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



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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Autumn 2008

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Cover

A sampling of recent cover and poster art by the Graphic Arts Branch of the Naval War College's Visual Communications Department. This by no means exhaustive selection suggests the scope and variety of the College's publications and events, and it reflects the striking diversity and quality of the images that the College's graphic artists and illustrators have produced to support them. Reading from the top, left to right, on the front cover: the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Flag Course series (Course 08-2C was held in Naples, Italy, in July 2008); a China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) conference held in December 2007; the Naval War College Press Newport Paper monographs for 2008 (no. 33 in the series, pictured, is U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, forthcoming as this goes to press); a December 2006 product of a long-term CMSI study; the Navy Title X War Game, known as Global '08, held at the College in August 2008; the August 2007 Naval War College ethics conference, an ongoing program; Prof. Jeffrey H. Norwitz's Armed Groups, which appeared in 2008; the June 2008 Current Strategy Forum; and the International Programs office's next regional symposium, scheduled for October 2008 in Bahrain. On the back cover: a Jerome P. Levy conference held in February 2007; a war game at the College conducted in June 2008; a workshop held at the College in August 2008; the multicity, multiyear "Conversations with the Country" program; a conference held at the College in June 2008; and the Naval War College's most recent graduation ceremony, on 20 June 2008.

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FROM THE EDITORS

The sudden escalation of hostilities between Russia and Georgia over the status of the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in early August 2008 has provided an unpleasant reminder of the strategic salience of the ethnic conflicts that continue to fester along the periphery of the former communist world. The United States has been forced to divert its attention from the ongoing conflicts in the greater Middle East to the problem of a geostrategically resurgent Russia and its implications for the NATO alliance. In this context, it is essential to reassess the current state of play in the former Yugoslavia, where Russian interest and influence remain a significant factor and NATO has a continuing military presence. John Schindler of the Naval War College provides a timely overview of the recent history of Western intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as an assessment of what has been achieved and what remains to be done. Much depends, he argues, on whether Serbia can be persuaded to cast its lot definitively with the West—or whether, perhaps encouraged by Russia's recent defiance of the international community, it will continue to be a source of ethnic tension and instability in the Balkans.

The Navy's recently promulgated maritime strategy continues to attract attention and commentary around the world. In this issue, Andrew Erickson, of the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, discusses the reactions to the maritime strategy by military intellectuals and commentators in the People's Republic of China, providing translations and in-depth analysis of three especially informed and thoughtful essays on the subject. While these assessments do not entirely agree, they share a generally positive view of "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," treating this document as a highly significant development in American naval thinking—and perhaps American national strategy.

The *Review* maintains a long-standing commitment to military historical subjects, and in this issue we are pleased to offer readers two outstanding articles on intelligence and operational deception in World War II. The gradual opening of sensitive military intelligence archives of all kinds in recent decades continues to provide many opportunities for fruitful reconsideration of the history of recent wars, but World War II in particular continues to offer important lessons

for the present concerning the integration of intelligence and military operations and—especially—the sophisticated employment of intelligence-derived information for purposes of operational deception. Commander John Patch, USN (Ret.), tells the fascinating story of the intricate deception planning that accompanied Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, at that time probably the largest amphibious operation in world history. This operation, over long distances and essentially uncommanded seas, would have been at high risk of failure without the extraordinary intelligence support that enabled it to thread the needle of Axis air and naval power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Commander Patch concludes with a cogent distillation of the lessons of Operation TORCH for American operational planners today. Robert Hanyok then offers a detailed recounting of the denial and deception efforts that gained the Japanese battle fleet surprise in its attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

Finally, as Colonel Gary Ohls, USMC (Ret.), demonstrates in this first-ever fully documented account of Operation EASTERN EXIT, the Marine-led evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel from Somalia in January 1991, it is important to capture the lessons of very recent history while the memory of events remains fresh and participants in them are still accessible. Though overshadowed at the time by the developments leading up to the outbreak of the first Gulf War later that month, EASTERN EXIT, as Ohls shows, represents a kind of preview of post-Cold War maritime operations; indeed, it would prove a significant reference point for the refashioning of Navy and Marine Corps doctrine later in the decade, with a new emphasis on the littoral environment. This article is part of a larger body of research being conducted by Colonel Ohls on U.S. military operations in Somalia in the early 1990s, to be published by the Naval War College Press as a Newport Paper in 2009.

WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL ARTICLE PRIZES

The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing in the *Naval War College Review*.

The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the *Review* in the preceding publishing year. Cash awards are funded through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation.

- First place: Colonel Gary Solis, USMC (Ret.), “Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict,” Spring 2007 (\$1,000)

- Second place: Captain Arthur M. Smith, MC, USNR (Ret), Captain David A. Lane, MC, USN, and Vice Admiral James A. Zimble, MC, USN (Ret.), “Purple Medicine: The Case for a Joint Medical Command,” Winter 2007 (\$650, shared among coauthors)
- Third place: Peter Dutton, “Carving Up the East China Sea,” Spring 2007 (\$350).

The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for the author of the best historical article appearing in the *Review* in the same period. This year’s winner is Dr. George H. Quester, “Two Hundred Years of Pre-emption” (Autumn 2007) (\$500). In addition, two articles received honorable mention: “Did a Soviet Merchant Ship Encounter the Pearl Harbor Strike Force?” by Marty Bollinger (Autumn 2007) and “Expectation, Adaptation, and Resignation: British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914–April 1916,” by Jon Tetsuro Sumida (Summer 2007).

NEW AND FORTHCOMING NEWPORT PAPERS

A flurry of additions to our Newport Papers monograph series is now appearing. Number 31, *Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas*, edited by Ambassador Paul D. Taylor, collects thoughtful observations on the U.S. Navy’s new maritime strategy process offered by naval war colleges of our Western Hemisphere neighbors, from Canada to Argentina. Newport Paper 32, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents*, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, furthers the invaluable series of Newport Papers in which Professor Hattendorf (the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History) has compiled the Navy’s key strategy documents of recent decades. (Newport Paper 19 treated the Maritime Strategy of 1986, number 27 treated the 1990s, and number 30 the 1970s. A further volume, for the 1950s, is planned.) Finally, in Newport Paper 33, *Major Naval Operations*, Dr. Milan Vego of the Naval War College addresses in a comprehensive way a key aspect of naval operational art, a discipline in which he is an internationally recognized authority. All three are available electronically on our website and portal. As this issue goes to press, all are in press and will soon be available in hard copy.



Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in 1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina. His initial assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master's degrees in public administration (finance) from Harvard and in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction.

After completing department head tours in USS Deyo (DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.

Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998, deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency "E" for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.

Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy Division as chief of staff of the Navy's Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission area. His most recent Washington assignment was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate Liaison.

In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 August 2004.

PRESIDENT'S FORUM



Operational and Strategic Genius: Building the Main Battery for the New Maritime Strategy

The “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” suggests new ways to design and operate the Navy. How do we anticipate what our leaders must learn to implement the Navy’s new strategy and its enabling concepts?

ONE OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE’S key missions is to prepare future leaders to operate effectively at the operational and strategic levels. This is the realm of the senior operational headquarters, a realm characterized by a wide scope of responsibility, geopolitical consequence, complexity, and uncertainty—a realm where the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational elements of national power intersect and must be managed. This is a realm where no one gives the leader a playbook or clear terms of relations with other stakeholders; nor is there likely to be an agreed-to organization chart. A commander at this level, charged with huge responsibilities, may find that he or she has not even been given a useful or practicable mission statement. Moreover, the commander and staff may discover that they are effectively “in charge” of very little, yet expected to deliver much.

How do we know that our curricula in fact prepare our students to meet this challenge? How do we figure out just what competencies leaders and those in supporting roles within our various operational headquarters will need to be successful in such a dynamic—indeed, chaotic—realm? Add to this the fact that the concept of a maritime headquarters is in full-blown transformation, and you get some idea of just how difficult a task this is. The Naval War College has worked with great focus and served as a “thought leader” and implementer of a range of initiatives to instantiate the Navy’s goal to be “a service focused at the operational level of war”^{*} and support the broader policy objectives defined in

^{*} This is the primary proposition that emerged in January 2006 from the first “CNO’s Maritime Security Conference,” which brought together the senior operational leadership of the Navy to consider its most pressing operational issues.

that strategy. Being at the nexus of this activity, the College is in an ideal position to help the Navy define both the functions and the competencies necessary to meet its goals.

Globalization has changed many features of war, and we see many of its rules changing as well. As our new maritime strategy (www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf) points out, maritime forces must play an increasingly prominent and strategic role, and they require close collaboration with international forces and nonmilitary organizations to do so. Coordinating and synchronizing activities across such a wide range of diverse partners emerge as key functions of a joint force commander. Coordinated and synchronized employment of joint, multinational, and multiagency forces in both peacetime and wartime demands a very sophisticated, globally netted command-and-control (C2) capability and a comprehensive system that develops Navy leaders able to use it. The maritime strategy emphasizes the necessity of understanding and employing maritime forces as a continuously engaged, globally distributed implement of national influence. This places an even greater premium on building the genius necessary to grasp the essence of a problem, to appreciate it in a strategic framework. It also assumes that the necessary competencies—cognitive and practical—will be in place to apply that force with strategic effectiveness.

