British cases discussed above, American business and financial institutions generally worked hand in glove with the American government, and they dominated the economies of the region. In several important instances, the United States itself took over the public finances of Caribbean states. Beyond this indirect or direct control over Caribbean economies, the United States also enjoyed considerable political penetration of regional elites, which in some cases identified closely with the United States.

America's military freedom of action in the Caribbean during this period was essentially unlimited. In the wake of the Venezuelan crisis of 1902, the two great powers that might conceivably have disputed American hegemony, Great Britain (which had the naval power but not the interest) and Germany (which found itself diplomatically at odds with the United States but was otherwise engaged in Europe), effectively conceded the region. In American domestic politics, both conservatives and liberals, though for different reasons, supported the Progressive policy of intervention; no significant voices opposed it. The international regimes of the day gave the United States carte blanche, even strong encouragement, for intervention. In short, options up to and including prolonged military occupation were entirely feasible.

Despite this overwhelming power and the absence of constraints on its use, U.S. policy must be judged as at best only partially successful. While the United States kept other powers out of the Caribbean,

largely prevented interstate clashes, and protected American property and investments, it failed in its efforts to transform domestic societies and create stable internal order. The region remained marked by domestic instability and violence. Although the United States was able to determine the political victors in internal struggles across the Caribbean, this did not result in the political progress the United States sought.

This is a striking finding, worth underscoring. Despite the fact that the United States possessed overwhelming military, economic, and political capabilities, including the capacity to respond decisively, and essentially immediately, with naval power; despite strong domestic support and a lack of international opposition; and despite the comical military and political weakness of regional states, the United States was unable to reshape domestic order in the Caribbean.

A second worrisome point: in the end, American intervention proved domestically unsustainable. After 1920, as part of a general rejection of U.S. interventionism, American public and elite opinion turned against the Caribbean policy, and efforts to reshape the region politically were largely abandoned.[30]

Case 5, "la Chasse Gardée": France in West Africa, 1960–70. There are important parallels between American involvement in the Caribbean in the early decades of the twentieth century and French presence in francophone West and Central Africa in the post–World War II period. Both great powers sought to influence domestic as well as international conditions, using a mix of military, economic, and political tools. In each case, the great power's economic and political penetration of the region was extraordinary. In each case the great power had a fairly free hand—while suspicious of other great powers and determined to prevent encroachment in an area they saw of vital interest, the United States and France actually enjoyed widely, if only implicitly, recognized spheres of influence, and both had only the most general domestic political constraints on their actions.

French and American objectives, however, differed substantially. For France, the goal of preserving a *"chasse gardée"* (literally, a feudal hunting preserve) in Africa stemmed from a perceived need to restore its political prestige and retain effective control over the region's raw materials, manpower, and markets.[31] This dictated "shaping" the region's politics in such a way that none of the three threats France perceived to the *chasse*

gardée—political and cultural encroachment by the anglophone powers; ideological and diplomatic interference by the Soviet Union and its clients; and African anti-neocolonial, nationalist sentiment—endangered either the continued special politico-economic relationship between francophone Africa and France or the continued dominance of francophone culture. Thus where the underlying aim of American involvement in the Caribbean was to ensure stability and progress, that of France's involvement in Africa was to protect its hegemony over, and the French special relationship with, the region.

We note this difference in goals not to claim some moral superiority for America but to point out two factors that may explain differences in success. First, in conception if not always in practice, American policy ultimately sought a profound transformation of political institutions and social relationships; French policy accepted the existing ones. Second, whatever pragmatic compromises it from time to time embraced, American policy during the Progressive period regarded disorder and the violent overthrow of governments as undesirable per se; French policy, by contrast, was willing to tolerate political violence and embrace undemocratic political transitions so long as they yielded leaders who continued the French relationship.[32]

French efforts also displayed a greater continuity of purpose over time and a higher level of involvement: French politico-economic-military penetration of the region dated from the colonial expansion of the nineteenth century; it continued to follow a clear and consistent policy after the Brazzaville Conference of 1944;[33] and perhaps most importantly, it was managed directly by a succession of French presidents who were remarkably free not only of parliamentary scrutiny but of the red tape of bureaucratic management.[34] Finally, it should be emphasized that the French penetration of the region was a product of colonial history. It is difficult to imagine so pervasive a local political presence in any but a postcolonial context.

French military presence in the region took three simultaneous forms: troops and bases; a network of military and intelligence advisors and agents in key posts;[35] and a sustained pattern of military aid and transfers.[36] Defense and military cooperation agreements signed at the time of independence of each former colony provided not only the legal bases for French intervention but also foundations for extensive political and politico-military penetration: French military advisors in Africa ranged between a thousand and three thousand in the 1960–80 period,

expatriate French officers occupied key positions in most francophone African militaries, and substantial numbers of African officers were trained in French schools. France also provided the visual trappings of power—uniforms, jets, military ceremonies—that conveyed legitimacy for African rulers.[37]

The superiority of French forces over those of West Africa was large and unquestioned. The armies of francophone African states remained small and poorly trained.[38] France's technology provided its forces with airpower and superior mobility, though its logistical capacity for long-term actions was always problematic. French forces based in Africa were backed up by the metropolitan-based (that is, in France) divi-

