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
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Summer 2005

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Cover

A series of images—variously contemporary, conceptual, and futuristic—that have been produced for and now support discussions of sea basing, one of the four fundamental elements of the U.S. Navy’s Seapower 21 vision. The broader issue of operational military bases—in effect, the context of the modern sea-basing concept—is the subject of our lead article, “Thinking about Basing,” by Robert E. Harkavy of Pennsylvania State University. Two more such images, portraying “consolidation” of stores between logistical ships and their transfer ashore, illustrate Dr. Harkavy’s text.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW



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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in 1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina. His initial assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master's degrees in public administration (finance) from Harvard and in national security studies and strategy from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction.

After completing department head tours in USS Deyo (DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.

Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998, deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency "E" for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.

Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy Division as chief of staff of the Navy's Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission areas. His most recent Washington assignment was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate Liaison.

In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser Destroyer Group 3 in August 2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 August 2004.

PRESIDENT'S FORUM



The Naval War College's Twin Missions

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE plays two coequal roles in preparing the Navy for the challenges of the twenty-first century: educating future leaders and helping to define naval forces and operational concepts through research, analysis, and war gaming.

Although for simplicity I have said the College has two distinct missions, in reality classroom instruction and research, analysis, and war gaming are thoroughly intertwined. In order to graduate, all of our students must participate in at least one large, multiweek war game planned by our Joint Military Operations Department and executed by our War Gaming Department. An increasing number of our top students, now around 25 percent, are involved with focused research, analysis, and war-gaming projects.

Each of the two missions for the Naval War College, education and research, is critical to the other: We cannot achieve our educational objective without research, analysis, and gaming capabilities, nor can we achieve our research objectives for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and our fleet commanders without our teaching faculty and students.

The complementary relationship of education and research functions is in the process of becoming deeper, stronger, and more necessary to the College as we revise our educational curricula.

- First, we are developing from the ground up an intermediate-level command and staff course of instruction, graduates of which will be Joint Professional Military Education Phase I (JPME I) certified. But more importantly, these officers will be critical thinkers with an operational perspective, planners who are capable of applying operational art in maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational environments and skilled in the joint planning process.

They will *excel* in operational billets on our numbered fleet, joint, interagency, or multinational staffs.

- Second, we are restructuring and elevating our senior-level professional military education program, graduates of which will, for the first time ever at the Naval War College, meet the Joint Chiefs' requirements for JPME Phase II. (JPME I and II certification are required by law for promotion to flag rank.) This curriculum will focus on preparing officers for assignment to key and essential positions on service, joint, interagency, and multinational organizations and on developing competencies necessary at the highest levels of leadership in our nation. Our graduates from the senior course are expected to serve immediately as trusted, sought-after advisers to civilian policy makers or senior military commanders and to contribute directly to the strategic, operational, and resource-planning processes that will shape the future of our nation's security.
- Third, we are establishing a short course for flag officers to develop competencies required to serve as a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), the maritime command and control element of the joint force. (This course will stand up this August.) Each of these new courses depends heavily on our faculty, researchers, and war gamers, working together as a tightly coordinated team.

Dialogue with Leadership

I just returned from a ten-day series of visits to Washington, D.C.; Millington, Tennessee (with all our detailers); San Diego; and Hawaii. I visited all of our West Coast type commanders, Commander Third Fleet, and Commander Pacific Fleet. The purpose of the trip was twofold. The first objective was to continue the dialogue with Navy leadership on the range of issues associated with the implementation of a bona fide continuum of professional military education. (As of 2 March 2005, the Naval War College is responsible for establishing the curricula and course content for professional military education for pay grades E1 to O8.) The second objective of the trip was to provide results of ongoing analysis vital to the missions of our operational commanders.

The Navy's head detailer, "Pers 4," accompanied me on this trip to help accomplish my first objective. As head of the office responsible for all enlisted and officer personnel (except flag officers) assignments and for the establishment and management of career development tracks with the Navy's various communities and its manpower policy apparatus, his presence was invaluable. The implications for career development associated with the initiatives outlined in our last "President's Forum"—with the implementation of the *continuum*—are many and significant for our Navy. We will continue this dialogue to ensure that

the College moves forward, with the full support of the Navy's senior leadership, and plays a lead role in the development of the Navy's emerging Human Capital Strategy. Our engagement thus far has been encouraging without exception, particularly as we focus the traditional (and in many cases unique) strengths of the College on those war-fighting and leadership competencies most in demand at the operational and strategic levels of leadership across our armed services.

Also traveling with me were several students currently engaged in one of our Halsey directed-research groups. The recently instituted Halsey Program is focused on quantitative analysis of critical war-fighting challenges facing our operational commanders in their specific theaters. We have stood up different Halsey groups to conduct rigorous research, analysis, and war gaming in the areas of antisubmarine warfare (ASW), maritime air and missile defense, and sea basing. (The logic of these three focus areas becomes clear as one recognizes that sea basing is the distinguishing element of naval forces, and that success against the undersea and air threats enables the Navy's unique contribution to joint warfare.)

The research and analysis being produced and briefed to the highest levels of our service and joint leadership is rapidly gaining a reputation for credibility and relevance. CNO has noted that "once again the Naval War College is at the center of operational thinking in the Navy." Comments from the Navy's ASW Task Force commander that the ASW work being done by Halsey II is "the most useful analysis" he has seen in the ASW mission area typify the feedback we are getting as we brief-out to the fleet. These results should not be surprising.

The last two years have seen a *major shift in distribution of the Navy's most promising line officers into our College*. These officers bring not only a fresh operational perspective but also an expectation to move forward through the ranks to the highest levels of responsibility. The Halsey Program selects the most prominent and brings them into a cadre of world-class researchers and warfare analysts in our Center for Naval Warfare Studies. While the expert cadre remains in place and continues to advance our understanding of particular elements of war fighting, the students actually conduct the analysis, using the cutting-edge war-gaming techniques and facilities the College is famous for.

Payoff for the Fleet

The payoff is huge. First, our *students achieve key academic objectives* while, second, developing a *comprehensive and profound understanding* of real threats, capabilities, and the key tactical- and operational-level issues they will face in follow-on command and staff assignments. Finally, third, each Halsey group yields analysis *directly related to war-fighting challenges in a specific theater of operations*. This process discovers and highlights those tactical imperatives

or capabilities that are potentially linchpins of operational-level courses of action, themselves linked to our national strategic options.

Another set of students—our Mahan Scholars—works at the strategic level. Linking the operational and strategic analyses of the Halsey and Mahan efforts forces a detailed examination of how military conditions established by a commander relate to—and inform—the selection of military strategy and its political ends. With its career-focused, highly motivated, joint/interagency/multinational student body and its world-leading war-gaming and analysis capability, the Naval War College is in a unique position to do this type of comprehensive work.

The College is bringing this unique capability into battery to directly support our fleet commanders not only through the operational analysis driven by our Halsey groups but also through political-military expertise resident in our Strategic Research Department and through war gaming performed by both the War Gaming and Warfare Analysis and Research Departments. The most recent example of this is the College's support of the highly impactful Fifth Fleet "strategic review."

With a wider aperture, the research arm of the Naval War College is also exploring a potentially significant role in an area of increasing importance to the Navy—both national and theater missile defense. The prospect of conducting missile defense at sea to defend the U.S. homeland, American allies, and U.S. surface ships poses a remarkably complex array of challenges to the Navy and our regional commanders. How will we apportion and employ our capabilities to balance the national and theater missions? How are multimission-capable surface ships best used to conduct these missions? How are these platforms best defended, since, presumably, adversaries will assign a high priority to eliminating them? These are just a few of the questions that must be answered as the sea-based capabilities for missile defense continue to evolve against a very real threat.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns have challenged the Navy and its fellow military services to develop innovative approaches to defeating the nation's aggressive and highly adaptive enemies. Members of our Strategic Research Department, among others, have been at the forefront of analyzing the Iraqi insurgency and terrorist groups like al-Qa'ida. An international collaborative project on the new Proliferation Security Initiative has placed Newport in the lead for development of the U.S. and international community's latest approaches for halting the transshipment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their materials. In 2004, the College designed, executed, and analyzed a war game, held in Newport and attended by seventeen nations, to test the capability of a multinational effort to collaborate operationally and legally so as to interdict the movement of WMD and related materials at


sea. Also, as a result of the GWOT and the highly constrained nature of modern warfare more generally, there is a greater appreciation of the importance of international law in shaping military operations. Our International Law Department is fully engaged in exploring the implications of this development, especially ways of effectively disseminating the substance of operational international law to operational commanders.

Whether we are exploring the potential of Sea Power 21 or grappling with the latest terrorist threat, we construe military research and analysis to be a continuum. Any problem has contained in it other problems at all the levels of military operations: strategic, operational, tactical, and technical. As analysis proceeds up and down those levels, different methods and organizations are brought into play. Our comparative advantage is focusing largely, but not exclusively, on the strategic and operational levels of military operations. But, obviously, it is important to be knowledgeable about tactical- and technical-level subjects so as to make higher-level research, analysis, and gaming possible in the first place. We do this by maintaining an outstanding faculty and student body and by partnering with other war-gaming and analysis activities in both the public and private sectors. By reaching out to the fleet, to Joint Forces Command, the U.S. intelligence community, and various other agencies and departments, the Naval War College leverages its own resources in an era defined by joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

Following World War II, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz wrote, "The war with Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people, and in so many different ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise . . . absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war—we had not visualized these." I have always felt this was a good-news/bad-news story. The good news is that we successfully prepared for waging a deadly war across the Pacific. What our predecessors accomplished in Pringle Hall and Sims Hall hastened victory and saved many lives. The bad news is that something important was missed that slowed the final victory and cost more lives than was necessary.


This is why we maintain a small exhibit dedicated to Fleet Admiral Nimitz, centrally located in McCarty Little Hall, the Navy's state-of-the-art facility where we do our world-renowned research, analysis, and war gaming. We want our people to remember every day as they come to work that thinking carefully about future wars matters enormously. It has real consequences—good and bad. We have to get it right. Our criterion of success is a set of insights into military conflict of such scope, accuracy, and penetration that current and future leaders can voice the same sentiments as those of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, now a half

century ago. And when our students leave, they take with them to the fleet and positions of extraordinary responsibility around the world not only the substance of these insights but the analytic and intellectual skills to create them.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. L. Shuford'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'J' and 'S'.

J. L. SHUFORD

*Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College*



*Quarters AA
Residence of the President of the Naval War College*

Dr. Harkavy is professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. He has also taught, performed research, or served at the U.S. Army War College, Cornell University, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kalamazoo College, and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. He earned his PhD in international relations at Yale University in 1973, having pursued graduate study also at the University of California at Berkeley, the Harvard Business School, and Basel University in Switzerland. After earning his BA at Cornell, he was for eight years a junior officer in the U.S. Army Reserve (artillery). He has written or edited several books, most recently Warfare and the Third World (2001) and Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (1997).

The author wishes to thank Lucian Czarnecki, Penn State undergraduate, for research assistance in connection with this project. An expanded version of this article (with additional historical and tabular material) is to be published by the Naval War College Press as a Newport Paper.

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THINKING ABOUT BASING

Robert E. Harkavy

Recent U.S. experiences—1990–91 in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)—have highlighted the complexities and uncertainties of basing access in the post–Cold War period. They have involved questions of access to, and overhead transit rights for, a variety of nations: all over Europe, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti, and many others. They have also highlighted the crucial importance of the future of American basing access at a time of shifting alliances, friendships, and enmities amid wholesale changes in the structure of the international system, and of the movement to the forefront of the issues of terrorism, radical Islam, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a looming hegemonic challenge by China.

There are some initial points to be made regarding definitions. One may speak variously of bases, facilities, host-nation support, installations, strategic access, forward presence, global posture, and FMP (foreign military presence). During the latter part of the Cold War, common usage dictated the use of “facilities” rather than “bases,” because the user nation (primarily the United States) had only limited discretion over the use of a “base.” The U.S. Defense Department’s compilation of domestic and foreign bases is organized according to discrete installations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute uses the basic concept of “FMP” in a way roughly synonymous with others’ use of “base.”¹ The concept of “basing access” or “strategic access” is a broader construction, subsuming overflight rights and perhaps access for intelligence operations. During the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of “power projection” came to be seen as an overarching one.²

More recently, “global posture” (also “footprint”) has become the dominant definitional concept; more theoretically oriented academic studies, working in historical contexts, have begun to focus on “global reach” or, earlier, “sub-global reach.”³ Recent Defense Department publications—for instance, the September 2004 report to Congress on the global defense posture—have taken to defining that posture according to five criteria: relationships (interaction with allies and partners at all levels), activities (training, exercises, and operations), facilities (where forces live, train, and operate, and where they preposition materiel), legal arrangements (the framework of presence, including status-of-forces agreements, both bilateral and multilateral), and global sourcing and surge (a global-force management system for power projection).⁴ Thus, although the main focus of this article will be on bases/facilities, “global posture” does have a broader frame of reference.

BASING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the centuries-long history of the basing systems of the “great powers,” or “long-cycle hegemons,” several major areas of generalization and trend stand out, each of which is relevant to current problems. These are complex matters, and we can merely summarize them here.

- The role of international system structure (bipolarity, multipolarity, etc.) and the presence or absence of ideological roots of rivalry between contending major powers
- The basis for basing access: conquest or colonization versus formal alliances or alignments versus tangible *quid pro quos*—that is, security and economic assistance, arms transfers, etc.
- The impact on basing of ever-evolving technological change—for ship propulsion, from sail to oared galleys to sail to coal to oil to nuclear power
- The nexus of security and economic functions of basing and how that has shifted over time
- Heartland versus rimland as a basic pattern of rival basing structures through time.

The relationship of system structure and the ideological basis for conflict over many centuries is a complicated story. The empire of the Mongols, who were predominantly a land power, stretched across most of Eurasia but also exercised maritime and basing dominance in the Far East in the thirteenth century. Subsequently, the Chinese Ming dynasty, a regional hegemon, had uncontested access to bases throughout Southeast Asia and around the Indian Ocean. In the Mediterranean, from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries first Venice and

Genoa, then Venice (latterly Spain) and the Ottoman Empire were locked in regional competition for maritime dominance and basing structures. Their respective bases, especially those of Venice and Genoa, were often cheek by jowl, constituting interpenetrating systems. (The Venice-Ottoman rivalry and that of Spain and the Ottomans was somewhat more demarcated between east and west.)

Portugal and Spain had rival but formally demarcated basing structures, with Portugal acquiring bases all around Africa and the Indian Ocean and in the Far East and Brazil, Spain mostly in Latin America but also in the Philippines and the western Mediterranean. Some scholars do not rate Portugal a great power during the early modern era, as it was a maritime power only, standing on the margins of a Europe then dominated by the Habsburg Empire. If so, we have somewhat of a divorce between great-power status and the facts of semiglobal basing structure. In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands was a commercial and maritime hegemon, with the most elaborate basing structure of its day, but it existed within a multipolar power structure in Europe, and its bases interpenetrated the systems of England and France, particularly in India.

The British Empire had maritime predominance and an unmatched global basing system, also in the overall context of European multipolarity, wherein other powers—France, Prussia/Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—were major land powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and on up to World War I.

During the Cold War, the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union saw a global competition for basing access, but an asymmetric one with respect to maritime power, in which one side, the United States, was predominant throughout. Only since the early 1990s, however, has the United States had complete maritime predominance and the only global basing presence, with no rival whatsoever. Generally speaking, basing structures have correlated with the facts of relative national power, with the exception, perhaps, of Portugal.

Over time, bases and access in general have resulted from conquest and colonization, alliances, or *quid pro quos* such as security assistance, though these have not been mutually exclusive. The Mongols' few bases were acquired entirely by conquest. Those of Ming China seem to have been a mix of "forced entry," also known as intimidation, and agreements with local potentates interested in trade. The bases of the Venetian, Genoese, Ottoman, and Spanish fleets of oared galleys in the Mediterranean were mostly the results of conquest, in some cases of more consensual arrangements. Spain's basing structure accrued entirely by ruthless conquest and colonization. Portugal's involved some military conquest, but also a good deal of alliance building among more advanced (relative to those of Spain's domain) societies in India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Dutch

took over most of the Portuguese basing structure by conquest; the British built their empire and its attendant basing structure almost entirely on the basis of conquest “beyond the line,” in what now is called the Third World. But many British bases in Europe were acquired, often ad hoc, on the basis of ever-shifting alliances in a multipolar European system sans ideology.

In the early part of the Cold War, the United States availed itself of a large number of bases via alliances with the United Kingdom and France, before the possessions and bases of the latter gradually dwindled as a result of decolonization. After that, starting in the 1960s, the United States (and also the Soviet Union) built global basing structures on the basis of alliances with ideologically friendly client states, underpinned by protection and provision of security but also by extensive security assistance, mostly in the form of arms transfers.

Throughout the past half millennium or more, needless to say, technological change has been a major driver of basing requirements. Up to World War I and somewhat beyond, that pattern pertained almost entirely to naval technology. The Mongols and Ming Chinese built large sailing vessels that gave them long-range power-projection capability. In the Mediterranean from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, the contending powers used oared galleys; their limited ranges and extensive logistical requirements translated into the need by the Venetians, Genoese, Ottomans, and Spaniards for elaborate basing networks even in that relatively small theater.⁵ Portugal, on the basis of technological developments in shipbuilding, navigational equipment, and naval gunnery, was able to move to the forefront of naval power and establish bases in a quasi-global system centered on the Indian Ocean.⁶ But travel was slow and dependent on prevailing winds and currents; warships going from Lisbon to Goa around the Cape of Good Hope had to travel west almost to Brazil to pick up winds favorable for the trip around Africa. The Netherlands, France, and Britain improved the capabilities of sailing ships over several centuries. In the nineteenth century the advent of coal-fired steam propulsion resulted in faster and more direct travel for naval ships, but also in a requirement for numerous coaling stations—a development of which Britain was able to take particular advantage because of its global empire. The appearance of oil-fired ships (also of fleet oilers and colliers) reduced these requirements; later, nuclear propulsion would reduce them further.

But after World War I, developments in aviation produced entirely new requirements for external air bases; as aircraft ranges were short, the number of bases required for ferrying combat aircraft or troops and materiel was huge. Japan in 1941, for instance, had numerous air bases on Taiwan and Hainan Island; Italy had them in Libya and Somaliland.⁷ The submarine produced yet further requirements (for example, Franco’s Spain gave German boats access to the

Canary Islands for refueling). Beginning with the undersea communications cables before 1914, after World War I with radio relay and intercept stations, a basing requirement arose, for technical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. After World War II, that became an important matter; the United States constructed elaborate global networks of AUTOVON/AUTODIN communications, DSP and other satellite downlinks, the DEW Line and BMEWS, SOSUS, NUDETS, signals-intelligence ground installations, and much more.* Oiler refueling (for transfer to operating forces at sea) and constant ocean surveillance produced still other basing requirements. But, paradoxically, oiler refueling and increasing aircraft ranges greatly reduced the need for elaborate external networks of air bases.

There had once existed a close nexus between the security and economic functions of overseas bases. The Ming Chinese Zheng Ho navy, which roamed the Indian Ocean littoral and its ports, did so mostly with the purpose of advancing trade. Venetian and Genoese bases in the eastern Mediterranean–Black Sea area likewise were colocated with a variety of economic enterprises, and many of the Venetian and Genoese war galleys were actually armed merchant vessels. Portuguese bases in East Africa, India, and elsewhere were also entrepôts, hubs of commercial activity. A number of the British and Dutch bases in Asia were established by semiprivate trading companies closely tied to and protected by their nations' fleets and armies. By the heyday of the British Empire, however, this collocation of military bases and entrepôts had largely been broken, and naval bases were obtained and operated more or less entirely for military reasons.

During the Cold War, however, the critical issue of Persian Gulf oil became inextricably linked to basing access. American bases along oil-tanker sea-lanes to Asia and North America came to be viewed in the context of a possible Soviet effort (from bases in Angola, Guinea, Somalia, South Yemen, etc.) to interdict them in case of war. In the late 1980s, with the “reflagging” operation on behalf of Kuwait, the United States established new points of access in the Persian Gulf. Today, as is heavily reflected in Defense Department and Congressional Budget Office publications, overseas bases are seen in connection with potential struggles over oil resources, not only in and around the Persian Gulf but in Azerbaijan, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc.⁸ Economics, then, in the form of access to oil, has crept back into basing access and global presence.

* AUTOVON/AUTODIN = Automatic Voice Network/Automatic Digital Network; DSP = Defense Satellite Program; DEW = Distant Early Warning; BMEWS = Ballistic Missile Early Warning System; SOSUS = Sound Surveillance System; NUDETS = Nuclear Detonation Detection and Reporting System.

Over the past five hundred years, the basing networks of the contending great powers have corresponded closely with the geopolitical imagery of “heartland” and “rimland.” As noted by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Colin Gray, and others, the successive maritime hegemon—Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States—all established a degree of blue-water sea control based on superior main fleets and a ring of naval bases all around the Eurasian supercontinent.⁹ Periodically, they were challenged by land powers attempting to develop equivalent seapower: France under Louis XIV, Germany before World War I, the Soviet Union during the Cold War.



As has been pointed out in connection with “system leader lineage,” the successive maritime hegemon typically inherited their predecessors’ basing structures, with modifications.¹⁰ The Dutch took the Portuguese bases by force, but Britain in its turn mostly acquired the Dutch bases peacefully, as did the United States when it took over the role of rimland naval hegemon from Britain after World War II. Certain bases or strongpoints astride key “choke points” or adjacent to strategically important locales, and islands with strategic locations,

have risen to importance with noteworthy frequency over five hundred years: Hormuz, Angola, Gibraltar, Aden, Trincomalee (in Sri Lanka), the Malabar and Coromandel coasts of India, Malacca/Singapore, Mauritius, Mogadishu, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Cyprus, Malta, and Crete appear again and again in the history of naval warfare and bases.

During the Cold War, the United States, sometimes relying upon the remnants of the British Empire, established bases in Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Azores, Morocco, Spain (at Rota), Italy, Greece/Crete, Turkey, Iran (up to 1979), Ethiopia (up to 1977), the Seychelles, the Maldives, Pakistan, Diego Garcia, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, Taiwan (up to 1972), Japan, and South Korea—in a pattern perfectly reflective of a rimland configuration around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Now, of course, analysts refer to a newer geopolitical configuration focused on intersecting “arcs of crisis” from North Africa to South Asia, and from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia, reflective of a present emphasis on oil politics and on combating Islamist terror and nuclear proliferation. At least in part the rimland basing structure has been retained, but the newer geopolitics spotlights the importance of access to Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel (a narrow band of

semiarid land south of the Sahara Desert), all around the arcs of crisis. Also, of course, in view of U.S. naval dominance and the absence of a maritime peer competitor, there is an emphasis on littoral warfare and control, in lieu of Mahanian sea control.

CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES, SCENARIOS, CONTINGENCIES: THE CONTEXT OF U.S. GLOBAL PRESENCE

Recent Defense Department and other studies have focused on outright intervention scenarios (Iraq, Iran, Korea, Taiwan, et al., plus numerous smaller situations involving various types of low-intensity conflict) as the core of the problem of forward presence, and accordingly have emphasized the more ad hoc forms of access. That is appropriate, but it may be worthwhile to present a more complex framework, with historical examples and possible future scenarios. Hence, the following analysis refers to both bases and other forms of access, with a (not always clear-cut) distinction between nuclear deterrence and the various levels of conventional power projection.

Nuclear Deterrence and Defense

During the Cold War, numerous overseas bases were dedicated to functions related to the U.S. nuclear deterrence posture vis-à-vis the USSR and, to a lesser degree, the People's Republic of China. But many bases served dual purposes with regard to prospective nuclear and conventional power projection—for instance, forward-based attack aircraft in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea; access for carriers in the Mediterranean and East Asia; aerial tanker bases in places like Thule, Gander, and Keflavik; land-based signals intelligence stations all around the Soviet periphery; U-2 and SR-71 surveillance aircraft bases; and others.

But some overseas access had functions that were primarily if not solely nuclear. Early on there were Strategic Air Command B-47 “Reflex Force” bases in Spain and Morocco; medium-range ballistic-missile bases in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey, as well as on Okinawa and Taiwan (for the Mace and Matador missiles); DSP downlinks in Australia and Germany; SOSUS terminals in a variety of places near choke points and Soviet submarine transit routes and “bastions”; ground-launched cruise-missile and Pershing II emplacements in Europe (before the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty); BMEWS sites in the United Kingdom and Greenland; nuclear detection facilities (seismic arrays) in numerous countries including Norway and Turkey; signals-intelligence stations collecting telemetry data (in Iran, among other places, and later in China); Omega and LORAN navigation aids; TACAMO (related to communications with U.S. submarines); bases for ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) at Rota and Holy

Loch and for attack boats (SSNs) at La Maddalena, Faslane, and Sasebo; and solar flare stations, other communications facilities, and the DEW, PINETREE, and North Warning System early warning radars in Canada and Greenland. Much of this structure was dismantled as the USSR disappeared as a rival (SOSUS and SSBN bases, for example), but some of it remains (such as signals-intelligence and DSP downlink facilities).

Today the future of nuclear deterrence basing is somewhat indeterminate. The SSBNs—“boomers”—are now all based in the continental United States, in Georgia and Washington State. Nuclear-capable forward-based aircraft, such as the F-111s in the United Kingdom, have been stood down. But some technical facilities remain—again, for instance, the DSP downlinks. U.S. nuclear deterrence today has Russia in mind only in part; basing in the context of nuclear deterrence has mostly to do with missile defense vis-à-vis China, North Korea, and Iran. In Europe, the BMEWS radars at Fylingdale Moor in the United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland (under Danish sovereignty) are to be upgraded. There appears to be an agreement in the offing with Britain to base theater missiles at Fylingdale as well. Farther east, Poland appears the most likely host (Romania and Hungary have also been considered) for missiles that could defend most of Europe from threats in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Pakistan may all soon be capable of reaching the heart of Europe with nuclear-armed missiles). In the Far East, Japan has still to decide whether to host U.S. missile defenses against North Korea and China; Japan and South Korea may host related warning radars (Alaska serves this purpose for the defense of the continental United States from Chinese and North Korean missiles). Finally, the United States could deploy shipborne theater antiballistic missiles in the waters around Japan and Korea, in the Mediterranean and Arabian seas, and maybe in the Baltic; the ships that carry them would (to some extent) need access to nearby ports.

Conventional Conflict

The heart of the problem of global posture is future U.S. access in a wide variety of possible scenarios in a context of ambiguous threats, uncertain alliances, and ill-defined international system structure.

Before World War II, a more or less isolationist America had little in the way of overseas bases, mostly (as also, on a much larger scale, for Great Britain) in colonial possessions or protectorates—the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. The Lend-Lease Act of 1940 provided the United States a string of bases, on ninety-nine-year leases, reaching from Newfoundland to British Guyana. During the war, many other bases—in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, Acapulco, the Galapagos Islands, Recife and Fortaleza in Brazil—were provided by a number of countries.

After World War II, the elaborate alliance system afforded to the United States bases in the colonial possessions of Britain, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The use of numerous allied bases all around the Eurasian rimland was a virtual given. This made it easy for the United States to operate in conflicts large and small.

In the Korean War, bases in Japan were about all that were needed. In the Vietnam War, the United States was availed of air and naval bases in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Before and during DESERT STORM, access was available just about everywhere in Europe and the Middle East. For a variety of contingencies large and small, the United States operated in a permissive environment for access because of numerous stable alliances and other client relationships, all underpinned by security assistance. Things became tougher in 2003.

At present, and for the future, the security environment is much more ambiguous, as are alliance relationships themselves. In place of a set and more or less stable twilight struggle against the Soviet Union and its allies, there is now a multilayered and fluid threat environment featuring terrorism, WMD proliferation, nation building, and peacekeeping in a variety of places, as well as a looming hegemonic rivalry with China, maybe the European Union, and maybe Russia (again), in combinations and sequences not easily foreseen.

In fact, even with the best analytical work, conflicts—and hence basing requirements—are not always easily envisaged or predicted. Few people in the summer of 2001 could have predicted the need within months for U.S. access in Central Asian ex-Soviet socialist republics to enable large-scale military operations in Afghanistan. Earlier, presumably, few British analysts foresaw the need for a large-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands under adverse weather conditions, and a critical associated requirement for access to a (British-owned) air base on Ascension Island. The critical role of Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores for arms resupply to Israel in 1973 (which arguably averted resort by the latter to nuclear weapons) had probably also been only dimly perceived by defense planners. Whatever the elaborateness of scenarios, then, surprises may be expected, including some that overwhelm “capabilities-based analysis.”

That said, scenarios for the future can be broken down into two basic categories, generic and specific. Most current open-source Defense Department analyses rely on the former, if only to organize the subject. The generic scenario types now commonly utilized are *traditional*, *irregular*, *catastrophic*, and *disruptive*. “Traditional” refers to familiar force-on-force, large-scale engagements, such as the two world wars, the Korean War, DESERT STORM, the Iran-Iraq War, and the 1967 and 1973 Middle Eastern wars. In the academic literature—for instance, in the research emerging from the “Correlates of War” project—the relative scale of such conflicts is gauged by the variables of magnitude (number of

combatants involved), severity (number of combat deaths), and duration.¹¹ Additionally, one can point to “moving fronts”—that is, an identifiable shifting demarcation of large-unit forces, analogous to a football line of scrimmage. Some analysts speak of a spectrum running from all-out conventional war to various forms of “limited” conventional war, Korea being an example of warfare characterized by tacit geographical limits. Most traditional conflicts are interstate, though the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s was an intrastate example.

“Irregular” conflicts refer to a range of conflict types roughly similar to the spectrum of low-intensity warfare, a term in vogue in the 1980s and 1990s. It comprises guerrilla and insurgency warfare, civil wars (ethnic wars over territory and ideological wars over control of governments), coups, terrorism, border friction, etc.¹² Most of these wars, the latter example excepted, are of an intrastate nature. Over time, the dominant frequency of Marxist insurgencies gave way to “Reagan Doctrine” anticommunist insurgencies and then, in the 1990s, to a heyday of ethnic warfare.

“Catastrophic” conflicts comprise those in which large-scale casualties are caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological warfare. Hypothetically, some forms of environmental warfare might also be envisaged under this heading. Catastrophic conflict can involve interstate warfare or terrorism. In the former case, it could come in the form of “bolts from the blue” (preemptive attacks) or could come through escalation of a conventional war to the use of tactical, theater, or strategic WMDs.

“Disruptive” scenarios are perhaps more difficult to categorize than the others. Presumably they could include such things as electromagnetic-pulse attacks that disrupt communications or “cyber warfare,” with or without an identifiable perpetrator. They might also involve major political changes in nations via elections or significant shifts in foreign-policy orientation that could heavily impact on U.S. global presence.

Again, the above generic scenario types seem largely a recasting of the conflict spectrum elaborated by various authors in the 1990s running from nuclear to conventional to limited conventional, to high-, medium-, and low-intensity conflict.¹³ The shift toward a multipolar system somewhat devoid of ideological conflict, and the advent of new technological possibilities for conflict such as EMP and cyberwar, have added new dimensions to a comprehensive scenario menu.

In the Cold War, U.S. government studies openly acknowledged expected, possible, or actual scenarios, mostly related to the two “base cases,” war in Central Europe and in the Persian Gulf, both expected to involve the USSR. War started in one of these theaters was thought likely to spread to the other (“horizontal escalation”). Korea was, in addition, long an additional “mini-base case.” Specific scenarios, however, are politically sensitive in an ambiguous political

environment in which the identities of friends and foes are not always as clear as in the (in this respect) halcyon Cold War years. Now the scenarios considered are far more varied, with respect to both type and location. Political sensitivities put some within the classified realm, and again, there is a high likelihood of the unforeseen, though most can be fitted into the aforementioned four-way typology. Underlined in all of this is the global, diverse, almost open-ended nature of potential problems and the uncertainty of access in the context of shifting, indeterminate, and contingent or ad hoc political relationships. We shall return to this.

Arms Resupply during Conflict. Any number of scenarios can be divined regarding future basing problems in connection with arms resupply during conflict. In numerous past situations, the United States and other major weapons suppliers have had to choose, in conflicts involving allies or friendly states, policies from a spectrum ranging from embargo (the U.S. embargo on Pakistan in 1965, which drove the latter into a long-term alliance with China) to all-out arms resupply, with a possible time lag in the latter case, as in 1973.¹⁴ In 1973, access to bases in the Azores (territory of Portugal) and perhaps Spain (tanker refueling) was critical to the resupply effort on behalf of Israel, as was the movement of some materiel out of Germany. An “air corridor” through the Gibraltar Straits was also vital. On the other side of the Cold War divide might be noted Soviet use of air staging bases and overflight corridors for resupplying clients in Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977–78), and Vietnam (1979). In Angola and Ethiopia the Soviets used north-south air corridors similar to what the United States now seeks in its contingency planning.

As for the future, who can say? Scenarios have been bruited for possible arms resupply operations involving Israel, Egypt, maybe Iraq, possibly Pakistan or India. A new round of fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia, or between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could bring this matter into play. In the case of Israel and Egypt, a new conventional conflict might prompt an American embargo on both, perhaps coupled with asymmetric Russian or European Union (EU) resupply of Egypt; that could trigger a repeat of the near-nuclear scenario of 1973. In another round, Portugal and Spain might not likely allow the United States access for resupply of Israel, but longer-range transport aircraft render this a less crucial matter than before.

Coercive Diplomacy, Air-Based Intelligence. Coercive diplomacy, known as “gunboat diplomacy” in an earlier time, may also require access. Numerous cases have been detailed in which this issue came into play during the Cold War, many cases involving access to bases and overhead air space.¹⁵ Once, coercive diplomacy usually involved the movement of ships, like the actual “gunboats” used by the United States to affect behavior in Central American states.¹⁶ In

1970, American ships based in Souda Bay (Crete) and elsewhere coerced Syria into halting its invasion of Jordan. In 1971, a carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean signaled an American “tilt” toward Pakistan in its conflict with India, and friendship toward China as well. More recently, the forward movement of AWACS* aircraft has become more the norm, though movement of U.S. ships through the Taiwan Straits in 1996 to signal support for Taiwan was closer to the earlier model. The firing of Tomahawk missiles as “signals” (some might say futile gestures) in Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan may be cited, involving ships that may have had access to regional ports. A related matter is the flying of intelligence aircraft off the shores of rival nations such as China, in which case access to bases in Okinawa would have been required.

During the Cold War, the United States flew U-2 missions from Bodo (Norway), Wiesbaden (West Germany), Incirlik (Turkey), Peshawar (Pakistan), and Atsugi (Japan), among other places, and electronic intelligence planes along the Soviet Arctic coast from bases in Western Europe.¹⁷ The shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 may have resulted, accidentally, from such activities. Electronic intelligence collection is now typically conducted by satellite, but the need for basing electronic and photographic intelligence aircraft may remain.

Presence/Showing the Flag. “Presence,” or “showing the flag,” mostly through port visits, is a longtime maritime tradition, an important aspect of the politics of prestige and alignments. In the nineteenth century, for instance, all the major naval powers sent flotillas (one of them the American “Great White Fleet”) around the globe to show the flag, display might, perhaps intimidate a bit. Such visits are made to allied nations but also to neutral and even somewhat unfriendly ones. As was recently the case with U.S. ship visits to Vietnam, “showing the flag” (or the acceptance by hosts of such visits) can be a way of indicating new political relationships. The bombing of the USS *Cole* (DDG 67) took place in that context—in Aden (Yemen), which had been not much earlier a major Soviet naval base.

Peacekeeping. A more recent phenomenon is the use of foreign facilities in order to conduct peacekeeping or interposition operations nearby. Here one might cite U.S. access to facilities in Egypt to support peacekeeping in the Sinai, and in Hungary and Albania for operations in, respectively, Bosnia and Kosovo. West African ports like Dakar, Senegal, have been used to support peacekeeping operations in nearby states, such as Liberia.

A few points stand out from the myriad of possible complex scenarios. Most reflect focuses on WMD, terrorism, hegemonic rivalry with China, and competition over scarce resources—particularly oil, but possibly also such minerals as

* Airborne Warning and Control System.

iron ore and manganese—and the possible nexus between the latter two.¹⁸ The possession, existing or possibly pending, of nuclear weapons by Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, perhaps later Egypt, Syria, or Taiwan, among others, is at the heart of numerous scenarios. Islamist terror raises the possibility of conflict and, hence, access requirements in numerous areas spanning the West, North and East Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Central Asia, etc. Hegemonic China looms large in such scenarios. Most importantly, maybe, the supply-demand equation for oil also looms large, what with enormously increased demand by China, India (with a projected population of 1.6 billion), and other Asian countries. China is now getting oil in large quantities from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Angola, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Yemen, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Indonesia.¹⁹ It is looking for additional sources in Chad, Canada, and Peru, among other places.

THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL PRESENCE

The United States has been reshaping its global presence to deal with new threats, emanating from sometimes new sources, in a very fluid and complex global environment. It is positioning itself according to new geopolitical emphases (arcs of crisis, African oil fields, etc.) and also in line with its own “transformation”—an emphasis on smaller, lighter, more mobile forces. There is a clear shift away from the residual Cold War global presence, marked by heavy forces stationed where they would be expected to fight—in Central Europe and Korea. The upshot of the scenarios themselves, the comparative costs involved, the necessity to retain military personnel and attend to their families’ needs, and a desire to lower the intrusiveness of the U.S. presence and infringement on other nations’ sense of sovereignty is that global presence is being seen in terms of trade-offs. The traditional option is forward presence/basing; a new possibility is sea basing; both political and new technological realities, however, increasingly allow for resort to basing military operations in the continental United States (Conus) itself. The latter two broad options are, of course, linked.

As indicated in recent Defense Department publications, basing access has come to be viewed along a spectrum embracing the “main operating base,” “forward operating site,” and “cooperative security location.” Main operating bases involve “permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure” and “will be characterized by command and control structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures.”²⁰ Examples mentioned are Ramstein Air Force Base (Germany), Kadena Air Base (Japan), and Camp Humphreys (Korea). Others that might fit that category are the air bases at Thumrait, Seeb, and Masirah in Oman, and Al Udeid in Qatar. Yet others might be the naval base at Yokosuka, the complex of bases on Guam, the naval facilities

on Diego Garcia, maybe the air and army bases in Kuwait, and perhaps the main army bases in Germany at Baumholder, Wurzburg, Wiesbaden, Friedberg, Schweinfurt, and Vilseck.