The new strategy has brought into focus the links between maritime capability, the stability it ensures, and global prosperity. To achieve the underlying goal of regional or global maritime security, however, demands a degree of interagency and international cooperation never before achieved. The requirement is not so much for unity of command as for unity of effort. That unity relies on political mechanisms, decision processes, information and technical standards, and protocols to bring diverse stakeholders in global and regional stability into more cooperative and effective relationships.

Two drivers of naval force design emerge from the doctrinal logic of the strategy: the need for combat-credible forces focused in regions where the potential for major conventional operations is highest and where the demand for a prominent, war-winning deterrent is greatest; and the need for globally distributed forces tailored to specific regional strategies. The two drivers signal an evolution beyond the general-purpose force designed for the Cold War era.

Implications for How We Operate Naval Forces

The Naval Operating Concept supporting the strategy recognizes this evolution in how naval forces are used. Task forces are being employed less today as integrated formations built around aircraft carriers or big-deck amphibians and more as arrays of multipurpose platforms. These platforms can be dynamically employed to create a wide range of discrete operational-level effects—beyond the

awareness and control horizons of the group commander and his more tactically oriented staff. Further, naval forces are increasingly understood and valued as constituting a key strategic element of national power, applicable not just in a reserve or supporting role in the case of a major conventional operation but as an engagement force applied globally in a synchronized, concerted fashion “24/7,” 365 days a year, to achieve *strategic* effects—to prevent war, to avert crisis, to provide maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and to underwrite regional and global stability.

Formerly, strike groups would bring their command and control with them as a near-autonomous capability, in a virtual “bubble” of situational awareness and C2. Today, because of the long reach of naval weapons and sensors, the diversity and mobility of afloat forces, and their increasing criticality to other joint commanders for application across a wide range of missions, that bubble must be expanded and integrated into a joint doctrinal and C2 “blanket” that extends over and across regions. This requirement for integration is forcing the locus of planning and assessment to a higher level, into a joint functional maritime headquarters. We are maturing now the processes, terms of relations, and functions of this “Maritime Headquarters” and the “Maritime Operations Center.”*

These concepts are driving the Navy to review how it operates, commands, and controls maritime forces, in a globally synchronized way and in routine concert with a wider range of partners. The Naval War College has been at the center of the Navy’s ambitious effort to rethink its command-and-control structures and its operational headquarters functions. Given the traditional role the College has played in developing expertise at the operational and strategic levels, and given its involvement and leadership in the current raft of operational-level initiatives, it is well positioned to help the Navy define the competencies necessary to operate these evolved headquarters and operations centers.† Getting manpower requirements right is always challenging, but the fact that the Navy is still coming to grips with the broader, more robust command and control

* “MHQ w/ MOC,” or Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center. The MHQ is the headquarters that supports a maritime commander focused above the tactical level (i.e., at the operational level). The MOC is *not* the command center but rather that portion of the maritime headquarters (a combination of personnel, systems, and processes) that supports the operational requirements of the commander that could have various operational roles assigned (e.g., numbered fleet commander, as a designated joint-task-force commander). The MHQ w/ MOC concept is viewed as a system of systems whereby MOCs around the globe are connected so as to provide maritime situational awareness, support maritime security, and provide “reachback” to each other to deliver maritime capabilities to the combatant commanders.

† A Chief of Naval Operations e-mail of 24 November 2006 to the President of the Naval War College and Chief of Naval Personnel directed the College to identify the personnel and training requirements for MHQ w/ MOC. This followed verbal tasking to determine “what kinds of people and competencies . . . we need in these headquarters and MOCs.”

implied by its new strategy and operating concepts makes this assignment more difficult still. Nonetheless, great progress has been made. Even more promising, the process that the Naval War College has built to respond to this tasking promises to apply as well to the problem of defining manpower requirements more broadly across the Navy.

Understanding Manpower Requirements in Terms of Joint Capabilities

The Navy is coming to grips with the need to understand manpower requirements in terms of joint capabilities. Building on the work of the Quadrennial Defense Review,* the Navy has determined that we need to understand manpower in terms of “capabilities”—and that this capability-driven aspect of manpower would result in understanding the Navy’s workforce requirements. Manpower requirements would, perhaps for the first time, be linked directly to *mission-essential tasks* in order to understand the effect of manpower decisions on warfighting readiness. This is how we must determine what expertise belongs in our operational headquarters and operations centers—by looking first at what they must do and how they must do it.

Historically, the Navy has been world class at building competence through training. Further, its forward-deployed tempo has generated vast experience. However, competence emerging from training and deployment experience is predominately tactical in nature. On the other hand, Naval War College research, empirical evidence, and senior leadership assessment demonstrate that operational- and strategic-level competence is built through a *blend* of focused training, education, and experience *across a continuum*: competencies are built over time. Experience in tactical tours, no matter how strenuous, simply does not normally equate to expertise at the operational level of war.

The College’s response to the tasking of the Chief of Naval Operations eventually involved a cross-functional team of experts to conduct research in partnership with U.S. fleet forces.† Starting with joint warfighting-capability requirements, the team set out to articulate a comprehensive understanding of the operational-level-of-war domain; to build from an inclusive view of how mission-essential tasks, organizational processes, systems, and people need to

* The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a congressionally mandated vehicle through which the Defense Department undertakes a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources. Specifically, the QDR is expected to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to execute successfully the full range of missions within that strategy.

† This collaboration, defined below as the Capabilities Based Competency Assessment, is led at the Naval War College by Professor Richard Suttie. Together with Fleet Forces Command’s MHQ w/ MOC Project Team, the College has conducted a two-year study to map the manpower requirements and skill sets necessary to support the new concept.

work together; and then to integrate a dynamic, analytically reliable, valid, and repeatable methodology that would generate the manpower requirements for the operational level of war. This effort came to be known as CBCA (Capabilities Based Competency Assessment) and is viewed as a critical path to implementing the Navy's new headquarters concept.

Ultimately, we expect the CBCA process to yield specific manpower requirements, including competencies that the warfighter identifies as critical to mission tasks. It should also give us valid, reliable, capability-focused, and competency-based manpower requirements for MHQ/MOC operational positions. It will also identify, for each operational position, the importance, frequency, and duration of use of specific equipment and systems and the language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC) competencies needed. Through process-based analysis and optimization we also expect to understand the manpower costs and savings.

This work will continue through 2009, but we estimate that the methodology will lead to fundamental changes in how people are understood—in the context of tasks, work, and missions. This will allow us at the Naval War College to understand better how the genius of our academic faculty and the curricula that the faculty creates yield the capabilities demanded by our new strategy and its enabling concepts. As this vanguard effort reports out, we will know that what we are teaching is on target, and if it is not, we—as we have demonstrated the responsiveness to do—will adjust fires.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

John R. Schindler is professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. He previously served for nearly a decade with the National Security Agency, where he specialized in Balkan and East European issues. He holds a PhD in modern European history and has published widely on southeast Europe, terrorism, and security, including Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida and the Rise of Global Jihad (Zenith, 2007).

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EUROPE'S UNSTABLE SOUTHEAST

John R. Schindler

From the perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense, Europe has been the world's "safe" region for several years. After the tumult and disorder that plagued the Balkans in the 1990s, resulting in two major NATO-led military operations—in Bosnia and Kosovo, in 1995 and 1999, respectively—Europe has been viewed as a peaceful, stable environment for American forces and interests. When European Command is compared with Central Command, with its ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe unquestionably and justifiably appears safe and happy; even the least-developed corners of Europe lack the endemic human security issues that plague portions of Africa, Asia, and South America.

Even the Balkans, the countries of southeastern Europe that until the early 1990s were part of Yugoslavia and whose integration into European and Atlantic economic and security relationships is incomplete, appear far more tranquil and promising than just a few years ago. Political, economic, and social progress, particularly in countries like Slovenia and Croatia, has been palpable and genuine. Also, the keeping of the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo by NATO and European Union (EU) forces, with hardly a shot fired during the stability phase, is no small accomplishment, considering how hot the fires of interethnic hatred so recently burned in those states. The early 2008 recognition of an independent Kosovo and the announcement that Croatia and Albania will be admitted to NATO have served as visible signs of progress in this troubled region.

However, beyond high-profile diplomacy, it remains unclear how much political and economic progress has actually been accomplished in the Balkans under Western guidance since the mid-1990s. It is far from certain that trouble spots like Bosnia and Kosovo have achieved much in terms of interethnic

reconciliation or the rebuilding of civil society—to say nothing of securing Western-oriented economic and political institutions—while Serbia, the region’s key country, remains distressingly outside Western political, economic, and security institutions. The Albanian question—a vexing political, social, and demographic issue that increasingly affects the neighboring states of Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro as well as Kosovo and Albania—remains out of bounds yet is increasingly important to regional security.

Western, and U.S., accomplishments in the Balkans since the 1990s are genuine and important, but has the mission been accomplished? While Americans can be forgiven for paying less attention to the Balkans since 9/11, as the Long War has caused U.S. military deployments in the region to dry up along with economic aid and political focus, the costs of recent inattention are mounting and may yet again lead to crisis in the region—something NATO and the United States will be unable to ignore.