> *"Being there" is not just "hanging around"—"showing the flag" and enjoying liberty ashore in exotic locales.*

sion-strength intervention force, a substantial portion of which was air mobile and which enjoyed access to an extensive network of bases.[39] Consequently, French military capacity in the region was neither theoretical nor limited to intervening in interstate conflicts: French forces possessed and frequently exercised the ability—and, under the terms of defense agreements, in many cases the legal right—to intervene in domestic politics, providing "internal security" within African states and for particular African leaders.[40]

The depth of French penetration into African societies and political institutions was remarkable, and this had obvious implications for how the French "shaping" effort proceeded. While most of the francophone African states became independent in 1960, the French left in place the institutions and individuals necessary for extensive Franco-African "cooperation" on military, political, and economic matters. Economically, francophone Africa was completely dependent on France; France controlled currencies and dominated investment and trade. Equally significant, French culture continued to pervade the region; also, in important cases, African rulers had personal relationships with a succession of French presidents.[41] In many ways, the borders of sovereignty were, and have remained, profoundly blurred.

Constraints on French actions were few. The power to set and implement African policy was concentrated in the president's hands. Domestically, the only significant military constraint was the legal one against deploying conscripts abroad, necessitating the creation of

nonconscript units.[42] Competition from and complications caused by other great powers were also limited. Even when the Soviet Union and its allies provided significant aid, and even when African states declared themselves "Marxist," it was always within the context of lingering French dominance.[43]

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the resources at its disposal, France was successful nearly everywhere in francophone West Africa in maintaining its hegemony during the years 1960–70. Only one of its former colonies, Guinea, completely split with France during this period. Both anglophone and Soviet influences were largely excluded.

This said, it is also useful to note that managing the region required constant French attention and the frequent use of troops in shows of force and to restore order. The *chasse gardée* did not maintain itself, nor was it a little piece of paradise. The situation in francophone West Africa was generally better than that in Central Africa (if more than thirty thousand people died violently in Cameroon, over a hundred thousand were killed in interethnic conflict in Rwanda in the 1950s and 1960s, and a similar number in Zaire);[44] nonetheless, it would obviously be an overstatement to describe the region as peaceful or politically stable. Still, it is important to recognize that thanks to careful French management, neither periodic violence nor endemic instability threatened France's position, and partnership with capable francophile leaders, like Félix Houphouët-Boigny in the Côte d'Ivoire, actually yielded long-term internal stability. Francophone African rulers with close ties to French presidents knew they could count on intervention on their behalf; those who thumbed their noses at Paris knew that without its backing they were vulnerable to their own domestic opponents.[45]

Also interesting is that French influence and leverage does not appear to have extended to neighboring states where there was no French military presence or political penetration. France's indirect support for Biafra during the 1967–70 civil war in anglophone Nigeria was a failure, for example, as were its efforts to limit or reduce Nigeria's growing involvement in regional politics.[46]

Finally, it is worth observing that France's success stemmed at least in part from the extraordinary weakness of its potential adversaries in the region. Typically, even very small numbers of French troops, if deployed in a timely fashion, could have a decisive impact. However, when France found itself facing an adversary of even modest capability and staying power—for example, when it confronted Libyan-backed

forces during the protracted Chadian civil war—its military was unable to impose solutions France found fully satisfactory.[47]

Case 6, Toujours "la Chasse Gardée": France in Central Africa, 1970–95.
This case represents a sequel to the preceding one, and it illustrates the difficulties of continuing to "shape" a region over time. French goals in Central Africa from 1970 to 1995 were essentially identical to those for West Africa in the preceding period. Also as before, French ability to shape political outcomes grew out of an extraordinary and carefully maintained penetration of the region—involving not only military forces, advisors, and aid, but *"cooperants"* throughout the state apparatus and education for African officers and bureaucrats. Gradually but increasingly, however, the difficulties of preserving postcolonial influence grew. While to a remarkable degree France succeeded in preserving its African *chasse gardée,* this preserve showed signs of decay, and by the mid-1990s the prospects for its continuance looked questionable.

The most spectacular French failures occurred where French political penetration was most recent—in the former Belgian colonies of Zaire and Rwanda. In Zaire, France's inability to "shape" the post-Mobutu years resulted in the effective collapse of the Zairean state, civil war, and intervention by nonfrancophone neighbors. In Rwanda, the victory of a largely Tutsi insurgent army supported by Uganda (an anglophone state), international condemnation of Paris's tacit support of genocide by a northern Hutu political faction, and international opposition to unilateral French military intervention (the widely reviled Operation Turquoise) all marked substantial setbacks for France.[48]

These debacles need to be understood as logical consequences of a number of long-term trends that increased the difficulty of "shaping" francophone Africa. (Indeed, there are parallels between the factors underlying this case and those operating upon the British in the eastern Mediterranean in the interwar years.) For the French in Africa, these trends included the passing of a generation of leaders in France and Africa for whom *la francophonie* was a powerful cognitive factor, and between whom personal ties were deep and profound; the increasing globalization of economic forces; and the growth of pan-African sentiment that transcended the historic division between anglophone and francophone, permitting Nigeria to play a growing role in West Africa, and Uganda and South Africa to play similarly threatening (from the French perspective) parts in Central Africa. It also included the

gradually increasing capacity of a few African states to challenge France's African presence militarily; for instance, the substantial long-term commitment France found unavoidable in Chad, thanks in part to Libya, was a major drain throughout this period.[49]

As in Case 5, France retained a substantial land-based military presence, backed up by interventionary forces based at home. Both Valery Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterand invested in and expanded this interventionary capacity, though logistical support remained a weakness. Although technological sophistication grew in importance, especially as France faced Libyan-backed forces in Chad, superior training and specialized capabilities, such as airborne assault, remained critical. Also as in the earlier instance, French forces intervened frequently in domestic politics—restoring order, protecting French-supported governments (and by purposeful inaction allowing the overthrow of governments that no longer enjoyed French support), and, in unusual cases like that of Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Empire, toppling governments that had become embarrassments.[50] More generally, however, French political penetration was sufficient to induce changes in governmental composition or policy without more dramatic action.