A forward operating site is defined as “an expandable warm [i.e., kept in ready condition] facility maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment.”²¹ Further, they “will support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training.” Examples cited include the Sembawang port facility in Singapore (which may be approaching, de facto, the status of a main operating base) and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. Other U.S. Air Force bases around the world that, as measured by permanently stationed personnel, might qualify are Keflavik in Iceland, Royal Air Force Stations Lakenheath and Mildenhall in the United Kingdom, Spangdahlem in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Incirlik in Turkey, and Utapao in Thailand. Naval Air Station Atsugi in Japan might qualify as well. Of course, the newer facilities being expanded and utilized in Bulgaria and Romania fit this model, as do some in the smaller Persian Gulf countries. The U.S. facility at Sigonella in Sicily (during the Cold War mostly a U.S. Navy P-3 antisubmarine patrol aircraft base), if expanded, would presumably also qualify as a forward operating site.

Cooperative security locations are “facilities” with “little or no permanent American presence.” Instead, they are maintained with “periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support.” Cooperative security locations would provide contingency access and serve as focal points for “security cooperation activities.”²² According to Defense Department documents, Dakar is one example; there the U.S. Air Force “has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and final contracting arrangements . . . which [made Dakar] a staging area for the 2003 peace support operation in Liberia.”²³ According to a recent article in the *Christian Science Monitor*, which omits the acronyms and Pentagon jargon, cooperative security arrangements of this sort are being set up in several African countries: Chad, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, and Algeria, among others.²⁴

Obviously, the main thrust here is in the direction of a very limited number of main operating bases, so as to lessen the U.S. overseas footprint, and an increase in forward operating sites and cooperative security locations to accommodate lighter and more mobile forces for a variety of contingencies.

The current, evolving trends are clear. The first is some degree of drawdown in “old Europe,” mostly in Germany, in favor of forward sites in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland, either with limited permanent personnel or forces rotated from Germany or the United States.²⁵ The second comprises the maintenance of forward sites, cooperative locations, and prepositioned materiel in the Middle

East—in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman (concurrent, however, with a reduction of deployments to Saudi Arabia). A third is the maintenance of bases in relation to Afghanistan—and this apparently in the face of mounting pressure from President Vladimir Putin of Russia, who claims the United States promised to withdraw from Central Asia after the end of the crisis there. Washington has kept its bases in Afghanistan at Bagram, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif, etc., and has solidified access to air bases in Kyrgyzstan (Marias) and Uzbekistan (Khanabad).²⁶ That in neighboring Kyrgyzstan has also drawn notice due to its proximity to western China. Fourth, Diego Garcia remains (with British permission) a critical U.S. base for prepositioning, refueling, and crew rest for B-2 and B-1 missions. Finally, in East Asia, Australia continues to host important American intelligence and surveillance facilities (Exmouth, Pine Gap) as well as offering American planes and ships access. Singapore, as noted, now hosts a major U.S. naval facility, and the Philippines now is resuming basing access for the United States after a long hiatus, prodded by the necessities of cooperation on antiterrorism.

THE BASIS OF BASING

As we have seen, and historically speaking, nations have acquired basing access in one of three basic ways: by conquest or colonization, by providing security or protection for the host via formal alliances or less formal arrangements that still imply protection, or by tangible *quid pro quos*—security assistance, arms transfers, subsidies, or what amount to “rents.”

In the current context for the United States, conquest is more or less irrelevant, precluded by emerging international norms or “laws”—though some critics of the Iraq invasion see enhanced basing access as having been a motive for it. An extreme situation regarding access to oil, oil embargoes, or unacceptably high oil prices could raise the question of conquest of bases to deal with it. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, indeed, warned of this possibility in the 1970s.

As for bases acquired through the provision of security, during the Cold War a number of nations provided the United States access at least in part because it provided assurance against Soviet or Chinese aggression. The term “extended deterrence” was often used to describe such a relationship. It may still be applicable in a number of cases—for example, Japan, South Korea, perhaps again the Philippines, even Vietnam. Access in Georgia and some of the ex-Soviet states in Central Asia might be included, in relation to a possibly resurgent and revisionist Russia. Around the Persian Gulf, states are being made secure by a U.S. presence against Iranian aggression and maybe reassured about the implications of a possible Saudi Islamic revolution. In addition, a growing number of nations—

again, the Philippines, and some in Africa—may see an American presence as deterring terrorists.

All of this represents extrapolation from current problems and scenarios. Perhaps absent here is the broader picture of a changing but indeterminate international systems structure that may heavily impact future scenarios, formal and informal alliances, and hence basing access. Cold War bipolarity based largely on an ideological divide has now given way to a degree of unipolarity heavily influencing the facts of basing dominance, admixed with an incipient



though asymmetric multipolarity, the poles of which are the United States, the EU, Russia, China, Japan, India, and perhaps a nascent radical “Islamic world.” Save the remnants of communism and the growing ideological-religious aspects of Islamic radicalism, the new system is largely devoid of an ideological basis for enmity and friendship, a state of affairs that allows, as was the case in the Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rapidly shifting alliances based on short-term or medium-term expedience and balance-

of-power considerations. Russia’s recent oscillation between China (arms transfers, coalescence vis-à-vis the United States), the EU (ganging up on the United States), and the United States (common front against Islamic terrorism) may be a harbinger of things to come as well as a reminder of the past.

What of the future? The West versus the rest? The United States aligned with Japan, India, and maybe Russia against rising Chinese global hegemony, with the EU as a “balancer” and Islam aligned with China?²⁷ An all-Asia front to drive U.S. power out of Asia? There are various possibilities, and again, the shifts may be rapid and frequent. At another level, nuclear proliferation, juxtaposed to big-power multipolarity, will be critical, and numerous new entrants to the “nuclear club” are likely. North Korea (maybe later a nuclear-armed united Korea), Iran, maybe Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and Indonesia, are all technically qualified.

What will be the impact of all of this on basing and, specifically, on the American basing posture? In the past, multipolar systems devoid of long-term stable alliances usually have obviated or limited large-scale basing systems; in such a world today’s “friend” is tomorrow’s rival and someone else’s “friend.” Nuclear proliferation seems to portend the decoupling of alliances because of the intimidation factor—unless the protection/security factor drives cooperative missile

defense systems. Will Japan, China, Russia, India, and the EU develop effective ballistic-missile-defense systems? Will some of these powers provide security assistance as quid pro quo for their own bases or to deny access to the United States? On the whole, decoupling and a very constrained environment for U.S. basing might be predicted—and hence further reliance on sea-basing or Conus-basing schemes (see later)—but all of this is uncertain. The effective use of security assistance might alter the equation.

Security Assistance

The third category, in the current context, relates primarily to the use of security assistance as a quid pro quo for basing access. During the Cold War, some of the largest recipients of American security assistance—Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Philippines—were providers of critically needed access for the United States.

There are several categories of security assistance: the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and the Economic Support Fund.²⁸ Some seventy-four countries receive foreign military financing, some 130 receive IMET money, and some twenty-six accept money from the Economic Support Fund, which is also used to support multilateral programs concerning regional democracy, regional women's issues, administration of justice funds, and other such initiatives.

Several points stand out regarding the current structure of U.S. security assistance. The first point is the dominance of the numbers by Egypt and Israel. Another is the truly remarkable number of countries receiving U.S. funds from one or more of these sources, more than two-thirds of some 190 sovereign nations in the world. Many that now receive such assistance are former Soviet allies and arms clients (or even former Soviet republics), many of which once provided Moscow basing access and overflight rights; among them are Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Angola, Mongolia, India, and Cambodia.

Regarding the Foreign Military Financing Program, Egypt and Israel are the largest recipients, primarily as a result of supporting the Camp David peace process, though Egypt has provided the United States access in recent times. In 2003–2004, aside from Egypt and Israel, only Jordan, Oman, Morocco, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Georgia, Turkey, Colombia, the Philippines, and Pakistan received over twenty million dollars, modest sums. The low figures for Latin America correlate with low levels of conflict and strategic threat and the near absence of American bases (Colombia, for instance, has had significant support in relation to drug interdiction). The United States once provided large amounts of security assistance, as much as five hundred million

dollars annually, to a small number of key basing hosts: Portugal (the Azores), Spain, Greece, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines. Now, aside from the billions required to support the Egypt-Israel Camp David accords, money is spread out to a much larger number of recipients in smaller amounts (though some are still quite large): Jordan near a half billion (in part for underwriting the “peace process,” but perhaps also for American access in the Iraq war), and Afghanistan \$190 million.

Djibouti and the Philippines have the largest accounts in the Economic Support Fund, each around twenty-five million dollars, no doubt reflecting American military access. U.S.-Philippines collaboration on the war on terrorism is germane here. The IMET goes to a number of states, but the amounts are small, only a handful above a million dollars per year: the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Senegal, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Yemen, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania. The relation to basing access is clear in many of these cases.

Hence, it would appear that in many cases all over the world, relatively small increases in absolute levels of assistance would represent large proportional jumps. Such increases could judiciously be used in exchange for enhanced access.

What potentially is involved was illustrated in recent cooperative security and training exercises in various African states. The focus is on counterterrorist training, particularly in and around the Sahara Desert and the Sahel; “These are vast lawless lands where terrorists linked to Al Qaeda are known to operate—and where the region’s large Muslim populations sometimes offer support or sympathy to extremists.”²⁹ There are promising oil fields around and near the Gulf of Guinea—in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe. Reportedly China has been scouring the African continent to line up deals regarding a variety of nonfuel natural resources. As we have noted in this connection, the United States has been developing north-south air corridors to support military operations. U.S. forces are also training personnel in Chad, Botswana, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and Djibouti; in the last-named now are some two thousand American troops poised to launch antiterrorist operations in the Horn of Africa or the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. The amounts of IMET targeted for these countries range from around one or two hundred thousand dollars per year on up to about a million for Senegal.

ACCESS PERMISSIVENESS AND SCENARIOS, PAST AND PRESENT

As previously discussed, basing access has become more ad hoc and situational since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the weakening of the formal alliance structure constructed by the United States during that protracted struggle. During the Cold War, the United States was able, almost always, to utilize its overseas facilities and the airspace of friendly nations. For instance, air bases in Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand were used to prosecute the war in Vietnam. U-2 aircraft were flown over the USSR from bases in Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Japan. Germany was a jumping-off point for American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. Various nations allowed access for satellite downlinks in connection with nuclear early warning and satellite control: Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Seychelles, even Madagascar for a period. The United Kingdom, Turkey, Italy, and Taiwan allowed forward basing of land-based missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and China. There were few exceptions—denial of airspace by France and Spain for the raid on Libya in 1986 was one example. Also, numerous nations tied in one way or another to the USSR allowed Moscow access and denied it to Washington: Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, South Yemen, Iraq, Libya, India, and the whole contiguous Warsaw Pact bloc from Eastern Europe to Mongolia.

The keys here, in the prior period, were systems structure (a bipolar struggle with ideological cement on both sides), shared threats, protection of basing hosts, and perhaps a lower level of the anti-Americanism that is now the hallmark of diplomacy.

After the end of the Cold War, permissiveness persisted at least for the 1990–91 DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM operation. There the United States led an effective coalition that was underpinned by the collective security mandate of the UN and that enjoyed strong support from Saudi Arabia, hence also from most of the Middle East. Only Jordan seems to have denied the United States relevant access, which was provided fully by the Saudis and other Gulf states, Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Turkey, all of the other NATO allies, and even the newly “independent” Eastern bloc countries.³⁰ Some political problems arose, however, in India and Thailand, as a result of the granting of permission to stage U.S. Air Force transport planes.

In the Afghanistan war, the United States also was provided access almost everywhere necessary. The ex-Soviet states in Central Asia, with the permission of Moscow, gave the United States vital air bases and jumping-off points to the north of Afghanistan. Britain provided Diego Garcia. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and others allowed the United States to fly missions from their territory to Afghanistan. Nations in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus granted overhead-transit access. Perhaps the only problem (other than Iraq and Iran, for obvious

reasons) was Pakistan, and even that nation, under pressure from the United States (and fearing American encouragement of an invasion from India) allowed overflights and some access for heliborne ground operations. Intimidation was a factor in that case. But overall, sympathy in the wake of 9/11 and perhaps fear of an aroused and dangerous United States made for a permissive basing access environment. Enhanced security assistance and the promise of more were important.

In the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, there was an overall less permissive environment for U.S. access, for reasons of political disagreements with states in “old Europe” and pressure from the “Arab street” in the Middle East. Access to European bases and overhead airspace was mostly maintained (Switzerland, irrelevantly, denied the latter). But reluctance by Saudi Arabia prompted the moving of air command and control operations to Qatar (which, with Kuwait and Oman, was solidly favorable to American access). Egypt quietly allowed overflights, refueling, Suez Canal transit, and use of a major military hospital. But permission for the movement of the 4th Infantry Division across Turkish territory was denied; there were hints of covert pressure from France and Germany in connection with Turkey’s prospective admission to the EU. During this period, also, there were reports of Russian complaints about continuing U.S. access to the Central Asian states.

For the future, access may be even more situational and ad hoc. The keys are likely to be alliance and security assistance relationships, the overall global level of support for American policies on antiterrorism and WMD proliferation, the political specifics of given situations, and the balance between reliance on U.S. provision of protection and security and the counterleverage of foes of the United States or states pressured or intimidated by the latter. Europe’s growing divorce from the United States, and perhaps its growing competition with the United States over access to Middle Eastern oil, may be a growing factor. Pakistani and Iranian nuclear arsenals may increasingly be intimidating factors. The Muslim “street,” in Africa and Southeast Asia as well as the core Middle East, may be another. Japan’s fear of nuclear-armed North Korea, not to mention China, may be a strong factor in the Far East. In general, and short of actual crisis, U.S. access all over Africa, in the Persian Gulf area, and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia seems to be growing and solidly assured, but in specific situations things may be different.

It is difficult to predict the extent to which permissiveness of access may vary by scenario type—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive. This question involves a spectrum that can be measured as macro to micro—that is, a nuclear or biological terrorist event to a peacekeeping operation—but also in technological terms, running from force-on-force military operations to, say, a cyber-

attack out of nowhere. Again, degrees of access allowed may be scenario specific, depending upon the identity of the foe (Islamic or not, raising the issue of religious identification), fear and intimidation (in both directions), influence afforded by oil politics or other types of leverage (EU admission, security assistance, various quid pro quos), and the overall intensity of anti-Americanism (perhaps with regional variations). Relatively small “disruptive” scenarios involving peacekeeping, responses to coups, etc., would appear to be most permissive in terms of access; likewise, catastrophic scenarios would probably result in sympathy for U.S. operations, though perhaps counterbalanced by the fear and intimidation factor. One may note here the extensive granting of access to American military forces engaged in the tsunami rescue operation in places like Thailand, but also the skittishness of the Indonesian government about U.S. military activities on Sumatra.

It is worth pointing out that aside from broadly systemic factors and prevailing moods, global or regional, the domestic politics in given nations may be a determining factor, with respect either to electoral change or coups and revolutions. There are any number of historical examples, even from the period of stable alliances during the Cold War. France, under Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s, canceled U.S. access to air and naval bases (Villefranche in the latter case) and to crucial petroleum pipelines running from France’s Atlantic coast to Germany. Iran’s revolution in 1979 cut off important access to telemetry intercept facilities in northern Iran (the Iraqi revolution in 1958 had ended Western access to air bases there). In the latter part of the Cold War, American access to Greek bases was curtailed when anti-American governments came to power. Later, the United States had to withdraw from Spanish air bases, obtaining additional access to Italian bases to offset the loss. The Turkish situation in 2003 has widely been reported upon; it came in the wake of the accession to power of an Islamic party. In the Philippines, post-Marcos politics expelled the United States from major air and naval bases. On the other side of the coin, in recent years friendly governments in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Australia have translated into very permissive access. Shifting political winds could later cause problems in these countries, and in Japan and South Korea as well.

Conus Basing and Sea Basing

Alternatives to contingent basing access, or perhaps supplements to it, are Conus basing and sea basing. Their utility will depend greatly on the scenario, both in terms of distance and location, and also the sheer scale of operations required.

Conus Basing. The option of relying more on basing within the continental United States has been illustrated by, among other things, B-1 and B-2 bomber missions in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM,

mounted from Barksdale and Whiteman Air Force bases, the latter at least making some use of Diego Garcia. Also, military transformation, translating into lower force levels and logistical requirements for given operations, has resulted in more optimism about being able to rely more, if not wholly, on Conus basing. Operation from the United States might be particularly applicable to preemptive strikes on WMD installations or terrorist facilities, as well as to interdiction operations in a “traditional” conflict. This option might be furthered by technological developments—faster attack aircraft with longer ranges and more accurate bombing systems, enhanced capabilities for conventional interdiction by SSBNs, etc. Also, satellite capabilities and reduced requirements for overseas downlinks might in the future allow reduced dependence on foreign bases for intelligence and surveillance. Better and faster sealift and airlift would also help, but obviously only within limits, for traditional and disruptive scenarios at least.

Sea Basing. Sea basing has captured increased attention. It is, indeed, one of the four elements of Seapower 21, along with Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and ForceNet.³¹ This new emphasis is the result of worry that land bases may not so readily be available for future power projection operations, for reasons we have enumerated. So some analysts now foresee greater use of seaborne platforms for operations ashore, a trend already foreshadowed by several small crisis operations (removal of American embassy personnel, small-scale interpositions), mostly in Africa, and by some aspects of the Afghanistan conflict. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) observes,

But the third, Sea Basing, is considered by many in the Department of Defense to be the most transformational of the three ideas. It envisions putting a substantial Marine Corps ground force on shore and sustaining it from ships at sea rather than from a land base. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps could conduct amphibious assaults (including “forcible-entry” operations, like those conducted on Japanese-held Pacific islands during World War II) without needing to seize the enemy territory to build a base or to get permission from a nearby country to use an existing base. Supporters argue that sea basing would therefore allow U.S. forces to operate overseas more independently, flexibly, and quickly.³²

The U.S. Navy’s present 293-ship fleet includes thirty-five amphibious ships.³³ The latter comprise five amphibious assault ships of the *Tarawa* (LHA 1) and *Wasp* (LHD 1) classes, eleven *Austin* (LPD 4) amphibious transport docks, and eight *Whidbey Island* (LSD 41) and four *Harpers Ferry* (LSD 49) dock landing ships. In addition, there are now sixteen maritime prepositioning ships. The first three types of ships “carry Marines, vehicles, and the landing craft that are used to ferry troops and equipment to shore; some also carry helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.”³⁴ The L-type ships together provide lift transport capacity

of 1.9 Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) amounting to twenty-seven thousand troops and their equipment. According to the CBO, in the past these ships were arranged into twelve amphibious ready groups, three ships apiece, which operated independently from the fleet and carried a Marine expeditionary unit of about 2,200 troops, a battalion equivalent. Now the Navy is reorganizing its fleet to make three surface combatant ships and one submarine available to each amphibious ready group, producing what is known as an expeditionary strike group. Clearly, this reflects a shift away from blue-water sea dominance toward littoral warfare, under a myriad of possible scenarios.

The maritime prepositioning ships carry equipment only, no troops; they are organized into three squadrons of five or six ships apiece, based at ports in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), and the western Pacific (Guam). Each squadron carries enough materiel to equip an MEB and sustain it for thirty days, thus a lift capacity of three MEBs. So that is the current basis for sea basing.

In March 2003, the Navy proposed to Congress a fleet of 375 ships, including thirty-seven amphibious ships and eighteen new MPSs capable of conducting sea-basing operations. Over a thirty-year period up to 2035, this would involve purchasing twelve LPD 17s (*San Antonio* class), ten amphibious ships of a new class (LHA-R) similar to the present LHDs but carrying more aircraft, twelve dock landing ships of a new class (LSD-X), and up to twenty-one new MPF(F)s, far more capable than the current maritime prepositioning ships. Thus by 2035 the Navy would have fifty-seven combined amphibious warfare ships and maritime prepositioning ships, organized into twelve expeditionary strike groups and three MPF(F) squadrons.

The CBO sums up the Navy and Marine Corps plans for sea basing as follows:

In the Navy's and Marine Corps's vision for sea basing, amphibious ships would continue to carry the "assault echelons"—the first wave of troops—in any expeditionary operation. The MPF(F) ships would carry most of the materiel needed to sustain that force in the first 20 days of operations. They would also hold all of the equipment for "follow-on assault echelons"—successive waves of troops that would be transported to the theater on aircraft or high-speed surface craft. With sea basing, no land base would be necessary for the follow-on forces to assemble themselves and deploy—all of that would occur on the ships comprising the sea base. Nor would there be a large supply depot on land to offer a prime, stationary target for attacks by enemy ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or aircraft. The MPF(F)s are the linchpin of the sea base; without them, the Navy and Marine Corps would not be able to implement that new approach to amphibious warfare or forcible-entry operations.³⁵

There are several lower-cost options: first, buy fewer more-capable ships within the historical spending level; second, buy more less-capable ships at the

historical spending level; third, create a more survivable sea-basing force; and fourth, deemphasize sea basing in favor of forward presence. These options involve a blizzard of possible options with regard to types and mixes of ships, trade-offs between men, equipment, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, defensive systems and survivability based on ship construction, etc., each to be costed out.

Another layer of complexity is the question of connectors for the sea bases—that is, how to get troops from the continental United States (or Europe or U.S. bases in the Far East) to combat zones, get them ashore, and then sustain them. One option mentioned by the CBO is to purchase fast sealift ships capable of ferrying troops from Conus (or European or Asian bases) at high speeds. Another would be to fly troops to an advanced base and then ferry them to the sea base using short-range, higher-speed vessels. Ships of the latter type already exist, but new, scaled-up designs would be required. Other needed connectors are flow-on/flow-off ships to bring landing craft close to shore, large air-cushion landing craft to get everything to the beach, a new heavy lift helicopter to replace the CH-53, or a new aircraft with quad-tilt rotors.

The CBO report briefly discusses four arguments against sea basing, whether on a modest or major scale.³⁶ Those arguments are the possible inability of even maximal sea-basing schemes to deal with large-scale military operations, such as in Iraq in 1990–91 and 2003; the vulnerability of sea bases to attack from ballistic and cruise missiles, maybe even greater than that of less concentrated land bases; the seeming unlikelihood that the United States would attempt large-scale amphibious operations when it has not done so since the Korean War; and the expense of all the new ships and connectors needed. Though the third argument may be specious—this is what sea basing is all about, the *projected* lesser availability of land bases in an ambiguously evolving global political climate—but the other three are serious. For instance, the sea-basing force envisioned by the CBO for 2035 could cost seventy to ninety billion dollars over that period. Such numbers would dwarf the current non-Egypt/Israel security assistance budgets, raising the prospect of trade-offs between them and sea basing.

The CBO and other recent studies of sea basing have focused almost entirely on force structures and associated budgets, with little reference to conflict scenarios—the possible locations and sizes of conflicts, impact of alignments, availability of land bases, etc. The CBO's overseas basing study is also stingy with reference to possible or most likely scenarios, aside from brief mention of Nigeria and Azerbaijan (potentially important future sources of oil) and of Uganda and Djibouti (potential staging bases for conducting operations in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to counter instability and terrorism).³⁷ Likewise missing is any juxtaposition to or cross-referencing with the now-standard general

breakdown of conflict scenarios. An agenda for further, broader analysis involves such issues as these:

- The relationship of projected sea-basing capabilities to generic and more specific scenarios
- Sea-basing capabilities in a variety of regions, littoral scenarios versus inland scenarios, etc.
- The viability of force structure planning with a long (thirty-year) time frame
- Jointness—the disconnect between CBO's Navy/Marine sea-basing studies and its Army-related study focused on Europe and Korea
- The relative costs of sea basing and of enhanced security assistance to land-base hosts, to the extent the latter is politically feasible.

A sea-basing scheme that allows for lift of 1.5–2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades, up to forty thousand Marines, might be suitable for littoral operations on the scale of the Afghanistan war or, given overflight rights, somewhat inland. Sea basing would easily be capable, as it has been in the past in Africa and elsewhere, of dealing with extraction and peacekeeping operations on a small scale. Without supplementation from the Army, however, or maybe even with it, a sea base might not be capable of operations on the scale of DESERT STORM or IRAQI FREEDOM, transformation to smaller, more mobile, and more lethal forces notwithstanding.

Further, the relevance of sea basing to “catastrophic” generic scenarios is ambiguous, as is preemption of sources of such threats. The limitations of sea basing away from littorals needs further analysis. Could, for instance, a MEB with submarines and aircraft attached be useful in Azerbaijan, Tibet, Chad, or Uganda?³⁸ Presumably such issues, and the nexus generally between sea-basing force structures and specific and generic scenarios, are being studied on a classified basis. The political sensitivity is strongly implied in the almost antiseptic CBO studies.

Another conspicuous absence in the two CBO studies (Navy and Army related) is jointness. Army forces are hardly mentioned in connection with sea basing, nor are Air Force capabilities in relation to littoral warfare. In the CBO study of the Army's overseas bases, the Marines are largely missing and the Navy figures only in connection with “locations with the fastest deployment by sea to potential areas of conflict.” Hence, regarding the latter, Diego Garcia is seen as the best launching pad for operations in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, etc., and Bulgaria and Romania for operations in the Mediterranean–Black Sea area. Emphasis here is on the degree of forward deployment, use of

cooperative security locations, rotation of units back and forth to the continental United States, etc. Missing is an analysis of how the lift capabilities laid out in the sea-basing study could help both the Army and Marines deal with large-scale traditional scenarios, or of the limits upon deployment of the troops of the two services imposed by sea basing, even with extensive airlift.

CONNECTING THE DOTS

The future of U.S. force-projection capability is, of course, a maddeningly complex subject. There are many unknowns—in contrast to the Cold War period, with its known potential enemies, known and stable system structure and alliances, and a limited set of likely scenarios. Now, the enemy or threat may be large or small, a state or something else, and may or may not have weapons of mass destruction. The identities of allies or “friends” in myriad possible scenarios are contingent, unclear. Hence, the confused set of possibilities for basing, ranging from land basing on the territories of allies to sea basing or to greater reliance on bases at home.

Much has been made of the (perhaps overdrawn or nebulous) distinction, in this context, between threat-based and capabilities-based planning. Threats, of course, are only partly predictable, but capabilities and resources have their limits, so planning for capabilities to deal with all possible threats would be unrealistic even if all could be known. Also, at least in peacetime, capabilities can be acquired only over long stretches of time; for instance, the Navy would not have the amphibious and prepositioning ships envisioned by the Congressional Budget Office, largely on the basis of current projections of threats, until 2030–35. But over the next thirty years, just about anything could happen to alter threat perceptions: terrorist WMD attacks on the homeland could occur; China could overtake the United States as the world’s premier power; Japan could join China in an all-Asia alliance. The European Union could become a hegemonic rival to the United States. Russia might try to reconstitute the Soviet Union, or orient itself to the EU, China, or parts of the Islamic world. Israel or Pakistan could in desperation use nuclear weapons, perhaps suffering nuclear responses from, respectively, Iran or India. Ever-rising oil prices, propelled by massively rising demand in China and India, could cause another worldwide depression, and with it *military* competition over oil resources in the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, North Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, there is the looming danger, now taken seriously by the Defense Department, of catastrophic climate change.³⁹ Then again, a far more benign set of events (which extrapolation from the present would suggest are more likely) might occur.

A special case is the emerging and important issue of external basing in relation to ballistic missile defense, which involves both defense of the United States

itself from nuclear attack, and theater defense of U.S. forces abroad and allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.

Regarding defense of Conus from missile attack (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea are concerns), the main basing issues today have to do with the upgrading of the BMEWS radars in the United Kingdom at Fylingdale Moor and at Thule, Greenland, under Danish sovereignty. For many years enhanced access to those sites was threatened by political forces in Europe unhappy in general with U.S. ballistic missile defense schemes. But the external basing of missile defense should be seen also in the context of the defense of allies. In that connection, I have developed elsewhere the concept of “triangular” or “indirect” deterrence, whereby nations targeted by a U.S. strategic or preemptive campaign that are unable to respond against the American homeland or installations overseas may instead threaten U.S. allies.⁴⁰ The value of the deterrent depends somewhat on U.S. concern for the well-being of allies.

The 1991 Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia (Iraq having no capacity to attack the continental United States) constituted an early example. North Korean missile tests over Japan imply such a threat to strike Japan in response to American preemption against Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities. Iran and perhaps Pakistan could do likewise; both will be acquiring missiles that can reach throughout their respective regions—to Israel, to the Central Asian states, etc. As nations acquire still longer range missiles, the threatened area will expand—in the case of Iran, all over Europe. Hence the United States must think in terms of comprehensive regional ballistic-missile-defense capabilities. But some potentially threatened nations, such as Japan, may be wary of acquiring such defenses as “provocative” (this is a widely held view among the Japanese left) and may indeed decouple from the United States and withdraw access for U.S. forces.⁴¹ States intimidated by Iran or Pakistan could also decline offers of missile defense.

Europe may be less likely to block installation of theater defense systems under intimidation or for fear of provocation, but some similarities may exist. An “old” European nation might now conceive of its “grand strategy” as one of building a “counterweight” to the United States, taking advantage of U.S. support for Israel to ingratiate itself with the Islamic world so as to attain preferential access to oil and the greater use of euros to pay for it. That could lead such a nation to decouple itself from American defense policy, including theater missile defenses intended to protect it from “triangular” retaliation.

Poland, in contrast, appears to be negotiating the possibility of basing U.S. theater antimissile systems within its borders, missiles that could cover much of Europe. Britain seems willing to allow the United States to upgrade the Fylingdale Moor site and maybe install missiles. Of course, U.S. warships

capable of antimissile defense could be stationed in the Mediterranean or Baltic seas, or off Europe's Atlantic coast.

American antiballistic missiles could conceivably be used to "shut down" nuclear exchanges in progress in the Greater Middle East. That could be done by shipboard missiles, but the possibility of doing so with land-based missiles somewhere in the region (Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus) cannot be ruled out.

Out of all these complex and contingent sets of scenarios and possible policies in connection with the future of the U.S. global defense posture, a number of general points deserve emphasis. The first is that the diverse, uncertain, and global nature of the emerging threat environment requires an elaborate global basing and posture strategy. Threats include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, traditional warfare possibilities in Iran, Taiwan, and Korea, perhaps hegemonic rivalry with China and, maybe, the European Union. But looming quietly behind them may be a struggle for oil, gas, and nonfuel minerals, perhaps to be linked to terrorism, WMD, and great-power hegemonic rivalry.

A second point, related to the above, is the uncertainty surrounding the future of the international system, specifically whether the current U.S. unipolar dominance and alliance structure will hold up. In terms of basing, the issue is a continuing permissive environment for American basing access versus a far more restrictive one marked by withering alliances, a systemic shift toward multipolarity, "ganging up" on the United States, etc. Historically, multipolarity has meant less stable alliances and hence less durable, more contingent, and ad hoc basing access.

A third concerns the present and prospective state of the three historical routes to basing access: conquest/colonization, alliances and provision of security umbrellas (extended deterrence), and the quid pro quo of security/economic assistance. The first-named is mostly now ruled out by prevailing international legal norms. Alliances and security provision may be in jeopardy as sources of access, because of changing international system structure and intimidation related to WMD proliferation. Security and economic assistance, however, may be at present an underutilized instrument of acquisition and maintenance of bases, and a less expensive one than sea basing.

Fourth, and while sea basing and Conus basing are serious alternatives to land basing by virtue of technological changes in ships, aircraft, etc., there are serious questions of cost and of feasibility in relation to important categories of scenarios.

Finally, and while I am not privy to the gaming of future possible conflicts within the Department of Defense, attention clearly needs to be paid to a

complex plethora of scenarios, along the lines of type (traditional, disruptive, catastrophic, irregular) and cross-referenced both to expected availability of bases and to various possible levels of basing at sea.

NOTES

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9. A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower upon History 1600–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); and Colin Gray, *The Leverage of Seapower* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
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15. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978); and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971).
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TAIWAN

Melos or Pylos?

James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara

The past four years have witnessed an unexpected warming of relations between the United States and China. The rancor generated by the EP-3 spy-plane controversy and the debate over American arms sales to Taiwan dissipated in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Beijing supported the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. It has co-

operated with the United States in the war on terror, sharing intelligence and coordinating law-enforcement efforts.¹ Perhaps most strikingly, Chinese officials have worked quietly but assiduously to break the nuclear impasse on the Korean Peninsula.

Understandably, many observers in the West have hailed the seeming shift in Chinese foreign policy in a more pro-American direction, interpreting it as evidence that Sino-American relations will remain on the upswing. Other moves by Beijing, however, cast doubt on this optimistic view. Wary of Taiwan's seeming drift toward independence, China has stationed some five hundred ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait from the island and is deploying additional missiles each year.² These missiles have no plausible purpose other than to coerce Taipei into opening talks on reunification with the mainland—or, failing that, to batter the island into submission.

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Chinese leaders have talked, loudly and often, about doing just that if the Taiwanese persevere in President Chen Shui-bian's plans to enact a new constitution by 2008.³ Beijing interprets Chen's advocacy of a new constitution as a precursor to de jure independence from the mainland. In the meantime China has pursued an aggressive program of military modernization, purchasing or building the armaments it would need to make good its threats against the island.⁴ Of particular note are purchases of aircraft, warships, and missiles overtly intended to give the People's Liberation Army (PLA) the ability to fend off U.S. reinforcements if indeed Beijing chooses war.⁵

On the other side of the Strait, the deeply divided Taiwanese electorate and legislature have been unable to agree to arm themselves.⁶ Plans to purchase diesel submarines from the United States, for example, have effectively been shelved;⁷ that decision leaves the Taiwanese navy with only four boats—two of World War II vintage—to fight off China's large, increasingly potent undersea force.⁸ The outlook for Taiwan's surface fleet is equally bleak. Four retired American guided-missile destroyers are scheduled for delivery starting this year, but Washington, fearful of antagonizing Beijing, has yet to approve the sale of Aegis destroyers that Taiwan really needs if it is to shoot down the barrage of ballistic missiles likely to be lofted its way in wartime.⁹ Even if the Bush administration relents on an Aegis sale, it remains doubtful that Taiwanese lawmakers will be able to set aside their factional bickering long enough to approve the billions needed for such a purchase.

In short, the cross-Strait military balance is tipping rapidly in favor of the mainland at a time when pressure is mounting on Beijing to act. The likelihood of a war in the Strait in the near term has risen sharply. If the military imbalance continues to grow and Taipei persists with Chen's plans for a new constitution, thus edging toward one of Beijing's red lines for military action, Taiwan could suffer the fate that befell another island nation that dared, two and a half millennia ago, to defy a powerful neighbor that coveted its territory. Taiwan needs to consider that fate and how it can be avoided. China too could learn from island wars of antiquity. Beijing ought to take a clear-eyed look at the hazards of protracted maritime war before it reaches for the gun. Finally, the United States could find in this historical case grist for some of the hard thinking it has to do about the cross-Strait impasse.

MELOS AND TAIWAN

The classics can help Taiwanese, Chinese, and American leaders sort out the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 416 BC the leadership of the Greek city-state of Melos opted to fight the mighty Athenian empire rather than accept vassal status. Athens had been at war against Sparta, to the south in the Peloponnesus,

more or less continuously since 431 BC (see map). Athens had been unable to make much headway on land against the vaunted Spartan infantry, while Sparta was no match for Athens at sea. Frustrations were mounting on both sides. A fragile peace was in place, but it was in the process of unraveling.¹⁰

Athens chose this moment to target Melos. Why? Thucydides, the premier historian of the Peloponnesian War and an eyewitness to many of the war's events, sheds light on Athenian motives in his account of the Melian Dialogue,



the famous exchange between top Melian leaders and an Athenian delegation dispatched to wring surrender from them in advance. After pleading unsuccessfully with the Athenian ambassadors to allow the island to maintain its neutrality, the Melian Council opted for defiance. Melos fell after a brief siege. The Athenian assembly voted to kill its adult male population and enslave the women and children.

Several themes emerge from the Melian Dialogue that bear on China-Taiwan relations. First of all, questions of justice do not arise in international politics absent a rough parity of arms between the contending sides. This elemental reality was not lost on the Melian spokesmen, who seem to have resigned themselves to defeat from the beginning. “We see that you have come prepared to judge the argument yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we prove that we are in the right, and so refuse to surrender, or else slavery.”¹¹

The Athenians agreed, noting that in practical terms “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” For them this was divine law. “Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can.” This was a permanent precept of international relations, concluded the Athenians: “Anybody else with the same power as ours”—including the Melians—“would be acting in precisely the same way.”

The geopolitical realities and the power disparity involved in today's cross-Strait relations are as stark as they were in classical Greece. Even a quick glance at the map (page 48) shows that China, by its size and proximity to Taiwan, casts a long and ominous shadow over the island. China's military and economic resurgence and its pretensions to great-power status have already sown doubt that Taipei could hold Beijing at bay for long. Not surprisingly, some analysts and policy makers in the West have already resigned themselves to the apparently inevitable outcome for Taiwan.¹² In essence they have succumbed to Thucydides' maxim concerning the repercussions of fundamental power imbalances between nations.

This is more than mere perception—the military balance *is* shifting in China's favor. As we have seen, Beijing is pursuing a determined, methodical military modernization program, while the Taiwanese legislature remains deadlocked over the future of the nation's defense. The qualitative advantage long enjoyed by the Taiwanese armed forces began to slip away in the mid-1990s, and it continues to do so.

As the preponderance of power shifts toward the mainland, the arguments proffered by those with a sanguine view of the cross-Strait stalemate lose credence.¹³ China will gain a decisive military edge in the Strait, and sooner rather than later. Indeed, by some accounts a reckoning with Chen's regime could take place this decade. If dominant power does in fact negate considerations of justice in asymmetric relationships, as the Athenian ambassadors maintained, China may soon be able to act against Taiwan with impunity.

Second, a powerful nation can use its armed might for a variety of purposes derived from the Thucydidean motives of fear, honor, and interest. An empire might, for instance, use its military power to acquire strategically placed territories. "By conquering you," proclaimed the Athenian ambassadors, "we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire." For Athens there were obvious geostrategic advantages to wresting Melos from its inhabitants. The island was ideally positioned off the southeast coast of the Peloponnesus. Operating from bases on the island, the formidable Athenian navy could conduct operations along the Spartan periphery, amplifying the already dominant seapower of Athens.

The Athenians also wanted to make an example of Melos, which had stubbornly maintained its independence in past years and had taken up arms to resist the imperial will. Many Athenian allies, weary of the high cost of war and the increasingly tyrannical behavior of Athens, had grown restive. The Athenians could not allow the Melians to defy them, lest they embolden others to seek liberty from imperial rule. "We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders too than the others," observed the Athenian emissaries to the Melians; "it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape."

