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Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific

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chapters that cover “Promoting Team over Self” and “Instilling a Commitment for Action” in part 1 will assist those federal leaders who work in a team environment. In part 2, “Focus on People,” there are discussions of such principles as “Eliminating the Frozen Middle,” “Cultivating Caring Relationships,” and “Creating an Effective Communication System.” The Coast Guard experience in this area may be a source of ideas to federal leaders who are currently struggling with workforce planning issues such as recruitment, retention, and motivating a large population that is or soon will be retirement eligible. Part 3, “Instill a Bias for Action,” also proves helpful in thinking about current issues. For instance, chapter 12’s “Give the Field Priority” will provide ideas to both military leaders working to implement network-centric warfare and a State Department leader working to improve communication between Washington and the field. Other chapters in this section, “Make Change the Norm” or “Encouraging Decisiveness,” may seem self-evident, but they are actually cultural changes needed to bring the federal workforce into the twenty-first century. Lastly, part 4’s discussion of “Ensure the Future” may also seem obvious, but a recent management survey noted that most workers want to hear “thank you” above all other rewards. Chapters on topics of “Spotlighting Excellence” are also important reads.

Character in Action does have some limitations. Due to a publication date that preceded the Coast Guard’s merger into the Department of Homeland Security, readers may find themselves wondering if the book’s lessons still hold true. For an answer to this question, see the

Spring 2004 *Review* article “Change and Continuity: The U.S. Coast Guard Today,” by Admiral Thomas H. Collins.

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Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. *Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003. 240pp. \$19.95

Asia’s brutal colonial and wartime history has left wounds that continue to shape the region’s politics and international relations. Traditional approaches to international relations say little about how to overcome lingering animosity and to replace it with trust and harmonious relations. Time alone is never a solution. Nor, as Japan has discovered repeatedly, are apologies enough. Even need, as that between developing China and economically and technologically advanced Japan, is insufficient. The contributors to this volume demonstrate that the path to reconciliation is different for each country, requiring unique blends of a wide range of political and social ingredients, many of which are in short supply.

This volume is the result of a conference sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace, which includes chapters on intrastate (Taiwan, Cambodia, East Timor, Australia) as well as interstate relations (Japan-China, Japan-Korea, North Korea-South Korea, and an appendix on Germany-Poland). Its timing is propitious as reconciliation itself is a growing phenomenon. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the UN-led war crimes tribunals for Bosnia and Rwanda have elevated world

consciousness. Democratization has allowed for the spread of appropriate legal structures, even as it has promoted self-awareness and sometimes ethnic nationalism. Media attention and the Internet strengthen such dynamics.

Yet the kind of success seen in South Africa and between Germany and its European neighbors has not been achieved in the Asia-Pacific. Daqing Yang shows how, following normalization of relations and apologies by Tokyo, the “history problem” resurfaced in the 1980s and has not gone away since. Diet members and millions of Japanese citizens have expressed their opposition to offer further apologies and to any prolonged self-flagellation. For its part, Beijing occasionally “plays the history card” in order to wrest concessions out of Japan, although the “card” is often played because of belligerent actions in Tokyo and “held” by the millions of Chinese who retain legitimate grievances for the ills of the 1930s and 1940s. Yang argues that historians on both sides need to acknowledge the complexity of the relationship and to disseminate their knowledge among large segments of the population. A more fundamental problem is that reconciliation presupposes an autonomous society capable of critical self-examination—in other words, democracy. In this case the People’s Republic of China has a long way to go.

Victor Cha explains how despite the establishment of formal relations between Seoul and Tokyo in 1965, and a great deal of mutual interest and admiration between the two societies, historical animosities prevent the sort of cooperation that one might expect from a rational or realpolitik perspective. The two main South Korean national

holidays celebrate independence from Japanese colonial rule. Substantive problems include the content of Japanese history textbooks, the political and social discrimination to which some 650,000 Korean-Japanese are subjected, the memory of Korean forced laborers killed by the atomic bombs, and the use of Korean “comfort women” by Japanese troops during the war. The security threat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as concern in Seoul and Tokyo over Washington’s commitment to provide a security umbrella, have both contributed to the steps toward reconciliation that have been made, including apologies, high-level meetings on the subject, and the establishment of consultations on security cooperation. Cha argues that democracy and development have contributed to this process. “As generations of Koreans, in the South or in a unified entity, come to live in a democratic and developed society, they will cultivate norms of compromise, nonviolence, and respect for opposing viewpoints that will become externalized in their attitudes toward Japan.”

The argument about democracy and norms is critical. Interestingly, Seoul’s perception of a lessened threat from the DPRK has actually increased its invectives toward Japan. Cha claims that without a process of identity change, material incentives such as the need for security or economic cooperation alone cannot ensure a continued march toward reconciliation.

This notion also captures the promise and peril of intra-Korean relations, where the nature and timing of reconciliation will have serious implications for the region’s security. Scott Snyder argues that Pyongyang’s economic

needs have driven the process, while public opinion in the South has determined its course. South Korean nongovernment organizations have also contributed large sums of money. The whole process presents a major challenge to the North's system "as it will be more and more difficult to build fences around South Korean economic investments and business practices." Once again, democratization and normative development will be as important as economic and security imperatives to successful reconciliation. Considering the implications, it is sobering to consider that there is no obvious way that such identity change can occur peacefully in North Korea.

Internal reconciliation processes are no easier than external ones. Nayan Chanda explains how Cambodia has achieved only superficial reconciliation following the genocidal acts of the Khmer Rouge regime. The Buddhist tradition can justify much as resulting from actions of a prior life. The lack of political stability makes many Cambodians fearful of reopening old wounds, particularly when racist aspects of Cambodia's political philosophy may bear some culpability. Phnom Penh earlier granted amnesties that would make it difficult to prosecute former leaders, and more recently argued that a full-blown tribunal would make reconciliation less likely. The legitimacy bestowed on the regime by other states makes prosecution somewhat awkward, and China opposes revealing fully the record of the former regime. The prospects are not good for major trials capable of healing this nation.

Other chapters present a mixed record on the prospects and benefits of reconciliation for Aborigines in Australia and

East Timor, and for the loved ones who died in a popular uprising on Taiwan in 1947. In addition to the political and cultural repression involved, the dead in each case number in the tens of thousands. The Taiwan case makes what is probably the most convincing argument that democratization and political stability, combined with firm political leadership, are critical to successful reconciliation.

All who study Asian security or the role of justice in international relations should read this book. Reconciliation can bring restorative justice to war-torn peoples. However, this requires a rejection of purely retributive justice. In addition, the case studies in this volume reinforce that there is no universal formula and that a great deal of political creativity and political courage is required. As the editor also concludes, victims and victimizers must work together and maintain a forward-looking approach, preferably in a democratic environment. Most of all, there must be a commitment to the process. It is perhaps this factor that promotes the kind of identity change that is required for true reconciliation.

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Langston, Thomas S. *Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America since 1783*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2003. \$39.95

Thomas S. Langston believes "it has never been easy for Americans to decide what to do with the military" at the end of a war. During peacetime, should the military solely focus on preparing for future wars, or should it usefully serve