Thus the overall appraisal must be that France was able to use its overwhelming political, economic, and military influence to "shape" the region into a French preserve. Nonetheless, this case raises interesting cautionary notes. Although France remains able to dominate Central Africa, its failure to promote substantial political, social, or economic development has resulted in instability that the French have found increasingly difficult to control—as Zaire, Chad, and Rwanda have demonstrated.

Patterns

As is already apparent, there are intriguing patterns to be found in this collection of historical cases. In the interest of promoting spirited debate and stimulating additional study, we present the patterns we have observed as a set of deliberately provocative propositions about "shaping." Obviously, as the results of focused comparison of only six cases, our findings must be regarded as highly tentative. Two further reasons for caution must be emphasized. First, our cases may have been in some way atypical; perhaps a larger or random selection would

have suggested other findings. Second, we may have asked the wrong questions—our "focused comparison" may conceivably have focused on the wrong issues; if this is the case, a theoretically better informed investigation would highlight other, more general, or more useful, lessons about which attributes of military power truly matter.

But it is necessary to start somewhere. So, though claiming only modest confidence in our analysis and urging that it be subjected to further testing, we offer this set of historical cases as a good place to begin to think about the question of "shaping," and also ten basic propositions that seem to arise from them.

Proposition 1: *"Being There" Matters.* That actual military presence in a region is fundamental represents at once the most obvious and most problematic of our conclusions—obvious, because our historical examination makes plain that military presence has clearly been the necessary basis for effective political "shaping"; problematic, because our cases offer little insight into what happens in its absence. Because we deliberately selected cases in which a great power was militarily predominant in a region, military presence was the norm. Plainly, to demonstrate conclusively the importance of presence it is necessary to review cases in which great powers attempted to "shape" regions without a military presence. This additional work should be done; nonetheless, we are quite convinced that in our six cases military presence was a prerequisite for the "shaping" each of the great powers sought to accomplish. Examining both the variation within our cases and the processes by which outcomes were achieved, we conclude that troops on the ground and ships on the horizon make a difference. In the eastern Mediterranean during the Concert of Europe, for example, when Britain's naval forces were not present, its success in "shaping" outcomes declined sharply. During the interwar years, as British forces were withdrawn from the Arab world, London's ability to control domestic political outcomes dropped; Britain's influence along the northern littoral, where it generally lacked forces ashore, was always less than it was along the southern and eastern littorals, where its forces were. Similarly, in West and Central Africa, French influence was largely limited to those countries with which it had a postcolonial relationship and in which it maintained a military presence. Our conclusion that presence matters is also plainly consistent with the views of contemporary decision makers. Even in the South American case, as small and

modest as the Royal Navy's squadron was, local nationals and British consuls clearly thought it made a difference.

Proposition 2: *In General, Presence Must Be Tailored to Foreclose Opponents' Military Options.* Typically, "being there" is not enough; rather, what makes the difference is "being there" with military forces that foreclose for regional actors and other great powers particular options they might otherwise be interested in (or that creates options preferred by the dominant power that would otherwise not have been feasible). "Being there" may deter or reassure, but what it is deterrent or reassuring about is quite specific—it deters specific actions and reassures friends that specific actions desired by the great power can be taken safely. To be effective, therefore, presence must be tailored not only to overall goals but to particular threats and concerns.

For example, British naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean in the early years of the nineteenth century was critical in "shaping" the region because it foreclosed Egypt's option of attacking the Ottoman Empire. By contrast, in the early twentieth-century interwar years, British presence did not stop Turkey from demanding a revision of the regional settlement, largely because British military power, however superior to Turkey's, was not able to block Turkish actions directly. In a very different context, the effectiveness of French presence in Africa seems to have been linked to the ability of French forces to respond to the internal threats and domestic dangers that most clearly threatened local rulers.

The cases suggest that regional actors, if sufficiently motivated, will try to "design around" the great power's presence. Thus "being there" does not foreclose all hostile activities by regional actors—only those to which the forces on the scene are militarily relevant. For example, British naval presence did not stop all Egyptian efforts to undermine the status quo during the Concert years, or make Egypt a satisfied power; it only prevented challenges to the status quo that would have required mastery of the littoral. British military presence ashore in the Arab areas of the eastern Mediterranean during the interwar years did not stop Arab nationalism, but it did foreclose particular nationalistic expressions that would have been most damaging to British interests.