SUCCESS STORIES

The passing of communist Yugoslavia in mid-1991 was met with anticipation by many of its peoples, glee by some and dread by others, but with a lack of interest by most Europeans and Americans. While Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia got good press in the West, its heretic communist regime serving as a strategic asset to NATO in the Cold War, it was less popular with many of its citizens. Tito’s unique brand of communism, with its relatively liberal attitudes on social matters, allowances for multiethnic expression, and quasi-market economy, was popular with Western scholars as much as with governments. Yet Yugoslavia’s secret police was as active as that in any Soviet-bloc state, its prisons filled with dissidents. By the late 1980s, as the economy contracted and nationalism arose again after decades of official restrictions, the federation created by Tito from the ashes of Axis occupation in 1945 was no longer viewed as a happy home by many Western-oriented Yugoslavs. It was therefore no surprise that Slovenia and Croatia, the most westward-looking Yugoslav republics—geographically, politically, economically, and socially—were the first to depart Tito’s doomed state. Both abandoned Yugoslavia by force in mid-1991, resulting in two wars: one short and easy, and one long and painful.

Slovenia’s departure from Yugoslavia in the so-called Ten Day War beginning in late June 1991 with hindsight seems to have ended before it really started. There were barely sixty killed on both sides, and the conflict unfolded almost anticlimactically before CNN cameras. Yet the ease with which tiny Slovenia’s militia forces, equipped with little more than small arms, local knowledge, and sheer grit, beat back the once-mighty Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was no accident; it was the result of months of careful preparation by Slovenia’s clever and

thorough defense leadership.¹ No less important was the fact that the JNA General Staff was deeply divided over how to react to Slovenia's declaration of independence and produced no coordinated military response to the crisis. Although the JNA vastly outnumbered Slovene forces, especially in firepower and mobility, paralysis at the top coupled with low morale among Yugoslav conscripts, who were unenthusiastic about fighting fellow Yugoslavs, unraveled JNA efforts from the outset.²

If Slovenia won its independence from Yugoslav cheaply, however, Croatia's road out of Titoism would prove arduous and costly. The JNA, the servant of a disappearing state, was willing to let Slovenia go, but Croatia was another matter; the officer corps, which was disproportionately Serbian, wanted to keep Croatia in Yugoslavia by force, not least to protect the large Serbian minority in Croatia.³ The result was a bitter conflict that cost thousands of lives and raged into early 1992. The JNA's grand offensive to subdue Croatia was an utter failure, yet it did succeed in carving away a third of Croatia's territory, mostly where ethnic Serbs were.⁴ This Belgrade-backed pseudostate, known officially as the Republic of Serbian Krajina, would last not four years. After the fighting died down in early 1992, with the stalemated front patrolled by UN peacekeepers, the Croatian government in Zagreb devoted serious effort and resources to creating new, Western-style military forces. Croatia's maneuver-oriented New Model Army saw its debut in mid-1995, after long and effective preparation, in two offensives, known as FLASH (May) and STORM (August). These operations together destroyed nearly all the Serbian-controlled regions of Croatia, at a minimal cost in military casualties (though at a high cost in refugees, principally the two hundred thousand Krajina Serbs who fled rather than live in independent Croatia).⁵ The struggle for independence, called the Homeland War by Croats, ended in an unambiguous victory for the government of Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb.

Given this recent history, as well as Slovenia's more advanced economy and closer ties to Austria and Italy, it is unsurprising that Slovenia has integrated into Western institutions faster than Croatia or any other former Yugoslav republic. It joined NATO and the European Union in the spring of 2004, and it became the first postcommunist state to hold the presidency of the Council of the EU, for the first half of 2008. Such political progress is perhaps remarkable, given that Slovenia became an independent entity for the first time in 1991, but can be attributed to its stolid, serious politics and avoidance of radicalism of any kind. It certainly helps that Slovenia is essentially devoid of minorities (nearly all citizens are ethnic Slovenes), and that there is no religious conflict either, since Slovenes are nearly all Roman Catholics, at least nominally. Because there is no real Slovene irredenta—the small Slovene minorities in Austria and Italy live

peacefully—relations with Western neighbors are very good, and Austria and Italy have been strong supporters of Slovenia’s political and economic Westernization since the collapse of Yugoslavia.

In economic terms, Slovenia’s progress has been real and impressive. Its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is very near the EU average, and Slovenia is far and away the most economically vibrant and productive of the “new” (i.e., postcommunist) EU member accessions. In 2007, Slovenia was the first new EU state to adopt the euro. While the economy has some structural challenges, principally a high tax rate and low foreign direct investment, problems such as the loss of manufacturing jobs to China and India demonstrate that Slovenia has rapidly become a “normal” European country. It is important to note, however, that Slovenia’s impressive economy is nothing new; under communism, it possessed by far the strongest economy in Yugoslavia, with a robust and diverse manufacturing sector and a standard of living approaching Western levels. The end of communism has merely enabled Slovenia to grow and integrate better a functioning economy that was already impressive and decently integrated with those of Austria, Italy, and Germany.

Recent changes to the Slovene military have been substantial. Since independence, successive governments in Ljubljana have overseen the creation of a wholly new defense system, centering on the transition from a territorial militia to a mobile, professional force. Conscription has been abolished, and the Slovene military is today a small (nine-thousand-strong) army, with modest air and naval support, capable of battalion-sized deployments out of the NATO area. Peacekeeping missions have included Bosnia and Kosovo, with small contingents elsewhere, including Afghanistan.⁶ Despite resource constraints, Slovenia’s military has integrated successfully into NATO and is the most Westernized of all militaries in the former Yugoslavia.

Considering the undoubted success of Slovenia since 1991, in political, economic, and social terms, it is paradoxical that there remains considerable affection, even nostalgia, for Tito and his multinational state. Such views, derided as “Yugonostalgia” by critics, have a hold in all parts of the former socialist federation but are particularly pronounced among the Slovenes, many of whom miss belonging to a larger, more diverse state, one in which average citizens were protected from the free market by pensions, limited working hours, and free health care.⁷

There is less nostalgia for Tito (who was half Slovene and half Croat) in neighboring Croatia, where bitter memories of communism are commonplace. Croatia, with some justice, considered itself the most nationally oppressed of all Yugoslav republics, and many Croats still denounce “Serbocommunist” with passion. That said, Croatia’s hard-won independence from Titoism has proved

less successful than Slovenia's in political and economic terms, and its recently announced admission into NATO and candidacy for EU membership mark not the end of Croatia's transition but a midway point.

In economic terms, Croatia is doing well for its region but not by EU standards. Its per capita GDP is only 60 percent of Slovenia's, and inflation and unemployment remain perennial concerns. Niche exports, especially shipbuilding, are strong points—another holdover from the communist era—while tourism has rebounded vibrantly from its virtual disappearance in the 1990s. Corruption is perhaps the biggest drag on the economy, infecting the contracting and judiciary realms, and public-sector reform is stagnant, as it is across much of the Balkans. The fall of communism brought little in the way of “good govern-

In purely military terms, enforcing the Dayton Accords has been a resounding success . . . [but] the political side of Dayton has been markedly less successful.

ment”; indeed, corruption in the 1990s, during the presidency of Franjo Tudjman, was possibly worse than under Tito. Much remains to be done.⁸

Croatia is a functioning democracy, and it has shed the outward vestiges of the Tito era, but its political culture maintains holdovers in mentality and personnel from the communist era. The lack of lustration (i.e., decommunization) remains a sore point, including for the police and security services, while public cynicism about the political process is widespread and voter turnout generally low. Although President Stipe Mesić, in office since 2000, has spurred little of the controversy or enmity that were associated with his predecessor Franjo Tudjman, the “father” of independent Croatia and head of state until his death in 1999, neither has Mesić accomplished as much as many had hoped by way of political reform. In stark contrast with Tudjman, who was a hard-line nationalist, Mesić has sought better relations with Croatia's neighbors and has attempted to heal the regional wounds of the last decade, with some success; Zagreb since 2000 has taken a much more conciliatory and productive line vis-à-vis Bosnia, for instance.⁹

Many pitfalls of the Tudjman era remain, however, not least the vexing problem of war criminals. With great difficulty, the Mesić government has handed over several high-ranking Croatian military officials to face charges before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The greatest controversy surrounded the capture in Spain in late 2005 of General Ante Gotovina, considered by many Croats one of the leading heroes of the Homeland War. Gotovina had been on the run for several years, facing secret indictments by the ICTY relating to Operation STORM in 1995, and apparently had enjoyed quiet assistance from Croatian military and security services. Yet it was understood that the

Mesić government had acquiesced in—and likely assisted—Gotovina’s capture, causing a firestorm of controversy in Croatia and widespread hard feelings among veterans.¹⁰

Nevertheless, defense reform has been a significant accomplishment of the Mesić government. While Croatia’s military has some distance to go before it is fully interoperable with NATO, since 2000 officers with controversial pasts have been pensioned off and professionalism has replaced political cronyism as the prime mover of careers. Through the 1990s, the Ministry of Defense, run by Gojko Šušak, the most corrupt of all Tudjman’s ministers, was a hotbed of graft, kickbacks, and outright theft; rooting this dysfunctional culture out of the Ministry of Defense has taken years, but progress is significant. All efforts have been focused on NATO accession, and in 2008 Croatia suspended conscription. Under plans known as “Force 2010,” total active personnel will fall to twenty thousand. The ground forces, built around three maneuver brigades (one reserve), will receive several new types of vehicles (armored and unarmored), tank modernization, and new artillery; the air force will procure a small squadron of modern, multirole fighters; and the navy, essentially a coastal defense force, will receive several new corvettes and fast patrol craft.¹¹

Croatia’s contribution to international peacekeeping has been modest to date, the only noteworthy mission being Croatia’s 320-strong contribution to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Zagreb’s unwillingness to commit troops abroad has as much to do with the domestic political mood, which is suspicious of foreign adventures *en principe*, as with the unreadiness of the armed forces to operate alongside NATO before Force 2010 is fully implemented.