The strategic calculations evident in the Athenians' deliberations about Melos, particularly with respect to the island's favorable geographic position and its potential to encourage would-be rebels, can be detected in Chinese thinking about Taiwan. Another look at the map makes it abundantly clear that geographic destiny binds Taiwan to China. The island's position off the Chinese coast imposes a natural constraint on naval power-projection from the mainland. In a very real sense, then, Beijing's aspirations to regional and world power hinge on gaining control of Taiwan.¹⁴

The Chinese landmass radiates outward into the Pacific in a broad arc reaching from the Shandong Peninsula in the north to Hainan Island in the south. Yet the island chain that stretches from the Japanese home islands to the Philippine archipelago envelops this continental crest. Taiwan holds a central position in the island chain, sitting directly and conspicuously opposite the center point of the mainland's coastline.

For Beijing, in short, Taiwan represents either a gateway to the western Pacific, a vast expanse long dominated by the U.S. Navy, or a sentinel blocking China's strategic access to the high seas.¹⁵ Chinese analysts are quick to quote Secretary

Fear, honor, interest—Thucydides could scarcely have phrased it better.

of State Dean Acheson, who in 1950 sketched a "defense perimeter of the Pacific" running along the island chain;¹⁶ they

also recall General Douglas MacArthur, who famously depicted Taiwan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier," able to radiate power along China's coasts.¹⁷

Not surprisingly, Chinese strategists have repeatedly urged Beijing to neutralize the hostile forces occupying the island, thereby ensuring that China's navy can operate freely along the nation's maritime periphery and project power beyond the island-chain perimeter.¹⁸ They hope to extend China's own defense perimeter seaward, in effect inverting Acheson's strategy.

There is also an inescapable imperial dimension to China's strategic calculus, just as there was for the Athens of antiquity. The Chinese leadership understands that failure to subdue Taiwan could embolden independence movements within its own far-flung and ethnically disparate western provinces, namely Tibet and Xinjiang.¹⁹ Just as Athens's increasingly tenuous hold over its empire hardened its position over Melos, Beijing can ill afford to "lose" Taiwan, for fear of unleashing even greater centrifugal forces in China's hinterlands. Unification with Taiwan promises to foreclose the possibility that separatists will draw inspiration from Taiwanese insolence.

Beyond its imperial possessions, Beijing worries about China's domestic constituents, who are riven by deeply ingrained regionalism and suffer from socio-economic dislocations, the latter an unintended by-product of two-plus decades

of government-instituted economic reform.²⁰ As the appeal of communist ideology dwindles, Communist Party leaders have increasingly invoked economic prosperity and nationalism to shore up their legitimacy and hold together a deeply fractured polity.²¹

Should Taiwan declare and successfully maintain its independence, failure by Beijing to fulfill its decades-long promise to recover the motherland's last piece of lost territory would surely discredit Chinese rulers and might foment domestic instability. Just as the Athenians worried about the integrity of their empire, so too are national unity and survival of the regime at stake for China.

Third, the side endowed with preponderant armed strength has the luxury of pursuing a harsh diplomacy with the objective of winning without resort to arms (the "acme of skill" in Chinese statecraft).²² It can attempt to browbeat a weaker opponent into submission by holding out the prospect of defeat and destruction.

This, as much as any coarsening of Athenian virtue during the course of protracted war, helps account for the ruthless, frankly immoral tone of the Athenian pronouncements to the Melians.²³ The Athenian ambassadors waved away the Melian petition for justice: "We on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us—a great mass of words that nobody would believe."²⁴ Not persuasion but brute power was deployed at Melos.



China's rhetoric over Taiwan has been equally stark.²⁵ President Chen's talk of independence has aroused consistent, severe consternation among the Chinese leadership. Even top leaders have not shied from bombast: "We totally have the determination and the ability to crush any attempt to separate Taiwan from China,"

Communist Party chief Hu Jintao told an enthusiastic crowd of Chinese officials who had gathered to mark Deng Xiaoping's hundredth birthday. "We should extensively

unite all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, including all Taiwan compatriots, to jointly oppose and contain Taiwan independence splittist forces."²⁶ Hu's brand of exhortation, which dominates China's cross-Strait diplomacy, closely mirrors Athens's morally dubious attitude toward Melos.

Lieutenant General Liu Yuan of the People's Liberation Army was even more blunt and graphic. Writing in the official *China Youth Daily* in response to rumors that Taipei might attack the Three Gorges Dam during a cross-Strait war, Liu vowed that China would "be seriously on guard against threats from 'Taiwan independence terrorists.'" He insisted that China would not be deterred by such tactics, promising "retaliation that will 'blot out the sky and cover up the earth.'"²⁷ If Liu's words are any guide, the Chinese are prepared to inflict unthinkable (perhaps nuclear) devastation on the island.

Admittedly, bluster is a staple of Chinese diplomacy, but Beijing has put steel behind its pronouncements, placing force and coercion at the forefront of its strategy toward Taipei. Chinese rulers have clearly set out to use fear, the unavoidable consequence of a sharp power imbalance between contending nations, to modulate Taiwanese behavior.

Fourth, hope is not a strategy in international politics. The Melian representatives held that because their cause was just, they could trust to fortune, or to the Spartans to intervene and avert disaster. They maintained that "in war fortune sometimes makes the odds more level than could be expected from the difference of numbers of the two sides." They also pointed to the geographic proximity of Sparta and an ethnic affinity between Spartans and Melians: "We think [the Spartans] would even endanger themselves for our sake and count the risk more worth taking than in the case of others, because we are so close to the Peloponnese that they could operate more easily," and because "we are of the same race and share the same feelings."

Hoping to disabuse the Melians of their illusions, the Athenians delivered a blunt rejoinder. "Hope, that comforter in danger!" they sneered. Unless "one has solid advantages to fall back upon," in the form of hard power, hope is folly. The Melian army could not compete with the Athenian expeditionary force. The

Taiwan could soon find itself in a Melian predicament.

Athenians, moreover, scoffed at Spartan seapower, a central element in any relief effort. No outside power, let alone fortune or the gods, would step in to save Melos.

Taiwan's apparent overconfidence in the ability and willingness of the United States to defend it during a cross-Strait conflict suggests that Taipei harbors similar hope. Some observers have warned that Taipei's behavior in the past few years, especially following President George W. Bush's 2001 pledge to do "whatever it [takes] to help Taiwan defend herself," reflects a misguided calculation that Washington's support is and will remain unconditional.²⁸ President Chen's provocative referendum bid prior to the most recent presidential elections seemed to confirm his faith in the United States.²⁹ In other words, Chen, encouraged by Bush's words, may have concluded that he holds a blank check from Washington to push his agenda, regardless of how Beijing reacts.

Far from being chastened by President Bush's rebuke over the referendum issue or Chen's setback in the December 2004 legislative elections, independence-minded leaders in Taiwan have continued to goad China.³⁰ The logjam in the Legislative Yuan over the U.S. arms package provides further evidence of a belief among Taiwanese leaders that Washington's defense commitments are absolute. In a stunning display of naiveté, one opposition member reportedly argued that since Taiwan could not possibly defend itself, even with new weaponry, the island should simply hope for American intervention.³¹ Another, responding to American pleas to approve the arms package, likened the United States to a "mafia leader" demanding "protection money."³²

Such statements bespeak a fundamental unseriousness of purpose. The Taiwanese leadership may truly believe that America's resolve to help the island is unshakable. Alternatively, Taipei's inaction could simply be a symptom of the island's venomous partisan politics. Either way, Taiwan could soon find itself in a Melian predicament.

Taipei should not blindly count on the United States to defend it. Even if the political case for U.S. intervention were beyond dispute—say, if China launched an unprovoked attack on the island—Washington's ability to deter and to fight a cross-Strait contingency stands on increasingly shaky ground. Over the next decade, the growing capacity of Chinese naval, air, and missile forces will pose an ever more daunting challenge to American defense planners.³³ Indeed, fears that Beijing will soon be able to deny the U.S. Navy access to the Taiwan Strait in wartime are already palpable in certain Pentagon documents.³⁴

China's ability to pursue a strategy of sea denial, then, is growing and will have direct consequences, for both the U.S. military and Taiwan's security.³⁵ Assuming that the PLA proceeds along its modernization path, it will soon field a force capable of keeping U.S. reinforcements at a distance while Beijing prosecutes a showdown with Taiwan in which the balance of forces overwhelmingly

favors China. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense has estimated that the Chinese military will gain the upper hand by 2006.³⁶ Lee Jye, the minister of national defense, recently told lawmakers that the mainland would pose a "reliable threat" by 2015.³⁷

If these predictions come to pass, China will have gained the ability to inflict a Melian fate on Chen's regime, securing a swift victory that would forestall American intervention. Beijing could then thereby present the world with the fait accompli of a reunified China. These emerging strategic realities should impel Taipei and Washington to rethink their long-standing assumptions surrounding the cross-Strait military balance and its political implications. Taipei must guard against the temptation to free-ride on U.S. defense commitments. As the Chinese military improves its war-fighting capabilities and doctrine, Washington cannot continue to take the PLA as lightly as it has for decades. It behooves the Pentagon to begin thinking ahead about its military strategy for a cross-Strait war.

At the same time, the United States should remain vigilant about Taiwanese actions that could trigger a Chinese military response. In their discussions with Taiwanese leaders, U.S. leaders should attempt to inject a measure of realism into Taipei's strategic thinking. Taiwan is of course free to pursue its destiny as a de facto independent country. If it opts for de jure independence, however, it must generate the military means necessary to uphold its political aspirations. Washington must caution the island's leadership against the kind of brinkmanship that could end up costing American lives.

Taiwan cannot pin its desire for more international space and independence on American political sympathies alone. No amount of shared democratic values between the two nations will compel the United States to sacrifice its vital national interests. Over the course of its history, argues one perceptive Chinese analyst, "America shows itself to be a country that acts most on its strongest interests. It has never shown a willingness to help a 'drowning dog'" such as Taiwan. Concludes this analyst, "'American honor' seems unlikely to provide a sufficient motivation for American intervention" in the Strait.³⁸

Fear, honor, interest—Thucydides could scarcely have phrased it better.

TAIWAN AS PYLOS

Thucydides' account of the impending demise of Melos underscores the politico-military difficulties that Taiwan will face in the coming years, particularly in light of Taipei's apparent indecision over its defense. Even if Taiwan finds itself in a Melian predicament, however, China will still face daunting operational barriers that will keep very steep the military costs of imposing such a fate on the island. Notwithstanding the Melian precedent, China should be wary of a clash of arms in the Strait, at least in the short term.

If Thucydides' account of the Melian Dialogue provides a cautionary tale for Taipei, his account of another battle, at Pylos, offers the same for Beijing. The battle took place in 425 BC, a few years before the encounter at Melos. The outcome demonstrates the practical difficulties involved with island warfare, even for a combatant that, like Sparta, enjoys military superiority on land, can achieve temporary superiority at sea, and is fighting close to home against an enemy encumbered by long, hazardous lines of communication. If the Melian Dialogue shows that Taiwan needs to beware of the emerging military imbalance in the Strait, the Pylos case warns China that it should not blithely assume that its growing military power would assure it an easy victory over Taiwan.

China, which occupies an operational position similar to that of Sparta, would do well to heed Thucydides' observations on the Athenian-Spartan encounter at Pylos. The Athenian experience shows how difficult it is to take an island by force, even with the advantage of dominant seapower; Sparta's experience shows that a land power can achieve initial success in island warfare yet see its expeditionary force cut off and defeated by an adversary with a superior navy.

What transpired at Pylos? In the spring of 425 BC, "before the corn was ripe," an Athenian fleet under Demosthenes was cruising off the west coast of the Peloponnesus, ostensibly to succor embattled democrats in Corcyra (modern Corfu, off the northwestern coast of Greece near the modern Albanian border) before sailing on to Sicily.³⁹ But the Athenian commander in fact "had other

ideas."⁴⁰ He intended to break with Pericles' strategy of peripheral amphibious raids, landing at Pylos, some fifty miles from Sparta, and building a permanent fort there. Demosthenes' fellow

commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, wanted to push on to Corcyra, there to confront a Spartan flotilla.⁴¹ Luck favored Demosthenes—a squall carried the Athenian fleet into Pylos, where he "at once urged them to fortify the place," pointing out that it "was distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbor close by."⁴²

The advantages of fortifying Pylos were many. From a permanent base in the Peloponnesus, Athenian triremes could range across the peninsula's maritime frontiers. From there the Athenians could foment rebellion among the large population of Spartan helots (slaves), threatening the survival of the Spartan regime. Local allies could "do [the Spartans] the greatest harm from it."⁴³ Pylos would be a magnet for escaped helots.⁴⁴ In short, it would be a permanent irritant to the Spartans, much as the Spartans' periodic invasions of Attica vexed the Athenians. Sparta would find itself, in effect, in the position of modern China

The geopolitical realities and the power disparity involved in today's cross-Strait relations are as stark as they were in classical Greece.

with respect to Taiwan: China's Cold War confrontations with the United States over Taiwan stemmed in part from fears that the island might be exploited as a geopolitical springboard from which hostile external forces would seek to interfere in the mainland's internal affairs. This sentiment persists. Indeed, Chinese leaders have long asserted that overt Taiwanese collusion with "foreign forces" (a thinly veiled reference to the United States) would constitute a *casus belli* comparable to an outright declaration of independence.

As for the Spartans, although they "at first made light of the news" that Demosthenes' troops were building a fort, they quickly grasped the geopolitical significance of a nearby Athenian outpost.⁴⁵ The Spartans recalled an invasion force then in Attica after only fifteen days and diverted it toward Pylos by land and by sea, "hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison" by joint action.⁴⁶ The Spartan commander planned to block the two channels into the harbor, using "a line of ships placed close together with their prows turned toward the sea" to turn away the expected Athenian reinforcements.⁴⁷ To buttress the Spartan defenses further, a force of some 420 hoplite warriors (heavy infantry in armor) landed on Sphacteria, a long, narrow island that sat athwart the harbor mouth.

By this means both the island and the continent would be hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on either; and since the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet toward the open sea had no harbor, there would be no point that the Athenians could use as a base from which to relieve their countrymen. Thus the Spartans would in all probability become masters of the place without a sea fight or risk, as there had been little preparation for the occupation and there was no food [in the Athenian fort].⁴⁸

Meanwhile, Demosthenes, realizing that a joint Spartan assault was imminent, "was himself not idle."⁴⁹ He took charge of the Athenian defenses, paying particular attention to the beaches, the weakest point in the defensive perimeter. The Spartan troops were ultimately unable to establish a beachhead, "owing to the difficulty of the ground," which kept them from landing except in small detachments, as well as to "the unflinching tenacity of the Athenians." "It was a strange reversal of the order of things," observes Thucydides, "for Athenians to be fighting from land . . . against Spartans coming from the sea," since Spartans "were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and superior by land" while Athenians were "a maritime people with a navy that had no equal."⁵⁰ China, a traditional continental power with minimal amphibious forces, would do well to bear this Spartan example in mind.⁵¹

The Spartans desisted from their attacks after two days of fighting and prepared to invest Pylos. Before they could do so, however, Athenian reinforcements arrived on the scene, in the form of fifty warships. The Athenians

immediately assailed the Spartan vessels, some of them lined up for battle, some still beached and being manned. The Athenian triremes put the Spartan ships to flight “at once,” disabled “a good many vessels” and captured five, rammed some of the ships that had fled to shore, and began towing away beached vessels abandoned by their crews. “Maddened by a disaster” that cut them off on Sphacteria, proud Spartan infantrymen were reduced to wading into the surf in a vain effort to drag their vessels back ashore.⁵² “The stunning effect and importance” of the Athenian action, notes a recent historian of the campaign, “cannot be exaggerated.” Spartan commanders immediately requested an armistice, agreeing among other things to turn over their fleet to the Athenians and to allow the Athenian fleet to continue with the blockade it had imposed on the island while Spartan envoys set sail for Athens to parley.⁵³ As for contemporary China, the reigning consensus among Western analysts holds that it would likely meet Sparta’s fate should it attempt a conventional military assault on the island. Whether Beijing would accept a diplomatic settlement following a disastrous military defeat in the Taiwan Strait is less certain.

The Spartan delegates, upon arriving in Attica, appealed to the Athenian assembly to conclude a magnanimous peace. They exhorted the Athenians to “employ your present success to advantage, to keep what you have got and gain honor and reputation besides,” while suggesting that Athens would pay dearly if it opted to “grasp continually at something further.” The Spartans were uncowed, however, claiming that their defeat had been the result of miscalculation rather than “any decay in our power.” For “what power in Hellas stood higher than we did?”⁵⁴ Accepting peace now, they claimed, would spare the Athenians the permanent enmity of Sparta while helping them gain the acceptance of the Greek world, which would be grateful for concord between the two great powers. Nonetheless, Cleon, a popular—and belligerent—Athenian leader, prevailed upon the assembly to demand more: the Spartans must agree to allow their infantrymen to be brought from Sphacteria to Athens, and they must surrender certain territories.

Thucydides offers here some telling commentary about the perils of island warfare. Even Athens, the preeminent sea power of Greek antiquity, encountered difficulties at Pylos. The Athenians besieging Sphacteria found the Spartan resistance frustratingly resilient until their own reinforcements arrived, giving them an unchallengeable numerical edge. Athenian logistics were strained, making it difficult to maintain the blockade. The Spartans, for their part, displayed considerable ingenuity, promising to reward with their freedom helots willing to carry provisions to Sphacteria and thus risk capture by the besieging force. The Athenians’ “greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with

only brackish water to drink.” The Athenian garrison received few seaborne provisions, even in good weather; the surrounding countryside “offered no resources in itself”; and the onset of winter would have ultimately compelled Athens to lift the siege, allowing Spartan troops to sail away in the craft that delivered their stores.⁵⁵

In any event, Cleon’s harsh demands carried in the Athenian assembly, but the Spartans rejected them. Cleon “violently assailed” the emissaries, then exhorted the assembly to send a new expeditionary force to Pylos to overpower the Spartan resistance. The assembly took him up on the idea; having boasted that he could achieve victory in a matter of weeks and reacting to needling from his critics, Cleon consented to lead the force. Detachments of the new force landed on opposite sides of the island; the Athenians all together now outnumbered the Spartans on Sphacteria on the order of twenty-five to one. Given these lopsided numbers, the outcome was certain, notwithstanding the Spartan hoplites’ individual superiority over the assailants.⁵⁶ Peace ultimately followed—vindicating Cleon’s more bellicose approach to the war in the minds of some scholars: “The events at Pylos completely changed the outlook of the war.”

With valuable Spartan hostages, Athens needed no longer fear a Spartan invasion. It had little to fear at sea, since it had kept the fleet surrendered by Sparta under the terms of the armistice (reneging on its commitments under that armistice). It was free to exact new tribute from its allies, replenishing a treasury depleted by prolonged war. Athens had also gained the upper hand on a broader level. Until Pylos, the Peloponnesians had inflicted damage upon their enemies while suffering little damage to their own interests. “Now the Athenians could inflict continuing harm on their enemies, on land and by sea, fearing no retaliation.”⁵⁷

To apply the case to the present day, a similarly propitious outcome for the United States after a conflict over Taiwan would surely prove to be a strategic nightmare for China. What other lessons does the Pylos episode hold? First, as Athens learned during the early stages of its offensive against Sphacteria, islands can be at once invaluable from a geopolitical standpoint and difficult to invade—especially when they are in the hands of stubborn defenders. Even countries with powerful naval forces should leaven their calculations with a healthy respect for this reality. The political and military costs of naval and amphibious warfare can be prohibitive. Despite the geopolitical value that China attaches to Taiwan, the island may not be the pushover Beijing seemingly expects.

Second, and closely related, time may not be on China’s side during a Taiwan Strait contingency. Whether a barrage of ballistic missiles would cow Taipei into suing for peace, as Beijing seems to assume, is an open question. Nor does China have the means to land a large expeditionary force on the island. While the PLA

Navy may be able to fend off the U.S. reinforcements for weeks, that might not be enough. Should the U.S. Navy force the Strait, any Chinese forces on Taiwan could find themselves blockaded by the Seventh Fleet, much as the Spartans on Sphacteria found themselves encircled by Athenian triremes. Humiliating defeat could follow.

Third, military failure can endanger the survival of a regime as easily as can allowing the defiance of a wayward province to go unpunished. Sparta had to fear the possibility of a helot-led revolution after the debacle at Pylos. So too might China's social, economic, and political fissures widen if Beijing tried—and failed—to reunify the motherland by force of arms.

Fourth, the repercussions of failure for China's international standing could be dire, as they were for Sparta. "After the victory at Pylos," observes the prominent historian Donald Kagan, "no island could think of defying the Athenians."⁵⁸ Likewise, an American victory in a Taiwan contingency could bind not only Taiwan but Asia's other island nations to the United States, setting back China's quest to resume its "central position" in Asian politics.⁵⁹ Like Taiwan, China should take note of Thucydides' enduring wisdom.

A MELIAN FATE?

If taken to heart, lessons of the Peloponnesian War could help clarify thinking—and dispel dangerous illusions—in Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. Does Taiwan's predicament resemble that of Melos? Will China heed the lessons of Pylos and take a cautious stance in the Strait, or will it plunge ahead and risk suffering Sparta's fate? Will the United States clarify its cross-Strait diplomacy and ready its military strategy and forces in case diplomacy fails?

While historical comparisons of this kind are always inexact, four factors will determine which model applies. First is the matter of the military balance. As has been seen, China is poised to seize its advantage over Taiwan. Beijing is developing military means commensurate with its expansive political ends and will, by many measures, soon hold a commanding position in the Strait. Yet a Chinese victory is far from foreordained. The Chinese navy's feeble amphibious fleet, for instance, appears unequal to the missions likely to be assigned it. If China chooses to act against Taiwan without substantially strengthening its military capabilities in such areas, Beijing could well meet the fate of the Spartans on Pylos. In fact, Chinese weakness at present suggests that Beijing will continue to demonstrate a measure of restraint for the rest of this decade, biding its time while marshaling the capacity to subdue Taiwan. If Beijing remedies such weaknesses, gaining true military dominance not only over Taiwan but over any American force likely to be sent against it, it could skew cross-Strait relations in a Melian direction.

Second, the decisions taken by China's political leadership are another obvious factor shaping events in the Strait. In keeping with the Melian precedent, Beijing may well opt to pursue an even more assertive, no-nonsense diplomacy as its strategic posture improves. Beijing's calculations, however, could and should be different from those of the Athenians. Athens could justly scoff at Spartan seapower, which at the time was no match for their own. It was foolish, consequently, for the Melians to wager their survival on Peloponnesian reinforcements. China cannot so lightly discount U.S. military power. Nor will Chinese leaders be eager to earn the enmity of the world superpower at a time when they covet international commerce and the economic development that comes with it. These considerations warrant caution on Beijing's part.

Third, Taipei's actions will have an impact. The contrast between Chinese resolution and Taiwanese irresolution could scarcely be sharper where military affairs are concerned. Whether by conscious decision or through Taiwanese lawmakers' inability to set aside partisanship, Taiwan's means are increasingly out of sync

with its own political ends. That will be doubly true if Chen Shui-bian expands those ends by pressing ahead with his plans for a new constitution and ultimate independence. Taipei needs to put its

The cross-Strait military balance is tipping rapidly in favor of the mainland at a time when pressure is mounting on Beijing to act.

military affairs in order and think twice about provoking Beijing—else it could meet a Melian fate. Taipei must also come to terms with the operational constraints intrinsic to a contingency in the Strait for the U.S. military, the exigencies of worldwide American security commitments, and the reluctance of the United States to make an enemy of China, East Asia's foremost power. These factors could impel Washington to hesitate in a crisis, allowing Beijing to achieve a Melian outcome. Taipei's confidence in American intervention, then, could be misplaced.

Finally, the United States faces daunting challenges in managing the volatility of cross-Strait dynamics. Washington's ability to prevent either side from edging toward conflict could come under increasing strain. In particular, U.S. deterrence and reassurance in the Strait could continue to erode, especially in light of other pressing global security commitments. The shifting military balance in Beijing's favor and China's growing geopolitical preponderance have increased the likelihood that Taipei will be forced to make the unsavory choices that Melos had to face. From an operational perspective, China is steadily rectifying its military shortfalls, easing the operational problems that both Athens and Sparta confronted at Pylos. Diplomatically, Washington's limited influence over the course of events in Taiwanese politics could further exacerbate the deteriorating

strategic equation if the island's leadership continues to permit its military means to languish. What the United States can do to arrest these trends remains uncertain. In short, Washington may find it increasingly difficult to dissuade China from attempting a Melian solution to the cross-Strait impasse.

Leaders in all three nations should take Thucydides' lessons to heart as they frame their diplomatic and military strategies. On balance, the four factors examined above suggest that the belligerent logic behind the Melian analogy will eventually outweigh the operational constraints intrinsic to the lessons of Pylos—making war thinkable for Beijing. The Melian outcome was determined by basic structural features of international politics: power and fear. In contrast, the operational constraints demonstrated at Pylos may prove to be transitory for China, soluble as its military modernization continues. One thing is clear: Taipei cannot afford to put off work on its own defense needs. China is watching. Taiwan must put its own house in order—or run the risk of becoming a latter-day Melos.

NOTES

1. See David Shambaugh, "The New Stability in U.S.-China Relations: Causes and Consequences," in *Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century*, ed. Jonathan D. Pollack (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), pp. 23–33.
2. "'New Constitution' Means Timetable for Taiwan Independence: Official," Xinhua, 14 April 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/News/2004/Xinhua-140404.htm. For missile deployments see, for instance, "Taiwan Military Warns of China Missile Threat," Reuters, 30 September 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-300904.htm; Chris Cockel, "Powell Cautions Mainland China on Missile Build-Up across Taiwan Strait," *China Post*, 7 November 2003, available at taiwansecurity.org/CP/2003/CP-071103.htm.
3. See, for instance, "Chen Says Defend 'New Constitution,'" *China Post*, 17 June 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/CP/2004/CP-170604.htm.
4. "China Warns Army Can and Will 'Smash' Taiwan Independence," Agence France Presse, 1 August 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2004/AFP-010804.htm.
5. See James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "The Influence of Mahan upon China's Maritime Strategy," *Comparative Strategy* 24 (March 2005).
6. Edward Cody, "Politics Puts Hold on Taiwan Arms Purchase," *Washington Post*, 10 October 2004, p. A28. The results of Taiwan's 2004 legislative elections, which denied President Chen the electoral mandate he needed to pursue a constitution and perhaps independence, promise to prolong the impasse on U.S. arms sales.
7. See, for instance, Alinec Hung, "Protest in Taiwan against U.S. Arms Sales," Reuters, 26 September 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-260904.htm; "Defense Chief Lee Threatens to Resign over Weapons Deal," *China Post*, 20 September 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/CP/2004/CP-250904.htm.
8. See, for instance, "Republic of China Navy," Federation of American Scientists, available at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/rocn/index.html.
9. "U.S. Denies Sale of AEGIS Ships to Proceed Soon," *Taiwan News*, 17 August 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/TN/2004/TN-170804.htm.
10. Yale's Donald Kagan provides a perceptive account of the Athenian expedition to Melos

- in his *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 148–55, and *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Viking, 2003), pp. 247–49. Kagan indulges in a bit of armchair psychoanalysis vis-à-vis Athens, attributing the assault on Melos in part to the Athenians' frustration at their futility against Sparta in land combat.
11. All references to the Melian Dialogue come from Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1954), pp. 400–408.
 12. See, for example, "Taiwan Could Fend Off China Attack for 2 Weeks—Paper," Reuters, 12 August 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-120804.htm.
 13. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense estimates that the balance of forces will tip against the island as soon as 2006. China is pushing ahead with its military construction program, while partisan feuding in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan has stalled a U.S. arms package intended to preserve the balance. Flor Wang, "CNA: Mainland China to Have Military Edge over Taiwan in 2006: MND," 8 October 2004, FBIS CPP20041008000185.
 14. The specter of Taiwan as a U.S. naval base clearly haunts Beijing. "Militarily," contends one Chinese analyst, "Taiwan is a potential [base] which the U.S. could use in the western Pacific. The use of Taiwan could enable effective control of sea lines of communication between northeast Asia and southeast Asia and the Middle East," threatening Beijing's access to vital resources and the access of the PLA Navy to the high seas. "Thus, the U.S. sees Taiwan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier,'" able to serve as a "north-south relay station for the Seventh Fleet" and thereby give the United States a "maximum degree of control over China's East and South Sea Fleets." Lin Zhibo, "New Academic Analysis: Will There Be an All-Out U.S. Intervention in a Taiwan Strait War?" *People's Daily Online*, 20 July 2004, FBIS CPP20040720000040.
 15. The importance of Taiwan, however, is not confined to the purely naval sphere. China's strategic thought about Taiwan also exhibits a strong economic hue. In the summer 2004 issue of *The National Interest*, David Hale documented China's large and growing reliance on commercial shipping for its economic vitality. China's economic development, as well as its capacity for naval power projection, would remain perpetually at risk should the island chain remain in unfriendly hands. David Hale, "China's Growing Appetites," *National Interest* 76 (Summer 2004), pp. 137–47.
 16. Dean Acheson, "Remarks by the Secretary of State [Acheson] before the National Press Club, Washington, January 12, 1950," in *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. 12, *January 1–December 31, 1950*, ed. Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1951), p. 431.
 17. Ross Munro, "Taiwan: What China Really Wants," *National Review*, 11 October 1999, available at www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_19_51/ai_56754228.
 18. The most prominent advocate of this way of thinking about China's maritime destiny was Adm. Liu Huaqing, who commanded the PLA Navy in the 1980s. Liu exhorted Beijing to build up naval forces capable of waging an "active offshore defense," as opposed to coastal defense. China, he maintained, should gain control of the waters within the island chain before pursuing a global, blue-water navy. Taiwan remains a barrier to Liu's aspirations. For a more comprehensive overview of Liu Huaqing's vision, see Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), especially pp. 165–68.
 19. See Zhu Feng and Drew Thompson, "Why Taiwan Really Matters to China," *China Brief* 4, no. 19 (30 September 2004), available at www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=3090&article_id=2368616. According to the authors, "[The] loss of Taiwan could spur dissent in other provinces with separatist tendencies, such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet. Losing Taiwan could upset the regional long-term plans for integration that have been relatively successful to date." For details on separatist activities in Xinjiang, see Igor Rotar, "The Growing Problem of Uighur Separatism," *China Brief* 4, no. 8 (15 April 2004), available at www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=2912&article_id=23548.

20. For the sources and consequences of social dislocation, see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, "Social Change and Political Reform in China: Meeting the Challenges of Success," *China Quarterly* 176 (December 2003), pp. 903–25, and Yongshun Cai, "The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period," *China Quarterly* 170 (June 2002), pp. 327–44.
21. See, for instance, John F. Copper, "The 'Glue' That Holds China Together," *World & I* 17, no. 7 (July 2002), pp. 20–26. For details on the Chinese government's increasing willingness to exploit nationalism to attain foreign-policy goals, particularly in the aftermath of the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing incident, see James Miles, "Chinese Nationalism, U.S. Policy and Asian Security," *Survival* 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000), pp. 51–71.
22. See, for instance, Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), especially p. 77.
23. Moral decay has been a common theme among commentators on Thucydides' *History*. See, for instance, W. Robert Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), especially pp. 147–57, and Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides the Constructivist," *American Political Science Review* 95 (September 2001), pp. 547–60.
24. Victor Davis Hanson provides a sprightly account of the Persian Wars, including the leading role played by Athens, in his *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York: Anchor, 2002), pp. 27–59.
25. Former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui's talk of "special state-to-state relations" between the mainland and the island provoked an outpouring of vitriol from Beijing. Chinese commentators decried what they viewed as a move to renounce the long-standing one-China principle, which has governed cross-Straits relations since the 1970s. A typical example from an official daily was "Commentary: Nature of 'Special State-to-State Relations' Is Splittism," *People's Daily Online*, 7 August 1999, available at english.people.com.cn/english/199908/07/enc_19990807001026_TopNews.html.
26. "China Determined to Crush Taiwan Independence—Hu," Reuters, 22 August 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-220804.htm.
27. "China General Threatens War If Taiwan Targets Dam," Reuters, 16 June 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-160604.htm.
28. Kelly Wallace, "Bush Pledges Whatever It Takes to Defend Taiwan," CNN.com, 25 April 2001, available at archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.ab/c/.
29. Edward Cody and Philip P. Pan, "China Warns Taiwan Referendum Will Endanger Peace: Beijing Says Vote Is Prelude to Independence," *Washington Post*, 11 February 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/WP/2004/WP-110204.htm.
30. "Powell Stresses U.S. Opposition to Taiwan Changing Status Quo," Agence France Presse, 24 February 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2004/AFP-240204.htm.
31. "Yu Defends Advanced Arms Procurement," Central News Agency, 22 September 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/CNA/2004/CNA-220904.htm.
32. "U.S. Official Warns of 'Repercussions' If Taiwan Fails to Approve Weapons Deal," Associated Press, 6 October 2004; "Warning on Arms Purchase Angers Taipei Opposition," Reuters, 7 October 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-071004.htm.
33. See Holmes and Yoshihara, "Influence of Mahan upon China's Maritime Strategy."
34. See, for example, U.S. Defense Dept., *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
35. For a broad assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the PLA Navy, see Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "China Emerges as a Maritime Power," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (October 2004). For an assessment of China's submarine fleet, a pivotal element in the nation's sea-denial strategy, see Goldstein and Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161–96.
36. Wang, "Mainland China to Have Military Edge."

37. Lin Chieh-yu, "China a Threat by 2015, Defense Minister Says," *Taipei Times*, 5 October 2004, available at taiwansecurity.org/TT/2004/TT-051004.htm.
38. "Will the U.S. Really Militarily Intervene in the Taiwan Straits?" *Renmin Haijun*, 21 August 2004, FBIS CPP20040922000227.
39. Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, intro. Victor Davis Hanson (New York: Free Press, 1996), p. 223. The operations at Pylos are described on pp. 265–98 of the Rex Warner translation of Thucydides, cited previously.
40. Donald Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1974), p. 221.
41. Pericles' strategy is profiled among other places in Donald Kagan, "The First Revisionist Historian," *Commentary* 85, no. 5 (May 1988), pp. 43–49. In brief, Pericles warned Athenians to conserve their empire, showing Sparta it could not prevail in an extended war. A negotiated peace would ultimately follow. A peripheral maritime strategy circumvented Sparta's overwhelming dominance in land combat while making use of the overwhelming naval superiority of Athens.
42. Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides*, pp. 223–24.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
44. Kagan, *Archidamian War*, pp. 221–22.
45. Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides*, p. 224.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 227. Kagan disputes Thucydides' description of the Spartan plan to close the south channel, noting that the south entrance was far too wide for such a strategy to work. Kagan, *Archidamian War*, p. 227.
48. Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides*, pp. 227–28.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 228.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 230.
51. "People's Liberation Army Navy," Federation of American Scientists, available at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/plan/index.html.
52. Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides*, pp. 230–31.
53. Kagan, *Archidamian War*, pp. 229–30. Kagan attributes the Spartans' sudden willingness to make peace to a shortage of military manpower. While the number of prisoners was small by modern standards, it accounted for fully a tenth of the Spartan army, the size of which was kept small by the Spartans' strict policy of eugenics, their practice of separating men from women during prime childbearing years, the stringent code of honor they imposed on soldiers, and their requirement that members of the leading caste marry only among themselves.
54. Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides*, pp. 233–34.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–38.
56. Kagan, *Archidamian War*, pp. 238–47.
57. Kagan, for example, is generally sympathetic to Cleon, accusing Thucydides of bias against the brash Athenian. An early peace would have meant accepting assurances from Sparta that could have been disavowed at any time. Kagan, *Archidamian War*, pp. 234–38, 248–50.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
59. On China's aspiration to resume its status as Asia's Middle Kingdom, see Chen Jian, *The China Challenge for the Twenty-first Century* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 4–8.



THE GROWING PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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The sea dominates Southeast Asia, covering roughly 80 percent of its area. The region's islands and peninsulas, wedged between the Pacific and Indian oceans, border major arteries of communication and commerce. Thus the economic and political affairs of Southeast Asia have been dominated by the sea. In the premodern period, ports such as Svirijaya and Malacca established empires based upon sea power in area waters. In succeeding centuries European warships and their heavy guns were the keys to colonization. Today more than half of the world's annual merchant tonnage traverses Southeast Asian waters; its oceans and seas yield vast revenues in such industries as fishing, hydrocarbon extraction, and tourism. In fact, more than 60 percent of Southeast Asians today live in or rely economically on the maritime zones. However, the sea is also the source of a variety of dangers that not only menace the prosperity of local populations but directly threaten the security of states. Those dangers include territorial dis-

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putes, nonstate political violence, transnational crime, and environmental degradation. Maritime security, accordingly, is at the forefront of Southeast Asian political concerns.

Successful response to maritime security threats requires international cooperation, because those threats are primarily transnational. As Singapore's deputy prime minister has eloquently explained, "individual state action is not enough. The oceans are indivisible and maritime security threats do not respect boundaries."¹ Southeast Asian cooperation is currently inadequate in terms of the maritime threat;

however, structural, economic, and normative factors are leading to greater cooperation. In the last four years there have been notable steps forward, and the factors responsible for them should soon produce greater cooperation.

This article discusses the threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia, describes the factors tending toward strengthened maritime security cooperation, and argues that networks of bilateral relationships may be more fruitful than purely multilateral arrangements. The first section, a historical overview of maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia from the end of the Cold War through December 2004, is followed by a survey of contemporary maritime security threats. The article then discusses five significant factors that now favor improved maritime cooperation. It concludes with the various forms that future cooperation might take and speculation as to which are mostly likely in light of evolving state interests and constraints.

It is necessary first to limit the scope of analysis. Warfare is unlikely to break out among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Accordingly, the focus here is on cooperation to counter extraregional and transnational threats, rather than to prevent interstate conflict. In that context, the concern is not simply cooperation but *operationalized security cooperation*. Cooperation, in its broad sense, occurs when states, in order to realize their own goals, modify policies to meet preferences of other states. "Operationalized" security cooperation is a specific type and degree of cooperation in which policies addressing common threats can be carried out by midlevel officials of the states involved without immediate or direct supervision from strategic-level authorities. Consultation and information sharing between security ministries are examples of "cooperation," whereas the data assessment and intelligence briefing by combined teams of analysts would involve operationalized cooperation. In the maritime environment, international staff consultations exemplify cooperation. A highly orchestrated and closely supervised combined search-and-rescue exercise would be considered very thinly operationalized at best. Complex naval exercises and regularly scheduled combined law enforcement patrols are more substantial examples of operationalized cooperation.

MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE THE COLD WAR

In 1991, Southeast Asia was regarded as a relatively stable region in which the maturity of ASEAN had made significant contributions to management of disputes between member states. During the Cold War, the region had been polarized between the communist and free market states, but the collapse of Soviet support relaxed tension and produced a general reconciliation between the two camps. The addition of Laos and Vietnam in 1992, and of Cambodia and

Myanmar in 1995, to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation—originally concluded in 1976 for the peaceful settlement of intraregional disputes in a framework of absolute respect for state sovereignty—cemented the inclusion of the former communist-bloc states into the ASEAN community. Similarly, by 1991 the region’s few remaining communist-inspired insurgencies had been localized, and almost all of its states had earned unquestioned international legitimacy.²



The revolutionary structural changes that accompanied the end of the Cold War complemented regional dynamics already in motion—improvements in domestic security, rapid economic development, and the maturing of regional identity—to produce an environment conducive to increased cooperation and the reorganization of security priorities in Southeast Asia. Analysts quickly identified maritime security as a major concern.³ Many studies focused on state-to-state naval conflict, but some looked beyond “traditional” threats to examine a diverse range of broader, “nontraditional” maritime concerns, such as ocean resource management, changes in patterns of commercial shipping,

transnational crime, and environmental pollution.⁴ Even as these studies were going on, regional states launched cooperative efforts to address maritime security issues.

The enhanced maritime security cooperation developed during the decade immediately following the Cold War has been called “particularly noteworthy” and “notable.”⁵ In 1992, ASEAN’s first communiqué on a security issue, “Declaration on the South China Sea,” emphasized “the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means” and urged “all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.” In the same period, a handful of new institutions emerged. For example, the Indonesian

South China Sea Workshops (known as the SCS Workshops) sought to reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in the South

Though transnational maritime crime rarely presents a direct threat to states, piracy and robbery at sea are such severe problems that they are now perceived to do just that.

China Sea, while the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation Working Group (CSCAP-MCWG), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Working Group on Maritime Security, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) tackled Southeast Asian issues within the broader Asia-Pacific maritime context.⁶ However, progress at this point was almost entirely limited to transparency, dialogue, pledges of greater future cooperation, and other maritime confidence- and security-building measures (MCSBMs).⁷

By the end of the twentieth century, cooperation was not yet sufficiently oriented to the region’s new nontraditional security threats, and the few examples of operationalized cooperation were very weak. Several Cold War-era defense arrangements, such as the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and various bilateral U.S. security agreements, were adapted to new functions. However, the usefulness of the FPDA was questioned, and the American presence in Southeast Asia had decreased with the withdrawal of military forces from the Philippines in 1991 and limitations placed by Congress on military-to-military contacts with Indonesia beginning in 1993.⁸ There were new operationalized cooperation endeavors; such pairings as Indonesia-Malaysia, Malaysia-Cambodia, Brunei-Australia, Singapore-India, and Malaysia-Philippines initiated bilateral naval-exercise programs. Of these new bilateral agreements, the Malaysia-Singapore, Singapore-Indonesia, and Malaysia-Indonesia coordinated patrols in the Strait of Malacca were the most operationalized. However, shipboard officers privately lamented that bilateral coordination of these patrols amounted to little more than exchanges of schedules, to which in many cases partners did not adhere.⁹

From 2000 to 2002, a series of events propelled the Southeast Asian maritime sector from the post–Cold War years into the new world of the twenty-first century. The first was the February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry *Our Lady Mediatrix*, which killed forty people and wounded another fifty. The attack was blamed on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; however, being regarded as just another statistic of the ongoing violence in the southern Philippines, it had less psychological impact than the next transformative event, the October 2000 suicide-boat attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS *Cole* (DDG 67). Although the attack on *Cole* occurred in Aden, outside Southeast Asia, the publicity generated and the fact that this powerful attack had succeeded against one of the U.S. Navy’s most sophisticated warships raised awareness about the maritime terror threat in Southeast Asia and started security experts there thinking about the dangers in their own region. Third, a rash of amphibious kidnapping operations carried out by the Abu Sayyaff Group—especially high-profile kidnappings of Western tourists from resorts on Sipadan, Malaysia, in March 2000 and in Palawan, Philippines, in May 2001—demonstrated the capabilities of Southeast Asia’s indigenous transnational maritime terrorists.

The possibility of truly unbearable terrorist attacks was driven home for Southeast Asians on 11 September 2001. A few months later, Singaporean intelligence discovered a series of al-Qa’ida-related plots to attack several international targets, including visiting American warships, in that island state. These findings were corroborated by the discovery of planning videos and documents in Afghanistan. In December 2001 the ferry *Kalifornia*, transporting Christians in Indonesia’s Maluku Archipelago, was bombed. The attack killed ten, injured forty-six, and began a cycle of violence in which several other passenger vessels were attacked.¹⁰

Maritime Southeast Asia completed its initiation into the “age of terror” in October 2002. On the 6th, Islamist terrorists struck the tanker *Limburg* in the Arabian Sea, demonstrating that international maritime trade was a target. Finally, the 12 October triple bombing in Bali proved that Southeast Asia was on the front lines of international terrorism. Today, while some Southeast Asia officials and captains of industry remain “in denial,” terrorism has become the pre-eminent security issue in the region, and maritime terror is broadly recognized as a very dangerous threat.

Accordingly, maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia is now developing more quickly than in the preceding decade. States have demonstrated greater commitment to expanding MCSBMs and operationalizing cooperation. Appropriately, the bulk of the new cooperation has been oriented toward such transnational threats as terrorism and piracy. Although considerable obstacles remain and states have not been equally proactive, commitments have been reinvigorated

and several new arrangements created. Clear statements of renewed interest in improving cooperation include the June 2003 “ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF] Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security” and the “Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime,” which was endorsed by the January 2004 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. More concretely, most regional shippers and nearly all major port facilities achieved compliance with the International Maritime Organization’s December 2002 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) before or shortly after its July 2004 deadline. Also in 2004, Singapore acceded to the Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (known as the SUA Convention). Singapore’s accession was considered by many analysts as an important step toward wider regional acceptance of the SUA Convention.

Examples of new operationalized interstate cooperation began to emerge almost immediately after 9/11, when the United States began including counterterrorism packages in its bilateral exercises with regional states and sent naval forces to assist the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaff Group. Indigenous operationalized cooperation also began to grow. In September 2003 Thailand and Malaysia announced that, concerned about insurgents and terrorists, they had invigorated cooperative maritime patrols in the northern Strait of Malacca. In June 2004, a meeting of FDPA defense ministers in Penang, Malaysia, decided to orient their organization for the first time toward nontraditional maritime security, focusing on counterterrorism, maritime interception, and antipiracy.

In July 2004 Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia began a program of trilateral coordinated patrols throughout the Strait of Malacca. These patrols are of particular significance, for a number of reasons. First, the strong endorsement given by regional media and the positive public response to the first patrols demon-

From 2000 to 2002, a series of events propelled the Southeast Asian maritime sector from the post-Cold War years into the new world of the twenty-first century.

strated the desire of governments to appear committed to the program and widespread support for the project. Indonesia’s December 2004 mobilization of two maritime patrol aircraft and four warships to recover a hijacked

Singaporean tug exemplifies the program’s positive benefits. Second, this is the first significantly operationalized multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia to develop without an extraregional partner. Commitment to operationalizing maritime security cooperation continues to grow; India and Thailand, neighboring states that control the northern approaches to the Strait of Malacca, have

expressed interest in joining the patrols, and the founding states have responded favorably. Nonetheless, officers directly involved in the patrols state privately that the trilateral patrols are often matters more of “show” than of real utility and that it is too soon to assess their impact on piracy, smuggling, and other maritime crimes in the strait.

In November 2004 sixteen countries (the ASEAN members plus China, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka) concluded the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). This agreement, first proposed by Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi at the 2001 ASEAN-plus-Three Summit in Brunei, had been deadlocked for months by disagreement over where to locate the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC), which would maintain databases, conduct analysis, and act as an information clearinghouse. As explained by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s Director for ASEAN Politics and Communications, sensitivity stemmed from the possibility that the ISC might publish reports unfairly critical to member states. This official shared that concern, arguing that the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center has misrepresented incidents in Malaysia waters as having occurred on the Indonesian side of the Strait of Malacca because the center is located in Kuala Lumpur.¹¹

ReCAAP is a positive step, being an indigenous pan-Asian initiative devised primarily to deal with piracy, a phenomenon most conspicuous in Southeast Asia. The fact that members ultimately agreed to locate the ISC in Singapore demonstrates willingness to compromise in order to advance maritime security issues. However, the agreement does not obligate members to any specific action other than sharing information that they deem pertinent to imminent piracy attacks; furthermore, the ISC’s funding will be based on “voluntary contributions.”¹² Although not insignificant, ReCAAP alone will not eradicate Asian piracy.

Taken together, these many developments constitute significant progress. Dialogue and information sharing have been enhanced, states seem firmly committed, and some states have begun to operationalize their maritime security cooperation. However, the few operational arrangements that have been created are insufficient to counter the grave maritime threats the region faces.

CONTEMPORARY MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Although the regional states have declared commitments to settling differences peacefully, the threat of traditional conflict cannot be completely ruled out, and the proximity of international sea lanes guarantees that any such conflict would have very serious implications. One potential trigger for such conflict is the remaining territorial disputes between states. Other, less traditional security

concerns pose a more immediate threat. These include terrorism and insurgency; transnational maritime crime; and harm to the maritime environment.

Territorial Disputes

Territorial disputes, most of them maritime in nature and involving conflicting claims to either islands or littoral waters, contribute to interstate tension in Southeast Asia. Among the disputes with significant maritime dimensions are the Philippine claims to Sabah, overlapping claims to economic exclusive zones, and multilateral disputes over islands and waters in the South China Sea. One such issue was seemingly resolved in 2002, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Malaysia over Indonesia with regard to claims to Sipadan and Litigan islands. Similarly, Malaysia and Singapore have submitted to the ICJ for arbitration a dispute regarding sovereignty over Pedra Blanca (Pulau Batu Puteh), an island in the Singapore Strait with an important aid to navigation that is passed by about fifty thousand ships every year. However, given the history of Malaysian activities that Singapore regards as provocative, the latter still devotes sizable forces to sustaining its claim. Other disputes have even less prospect for resolution in the near future.

The most troublesome disputes are those in the South China Sea, where Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, China, and Taiwan assert conflicting claims to sea and island territories.¹³ These claims are deemed to be of vital importance, because the archipelagic seas may have vast petroleum resources and the islands are strategically positioned for support of sea-lane control or amphibious warfare. In recent history claimants have clashed violently, and the possibility of renewed fighting (short of open warfare) clearly exists. The current situation is “volatile and could, through an unexpected political or military event, deteriorate into open conflict.”¹⁴ Any escalation could disrupt the South China Sea’s huge volume of shipping, with grave consequences.¹⁵ In 2002 the ASEAN members and China indicated their desire to minimize the risk by agreeing to a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. However, the declaration is something less than a binding code of conduct or a consensus about the way forward; the South China Sea remains a flashpoint.¹⁶

Terrorism and Insurgency

Several Southeast Asian guerrilla and terrorist groups possess substantial maritime capabilities. Since 2000, al-Qa‘ida, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Laskar Jihad have all been suspected of planning or executing maritime attacks. Other groups have used the sea to transport weapons, move forces, and raise funds.

The most successful has been Abu Sayyaff, which has conducted dozens of successful maritime operations in the southern Philippines, metropolitan Manila, and East Malaysia. In 1995, Abu Sayyaff conducted its first large-scale attack: amphibious forces landed by boat, torched the Philippine town of Ipil, robbed seven banks, and killed about a hundred people. Abu Sayyaff gained global notoriety in 2000 and 2001 when it kidnapped dozens of people, among them Filipinos, Malaysians, Chinese, Europeans, and Americans, in a series of raids on villages, resorts, and ships in and near the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Despite a large-scale government offensive backed by American forces, Philippine officials have confirmed Abu Sayyaff claims of responsibility for the 26 February 2004 sinking of *Superferry 14* near Manila, in which 116 people were killed.¹⁷

Although so far less successful in maritime Southeast Asia than Abu Sayyaff, al-Qa'ida and its close regional allies Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia have demonstrated their intent to conduct large-scale operations against the U.S. Navy and global trade. Since 2000, regional security forces have disrupted half a dozen plots to attack American warships transiting narrow waterways or visiting ports in Southeast Asia.¹⁸ The 2002 attack on the *Limburg* demonstrated al-Qa'ida's desire to strike the petroleum distribution infrastructure, a desire also confirmed by al-Qa'ida literature, including a December 2004 edict issued by Osama bin Laden. There has also been increasing concern that al-Qa'ida or its affiliates might use a merchant vessel to administer a cataclysmic attack—perhaps a nuclear bomb, radiological “dirty nuke,” or other weapon of mass destruction—in a shipping container. Alternatively, a large petroleum, liquefied gas, or chemical carrier could be hijacked and either sunk in a key waterway or crashed into a port facility or population center, turning the vessel's cargo into a gigantic bomb. Many of these scenarios could cause unprecedented loss of life and economic disruption.¹⁹

Transnational Maritime Crime

Transnational maritime crime involves such economically motivated activity as piracy, smuggling, and illegal migration. Transnational maritime crime has substantial security ramifications. It is costly in human terms and is a major drain on national resources. Furthermore, it has a synergetic effect that exacerbates interstate conflict and nonstate political violence. For instance, illegal migration fuels tension between Malaysia and Indonesia. Transnational maritime crime provides terrorist and guerrilla groups the means to move weapons and personnel, raise funds, and recruit new members. For example, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka is heavily involved in the smuggling of people, weapons, and other contraband across the Strait of Malacca to sustain its struggle against the Indonesian

government. Similarly, Islamist terrorists are believed to maintain routes in the Celebes Sea to move operatives, explosives, and firearms between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.²⁰

Though transnational maritime crime rarely presents a direct threat to states, piracy and robbery at sea are such severe problems that they are now perceived to do just that. These attacks take a variety of forms. In their most innocuous form, unarmed robbers slip on board ships and remove such valuables as cash, jewelry, and electronics. At the other extreme, pirates hijack ships outright, killing the crews or setting them adrift, removing the cargo, and fraudulently altering the ship's identity. As shown by the table, the frequency of pirate attacks, though apparently not increasing, is already of dangerous proportions. Piracy is

REPORTED PIRACY AND SEA ROBBERY ATTACKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998
Global Attacks	445	370	335	469	300	202
Attacks in Southeast Asia	189	170	170	257	167	99

Source: International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report*, 1 January–30 December 2003 ([Kuala Lumpur]: January 2004), p. 5.

also growing more violent and complex. First around the Sulu Sea, and since 2001 in the Strait of Malacca, pirates have been taking crew members prisoner and ransoming them from hidden jungle camps. Similarly, automatic weapons and grenade launchers, previously found mainly in the hands of Filipino pirates, have also become commonplace in the Strait of Malacca.²¹

Piracy may have a nexus with terrorism. Security officials have suggested that terrorists might work with pirates or adopt their techniques. A case in point was the March 2003 hijacking of the chemical tanker *Dewi Madrim*, during which pirates wielding assault rifles and VHF radios disabled the ship's radio and took over the helm for about half an hour before kidnapping the captain and first officer for ransom. What looked like just another act of piracy may in fact have been—as many observers, including Singapore's deputy prime minister, Tony Tan, have suggested—a training run for a future terrorist mission.²²

Harm to the Maritime Environment

The power of environmental phenomena is unquestionable, given the recent memory of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamis that killed (according to estimates at the time of publication) well over two hundred thousand people. In addition, environmental damage not only causes direct harm to land, water, and populations but can precipitate tension or conflict within or between states. This being the case, resource depletion and human degradation of the environment have been recognized as directly relevant to Southeast Asia's security agenda.²³ Hydrocarbon resources are central factors in the strategic calculus in

such conflicts and disputes as those in Aceh and the South China Sea. Although less frequently discussed, damage done to the marine environment—damage to tropical reefs, oil spills, overexploitation of fisheries, etc.—has also impacted Southeast Asian security. For example, the destruction of reefs and overexploitation of fishing groups are contributing to Indonesian poverty and exacerbating domestic violence.²⁴ Similarly, foreign trawlers have been targeted by guerrillas in the southern Philippines because these are seen as holding unfair technical advantages in the race to harvest fish from traditional Moro fishing grounds.²⁵ At the interstate level, rapid depletion of fisheries has contributed to tension between Thailand and Malaysia and between Thailand and Myanmar.²⁶ While environmental degradation is unlikely to be the direct cause of military conflict in Southeast Asia, it poses a real threat by undermining international relationships, economic development, and social welfare. As regional industries continue to abuse the environment, these security threats will continue to rise.

FACTORS ENABLING GREATER COOPERATION

Structural, normative, and economic changes to the regional system are enabling greater maritime security cooperation. Some of these changes are direct results of the global recognition of terrorism as a preeminent security threat, while others are a continuation of older regional trends already visible in the post–Cold War era. The changes can be summarized by looking at five key factors: relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, extraregional power interests, increased prevalence of cooperation norms, improving state resources, and increasing prioritization of maritime security. These five factors are not necessarily distinct; they are analytical concepts used to describe interrelated and complementary themes present in the evolving regional “orchestra.”

Relaxing Sovereignty Sensitivities

Sovereignty sensitivities are traditionally extremely high among Southeast Asian states, and they play defining roles in the foreign policy formulations of these states. These sensitivities have made the principle of nonintervention the bedrock of intraregional state relations; they are undoubtedly the single most powerful inhibitor of maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia. In fact, they have until very recently been seen as almost completely eliminating the possibility of cooperative ventures that even might compromise or qualify exclusive sovereign rights.²⁷ Even cooperative ventures that do not directly undermine sovereignty, such as joint exercises or voluntary information sharing, are viewed with caution lest they lead to creeping infringement. In some cases, reduction of sovereignty seems tantamount to decreased security; in other cases, leaders fear that cooperation might expose to their domestic constituencies problems that they

desire to downplay. In yet other cases, national pride and the desire for prestige make governments reluctant to reveal inadequacies to their neighbors.²⁸

There are signs, however, that sovereignty sensitivities may be relaxing, at least in the maritime area. Even a slight easing would be remarkable, since aside from the factors above, many Southeast Asian states have strong practical reasons for maintaining exclusive sovereignty over their waters. Most of the coastal states rely heavily on offshore economic resources. Furthermore, foreign powers have historically operated within the national waters of several, specifically to undermine state security. In more recent years regional states have seen ample need for legal restrictions on shipping in their waters. For example, in May 2003 Indonesia banned foreign vessels without explicit permission from waters adjacent to the province of Aceh, where it was attempting to suppress a rebellion. Similarly, Malaysian authorities have restricted maritime traffic to specific corridors in order to improve security on Sabah's eastern coast and offshore islands. In general, the region's few operationalized cooperation arrangements have been carefully crafted to minimize their impact upon state sovereignty. For example, coordinated maritime patrols have not been coupled with extraterritorial law-enforcement rights, extradition guarantees, or "hot pursuit" arrangements.

Nonetheless, in recent years states have been increasingly willing to allow infringement upon or qualification of their sovereignty for the sake of improved maritime security. Perhaps most significantly, in 1998 Malaysia and Indonesia requested the ICJ to arbitrate the ownership of Litigan and Sipadan Islands, and in 2002 Indonesia accepted a ruling in favor of Malaysia. To provide another example, Singapore and Malaysia have also accepted what they might have considered infringement of their sovereign rights by allowing the stationing of American personnel in their ports to ensure the fulfillment of International Maritime Organization and U.S. security standards. Thailand has accepted similar arrangements in principle.

The decision by Indonesia and Malaysia not to protest Indian and U.S. naval escort operations in the Strait of Malacca in 2001 and 2002 is a further example of increasing flexibility with regard to maritime sovereignty. Although these extraregional navies only escorted vessels through the Strait of Malacca—an activity clearly legal under the terms of the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—these operations could easily have been construed by sovereignty-sensitive states as akin more to law enforcement than to transit passage. Indeed, media outlets commonly (and incorrectly) referred to the operations as "patrols." Furthermore, both Indian and American officials were reported as making statements that could imply that the operations were more than just escorting. The *Straits Times*, which characterized the operations as "the joint

patrolling of sensitive, pirate-prone waters,” quoted an Indian official as describing the mission as “regional policing.”²⁹ Similarly, *Navy Times* referred to “joint patrols” and reported American sailors as saying that their “attention to detail on [the] patrol mission” had been heightened by anger over the events of 11 September.³⁰ *Navy Times* also quoted the assistant operations officer of one of the ships involved as saying, “We didn’t catch anybody,” which could have been interpreted as evidence that the crew was seeking out criminals rather than simply safeguarding ships exercising free navigation.³¹ Although the regional accommodativeness followed considerable U.S. preemptive diplomacy and a reluctance to interfere with American security efforts in the wake of 9/11, it nonetheless demonstrates Malaysian and Indonesian willingness to make concessions when doing so seems advantageous.

Indonesian and Malaysian officials did not show the same restraint in 2004 after misleading reports regarding the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), a U.S.-suggested protocol to foster the sharing of information. When international media sources incorrectly reported that Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, had testified before Congress that Special Forces and Marines in small craft would be deployed under RMSI to safeguard the Strait of Malacca, Malaysian and Indonesian officials asserted in strong language their sovereign control over the waterway. Though their statements did not completely bar cooperation, the very public, highly rhetorical, and inflammatory nature of the episode put the United States on the diplomatic defensive.³² RMSI had been discussed openly for months and would have in no way challenged the sovereign rights of regional states.³³ Nonetheless, the fallout was so severe that the U.S. State Department issued special press releases correcting the media reports of Admiral Fargo’s testimony.³⁴ Six months later senior Malaysian and Indonesian officials, such as Malaysian deputy prime minister Najib Tun Razak and Indonesian navy chief Bernard Kent Sondahk, were still criticizing perceived American intentions to violate their sovereignty.³⁵ If sovereignty sensitivities have relaxed, then, they remain central. Still, they do not amount to absolute limits on maritime cooperation when the perceived benefits are suitably high.

Extraregional Power Interests

Maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia has been historically limited by extraregional rivalries. During the Cold War all security arrangements were managed within the context of the Soviet-U.S.-Chinese bi/tripolar structure.³⁶ In the immediate post-Cold War era, the Soviet Union’s role in Southeast Asian affairs evaporated, but developing rivalry between China and the United States now constrained cooperation. Some American policy makers sought to contain

China, while China's generally realpolitik outlook made it distrustful of maritime security cooperation through the 1990s.³⁷

Today, however, all extraregional powers involved in Southeast Asian maritime affairs have aligned their interests toward maritime security cooperation, especially protecting navigation in strategic sea lanes from transnational threats. Most important among these powers are the United States, Japan, and China, but Australia and India, two large neighbors with substantial navies, have also demonstrated commitment to maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia. This convergence of interests not only removes inhibitors previously at play but encourages new cooperation.

Since 11 September 2001, the United States has furthered regional maritime security in a number of ways, including promoting an "alphabet soup" of antiterrorism-focused cooperation in Southeast Asia. Two such initiatives are the CSI (Container Security Initiative) and PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), global initiatives that focus to a considerable degree upon Southeast Asia. In contrast, the RMSI and its follow-on programs are limited to the Asia-Pacific.

Officers directly involved in the trilateral patrols state privately that the patrols are often matters more of "show" than of real utility.

American maritime authorities like Secretary of Navy Gordon England and Admiral Fargo have used speaking engagements to draw attention to transnational maritime threats and the desir-

ability of greater international cooperation.³⁸ An April 2004 joint U.S.-ASEAN workshop on "Enhancing Maritime Anti-Piracy and Counter Terrorism Cooperation in the ASEAN Region" reflected American commitment to that end. In fact, U.S. enthusiasm for maritime security cooperation is so strong that it risks being seen as hegemonic and inspiring a regional backlash, like that surrounding RMSI.

Japanese devotion to improving Southeast Asian maritime security cooperation predates the events of 2001 and should be regarded as separate from, if in alignment with, American interests. Japan is economically dependent on Southeast Asian sea lanes for more than 80 percent of its petroleum, as well as other strategic commodities, such as coal, uranium, grain, and iron ore. These waterways also carry Japanese manufactured goods to Europe, Australia, the Middle East, and Africa. Therefore, safety of navigation is vital to Japanese comprehensive security and a major policy objective. To this end, Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the government in Tokyo have funded navigation aids, conducted hydrographic surveys, and supported various other maritime safety programs for decades. Since 1999, Japan has vigorously promoted a number of more direct security initiatives. The most radical of these,

the Ocean-Peacekeeping concept, which called for a multinational naval force to patrol both international and national waters, has been tabled; nonetheless, Japanese NGOs like the Nippon Foundation, the Ship and Ocean Foundation, and the Okazaki Institute continue to press for multilateral operationalized maritime security solutions. Since 2000, the Japanese Coast Guard has formed bilateral training and exercise agreements with the maritime law enforcement agencies of six Southeast Asian states. Its ReCAAP endeavors have also been successful, although ReCAAP's results are far less ambitious than the Japanese ideal concept.³⁹

Since the mid-1990s China's stance on maritime security cooperation has been reoriented away from a belligerent position characterized by hard stances and the absolute value of sovereignty toward a posture favorable to discussion and dispute management.⁴⁰ As late as 2000 China was still strongly opposed to multilateral maritime cooperation, as demonstrated by its positions at an ARF antipiracy meeting in Mumbai and Japanese-sponsored conferences in Tokyo.⁴¹ Since then its position has grown considerably less obstructive, and it has positively contributed to discussions on enhancing security cooperation. This trend seems to mirror, but perhaps run a couple of years behind, a general Chinese shift away from defensiveness and toward cooperativeness. In late 2003, China conducted its first international maritime exercises in decades—brief search-and-rescue programs with India and Pakistan.

Australia—with a longtime involvement in Southeast Asian security exemplified by its deployment of troops to fight communist insurgents in Malaya and Vietnam, continued commitment to the FPDA, and its peacekeeping mission in East Timor—has made recent contributions to regional maritime and nontraditional security. The Royal Australian Navy has increasingly assumed constabulary roles appropriate to transnational threats, and in 2004 it carried out command-level sea-lane security exercises with several regional states.⁴² Strong Australian support for improved regional maritime security is reflected in Prime Minister John Howard's commitment to fighting terrorism and to a vast new program that includes a maritime security zone reaching into Southeast Asian waters.⁴³

India also has become increasingly involved in Southeast Asian maritime security, as part of its reinvigorated activism in the wider Asia-Pacific region and its "Look East" policy, aimed at strengthening its influence in Southeast Asia specifically. As seen above, in 2002 the Indian and U.S. navies worked together to ensure the safe transit of high-value units through the Strait of Malacca. In 2003 a Singapore-India agreement to improve maritime and counterterrorism cooperation resulted in the planning for joint exercises on sea-lane control, the first Indian exercise in Singaporean waters. Shortly after the previously described Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore coordinated trilateral patrols of the Strait of

Malacca began, India raised the possibility of contributing itself. In September 2004, India and the Indonesian navy began joint patrols of the Six Degree Channel, the waterway just west of the Strait of Malacca, which lies between Indonesia's Aceh Province and India's Nicobar Islands. These active measures have been complemented by Indian navy port visits throughout the region and training exercises with the navies of almost every coastal state.⁴⁴ In addition, India has sought to coordinate with other extraregional maritime powers, such as the United States, Australia, and Japan. For example, New Delhi has suggested to Prime Minister Koizumi that Japan resume some of its more aggressive initiatives.⁴⁵

Increasing the Prevalence of Cooperation Norms

Although the Southeast Asian states coexist peacefully, their conflicting interests, contrasting populations, nationalistic tendencies, and histories of warfare continue to burden interstate relations. Even disputes without specific maritime dimensions inhibit maritime security cooperation, by limiting dialogue and aggravating distrust. However, since the end of the Cold War regional institutions and NGOs have made considerable progress in fostering cooperation norms.

The blossoming of maritime confidence- and security-building measures and other cooperation agreements have established such norms of cooperation and made the operationalizing of future endeavors much easier. The dialogue norms are embodied in and sustained by institutions like CSCAP-MCWG, SCS Workshops, WPNS, the ARF Maritime Focus Group, the APEC Working Group on Maritime Security, and ReCAAP (all mentioned above). Although obligating member states to relatively little and consistently reaffirming the "ASEAN way" norms of sovereignty preservation and nonintervention, recent ARF and ASEAN documents exemplify the increasing prevalence of cooperation norms. Although some scholars might debate their specifics, the value of dialogue and MCSBMs cannot be simply disregarded.⁴⁶ Even the most skeptical would not suggest that the new cooperation norms in Southeast Asia reflect a negative trend. Regular cooperation improves the information available to states, builds familiarity, lowers transaction costs, reduces distrust, and creates habits of consultation. Therefore, it may be that the decade of maritime confidence and security building that preceded the emergence of terrorism as a major threat enabled the relatively rapid development of cooperation in the last two years.

Improving State Resources

Regional maritime security cooperation has also been limited by a lack of resources. Not only have many of the Southeast Asian states faced challenges to their economic development, but most of them possess sea territories disproportionately large with respect to their land areas and cannot properly patrol them. Only Singapore and Brunei, relatively wealthy states with modest

territorial seas, are capable of adequately securing their maritime territories. This is one of the reasons states have generally given their own operations priority over international cooperation.⁴⁷

Resource shortages were exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which caused several states, including Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, to delay plans to expand and improve their maritime capabilities. The effect was especially profound in Indonesia, where economic hardship and an American spare-parts embargo have so immobilized the national fleet that only an estimated 15 percent of Indonesia's naval and law enforcement ships can get under way at any one time.⁴⁸

In recent years, Southeast Asian economies have recovered, and the resources necessary to sustain the deployment, and in some cases even expand the capabilities, of maritime forces are again available. Since 2001, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand have all taken possession of new naval ships. Malaysia is committing the resources necessary to establish a new coast guard force to relieve its currently overburdened navy and maritime police. These trends are expected to accelerate in the near future, and regional governments are expected to double their expenditures on new naval ships by 2010.⁴⁹ This is not to say that the problem of resource shortages has been solved. Most significantly, in the state with the largest sea territory, the Indonesian maritime forces continue to suffer from a critical lack of resources to maintain and operate their ships. However, speaking generally of the region, economic recovery is encouraging improved maritime security cooperation.

Increasing Prioritization of Maritime Security

Maritime security concerns compete for attention with traditional military threats, guerrilla insurgencies, narcotics production, organized crime, and poverty; accordingly they have historically held rather low positions in the interest hierarchies of most Southeast Asian states, even those with large maritime territories, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Since the Cold War ended, and even more so in the twenty-first century, however, maritime threats have been steadily rising as state priorities. Singapore, which sees maritime security as an existential issue, has clearly taken the most interest in improving it.⁵⁰ However, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are all giving maritime security increasing priority as well. This shift has been due to a combination of the disappearance of Cold War menaces and the increasing recognition of maritime dangers.⁵¹ Deadly terrorist attacks like those against *Our Lady Mediatrix*, *Cole*, *Lindberg*, *Kalifornia*, and *Superferry 14*, let alone those in New York City, Bali, and Madrid, have further sensitized policy makers to the need for action. Their growing concern is clearly reflected in their public comments.

THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION

The structural, economic, and normative changes that have accompanied Southeast Asia's transition from the immediate post-Cold War years into the twenty-first century are creating unprecedented opportunities for maritime cooperation. However, powerful constraints, most notably acute sensitivities over sovereignty, interstate distrust, resource competition, and fiscal shortages, remain. Therefore, cooperation will not be unlimited, but will grow incrementally. Within this framework certain forms of cooperation—those that maximize perceived benefits but minimize perceived costs—will develop more quickly than others.

Global Cooperation

Global cooperation is characterized by the accession of states to international conventions or other cooperative agreements of worldwide scale. Although global institutions like the United Nations, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau are proactive about improving maritime security through increased cooperation, the diverse interests of their constituencies suggest that their measures will progress slowly. Southeast Asian states, with the exception of Singapore, will most likely be followers rather than leaders in the development of these measures, complying with initiatives that offer net advantages. Singapore, a relatively rich nation with a strong maritime outlook, a critical dependence on international trade, and a security strategy that relies heavily upon international cooperation, may lead the way.

The regional responses to global cooperation initiatives will be similar to those executed in response to the International Maritime Organization's comprehensive ISPS Code, which came into force on 1 July 2004. In general, and as noted, Southeast Asian states, ports, and shippers have made significant progress toward compliance; Singapore did so months ahead of schedule, implementing measures significantly beyond the minimum requirements. Nonetheless, and despite the threat of lost tonnage and increased insurance rates, there are still port facilities—less prosperous, many of them handling only small volumes of cargo bound outside the region—that remain noncompliant several months after the deadline.

Regional Cooperation

Even when extraregional powers participate, a multilateral cooperative arrangement may be considered regional if its goals are primarily regional. In Southeast Asia, the development of stronger multilateral arrangements for maritime security cooperation has received wide discursive endorsement. Such cooperation could come in the form of new multilateral agreements or be superimposed on

an existing organization, such as ASEAN, ARF, or APEC. In particular, it seems quite likely that existing regional organizations will develop new initiatives, most probably expanded dialogue, issuance of declaratory statements of intent, and improved information sharing. However, considering the diverse interests of their members, sensitivities, and long-standing insistence upon nonintervention, they are unlikely to institute major operational measures.

New regional agreements, however, are less promising than those that build on existing institutions, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, regional states are distrustful of new organizations for fear of hidden agendas or that improperly crafted entities may spiral out of control and infringe upon state sovereignty and resources. Not surprisingly, extraregional powers prefer new multilateral frameworks, precisely because the protocols can be customized for their purposes. The result is typically an unsatisfactory compromise; the newly formed ReCAAP is a case in point. After long negotiations, this Japanese-sponsored group emerged as a nonbinding, externally funded organization empowered only to collate information voluntarily submitted. A senior Japanese government official directly involved in operationalizing maritime security efforts calls it “a very, very small step forward.”⁵²

Bilateral Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation, though it involves only two states, can be more productive than multilateral initiatives in producing operational maritime cooperation. Where multilateral cooperation often develops only to the level acceptable to the least keen partner, bilateral arrangements match the aligned interests and so maximize productivity. Bilateral approaches can also minimize distrust and sovereignty sensitivities; areas of disagreement can be more readily identified and then capitalized upon or adapted around, as appropriate, when only two states are involved.

Bilateral agreements are most likely to be operationalized between states that have generally cooperative outlooks, are least distrustful of each other, and share security interests. A prototype would be the coordinated Malaysian-Thai border patrols. The two states have a history of cooperation, going back to joint prosecution of the communist insurgents who once used bases in Thailand for attacks in Malaysia. Although tenuous at times, this cooperation eventually allowed cross-border “hot pursuit,” the only such instance between ASEAN states.⁵³ Although the imperfection of this relationship can be seen in Thai prime minister Thaksin Sinawatra’s December 2004 charges (and the angry responses to those statements) that insurgents in the south of his country had received training and support in Malaysia, this history has underlain bilateral cooperation against the current separatist insurgency in southern Thailand. Though some Malaysian

government officials may personally sympathize with the Malay rebels, who are ethnic brethren, Malaysian policy makers clearly understand the security risks involved. In addition, Thailand and Malaysia both worry that the unrest in Aceh could cross the Strait of Malacca if not managed carefully. Similar cooperation will probably occur between other states as well—though constrained by a variety of factors and emerging only where security threats are most direct and perceived costs are lowest.

Networked Cooperation

If bilateral agreements are more likely than multilateral endeavors to produce operational cooperation, the most profitable form of future cooperation will be synergetic networks of bilateral arrangements. Because they are based on bilateral agreements, networked cooperation arrangements enable states to customize the most direct relationships so as to maximize value and minimize risk. The networks, however, also increase trust and understanding between all their members, thus reducing the costs of building further cooperative relationships. Such networks would be informal at first, but once formalized would provide benefits to parallel those of multilateral arrangements. Even as informal arrangements, however, cooperative networks promote security. The idea draws upon the American “hub-and-spokes” strategy of alliance building in Asia but, as is characteristic of networks, does not necessarily require a “hub.” In other words, although cooperative networks often arise through the leadership of a powerful state, they can develop without a hegemon. Simply increasing the number of bilateral agreements within the region expands the network and binds regional states more thoroughly into ever greater cooperation.

An example of a mature cooperative network underpinned by a major power is the annual COBRA GOLD military exercise held in Thailand. COBRA GOLD began as a bilateral maritime warfare exercise between the United States and Thailand in 1982. In 1999 the United States capitalized on its strong relationship with Singapore to persuade its armed forces to participate. Since then the exercise has continued to expand on the basis of American bilateral agreements and now includes the Philippines and Mongolia, as well as observers from ten other countries. Participants remark on how the exercises bring them not only closer to the United States but to each other, and how the common training experiences improve mutual understanding. With even more participants invited for future exercises, COBRA GOLD is the region’s most developed formal cooperation network and a model for operational improvement in regional maritime security.

The trilateral Strait of Malacca patrols (involving Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia) constitute a cooperation network that developed from an informal network of bilateral agreements without external leadership. In fact, it seems

that one motivation for their development was to exclude the United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan from direct, visible roles in Strait of Malacca security. The trilateral patrols built upon bilateral patrols conducted by all possible pairs of the three states for more than a decade. Without the history of bilateral cooperation, the trilateral patrols are unlikely to have been formalized so quickly or to have reached the same level of operationalization.

The potential for the strengthening of this network is clear from suggestions that Thailand and India might join. As India already executes coordinated patrols near the Strait of Malacca with Indonesia, and Thailand does so with Malaysia, these two states are already part of an informal cooperative network. The public discussion of the potential for expanding the currently trilateral program is one way in which a five-state network may become formalized.

An example of a nascent network involves Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Already the Japanese Coast Guard cooperates extensively with both Southeast Asian states. It has conducted antipiracy training with both states, has designed new training curricula for the Philippine Coast Guard, and is advising Malaysia in the establishment of that country's own coast guard. These two bilateral relationships are growing stronger and as they mature will naturally proliferate into a network by which the Malaysian and Philippine coast guards will develop greater trust and understanding of each other through their common involvement with the Japanese.⁵⁴ Although it may take time to develop, this network will reduce tension, ease the flow of information, and perhaps lay the groundwork for new bilateral relationships between Malaysia and the Philippines.