At first blush, the case of Britain in South America during the height of the Pax Britannica would seem a counterexample: after all, Britain was able to achieve its goals even though its forces in region were

trivial and possessed an extremely limited capacity to intervene. On more careful examination, though, this case underscores rather than undercuts the proposition. In South America there were no military threats to British objectives. The threat was political (that either regional states or other great powers would doubt British commitment to free trade and sovereignty); therefore, token military forces were sufficient to make the political point that Britain remained committed. Global naval superiority also mattered—no great power could establish South American colonies over British objections, given British ability to close the sea lanes. In this case, though, the forces Britain needed to foreclose the option of imperial conquest in South America did not have to be on scene but could be concentrated in home waters.

Our cases thus suggest that if military presence is to be effective in "shaping" an environment, it must be tailored both to the political objectives of the great power and to the challenges from regional actors and other great powers. "Being there" implies a clear set of objectives and a force deployment sized and structured to achieve them. "Being there" is not just "hanging around"—"showing the flag" and enjoying liberty ashore in exotic locales. Specifically, in designing military forces for forward presence, three questions must be addressed: the nature of the great power's goals, the goals of the adversary, and the adversary's degree of commitment.

Here it is worth noting that "adversaries" are not necessarily states, either regional ones or rival great powers outside of it. Indeed, in many situations the key adversaries whose behavior and outlook must be "shaped" can be nonstate entities. They may be insurgent movements or local political leaders (as was frequently the case in the Caribbean), nationalist movements or tribal actors (as in the eastern Mediterranean in the interwar years), or feuding political elites or dissatisfied military officers (as in Africa). Different adversaries have vastly different goals and tools at their disposal, and their levels of commitment to particular objectives also vary significantly. As a consequence, the options these adversaries might find attractive range widely, and the military or other measures a great power needs to take to ensure the outcomes it desires vary as well. Forces that were appropriate or sufficient to shape one environment successfully may be inappropriate or insufficient in another, even if the great power's goals are the same.

Five conclusions follow. First and most importantly, no generalizable picture emerges of precisely the kinds of military forces that are

relevant for "shaping." It is impossible in the abstract to argue what forces are needed for effective presence—for example, air power, missile defense, precision strike, or ground forces—precisely because this depends on the options that need to be foreclosed or created, which in turn depend on the nature of the great power's goals, the nature of the adversary, and the adversary's degree of commitment—all highly variable.

Second, one size does *not* fit all: when used for peacetime presence, military forces need to be tailored to the particular scenario. Standardizing the forces to be forward deployed in peacetime for presence purposes is likely to be a suboptimal or even counterproductive approach.

Third, given the ability of adversaries to "design around" great-power commitments and threats, great powers find useful presence forces that have a range of capabilities. This offers great powers the ability to tailor—and retailor—responses to adapt to particular events or reformulated challenges and to solve the changing problems of a particular ally. Flexibility complicates adversaries' planning and makes it easier to help friends.

Fourth, speed of reaction is important. Foreclosing options and preventing faits accomplis clearly mattered in all but one of the cases we studied, the possible exception being South America. (A warning here is in order, however: the cases we examined offered little variance, and without exploring cases in which the great power lacked the capacity to respond quickly, it is difficult to know exactly how much speed is necessary.)

Fifth, it is important to understand regional actors and politics, and to be able to learn, assess, update, and adapt quickly. Situational awareness, resting on carefully established and consistently maintained intelligence networks, is a key to responding flexibly and appropriately.

Caveat to Proposition 2: A Token or Symbolic Presence May Be Sufficient to Deter Weakly Motivated Adversaries. Although our cases underscore the point that forward-deployed forces are usually important because they offer specific military options, they also raise the possibility that in some situations forward forces are primarily symbolic or communicative—that is, they represent a credible token of the great power's commitment—or are tripwires for a major intervention by the great power. Our cases suggest that there may well be a direct relationship between

the degree of commitment, or strength of motivation, of adversaries and the degree to which the great power must tailor its forces to specific threats. While particular capabilities matter when dealing with highly motivated adversaries, simply having forces present at all may deter weakly motivated ones. In South America, on those rare occasions when Britain became involved in regional squabbles, the mere presence of British warships was sometimes sufficient; in cases like this, in which the challenger is not deeply committed to its particular objective, a small risk that events might spiral out of control may be enough.

Proposition 3: More (Presence) Is Not Always Better than Less (Presence). The clearest illustration is the British experience in South America, where heightened British presence plainly would have inflamed Latin American public opinion and unnecessarily alarmed national elites, weakening rather than strengthening Britain's ability to "shape" the region. Other cases, however, possibly offer even more compelling evidence. Certainly the British experience in the eastern Mediterranean in the interwar years reveals the fine line between a presence large enough to deter and "shape," and an overbearing one that heightens nationalist opposition. The French have faced the same problem in Africa; Niger in the early 1960s is a useful example.[51] Military presence risks defeating its political purpose by stimulating countervailing political or military reactions, and the danger grows as the scale of the presence grows.

Interestingly, there is some indication that "less is more" may be as true in the long run as in the short or medium terms, but with a different mechanism. Both the French cases and the American involvement in the Caribbean suggest that greater presence may not only generate opposition but create long-term structural obstacles that reduce the great power's ability to achieve its goals. It is precisely in those Caribbean nations in which American presence was greatest that the long-term development of democracy and stable government institutions has been most problematic. For the French in Africa the evidence is a little less clear (and we have less historical perspective), but again it seems that at least in some nations French military presence has been an alternative, rather than an aid, to stable domestic institutions that would have maintained French influence at low cost.[52] Maximizing military presence for "shaping" outcomes in the short run may in the

long run result in poorly developed or vestigial political structures that make presence untenable or that undercut the long-term goals that prompted great-power involvement in the first place.

