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## Rockets' RedGlare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics

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aid as a diplomatic tool to coax concessions from Pyongyang. He maintains that such a position is ethically indefensible, since it punishes innocent populations, people who are unable to affect their government's policies.

The book does have a few weaknesses. First, its organization may prove frustrating. Different chapters focus on various perspectives of the famine, but this approach leads to some confusion about the overall chronology of events, which, given the complexity of the subject, is quite difficult to grasp. A second flaw is the lack of photographs. This in itself would not be a problem if no such photos existed, but Natsios makes a point of emphasizing the importance of photographs in conveying the reality of a famine. He also discusses the works of specific photographers but then fails to explain their absence. Finally, the overall analysis of the United States and North Korean interaction might have been stronger if greater attention had been paid to the nuclear proliferation issue. Certainly this was the most important concern in conditioning relations between the two countries, but Natsios hardly broaches the subject.

Overall, this study is an essential addition to recent scholarship on North Korea, which has not paid adequate attention to the human tragedy as it unfolded during the last decade. While Natsios makes a strong case for breaking the link between food aid and U.S. strategic interests, one wonders if relief efforts are aiding the North Korean regime and thus prolonging the catastrophe that Natsios has so eloquently described.

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Wirtz, James J., and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. *Rockets' Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001. 352pp. \$28.50

When President George W. Bush made his remark about the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address, he publicly exposed the ballistic missile threat Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pose to the United States and its allies. So far, media concern has concentrated only on his name-calling. *Rockets' Red Glare* explores the missile defenses designed to counteract the threat from these countries.

James J. Wirtz, a national security affairs professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, a senior policy analyst of the Science Applications International Corporation, edited this book, which is an anthology of papers written to explore the implications of national missile defense (NMD). Contributors had a common assumption—that NMD will be deployed in a national security environment with either a modified antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty or no antiballistic missile treaty at all. This assumption allowed them to focus on the strategic level consequences of an NMD deployment; the editors then asked them to examine three levels of NMD deployment. These are “Limited Defense in a Cooperative Setting,” “Enhanced Defenses and the Limits of Cooperation,” and “Unlimited Defenses Unconstrained by Treaty.”

Wirtz and Larsen organized their anthology in these three major parts. The “ABM Regime” provides historical background. Kerry Kartchner, the State Department's senior representative to the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, Switzerland, researched the

origins of the ABM Treaty. Robert Joseph (special assistant to the president and senior director for proliferation strategy, counterproliferation, and homeland defense) reviewed the changes in the political-military landscape. Dennis Ward, a professional staff member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, examined changes in technology since the inception of the ABM Treaty and their impact on both offensive and defensive systems.

Part 2 is entitled "Defense, Arms Control, and Crisis Stability." Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, takes the lead by looking at the ramifications of NMD deployment on U.S. politics. Richard Harknett, associate professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati, focuses on how the strategic landscape will change with NMD deployment. Julian Schofield, an assistant professor at Concordia University, Montreal, analyzes NMD deployment in a multilateral arms control environment.

Part 3, "Regional Responses to National Missile Defense," divides the world outside the United States into regions, and in some instances specific countries, examining the effect NMD deployment may have. Bradley Roberts, a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, reviews the impact NMD deployment may have on China and what its responses will likely be. Ivo H. Daalder, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, and James Goldgeier, acting director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, look at NMD deployment from a Russian perspective. Timothy D. Hoyt, director of special programs and adjunct

professor in the national security studies program at Georgetown University, analyzes the effects of NMD deployment on the states of South Asia, an area prominent in the current environment. Charles Ball, a senior scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, studies the wide variety of views held by U.S. global allies.

The book's appendices provide source documents, including the ABM Treaty itself and related documents that further refine the initial treaty. Presidential speeches on NMD include the appendices: President Bill Clinton's speech of 1 September 2000 deferring a decision on NMD; George W. Bush's speech as a presidential candidate delivered on 23 May 2000; and his presidential speech at the National Defense University on 1 May 2001.

As one who has a limited role in the operational aspects of NMD, I found in this book the historical context and strategic implications of its deployment, at least prior to the events of 11 September 2001. Obviously, those events could not have been foreseen, but we may suspect that the September tragedy would significantly reinforce the conclusions reached by the editors and contributors.

President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address showed a new willingness on the part of the United States to confront aggressively and directly the threats posed by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. NMD provides defense against these specific ballistic missile threats. But if U.S. political determination removes the ballistic missile threat from these states, what then for NMD? If NMD deployment continues, absent a threat from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, what effect will that have on the global landscape? Will a capabilities-based argument against an

undefined and unknown emerging threat be acceptable to the rest of the world?

*Rockets' Red Glare* has my wholehearted recommendation. However, it must now be read with an active consideration of, and sober reflection on, the impact of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath, the war on terrorism.

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Miller, Judith, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad. *Germ: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. 382pp. \$27

In 1988, only two years before the Soviet empire fell, secret scientific efforts were still turning germs into weapons and creating entirely new germs. In Koltsovo, a hidden Siberian city, scientist Nikolai Ustinov died from an accident while working with the Marburg virus, designed to bleed victims to death. With clinical detachment, he documented his own decline in a journal with blood-spotted pages. His colleagues found that the virus had mutated while killing him. Their response was consistent with their careers—they buried the scientist in a zinc-lined coffin and turned the “new” virus into a weapon, naming it “Variant U,” in tribute to Ustinov.

That story, with its multiple layers of horror, shows why reality is often more remarkable than the best novel. It also has important parallels to current concerns over states that manufacture and prepare living weapons for deployment. Iraq again made the news when in March 2002 Iraqi civil engineer Adnan Sayeed, along with another defector, smuggled

out evidence of Iraq's ongoing germ weapons program. Then there is Iran. This book reprises the authors' earlier reporting on wide-ranging, well-funded Iranian efforts to buy up talent from destitute Soviet weapons labs.

This is an important book on current affairs, crafted in an accessible style by three professionals of the *New York Times* who have excellent contacts in the federal government. William Broad is a science writer who has shared two Pulitzer Prizes. Stephen Engelberg has long reported on national security issues. Judith Miller has done groundbreaking investigations on anti-American terrorists. Although their report is not what might have been done by a blue-ribbon scientific panel, it is reaching a much larger audience. Moreover, it deserves favorable notice as an original work created well before the 2001 anthrax attacks.

*Germ* is not specifically about biological threats posed by small terrorist groups; it focuses on state producers of “super germs”—disease-generating organisms to be used in military weapons systems. It discusses the tension between developing biological weapons and devising programs to counter them. Any argument as to whether a weapons program is for offense or defense (as Winston Churchill showed in a humorous “disarmament fable” in October 1928) is more about intentions and regimes and fears than about actual weapons. That leaves challenging ambiguities. Parts of this book appear to be directed against any U.S. government germ work that goes beyond research and into development. Its wider appeal is that all countries be kept within bounds by treaty law.

Several small flaws are apparent. One paragraph flatly dismisses the value of all U.S. Senate hearings as mere stage