Although networked cooperation holds the most potential for improving regional security, such networks are not necessarily easy to create. An example of an unsuccessful attempt is the Japan Coast Guard's failure to organize existing exercise programs with Singaporean and Indonesian maritime security forces into a trilateral agreement. The hurdles include Indonesia's lack of resources, Japanese constitutional provisions that ban the Japan Coast Guard from working with the Indonesian navy, and the anti-Japanese sentiment that still persists more than fifty years after World War II. Still, networked cooperation holds the greatest potential for tangible improvement in regional maritime security.

CAPITALIZING ON OPPORTUNITIES

Although Southeast Asian states have taken significant steps toward improving their maritime security cooperation during the post-Cold War period, serious maritime threats endanger the regional states and their populations. At the same time, structural, economic, and normative changes in the Southeast Asian security complex are broadening and operationalizing maritime cooperation.

Despite these improvements, major obstacles remain. Although sovereignty sensitivities have relaxed slightly, states continue to be wary of even small erosions of exclusive rights. Similarly, although dialogue is becoming a behavioral norm, distrust remains high and threatens to stymie efforts to develop maritime cooperation that goes beyond discourse.

Nonetheless, neither sovereignty issues nor distrust are absolute restraints on cooperation. Given the alignment of interest among extraregional powers, the strengthening of regional cooperation norms, the higher priority now given to maritime security, and the growing resources available to regional maritime security forces, the time is right to press for enhanced maritime security cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral efforts both have potential when states can identify interests, capitalize on opportunities, and ameliorate obstructions. At the same time, governments should seek to network existing relationships, bearing in mind that while formal networks are most valuable, informal arrangements are also of benefit. Further research into how policy makers perceive the stakes would be valuable. Such studies will improve their ability to exploit current opportunities and create new opportunities for maximizing security cooperation—as they must do in the immediate future, because the maritime threats in contemporary Southeast Asia are dire.

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TECHNOLOGY AND NAVAL BLOCKADE

Past Impact and Future Prospects

Roger W. Barnett

Anyone who wishes to cope with the future should travel back in imagination a single lifetime . . . and ask himself just how much of today's technology would be, not merely incredible, but incomprehensible to the keenest scientific brains of that time.

ARTHUR C. CLARKE

Through the centuries major changes have taken place in the ability of states to prevent the movement of ships or particular goods over the sea lanes of the world.¹ Some of the changes have been wrought by technological evolution, some by increasing importance of seaborne trade, and some by alterations in the structure of international relations. The combined effect has profoundly affected both the way maritime blockades are conducted in the twenty-first century and the means employed for them. In large measure, it has also rendered the traditional law of blockade obsolete.

BLOCKADE OPERATIONS

Until World War I maritime blockades were undertaken by states seeking to prevent the movement of ships or cargoes that would assist in the ability of adversaries to conduct international armed conflict. Blockade law evolved in the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to regulate how states conducted blockades while concurrently safeguarding the rights of neutrals to use the open seas to conduct nonproscribed trade.

The appearance in the last half of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth of sea mines, surface and submarine torpedo-attack craft, long-range rifled guns with exploding projectiles, and eventually aircraft meant that the traditional form of blockade—in close proximity to the adversary's

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coastline, where ships could be kept under surveillance and discouraged from departing their ports—could no longer be sustained.² Thus maritime blockade evolved into long-range operations or blockade zones, and the rules that had been laid down for the conduct of blockade were for the most part ignored or rationalized away.

New technologies had required blockading states to move farther from the adversary's coastline, and at the same time they promoted the use of submarines and mines as instruments of blockade, because they were relatively immune to countermeasures by the blockaded party. In both the First and Second World Wars the law-imposed requirements to visit and search ships, before attacking them, in order to determine whether they were carrying contraband and to provide for the safety of people on ships attempting to breach the blockade were massively violated.

A prescient *Yale Law Journal* article over a decade ago declared,

In the future blockade may become even more important as the need of a blockading state to stop every merchant ship grows more vital. The recent willingness of ostensibly neutral states to supply not simply technical know-how and materials for weapons construction, but also ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the highest bidder portends such a future. As the negative consequences of allowing even one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will become more willing to use the new blockade forms [long-range blockade and blockade zones] at the expense of neutral interests.³

What the writer could not have foreseen happened on 11 September 2001—events that changed the world, and in ways not yet fully comprehended. What was extraordinary about the events on that date was that a nonstate entity had succeeded in conducting a coordinated attack against a sovereign state on its home territory with a hitherto unappreciated weapon of mass destruction, a fully fueled airliner. Historically, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—such as nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons—have been under the strict control of sovereign states, their manufacture, storage, and use carefully constrained physically by security measures and strategically by deterrence and international law.⁴ The message conveyed on 11 September was that henceforth weapons of mass destruction could be controlled, distributed, and perhaps used by nonstate entities or even individuals. This was an unanticipated, and very unwelcome, extension of the envisioned “negative consequences.”

After 9/11 the central security problem, for the United States at least, became how to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction could be used by nonstate entities against American citizens in the homeland. Thus the Homeland Security Department was created, and new initiatives to prevent the international

transfer of such weapons and of launching and support mechanisms for them were instituted. Because no WMD use against the United States could be tolerated; because nonstate entities are difficult—and perhaps impossible—to deter; and because no retaliatory measures could repair the damage that the use of WMD could wreak, a new policy of preemption was announced and codified in a new national security strategy in September 2002.⁵

It is far better to seek to control shipping or the shipment of contraband at the source rather than at the destination. This has long been a guiding principle of blockade, recognized and enunciated by Alfred Thayer Mahan in his seminal

States have been rather inventive in conducting blockade operations but calling them something else to evade the legal requirements.

article “Blockade in Relation to Naval Strategy”: “Whatever the number of ships needed to watch those in an enemy’s port, they are fewer by far than those that will

be required to protect the scattered interests imperiled by an enemy’s escape.”⁶ In Mahan’s time ships carried all of the international trade that took place between states separated by water. Cargoes might be liquid or bulk, but they were not containerized.

Since Mahan wrote, however, international trade has mushroomed. The value of U.S. imports and exports in 2002 was a thousand times what it was in 1900. Roughly 80 percent by volume of all international trade travels the sea lanes of the world, and some 90 percent of that portion is transported in cargo containers. Nearly nine million containers arrive annually in the 301 American ports of entry. Any form of WMD could be shipped in a container, and any use of such a weapon could be politically and economically catastrophic for the United States.⁷

Whereas a blockade is a “belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation,” and the belligerent right of blockade is “intended to prevent vessels and aircraft, regardless of their cargo, from crossing an established and publicized cordon separating the enemy from international waters and/or airspace,” a belligerent right of visit and search “is designed to interdict the flow of contraband goods.”⁸ In today’s context, contraband WMD can be shipped from states, nonstate entities, or individuals, or consigned to any of the three. The form of blockade operations, accordingly, has changed dramatically from close blockade through distant blockade and blockade zones, to prevention of movement of specific items at, or as close as possible to, their source.

The better to control the international movement of WMD, their associated delivery systems, and related materials, the United States announced a

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in the spring of 2003, complementing the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which had been announced a year earlier. The PSI is indicative of the form the modern-day “belligerent right of visit and search” has taken. The context is one of global armed conflict against terrorists, sovereign states that would support them, and other WMD proliferators; the focus is on preventing the shipment of “contraband” WMD.

The PSI commits its over sixty participating states to:

- Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials
- Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information
- Work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities to accomplish these objectives and to strengthen international law and frameworks
- Not transport or assist in the transport of any cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials to or from countries or groups of proliferation concern
- Board and search any suspect vessels flying their flags in their internal waters, territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state
- Consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of their own flag vessels by other states and to the seizure of WMD-related cargoes
- Stop or search suspect vessels in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones and enforce conditions on suspect vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas
- Require suspect aircraft that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes, and deny to these aircraft transit rights through their airspace
- Prevent their ports, airfields, or other facilities from being used as transshipment points for WMD-related cargo.⁹

The CSI has a narrower focus—containers that are being shipped to the United States—and the following elements: security criteria to identify high-risk containers; prescreening of containers before they arrive at U.S. ports; technology to prescreen high-risk containers; and “smart” secure containers. As of November 2004, the CSI had twenty participating countries, with some thirty-seven ports committed. These include the world’s twenty largest ports, accounting for almost two-thirds of containers shipped to the United States.

As can be seen, over time the *ways* maritime blockades have been accomplished and the *means* for conducting them have changed dramatically. The objective of maritime blockade operations has remained constant, however: to prevent the movement of particular ships and aircraft, or of particular cargoes in ships and aircraft, on or over specified waters of the world—excluding inland rivers and seas.

In view of the foregoing, this article takes a broad view of what constitutes a “blockade.” For our purposes “blockade operations” encompasses not only actions embraced by the traditional legal definition of “blockade” cited above but also all others having the same objective—to prevent the movement of ships or aircraft in maritime sea areas or in the skies above them, or of particular cargoes (including people) of the blockaded party. Clearly, this approach widens the scope of what constitutes a “blockade” beyond the strict legal sense. States have been rather inventive over the years in conducting blockade operations but calling them something else in order to evade the legal requirements of blockade law. Accordingly, this article rolls up what have been called quarantine operations, close or tactical and distant or strategic blockades, pacific blockades, exclusion zones, and maritime intercept operations as simply “blockade operations.”

In this sense, blockade operations encompass both the objective of the blockading force and the enforcement mechanisms it employs. In contrast, “embargoes” or “economic sanctions” refer only to objectives. According to one expert, for example,

Between 1993 and 1998 alone, the United States imposed sanctions 61 times—out of a total of 125 cases since World War I. Sanctions eventually targeted 75 countries and some 42 percent of the world’s population for reasons ranging from support for terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other sensitive technologies, to concerns over human rights and the environment and even the mislabeling of tuna.¹⁰

Moreover, “blockaded party” includes both states and nonstate entities, such as terrorist organizations. This takes on additional relevance in the wake of reports of the operation of merchant ships by the terrorist organization al-Qa’ida; such a vessel might have delivered the explosives used in the embassy bombings in Africa.¹¹

Some additional elucidation of terms is necessary. The *effectiveness* of a blockade as used here refers to the degree to which it accomplishes its objectives. This is an operational sense of the term, as opposed to the legal usage, which harks back to the words in the Paris Declaration of 1856: “Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.” The idea of legal effectiveness,

adopted in order to delegitimize unenforced, or “paper,” blockades, was generally regarded to require the presence of at least one surface warship in or near the area that had been declared as blockaded. This is an “input” measure of effectiveness, established by a legal regimen, and its relationship is tenuous at best to the accomplishment of the blockade’s objectives, which is an “output,” or operational, measure.

TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MARITIME BLOCKADE OPERATIONS

Technology has historically played a key role on both sides of the question of maritime blockade operations. The imposer of the blockade requires special types of technology in order to make the blockade effective, and the target of the blockade has certain technological needs in any effort to breach the blockade. The right of visit and search requires its own separate category of technology.

In the future, then, technological requirements for maritime blockade operations will generally fall under four headings: ship propulsion; reconnaissance (finding) and surveillance (watching) techniques and devices; weapons with which to threaten or to attack ships and aircraft; and methods to inspect for and detect specific cargoes (contraband).

Ship Propulsion

Ship propulsion is an important category because of the effect it can have on the capability and the number of ships necessary to mount and sustain traditional blockade operations. When galleys were the primary form of warship blockade was rarely attempted, because of their short endurance and poor sea-keeping ability. The advent of much more seaworthy sailing ships meant that extended blockades could be undertaken; their effectiveness, however, was influenced significantly by the speed and direction of the wind. Prevailing westerly winds aided the English in their blockade of French Atlantic ports, for example; for the same reason, blockade of the eastern seaboard of the United States was difficult for sailing ships. Sailing ships could operate outside the range of shore batteries and still maintain surveillance of the blockaded port. For sailing ships the endurance limit tended to be not technological but human—victuals and the health of the crews. For example, in the age of sail far more British sailors died of disease on blockade station than were killed in battle.

When ships powered by fossil fuel (coal and then oil) appeared, the limiting logistic factor became the supply of fuel rather than the well-being of crews. Higher patrol speeds could be employed, and transit times from home port to blockade stations became shorter, but provision to refuel the steamships at or near their blockade stations had to be made. At first colliers and coaling stations

were used, and later—when oil was adopted, in the early twentieth century—refueling tankers were developed. Submarines were used in both world wars as blockading forces not only because they were stealthy but also because they had very long unrefueled range; they could remain on distant patrol station for many weeks without refueling. In World War II the German navy even deployed reprovisioning submarines, known to the Allies as “milchcows,” so that torpedo submarines could remain on patrol longer. Nuclear power for surface ships and submarines restored crew endurance rather than fuel as the limiting factor.

For hydrodynamic reasons, the speed of oceangoing ships has not changed appreciably in the past century. Prospects for significant increases in surface ship speed in the future are not rosy. The *effective* speed of ships, however, can be greatly enhanced by the embarkation of aircraft—either fixed-wing aircraft in the case of aircraft carriers or helicopters for many other types of ships. With embarked aircraft, ships can scout much greater areas and project their presence hundreds of miles from their actual positions.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Reconnaissance and surveillance are critical to the maintenance of effective blockades. At the same time, reconnaissance and surveillance have become both more important and in some ways more difficult: “The need to track thousands of civilian ships worldwide has intensified given the potential for seemingly harmless shipping to be involved in nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist operations. It was easier to track Soviet warships than a far larger number of civilian ships with unknown cargos and crew.”¹²

Once again, technology has played a key role. From the time of the ancient Greeks, who conducted the first maritime blockades in the fifth century BC, until the appearance of aircraft, reconnaissance and surveillance were limited by

DISTANCE TO THE HORIZON

Height in Feet	Nautical Miles
10	3.6
50	8.1
100	11.4
250	18.1
500	25.6
1,000	36.2
10,000	114.4
30,000	198.1
50,000	255.8
100,000	361.8

Source: Nathaniel Bowditch, *American Practical Navigator: An Epitome of Navigation, HO Pub 9* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, 1958), table 8, p. 1254.

visibility and the curvature of the earth. Thus, even on a clear day one cannot see forever—only as far as the horizon (or to some object beyond it, like a mast or mountain, tall enough to extend above a line from the observer tangent to the horizon). The distance to the horizon depends on the height above the surface of the observer. The table illustrates the relationship.

Surface ships typically have a “height of eye” between fifty and one hundred feet, so their horizon distance is roughly ten miles. Low height of eye (especially for submarines), night, weather, and distance make reconnaissance and surveillance for blockading nonairborne forces difficult. The absence of wireless communications until the

early part of the twentieth century, moreover, meant that collaboration among ships on blockade station was also limited to the line of sight, and then only at the very low data rates provided by flag hoist and flashing light.

From the table it is evident that the way to expand the reconnaissance and surveillance horizon is to put a sensor aloft. High-frequency line-of-sight communications systems would experience a concurrent boost in their ranges as well. Not only did aircraft extend the horizon for detection and tracking, but their high speeds compared to ships allowed, as we have seen, significantly larger areas to be scouted, and more quickly. It was due to their height of eye, then, as well as their speed, that aircraft—especially ones that could be carried on ships—represented a major improvement in the ability to find, track, and report the movements of potential blockade runners. When ship- and air-borne radar became available during the Second World War, detection capability experienced a further major advance, since it mitigated the effects of darkness and weather; the human eyeball was supplemented with electronic imaging.

The ultimate reconnaissance and surveillance platform—a geostationary satellite that could stare at the planet below—is impractical, because of the altitude at which it would have to orbit, some 22,300 miles. Satellites in somewhat lower orbit use radar, electronic, or electro-optical sensors and can perform reconnaissance, but except for radar their surveillance capability is poor. Satellites in low earth orbits have their own limitations; for example, clouds and darkness limit photographic satellites that use the visual spectrum, while other reconnaissance techniques (passive electronic intercept and infrared) require detectable

It is far better to seek to control shipping or the shipment of contraband at the source rather than at the destination.

emanations by the target. Satellites with active radar are extremely expensive because of weight and power requirements; good capability for both recon-

nnaissance and surveillance requires large constellations—on the order of twenty-four to forty-eight satellites—compounding the expense. In this regard it has been asked, “Will any technology similarly [to nuclear weapons] transform war in the next 25 years? . . . Some have suggested that space technology, currently providing reconnaissance and communications support to military operations, is in the same relative position that aviation technology was in 1919. The high cost of producing and orbiting satellites may, however, prevent such a pervasive transformation.”¹³

A variety of new small and inexpensive (compared to satellites or manned reconnaissance aircraft) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is appearing. Some are lighter-than-air systems, either floating or steered-floater platforms; others are classified as high-altitude maneuvering systems. These new capabilities, in

various stages of development, are projected to have operating cycles of from two days to five years and cost from a thousand dollars per eight-hour flight to five million dollars in the case of a high-altitude airship with multiyear endurance.¹⁴ Interest in such new technology is high within the United States. Interest abroad has been keen at least since 1996, when it was reported that “30 other countries also make UAVs of varying degrees of sophistication. . . . Given their special capabilities, UAV sensors can identify an object, when sensors on a satellite can only spot it. . . . Unlike stealth aircraft, UAVs are useless if not communicating.”¹⁵

Weapons

Weapons for enforcement of blockade operations have become virtually global in range and potentially unlimited in power. They range from sea mines, which are inexpensive and effective, to long-range stealth bombers with sophisticated air-to-ground weapons, at over a billion dollars apiece. Fixed-wing aircraft, of course, are incapable of visit and search, but with air-to-ground weapons they have the means to stop or turn around would-be blockade runners. Submarines likewise, while very deadly, as history has demonstrated, have severe limitations in terms of visit and search, and of providing for the safety of crews and passengers of attacked ships.

The effect of late-nineteenth-century weapons on blockade operations has been outlined in a seminal work on technology and naval warfare: “Torpedo boats could threaten fleet operations in confined waters along a coast. But the fleet adopted quick-firing guns as a defense, and with new high-freeboard battleships, it moved farther out to sea where it could operate effectively but torpedo boats could not. This is the period when the strategy of distant blockade began to replace the traditional close blockade.”¹⁶

The combination of naval mines, torpedo boats, and submarines doomed the close blockade and rendered blockades much more difficult to impose effectively. It increased the premium on over-the-horizon reconnaissance and surveillance, a problem that was intractable prior to the introduction of the aircraft.

Weapons for enforcement of blockade operations have to be employed only if a ship or aircraft attempts to breach the blockade. Weapons to *prevent* the imposition of a maritime blockade tend to be similar to those used for enforcement. Technologically, weapons for use in maritime environments have become longer in range, more stealthy (which makes them more difficult to counter), and more accurate. Air-to-surface weapons have achieved high precision owing to satellite guidance against fixed targets and to terminal homing against moving ones. Mines by and large are cost-effective weapons for use against ships and submarines. Submarines have proven very deadly in the enforcement of blockades—most recently in the Falklands War of 1982.

Using submarines for blockade running could be a future possibility, especially carrying teams of infiltrators with weapons of mass destruction. The limiting factor will be that states with submarines that might be used for such a purpose tend not to operate them competently. While about forty states in the world have submarines in their naval orders of battle, those of only a few routinely submerge or leave their territorial waters. Of course, that could change in the future, but it could not happen quickly or undetectably, without intelligence warning. Further, it is unlikely that a nonstate entity, such as a terrorist group, could acquire and competently operate a submarine.

Inspecting for and Detecting “Contraband”

The fourth of the technologies arises from the need to do more, having detected and stopped a ship, than check its manifests and match them against the cargo. Fortunately, “Technology has enhanced the capabilities of naval forces to conduct reconnaissance and identification over wide areas of the ocean and to detect the presence of some contrabands that were previously undetectable.”¹⁷

Containerization can easily foil off-board detection, however, and WMD can be very small and difficult to detect. Detection equipment exists for all known weapons of mass destruction; the problems are those of intrusiveness and sheer volume. This is where the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative supplement inspections at the destination port. They seek to ensure that no WMD or other materials that would assist terrorists are loaded into containers at their origin or added while the container is in transit. Technology is very much in an “assist mode” in this application; the first line of defense is to ensure that “contraband” is never placed in a container. The need to ensure that containers are not opened nor contents disturbed in any way makes seals and detection devices important. Significant technological efforts are under way in all these areas.¹⁸

If this book seems completely reasonable and all my extrapolations convincing, I will not have succeeded in looking very far ahead; for the one fact about the future of which we can be certain is that it will be utterly fantastic.

ARTHUR C. CLARKE

The U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act requires, in a provision that became effective 1 July 2004, that all foreign ships entering American ports have international shipping security certifications as well as secured bridges and engine rooms.¹⁹ The intent of the act, and of the CSI and PSI, is to ensure that no materials, such as weapons of mass destruction, can be shipped to underwrite acts of terrorism.

How blockade operations—to prevent the movement of ships, aircraft, and their specific cargoes—have been conducted and the means by which they have been conducted have changed significantly over time. Technology has been the handmaiden of change, and, especially recently, it has had to bear the burden of making blockades operationally effective. Blockade law has not evolved to meet the new demands placed upon it. International law, of course, is impotent to control international terrorist acts; in any case, the international movement of WMD would render moot any idea of “neutrals” whose rights need to be protected in the event of blockade operations.

As was clear even in the early 1990s, however, “over the history of naval and administrative blockade there has been a steady improvement in the technology of enforcement, but there has never been a blockade of a major state which was impermeable.”²⁰ Unfortunately, since one terrorist act with weapons of mass destruction could have cataclysmic effects, the success rate of blockades against them must be 100 percent. No blockade in history has been 100 percent effective in preventing “contraband” from entering a blockaded state or in completely suppressing blockade running. The odds favor the perpetrator in these cases. That is all the more reason why states must take all possible precautions and pursue as many approaches as possible to prevent such a calamity.

NOTES

1. The epigraph is from *Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible*, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 17 [emphasis original].
2. British blockades of the French often sought to encourage the French battle line to come out and fight: “Nelson’s blockade of Toulon in the period 1803–5 provides examples of every imaginable ruse to induce the French to put to sea.” Colin S. Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 21.
3. Michael G. Fraunces, “The International Law of Blockade: New Guiding Principles in Contemporary State Practice,” *Yale Law Journal* 101 (1991–92), p. 902.
4. “Weapons of Mass Destruction—Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons but exclude the means of transporting the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.” U.S. Defense Dept., *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 12 April 2001, as amended through 30 November 2004), pp. 573–74, available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
5. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf.
6. U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 12, no. 4 (1895), p. 856.
7. In October 2001 a suspected al-Qa’ida terrorist was apprehended at a port in southern Italy inside a container bound for Canada. He had provisions for a long journey, false documents, a bed, and a bucket for a toilet. Richard Owen and Daniel McGrory, “Business-Class

- Suspect Caught in Container,” *London Times*, 25 October 2001.
8. U.S. Navy Dept., *Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M (Washington, D.C.: Navy Staff, 1995), sec. 7-7.
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 10. Dimitri K. Simes, “What War Means,” *National Interest* (Thanksgiving 2001), pp. 37–38.
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 12. Craig Covault, “Sea Reconns Readied: NRO to Bolster Space-Based Ocean Surveillance to Track Suspicious Ships,” *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 1 December 2003.
 13. Thomas C. Hone and Norman Friedman, “Harnessing New Technologies,” in *Transforming America’s Military*, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 2002), p. 41.
 14. For a sampling see U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Joint Transformational Potential for High Altitude Long Loiter (HALL) Capabilities,” Rapid Assessment Process (RAP) Report 04-02 (Norfolk, Va.: May 2004), p. 10.
 15. Martin C. Libicki, “Technology and Warfare,” in *2015: Power and Progress*, ed. Patrick Cronin (Washington, D.C.: National War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, July 1996), available at www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/2015/chap4.html.
 16. Karl Lautenschlager, “Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare,” *International Security* 8, no. 2 (Fall 1983), pp. 17–18.
 17. Paul D. Hugill, *The Continuing Utility of Naval Blockades in the Twenty-first Century* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1998), pp. 5–6.
 18. See, for example, Maarten van de Voort and Kevin A. O’Brien, “Seacurity”: *Improving the Security of the Global Sea-Container Shipping System*, MR-1695-JRC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003).
 19. Epigraph from *Profiles of the Future*, p. xvii [emphasis original].
 20. Nicholas Tracy, *Attack on Maritime Trade* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 238.

WHEN IS COERCION SUCCESSFUL?

And Why Can't We Agree on It?

Patrick C. Bratton

When is coercion successful? How is success to be defined? Coercion, broadly speaking, is *the use of threats to influence another's behavior*.¹ Although there is a substantial and growing literature on coercion, there is little consensus within that literature as to what qualifies as a successful example of coercion. Different authors formulate their own definitions of "success" and apply them to case studies, often with contrasting findings within the same cases.² That is because the literature lacks a clear conceptual framework to analyze coercion. This absence of a shared framework limits the usefulness of the concept, even though much has been written about coercion since the seminal work of Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, was published in 1966. There are several deficiencies in the coercion literature, deficiencies that often lead authors to separate coercion from its actual context within foreign policy. Rather than judging the relative merits of coercive tools—different types of air power or the effectiveness of economic sanctions—or the short-term success of a coercive strategy, theorists should look at how and when coercion actually assists policy makers achieve their greater foreign policy goals.

Two principal weaknesses result from the lack of a conceptual framework: the absence of agreed definitions of what coercion is and who the coercer and target

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are; and disagreement on how to determine success. At this stage, it is useful to assess the coercion literature to see why these deficiencies exist and what can be done in future studies to deal with them. This article, then, is less an empirical study of coercion than a reflective essay attempting to assess where we currently stand and to explain why there is so little agreement as

to when coercion is successful.³ Coercion needs to be placed within the larger field of foreign policies of the relevant actors in order to see how it meets the needs, concerns, and options of policy makers.⁴

COERCION: WHAT IS IT, AND WHO DOES IT?

In the almost forty years that have passed since Schelling's work, the coercion literature has proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of its strategic counterpart, deterrence. Although authors generally agree on what is at the core of coercion—the use of threats to influence another's behavior—the coercion literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as each author seeks to build his or her own concept rather than refine the work of others.⁵ This is evident from the various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coercion: compellence, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military strategy, and strategic coercion.⁶ This proliferation of terminology has complicated the study of what makes coercion successful, since writers have their own criteria in mind and studies of even the same cases can lead to opposite conclusions.⁷ Depending on the author and the term used, the qualities imputed to the coercive process can vary in three principal ways: the types of threats that are included within coercion, the role of the use of force as compared to the threat of the use of force in coercion, and who the actors are.

What Types of Threats Are Involved?

Coercion is the use of threats to influence the behavior of another (usually a target state but occasionally a nonstate actor) by making it *choose* to comply rather than directly forcing it to comply (i.e., by brute force).⁸ Some authors separate *compellent* threats, made to cause an opponent to *stop* a current action or to *undertake* another, from *deterrent* threats, made to cause an opponent to *not take* a certain action, and on that basis discuss compellent threats as if the same as coercion.⁹ Others include both deterrent and compellent threats as two types of coercion.¹⁰ (Please refer to table 1—which, like the tables that follow, is intended not as a comprehensive list but as a visual aid.)

Thomas Schelling, in *Arms and Influence* and his other influential book *The Strategy of Conflict*, distinguished two types of coercive threats, deterrent and

compellent.¹¹ As Schelling explains, deterrence and compellence are merely two types of coercive threats, the difference being that “the threat that compels rather than deters

TABLE 1
WHAT TYPES OF THREATS ARE INVOLVED IN COERCION?

Only compellent threats (i.e., coercion is different from deterrence)	Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein, Robert Pape
Both compellent and deterrent threats (deterrence and compellence are both types of coercion)	Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, Wallace Thies, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman

often requires that the punishment be administered *until* the other acts, rather than *if* he acts.”¹² Deterrence, the better known of the two, is the threat to use force in retaliation if the opponent takes a certain action. In the words of Robert Art, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.”¹³

Compellence is the use of threats to make a target stop an action it has already undertaken, or to take an action that the coercer wants. Schelling elaborates that the difference between the two types of threats is the “difference between inducing inaction [deterrence] and making someone perform [compellence].”¹⁴ It is generally assumed that compellence should be more difficult to achieve than deterrence.¹⁵ Deterrence requires only that target states maintain the status quo, that they do nothing; they can claim that inaction is their free choice. In contrast, compellence involves an obvious change in behavior, acquiescence to the demands of the coercer, that could be costly in terms of prestige and domestic and international legitimacy.

Clearly, deterrence and compellence are two types of coercion, or two sides of the same coin. Both concepts depend on risk, threats, and choice. The coercer, whether seeking to deter or compel, is exploiting the potential risks the opponent faces in resisting the coercer’s threats. The coercer bases coercion “on the exploitation of threats, of *latent* violence,” what is yet to come unless the target complies.¹⁶ In both deterrence and compellence, the target chooses to comply. Writers on compellence generally assume that the target chooses rather than is forced to comply, and deterrence writers sometimes forget that “the deterree has to agree to be deterred.”¹⁷ In both cases, in fact, the choice of action versus inaction thus lies with the target.

Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target believes that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the threats will have a great impact on the target).¹⁸ Credibility normally depends on whether the coercer has a reputation for carrying out threats that it makes. Persuasiveness comes from the ability to threaten great damage to something the target considers vital. Threats are not automatically both credible and persuasive; they can also be one but not the other. For example, in the context of a trade dispute a threat of nuclear attack would be very persuasive but not very credible.

Schelling distinguishes compellence from “brute force” in that the coercer credibly threatens the opponent that if the action in question is not stopped, or a desired action is not taken, force will be used to *induce* compliance.¹⁹ If the opponent does not comply, force is applied. The coercer then hurts the opponent but not as much as it might, leaving open the threat of even more pain if the opponent still does not comply. In contrast, “brute force” is simply getting what one wants by violence, as much as it takes.

What Is the Role of Force?

The second conceptual divide concerns the actual or threatened use of force. The role of force complicates the coercion/compellence literature. Simply put, writers on deterrence do not spend much time on force, because the use of force implies the failure of deterrence.²⁰ Depending on the role assigned to the use of force, much of the coercion literature can be classified into three schools: coercion through diplomacy separate from the use of force; coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power); and coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force.²¹ Authors of the first school look at coercion as something that happens before “the first bomb is dropped.” The actual use of force, except for minor demonstrations of resolve, means that coercion has failed; the coercer is moving to brute force to take what it wants. These authors focus on the diplomatic techniques and difficulties of sending “signals” that convey clear coercive threats to the target and of “orchestrating” words and deeds into coherent messages that the target can clearly receive. For this school, coercion is an outcome produced by clear signaling and orchestration. The term “coercive diplomacy” here is intended to accentuate the political-diplomatic nature of this type of coercion, as opposed to the use of force to seize or destroy in “traditional military strategy.” The goal of coercive diplomacy is to *persuade* the opponent to halt what he is doing, not to strike him until his capabilities are so reduced that further resistance is futile. “Coercive diplomacy, then, calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is used at all—to demonstrate one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.”²²

The second school takes a much more forceful approach, viewing coercion as a process that happens during the use of force, or during the actual use of other “sticks,” such as economic sanctions. Coercion is the use of force to get the target to comply with the demands of the coercer, but without completely destroying the military forces of, and occupying, the target state. These writers look at the prospective merits of different coercive strategies, like punishment-versus-denial strategies or force versus economic sanctions. One prominent exemplar of this view limits his focus to open conflict or warfare, wherein coercion happens “after the first bomb has been dropped.” For instance, a successful example of military coercion for him is the American air and naval Pacific campaign, which in 1945 caused Japan to surrender without having been invaded and conquered. In contrast, the air campaign in Europe failed to coerce Germany, which refused to surrender and had to be overrun. One problem for this school, as has been pointed out, is that it is hard to distinguish clearly between coercion and brute force given the scale and intensity of the conflicts studied.²³

A third school of thought draws no sharp distinction between coercion virtually without force and that exercised only through force. For these writers, coercion includes both “signals” sent by diplomatic and military means and the actual use of force. For Schelling the use of force is essentially a continuation or escalation of a threat first articulated before any resort to force. What distinguishes coercion from brute force in this school is that force is used in a measured and controlled way to “signal” to the target the threat of further punishment unless it complies. Coercion for the third school subsumes “coercive diplomacy” and also includes forceful (sometimes very forceful) actions: “Coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done.”²⁴ A classic example is the effort of the Lyndon Johnson administration to coerce the North Vietnamese government to cease its support of the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam in the 1960s. In the view of a scholar who has

traced this attempt, there is no sharp break between, first, coercive diplomatic efforts backed by very limited and covert use of force in 1963–64; second, limited demonstrative uses of force in reprisals after the Gulf of

Tonkin incident; and third, the escalating air campaign of ROLLING THUNDER.²⁵ In this view the increasing use of force—in a measured and connected way—is a means of driving home the coercive threat, not necessarily representing the failure of coercion.

Threats and Force

The lack of a shared definition of coercion limits the scope of many studies, and unnecessarily. For example, authors who exclude deterrent threats from their analyses rule out many potentially fruitful areas of research. Similarly, a study of compellent threats that includes only economic sanctions or air power and not deterrent threats automatically excludes many potential cases and insights. It has been suggested that in practice deterrent and compellent threats “mingle” depending upon the actions and reactions of the coercer and target:

General demands to Iraq, such as “Don’t invade Kuwait,” appear to fall clearly in the deterrence camp, whereas calls to withdraw seem like compellence. The in-between areas are more ambiguous. “Don’t go further” involves both stopping an existing action and avoiding a future one—both immediate deterrence and coercion. Moreover, a call to withdraw carries with it an implicit demand not to engage in the offense again and affects the credibility of the deterrence call to not invade Kuwait in the future.²⁶

TABLE 2
WHAT ROLE DOES FORCE PLAY IN COERCION?

Coercion <i>before</i> the use of force	George, Gross Stein
Coercion only <i>through</i> force	Pape
Coercion through diplomacy <i>and</i> force	Schelling, Thies

Even more problematic, the absence of a common conceptual framework means that two authors examining the same cases can come to opposite conclusions. If their criteria and definitions differ, so will their conclusions as to when coercion is successful or not. A writer using the coercive diplomacy framework almost excludes the use of force;²⁷ according to coercive military strategy, however, the use of force is not in itself the failure of coercion.

These differing conceptual frameworks result, for example, in opposite points of view on the 1990–91 Gulf War. One scholar codes the 1990–91 Gulf War as a failure of compellence; Iraq's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait meant that compellence had failed, since the coalition's objective was to get Iraq to leave Kuwait without using force.²⁸ In contrast, another lists the Gulf War as a success for a coercive air strategy of denial. The U.S.-led coalition was able to use military force to get Baghdad to retreat from Kuwait without having to invade and occupy Iraq wholesale.²⁹

NATO's air war over Kosovo in 1999 may be an even better example. If one views coercion as the use of force only, Operation ALLIED FORCE looks like a success. NATO's bombing campaign caused the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo without a ground war and to allow the presence of NATO peacekeeping troops.³⁰ Many believe that "the prophecies of Giulio Douhet and other air power visionaries appear[ed to have been] realized," that air power can coerce by itself.³¹ However, if one adopts the perspective that coercion is exercised through both diplomacy and force, Kosovo seems at best like a limited and belated success, if not a failure. From March 1998 to March 1999, when Operation ALLIED FORCE began, the Serbs withstood various attempts at coercive diplomacy, which led the Serbs to believe that they could depopulate Kosovo and get away with it.³² In his view, the claim that the air war succeeded because the Serbs eventually capitulated begs the question of why it was necessary to have an air war at all. What led the Serbs to believe that they could ignore a full year of coercive threats, apparently without fear of force being used against them?³³ NATO's coercion of Serbia did not begin "once the first bomb was dropped" but a full year before. Looking for coercion only in the air war and not the deterrence and compellence failures that preceded it effectively excludes from consideration many of the most interesting questions about coercion, about how it works and why it succeeds or fails.

Who Are the Actors?

Coercion writers have for the most part assumed that states involved in coercion are unitary, rational actors.³⁴ Schelling, an economist by training, often incorporated into his writings examples drawn from interpersonal relations—such as mugger and victim, buyer and seller, parent and child—that assume the rational,

value maximizing actors of classic economic theory. This model takes the costs of noncompliance (sticks) and of compliance (carrots) as the independent variables, to be raised and lowered, respectively, against change in the target state's policies as the dependent variable.³⁵ The general underlying theory suggests that if the coercer can make not complying costlier than complying, coercion should be successful. If not, coercion is likely to fail. Success is conventionally thought of as achieved when the target complies with the coercer's demands. This presumption implies that the coercer does not need to know a great deal about the target, only to "step into its shoes" and imagine how a rational, calculating actor would respond to sticks and carrots.

Some more recent authors have slightly modified this assumption, to acknowledge, for instance, that factions within a target state can influence its reactions (Japan in 1945 is an excellent example). One scholar argues that various types of economic sanctions are more or less effective depending on whether the target is democratic or an authoritarian regime. Another makes a convincing point that whether the coercing state has a strong presidential system or a parliamentary one can affect how effectively it sends signals.³⁶

Schelling himself conceded that there is a difference between coercing an individual and coercing a government, but he did not develop the point extensively.³⁷ It has been subsequently pointed out that the rational actor model forgets that the coercer and the target of the coercion are actually governments rather than individuals: "Governments are coalitions of numerous individual decision-makers, virtually all of whom occupy positions within large, semi-autonomous, bureaucratic organizations; any government involved in an attempt at coercion is likely to speak with many voices at once."³⁸

In most, if not all, instances of coercion, groups or individuals in the target state's government have staked their positions and reputations on the policies or actions that cause the coercion in the first place.³⁹ It is likely to be extremely difficult, if possible at all, to convince them that the costs of pursuing this policy would be prohibitive, no matter how high those costs become. Moreover, as has been suggested, it is difficult "to assess the impact of particular coercive pressures" upon the adversary's decision-making process.⁴⁰ Different targets will not respond identically to the same coercive threats.⁴¹ A convincing case can be made that the type of regime targeted for economic coercion has a great effect on the types of coercive threats that are most effective against it.⁴² Even in the same state, individuals or groups might react differently to coercive threats, and some might be more or less responsive to various types of threats to different parts of the target. "For officials involved in an attempt at coercion, then, the problems that they must confront include not only deciding what demands they

should make of an opponent but also learning *who* on the other side must do *what* if the attempt at coercion is to succeed and *how* can the coercer's action be manipulated, if at all."⁴³

Diplomatic threats might mean more to people in a foreign ministry than in a defense ministry, and economic sanctions might have more impact on elected officials than on nonelected ones. One target might be more vulnerable to threats to its industrial centers, while another's military forces might be more susceptible; yet others are not particularly sensitive to threats to either. It has been argued that a coercer needs to determine the Clausewitzian "centers of gravity"—the target's greatest sources of strength, either material or intangible, that "if destroyed, would cause the enemy's resistance to collapse[;] . . . only by threatening the state's center of gravity can a coercer compel the greatest concessions from the target state."⁴⁴ The record of attempts to coerce Saddam Hussein shows that he was most sensitive to threats to his relationship with his power base; that threats to his conventional military power, public sentiment, or the Iraqi economy were less effective.⁴⁵

That individuals within a target government react differently to coercive measures suggests that even if a coercer succeeded in getting demands accepted in the short term, it would be very difficult to secure complete acquiescence in the long term, because certain members of the target's government would attempt to reinstate their objectionable policies, since their political careers (and in some regimes, their lives) depend on it. Coercers, then, need to know a great deal about the regime's composition and internal political struggles, not conceptualize it as a "rational, calculating actor." The coercer needs to know the "political realities within the target state's government and to shape their policies in a way that maximizes the influence of those in the target state's government whose hopes and fears are most compatible with the coercer's objectives."⁴⁶ In some cases there will be factions that are compatible with the coercer's desires, in others not.