Proposition 4: *Depending on Circumstances and on the Goals of "Shaping," Presence May Have to Be Ashore.* This proposition is no more than a logical corollary to Proposition 2, but it is worth distinguishing. It may be possible to deter interstate conflict or ensure favorable outcomes in wars from positions on the international commons (as Britain did in the eastern Mediterranean in the Concert years and also, with more limited objectives, in Latin America). However, in some cases, because of geography or the goals of adversaries, deterring or winning regional conflicts may require a presence ashore. For the British, this point was driven home by the Chanak crisis with Turkey.

More importantly, when "stabilizing" a region means "shaping" domestic behavior or influencing domestic actors rather than simply blocking another nation's particular foreign policy actions, typically boots on the ground are required, whether routinely or during crises or conflicts. In the Caribbean, to ensure "responsible" government that would deny European powers a pretext for intervening, American Marines had to go ashore. In the Arab world in the interwar years, whether to prevent the rise of uncontrolled Arab nationalism or to force particular policy changes by the Egyptian government, British forces had to be either permanently stationed ashore or available to make demonstrations, as they did in Alexandria to reassert British power after Sir Lee Stack, a prominent British administrator, was assassinated by Egyptian dissidents. To prevent (or at least limit) a humanitarian disaster when the Turks occupied Smyrna in 1922, British forces had to be ashore as well as at sea. Perhaps most strikingly, French efforts to control the composition and policies of African governments, and to reassure pro-French leaders, required forces inside countries or a manifest ability to get them there rapidly.

The logical corollary to Proposition 3 also holds, however: forces ashore would seem more likely than forces at sea to generate a countervailing reaction. Certainly this appears to have been the British experience in the Arab world.

Especially given this last point, it might seem comforting to note that the range of tasks that can be accomplished from the sea—that is, the range of activities that can be deterred or the kinds of reassurance

that can be provided—is growing. Obviously, a study like this one that looks to the past provides little guidance as to what technology will make possible in the future. The historical record does indicate, however, the range of threats that efforts to "shape" may have to deal with. To the extent that great powers have perceived needs to ensure internal order, support particular leaders, or (most problematically) promote some sort of domestic transformation, they have had to go ashore. Thus, whatever will be technologically possible in the future, there is reason for caution in assuming that "shaping" can necessarily be accomplished purely from the sea. A sea-based ballistic-missile shield may reassure allies that they will be protected from a rogue neighbor, and a sea-based arsenal of cruise missiles may convince a would-be aggressor that its political and military command and control would not survive a conflict. It is less clear, however, how these capabilities would reassure a pro-American leader that an antidemocratic military coup is impossible, that revolutionaries or rebel forces will not be able to seize control of the hinterland, or that the demands of fundamentalist movements can safely be ignored.

Proposition 5: *Technology Does Not Offer Magic Bullets.* To the extent that we are currently experiencing a "revolution" in military affairs, the past may not provide reliable guidance for the future. Nonetheless, it may be useful to note how limited, on balance, the impact of technology has been.

In several cases examined above, technology clearly did serve as a force multiplier. For the United States in the Caribbean, modern communications permitted the rapid dispatch of warships to trouble spots, reducing the number it was necessary to maintain in the region. For the British in the interwar years, airpower was able to police lightly populated parts of the Arab countryside, lessening the size of garrisons. For the French in Africa, air mobility permitted rapid intervention with either forward forces or metropolitan-based troops.

Four points seem worth highlighting, however. First, in two of the cases (the eastern Mediterranean during the Concert of Europe, and South America), the great power successfully "shaped" with essentially the same technology that was available to regional actors. Second, in several cases regional "shaping" was principally left to older, less advanced forces (South America, Africa, and, to some degree, the eastern Mediterranean in 1816–52). Third, in most cases where technology

does seem to have mattered, what was critical was the great power's ability to develop new tactics or strategies to use existing technologies (airpower, air mobility) to meet the particular military threats of the region (disregard of British authority in distant areas; rapidly develop-ing but lightly armed domestic insurgencies).

Fourth and perhaps most interesting, where technology made a dif-ference, it was the particular technology rather than technological su-periority that mattered. Certain technologies—for example, radio communications or air bombardment—were useful to the great power given the nature of its goals and the nature of its opponent. Neither rel-ative overall superiority in technology nor the possession of advanced, state-of-the-art forces figured prominently in our findings, but the in-telligent employment of particular technologies to solve particular problems did. It was not that a great power had access to technologies unavailable to regional players or competitors that made the difference, or that it was pushing the technological envelope to new limits, but rather how creatively the great power used existing technology to make the problem of peacetime presence easier to manage.

Proposition 6: Training, Discipline, and Professionalism Matter. This was a common theme in every case examined. Better training, discipline, and professionalism not only permitted relatively small forces to deal with numerically superior adversaries but provided the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. It thus played an important role in foreclos-ing options to potential adversaries.

