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Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security

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change was absorbed by the “new Navy” of American Manifest Destiny. Lehman reminds the reader that the “new Navy” was made possible by the nation’s ever-increasing industrialization. The epitome of these changes, according to Lehman, was the fast cruiser USS *Olympia*, “the product of the first American military-industrial complex.” The end result of this rapid naval evolution was a recognized role for the United States on the global high seas. Lehman believes that it was President Theodore Roosevelt who dragged the United States to its true destiny: “TR was the midwife who delivered from the old isolated America the new international United States. And his instrument was the Navy.” It is clear that Lehman holds that, today as well, the Navy is the instrument of the international United States.

Outlining the role of the Navy in the Second World War, Lehman begins with War Plan ORANGE. Rejecting Napoleon’s dictum that planned strategies cannot last beyond the opening salvos of battle, Lehman asserts that War Plan ORANGE was “the most successful strategic document in the history of warfare.” He then discusses key campaigns of the naval war, including Midway, Guadalcanal, Normandy, Leyte, and Okinawa.

Among the book’s many unique features are vignettes of naval personalities. From the chapter on the American revolution to that covering the Cold War at sea, Lehman has laced into his narrative many enlightening and analytical biographies of the people behind the wood and steel walls of the fleet—“daring warriors,” “more prudent—less dramatic leaders,” and the “reluctant warriors.” These figures include the likes of John Barry, John Paul Jones, Stephen Girard, Uriah Philips Levy, William B. Cushing, Raphael Semmes, Chester W.

Nimitz, and Hyman G. Rickover, to name only a few.

John Lehman has given us a first-rate addition to the historiography of the U.S. Navy. With its brief bibliography, notes, and index, this work will benefit the naval enthusiast and the professional seafarer alike. However, this reviewer particularly commends *On Seas of Glory* to professional personnel of the sea services. It will remind them why they decided to commit their time, and possibly their lives, to such institutions.

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Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 545pp. \$28.95

If you intend to own only a single volume on the crucial question of civil-military relations in the United States, choose this book. It is a comprehensive (indeed, exhaustive) review of the literature and commentary surrounding this timely debate. (A synthesis appears as the lead article in this issue.) It addresses what former secretary of defense William Cohen described as a “chasm” in American society. The editors have assembled a wide variety of commentators who examine two fundamental questions: Are the American armed forces and the civilian sector drifting apart as the result of a lack of shared values and near-total ignorance by the civilians of the military role? If so, what are the potential consequences for U.S. society?

The answer to the first question seems relatively easy. Clearly there is a growing divergence between civil and military sectors of society. This conclusion is based on

fundamental facts: the end of the draft in the early 1970s, and the resultant lack of firsthand exposure to military life; the dearth of elected representatives who have military experience or exposure, especially now that the World War II generation is passing into history; surveys conducted by a wide variety of credible institutions; and general sociological and demographic changes.

The more interesting question is, does it matter? After all, one could argue that there have always been “gaps” between the sectors in American society and that there is sufficient fundamental respect for civilian authority in the military ethos and culture to ease any concern. The contributors to this volume apply skill and insight to answer both of these questions.

Much of the work is based on a wide-ranging survey of civilians—both leaders and academics—as well as of military officers and the public at large. The baseline work was conducted by the well-regarded Triangle Institute for Security Studies, buttressed here by the analyses of a superb group of commentators. Their broad assessment is that the gap is real and has undermined cooperation between the military and civilian sectors. They see indications that it may reduce overall military effectiveness and produce wider consequences, although specifics are hard to define. This finding is clearly in the mainstream of thought, including the expressed view of military people found in various surveys that there is reason for “serious pessimism about the moral health of civilian society and that the military could help society become more moral, and that civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and behaviors.”

In addition to the survey work are significant historical sections that put the debate

in perspective. The fine essay by a leading American military scholar, Russell Weigley, “The American Civil Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,” is worth the price of the book in itself. Additionally, Eliot Cohen, distinguished professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a frequent commentator on this topic, provides an exceptional discussion on the question of the use of force as it plays in this debate.

In their conclusion the editors outline the path ahead. While they make clear up front that “no problem identified is so acute or urgent as to require a drastic response,” they offer a series of relevant ideas meant to ensure that these sectors of our society maintain a healthy alignment. This book will provide an excellent springboard for future assessment.

Overall, this is an excellent survey of a vital topic in national security studies. It deserves to be read by anyone serious about civil-military relations in the United States today.

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Harvey, Miles. *The Island of Lost Maps: A True Story of Cartographic Crime*. New York: Random House, 2000. 405pp. \$24

In 1995 a middle-aged, well dressed, inconspicuous man attracted the attention of an alert librarian at the George Peabody Library in Baltimore, Maryland. This man was Gilbert Bland, Jr. Notwithstanding his appearance and name, however, the crime he was committing was hardly unassuming. Gilbert Bland (alias James Perry), using the razor-and-fold technique, had stolen from