The Mesić government likewise deserves praise for its regional and cooperative approach to security affairs. Zagreb since 2000 has consistently viewed its national security as an international matter, and both the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry (responsible for the police and counterterrorism) consider close partnerships with other former Yugoslav republics indispensable in confronting transnational threats. While few Croats pine for the lost Yugoslavia, most understand that good relations are a *sine qua non* for regional security and prosperity. Lacking any major conventional foes or significant internal security threats—Croatia’s Serbs, more than a quarter of the population in 1991 and considered a fifth column by many Croats, are less than 5 percent today, after Operation STORM—Zagreb in recent years has emphasized unconventional threats like terrorism, migration, and crime as its primary security concerns. For several centuries Croatia, as part of the Habsburg empire, stood as the bulwark of Christendom against the Ottoman Turks to the south and east, an image that has not been forgotten, particularly in the post-9/11 world.

BOSNIA: UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Croatia's security concerns are disproportionately focused on Bosnia, its troubled neighbor to the south. Formally the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the country received its independence from Yugoslavia in April 1992 and was immediately plunged into a bloody civil war that lasted until the fall of 1995. The country has been under foreign—first NATO, now EU—occupation ever since.

The Bosnian disaster was the leading foreign-policy story of the last decade, grabbing the attention of the world's media and helping drive direct NATO military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995, in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE. Claims of "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" in the summer of 1992 caused a firestorm of controversy that never abated. With hindsight and dispassion, it is evident that the international media, encouraged by the Bosnian Muslim government in Sarajevo, significantly overstated war deaths and the extent of wanton crimes against civilians. In particular, the number of war dead, estimated at 200,000 or even 250,000, allegedly mostly Muslim and civilian—a significant number from a total Bosnian population of 4.3 million at the war's outbreak—was grossly overstated. Detailed analysis by Bosnian authorities and the ICTY independently determined that the total figure for war dead was about one hundred thousand on all sides: roughly 54 percent military and 46 percent civilian, with 62 percent being Muslim, 23 percent Serb, and 5 percent Croat.¹²

That said, it cannot be disputed that prewar Bosnia, a relatively thriving multicultural society, was destroyed by the 1992–95 conflict. Before the war Bosnia was almost 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serbian (Orthodox Christian), 17 percent Croat (Roman Catholic), and 5 percent Yugoslav (those, often of mixed background, who refused to identify with a particular ethno-religious group). All Bosnians are Slavs, divided by religion and history but speaking a common language, once known as Serbo-Croatian and today as Serbian, Croatian, or Bosnian, depending on one's preference (despite differences in orthography and vocabulary, these are linguistically nearly identical).¹³ Although postwar analysis reveals few changes in population mix (though Muslims, who now prefer the term "Bosniaks," constitute 40 percent of the population), the country has just under four million citizens; many left as refugees in the mid-1990s and have not returned. More significantly, regional demographics within Bosnia are notably changed.

The American-backed Dayton Peace Accords of late 1995, which formally ended the civil war, enshrined two substate entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic, each comprising about half the country. These entities, which represented the warring factions—the Muslims and Croats had been allied against the Serbs since early 1994, under pressure from Washington—were given substantial powers, which were supposed to be distinctly temporary.

This division recognized the population shifts that occurred during the war, and despite Dayton's pledges to resettle refugees in their prewar homes and communities, more than a decade after the guns fell silent the strong majority of refugees have not returned. As a result, most Muslims and Croats remain in the Federation, while Serbs are largely confined to their Republika Srpska. For instance, Sarajevo, the country's capital and largest urban area, was a multicultural city before 1992 but today has few Serbs, who are just 5 percent of Sarajevo's population, fallen from 38 percent prewar.¹⁴

In purely military terms, enforcing the Dayton Accords has been a resounding success. While under foreign occupation, which has coincided with a drastic drawdown in Bosnia's military capacity, the country has seen no return to open conflict, despite high levels of hostility among Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Beginning in late 1995 as the U.S.-led, corps-strong Intervention Force (IFOR),

It remains unclear how much political and economic progress has actually been accomplished in the Balkans under Western guidance since the mid-1990s.

which was renamed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year later, NATO peacekeeping was robust and properly resourced, relative to the size of the local population; just as important, the warring fac-

tions were exhausted and uninterested in more combat. Over the next several years, the force's strength fell from three divisions (one U.S.) to two brigades. By the time SFOR was closed out at the end of 2005, to be replaced by the smaller, European-led EU Force (EUFOR, at a current strength of only 2,200), it was clear that the military dimension of NATO-led nation (re)building was worthy of praise. Hence the claim of the last SFOR commander, Major General James Darden, U.S. Army: "If we could do it all over again, I don't know how we could do better."¹⁵

However true such claims may be in strictly military terms, it is clear that the political side of Dayton has been markedly less successful. In the first place, the political reintegration of Bosnia is far from complete. The two entities still exist, and the Republika Srpska, in particular, remains jealous of its prerogatives and unwilling to relinquish power to the ostensible national government in Sarajevo. Dayton has not changed the basic political fact, which to a considerable extent lay behind the civil war, that Bosnia's Serbs do not wish to live in a unitary Bosnian state politically dominated by Muslims, the largest group in the country. For their part, most Muslims cannot envision a Bosnia that is not in some way a unitary state, while Croats are increasingly resentful of their perceived second-class status vis-à-vis the Muslims in the Federation. Bosnian Croat support for enhanced status under Dayton, the so-called Third Entity movement, continues to exist, even though this is a taboo subject as far as Bosnia's Western

masters are concerned. Many sore points remain, above all the issue of war criminals. While many Bosnians, heavily but not exclusively Serbs, have been extradited to stand trial in The Hague on war crimes charges, some of the biggest fish remain at large. The July 2008 move by the new Serbian government to capture and extradite Radovan Karadžić, the civil leader of the wartime Republika Srpska, appears to be a positive development, yet there is no guarantee that his upcoming trial will not devolve into a disappointing spectacle like many high-profile trials at the ICTY. Moreover, General Ratko Mladić, the Republika Srpska's wartime warrior-in-chief, a revered figure to many Serbs, remains at large as of this writing, his whereabouts officially unknown. It is far from clear whether the ICTY model has worked well for Bosnia—some have suggested that a South African-style “truth and reconciliation” model might be more politically healing and empowering for Bosnians—and it is incomprehensible to many Bosnians that after more than a dozen years NATO has been unable to track the most-wanted men down.

Since Dayton, Bosnia's de facto ruler has been the high representative, selected from EU member states. The high representative enjoys essentially colonial powers, including the right to fire ministers and dissolve governments. Despite, or perhaps because of, this situation, political reform in Bosnia has lagged far behind where even pessimists expected it to be well over a decade after Dayton. While recent years have seen belated progress in transferring authority from the entities to the national government—including, significantly, the unification of entity militaries in 2005 (since 2006 Bosnia has had modest armed forces recruited from Muslim, Serb, and Croat volunteers)—much work remains to be done, and Bosnia today cannot plausibly be described as possessing an effective unitary government.

Whatever the shortcomings of Bosnia's political reconstruction since 1995, its economic rebuilding has been even less impressive. The prewar economy, which included a strong industrial sector, has not reemerged, despite ample Western aid and direct investment. Much of Tito-era production was military, which was neither needed nor wanted under Dayton. Just as serious, corruption in all entities and at all levels of society is entrenched and so grave as to undermine any meaningful economic reform. How bad this institutionalized theft actually is became evident in 2000, when extensive investigation revealed that of the five billion dollars in aid lavished on the country over the five years since Dayton, one-fifth—a billion dollars—had simply disappeared. Worse, the corruption infects all the entities and political parties, and in real terms such back-room deals have outpaced the country's notional economy.¹⁶ While many Western firms attempted to open plants in Bosnia after 1995, few remain, daunted by the culture of theft and corruption that confronts all commercial

activities. Even major international corporations have been unable to make headway. After Dayton, the German auto giant Volkswagen AG attempted to rebuild at Vogošća, a Sarajevo suburb, a car plant that had been damaged during the war. But the project was a bust, and after several years of trying VW pulled out in frustration, having lined the pockets of local politicians but never getting a functioning car factory going. Western investment was no solution to Bosnia's ills, concluded the VW director for the country: "No chance. You would lose your money completely."¹⁷

As a result, the unofficial unemployment rate is around 50 percent, and no one seems to know the size of the grey economy or even how to determine where it begins and the legitimate economy ends. The country has become, in the eyes of leading human rights activists, "the last black hole in Europe." Despite widespread poverty, there is a wealthy class of Bosnians, usually connected to both the political and criminal elites (who are not infrequently the same group), but average citizens continue to be underemployed, to the detriment of societal happiness and stability.