Obviously, technology and training go hand in hand: the first de-mands the second, and the second permits effective use of the first. Nonetheless, to the extent that there is a budgetary tradeoff between technological advance and improvement of training, education, and morale, the cases suggest the importance of the latter. Less clear, and worth further investigation, is the appropriate balance between fo-cused, mission-specific training, designed to maximize capability to meet particular threats, and training aimed at a range of challenges. Overall, however, the importance of investing in human capital is plain.

Proposition 7: Staying Power Matters. This is really two propositions. First, great powers interested in "shaping" a region typically need lo-gistical staying power to support sustained major military operations.

Forces attempting to shape events may have to stay a while, and in large numbers. A limited logistical capacity, for example, constrained France's options in Chad and Rwanda, undercutting its ability to influence outcomes there. This proposition underscores the importance of investing in appropriate logistical "tail" and of developing a base infrastructure in a region. To return to the French experience, a network of bases and airstrips was critical to France's ability to respond quickly and forcefully to political and military events.

Second and more importantly, great powers need political and economic staying power to remain involved for the long haul. "Shaping" does not happen quickly; indeed, it may be open ended. This seems to be how the British regarded their South American commitment, and how the French regard their African ones. Thus effective "shaping" is likely to demand a basic political consensus within the great power on the wisdom or necessity of remaining engaged and a willingness and ability to pay the price of that engagement.

This proposition is logically connected to earlier ones. "Shaping" aimed at deterring particular actions by revisionist players requires constant vigilance (as illustrated in the eastern Mediterranean cases). "Shaping" to preserve particular governments or ensure that whoever governs is favorably disposed (as, for example, in the French cases) represents an open-ended commitment. If "shaping" means transforming domestic social, economic, or political conditions (as it did for the United States in the Caribbean), it is likely to take a long, long time.

Obviously, staying power in this context involves a combination of picking objectives that will be sustainable in the long haul and creating the domestic political mechanisms or consensus that will permit long-term engagement. If economic and political resources are not sufficient for the long haul, political goals must be reduced. A decline in economic power, as Britain experienced in the interwar years, or loss of political support, as occurred in the United States at the close of the Progressive period, can force a retrenchment or abandonment of "shaping" efforts.

Proposition 8: *In Democracies, Public and Legislative Opinion Is Likely to Set the Overall Parameters of "Shaping" Policies.* Our historical cases suggest two interesting lessons about the ability of a democratic great power to use forward presence and engagement to shape regional developments. First, there was little evidence that public and legislative opinion typi-

cally imposed significant direct or immediate limits on action. Although in a few situations governments found or felt themselves constrained, in general they seem to have had a free hand.

Second, however, public and legislative opinion was quite likely to set significant parameters on overall policy—by dictating national goals, limiting budgets, or prohibiting certain actions on ideological grounds. British policy makers during the interwar years, for example, found themselves constrained by a society and parliament that viewed war as an unacceptable instrument of policy and that severely limited military expenditures—both of which necessarily hampered "shaping" efforts. Similarly, while French presidents had impressive freedom in setting African policy, it was within the framework of laws prohibiting the deployment of conscripts overseas, thus limiting available logistical infrastructure and the scale of any African intervention. The American experience in the Caribbean is perhaps even more interesting: while public opinion through the decade of 1910 was broadly supportive and the executive branch faced little opposition in its interventionist policies, the "return to normalcy"—that is, to isolationism—of the 1920s dictated a fundamentally changed approach.

The lesson here seems to be that great-power governments need to maintain public support for "shaping" policies if they wish to pursue such policies consistently and for long periods.

Proposition 9: *"Winning Minds" Is a Key Element in "Shaping."* Ultimately, the success of "shaping" depends on influencing how foreign leaders or masses view their situations. In the simplest scenarios and the shortest time frames, this may simply mean convincing a would-be adversary that it cannot achieve its foreign policy goal through military means and that it makes no sense to try. More generally and in the longer run, however, "shaping" is likely to require a more fundamental change in how leaders and peoples in a region think about who they are, what their goals are, and how they can best achieve those goals. It means getting regional players to conclude that they share the aspirations of the great power. Our cases suggest that to be successful in the long run, forward military presence must be viewed as an integral part of, not something separate from, an overall political effort.

Perhaps the clearest examples are the French cases. France's success at "shaping" hinged on convincing African leaders that their interests were best served by remaining within the *chasse gardée*. In part, this

meant making sure it *was* in their interest —that those who followed the French lead were in fact protected from domestic threats and able to reward supporters or boast domestic economic or political successes. However, it also meant ensuring that they understood themselves as sharing a common purpose with France or as participating in a community, whether of culture or personal friendship. To use the terminology now popular in the social sciences, French "shaping" efforts aimed at "constructing" a distinctive francophone African identity in which France had a parental role.

Similarly, consider the case of Britain in South America. The key was that Latin American elites had come to share the British presumption that free trade was beneficial. Given this shared identification with free trade, British military efforts could be largely simply symbolic.

By contrast, despite its overwhelming military power and its consequent ability essentially to determine who would rule various Caribbean nations, the United States was unable to reshape the Caribbean into a Progressive bastion. Failure to create in either the elites or mass publics commitments to Progressive goals doomed American policy to failure. (Here it may be useful to remember Proposition 7: staying power matters.)

"Winning minds"—constructing regional identities that encourage cooperation with the great power, and convincing regional players that they share the great power's goals—is obviously difficult. It is not in any sense a classical military task. Nonetheless, military presence is clearly a factor, for better or worse. A military presence that draws attention to or exacerbates cultural, civilizational, or ideological clashes is unlikely in the long run to prove sustainable or productive.