To illustrate the effects of internal politics on the responses of targets, it is useful to compare the successful case of coercion in the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 with the failure against North Vietnam from 1963 to 1968. In the former, Nikita Khrushchev's decision to deploy the missiles to Cuba was taken only about six months before the crisis erupted.⁴⁷ In addition, he made his choices very quickly and with only a small circle of advisers; there was relatively little political or bureaucratic struggle over the decision to deploy the missiles.⁴⁸ The Soviets appeared surprised by the Kennedy administration's firm reaction to the missiles and not to have considered the possibility of war—even a limited one in the Caribbean, let alone a nuclear one—with the United States. Given their surprise and lack of preparation for a war, it is perhaps understandable that

they yielded when offered tangible incentives (the pledge not to invade Cuba and the offer to withdraw missiles from Turkey).⁴⁹

In contrast, the North Vietnamese decision to aid the Viet Cong and resist American pressure was the outcome of a bitter intraparty debate—involving figures, like Le Duan, who had staked their political reputations and careers in the North Vietnamese government on not yielding to American pressure—over the course of an entire decade.⁵⁰ As a result of this debate, the North Vietnamese government took seriously the threat of conflict with the United States, even a direct American invasion of North Vietnam, and vigorously prepared for such an eventuality. Unlike the Soviets in Cuba, the North Vietnamese were unsurprised by American pressure, even escalating force. “We can hypothesize that the longer the bureaucratic battles involved, the more rigid the positions of the participants will become and the greater the stake each participant will have in insuring that his preferred course of action is adopted.”⁵¹

For its part, the coercing state is made up of competing bureaus and organizations. Orchestrating clear signals can be difficult, because “the leadership itself speaks with many voices at once, and there is no guarantee that every voice will convey the same message.”⁵² Messages sent by governments can thus be contradictory and self-defeating. For example, in June 1998, American threats meant to induce Serbia to halt its offensive against Kosovo were supposed to be reinforced by open planning for a military intervention and by air exercises.⁵³ Unfortunately, these efforts were undermined by public comments of national security adviser Samuel Berger and Secretary of Defense William Cohen that no plans for military intervention were “on the table” and that the exercises were only that, exercises.⁵⁴

Even given agreement on the use of a coercive strategy, the issues of how, when, and with what tools that strategy is to be implemented can be contentious and reduce its effectiveness. Members of various agencies will probably suggest policies that draw upon their organizations’ expertise—military action for defense ministries, diplomatic action for foreign ministries, etc. For example, in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, as many argue, the People’s Liberation Army played a key role in a decision to shift the unification strategies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from “peaceful coexistence” to coercive diplomacy through shows of force—missile tests and military exercises—to make compelling threats to the Republic of China.⁵⁵ It has been argued that the Army did so because it saw the diplomatic sanctions of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs—the cancellation of visits and the recall of the ambassador to Washington—as “weak and indecisive.”⁵⁶ Individuals and organizations within the same state can find themselves in intense competition for the adoption of “their” policies over rivals’, or put organizations or services at cross purposes.

Therefore (see table 3), coercion theorists need to analyze the reactions of the target as the responses of groups and organizations rather than of a rational individual. Theorists must also take into consideration the fact that the coercer is not a unitary rational actor either.

TABLE 3
WHO ARE THE ACTORS?

Best thought of as identical, unitary, rational calculating actors	Schelling, George, Pape,* and Daniel Drezner
Rational actors that can be somewhat different (democracies vs. authoritarian governments) or are made up of a few simple parts (government, military, public, etc.)	Pape,* Risa Brooks, Byman and Waxman
Complex governments that both threaten and respond to threats differently	Thies, David Auerswald

* In some cases Pape treats the target as unitary rational actor, but in others he distinguishes between different factions that react differently to coercive threats (as in the case of Japan and Germany in World War II). See his *Bombing to Win*, pp. 108–27 and 283–313.

PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES

Much of the literature on coercion (whatever the term used) is devoted to the practice of coercive strategies rather than the results of coercion. This is particularly true of works that focus on air power and economic sanctions as coercive instruments.⁵⁷ This approach, while valuable, risks suggesting that the right strategy and the right coercive tool will prevail no matter the consequences or setting. In other words, the right strategy will actually have yielded very little in the long term if the target continues to take actions like those that caused the coercion in the first place.⁵⁸

It is often forgotten that coercion is only a tool of foreign policy and that “success” in coercion depends not only upon the tactical success of a particular coercive strategy but also upon the benefits accruing to the foreign policies of coercing states. Coercion does not take place within a vacuum; important political, historical, and situational factors influence outcomes.⁵⁹ “The effectiveness of coercive strategies will therefore depend on the overall political context in which they are implemented, and even a potentially promising use of force can be squandered by an ineffectual diplomacy.”⁶⁰

It must be remembered that coercion is not a substitute for an effective foreign policy.⁶¹ A comprehensive study has been made of American political uses of military forces, including coercive (both deterrent and compellent) threats and deployments in support of allies, between 1946 and 1975. It found that most of the time these actions served only to buy time and that the effectiveness declined sharply over time.⁶² It “should be recognized that these military operations cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions—diplomacy, close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and

perceptions—which can form the basis either for sound and successful alliances or for stable adversary relations.”⁶³ If coercion, then, can produce only a breathing space, the coercer needs to consider using that time to “*reduce the motivation* underlying that [aggressive] intention, and/or to *provide alternative goals* that may be relatively satisfactory to the deterred [or in this case, the coerced] power.”⁶⁴

For example, it has been argued that China was successful in its efforts to coerce Taiwan during the 1995–96 crisis. At first glance, the PRC does seem to have achieved some of its goals in the short term, with respect both to Washington and Taipei. In Washington, President William Clinton gave a public assurance that the United States did not support “a two-China policy, Taiwan independence, or Taiwan membership in the UN.” In Taipei, the pro-independence Democratic People’s Party made a poor showing in the March 1996 elections, President Lee Teng-hui scaled back his “independence diplomacy,” and Beijing found itself taken more seriously in the region, especially regarding its willingness to use military force over Taiwan.⁶⁵

However, the long-term benefits of that coercion for China are less clear. The American and Taiwanese defense relationship, which had been left uncertain under the American policy of “calculated ambiguity,” was now clarified: the United States was both willing and able to defend Taiwan militarily.⁶⁶ Beijing’s actions increased the perception in Washington of the PRC as a threat, particularly among the “anti-China” lobby.⁶⁷ American and Taiwanese defense cooperation, which had been almost withering away, as some feel, since the 1970s, was renewed and strengthened by Beijing’s threats.⁶⁸ President Lee, who won the election, after a short pause resumed his efforts to increase Taiwan’s international recognition, including lobbying for UN membership, high-profile visa requests, and international trips (his “transit diplomacy”).⁶⁹ Security arrangements between the United States and other powers in the region, like Japan and South Korea, were also increased, and if other Asian countries took Beijing more seriously, it was because they had reassessed the PRC as a possible future security threat.⁷⁰ “The international reaction to China’s military coercion surprised Beijing, which had hoped that most countries would close their eyes to its efforts to punish Taiwan. . . . In fact, Beijing’s actions quickly internationalized the Taiwan issue in a way that had not occurred since 1971. . . . By going too far, Beijing catalyzed international opinion against itself.”⁷¹

Coding Coercive Outcomes

Most authors categorize the outcomes of coercion as either “success” or “failure.” “Success” is said to occur if the target concedes to a significant part of the coercer’s demands, and “failure” when it does not. A scholar associated with this “unidimensional” criterion, analyzing strategic bombing campaigns, codes as

successes the campaigns against Japan in 1942–45 and North Korea in 1950–53, the LINEBACKER raids in 1972, and the 1990–91 Gulf War, but as failures the campaign against Nazi Germany in 1942–45 and ROLLING THUNDER in 1965–68.⁷²

Others reject this simple approach.⁷³ One argues, for instance, that a unidimensional criterion for success—that the target concedes to a “significant part of the coercer’s demands”—“does not allow for gradations in the degree or kind of success.”⁷⁴ Such an analysis, on this view, ignores both the costs for the coercer of using sanctions and the possibilities of partial success. In other words, a “multidimensional” approach would acknowledge that sanctions, for instance, can be *useful* to policy makers without “working” in and of themselves.⁷⁵ It is worth quoting one scholar at length on this point:

What policymakers “most want to know” is not, as [scholar Robert] Pape asserts, “when the strategy of economic sanctions can change another state’s behavior without resorting to military force,” but rather when economic sanctions are likely to have more utility than military force. The deductive case for using economic sanctions is not based solely on the comparative effectiveness of military force and economic sanctions, as Pape implies; it is based on their comparative utility, which is a function of both effectiveness and costs. Thus it is quite possible for sanctions to be more useful than force even in situations in which they are less effective.⁷⁶

Some demands will be easier for the target to meet than others; “a moderate degree of success in accomplishing a difficult task may seem more important than a high degree of success in accomplishing an easy task.”⁷⁷

For one scholar, whatever the form of coercion, the more important question “is not whether it works, but whether it is useful, and if so, whether it is worthwhile.”⁷⁸ Another, moreover, criticizes the “simple dichotomy of success/failure” in the economic sanctions literature. The idea that success is a return to the status quo ante and failure anything else is an unfair test. On this view, outcomes need to include the possibilities of compromise between the actors and to take into consideration what is demanded of the target.⁷⁹

Other “multidimensionalists” look not for either success or failure but for marginal changes in the probability of behavior.⁸⁰ It is not an “either-or” contest. Further, different coercive tools can work together to produce results; “economic and military pressure can act together synergistically—just as naval and infantry forces usually work with air power.”⁸¹ Coercion, it is argued, is a dynamic process; because the target is not static, it can attempt both to neutralize coercive pressures and coerce the coercer in return.⁸² This interaction can lead to unpredictable results that do not fit neatly into complete successes or failures.⁸³

As has been argued, it is misleading to code cases of coercion in absolute binary metrics, with “success” and “failure” the only possible outcomes. An attempt

at coercion that “fails” does not necessarily return the situation to that which previously existed; the new situation could be much worse for the coercer. In any case the coercer must pay enforcement or implementation costs, and these can outweigh the benefits of even successful coercion, making it Pyrrhic.⁸⁴ A comparison between the international position of the United States in 1963, before the expansion of the coercive conflict against Hanoi, and in 1973, at the time of the withdrawal from Vietnam, shows that “failure” does not simply mean returning to the previous status quo.

Authors (see table 4) then need to expand the framework on coercion to include results that cannot neatly fit into either success or failure. All too often, coercion and coercive tools are viewed “in a vacuum” and are judged on their ability to coerce in and of themselves.⁸⁵ The focus of much of the literature on coercive tools reinforces a belief that success in a particular coercive strategy will translate into the achievement of some policy goal.⁸⁶

TABLE 4
HOW IS SUCCESS DEFINED?

Full compliance with coercer’s demands, independent of any other factors	Pape
Need to distinguish degrees of success. Possible to have partial success or secure secondary objectives without securing primary objectives	Kimberly Elliot, Drezner, Karl Mueller, and Byman and Waxman

Coercion and the Great Air Power Debate

The tendency to study coercive methods at the expense of their long-term consequences is perhaps most marked among writers who focus on the role of air power as a coercive tool. The failure of air power in the Vietnam War and its apparent recent success in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have both rekindled the “great air power debate”—Can air power win wars by itself?—and have tied that debate to coercion.⁸⁷ Like coercion theorists, air power proponents have sought to show that it can force a target to capitulate with its military forces undefeated, while air power pessimists have doubted the ability of air power to “do it alone.”⁸⁸

In an attempt to resolve the air power debate by combining it with the coercion literature, a distinction was drawn between *denial* strategies, which target and disrupt the enemy’s military strategy through the combined pressure of theater air and ground forces, and *punishment* strategies, in which strategic air power targets civilian centers. The conclusion from the case studies adduced is that denial strategies can produce successful coercion while punishment strategies are rarely successful. In that case, the best (if not only) way to coerce

successfully is to “undermine the target state’s confidence in its own military strategy.”⁸⁹ Once the costs of resisting are higher than the costs of surrendering, coercion can succeed; hence, the successful coercer manipulates effectively “the costs and benefits” of continuing the action in question. However, denial is not a silver bullet; it is not guaranteed to work in all situations. It is most effective against an opponent who uses a conventional military strategy that depends on massive logistical support and communications and offers lucrative targets for air strikes. On the contrary, if the opponent relies on a guerrilla strategy that depends on local support and slight logistical “tail,” denial is likely to fail.

An illustration of the superiority of denial strategies might be the Johnson administration’s failure to coerce Hanoi by means of a combination of punishment and denial strategies from 1965 to 1968 (ROLLING THUNDER), as compared to the success of the Richard Nixon administration’s denial strategy in 1972 (LINEBACKER I and II).⁹⁰ Conventional punishment failed, as some argue it almost always will, and conventional denial failed as well, because bombing could not easily disrupt Hanoi’s guerrilla strategy of the earlier period, which required no elaborate logistical network. However, when Hanoi switched to a conventional strategy in its 1972 offensive against South Vietnam, it became vulnerable to the denial bombing campaigns of LINEBACKER I and II. These campaigns, it is argued, halted the North Vietnamese offensive and brought Hanoi to agree to U.S. demands at the negotiating table: “The bombing was a coercive success, forcing the North to cease its ground offensive and accept a cease-fire, even though it retained the capacity to continue organized military action.”⁹¹

Such conclusions about the LINEBACKER strikes are an excellent example of the dangers of concentrating on coercive tools but losing sight of the actual long-term effects of coercion. It is true that in the short term the LINEBACKER strikes disrupted the North Vietnamese offensive and guaranteed the independence of South Vietnam during the American withdrawal. However, what the North could not accomplish in 1973 it accomplished in 1975, when Saigon fell. It seems a stretch to list the LINEBACKER campaign with the surrender of Japan in 1945 or the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 as a successful example of coercion. To do so would lower the standards to endorse policies that at best only buy time or save face, rather than secure desired outcomes.

Coercion and the Sanctions Debate

In contrast to the air power debate, the economic sanctions debate largely concerns the merits of sanctions themselves rather than the relative merits of different types. Some authors attempt to judge sanctions on their ability to coerce targets by themselves; for these authors, success is when the target complies with

the coercer's demands, failure is when they do not. Judged by this standard sanctions appear to be a "notoriously poor tool of statecraft," with a very low success rate.⁹² At first glance this seems to be a logical and rigorous standard; in fact, however, it is an unrealistic and unfair test for economic sanctions.⁹³

As has been pointed out, economic sanctions cannot be evaluated only by their ability to coerce targets by themselves.⁹⁴ The costs and benefits of economic sanctions must be evaluated within the context of other instruments that policy makers have at their disposal, such as military force or diplomacy. Moreover, depending on that context, "ineffective" economic sanctions might be the best, or the only, option available.⁹⁵ There are always costs to using coercion, and the most "effective" tools are not always the most useful.⁹⁶ In certain circumstances, for instance, the use of military force is unthinkable. For example, during the 1956 Suez crisis, President Dwight Eisenhower wanted to coerce two allies, Britain and France, but military force could hardly be used against liberal democratic allies, however "effective" it might be in theory. The president instead threatened an economic sanction—refusal to let the International Monetary Fund provide a backup loan to Britain (the currency of which was under increasing pressure) or to give access to dollar credits to pay for oil imports from dollar zones in North and South America.⁹⁷ If economic sanctions are "notoriously poor tools of statecraft," are there any better tools that are low cost, always available, and highly likely to succeed? The answer, once again (see table 5), depends on the definition of success.⁹⁸

TABLE 5
WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF COERCION?

Whether or not certain coercive tools (air power strategies, economic sanctions, etc.) can coerce by themselves	Pape
How coercive tools can help meet the greater foreign policy goals for statesmen	David Baldwin, Mueller, Elliot, and Byman and Waxman

WHERE DOES THE FIELD GO FROM HERE?

This controversy over success and outcomes does more than complicate academic arguments; it has consequences for policy. States have used coercion at least since the time of Thucydides, and all indications from recent events—the 1999 war over Kosovo, Indo-Pakistani standoffs, Russian pressure on Georgia, and the American pressure against Iraq—imply that states will continue to use coercion as a foreign policy tool.⁹⁹ Yet for all the rich history of coercion and manifest willingness of many states to use it, coercion lacks a commonly accepted conceptual framework. Should policy makers think of deterrence and coercion as separate strategies having nothing to do with one another, or of deterrent and compellent threats as two types of coercion that may overlap in

practice? Can a coercer simply reason deductively, on the basis of how rational individuals would respond to threats and pressure? Or does a coercer need to have accurate intelligence on the composition and politics of the target's decision-making system? How can policy makers know the difference between conditions and techniques that are conducive to success and those that are not, when the very meaning of "success" is contested? Do air power and economic sanctions need to be effective by themselves to be useful?

Three things could be done to increase the understanding of when coercion "works" and when it does not. First, coercive theorists should concentrate on building a solid, shared definition of coercion, rather than each one designing his or her own topic with its own qualifications. A third school, one that considers both the threat and the use of force, should provide an adequate compromise on the role force should play in coercion, since it acknowledges that the answer depends on the case in question. At times threats are all that might be required, at other times only force might work, and many cases will fall somewhere in between.

Indeed, the answers to some of the questions listed above as left open by the literature are in fact clear enough. The reasons, after all, that effective coercion is rare are, first, that states sending and receiving signals do not behave as unified actors, and second, that coercion is best viewed as a process rather than an outcome, being the product of a wide array of interactions among distinctive international actors.¹⁰⁰ Neither the coercing government nor a target government is a unitary, rational actor. Further, coercers do need to know a great deal about the nature of the target to determine whether it is likely to be coercible, and if so, what kinds of threats will be most effective. Because they are not unitary actors, coercers can rarely send clear "signals" or "orchestrate" coherent messages, and targets can rarely be relied upon to listen to the correct messages or draw the right conclusions.¹⁰¹

Second, concerning the outcomes of coercion, it would be useful to analyze coercion in terms of positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or failures. It has been argued that studies should focus on the "outcomes related to the principal behavior desired by [the coercer and the target]."¹⁰² As suggested earlier, the dependent variable should be defined as a marginal change in the behavior of the target rather than in absolute terms—complete compliance with the coercer's demands versus no compliance at all. The more the outcome suits the desires of the coercer, the more positively the outcome can be rated. If the target does not change its behavior to suit the coercer's demands—by maintaining its current behavior or intensifying its activities—the outcome can be judged as negative. Outcomes achieved in the short term can differ from what emerges in the long term, as the examples of the LINEBACKER raids and the 1995–96 Taiwan

Strait crisis illustrate. Moreover, the outcomes can be positive for both the coercer and the target if a compromise can be found that is acceptable for both; in truly disastrous cases, one can conceive negative outcomes for both.¹⁰³

Third, writers need to place coercion in the perspective of the greater foreign policies of states rather than concentrate on “how-to” approaches, and they should not assume that the success of a particular coercive strategy will meet the needs and concerns, and fit the options, of policy makers. It would be useful to consider not only how examples of coercion play out but also their long-term impacts (positive or negative) on the triggering events, the internal politics of both coercers and targets, and the relations between the actors in the years following the coercive acts.¹⁰⁴ What is needed is a comparative study that goes beyond the incidents of coercion themselves to examine the contexts in which the selected cases occurred and their aftermaths, in order to see when coercion in combination with an effective foreign policy can yield long-term benefits.¹⁰⁵ As is often said, “It is possible to win the war but lose the peace.” The political interactions at the end of a crisis, or just following a conflict, can be just as vital as the ones just before.¹⁰⁶ What Colin Gray has said of competent strategists could be applied to competent coercive strategies: “A competent strategist . . . balances means with ends and understands that lasting success requires the definition of the international order which erstwhile foes find tolerable. An incompetent strategist . . . fails to define and settle for such an order.”¹⁰⁷

NOTES

1. This definition is a broad synthesis of Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 2–6; Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” in *Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation*, ed. Oran Young (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 344; Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” *Strategic Coercion: Cases and Concepts*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), p. 15; and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), p. 1.
2. Janice Gross Stein argues that the 1990–91 Gulf War was a failure of compellence, and Robert Pape that it was a success for a coercive military strategy of denial. See Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–91: A Failed or Impossible Task?” *International Security* 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 170–79; and Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 211–19.
3. This essay seeks to emulate Donald Puchala and Stuart Fagan’s stock-taking of the international relations literature in “International Politics in the 1970s: The Search for a Perspective,” *International Organization* 28, no. 2 (Spring 1974), p. 248.
4. Karl Mueller, David Baldwin, and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman have also made this point. See Mueller, “Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power,” *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 201–202; Baldwin, “Correspondence: Evaluating Economic Sanctions,” *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998),

- p. 189; and Byman and Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), p. 6.
5. This has been similar to the ever-expanding list of names of liberalism and realism (utopianism, liberal-idealism, neo-liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, traditional realism, neo-realism, structural realism, contingent realism, etc.).
 6. Schelling uses "coercion" and "compellence," in *Arms and Influence*; Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons use the term "coercive diplomacy," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba and Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Ellsberg, "coercion," in "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," pp. 343–63; Pape, "military coercion," in *Bombing to Win*; Stephen Cimbala, "coercive military strategy," in *Coercive Military Strategy* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1998); Freedman, "strategic coercion," in "Strategic Coercion"; and Byman and Waxman, "coercion," in *The Dynamics of Coercion*.
 7. For example, the contrasting findings of Gross Stein and Pape in the case of the 1990–91 Gulf War mentioned in note 1. There is also a debate over whether Operation ALLIED FORCE, the air war over Kosovo, was a success (as Javier Solana and Wesley Clark see it) or a failure, or at best a qualified success (as Wallace Thies sees it). See Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November–December 1999), pp. 114–20; Clark [Gen., USA (Ret.)], *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), pp. xxv, 417–19; and Thies, "Compellence Failure or Coercive Success: The Case of NATO and Yugoslavia," *Comparative Strategy* 22 (June 2003), pp. 243–67.
 8. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 2–3. There has been a growing interest in the differences and difficulties of coercing nonstate actors like terrorist groups and drug traffickers. See Joseph Leggold, "Hypothesis on Vulnerability: Are Terrorists and Drug Traffickers Coercible?" in *Strategic Coercion*, ed. Freedman, pp. 131–50; and Yezid Sayigh, "A Non-State Actor as Coercer and Coerced: The PLO in Lebanon, 1969–1976," in *Strategic Coercion*, ed. Freeman, pp. 212–48.
 9. See George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence," pp. 147–48 (notes); Alexander George and William Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); and Pape, *Bombing to Win*.
 10. See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 69–86; Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," pp. 344–45; Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," pp. 20–26; and Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pp. 6–9.
 11. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), and *Arms and Influence*; also the summary of Schelling's contribution to nuclear strategy in Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 219–23.
 12. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 70.
 13. Robert Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" *International Security* 4, no. 3 (Spring 1980), p. 6.
 14. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 175.
 15. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" pp. 8–10; Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," p. 34; and Pape, *Bombing to Win*, p. 6. Schelling qualified this by saying: in a "world without uncertainty . . . [i]t is easier to *deter* than to *compel*" [italics original], p. 100. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein debate this assumption; see "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (1990), pp. 351–53. The difficulties in getting an opponent to acquiesce through coercion when the leadership of the target state has staked its political capital on the policy in question is addressed in detail by Wallace Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–68* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980).
 16. Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," p. 21.
 17. Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), p. 338.
 18. Thies, "Compellence Failure or Coercive Success?" p. 5. Also see James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68–91; and David Auerswald, *Disarmed Democracies: Institutions and the Use of Force* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 133–36.

19. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 79–80.
20. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
21. Alexander George and Janice Gross Stein represent the first school; Robert Pape, Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman the second; and Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, Wallace Thies, and Lawrence Freedman the third.
22. George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 10.
23. Mueller, “Strategies of Coercion,” pp. 191–92.
24. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 172.
25. Thies, *When Governments Collide*.
26. Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” pp. 19–20; and Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pp. 7–9.
27. For example, two of Pape’s cases, the bombing of Germany and of Japan in the Second World War, would automatically be excluded by George’s framework.
28. Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence,” pp. 170–79.
29. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, pp. 211–19, although Pape finds the Gulf War a failure for a coercive military strategy of decapitation (pp. 211–14, 226–40).
30. Former Secretary-General Javier Solana and General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time, take this position. See Solana, “NATO’s Success in Kosovo,” pp. xxv, and Clark, *Waging Modern War*, pp. 417–19.
31. Byman and Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” p. 5.
32. Thies, “Compellence Failure or Coercive Success,” pp. 2–3.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3, 41–47.
34. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 2–5; George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 18–19; and Pape, *Bombing to Win*, pp. 15–18.
35. Interestingly, carrots have not received as much attention as sticks, though there are exceptions. See Daniel W. Drezner, “The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements,” *Security Studies* 9, no. 2 (Fall 1999/Winter 2000), pp. 188–218.
36. On the first point see Pape, *Bombing to Win*, pp. 108–27, 283–313; on the second, Risa Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Types: What Works, and When?” *Security Studies* 11, no. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 12–20; and the last, Auerswald, *Disarmed Democracies*, pp. 132–36.
37. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 85–86; and cited by Thies, *When Governments Collide*, p. 221.
38. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, p. 13.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 262–66, esp. chap. 5, “Coercing Governments,” pp. 213–83.
40. Byman and Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” p. 12.
41. As Yaacov Vertzberger remarks, “Culture shapes the decisionmaker’s style of thinking, mode of judgment, and attitude to information. The norms of rationality are culture-bound; that is, the same behavior may be interpreted differently in different cultures.” Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990), p. 270.
42. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Types,” pp. 1–50.
43. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, pp. 13–14.
44. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 595–97; and Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman, “Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past,” *Survival* 40, no. 3 (Fall 1998), p. 127.
45. Byman, Pollack, and Waxman, “Coercing Saddam Hussein,” pp. 140–42.
46. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, p. 417.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
48. As Thies notes, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Dobrynin, was apparently unaware of the deployment of missiles to Cuba; *ibid.*, p. 281. Drawing upon declassified documents, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali give the date of Khrushchev’s decision even later than Thies, on 20–21 May 1962. See *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro,*

- and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 179–83.
49. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, p. 281.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 262–83.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 280. See also Ann Cheng Guan, *The Vietnam War from the Other Side* (New York: RoutledgeCurson, 2002).
52. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, p. 286.
53. Thies, “Compellence Failure or Coercive Success,” p. 23.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.
55. You Ji, “Changing Leadership Consensus,” in *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis*, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 86–90; Suisheng Zhao, “Changing Leadership Perceptions: The Adoption of a Coercive Strategy,” in *Across the Taiwan Strait*, ed. Zhao, pp. 99–103; Steven Goldstein, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” in *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, ed. Alastair Ian Johnston and Robert Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 73; and Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000), pp. 232–36.
56. Scobell, “Show of Force,” p. 235.
57. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, and “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136; Byman and Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate”; and Elizabeth Rogers, “Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts,” *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 43–72.
58. This could be argued of the LINEBACKER II air strikes in 1972. The North Vietnamese offensive was halted, but shortly thereafter the United States withdrew and Hanoi conquered Saigon. For an argument of the success of LINEBACKER, see Robert Pape, “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,” *International Security* 16, no. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 130–45.
59. George and Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 270–74; Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 109–32; Korina Kagan, “The Failure of the Great Powers to Coerce Small States in the Balkans, 1875–1877 and 1914: Situational versus Tactical Explanation,” in *Strategic Coercion*, ed. Freedman, pp. 90–92; and Thies, “Compellence Failure or Coercive Success?” p. 6.
60. Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” p. 33.
61. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, p. 415.
62. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*, p. 517.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 517–18.
64. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974), p. 63 [emphasis in original] (as quoted in Thies, *When Governments Collide*, pp. 414–15).
65. Scobell, “Show of Force,” pp. 243–44, 112–18; and Robert Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), p. 90.
66. John Garver, *Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 149–50.
67. *Ibid.*; and Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Implications for U.S. Security Policy,” in *Across the Taiwan Strait*, ed. Zhao, pp. 281–84.
68. Van Vranken Hickey, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996,” pp. 279–90; and Goldstein, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” pp. 77–78.
69. Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,” pp. 115–16.
70. Garver, *Face Off*, pp. 139–45.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
72. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, pp. 52–54.
73. They include David Baldwin, Daniel Drezner, Karl Mueller, Kimberly Elliot, Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman.
74. Baldwin, “Correspondence,” p. 191. These points were in an exchange of correspondence in which David Baldwin took issue with Robert Pape’s unidimensional analysis of economic sanctions.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

77. David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), p. 372.
78. Mueller, "Strategies of Coercion," p. 204.
79. Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 18–19.
80. Byman and Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," pp. 13–15, and *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pp. 33–37; and Daniel Byman, Eric Larson, and Matthew Waxman, *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 22–26.
81. See Kimberly Elliot, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 54–57.
82. See Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, "Defeating U.S. Coercion," *Survival* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 107–20.
83. See also Elliot, "The Sanctions Glass," p. 56. Thies comes to similar conclusions, particularly in *When Governments Collide*, chap. 6, "The Government as Coercer: Idioms and Orchestration," pp. 284–348.
84. Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," p. 30.
85. The works of Robert Pape are the classic example of this tendency. See *Bombing to Win* and "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136.
86. George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 226–27; and Thies, *When Governments Collide*, pp. 416–20.
87. For a good introduction to the writings of the air power theorists, see David MacIsaac, "Voices from Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 624–47.
88. For a good introduction to the air power debate see *ibid.*, and Byman and Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate."
89. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, p. 10.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 174–76, 209–10.
91. Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," p. 131.
92. Kim Richard Nossal, *Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1994), p. xv (as quoted in David Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," *International Security* 24, no. 3 [Winter 1999–2000], pp. 80–107).
93. This point was well made by Elliot, "The Sanctions Glass," p. 51.
94. Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," pp. 85–96.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 92, and Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 66–67.
96. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, pp. 65–69.
97. Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman, 2000), p. 159; and Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," p. 115.
98. As Baldwin well put it, "It is not enough to describe the disadvantage of sanctions, one must show that some other policy alternative is better. If the menu of choice includes only the options of sinking or swimming, the observation that swimming is a 'notoriously poor' way to get from one place to another is not very helpful." "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," pp. 83–84.
99. There is a rich set of examples of coercion in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, but see especially "Book I: The Spartan Ultimatum and Pericles Reply," pp. 118–23, and "Book IV: The Melian Dialogue," pp. 400–408 (citations from Rex Warner's translation [New York: Penguin Books, 1972]). However, the practice of coercion goes back much farther than the Greeks.
100. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
101. Thies, *When Governments Collide*, pp. 386–99.
102. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*, p. 68. Blechman and Kaplan further argue that "success' and 'failure' imply causation, which cannot be determined absolutely" (p. 67).
103. The 1898 Fashoda crisis may be an example of a "win-win" outcome from coercion. Great Britain coerced France into withdrawing from Sudan but was careful to support the solidification of France's West and North African territories; by 1904 the powers were no longer rivals but allies. Perhaps the best example of negative outcomes for all parties is

Austria's failed coercion of Serbia in 1914, which quickly spread into a wider war, with devastating results for all.

104. Some authors have urged that terms of settlement be clear and that coercion be part of an effective foreign policy. See George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 226–27, 416–20.
105. One of the few studies to take a longer-term view was Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*. Yet while its framework was well executed, the detailed case studies were completed by other authors, who did not rigorously apply Blechman's research technique. Also, some of the case studies are now dated.
106. For an excellent example of the importance of the interactions at the end of conflicts, see Paul Kreskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958).
107. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, pp. 53–54.

RESEARCH & DEBATE

HAS THE RED CROSS-ADORNED HOSPITAL SHIP BECOME OBSOLETE?

Arthur M. Smith

Those responsible for casualty management in littoral conflicts must weigh multiple variables such as: the enemy's war-fighting strategies and tactics; the types of weapons systems used by the enemy; the complexity of the kinds of wounds and diseases commonly encountered during armed conflict; and the availability of resources to effectively treat those conditions.

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Despite Richard Grunawalt's plea (see "Hospital Ships in the War on Terror: Sanctuaries or Targets?" *Naval War College Review*, Winter 2005, pp. 89–119) to arm "protected" hospital ships during littoral warfare with encrypted communications, machine guns, defensive chaff, and Phalanx missiles, the reality remains that air-, sea-, and ground-launched missiles, as well as mines and other weapons, will create a future tactical environment of unparalleled complexity insofar as land, sea, and air interaction is concerned, which eventually may impede the timely evacuation and medical management of the wounded. Irrespective of Grunawalt's suggestions, therefore, during future military contingencies an operational commander may well determine that traditional medical treatment and evacuation ships will no longer benefit from the mantle of "privileged immunity" and for purposes of protection mandate them to assume unmarked anonymity; their only other option—geographic separation—would be counterproductive to the principal

mission of forward casualty support. Consequently, we should not necessarily expect dedicated “protected” hospital ships, as we now know them, to be readily available to every task force entering dangerous littoral waters.

“OVER THE HORIZON”: IN THE LITTORALS

If lives are to be sustained during future “over the horizon” and “ship to objective” amphibious operations, those who emphasize direct insertion of forces from an afloat sea base to an objective hundreds of miles inland without the establishment of a lodgment ashore must ensure that unique and effective scenario-dependent medical support is available at the tactical level. In addition, if the wounded are to survive, there should be innovative capabilities for their movement within the combat and communications zones, intratheater, that will accommodate the reality that medical treatment must be sustained while in transit. Tactical analysis suggests that medical support at the tactical level will be implemented predominantly using aviation-based evacuation assets. Furthermore, what is needed to satisfy the medical requirements in any littoral conflict is equally dependent upon the availability of a safe and effective strategic medical evacuation plan to medical facilities outside the zone of conflict. Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the revelation of uncertain security at terrorist-prone littoral anchorages and berthing facilities, again suggest that evacuation by air will be the preferred mode of casualty transport. These considerations may render obsolete the entire discussion of the Geneva Convention that formally protected hospital ships.

VARIABLE UTILIZATION OF AFLOAT MEDICAL ASSETS

Historically, varying forms of medical care facilities, in addition to an array of casualty transportation assets, have been utilized within both tactical and strategic phases of combat operations. Grunawalt’s detailed exposition clearly articulates the history of the many treaties, conventions, and protocols that apply to international armed conflicts, some of which are dedicated to respecting and protecting the immunity of hospital ships.

Yet history provides many examples of innovative medical adaptations to changing tactical and strategic requirements, only some of which were specifically dependent upon “protected neutrality.” Not only was the decision to convert some but not all of these casualty-care adaptations to a status of “neutral,” as defined by international conventions, clothed in the context of the prevailing war-fighting strategy, but operational commanders had duly recognized the perceived intent of the enemy either to recognize or disregard the same criteria. A familiarity with selected elements of medical support carried out during twentieth-century conflicts will provide a background for better understanding

the range of support options operational commanders might select during future conflicts.

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC MEDICAL EVACUATION BY SEA DURING WORLD WAR II: SELECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ASSETS

During World War II amphibious operations, and in subsequent landings at Inchon, Korea, “grey hull” tank landing ships (LST) were converted into an important component of the medical care system—the LST(H). Modified for surgical support of limited scope, these ships were primarily used by forward surgical teams to stabilize the wounded. Given the intensity of the warfare and the shortage of true hospital ships, LST(H)s became essential in providing quick, early, lifesaving treatment for the combat wounded in forward locations. In operational settings where larger hospital transports were available, the transports were often withdrawn at nightfall due to lack of air cover. The battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 demonstrates the benefit of beaching these “unprotected” surgical LSTs after unloading. Planners saw the value of holding one or two in reserve, to commit to beaches that were overwhelmed with casualties or without medical facilities. During the operations at Lingayen Gulf in 1945, six LST(H)s with embarked surgical teams were beached to provide casualty care. At Normandy, all LSTs were furnished to handle returning casualties; fifty-four were outfitted to perform surgery. Others were subsequently equipped to serve as casualty-control ships, regulating the backflow of the wounded to rear facilities afloat and ashore. One was even made a floating blood bank. Such hospital LSTs were able to provide sophisticated surgical care in a relatively safe environment close to shore. Operating without Geneva Convention protection, they performed effectively, even under fire at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Another scenario-driven innovation of World War II included the utilization of three grey-hull medically modified personnel transport vessels (APH). The attack personnel transport (APA), although not designed or properly equipped for handling casualties, often bore the brunt of the initial load from beach assaults—for example, at Iwo Jima. The use of APHs was considered desirable in an amphibious attack, because this type of ship could carry assault forces inbound, had a complete staff of specialists, and had a large sick bay so that specialized treatment could be provided. The APH had about eight medical officers and a bed capacity of over a thousand. These ships were held in the “transportation area” of the assault force as evacuation ships. When bed capacity was reached, the ship sailed, to prevent exposure to air attacks. As a general rule, the ships withdrew out to sea at night, but on occasion they remained anchored a thousand yards offshore, protected by a smoke screen.

Responding to command requirements, as defined by Admirals William F. Halsey, Jr., and Chester Nimitz, yet another innovation, near the end of the war, was the development of twenty-plus protected U.S. Army–staffed hospital ships on tanker and freighter hulls, as well as the construction of a smaller number of rapidly produced Navy hospital ships.

At Leyte Gulf, it became apparent that floating hospitals were urgently needed at the objective, especially during the night, when they were under orders to retire. When two APAs arrived, they were summarily designated as casualty-receiving ships and stationed offshore to provide hospitalization at night. Small escort patrol craft (PCE[R]) were also utilized, ad hoc, as rescue transport vehicles for casualty evacuation.