The painful truth is that since Dayton Western powers have done an inadequate job of forcing political and economic reform. Eschewing a fully colonial approach as politically (and perhaps fiscally) unacceptable, NATO and the EU have attempted to impose a pseudocolonial superstructure over Bosnian life, with negative results. Corruption remains endemic, and Bosnians themselves seem unwilling, or perhaps unable, to remedy the situation. The 2003 verdict of David Harland, the former head of UN civil affairs in Bosnia, is just as true and devastating five years on:

Eight years after a devastating war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a remarkable success story. Reconstruction is complete. Economic output has passed prewar levels and the republic's economy is now among the fastest-growing in Europe. Refugees have returned to their homes, war-time nationalist leaders are dead or in jail. Measured by the rate of marriage between young people of different ethnic groups, the hostility that recently led to so much blood-letting between Croats, Muslims and Serbs is receding. There is palpable optimism in the air. What was recently one of the most backward areas of Europe is moving forward.

The year is 1953.¹⁸

The Yugoslav communists did a far superior job rebuilding Bosnia politically, economically, and socially than the West has managed fifty years later. Bosnia recovered faster under Tito's leadership from the much more brutal and devastating Second World War than it has under Western tutelage from the 1992–95 civil war.

Another major issue confronting post-Dayton Bosnia is Islamic radicalism. Although Bosnia's Muslims are hardly radical as a group, there exists among them a small percentage of very radical sorts, many of them war veterans who fought in al-Qa'ida-linked mujahidin units. Such radicals hardly existed before the war but can be easily encountered today, thanks to lavish Saudi funding of radical mosques and Islamic "charities" and to quiet support from the wartime government in Sarajevo for extremist causes. While the number of foreign mujahidin who fought on behalf of Sarajevo was not large, probably four or five thousand in all, their political importance was of a high order, both for Bosnia and for the international jihadist movement. While few Westerners have paid sufficient attention, it is clear that in the 1990s Bosnia played a role in the growth of al-Qa'ida much as Afghanistan did in the 1980s; simply put, the Bin Laden organization metastasized from a South Asian regional problem into a global insurgency in the mid-1990s thanks in no small part to its successes in Bosnia.¹⁹

While NATO and the EU have persistently attempted to downplay the extent of the radicalism problem in Bosnia post-Dayton, some Bosnian Muslims have been less sanguine and more willing to point out that Saudi-style radical Islam, which was essentially unknown before the war, now has a visible foothold in the country.²⁰ With the death in 2003 of Alija Izetbegović, the Bosnian president from 1990 to 2000, radical Islam lost its most important benefactor; contrary to the secular and modern image granted him by the Western media, Izetbegović was in fact a lifelong advocate of extremist Islam. He was an early member of the Young Muslims, a subversive group linked to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned by Yugoslav authorities for its links to terrorism (during communist rule, Izetbegović was imprisoned twice for his illegal Islamic activism).²¹ Of greater concern today is the younger generation, hardened by war and swayed by radical messages (and Saudi money). The classic case is Nezim Halilović, a young preacher in Sarajevo with a considerable following on Bosnia's radical fringe. An avowed propagandist for al-Qa'ida and extremist Islam, Halilović boasts of his ties to mujahidin in many countries, and his Friday sermons from Sarajevo's King Fahd Islamic Center—built after Dayton with funds from Riyadh, in the "Saudi shopping mall style" loathed by most Bosnian Muslims—are disseminated across the country and beyond on the Internet.²²

Another continuing controversy has been the issue of Bosnian passports issued to foreign mujahidin during and after the civil war. It is clear that the Izetbegović government distributed several thousand Bosnian passports to foreign fighters and "aid workers" who fought on behalf of Islam; Osama Bin Laden is reportedly one of the many holy warriors who received a Bosnian passport under other-than-normal circumstances. (Subsequent investigation revealed that within two months of the Dayton Peace Accords signing, 741 foreign mujahidin

received Bosnian passports with assistance from the secret police, and 103 passports were granted on one day alone in late December 1995.) Sarajevo finally moved to revoke several hundred passports obtained under questionable circumstances in early 2007, after years of Western pressure to get serious about the problem. By that time, more than a decade had elapsed since the issue first arose in international intelligence and law enforcement circles, and no one knew where most of the mystery men were living. Some had already turned up dead in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.²³

The extremist problem in Bosnia resembles the country's bigger, broader challenges. Poorly understood by outsiders, some of whom actively deny the existence of a problem in the face of ample evidence, it is as much the product of foreign meddling and Western neglect as of anything done by Bosnians. It is inseparable from broader problems of corruption and criminality—and it shows no signs of going away or fixing itself.

KOSOVO AND THE ALBANIAN QUESTION

The political, economic, and social problems confronting Kosovo today are as grave as those plaguing Bosnia, perhaps more so. There can be no question that Kosovo remains the most volatile region in the Balkans, and the possibility of violent confrontation remains real. The emergence of an independent Kosovo in early 2008 represents not the end of the conflict over this contested land but possibly only the next round in a struggle that has plagued the Balkans for years, indeed generations.

The road to NATO intervention in Kosovo nearly a decade ago was long and difficult. Rising tension between Serbs and Albanians constituted one of the major causes of the collapse of Yugoslavia after Tito's death in 1980; as communism waned, nationalism reemerged with a vengeance in Kosovo among both Serbs and Albanians, and the Communist Party was incapable of keeping a lid on the problem as it had for decades.²⁴ The Yugoslav military had to be called in to restore order with bayonets in Prishtina, the region's capital, after serious riots in 1981, and by 1987 the JNA leadership was talking openly of a "rebellion" emerging in Kosovo that aimed at creating an Albanian republic free of Yugoslavia.²⁵ The Serbian crackdown that followed, and would last over a decade, permanently embittered Kosovo's Albanian majority and convinced even moderate and nonviolent Albanians that cooperation with the Serbian leadership in Belgrade was fruitless.

Serious armed resistance to Serbian rule emerged in Kosovo only in 1996, with the appearance of a shadowy group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army; for the first time since the Second World War Albanians were taking up arms against Serbian rule over Kosovo. This radical organization sought to

provoke a wider war by attacking Serbian police and, especially, Albanian “collaborators.” Such attacks mounted through 1998, and by the end of that year large parts of Kosovo were plagued with a bona fide insurgency.

Belgrade’s reaction was harsh, as expected, and in late March 1999 Serbian excesses against Albanian civilians provoked NATO military intervention, in the shape of Operation ALLIED FORCE, a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign that succeeded in forcing Serbian forces out of Kosovo. While it is now known that the extent of Serbian crimes against Albanians was seriously overstated for propaganda effect—contrary to claims of tens of thousands of noncombatant deaths in Kosovo, the ICTY was never able to verify more than three thousand Albanian civilians killed by Serbian security forces—the Serbs lost the propaganda war, as in Bosnia, in the opening round and never recovered.²⁶

NATO then inherited Kosovo, as it had Bosnia less than four years before. In ethnic terms Kosovo is less complicated; the population postwar is over 90 percent Albanian, with small minorities of Serbs, Gypsies, and Slavic Muslims. Nevertheless, nation building in Kosovo is by any standard even less successful than in Bosnia. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has done a respectable job of keeping the peace at modest cost; its total strength has dropped from over fifty thousand in 1999 to sixteen thousand in recent years, with a U.S. Army brigade as a standing contingent (supplied by the National Guard since before 9/11). Unlike in Bosnia, KFOR’s commanding general has always been a European.

Yet KFOR’s record has blemishes, and its mandate has been filled with irony. Within months of KFOR’s arrival in the summer of 1999, on the heels of bombing and refugee displacement, it was obvious that NATO’s job had become the protection of the remaining Serbs and other minorities from the victorious Albanians. Attacks on Serb civilians and religious buildings had been commonplace, culminating in orchestrated riots in March 2004 that were pronounced a “failure” for KFOR by leading nongovernmental organizations. The most detailed report of the Albanian uprising is damning: “On March 17, at least 33 riots broke out in Kosovo over a 48-hour period, involving an estimated 51,000 protesters. Nineteen people died during the violence. At least 550 homes and 27 Orthodox churches and monasteries were burned, and approximately 4,100 persons from minority communities were displaced from their homes.”²⁷

The political progress delivered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) since 1999 has been even less impressive than the military-security dimension. As UN veterans have elaborated in detail, UNMIK has singularly failed to bring about any sort of Western-style “civil society” in Kosovo. Allegiances remain anything but civic, rather ethnic, even tribal; few Albanians have any interest in living alongside Serbs or Gypsies, whom they consider enemies and traitors. Also, Western concepts of good governance and measures against

corruption fly in the face of local norms so completely that they are simply untranslatable without serious coercion, which NATO and the UN have never been willing to apply.²⁸

The result is a functionally mono-ethnic society that is run by the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army, many of whom are deeply corrupt, boasting ties to organized crime and little interested in reforming anything. Thanks in no small part to this disturbing reality, Kosovo's economy is very troubled. The legitimate economy provides few jobs, and at least half the workforce is without employment. Kosovo was the poorest, least developed, and most fecund region of Yugoslavia, and these trends have continued after 1999. Per capita income is about two thousand dollars a year, among the lowest in Europe and far below that of Slovenia and Croatia, or even Bosnia. Demonstrating how deep corruption and criminality run in Kosovo, Carla DelPonte, the longtime chief prosecutor for the ICTY and no friend of the Serbs, has recently asserted that Albanian fighters in 1999 murdered three hundred Serb prisoners, harvested their organs, and sold them on the international black market.²⁹

In February 2008 Kosovo ended its strange legal status—for nearly a decade it had been nominally a province of Serbia, while under NATO/UN occupation and quasi-self-governing—by formally declaring independence. This was predictably met with howls from Serbia and its ally Russia, but the United States and most EU members quickly recognized the republic's new status, as did most of Serbia's neighbors. NATO and the UN abandoned their former policy of "standards before status" (by which Kosovo would have been held to Western norms on human rights protection before independence was permitted); confronted with something of a mission impossible, NATO and the UN now considered an independent Kosovo unstoppable. To date, there is no indication that independence will ameliorate Kosovo's grave political, economic, and social problems.

