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From Annapolis to Scapa Flow: The Autobiography of Edward L. Beach, Sr.

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old-fashioned way. The problem with the deployable 65 percent was their rank (too much) and lack of thorough weapons training. Other problems were little more than irritations born by all Marines, which was interpreted as prejudice by the reservists.

After the readiness triage, the book becomes a mishmash of personal Korean War experiences—especially combat in the frozen crucible of the Chosin Reservoir campaign—and operational history. The authors recount the personal experiences well but bungle the general history in several details (none fatal)—for example, *Major* Courtney Whitney was not FECOM G-2.

Their Indiana Marines have tales to tell, but the stories will not move non-deployable readers. They are nevertheless the true ordeals of real people.

There is good coverage of the veterans of Company C that includes forty-three interviews, several with wives. However, apart from the interviews, the Millses use predictable secondary sources, sometimes without much real understanding. (This reviewer served twenty-seven years in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, nine as a commander and staff officer in two infantry battalions, commanding 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, from 1980 to 1981.)

On balance, *Unexpected Journey* gives the 1950 Marine Corps reserve mobilization a human face and an emotional dimension. As a tribute to Company C, this book succeeds and deserves inclusion in the personal literature on the Korean War.

ALLAN R. MILLETT
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Beach, Edward L., Sr., with Edward L. Beach, Jr. *From Annapolis to Scapa Flow: The Autobiography of Edward L. Beach, Sr.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003. 344pp. \$34.95

This charming and insightful memoir is among the most vivid and enjoyable portraits of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Navy ever written. Originally drafted in the 1930s following Captain Beach's retirement, it is the story of the fascinating career of an officer who began at sea by learning to handle sail as a midshipman in 1888 and ended by commanding a seventeen-thousand-ton steel battleship at Scapa Flow during the Great War. Full of equal parts delightful sea stories, harrowing maritime adventures, and thoughtful diplomatic insights, this is indeed a sailor's story. The volume was edited with loving care by the author's son, the late Captain Edward L. Beach, Jr., who was known for his famous work *Run Silent, Run Deep* (Naval Institute Press, Classics of Naval Literature series) and a dozen other histories and novels. Beach the younger inserts many wry and sometimes poignant asides that help to set in context his father's story.

And what a story! Beginning in the late 1880s, Beach senior served alongside Civil War veterans as he learned his trade in wooden sailing ships. He saw firsthand the naval renaissance of the late nineteenth century, powered by the intellectual energy of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and the political dynamics of Theodore Roosevelt. Beach began his commissioned service as an engineer and served as such until the merger of the engineering and line communities (amidst much

controversy) in 1897. He met and interacted with every significant naval figure of his time; among the most celebrated were a future commandant of the Marine Corps, John A. Lejeune, his Annapolis roommate, and a young assistant secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Beach's career included command of a repair ship, cruisers, and the battleship USS *New York*, which served as the flagship of the American Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Beach also commanded two major shore installations—the torpedo production facility at Newport, Rhode Island, and the Naval Shipyard at Mare Island, California. There are two episodes in his thirty-eight-year career that are particularly worth noting—the battle of Manila Bay, in which Beach served as engineer below decks in the cruiser USS *Baltimore*, and the destruction of the cruiser USS *Memphis* in the harbor of Santo Domingo in 1916 while under his command. (This story is brilliantly told in his son's gripping classic, *The Wreck of the Memphis*, in the Naval Institute Press, Classics of Naval Literature series.)

What is most striking about this superb memoir are the similarities to our own time. Even as the United States debates the transformation of its military today into an information-based force, the parallels are obvious in Beach's writing at the turn of the twentieth century: "The whole Navy of this period was enthusiastically interested in the fast-developing technology of warships and the sea. We developed smokeless powder from Russia, 'built up' guns from France and England, rapid fire and machine guns of our own invention, hardened armor plant, higher grade steel, the automobile torpedo, and the

submarine. There were many other inventions and developments of naval engines and weapons, all of which we worked on eagerly." Similarly, today, we are actively seeking to develop entirely new concepts of operating warships at sea, and many of the challenges are the same.

Likewise, the political tenor of Beach's time was similar to that which the United States faces today—a chaotic world with frequent requirements to apply naval power at the edges of the developed world. Beach was repeatedly thrust into diplomatic and military exchanges and, as many U.S. Navy captains do today, found himself developing U.S. policy at a great distance from Washington, D.C.

After retiring from the Navy in 1922, Captain Beach settled into an academic life, teaching history at Stanford University, entering complete retirement in the early 1940s. He described this in typical nautical terms, "And so I have finished my story. Lately, I have come under the domination of a most despotic admiral [his wife], who always makes me wear an overcoat when I go out for a walk, and even insists on my wearing a cap in the house, so I won't catch cold in my bald head. Our two sons are respectively in the Navy and Army, and so is our daughter, who has become a 'Navy Wave,' thereby ranking about even with her two older Lieutenant brothers. The only people left to obey my orders are a collie dog, who takes walks with me every day and thinks I'm wonderful; and a ridiculous cat, who is very insubordinate."

Beach lived to see the tragedy of Pearl Harbor but maintained faith in his Navy's ultimate victory until his death in 1943.

There is a comfortable fit to the feeling and tone of this autobiography. The camaraderie of the wardroom, the constant moving back and forth from sea to shore, the hard work and great rewards of command at sea, and the friendly naval gossip are so recognizable that he could be talking about the Navy of today. Indeed, the real charm of this book is in its candid yet loving portrait of one of the truly abiding institutions of the U.S. Navy. Captain Edward L. Beach, Sr., with the nicest of assists from his accomplished officer-author son, has given us not only his own story but a warm insider's view of our beloved Navy as well. This is a volume that deserves a spot in any serious Navy library.

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Crawford, Michael J., et al., ed. *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*. Vol. 3. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center (GPO), 2002. 874pp. \$70

During the War of 1812, the United States attempted to invade Canada three times in separate campaigns and failed on each occasion. Inept leadership, militia and service differences, and lost tactical opportunities marred translation of strategic aims into a workable operational plan. Vastly outnumbered by American troops on the land frontier along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, the British and Canadians remained on the defensive until events in Europe released regular reinforcements and ships of the Royal Navy. In 1814, Great Britain applied seapower against the United States and took the offensive. The resulting stalemate

eventually brought the two adversaries to the peace table to sign the Treaty of Ghent, whereby British North America's territorial integrity was preserved for the later confederation of Canada into a nation. This documentary collection, the third volume of a projected series of four to be published by the Naval Historical Center on the naval side of the war, concentrates on the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and Pacific theaters from 1814 to 1815. The selection of documents, like the two preceding volumes, deals comprehensively with events and persons behind the main battles and campaigns on both sides, as well as with such matters as recruitment, logistics, shipbuilding, and social relations from a wider perspective.

Almost half the book is devoted to the British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay and American defense against the mounting amphibious incursions of General Robert Ross and Admiral Alexander Cochrane into the American heartland. Once the resolve of General William Winder and his sundry troops crumbled at the battle of Bladensburg, Washington was left wide open. The occupying British burned the White House and other public buildings (allegedly in retaliation for burning the provincial legislature at York [present-day Toronto] by American sailors in April the previous year). The documents highlight the flexibility accorded the British to choose when and where to attack from the sea, as well as the significant naval contribution in stiffening American defenses.

The British likewise demonstrated the possibilities of concerted military and naval action on the internal waters of Lake Huron, Lake Ontario, and Lake