The large number of wounded at Iwo Jima emphasized the need for many medical support ships, two of which were USS *Samaritan* (AH 10) and *Solace* (AH 5), augmented by *Pinckney* (APH 5), *Bountiful* (AH 5), and a “reserve hospital ship,” the vehicle landing ship *Ozark* (LSV 2). Their only assigned function was transportation and en-route care of the sick and wounded. While the use of AHs was highly desirable, they could not go into the transport area until D-day plus-1 or later, and it was seldom possible for them to receive casualties directly from the beaches. Their main function was to relieve overloaded transports of casualties and evacuate them to base hospitals.

In April 1945 the invasion of Okinawa began. Enemy planes attacked three hospital ships. The USS *Relief* was attacked on 2 April, as was *Solace* on 20 April, but no damage was done. The only ship to suffer major damage and casualties was USS *Comfort*. On 28 April, while steaming away from the scene of combat, fully lighted in accordance with Geneva Convention protections, *Comfort* was hit amidships by a kamikaze, resulting in twenty-two killed, eleven wounded, and nineteen missing. The other ships, lying in close support, just off the landing beaches and within the protected ring of picket ships and transport area defenses, suffered no significant damage. Nevertheless, hospital ships continued to perform regular shuttle trips to hospitals in the Marianas.

UNIQUE UTILIZATION OF HOSPITAL SHIPS

From the earliest days of the Korean fighting, U.S. Navy hospital ships served as seaborne ambulances, and later as mobile hospitals. After the early service of the British vessel HMHS *Maine*, and the later arrival of the Danish *Jutlandia*, five such ships provided an unusual and successful addition to rear-area medical resources. While their original mission was to transport patients, giving care en route, Korean conditions made them far more valuable as floating hospitals. Patients were loaded aboard either by winching up litters directly from the docks or from lighters at sea, or from helicopters landing on the ships’ decks. (This was

preceded by the lashing of helicopter landing floats on the sides of hospital ship USS *Haven* in Inchon harbor, to facilitate direct rotary-wing air transport of casualties to hospital ships without flight decks.)

Since strategic evacuation routes were primarily directed toward Japan, movement by air was considered preferable, because of the inconvenience to patients caused by a sea voyage. The result was the unique decision to leave hospital ships in Korean ports for considerable lengths of time. The ships became a new form of mobile hospital in Korean waters, shifting about the Korean coast as needed: sometimes supporting the Inchon invasion—for example, USS *Consolation*; occasionally doing service in Japan; or by aiding the Hungnam, North Korea, evacuation. By the end of September 1952, admissions to the three Navy hospital ships nearly totaled 40,662, about 35 percent wounded in battle. In addition, while in port, these ships could conduct a clinic just as capably as a land-based conventional hospital. A large number of outpatients were treated aboard hospital ships, possibly equal to the total number of inpatients cared for aboard ship.

VIETNAM

The Vietnam War provided an ideal geographic setting and combat scenario for hospital ships—intermittent low-level warfare with the combat zone adjacent to the sea, in a long, narrow country with a substantial length of coastline. In addition, because of the air superiority enjoyed by U.S. forces, the helicopter was used extensively—the ideal medical evacuation system for hospital ships. The enemy lacked, or refrained from using, artillery or rockets to interdict the two red cross-marked U.S. hospital ships *Sanctuary* and *Repose*. They sailed freely, immediately offshore, seemingly immune from hostile activity.

FALKLANDS: THE UNIQUE TRUE TEST OF PROTECTED NEUTRALITY

The Falklands campaign afforded an opportunity to analyze both the benefits and disadvantages of protected neutrality established between both adversaries while concurring with international agreements.

Immediately prior to the British Falklands invasion, the Royal Navy requisitioned the luxury liner SS *Canberra* and rapidly converted it into a troop carrier, equipped with a major surgical facility. Plans called for it to receive casualties after unloading, even though *Canberra* did not qualify for neutrality by virtue of having traveled with combatant-ship escorts and transported both troops and combat equipment to the theater (similar to the APH concept in World War II). However, the lack of protected neutrality was felt to be an advantage, since troops could be successfully treated and returned to the field directly—

something prohibited from protected hospital ships. Unfortunately, as a result of fierce Argentine aerial attacks upon the fleet supporting the landing force, it was necessary to remove the unarmed *Canberra* from the San Carlos operational area.

Concurrently, in 1982 the Royal Navy secured the rapid modification of the commercial P&O cruise ship SS *Uganda* into a capable hospital ship. It sailed to the Falklands operating area unescorted by combatants, with sustained appropriate identification in accordance with international conventions. At Britain's suggestion, but with no special written agreement, the opposing parties established a neutral zone on the high seas, to the north of the islands, known as the "Red Cross Box." *Uganda* subsequently operated within this zone, twenty nautical miles on a side, along with Argentine casualty assistance vessels, and periodically implemented casualty transfers among them. *Uganda* was assisted by three Royal Navy ocean survey ships converted to protected ambulance vessels. These ships carried 593 stabilized casualties to a neutral aeromedical transfer point in Montevideo, Uruguay, 420 miles away, clearing room onboard the hospital ship for new wounded.

THE PERSIAN GULF

Helicopter access to the two U.S. hospital ships during the 1991 Gulf war proved problematic. The helicopters' carrying capacity and flying time were limited, and because of missile threats the ships were kept too far from the combat scene to serve as a critical resource. Concurrently, the Royal Navy initiated the innovative construction of an internal airtight citadel, housing a casualty-receiving hospital, in a portion of its grey-hull helicopter-training ship RFA *Argus*, recognizing that this arrangement best suited the needs of the combatant command.

Because of political and military considerations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, in 2003 the medical system was constrained by an inability to evacuate Iraqi casualties (both civilians and prisoners of war) to neighboring countries; amphibious task force ships with concurrent military obligations were prohibited from carrying human cargo. Accordingly, the principal activity aboard hospital ship *Comfort* was directed toward the treatment of prisoners of war and displaced Iraqi nationals, while strategic airlift was provided for coalition wounded to Kuwait and Germany.

PROTECTED NEUTRALITY REQUIRES RECIPROCAL ACCEPTABILITY!

The Falklands campaign demonstrated the benefits of reciprocal recognition of internationally recognized principles of the protected neutrality of hospital ships. Grunawalt's suggestions for improving the safety of such vessels, as mentioned

earlier, without invalidating the designation of neutrality, are ultimately contingent upon reciprocal acceptability of those capabilities by the opposing parties. Regardless, the most appropriate remedy for protection in each setting is, and historically has always been, the responsibility of the operational commanders.

ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS: ARE THEY NECESSARY?

During the Falklands conflict, six hospital ships of both warring parties exchanged radio communications on 2182-KHz in the clear. As described by Grunawalt, it was not possible for the hospital ships to communicate directly with the warships without revealing their position, no doubt an awkward and inefficient arrangement but wholly within the province of treaty-assured neutrality.

To maintain long-distance contact with their bases, the three British ambulance ships and *Uganda* used radio telex via the InMarSat (International Maritime System Satellite) system. Telex messages were also exchanged in the clear, meaning that hospital ships could not be informed in detail about incoming medical evacuations. The British naval command, from which *Uganda* received its orders, likewise could not use coded radio communications to inform the ship directly about the military dangers in the area. Neither could it safely broadcast information about the number of casualties to be evacuated, the wounds sustained, or any unresolved emergencies en route to the ship, obviously preventing the hospital ship from making proper preparations. Under the system used, it was easier for warships to communicate with hospital ships by way of naval bases, with the messages deciphered onshore and then retransmitted in the clear. This caused considerable delay, since combat communications generally had priority. Without an operative satellite link, communications with hospital ships were also interrupted by problems inherent in radio electric-wave propagation within the electronically complex combat environment. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that despite the impediments of an imperfect but neutral policy and communications agreement to operate in the clear, which was accepted and implemented by both belligerents, *Uganda* itself was still able to receive 730 combat patients, perform five hundred surgical procedures, and safely evacuate 593 patients by sea transfer to Montevideo, including a number of others to the Argentine medical carrier *Bahia Paraiso*.

ISSUES OF IDENTIFICATION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES OF IDENTIFICATION FAILURE

Grunawalt and others have written extensively about visual and electronic means of identification for ensuring the protected neutrality of ships. However, does vessel identification always provide a mantle of protection? History has

demonstrated clearly that some are indifferent to the Western etiquette of war. In 1917, for example, in disregard of international law, the Central Powers of World War I declared that hospital ships, no matter how prominently marked in compliance with the Geneva and Hague Convention accords, were no longer protected as neutral vessels. Such ships were denied immunity from attack in the English Channel, parts of the North Sea, and the Mediterranean, even if attackers knew their identities. Between 1917 and 1918 alone, eight hospital ships were torpedoed. Overall, the British lost fifteen hospital ships, most from mines and torpedo attacks. Similarly, during World War II, Germany and later Italy showed complete disregard for the Hague Convention accords. By the middle of 1941, although all Allied hospital ships were clearly marked, no fewer than thirteen had been sunk.

It has been reported that five thousand U.S. prisoners of war perished aboard Japanese “hell ships,” at the hands of the United States. However, would specific preannounced identification of the track of the Japanese prison transport *Asian Maru*, which held 1,800 U.S. prisoners of war, have convinced the commander of the submarine USS *Snook* not to launch the torpedo that destroyed it, killing all but five? Would the prison ship *Shinyo Maru* (lost with all but eighty-two of the 750 U.S. prisoners of war aboard) have likewise been saved from the USS *Paddle*? We will never know; in any case, such track information might have been ignored, given the prevailing perception that the Japanese abused such agreed identification methods.

During UN operations in Korea in the early 1950s, attacks upon medical personnel, vehicles, and tents became the rule, not the exception. The aid station was the first target of North Korean artillery—Korean riflemen used the red cross on regimental ambulances as a convenient bull’s-eye.

A historical review of nonsupport for medical aid in Korea reveals a famous photograph of a soldier smearing mud over the red cross on the side of his ambulance.¹ Likewise, one marked hospital train was hit while leaving Taegu at night for Pusan and then hit again as it emerged from a tunnel. As a result, hospital trains were required to run only during daylight hours; emergency night runs were guarded by military policemen, who rode on sandbagged flatcars.

The modern naval warfare environment has grown ever more dangerous and unpredictable; unbridled offensive weaponry now threatens any noncombatant ship that strays within target range. Although mine warfare has become increasingly sophisticated, it is doubtful that any sensor other than the human eye will be capable of discriminating between Geneva-protected and nonprotected vehicles. This can be illustrated by the fate of the non-Geneva-protected transport *Atlantic Conveyor*, which suffered an attack by a nondirected missile during the Falklands conflict.

On 25 May 1982, two Super Etendards of the Argentine air force appeared at a point seventy miles east of the Falkland Islands. The British were still more than thirty miles to the north when the frigate HMS *Ambuscade* detected an air attack and immediately alerted the fleet. While the fate of one Exocet missile was never determined, several of the crew on *Ambuscade*'s bridge saw the smoke trail of a second Exocet boring in, the red glow of its exhaust clearly visible. The ship opened fire with its 4.5-inch gun, antiaircraft guns, and machine guns. Above all, every British warship in the battle group fired chaff radar decoys. A Lynx helicopter is also believed to have been operating an active decoy. Unfortunately, the thirteen-thousand-ton container ship *Atlantic Conveyor*, perhaps two miles to starboard of *Ambuscade*, possessed no chaff. The missile veered sharply in midair away from the warships (including the carrier HMS *Invincible*) and struck *Conveyor* below the superstructure on the port side. A huge fire quickly took hold, eventually sinking the ship.

The harsh and unpredictable nature of missile-based warfare is further exemplified by the mistaken attack on an Iranian passenger jet by the Aegis cruiser USS *Vincennes* (CG 49). That tragedy brought into question the safety, effectiveness, and survivability of any unarmed craft—aircraft or ship—dedicated exclusively to the care of the combat wounded. The mishap occurred despite sophisticated electronic warfare systems. In reality, merely detecting a radar or transponder signal requires less technological sophistication than does interpreting it. Thus an adversary who is less technologically advanced but determined to win a conflict can use a raw signal from a craft to guide a missile without ever appreciating or acknowledging the target's noncombatant role.

Would possession of chaff and Phalanx missiles prevent similar catastrophes? Perhaps so, as long as they did not compromise an adversary's definition of neutrality. Clearly, such capabilities did not deter the disaster that befell USS *Stark* (FFG 31) when attacked in 1987 by Iraqi air-launched missiles.

TERRORISM AND PORT SECURITY

Attacks against maritime targets have historically been infrequent forms of international terrorism. Although the hijacking of *Achille Lauro* in 1985 and the bombings of USS *Cole* (DDG 67) in 2000 and *MT Limburg* in 2001 are notable exceptions, few terrorist incidents have taken place at sea. The general vulnerability of the ocean environment, however, has become more apparent, attributed in part to lax security at many world ports, as well as ineffective coastal surveillance by littoral states that are now confronting serious campaigns of political violence and latent extremist transnational challenges. This is especially true in Indonesia, the Philippines, Colombia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the countries around the Horn of Africa.²

Likewise, al-Qa'ida has maintained an interest in maritime terrorism. Although the 1999 attack on USS *The Sullivans* (DDG 68) failed, the 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, one of the most advanced U.S. naval ships, possessing both Phalanx missiles and defensive machine guns, succeeded, leaving seventeen sailors dead. The ship almost sank.

It was discovered that the architect of the attacks on both the *Cole* and *MT Limburg* also dispatched maritime terror squads to Morocco to target U.S. Navy ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. Similar plots in Southeast Asia were evidenced by charts in the possession of suspected terrorists marked with the location of Sembawang Wharf and Changi Port, Singapore, as well as the crowded port of Surabaya in eastern Java, Indonesia.³ The 120 annual port visits by U.S. Navy vessels to the region are expected to increase, following the construction of an aircraft carrier docking facility at Singapore's Changi Naval Base.

Future national budgetary priorities will significantly reduce expenditures for military hardware and defense personnel, prompting combatant commanders to alter war-fighting strategies. The Navy's sea basing concept, as originally conceived, will be drastically revised, and plans for afloat casualty care and strategic evacuation may be dramatically altered. Hospital ships, as we have come to know them, may no longer play a role in a military structured for rapid flexible response in asymmetric warfare. (Such is the glaring deficiency in the current debate over the futuristic sea base, in which the two current mammoth hospital ships—relics of a strategy for evacuating the sick and wounded from Europe during the Cold War—may never efficiently satisfy future casualty care requirements.)

How, then, will casualties be supported? Will commercially chartered cruise ships such as SS *Uganda*, already containing hotel, laundry, and other facilities required by a hospital, be available? Perhaps there will only be logistics-support ships, such as vessels of the Military Sealift Command; those vessels previously utilized for delivery of prepositioned military equipment; the surge and sustainment cargo vessels, otherwise known as medium-speed-roll-on/roll-off (LMSRs), of our strategic sealift forces; or ships of the Ready Reserve Force, including break-bulk and barge-carrying ships, or lighter-aboard-ship vessels? None of these would be eligible for protected neutrality, however, if first utilized for transport of war-fighting materiel.

It may be that no specific form of a current hospital ship or converted logistics ship will be sufficiently secure for use by combatant commanders. Perhaps as a result of uncertainties regarding the safety of traditional ships' berthing venues in the new environment of worldwide terror, will aeromedical evacuation surpass any practical approach to primary medical evacuation by surface ships? There is no guarantee, even if a new form of surface medical evacuation vehicle is

developed and outfitted with sophisticated cryptographic communications and modern defensive armaments and electronic countermeasures, that a white-painted hull with large red stripes will provide effective defense.

Ultimately, casualty care and evacuation requirements will continue to emanate from the province of combatant commanders, who will define scenario-specific needs in the twenty-first century. As such, Grunawalt's plea for greater protections within the context of protected neutrality will be rendered moot.

NOTES

1. Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medics' War: The U.S. Army in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), p. 76.
2. Andrew Holt, "Plugging the Holes in Maritime Security," *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 9 (6 May 2004), p. 6.
3. Zachary Abuza, "Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Keeping al-Qaeda at Bay," *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 9 (6 May 2004), p. 4.

THE SUBMARINE AS A CASE STUDY IN TRANSFORMATION IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INVESTMENT

James H. Patton, Jr.

It's not the strongest that survive, but the ones most responsive to change.

CHARLES DARWIN

The Department of Defense is sometimes guilty of glomming onto a buzzword or catchy phrase and wearing it thin. “Revolution in Military Affairs,” or RMA (a term derived, incidentally, from Soviet military writings concerning a “military-technical revolution”) certainly came close to crossing that threshold. Today, the word “transformation”—a marvelously useful and intellectually descriptive word—could similarly be at risk of exhaustion.

When such a phrase represents an apparently desirable property, there exists a tendency to attach that phrase to every conceivable defense system, thereby enhancing the program’s attractiveness to senior decision makers. “Transformation,” defined by the Department of Defense as a process shaping the way future wars are fought, including elements of concepts, technology, and organizations, clearly also includes the contemporary adoption of the Global Positioning System, precision weapons, and the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to guided missile submarine (SSGN) conversions—just as naval aviation and the Blitzkrieg were transformational when they were first introduced.

Though these programs may not be so abrupt or dramatic as to warrant the term “revolutionary,” it is important to note that there is also a significant evolution in military affairs under way, in that certain platforms and systems are adapting to changing conditions. Throughout the twentieth century and to the

present, the submarine has been a prime example of evolution, largely owing to its inherent flexibility and sometimes unintentional nonmission specificity. For example, many who were not submariners thought that the U.S. submarine force had lost its *raison d’être* when the Cold War ended, which was not the case. The following will show, therefore, that there has always been a next “most important mission” for these warships.

THE SUBMARINE AS A CASE STUDY


The U.S. submarine has a history of adaptation since its incorporation into the fleet in 1900. In a macroscopic sense, the figure below graphically depicts how

Captain James H. Patton, Jr. (Retired), a 1960 graduate of the Naval Academy, has served on seven nuclear submarines, commanding USS Pargo (SSN 650), with several associated shore tours. Upon retiring from the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College in 1985, Captain Patton founded Submarine Tactics and Technology, Inc., serving as its president. He has been a consultant to more than thirty major corporations and government agencies on matters of submarine stealth warfare, which included three years as technical consultant to Paramount Pictures for the script and production of the film The Hunt for Red October. Captain Patton has also served as the undersea/stealth warfare editor for Defense Science magazine, lectured extensively on defense, and written for many professional journals.

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the submarine's most important missions have continually changed in a hundred years. It is significant that it also alludes to how, at any one time, the submarine was likely to have current missions of high priority, missions of waning importance, and missions of increasing gravity. In almost every case, the time constants of these changes were shorter than the life cycle of the existing platform. To avoid obsolescence, it was sometimes necessary for extreme variant requirements to be made technically (and tactically) during a ship's (and crew's) lifetime. As a result it can be safely said that no U.S. submarine has ever been employed for its designed purpose, and no commanding officer ever performed that for which he was trained.

FIGURE 1
THE "MOST IMPORTANT" SUBMARINE MISSION



A partial list of examples for platform employment:

- S-Boats designed in the 1920s for coastal defense and fleet boats designed in the 1930s as battle-fleet scouts found themselves in 1942 as distantly deployed commerce raiders.
- The *Skipjack* class, designed to provide terminal guidance for nuclear-tipped Regulus cruise missiles fired from a large fleet of *Halibut*-class SSGNs, never materialized because of the advent of the Polaris ballistic missile.
- The *Thresher/Permit*-class SSNs, designed to operate in pairs while firing rocket-propelled nuclear depth charges at distant Soviet subs, never carried out that mission, due to the failure of SESCO, a secure acoustic communications system needed for information exchange and the triangulation of sonar bearings for target localization.

- Escorting carrier battle groups was the justification for the high speed of the *Los Angeles* class in the late 1960s. Even though submarines were used in direct support of battle groups in a 1977 Pacific Fleet exercise (RIMPAC), and a Navy warfare publication was published in 1980 based on further experimentation in RIMPACs 1978 and 1979, this mission was not routinely assigned until after the Cold War ended, when many of the class were being decommissioned.

With this sort of historical precedent, one can appreciate the wisdom behind the decision to widen the mission range of the *Virginia* class so that it could be somewhat better acclimated to joint operations in shallow coastal waters rather than, as some had insisted, optimized as *specifically* a “littoral combat submarine.” There have been few failures in U.S. submarine design, but the designs that did fail were those that were overoptimized for a narrow mission set, thereby losing their intrinsic adaptability.

A traditional approach to the kind of anti-access (AA) and area-denial (AD) scenario likely to be encountered by U.S. naval forces in the littorals would be an “outside-in rollback” of these maritime AA/AD networks.¹ However, when a key element of the forces is entirely capable of passing directly through (over/under) these networks, much as F-117s and B-2s have routinely gone “right downtown” before air defenses have been degraded, it makes enormous sense to do just that. Stealthy aircraft were and are *technologically* transformational, but it is *tactically* transformational to employ a characteristic of an existing system (i.e., a submarine’s intrinsic ability to covertly penetrate AA/AD defenses) for a different reason. In a previous life, submarines penetrated AA/AD defenses to collect intelligence or engage “bastioned” Soviet SSBNs. They can now do it actively, to take down AA/AD measures from the inside out, enabling other forces to enter the contested area. Here once again, the submarine has adapted to a different set of tasks than those for which it was originally created.

There are many factors that go into creating a long-lived weapon system capable of such unexpected adaptations. There is certainly the importance of selecting flexible, intelligent, and innovative personnel to man it, and there is the indispensable requirement to instill early in its crew a solid baseline of training that includes a “common culture” and provide continuous training as newer employments and missions evolve. Internal hardware, electronics, and software can, of course, be upgraded, facilitated by incorporating into the initial design considerable “space and weight reserved,” but there is a limit to just how much something like a nuclear submarine (built now with fuel to last more than thirty years) can be “reinvented” during its lifetime. Certain attributes, stealth being a primary example, must be engineered in at the beginning and therefore have

historically appeared initially to be far in excess of that which was considered adequate. However, continual component improvement and evolution of superior maintenance procedures can not only maintain “as-built” levels of emissions controls but actually improve upon them. For example, submarines decommissioned over the last decade or so left service significantly quieter than when they first sailed a quarter-century earlier.

Sometimes pure serendipity has enabled submarine platforms to age and adapt gracefully. When, in the 1930s, it was desired to design a submarine to operate with and scout for the main battle fleet, it had to make economically at least eighteen knots on the surface. Since maximum surface speed ultimately dictates the length of a ship’s hull, by the laws of hydrodynamics, this resulted in a nearly three-hundred-foot behemoth (for its time) displacing 1,800 tons. By comparison, the then-existing “gold standard” of submarines—the German Type VIIC, which did so much damage early in World War II—displaced only about seven hundred tons. The U.S. *Gato*-class fleet boat was able easily to carry enough diesel fuel to traverse the Pacific and have significant time on station, while the Type VIIC literally had to carry fuel in its bilges and conduct hazardous at-sea refuelings if it was to operate in the western Atlantic. Perhaps even more importantly, the fleet boat had room onboard to incorporate equipment developments and improvements in radar, sonar, and electronic intercept equipment while the small U-boat did not, significantly contributing to its rapid obsolescence and high loss rates. It was not until 1943 that Germany rectified the U-boat’s shortcomings and began design and construction of the Type XXI—a marvelous submarine that set the standard for postwar U.S. and Soviet designs. However, it did not arrive in numbers soon enough to have an appreciable effect on the war.

Similar design imbalances were seen between U.S. and Soviet submarines. Greater concern about radiation and other safety issues made American nuclear submarines far more reliable than their Soviet counterparts, with less radiation exposure. Marginal thermodynamic considerations and assumptions that these subs would always be operated in cold arctic waters made Soviet Type 2 nuclear submarines (e.g., Charlies, Victors) virtually inoperable in areas such as the Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf, while the engineering plants of *all* classes of U.S. SSNs operated superbly in waters of very high temperatures as well as in cold climates.

Clearly, the margin of superiority demonstrated by U.S. submarines over their Soviet counterparts played a key role in the winning of the Cold War. As recently as the late 1990s the Defense Science Board called the SSN the “crown jewel” of the U.S. armed forces. This prompted a two-year “Submarine Payload and Sensors” program by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to investigate what adaptations would be necessary to maintain that prestigious title through the next two decades. A finding of this program was that the new *Virginia*

class currently being built would need to be “modular” in its payload options and that the magnitude of such payloads would probably increase by a factor of ten. In this sense, the soon-to-be *Ohio*-class SSGNs (converted from SSBNs in excess of Cold War requirements) can be viewed as “bridges” to what fully developed *Virginias* will become.

Now that the largest class of U.S. nuclear submarines (the *Los Angeles* and its sisters) is drawing toward its end, it is instructional to review some of the good and not so good elements of their initial design. Built to accompany carrier battle groups, they needed to be fast, and they were, through a doubling of the shaft horsepower of their predecessors. Each successive class (after the first multiple-ship class [*Skate*]) improved access and habitability over its predecessor with resulting improvements in morale and reliability not easily measured in the initial investment. The engineering spaces of the *Los Angeles* class were well designed for easy access to equipment. Significant free-flooding volume forward of the pressure hull permitted installation in later units of the dramatically successful twelve-tube *Tomahawk* vertical launch system. However, to enhance speed by reducing hydrodynamic drag, the sail of the ship was made relatively small. As a result, it had fewer masts and antennas and was not “ice hardened,” reducing its value as an information systems research (ISR) collection platform and sacrificing ability to perform some arctic missions. Because of the much larger engineering spaces, the “front end” of the ship was actually smaller than that of the class it replaced, to keep overall length reasonable, reducing habitability and somewhat constraining systems growth potential (although this was fortunately counterbalanced by dramatic improvements in computer capacity per unit volume). Also, the hydrodynamics of the ship are such that the ship is not easy to control at speeds of one to three knots, making it difficult to deploy and recover special operation forces (SOF)—which has become an increasingly important mission.² All shortcomings have been addressed in the *Virginia* design.

While a brighter future is foreseen for better and even more flexible multimission submarines, the reality of force structure is out of phase with this vision by 180 degrees. From a Cold War level of one hundred or so attack submarines, the present level is about fifty and is falling—in spite of the fact that SSN taskings by fleet and national commanders have essentially doubled. Because of this submarine shortage, existing ships must now transit at much higher sustained speeds than originally planned, which threatens the life span of their reactors. During the last decade, the SSN has become the *Tomahawk* land-attack cruise-missile launch platform of choice. In Operation DESERT STORM, SSNs launched 5 percent of the missiles, while during IRAQI FREEDOM the number was more than 30 percent. This is not to argue that the sheer number of platforms is the critical variable. As Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, USN (Retired),

(Holland served on CNO staff as director for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Weapons, as Deputy Director for Space Command and Control, and as Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Staff) pointed out regarding the *Skate*-class SSN of the late 1950s, an “economy-sized” *Nautilus* follow-on was operationally disappointing and difficult to maintain.³ It is true that “quantity does have a quality all its own,” but in order to adapt and to transform there must be a nontrivial level of quality, robust design, and architectural flexibility resident in the initial version of a major weapons system.

By virtue of what history may note as remarkable speed and adroitness, the submarine and its crew once again have adapted to a different set of operational requirements. From essentially a “lone wolf” a decade ago, the submarine is now nearly universally accepted as a key node within network-centric warfare, the purveyor of “undersea dominance,” and an essential element of Sea Power 21. Disbelievers need only review the capabilities tested and demonstrated in exercise GIANT SHADOW of early 2003, where an operational SSBN, USS *Florida* (SSBN 728), simulating an SSGN on counterterrorist and counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) operations, launched a large autonomous undersea vehicle (AUV) to plot a minefield, landed and supported special operation forces, exploited ISR from a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), analyzed soil samples returned by SOF on the AUV, and launched two Tomahawk missiles to simulate the destruction of a terrorist WMD facility. An additional exercise, SILENT HAMMER, more fully developed and demonstrated SSGN potential by employing USS *Georgia* (SSBN 729).

One of the less publicized capabilities of the SSGN will exploit the virtually unlimited electrical power and air conditioning capability of all nuclear submarines, coupled with extensive space and manpower, to provide an extensive capability to absorb and process huge amounts of data from on- and off-board sensors and ISR platforms (such as Global Hawk, HAIRY BUFFALO, joint surveillance and target attack radar system, etc.). This data will be processed and fused within the ship to produce manageable quantities of information, analyzed onboard by humans, then distilled into *knowledge*. This grapes-to-wine-to-brandy process will permit an SSGN with the proper interfaces, such as the Distributed Common Ground System–Navy (DCGS-N), to become a vital theater node, transforming vast quantities of downloaded data from multiple sources into small nuggets of knowledge that are easily distributed (through a vastly smaller diameter “pipe”) via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to other users globally. It should also be clear, to those who think deeply about such matters, that the SSGN program is far more than just a way to extend the operational viability of declining SSBNs; it is a pilot program to

investigate just what the *Virginia* class should become when it has fully evolved in ten years.

However, with the world situation becoming increasingly unstable, there are more than one or two places where a credible, actual, or virtual U.S. presence must be claimed or maintained. Therefore, to sustain *persistently* unseen assets around the world, there is a force-level number that must be maintained. This number is significantly more than thirty, the level resulting from a one-per-year build rate of thirty three-year-design-life hulls, when operating tempos, maintenance, and transits are factored in. All post-Cold War submarine force level studies by several agencies indicate an enduring need for numbers of SSNs far in excess of what can be sustained by a one-per-year build rate.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT

An SSN is unique. Not only does just one submarine represent a credible military force, but it is also capable of surviving and operating independently anywhere in the world, including ocean areas as shallow as twenty fathoms, to which access has been restricted or denied to other platforms. Two or so weeks out of home port and an SSN can be anywhere in the world. These operational traits truly make it a desirable asset for multimission tasking, but even more important are the top-level characteristics and design specifications that have allowed it to demonstrate repeatedly that degree of adaptability. These specifications have included reserving space and weight that permits yet-unenvisioned equipment to be installed to counter now unimagined situations, and an insistence that core enabling characteristics such as stealth never be compromised.⁴ Other essential steps being taken to enhance flexibility are an expansion into other combat system areas of the extremely successful Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program, in which dramatic improvements are routinely and affordably incorporated into sonar systems, and a push toward weapon system modularity for the *Virginia* class, the SSGN, and subsequent classes.

Similarly, since reduced levels of detection, tracking, and weapons homing resulting from incorporation of low observable or very low observable technologies and techniques have shown to enhance dramatically the survivability of aircraft and surface ships, a reduction in design requirements of subsequent platforms should be imposed only with the greatest trepidation. Whatever new mission or tasking received will certainly be better accomplished, and the platform will be more survivable, with improved mitigation or control of its signatures.

Other mentioned submarine traits should also be objectively examined for possible applicability and incorporation into what one would wish to be inherently adaptable in the future. Are margins to grow, ability to gain access, and

persistent presence desirable attributes of the CVN-21 carrier, the DDX destroyer, Global Hawk, joint unarmed combat air system, and various space vehicles and other intelligence systems? The question should certainly be asked.

Platforms, procedures, or even people do not have to be revolutionary to be transformational. Perhaps a different word using the same semantic root better captures the intent—that these things be *transformationable*—designed, built, and maintained so as to be readily adaptable to inevitable changes. If this is properly done, survival will be enhanced not only in present and future budget wars but in present and future shooting wars.

NOTES

1. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), p. 60.
2. See J. H. Patton, Jr., “Slow Speed Controllability,” *Submarine Review* (January 2004), pp. 68–72.
3. W. J. Holland, “Really New SSNs,” *Submarine Review* (January 2004), pp. 60–62.
4. For example, when it became clear that the superb, Cold War–inspired *Seawolf* class was too expensive and in some regards overqualified for post–Cold War needs, the cheaper *Virginia* class traded off speed, depth, and magazine size, but not one decibel of the extraordinarily quiet levels of radiated noise achieved by the *Seawolf* design effort.



BOOK REVIEWS

IS BALANCE OF POWER RELEVANT IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICS?

Paul, E. V., James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds. *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004. 384pp. \$27.95

Although this book features a number of excellent essays, it is hard to understand why it was ever written. One would have profited more from rereading Ernst Haas's brilliant 1953 essay on the topic ("The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," *World Politics* 5, no. 4 [July 1953], pp. 442–77).

In his introductory essay, E. V. Paul poses several theoretical and empirical questions about the balance of power. However, the *real* issue is whether the concept is relevant in contemporary global politics. Frankly, I did not think that anyone (except, perhaps, John Mearsheimer) seriously believed that balance of power exhibits anything much about the real world.

Happily, the contributors to this volume reach a similar conclusion. Jack Levy sets the tone with a rigorous and well reasoned historical analysis. He concludes that "the tendency to treat the theory . . . as universal is misleading," because of the limited "scope conditions" in which the theory was applied. Douglas Lemke focuses on the

utility of balance of power as defined by Mearsheimer's version of "offensive realism" and determines that the concept is so "vaguely stated" that he finds it "impossible to imagine a scenario that would be inconsistent" with it. In his imaginative effort to add an economic dimension to balance-of-power theory, Mark Brawley suggests that it "is typically too parsimonious to be of great use," and James Wirtz concludes that the theory cannot predict outcomes in the post–Cold War world. Edward Rhodes continues to flog this dead horse, concluding that "liberalism and nuclear weapons mean that states will not seek to balance power."

The regional analyses change little. Europeans, Robert Art concludes, want more influence on U.S. policy but are not doing much about it; balance-of-power theory, declares William Wohlforth, "does not apply" to Russia or its neighbors; Benjamin Miller can find "no countervailing coalition . . . against U.S. hegemony" in the Middle East; and, according to Michael Barletta and Harold Trinkunas, there is no

“evidence of balance of power behavior in Latin America in the post–Cold War period.” Get the point?

The editors try to salvage something from this muddle by some fanciful ad hoc theorizing, in particular pressing us to accept the notion of “soft balancing,” which basically translates into arguing that almost any opposition to a country’s policies or actions constitutes balancing behavior. The most vigorous effort to salvage balance-of-power theory from history’s dustbin is Christopher Layne’s unapologetic realism, which, while finding little empirical evidence for balancing, nevertheless boldly predicts that it is “a pretty safe bet” that the United States “will not be able to escape the fates of previous contenders for hegemony.” This is a bet based on faith, not fact. The other believer is Robert Ross, who contends that “balance of power politics has been especially pronounced in East Asia.” What is extraordinary about Ross’s essay is that it ignores the implications of China’s economic growth, its integration into the world economic system, and its escalating interdependence with those against whom it is presumably balancing.

Overall, this is a book of missed opportunities. Perhaps the most important is its failure to come to grips with the subjective dimension of global politics. Authors repeatedly and positively invoke Stephen Walt’s modification of balance-of-power theory with the addition of threat perception but fail to recognize its importance in directing our attention to the centrality of ideas and perceptions. There are hints, however, as when Lemke discusses the key role of the “distribution of attitudes” and Wirtz alludes to “divergence in

perception.” Only Rhodes captures the critical role played by the social construction and reconstruction of ideas in the declining relevance of balance of power. In an essay that deserves greater attention than it will receive in this volume, Rhodes succinctly captures the degree to which balance of power has been made obsolete by the disappearance of trinitarian warfare. In the end, we conclude with him that it “is simply ludicrous” to assume that “every state lives in fear of the imperial ambitions of every other state in the present age.”

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Haldi, Stacy Bergstrom. *Why Wars Widen: A Theory of Predation and Balancing*. London: Frank Cass, 2003. 198pp. \$114.95

Why Wars Widen is a theoretical and empirical analysis of why neutral states choose to enter an ongoing great-power war. Most international-relations scholarship neglects this question, choosing instead to explain the origins of war. Haldi, of both the Naval War College and Gettysburg College, opens her book with the observation that states entering an ongoing conflict “may have interests and policies entirely distinct from those of the initial combatants.” The book seeks to reveal these interests. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the argument that neutrals are most likely to widen great-power wars in eras of low political cost, when war is limited and less threatening to state survival. Moreover, when political cost is low, widening a war is likely to occur for predatory reasons or to acquire strategic assets that will

enhance national power. In contrast, neutrals are less likely to widen wars when the political cost of war is high. In these eras, when wars threaten a state's survival, neutrals will tend to use ongoing wars to balance against an adverse shift in the distribution of power, but only after all other balancing options have been exhausted. The remaining chapters test this argument against alternative explanations, alliances and offense dominance, and offer predictions for the likelihood of war widening in the contemporary international system. Haldi's study encompasses great-power wars between 1700 and 1973, with a focus on the Seven Years' War, the French Revolutionary War, the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, and World War I. Additional cases of great-power wars susceptible to widening are included in an appendix. Prior to the Napoleonic Wars, the political cost of war was low, Haldi argues, because armies were costly to maintain and soldiers were not expendable. Thus predatory-war widening became more frequent in this era. However, political and social changes that occurred alongside the French Revolutionary War and the Napoleonic Wars reduced these costs, allowing France to introduce an era of unlimited wars that sought the enemy's total destruction. From that point forward, Haldi maintains, the political cost of war was high and balancing-war widening tended to be more prevalent. Perhaps the greatest strength of this analysis is that each case study examines the motivations of states that entered ongoing wars, as well as those that could have but did not. The author concludes that the war-widening theory explains each incidence of widening much better than the competing

theories can and may even lend insight into the likelihood of contemporary war widening.

The greatest appeal of this work is its attempt to delve into the largely neglected area of international-relations theory. However, it suffers from two serious flaws. First, it attempts to cover a lot of material succinctly, resulting in insufficiently explained references to history and theory, including the concept of great-power war, which is central to the author's argument. A deeper analysis of the alternative theories of alliances and offense dominance would also have been more satisfying. This deficiency makes the work most appropriate for graduate students and researchers already familiar with the terrain. The subject matter is interesting, but the author could have attracted a broader audience if she had analyzed her work in greater depth. Second, the contemporary relevance of Haldi's policy implications is unconvincing. Her conclusions drawn from European great-power wars are not clearly applicable to the contemporary international system, simply because the threat of such wars, let alone war widening, is negligible. Moreover, because future occurrences of great-power war widening will probably include at least one nuclear power, nuclear weapons should definitely be considered more systematically if Haldi's predictions are to carry any weight. These concerns might have possibly been overcome by including an analysis of the Korean or Vietnam wars—two cases found in the appendix—or perhaps an even more contemporary conflict like the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Despite these limitations, serious students of interstate warfare will find this

work a useful entry into the question of why wars widen.