Proposition 10: "Shaping" Domestic Politics Is Very Difficult. Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that when "shaping" involves more than deterring particular external actions, it can prove very hard to do. Given the expansive scope of current American "shaping" goals, concern is thus warranted. Our case studies suggest that even overwhelming military predominance may be insufficient to "shape" a region if this requires domestic transformation. The clearest illustration is the American experience in the Caribbean: continuous intervention provided a certain amount of surface stability but did not result in the construction of effective democratic political institutions. In Africa, the French began with a much higher level of political and intellectual pen-

etration, as a colonial legacy, and they pursued much more limited goals (preservation of French influence, vice the American aim of stable government) while tolerating more political instability and violence. Even so, they, like the British during the interwar years in the Arab world, found their influence gradually declining and their ability to influence events decreasing.

Implications

Assuming for the moment that this set of propositions is correct, what does it suggest about American efforts to "shape" a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world?

It points to the value of forward presence, conducted with carefully tailored forces capable of speedy reaction. These forces, designed to achieve clearly identified peacetime goals in the region and supported by good intelligence, need to be able to deny specific options to an adversary. In some instances a large presence may be counterproductive, while in others it may be necessary to be present not only on the high seas but in the country itself. While technology may be valuable, technological improvements at the margin are not likely to be cost effective. On the other hand, high states of training and professionalism will be critically important.

Ultimately, "shaping" is about changing (or reinforcing) how foreign leaders and ordinary citizens think about politics—how they view themselves, their world, and the problems they face. Military activities may affect how individuals view these, not only by foreclosing policy options but by forcing them to rethink basic premises—yet this can take considerable time. In pursuing "shaping" policies, U.S. leaders thus need to think about the long haul, recognizing there are no quick solutions and that their policies will need to be politically and economically sustainable across decades. This may mean scaling back political goals to levels consistent with the means likely to be available. Lastly, the nation as a whole needs to recognize that the kind of domestic transformations it implicitly envisions when it seeks democratic "engagement and enlargement" are very difficult indeed to accomplish.

Notes

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58 Naval War College Review

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11. British forces occupied parts of Turkey following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Once the nationalist Turks expelled Greek forces from Anatolia in 1922, there was no longer a buffer between British and Turkish contingents. Heightening tensions led to a British offer of armistice that was viewed by the Turks as an attempt to prolong British occupation. Consequently, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk dispatched forces into the Chanak Neutral Zone, spurring a crisis. British forces at Chanak, charged with maintaining a vulnerable four-mile perimeter, numbered just 4,700. British intelligence estimated that the Turks could bring to bear thirty-six thousand infantrymen and over a hundred artillery pieces. "Had war occurred, Britain's forces could not have maintained Britain's political aims [keeping the Dardanelles open, and preventing the fall of Constantinople] and might even have failed to defend themselves. Yet this strength . . . was the entire force Britain had available short of mobilisation." John Robert Ferris, *Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–1926* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1989), p. 121.

12. Geoffrey Till, "Retrenchment, Rethinking, Revival," in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, ed. J. R. Hill and Bryan Ranft (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 319–47; see also Clayton, *British Empire as a Superpower*, and Kennedy, *British Naval Mastery*.

13. The Trenchard system of air policing operated on the principle that an investment in punishment now would yield dividends via deterrence later. "Air route marches" of RAF planes flying over sparsely populated tracts served both as scouts and as a visible reminders of British omnipresence. If the visible deterrent of British planes failed, as it did occasionally, the British employed coercive bombing. Upon learning of a disturbance in the countryside, the British would warn the villagers of the risk of an impending attack, in hopes that the villagers would surrender the guilty parties; if cooperation was not forthcoming, RAF planes would conduct a limited bombing of the village. If a single punitive raid was ineffective, the British used a method called "blockading out," whereby regular bombing of the immediate vicinity of a village forced the villagers from their homes and their means of sustenance until the accused parties were surrendered. See, for example, Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 27–32.

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15. On different types of British penetration see John Gallagher, "The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire," in *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays*, ed. Anil Seal (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 73–152.

16. Bond; John Darwin, *Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918–1922* (London: Macmillan, 1981); Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1971*, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981 [1963]); and Ann Williams, *Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914–1967* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968).

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18. Richard W. Fanning, *Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922–1933* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1995); Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy between the Wars*, vol. 1, *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929* (London: William Collins Sons, 1968); Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940); Higham; and Till.

19. James Barros, *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970); and George Scott, *The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

20. On the Italo-Abyssinian debacle see, for example, Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915–1940* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974).

21. Clayton, *British Empire as a Superpower*; Erik Goldstein, "Great Britain and Greater Greece, 1917–1920," *Historical Journal*, June 1989, pp. 339–56; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977); and Aryeh Shmuelevitz, "Atatürk's Policy toward the Great Powers: Principles and Guidelines," in *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939*, ed. Uriel Dann (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), pp. 311–6.

22. The term "perfect indifference" was used by Lord Clarendon to define British policy toward domestic instability in Central America in the 1850s; see Platt. After a thorough search of all the relevant documents surrounding the War of the Pacific, the historian V. G. Kiernan describes the behavior of the foreign office as one of "masterly inactivity." Noted in Rory Miller, *Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Longmans, 1993), p. 64.