Ominously, the emergence of a new state in Europe has reopened the touchy issue of border revisions in the Balkans, as well as the perennially vexing Albanian question. While few in Albania proper seem to pine for reunion with conationals in Kosovo (officially now "Kosova," per Albanian usage) and the government in Prishtina is careful never to utter anything about Greater Albania, the Slavs who live adjacent to ethnic Albanian territory are undoubtedly worried. Memories are long in the Balkans, and no Slavs have forgotten that a Greater Albania briefly existed, consisting of Albania plus Kosovo and a good chunk of present-day Macedonia, as a satellite of fascist Italy during World War II.

Serbia has its own Albanian problem, even after the loss of Kosovo. In the months after ALLIED FORCE, Albanian militias operating in the Preševo Valley, adjacent to Kosovo, staged dozens of attacks on Serbian police and military outposts. Styling itself as a local offshoot of Kosovo's successful

Liberation Army and reportedly recruiting among the Albanian population concentrated in the valley, the Preševo guerrillas were a shadowy, small force that nevertheless succeeded in scaring Belgrade badly before disappearing.³⁰

The situation in Macedonia was, and remains, much more serious. Although this small, landlocked country of two million was fortunate enough to leave Yugoslavia in 1992 without bloodshed, the years since independence have been roiled by the ethnic question, to the detriment of peace and prosperity. Conceived by most citizens as a state by and for Slavic Macedonians (who are culturally and linguistically close to both the Serbs and Bulgarians), they are a young nation, despite having lived in the region for more than a millennium and a half; Slavic Macedonians were formally recognized as a distinct nation for the first time only in 1945, by Tito's regime.³¹ Yet Macedonia has a substantial Albanian minority of about 25 percent—in best Balkan fashion, the Albanians assert they are a third of the population, while Slavs counter that the real number is only one-fifth—heavily concentrated in the country's west and north, adjacent to Kosovo.

The desire of ardent Albanian nationalists for union with Kosovo is hardly secret, and it took tangible and violent form in late 2000 with the emergence in Macedonia of an Albanian insurgent force, the National Liberation Army, which promptly launched attacks on Macedonian security forces.³² Over the next several months, the insurgents staged assaults in or near several towns, and in mid-2001 fighting came close to the capital of Skopje. NATO intervention, including the deployment of over four thousand peacekeepers on the border with Kosovo, helped prevent the conflict from boiling over, but not before several dozen deaths had occurred; few outside the region realize how close the Balkans came to another war in 2001. Hard feelings remain on both sides, as do suspicions in Skopje that Albanian extremists are plotting more violence. Given that the Albanian question remains unresolved, at least in the minds of nationalist activists, there can be no assurances that such a conflict cannot reoccur, nor can anyone be certain that a wider war could be averted again.³³

“SERBIA IS RISING”: TWENTY YEARS AFTER

Given the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the biggest loser of the Balkans wars of the 1990s was Serbia, the largest Yugoslav republic and the one most responsible for the tumult of the previous decade. When Tito's federation went over the cliff in 1991, the Serbian government in Belgrade, led by Slobodan Milošević, enjoyed de facto control over Serbia, its once-autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the neighboring republic of Montenegro. Today the country has lost nearly everything; Serbs have been expelled from Croatia and

live under foreign occupation in Bosnia, while Serbia's borders are reduced to nearly what they were before the Balkan wars of 1912–13. Most painfully, the Serbian heartland of Kosovo is now irredeemably gone. In a real sense, the Greater Serbia project espoused by nationalists has resulted not in glory but ruin; Serbia has cartographically regressed a century.

It has long been easy to place blame for all this at the feet of the late Slobodan Milošević, Serbia's failed leader, who was extradited to The Hague in 2001 and died in ICTY custody in 2006. Much demonized by the West, Milošević has more recently been a figure for unhappy Serbs to blame for their current predicament. Milošević remains an enigmatic character, and he has never inspired balanced judgments, yet his passing offers Serbia an opportunity to reassess the recent past. Although Serbs managed to depose Milošević bloodlessly in October 2000, they have yet to come to terms with the damage wrought on Serbia during his years in power.³⁴

Milošević rose to prominence and power in the late 1980s by harnessing Serbian national feelings, which were emerging from under the ice of decades-long official proscription. Yet Milošević was never a nationalist himself; indeed, he seemed a colorless communist functionary from central casting, and he had little feeling for Serbian views (or for Serbs, for that matter). Cashing in on the patriotic slogan "Serbia is rising," he assured average Serbs they would be able to preserve their prerogatives as the largest nation in Yugoslavia. When Tito's Yugoslavia fell apart in 1991, Milošević helped fashion a new, downsized one, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro; under various names, this union would last until 2006, when Montenegro too wanted out.

Serbia under Milošević suffered from chronic ills, including profound economic collapse, the sinister blending of organized crime and state authority, demographic crisis, and losing wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.³⁵ While Milošević was culpable for some of these disasters, he created few of them alone, and some of the most serious defects in Serbia's economy and political culture were holdovers from Titoism. Yet it can be judged that Milošević did nothing to improve such ailments. Certainly his cynical brand of *divide et impera* politics, particularly his employment of the nationalist bacillus as needed, contributed to Serbia's problems long after he left the scene.

Serbia's current challenge is to form a new, postwar political identity suited to present-day realities, and there is no indication that this will happen quickly or easily. This should not be surprising, given the nature of the shocks to the system—political, economic, military, and social—that Serbia has absorbed in the last two decades, yet is not encouraging either. Fundamentally, Serbia's body politic is divided between modernists who envision a European future, based on a market economy, rule of law, and integration into such Western institutions as

NATO and the EU, versus traditionalists who favor isolation from “Europe,” perhaps in collaboration with a resurgent Russia and in explicit resistance to NATO, the EU, and almost everything else perceived as Western.³⁶ While the modernists have an appealing product, at least to younger Serbs, the traditionalists are able to fall back on ancient national themes, buttressed by hard feelings caused by recent mishandling by NATO and the West. How near run a struggle this remains has been laid bare by the spring 2008 parliamentary elections, which resulted in over three months of wrangling and horse-trading to produce a weak coalition government; in the winter of 2008, the modernist Boris Tadić required two rounds of voting barely to defeat the hard-line nationalist Tomislav Nikolić for the presidency (Tadić actually lost to Nikolić in round one, requiring a runoff election). While time may be on the side of the modernists, as younger voters increasingly desire a European future, it may take decades for pro-Western attitudes to achieve political dominance over the bitter-enders, and it promises to be a bumpy road.

Real reform in Serbia will require root-and-branch transformation of large aspects of public life, especially the breaking up of mafia alliances with parties, police, and politicians of all stripes. The assassination of Zoran Djindjić, the pro-Western and more or less reformist prime minister, in March 2003 by a team of mafia-linked secret policemen resulted in a short-term direct assault on the covert cadres that control much of Serbia’s economy and politics, but much more effort is required to defeat the perverse system that originated under Tito and thrived under Milošević.³⁷

While Serbia presently lacks the military power to harm its neighbors, it is beyond question that many Serbs, including numerous prominent politicians, consider Serbia’s setbacks of recent years to be temporary and reversible; many assess Kosovo’s “final status” as anything but final. While such views may not be reality based, given Serbia’s staggering economic and demographic problems, to say nothing of its inability to confront NATO in military terms, they are held rather widely and have their origins in Serbs’ deepest-held myths about themselves. Softening them will take decades and much patience. To be fair to Serbs who feel wronged by NATO and the West, it is far from self-evident why some Balkan borders are considered sacrosanct while others are not. Efforts by the Republika Srpska to renegotiate Dayton and perhaps leave Bosnia in the aftermath of Kosovo independence were rudely dismissed by the Western powers, but if Serbia’s borders can be redrawn by international fiat, why cannot the same be done with Bosnian frontiers? In Kosovo and elsewhere, redrawing state boundaries to align with ethnic realities on the ground, while temporarily painful, will undoubtedly solve problems in the long run.

Bringing meaningful and enduring stability to Europe's troubled southeast will require Serbia's involvement and participation politically, economically, and militarily. There can be no lasting tranquility in the Balkans without the involvement—not just acquiescence—of the region's largest and most populous state. While Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro cannot be held hostage to Serbia's weakened political culture, neither can Serbia's neighbors proceed very far down the road to peace and prosperity without Belgrade's active participation. Serbia's twentieth century, which began triumphantly with the Balkan wars and the creation of Yugoslavia on Serbia's terms after World War I, ended catastrophically, in defeat and despair. It can only be hoped that for Serbia, and for all the states of the former Yugoslavia, the current century, while beginning in difficulties, will end more happily.