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Roberts, Paul. *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2004. 386pp. \$26

By 2025 world energy demand is expected to increase by 54 percent. Oil and natural gas consumption is expected to increase 57 and 68 percent, respectively, by then. Total energy consumption in 2025 for China, India, and South Korea is predicted to equal that of the United States. What do these figures really tell us about today's energy economy? The answers can be found in *The End of Oil*, in which Paul Roberts superbly navigates the complex topic of energy and explains how energy has become the currency of political and economic power. Roberts's argument centers on three key points: "that energy is the single most important resource, that our current energy economy is failing, and that the shape of the next energy economy is being decided right now—with or without our input." The author's hope is that *The End of Oil* will provide nonexperts with a way to begin to think about energy.

The End of Oil is broken down into three parts. Part 1 explains how and why energy has become central to human existence. Part 2 examines the mechanics of the energy order. This section contains excellent discussions on consumption, the current

transformation of the oil and natural gas industries, alternate fuels, and conservation. Part 3 looks at the promise and peril of the world's energy future; it includes a valuable discussion on energy security. Roberts concludes with a look at how the world could transition to a new energy economy based on current trends.

Several important implications emerge from Roberts's analysis. First, the current energy system is failing to keep up with current demand. As the developing world tries to catch up with the developed world, the demand for energy will continue to increase regardless of what happens with population and energy technology. In the future, the issue may not be whether the world is producing the right type of energy but whether it can produce enough. Second, there may be real limits to our ability to produce ever-increasing volumes of energy. If this is true, then we will need to radically rethink how we consume and produce energy. Third, the sooner we start to transform the current energy economy, the more time there will be to assess options and technologies. Fourth, the world cannot politically or economically shift from a hydrocarbon-based energy economy to a new energy economy overnight. During the transition, the world will need to develop a transition, or "bridge," energy economy. A bridge economy will give markets and society the flexibility and opportunity to phase out the worst of current trends while creating a new energy system. According to Roberts, such an economy will likely require significant improvements in energy efficiency, and an increased reliance on natural gas. Fifth, America's energy

policy can no longer afford to focus solely on defending the supply of oil. As time goes by, less oil will remain outside OPEC countries; proportionally more will be in areas where its extraction is more difficult and costly. Over time, this trend will make access problematic and uncertain. Lastly, energy is political. Because energy is centrally connected to everything else of importance, overhauling the current system is going to be one of the most politically difficult challenges facing the world in the twenty-first century. This process will entail considerable political and economic risk.

Overall, Roberts's coverage is balanced, providing significant insights into all aspects of the energy economy. One of the strengths of *The End of Oil* is that it offers the big picture without bogging down the reader in endless technical details or facts. Another of its strengths is that although the author is somewhat pessimistic about the world's ability to transition effectively and peacefully to the next energy economy, he is able to be optimistic as well.

In summary, *The End of Oil* is an effective argument for the need to take a proactive role in building America's energy future. We can either construct the kind of energy future we desire or wait and hope that the transition to the next energy economy will work out on its own. Hope, as any good strategist will tell you, is not a strategy. *The End of Oil* is therefore a must read for strategists, political and business leaders, and anyone interested in America's future.

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Fukuyama, Francis. *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004. 132pp. \$21

This is an important policy analysis. Francis Fukuyama, an expert on political and economic development, has served on the State Department's policy planning staff and is now professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University.

In his book *State Building*, Fukuyama argues here that the international community must do a better job of "state-building . . . because weak or failed states are the sources of many of the world's most serious problems." We know a lot about public administration, he says, but much less about how to "transfer strong institutions to developing countries."

Fukuyama coins the term "stateness," referring to a regime's ability to perform. He distinguishes two dimensions of stateness: state *strength*, which denotes that a government can "enforce laws cleanly and transparently," and state *scope*, which embraces the range of the functions that a government tries to accomplish.

To understand what Fukuyama means by scope, imagine a government that seeks only to maintain public order, enforce contracts, provide national defense, and manage its money supply. Fukuyama would describe that state as having modest scope. Next, imagine a government that, in addition to what was just mentioned, owns and runs steel mills and hospitals, tries to provide free education through the university level, and promises its people pensions. Such a government would

have considerable scope. However, whether it could carry out any or all of these functions well is an entirely separate matter of state strength.

What do poor countries need to develop economically? According to Fukuyama, “conventional wisdom’s” answer to this question has changed in recent years. During the Ronald Reagan and the Margaret Thatcher years, development experts focused on state scope, arguing that less-developed countries (LDCs) needed smaller governments; accordingly, they urged states to discontinue activities that other parties could handle better. Unfortunately, they did not recognize the importance of institutions like courts that work and legal regimes that defend property rights. As a result, international bodies like the World Bank demanded that states get smaller without distinguishing between scope (which should have been reduced) and strength (which should have been enhanced).

Fukuyama lists the causes for LDC state weakness. Sometimes local elites benefit from the status quo, which in many instances is, for them, a life-or-death issue. In other cases, society may not understand how much better off it would be given better institutions—foreign donors’ efforts to develop stronger state institutions via “conditionality” often fail. (Donors find it hard to show “tough love” by cutting off states that fail to meet their conditions. Even if one does so, moreover, often another steps in.) In addition, donors often give higher priority to first-rate service delivery than to building the capacity of the LDC’s fledgling state bureaucracy. So they hire away the best locals, often leaving the LDC even weaker.

The book examines the “international dimension of state weakness,” stating that instability is in fact driven by state weakness. Since the Berlin Wall came down, the author notes, most international crises have had to do with weak or failing states. Sovereignty has been eroded because of this weakness. No one, says Fukuyama, in the international community believes in a “pure” sovereignty any more. The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s eroded what force that idea may once have had.

What should national security professionals learn from Fukuyama’s argument? Here are three lessons. First, do not assume that postwar stabilization operations always involve state building. For example, some people have expressed optimism about U.S. chances for making Iraq and Afghanistan into democracies, on grounds that the United States defeated tyrannical regimes in Germany and Japan and successfully made democracies of them. Fukuyama points out that those latter occupations did *not* involve state building. Germany and Japan were hard to beat because they were already strong states. U.S. victory and occupation changed those states’ bases of legitimacy; doing so was easier than creating a strong state from a weak one. Second, the United States should have modest expectations for building democratic states and growing economies in countries with weak states. The United States has “intervened and/or acted as an occupation authority . . . [and] . . . pursued . . . nation-building activities in . . . Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, and South Vietnam.” Despite U.S. efforts, “South Korea was the only country to achieve long-term economic growth.” Third, given America’s poor track record

at creating strong states via occupation, it should be thinking about fall-back positions if it fails at creating democracy overseas.

The United States needs to get better at state building. The U.S. military cannot avoid bearing much of the implied burden, like it or not. Read *State Building* for a thoughtful introduction to the challenges involved.

MARSHALL HOYLER
Naval War College



Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin, 2004. 695pp. \$29.95

The events of 9/11 led many in the United States to wonder what had actually led up to that fateful day. Who was to blame? How could the United States, with its multibillion-dollar intelligence and defense budgets, have allowed such a thing to happen? In *Ghost Wars*, Steve Coll provides a useful, if overly long, chronology and analysis of pivotal events, missteps, indecision, apathy, and ultimately tragedy up to the day before the attacks.

Coll, who served as the managing editor for the *Washington Post* until 2004, was the paper's South Asia bureau chief from 1989 to 1992. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1990 for his reporting on South Asia, and he has been a keen observer of events in the region. He begins his story with the burning of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1979 and traces the long road of events to 11 September. It was shortly after the riots in Islamabad that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, in December 1979.

As he weaves his narrative, Coll meticulously documents every player and agenda in this drama. Coll divides the book into three parts. In the first he discusses the Soviet occupation from December 1979 to February 1989. It is here that we are introduced to mujahedeen leaders Ahmed Shah Massoud, Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Osama Bin Laden. One also becomes acquainted with key players in the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) and in the Saudi monarchy who played key roles in bankrolling the resistance. The author also provides valuable insights into the U.S. policy-making process. During this period, the United States was consumed with battling the Soviet occupation, and most policy makers did not give serious thought to the repercussions of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate's growing control over aid distribution or the increasing anti-American attitudes of such rebel commanders as Hekmatyar.

Coll continues to trace events in Afghanistan after the Soviet pullout in 1989. Once the Soviets were gone, interest in a stable Afghanistan rapidly waned as other crises in the immediate post-Cold War era monopolized U.S. attention. As a result, Afghanistan fell into chaos as warlords fought each other for control of Kabul. The lack of American involvement after the Soviets withdrew left Pakistan as the primary force to manage the post-Soviet environment. The author captures the rivalries within Afghanistan, the manipulation of events by the Pakistani government, and the apathy of U.S. policy makers throughout this period.

One of the major strengths of *Ghost Wars* is how it skillfully captures the interagency debates within the U.S.

government on Afghanistan—specifically, the discussion on various debates among the CIA, the State Department, and the National Security Council—which were wide-ranging and often contentious. After reading these accounts one is left with the distinct impression that there was no overarching policy or strategy to attack al-Qa'ida. Instead, U.S. government policy comes across as ad hoc, driven by current contingencies or spurious information about Osama Bin Laden's whereabouts.

In the final section, Coll documents the often frantic and uncoordinated interagency campaign to find Bin Laden. Despite George Tenet's declaration in December 1998 that the CIA was at war with al-Qa'ida, the U.S. government as a whole never fully came to grips with the threat posed by terrorism. For many in Washington, terrorism represented only one threat among many facing the United States in the post-Cold War era. Although terrorism did elicit concern among top U.S. policy makers, it rarely moved into a sustained, interagency strategy to combat the threat.

Prospective readers of this book should be aware that it is lengthy and requires close attention. Characters and events discussed in part 1 are revisited. Coll helps the reader along with a list of principal characters at the front of the book. Despite its length, however, *Ghost Wars* will provide valuable insights for anyone working within the interagency process, as well as scholars and regional observers interested in how the United States got Afghanistan and Bin Laden so tragically wrong.

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Maurer, John H., ed. *Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*. London: Frank Cass, 2003. 164pp. \$79.95

One of three volumes of essays (two focus on different aspects of strategy) published in Handel's memory, this work is based on a conference held in Newport, Rhode Island. It offers four scholarly papers on Churchill's assessment of the German naval challenge before the First World War, Pacific security and the limits of British power between the wars, Churchill and the German threat in the late 1930s, and Churchill's views of technology. Each assesses a different aspect of Churchill's changing role.

Editor Maurer focuses on the early 1900s' battleship naval race with Germany. Brought in as First Lord of the Admiralty after the Agadir crisis of 1911, Winston Churchill is seen here as fully aware of the danger to Britain if its fleet were to be seriously disabled. The Admiralty tried to maintain at least a 60 percent advantage in dreadnought construction against Germany. Churchill sought to impress the Germans with the futility of trying to catch up with, let alone outbuild, Britain. Cognizant of the costs of this race, however, in 1913 he proposed a naval "holiday" to stretch out the construction of projected new ships over more time, hoping to reduce the pace. Maurer reviews the important domestic political battles that underlay this naval arms race.

Christopher Bell, who teaches history at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, assesses Churchill's concern over the growing threat posed by Japan in the interwar years. He notes a 1928 Churchill comment that "of all the wars

in the world, [war with Japan] was the least likely to happen.” After all, the two countries shared an alliance that dated to the beginning of the century. Extension of the “ten-year rule,” first promulgated in 1919, saw war in the Far East as highly unlikely for at least another decade. As Bell makes clear, this rule underlay a compromise between the Treasury, concerned about costs, and the Admiralty, which sought completion of its Singapore naval base and more ships. By the mid-1930s, an out-of-office Churchill began to change his position, now expressing (as were Whitehall ministries) growing concern about Japan’s intentions. However, his greater worry about a rearming Germany dominated naval needs in the Far East. Even in 1939 he argued the unlikelihood of a Japanese attack on far-off Singapore, just as he (and others) felt naval power alone could hold off aggression. Events, of course, proved this to be wishful thinking.

B. J. C. McKercher, the sole revisionist here, teaches history at the Royal Military College of Canada. He sees Churchill’s famous speeches against Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s as revealing a politician on the make: “Quite simply, he sought the premiership above all else; thus, his criticisms of British foreign and defense policy were less selfless than either he or his disciples later claimed.” McKercher’s arguments help balance excessive praise (years later) of Churchill’s stance in this period. He strongly defends prime ministers Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain as working to rebuild British defenses just as Churchill was attacking their seeming inaction. Munich is seen here—as by other revisionists—as a vital play for time to allow rearmament to reach full

effect. Churchill’s years in the political wilderness “resulted from his own follies, primarily his antipathy to Baldwin and Chamberlain,” during which, he argues, “Churchill consistently exaggerated threats.”

David Jablonsky teaches at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and makes clear Churchill’s fascination with what technology offered to overcome potential enemies. There are a host of interesting Churchill quotes on the impact (sometimes literally) of newly developed dum-dum bullets, improved pistols, and later the tank and the airplane. At the same time, Churchill was often concerned about possible unintended effects of technological choice, as well as the ethics of applying certain approaches. As the author notes, “The basic problem, Churchill came to realize, was that technology had changed the scale of warfare.” Before and during the war, he was fascinated with technical options, not all of them workable. Those that did work—such as signals intelligence—made a huge difference in the outcome.

This is a very useful collection, carefully researched and written, adding insight to what we know of Churchill’s varied diplomatic and military roles in a world that moved from cavalry charges to hydrogen bombs. Michael Handel would surely be pleased.

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Mullis, Tony R. *Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army Operations in Bleeding Kansas*. Columbia: Univ. of Missouri, 2004. 273pp. \$40.50

Tony Mullis, a serving officer in the U.S. Air Force, takes a close look at a

time when approximately 10 percent of the U.S. Army was intimately involved in one of the most challenging and politically charged assignments ever given to the U.S. military. Assigned occupation duties in a land where tribal loyalties had been the primary form of government, Army officers, in cooperation with diplomats appointed by the president, were tasked to assist a fledgling democracy attain statehood while avoiding incipient civil war. The task was complicated by the infusion of ideologically motivated outsiders, most of them heavily armed. The two main local factions committed a variety of atrocities, including the massacre of innocent civilians. Elections, new to the area, were viewed with open suspicion by most of the population. Local militias were often little more than muscle for political leaders. Many of the thornier underlying political issues had religious and economic overtones. Several Army officers assigned to these duties were involved in scandals, and at least one associated court-martial received national attention. Meanwhile, powerful individuals in Washington disagreed, sometimes publicly, over tactics, strategy, and policy in the affected region. To make matters worse, ingrained organizational barriers and an inherent resistance to change prevented promising new technologies from being used with maximum effectiveness. Finally, while the Army may have portrayed its role as one of neutral professionalism, both Democrats and Republicans were using the results of the occupation as a key component of their respective strategies for the next presidential election. The year was 1854, and the theater of operations was the Kansas Territory.

Peacekeeping on the Plains clearly began life as a doctoral dissertation. In its introduction Mullis lays out his basic premise. Debunking the perhaps popular conception that the United States has but recently come to experience peace operations, Mullis shows that the U.S. Army has been involved in missions of this type since the first days of the Republic—though this historical involvement has long been overlooked and underanalyzed. Mullis seeks to begin correcting this omission by examining in some detail the 1855 punitive expedition against the Lakota (of the Great Sioux Nation) as an example of the Army's efforts to keep peace in "Bleeding Kansas." Chapter 1 gives an overview of the U.S. Army's involvement in peace operations, and chapter 2 provides background information on the issue of slavery and the creation of the state of Kansas. Chapters 3 and 4 take a detailed look at the 1855 punitive expedition led by General William S. Harney. Chapters 5 through 8 deal with Army operations supporting civil actions in Kansas from 1854 to 1857. A conclusion and epilogue complete the work.

As was often demonstrated during the 1990s, the line between peace enforcement and war is often difficult to determine. This was no less true in 1855. The U.S. Army used deadly force against the Lakota, took hostages, and committed various acts that would, by the standards of today, be judged illegal. Yet, as Mullis points out, these operations were carried out with a political objective in mind, and, in the main, they were effective. Furthermore, Harney's success did have a positive impact, in that they influenced other tribes to remain peaceful. Such results would seem to have contemporary parallels with peace

operations conducted by the French in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the British in Sierra Leone, and the U.S. Marines in Liberia.

The parallels between current operations in Iraq and those of the Army in bleeding Kansas are even more strongly apparent. Faced with a unique and unwelcome mission, the Army faced a steep learning curve. There were missed opportunities and at least several instances of officers engaging in dubious ethical behavior in order to take advantage of perceived business opportunities. The initially appointed political leadership proved too vacillating and incompetent to deal with the complex difficulties inherent in the situation. Furthermore, the entire issue was a red-hot political football, which the newly created Republican Party was using to excoriate the incumbent Democrats.

Like those against the Lakota, the peace operations in Kansas were eventually successful. Nationalizing factional militias, deploying federal forces to prevent civil strife, and arresting infiltrating partisans all contributed to political stability and a safe election environment. Yet, as Mullis points out, several facets of policy either failed or were badly flawed. These included the failure to utilize the telegraph to transmit information rapidly to and from the area of operations. Mail was simply too slow to be operationally relevant—the telegraph could have been a powerful tool in the hands of the administration.

Peacekeeping on the Plains helps fill a gap in the coverage of some of the formative experiences of the U.S. Army. This is valuable in and of itself. However, the more immediate contribution of the work is to identify lessons learned in the

mid-1800s that may be applicable in the early years of the twenty-first century. However, as one would expect given the immense technological differences between the eras, these lessons are rather general in nature.

For example, it proved impossible to craft orders so detailed as to cover every situation the occupying forces encountered. Until local authorities began exercising authority they technically did not possess, the result was a paralysis of action. In connection with the Lakota reprisal, Mullis also makes a convincing argument for assigning older and presumably more mature officers to positions that would in these operations, under normal circumstances, go to younger officers.

Mullis's work also shows that the central conundrum of peace operations was as valid in the mid-nineteenth century as it is today. Enough troops with the right leadership can impose a peace, and might even be able to enforce a peace, but unless the root causes of conflict are resolved the peace has to be pinned into place by bayonets and will not endure. The peace imposed on the Lakota by the U.S. Army did not last long; it took a civil war and the destruction of the Confederacy to deal with the root causes that led to bleeding Kansas.

As mentioned earlier, this work is clearly derived from a dissertation, and for that reason, while it is intellectually stimulating, at times the writing is somewhat ponderous, repetitive, and dry. Yet the contribution this work makes to understanding both past and present eras of significance makes the effort worthwhile.

RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College



Herman, Arthur. *To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the World*. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. 648pp. \$26.95

The subtitle of Arthur Herman's grand maritime history *To Rule the Waves* gives it all away: *How the British Navy Shaped the World*. Through a series of well-described episodes, Herman convincingly discusses how the Royal Navy came to dominate the seas and sustained Britain's ability to expand and maintain its empire.

From John Hawkins and Francis Drake to the amazingly named Cloudsley Shovell, as well as Horatio Nelson, John Fisher, David Beatty, and the like, Herman traces the development of men, ships, and strategies, and the technologies that forced change.

The initial impulse for trade was matched by a desire for plunder, so that the relationship that later developed between the navy and the merchant trade required maturation. John Dee, writing a memorial to Queen Elizabeth in 1577, proposed a permanent navy as the "master key wherewith to open all locks that keep out or hinder this incomparable British empire." Although the queen lacked the means, the idea never really died. John Holland, not quoted by Herman, wrote in his 1638 "Discourse of the Navy": "If either the honour of a nation, commerce, or trade with all nations, peace at home, grounded upon our enemies' fear or love of us abroad, and attended with plenty of all things necessary either for the preservation for the public need, or thy private welfare, be things worthy thy esteem . . . then next to God and the King, give thy thanks for the same to the navy, as the

principal instrument whereby God works these good things to thee."

And nothing has changed.

This is a good book that describes all the twists and turns necessary for a nation to become a great commercial power and to protect itself from substantial competition and extraordinary technological challenges. What Herman establishes clearly is that ultimately it was the will to develop a navy and the willingness to use it in the most courageous manner, whether as a matter of policy or as a commander's individual initiative, that effectively supported the realm.

Unfortunately, Herman is not as well supported by his publisher. There are numerous editorial lapses in grammar and proofreading, and although substantive factual errors are few, there are enough to be annoying. For example, the assertion that the average Britisher consumed four pounds of sugar a day in 1700 and twelve pounds a day in 1720 should actually read "per year." Saint Michel should read Saint Mihiel. It is Saint Nazaire, not Nizaire, and Veinticinco, not Veinticino. There is also the omission of Port Stanley as a principal town in the Falklands, and the incorrect statement that "from [Prince] Alfred on, every generation of the royal family would make sure someone carried on the navy tradition, King George V and Louis Mountbatten being the most famous and Prince Philip the most recent" would leave Prince Charles and Prince Andrew wondering where they fit in. In citing the Falklands campaign, Herman also mentions what we in Naval Control of Shipping refer to as "ships taken up from trade." It is worth mentioning that without adequate auxiliaries a navy may be at risk and that

without a controllable merchant marine, a nation may be at risk.

Herman rightly celebrates the daring and enterprise of British naval officers and their willingness to use the means at hand to achieve their goals. A fleet in being is useless if not backed up by the commitment to use it. The problem was, as always, how to pay for the navy, which Herman cites as the major cause of Britain's civil war in 1642. The same issue faces us in 2005.

PAUL WILLIAM GARBER
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Stevens, David, ed. *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II*. 2d ed. Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2005. 336pp. AUD\$39.95

Australia is quintessentially a maritime nation. From the arrival of Lieutenant James Cook, RN, in Botany Bay in 1770, navies have featured heavily in the historical experience of Australia, and for this naval officer, the navy is rightfully regarded as "the senior service." Given this background, it seems surprising that there is not more written about this naval tradition and especially about the triumphs and tragedies of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in wartime. The recent publication of a second edition of David Stevens's *Royal Australian Navy in World War II* fills a very important gap. First published in 1996, the book has been augmented significantly in this new edition.

David Stevens is a former naval officer, a graduate of the University of New South Wales and Australian National University, and currently director of Strategic and Historical Studies within the Sea Power Centre—Australia. He

brings a critical and experienced eye to his editorship, and this is reflected in the many changes made in this edition. This book has a new cover, new photographs, six new chapters, and substantial updates to all preexisting chapters, with an increase of over a hundred pages. This work eschews any single theme but rather seeks to encapsulate an eclectic array of approaches to the general topic. While initially disconcerting, this methodology is skillfully used and provides a holistic account of the RAN wartime experience.

The chapters deal with, inter alia, matters of grand policy concerning Australian naval strategizing in the lead-up to the war, interesting accounts of battles experienced by former crew members, an outline of regional confrontation with Vichy French representatives, social assessments of the officer corps and female participation in the naval service, and a description of industrial reorganization within Australia, as well as accounts of naval operational thinking and planning during the course of the war. By any measure, the achievements of the RAN during the conflict were astonishing. At the war's close, the RAN comprised 337 ships and over forty thousand mobilized personnel. The navy served in almost every theater of that global war and earned its fair share of battle glory. As James Goldrick notes in chapter 1, the RAN had been involved in the sinking of numerous enemy capital ships and submarines, the destruction of over a hundred enemy aircraft and over 150,000 tons of axis merchant shipping. Perhaps the RAN's most significant achievement was its ability to keep open sea lines of communication to Australia at a

time when Japan had conquered vast swaths of South East Asia and the South West Pacific.

There are chapters devoted to a number of distinguished wartime Australian senior naval officers, and others that (re)address some of the perennial mysteries, such as the complete loss (and vanishing) of the cruiser HMAS *Sydney* on the eve of the Japanese entry into the war. The book also devotes a significant amount of attention to the Australian-U.S. alliance. Indeed, such concentration is not surprising. World War II represented a sea change for Australian security thinking, with attention diverted away from the United Kingdom and toward the United States as strategic partner within the region. Indeed, American readers will surely find interesting the accounts in chapter 7 (“The Pacific War: A Strategic Overview”) and chapter 8 (“Forging an Alliance? The American Naval Commitment to the South Pacific, 1940–42”) of the Australian-U.S. military partnership within the Pacific campaign. Particularly enlightening are the conclusions drawn of the essential correctness of prewar U.S. strategic naval thinking and the thorough testing of naval war plans at the Naval War College. On the other side, I am sure that American interest will also be piqued by the chapter by Commodore Loxton (retired), giving his account of postwar American revisionism concerning the battle of Savo Island. In this chapter he notes his attendance as a student at the Naval War College’s newly founded Naval Command Course (as the Naval Command College, today the senior of the school’s two international programs, was then known), and in 1959, his participation in a study that emphasized U.S. virtue

and Australian failings in that battle. Having been a badly wounded participant in the battle, he observes, “My arguments against some of those hypotheses were therefore largely based on an innate belief that we Australians and our Royal Navy Admiral could not have done as badly as we were led to believe. At the time I thought that I had not made much of an impression, but the following year Savo was not studied.”

David Stevens has produced a book that is both highly readable and engaging. He provides a much needed public face for the Royal Australian Navy wartime experience, and he effectively preserves the legacy of the period. Since the Second World War, the RAN has continued to fight alongside its U.S. Navy allies in conflicts ranging from Korea and Vietnam through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

For the American reader, this book provides rare insight into the historical events that formed the genesis of the modern Royal Australian Navy identity and thus has allowed an inside understanding of the impulses that continue to drive it. The RAN is a steadfast and reliable partner to the USN; gaining this appreciation of it is reason enough to read this valuable book.

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Ellis, Joseph J. *His Excellency: George Washington*. New York: Knopf, 2004. 320pp. \$26.95

Fischer, David Hackett. *Washington’s Crossing*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004. 564pp. \$35

Wiencek, Henry. *An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves and the Creation of America*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003. 404pp. \$26

Our nation's first commander in chief, George Washington, is back in the news. At Mount Vernon they are striving to recast Washington's image as America's first action hero, while also sponsoring a high-tech, computer-driven rejuvenation of him to figure out exactly what he looked like at ages nineteen, forty-five, and fifty-seven. These current labors, part of an eighty-five-million-dollar "To Keep Him First" campaign, have been bolstered by the efforts of others. The University of Virginia is in the process of publishing *The Papers of George Washington* (fifty-two of the ninety volumes have been completed), and the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art recently exhibited thirteen stunning portraits of Washington by the Rhode Island-born artist Gilbert Stuart.

A recent outburst of serious and extremely enjoyable books about the man has reinforced this worthwhile cause. The three books chosen for this review, all published within the last two years, emphasize a particularly important theme concerning Washington's incredibly eventful life—the development of his character and his growth as a man. One is a full biography, one focuses on the American Revolution, and the third explores Washington's attitudes on slavery; they make for a rich collection of informative reading.

It is generally accepted that Washington has become ever more remote from the hearts and minds of his countrymen and women. To use a prevalent expression, he is perhaps the "deadest, whitest male in American history." To paraphrase

Richard Brookhiser, he is in our textbooks and in our wallets but not in our hearts. Perhaps these books will at least help put him back in our minds, if not in our hearts.

The leadoff selection, *His Excellency: George Washington*, is a concise and exceedingly readable biography by Joseph Ellis, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation* (Knopf, 2000). Ellis's earlier biographies examined the characters of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. He once again has chosen to center his work on the character of his subject. Ellis has set out to write not another epic portrait of Washington but rather a fresh picture focused tightly on his character and based in part upon new scholarship on the revolutionary era. Ellis's goal is to relate how Washington became who he was. He gives us this new portrait of Washington's growth most admirably.

In looking for patterns of emerging behavior, Ellis cites the combination of Washington's bottomless ambition and near obsession with self-control. He also traces the development of Washington's personality, beginning with his experiences as a young man in the wilderness of the Ohio Valley. The author states that what in later years would be regarded as aloofness and cold reserve began with Washington's need as an inexperienced colonial officer in the French and Indian War to insulate himself and his reputation from criticism. To do this, he had to rely on the hard core of his own merit and self-control, his strongest assets as a young man on the way up.

Ellis notes that nothing had a greater influence on Washington's rise to distinction than his marriage to the widow

Martha Dandridge Custis. Her immense dowry launched Washington to the level of great planters in Virginia's Northern Neck region and provided the foundation for his rise in wealth and influence.

Ellis is particularly effective in reminding readers that nothing was inevitable about the success of either the American Revolution or Washington's role in it. If Washington had not been able to learn from his mistakes early in the war, caused in large part by his naturally aggressive strategy, the conflict could well have ended in defeat and subjugation for the colonies. Washington himself wrote, upon initially arriving at Yorktown, "What may be in the Womb of Fate is very uncertain." Nonetheless, Washington was the centerpiece around which the Continental Army and the cause had formed in 1775, and it was Washington who sustained the army for nearly eight years of desperate fighting, which enabled the ultimate victory.

Ellis also notes that historians have recently concluded that the American Revolution occurred simultaneously with a virulent smallpox epidemic in the colonies; it claimed about a hundred thousand lives, many of them soldiers. He makes the compelling case that one of Washington's most consequential and strategic decisions during the war was his policy of requiring smallpox inoculation for all troops serving in the Continental Army.

In what Ellis calls "the greatest exit in American history," Washington returned his commission to Congress in 1783. His retirement from power and return to Mount Vernon have been noted by other biographers as the greatest act of Washington's life. However, the author also argues that

Washington's unique character was primarily molded by his experiences during the Revolution. Just as he had employed a Fabian strategy of avoiding battles that would have risked the Continental Army's destruction, he also "fashioned a kind of Fabian presidency that sustained the credibility of the federal government by avoiding political battles that threatened to push federal sovereignty further and faster than public opinion allowed."

In the final chapter of this well written book, Ellis states that there were two distinct creative moments in the founding of America: the winning of independence and the creation of nationhood. Washington was the central figure in both events, and his judgment, in Ellis's view, on all major political questions proved prescient—this "remarkably reliable judgment derived from his elemental understanding of how power worked in the world."

Ellis ends his search for how Washington became the "unquestioned superior" of all the Founding Fathers by declaring that Washington "was that rarest of men: a supremely realistic visionary, a prudent prophet . . . devoted to getting the big things right. His genius was his judgment."

If the American Revolution was the key experience in forming Washington's personality and character, David Hackett Fischer's outstanding book *Washington's Crossing* goes a very long way to explain why. Fischer, a historian at Brandeis University and author of the equally masterful *Paul Revere's Ride* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) and *Albion's Seed* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), reminds us again that historical events are

not the products of irresistible forces outside the influences of human choice. They are instead the result of “decisions and actions by people who had opportunities to choose and act otherwise.” The summer, fall, and winter of 1776 was a time when human choices and actions truly mattered in determining the fate of the rebelling American colonies. In the famous words of Thomas Paine, first published in *The American Crisis* on 19 December of that year, they were “times that try men’s souls.”

The British had landed more than thirty-three thousand crack troops near New York during the summer and had driven Washington and the Continental Army from New York across New Jersey all the way to the banks of the Delaware River. They also had seventy warships lurking off the coast. America had none. The British had taken Rhode Island and threatened Philadelphia. American morale was at a nadir, while British smugness and confidence were soaring, and the “glorious cause” hung by a slender thread. This “cataract of disaster” was compounded both by the thousands of Americans who were signing oaths of loyalty to the crown and by the hard evidence at roll call that the Continental Army was shrinking daily. To reverse this desperate situation seemed almost hopeless, but it happened; Fischer masterfully relates not only how but why, and the deeper implications of it all.

Fischer expertly recounts the even now unbelievably dramatic facts. On Christmas night of 1776, Washington led a ragged army of 2,400 colonials across the ice-choked Delaware River during a raging storm. After marching all night, they surprised and defeated a garrison of 1,500 tough and well-led Hessian

soldiers at Trenton. These professional troops were not drunk from celebrating Christmas but exhausted from standing vigilant guard and fighting off harassing militia attacks. Within a few days after the New Year, the American forces had thwarted a violent British counterattack in Trenton, then slipped away overnight to surprise and defeat a British brigade at Princeton. These victories assuredly revitalized the American cause and saved the American Revolution.

Fischer greatly enriches the story of these historic and climactic events. He argues that after the loss of New York, Washington changed and adopted a new strategy that became an element of the new American way of war. This strategy was in part Fabian, as noted by Joseph Ellis—that is, to avoid a risky general action but strike only when a “brilliant stroke could be made with . . . probability of success.” Washington also adapted and learned to use artillery, initiative, speed, and intelligence as force multipliers, and he evolved an adaptive system of counsel and command that contrasted markedly with the rigidity of control in the British military.

The new way of war also included much more. It embodied Washington’s belief in what John Adams called a “policy of humanity,” extending quarter in battle and insisting on the decent treatment of prisoners, which aligned the conduct of the war with the values of the Revolution. These values were further extended by Washington’s strict prohibitions against the pillaging of civilian property and by his insistence on deference to his civilian superiors in Congress.

Fischer also comments on the unabashedly heroic painting *Washington Crossing the Delaware*, by Emanuel Leutze.

He reminds us that the magnificent (twenty by twelve feet) canvas that now hangs in New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art is highly symbolic. Completed in 1851, the painting was intended to inspire the mid-nineteenth-century European revolutionaries and depict the crucial importance of Washington's ability to unite the diverse Americans pictured in the boat to pull together in the common cause of freedom.

Fischer concludes his superlative book in the same manner Leutze conceived his painting—with a message for his contemporaries. He states that the message of Washington's crossing "tells us that Americans in an earlier generation were capable of acting in a higher spirit, and so are we." Trenton and Princeton were brilliant strokes, and *Washington's Crossing* is both a brilliant description of the events and an illumination of the man who made them possible.

If Americans in an earlier generation were capable of acting in a higher spirit, there is a reasoned argument to be made that George Washington himself did so particularly in the fourth paragraph of his last will and testament. After the brief first sections of the will, where Washington declared himself a citizen of the United States, settled his few debts, and provided for his wife, Martha, he began the fourth paragraph with the following extraordinary sentence: "Upon the decease of my wife, it is my Will & desire that all the Slaves which I hold in my own right, shall receive their freedom."

The story tracing Washington's tortured journey to personal awareness and moral change concerning slavery, and ultimately to the act of emancipation, is

superbly told by Henry Wiencek in his revisionist work *An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America*. Wiencek, winner of a National Book Critics Circle Award for his earlier book *The Hairstons: An American Family in Black and White* (St. Martin's, 1999), sees the Revolution as the primary experience that motivated Washington's reflection and ultimate change on slavery. Wiencek does not see Washington's freeing of his slaves as a parting act of grace or as a sign of his natural benevolence but as a testament to a "profound moral struggle," one that represented a "repudiation of a lifetime of mastery."

Tracing Washington's path to repudiation of slavery is a difficult task, necessarily filled with subtleties of interpretation. As one historian has said of Washington, "no more elusive personality exists in history." Nonetheless, *Imperfect God* aptly reinforces what Joseph Ellis notes, that the Revolution transformed almost everything, both for the country and for Washington.

Washington initially came to own slaves through inheritance from his father (at age eleven) and then from his half-brother Lawrence. Although he used his slaves and his wife's dower slaves to work the five joining farms of Mount Vernon his entire life, there are clues that Washington's long transformation concerning slavery began at least as early as 1769. Wiencek emphasizes that Washington took part in a slave lottery in Williamsburg that year and witnessed a slave auction "consisting chiefly of boys and girls, from 14 or 15 down to the ages of two or three years." Wiencek believes that this auction and similar experiences caused Washington to reflect on the monstrous cruelty of breaking apart families, so

that by the mid-1770s he had offered to buy an entire family he did not need rather than separate its members. In 1786, Washington wrote that he never wanted to purchase another slave unless there were most unusual circumstances, referring to “that species of property which I have no inclination to possess.”

Yet it was as commander in chief in Boston in 1775 that Washington really began to see blacks as human beings rather than as something to be owned. He must have been shocked on arriving in Massachusetts to see large numbers of black men bearing arms. He was introduced to a black hero of Bunker Hill, and the black poet Phillis Wheatley wrote a poem in his honor. In response to Wheatley’s poem and her accompanying letter, Washington invited her to his headquarters in Cambridge. He was changing his view of blacks, and the greatest impact of this change was in the Continental Army. His general orders issued 30 December 1775 stated: “As the General is informed, that Numbers of Free Negroes are desirous of enlisting, he gives leave to recruiting Officers, to entertain them, and promises to lay the matter before the Congress.” This was a new policy, and according to Wiencek, “Washington won the Revolutionary War with an army that was more integrated than any military force until the Vietnam War.”

Wiencek further traces Washington’s change in attitude after the war. With the encouragement of the Marquis de Lafayette, Washington, before he became president, had deeply reconsidered the implications of slavery. In 1786, he wrote that he hoped the Virginia legislature would abolish slavery “by slow, sure, & imperceptible degrees.” Wiencek believes there is evidence that

by 1789 Washington had experienced a moral epiphany, as he outlined a plan in secret to sell his western lands to finance gradual emancipation of his slaves. In 1794, Washington wrote to a relative, “I am principled against selling negroes, as you would do cattle in a market,” and he later stated to a friend that the “unfortunate condition” of his slaves “has been the only unavoidable subject of regret.”

In the end, he did what no other slave-owning Founding Father did. He freed the 123 slaves he had legal control over at Martha’s death and provided from his estate for the care and basic education of those who most needed it for the next thirty-three years. All this was done despite his wife’s (and his extended family’s) embittered opposition. He realized that this act made him a stranger in his own land. He had once remarked to Edmund Randolph that if slavery continued to divide America, “he had made up his mind to move and be of the northern.”

Wiencek’s book gives a balanced view of his subject. He is careful to place Washington in the context of his times, neither apologizing for nor condemning him. He does not avoid the fact that Washington owned, worked, punished, bought, and sold slaves. Yet the sum of Washington’s stature as a founder is not diminished by Wiencek’s portrait but rather better brought to light.

In sum, these three excellent books help to reveal Washington as a man in full who had the self-awareness, the will, and the moral courage to change. He saw life steadily, and he tried to see it whole. There is still a great deal to admire and to learn from his personal journey as a human being.

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FROM THE EDITORS

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The twenty-second of our monograph series, *China's Nuclear Force Modernization*, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S. Erickson, is now available from the editorial offices and online. Professor Goldstein, of the Strategic Research Department of the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies, has been at the forefront of recent research into China's future. In this project he has guided a handful of naval officers through the puzzle of China's ongoing nuclear modernization programs. With the able assistance of Andrew Erickson, these sailor-scholars have examined various aspects of nuclear modernization, from ballistic missile defense to nuclear command and control.

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC) PUBLICATION PRIZE

Timothy D. Miller and Jeffrey A. Larsen, both employees of SAIC, have won the 2004 SAIC Publication Prize in the category of economics, policy, and arms control, for their coauthored "Dealing with Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cash for Kilotons," in our Spring 2004 issue. The award comprised a trophy, a small cash prize, and an opportunity to brief the article to the annual conference of senior company executives.