23. In one of the few direct confrontations between British and regional forces, the Royal Navy prevailed in spite of its technological disadvantages. In 1877, there was an exchange of fire between the *Shaw*, an unarmored and undergunned British frigate, and the Peruvian ironclad *Huascar*. The *Huascar* eventually retreated to port, even though it enjoyed an enormous advantage in both firepower and armor. While John Beeler briefly mentions the incident in *British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866–1890* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1997), p. 24, the most detailed account is provided by William Laird Clowes in Brassey's *Naval Annual* (Portsmouth, U.K.: J. Griffin, 1892).

24. One member of the nineteenth-century Brazilian parliament confessed, "When I enter the Chamber I am entirely under the influence of English liberalism.... I am an English liberal ... in the Brazilian Parliament." Cited in Richard Graham, "Robinson and Gallagher in Latin America: The Meaning of Informal Empire," in *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy*, ed. W. R. Lewis (New York: Franklin Watts, 1976), p. 220.

25. Miller, p. 54, n. 1.

26. John Cady's *Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, 1838–1850* (New York: AMS Press, 1969 [1929]) remains one of the best histories of Britain's early interventions in the region.

27. For a very good study of the diverse elements of Progressivism, see John Milton Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983).

60   Naval War College Review

28. The rise of U.S. naval power in the region is chronicled in Donald Yerxa, *Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898–1945* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1991).

29. Graham Cosmas notes the importance of the U.S. Marine Corps' technological edge in "Cacos and Caudillos: Marines and Counterinsurgency in Hispaniola, 1915–1924," in *New Interpretations in Naval History*, ed. William Roberts and Jack Sweetman (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

30. The public's support and its ultimate opposition to U.S. interventionism are neatly reviewed in John Blassingame's "The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904–1920," *Caribbean Studies*, July 1969, pp. 27–43.

31. For example, this phrase is used in John Chipman, *French Power in Africa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 126.

32. See Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, March 1968, pp. 77–8; and also Claude E. Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987), pp. 14–5.

33. The Brazzaville Conference was organized by de Gaulle's Comité Français de Libération Nationale, established in 1943. De Gaulle's appeal to francophone Africans to cut off Vichy gave renewed importance to the French colonies as a base of operations for the Free French in exile, suggesting that salvation might come from francophone unity in the empire while France itself was divided and occupied. Although Gaullist histories record the 1944 conference of French colonial governors in Brazzaville as the first step toward decolonization, its purpose was not to promote self-government but to maintain African dependency and a vital extension of territory supporting France's claim to imperial greatness. See Chipman, pp. 88, 90.

34. Chipman, pp. 121 and 140. See also Pascal Chaigneau, *La Politique Militaire de la France en Afrique* (Paris: Le Centre des Hautes Études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes/CHEAM, 1984), p. 33.

35. Douglas A. Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1996), pp. 111–4.

36. Chaigneau, pp. 24–7 and 120. Arms transfer data can be found in Simon Baynham, ed., *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 228–49; and in Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 34. See also Bruce E. Arlinghaus, ed., *Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World* (Lexington, Ky.: D. C. Heath, 1983), pp. 46–7 and 110.

37. G. Wesley Johnson, ed., *Double Impact: France and Africa in the Age of Imperialism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1985), p. 384; Chipman, p. 197; and sources cited by Chaigneau, including Robin Luckham's "Le militarisme français en Afrique," *Politique Africaine*, February 1982. On the issue of legitimacy, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), p. 66.

38. For troop numbers, see J. M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 5. On training, see Bruce E. Arlinghaus, *Military Development in Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), pp. 71–4.

39. Anthony Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 382; and also Michel L. Martin, *Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment since 1945* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 42 and 355; Chaigneau, pp. 41 and 49; and Chipman, pp. 120–122.

40. Chaigneau, p. 22; Chipman, p. 117; and Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa*, p. 382.

41. John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier, eds., *Political Reform in Francophone Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 15–6; and also Chipman, pp. 123–5 and 171. For an exemplary case, see Samuel Decalo, *Historical Dictionary of Niger*, 2d ed., African Historical Dictionaries no. 20 (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1989), p. 100.

42. Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa*, p. 6, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*, p. 24, and *1987–88*, p. 60 (London: Brassey's). On French conscription policy, see Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 180–1.

43. Joshua and Gibert, pp. 31–4; and especially Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 39–88, on the former "People's Republic" of Congo (Brazzaville).

44. Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa*, p. 383; and Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 16th ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1996), p. 19.

45. Welch, *No Farewell to Arms?* pp. 172–3 and 179–181; Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule*, p. 214; and also Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970), p. 273.

46. Chipman, p. 126.

47. Ibid., pp. 141–3.

48. For a participant-observer's account of TURQUOISE, Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1995).

49. See Chipman, pp. 136 and 158; Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa*, pp. 383–8 and 437; Chaigneau, pp. 96–97; and René Lemarchand, ed., *The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 65, 106, 108, 112–3, and 119–20.

50. Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa*, pp. 383–4 and 390; and Chaigneau, p. 94. On the Central African Republic, see Pierre Kalck, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, 2d ed., trans. Thomas O'Toole, African Historical Dictionaries no.51 (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1992).

51. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule*, pp. 265 and 330.

52. Clark and Gardinier, pp. 3 and 114; and Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 135 and 241.

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