NOTES

1. See the account by Slovenia's then-defense minister, Janez Janša, *Premiki: nastajanje in obramba slovenske države, 1988–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladina, 1992).
2. This confusion is conveyed vividly in the memoir of the then-Yugoslav defense minister: Veljko Kadijević, *Moje vidjenje raspada: vojska bez države* (Belgrade: Politika, 1993).
3. On the politics of the JNA leadership see Mile Bjelajac, *Die jugoslawische Erfahrung mit multiethnischen Armee 1918–1991* (Belgrade: Institute for Modern History, 2002).
4. Martin Špegelj, "The First Phase, 1990–1992: The JNA Prepares for Aggression and Croatia for Defense," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995*, ed. B. Magaš and I. Žanić (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
5. This is covered well in Ozren Žunec, "Operations Flash and Storm," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995*, ed. Magaš and Žanić. The destruction of the Krajina forces is detailed in an unclassified CIA account, *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995: Volume I* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 2002), pp. 367–77. Why the Krajina Serb "republic" folded without much of a fight is elaborated in Milisav Sekulić, *Knin je pao u Beogradu* (Bad Vilbel: 2001), pp. 97–120.
6. "Vod 74. MOTB na preverjanju na ISAF," *Slovenska vojska* (Ljubljana), 7 February 2008.
7. On Slovene Yugo-nostalgia: "Oh, Yugoslavia! How They Long for Your Firm Embrace," *New York Times*, 30 January 2008.
8. Jelena Budak, "Corruption in Croatia: Perceptions Rise, Problems Remain," *Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika* (Zagreb), no. 106 (2006).
9. See the interview with Mesić in *Central Europe Review*, 15 May 2000, which lays out his goals for greater regional cooperation and integration.
10. "War Crimes Case Revives Passions in a Divided Croatia," *New York Times*, 12 December 2005.
11. The details of Croatian defense reform are elaborated in *Dugoročni plan razvoja Oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatska 2006–2015* (Zagreb: n.p., 2006), available at www.morh.hr, the Croatian defense ministry website.
12. *Dani* (Sarajevo), 23 December 2005; "102.000 drept i Bosnia," NRK [Norwegian Broadcasting Corp.], 14 November 2004.
13. On the complex politics behind this, see Robert D. Greenberg, *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and Its Disintegration* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004).
14. Louis Sell, "The Serb Flight from Sarajevo: Dayton's First Failure," *East European Politics and Societies* 14, no. 1 (Winter 2000).

15. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 14 September 2004.
16. *New York Times*, 17 August 2000.
17. See John Schindler, "Bosnia Prepares for Life after Izetbegovic," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 2001).
18. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 27 January 2004.
19. For a discussion of this problem, see this author's *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad* (St. Paul, Minn.: Zenith, 2007).
20. For instance, Esad Hecimović, *Garibi: Mudžahedini u BiH 1992–1999* (Zenica: Sina, 2006).
21. On Izetbegović's radical background see Sead Trhulj, *Mladi Muslimani* (Zagreb: Globus, 1992).
22. *Globus* (Zagreb), 28 June 2002; *Slobodna Bosna* (Sarajevo), 13 September 2001.
23. On Bosnia's post-9/11 efforts to confront the mujahidin problem, see Schindler, *Unholy Terror*, pp. 273–324.
24. The best backgrounder is Julie Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1999).
25. See the comments of Fleet Admiral Branko Mamula, the Yugoslav defense minister, in *New York Times*, 1 November 1987.
26. Note the statements by ICTY investigators in *The Guardian* (London), 18 August 2000.
27. From the sixty-six-page report *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004* (Brussels: Human Rights Watch, July 2004).
28. These are the conclusions of Iain King and Whit Mason in *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006). The authors, both UNMIK veterans, provide a rich, scathing account of the dysfunction of nation building in Kosovo.
29. *The Guardian* (London), 12 April 2008.
30. Zoran Kusovac, "KFOR Contains Conflict in Presevo," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 2001).
31. It is important to note that in the Balkans, the terms "nation" and "state" are markedly distinct, unlike in common American usage. Some Serbs, citing linguistic, religious, and historical commonalities, consider the Macedonian nationality to be a communist invention rather than an organic reality—a deeply offensive view to Macedonians, who are likewise skeptical of the motives of their Bulgarian and, especially, Greek neighbors.
32. See John Schindler, "The AKSh: Europe's Next Insurgency?" *Jane's Intelligence Review* (November 2000).
33. Violeta Petroska-Beska and Mirjana Najcevska, *Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future Conflict*, Special Report 115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, February 2004).
34. The most serviceable biography is Louis Sell's *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 2003).
35. The period is covered well in Robert Thomas's *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1999). How Belgrade got saddled with the evil alliance of mafia and state is clarified in Aleksandar Knezević and Vojislav Tufegđić, *Kriminal koji je izmenio Srbiju* (Belgrade: B92, 1995).
36. This schism is explained lucidly in the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia's 2007 annual report, *Self-Isolation: The Reality and the Goal* (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 2008).
37. Djindjić was not lacking mafia ties himself—Christopher Corpora, "The Untouchables: Former Yugoslavia's Clandestine Political Economy," *Problems of Post-Communism* 51, no. 3 (2004).



ASSESSING THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY

A Window into Chinese Thinking

Andrew S. Erickson

The new U.S. maritime strategy embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the nation can best pursue its interests in harmony with those of other states. In light of the strategy's focus on building partnerships to better safeguard the global maritime commons, it is vital that American leaders clearly understand the frank and unvarnished views of allies, friends, and potential partners. The strategy's unveiling at the Naval War College on 17 October 2007 with the leaders of nearly a hundred navies and coast guards present demonstrated initial global maritime inclusiveness. The new maritime strat-

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egy is generating responses from numerous states. As U.S. leaders work to implement global maritime partnerships in the years ahead, they must carefully study the reactions of the nations and maritime forces with which they hope to work.

Chinese responses warrant especially close consideration. China is a key global stakeholder with which the United States shares many common maritime interests. Beijing has not made any official public statements on the maritime strategy thus far. Yet Chinese opinions on this matter are clearly important, even if they suggest that in some areas the two nations must "agree to disagree." Chinese reactions to the maritime strategy provide a window into a larger strategic dynamic—not just in East Asia, where China is already developing as a great power, but globally, where it has

the potential to play a major role as well. How the United States can maintain its existing status and role while China continues to rise—as the world’s greatest developed and developing powers attempt to reach an understanding that might be termed “competitive coexistence”—will be perhaps the critical question in international relations for the twenty-first century.¹ To that end, this study analyzes three of the most significant unofficial Chinese assessments of the maritime strategy publicly available to date and offers annotated full-length translations (which follow, in the form of essays) so that a foreign audience can survey the documents themselves.²

A PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a long tradition of informing its policy elites on international affairs through the widespread translation of foreign news and documents.

Under Mao Zedong’s leadership (1949–76), official discourse was dominated by “doctrinalism.”³ Revolutionary leaders dedicated to “antagonistic contradictions and struggle” used ambiguous ideological statements to mobilize political factions and launch personal attacks against their rivals. By the late 1970s, however, Deng Xiaoping had shifted the national emphasis to economic and science and technology development, called for pragmatic debate of policy issues and solutions, and thereby opened the way for market forces and more widespread circulation of information.⁴

These factors have allowed a “public intellectual complex” to emerge under Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Members of this community of strategic scholars and policy makers at a wide variety of private and public institutions engage in increasingly vigorous debates, publish widely in specialized and popular journals, make media appearances, and on occasion brief policy makers and even China’s senior leadership. Some intellectuals are privy to internal deliberations, and a few play a major role in shaping policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. Even when Chinese public intellectuals are not directly involved in the policy process, their views often matter. Their ideas may inform policy makers indirectly and even be adopted as policy. They may also play a role in justifying or socializing already-established policies.⁵ When politics or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to the fore, public intellectuals may become caught up in a larger competition of ideas. For all these reasons, their writings are worth examining for possible insights into Chinese policy debates and even, possibly, government decision making. Chinese analysts are meticulous students of policy documents from major countries (particularly the United States), and they scrutinize their texts in the belief that wording contains specific insights; any significant U.S. policy

document (e.g., the maritime strategy) is therefore likely to receive careful vetting in Chinese publications.⁶

In this context, it is hardly surprising that the maritime strategy has been subject to Chinese description and evaluation. In the first year since the strategy's promulgation, it was covered extensively in China's civilian (and, to a lesser extent, military) press. The vast majority of these articles, however, were brief and descriptive.⁷ Some of the more extensive ones touched on the strategy indirectly in discussing more broadly U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific;⁸ a few were rather sensational in their obsession with the idea that the United States is attempting to "contain" China.⁹

这是美军海上战略可能发生的重大变化, 应该得到世界各国的肯定。

This could be a major change in the U.S. military's maritime strategy. It must receive the affirmation of all the world's nations.

Thus far, three openly published articles stand out from the rest in their focus on the strategy, the detail and sophistication of their analyses, and their having been written by recognized experts from major institutions; they have therefore been selected as the focus of this study. Their respective authors' affiliations suggest that their writings (in terms of variations in coverage) offer windows into how different elements of China's bureaucracy, with their specific interests and perspectives, assess the new U.S. maritime strategy. While these informed commentaries are not definitive and should not be overinterpreted, they may be suggestive of the Chinese government's viewpoint and future policy responses.

The first article is by Lu Rude, emeritus professor at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy.¹⁰ Lu has been a consistent proponent of maritime and naval development and contributes frequently to debates on China's naval priorities.¹¹ Lu enlisted in the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in 1951, beginning a military career that would last for half a century, of which over four decades would be devoted to education in maritime navigation.¹² Lu's full-page article on the new maritime strategy appeared in *People's Navy*, the official newspaper of the PLAN, which is published by the service's Political Department and provides guidance for officers and enlisted personnel.¹³ Lu outlines the new U.S. maritime strategy's context, content, and implications for international security, particularly in East Asia. He lauds the strategy's emphasis on conflict prevention and international cooperation but places the onus on the United States to demonstrate its strategic sincerity through concrete actions. He highlights the document's emphasis on multinational cooperation against unconventional threats but also draws attention to the Navy's stated mission of "detering potential competitors."

The second article is by Wang Baofu, researcher and deputy director of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies.¹⁴ Wang's comments and assessments on international relations and arms control appear frequently in China's official media, as well as in popular media and academic publications.¹⁵ His present article appeared in *Study Times*, a journal of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Party School. An outspoken critic of the American intervention in Iraq, Wang sees the new maritime strategy as the outgrowth of a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. military policy, methods, and objectives in the aftermath of both 9/11 and the early phases of the Iraq war.¹⁶

The third article is by Su Hao, a well published professor in the Department of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University and director of its Center for Asia-Pacific Studies.¹⁷ He is also a board member in a range of Chinese organizations that focus on security, cooperation, and bilateral exchange.¹⁸ Su has emphasized that Chinese national interests and identity are primarily continental.¹⁹ He displays a deep understanding of the strategy's wording, having also published a full-length Chinese translation.²⁰ Su's article appeared in *Leaders*, a popular magazine on current affairs and policy published in Hong Kong for domestic consumption there, as well as for a select mainland audience.

COMMON ASSESSMENTS

The three articles give a sophisticated and relatively comprehensive summary of the U.S. maritime strategy. They differ in assessing various aspects of the document, and there is some tension between the commonalities that emerge from shared perspectives and those that are products of the articles' having followed the strategy's original structure. But the three articles unambiguously share several major conclusions.

A New Strategic Direction. All three authors see the new U.S. maritime strategy as representing a major shift from the Maritime Strategy of 1986. Each regards the strategies issued in the interim as products of post-Cold War strategic uncertainties, with little lasting influence.²¹ They characterize the current strategy as fundamentally different. Su explains that when formulating the 2007 edition, "U.S. Navy theoretical circles were faced with the new situation of international antiterrorism and the rapid rise of emerging countries." Wang states that the new strategy "not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use military power to meet national security objectives." All emphasize the importance of the subject at hand: in Wang's words, "As a bellwether of world military transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits scrutiny."

Emphasis on Cooperation and Conflict Prevention. All three analysts praise the strategy's explicit focus on cooperation. Su declares that "it prominently emphasizes maritime security cooperation." Wang states that "the U.S. military's 'maritime strategy' has already taken 'international cooperation' as an important principle. This . . . indicates that the United States security and military strategy will face a major new adjustment." Lu writes, "One can see that the new U.S. maritime strategy emphasizes 'military software' such as 'humanitarian rescue missions and improving cooperative relations between the United States and every country.'"

The analysts all emphasize that the new maritime strategy elevates preventing war to an equal status with winning wars. They interpret war prevention as involving primarily soft-power operations, as opposed to deterrence based on war-winning capabilities to undergird otherwise cooperative approaches. Wang

有一个引人注目的新观点：明确写入“防止战争与赢得战争同等重要”的观点。

There is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that "Preventing and Winning War Are Equally Important."

terms the emphasis on war prevention the strategy's "most prominent feature." Lu describes this "conspicuous new viewpoint" as a product of "major change" and recognizes the utility of "maritime military operations other than war" and increased "international cooperation and noncombat use of navies," to include humanitarian rescue missions and improved cooperative relations with other regions. Su describes this as a "major bright spot." Chinese analysts implicitly welcome a U.S. Navy more focused on such missions than on sea control and power projection.

But the Chinese analysts are not prepared to acknowledge fully that war prevention may require substantial coercive capabilities. (Wang does mention "strategic deterrence theory," and Su notes that the strategy, in its own words, "does not assume conflict, but also recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically maintained"). They are examining regional maritime security from the perspective of China's national interests. These include emphasizing the use of venues in which Beijing is relatively influential (e.g., the United Nations) to address disputes and limit foreign military influence. In the views of many Chinese, letting other states unduly shape these areas could—in a worst-case scenario—lead to military intervention in a manner that could harm China's regional influence and sovereignty claims.²² In the analysts' apparent unwillingness to acknowledge that conflict prevention can sometimes rely on coercive capabilities, one can see an effort to emphasize desired elements of the document while deemphasizing or contesting undesired ones—a common practice in both policy analysis and international relations around the world.

Mention of Multipolarity. The analysts also note the maritime strategy's reference to a "multipolar" world. Lu describes this as a "first time" shift in U.S. policy documents. In the translator's opinion, however, the term "multipolar" describes neither the international system as it currently exists nor the world that U.S. policy makers would want in the future.²³ Moreover, many Chinese audiences regard "multipolar" (多极) as having a specific meaning: "a world in which there are several major regional powers and no single superpower hegemon." This situation would be realized in the near future only by substantial relative decline in U.S. power, to the benefit of other emerging major powers. A small but increasingly influential Chinese school of thought promoting an American "decline theory" (衰落论)—which lost influence after it incorrectly predicted the emergence of multipolarity immediately following the Cold War's end—has recently gained ground with the U.S. difficulties in Iraq and elsewhere.²⁴ China's 2006 defense white paper states that "the world is at a critical stage, moving toward multi-polarity."²⁵ The strategy's very use of the term "multipolar," therefore, appears to validate the Chinese government's vision of the potential benefits of a decline in American hegemony, which it views as a threat to its core interests.²⁶ To be sure, the authors surveyed clearly believe that the United States is still hegemonic and thus retains significant deterrence power.²⁷ But in the translator's view, while arrogance will only further erode American influence, actively encouraging the perception that American power is ebbing risks undermining deterrence capabilities in the longer term.

Together with other apparent instances of recognition by the United States of the limitations of its power and influence, the translator believes, such a change of attitude is likely to be seen by many Chinese as inspired not by sudden enlightenment in an altruistic sense but rather by growing recognition of weakness (in light of previously overambitious strategic goals). Indeed, the analysts cited here seem to welcome, as Su points out in almost Corbettian fashion, a strategy apparently based on recognition of limitations (U.S. "ability is not equal to its ambition") and a consequent reliance on cooperation with other international partners. As Su states, paraphrasing the strategy itself (as do Lu and Wang), "no country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security of the entire maritime area." In the translator's opinion, then, the problematic use of the term "multipolar" thus potentially risks causing misinterpretation, miscalculation, and false expectation on the part of Chinese analysts—or perhaps even worse, making the strategy's rhetoric seem removed from the reality of U.S. force structure and deployments. Care should be taken in further interactions with Chinese counterparts to counteract potential misperceptions in this regard.

Appreciation of Domestic Dimensions. The analysts also recognize the inter-agency aspects of U.S. maritime cooperation and coordination. As Su notes, this is the “first time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report,” which “makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three maritime forces.” He notes the strategy’s injunction “that coordination and cooperation must be strengthened among the maritime forces of each military service and each domestic department.” This seems to indicate recognition that cooperation and coordination among the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will be particularly important to the strategy’s successful functioning. Wang’s analysis, as will be discussed in more detail below, displays significant understanding of the U.S. defense policy process.

在美国官方正式的文体中首次提出了多极化转化，建设海上共同利益的“合作伙伴。”
This is the first time that U.S. official writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition to multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on maritime common interests.

A Special Role for Naval Forces. The analysts see the maritime domain as vital to many nations’ development and recognize the central role that the U.S. Navy has played in the world. Wang contends that “the ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . comprehension of sea power, and [its] emphasis on maritime force development.” All three note that today “the majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a direct bearing on the American people’s way of life.” Lu additionally observes (using wording similar to that of Wang) that naval forces are particularly relevant to fighting terrorism, because of such “special characteristics” as “mobility, which gives [them] the ability to advance and withdraw, to deter and fight.”

Asia-Pacific Focus. All three scholars identify the Asia-Pacific as a priority area for American naval presence. Lu describes the Middle East as a “powder keg” and acknowledges the status of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea—the two other areas specifically mentioned in the strategy—as strategic energy lifelines. But he uses his own interpretation to connect several issues mentioned separately in the strategy, concluding that “the Western Pacific is determined to be ‘a region of high tension’ where the United States has the responsibility to ‘carry out treaty obligations’ to its allies and to ‘contain potential strategic competitors.’” Wang and Su also take notice of the maritime strategy’s specific mention of the western Pacific.

Continued Hegemony. Perhaps most important, all three analysts view the strategy as part of a larger U.S. effort to maintain its predominant international

power and capabilities for unilateral action. They do acknowledge that the new strategy is far more cooperative than the 1986 version in both concept and rhetoric. Wang states that “overbearing, offensive language is relatively reduced, and there is noticeably more emphasis on ‘strategic cooperation.’” Lu notes that “the new maritime strategy is relatively moderate compared to the previous version in its use of words and style.” But, he emphasizes, while the strategy “projects the pleasant wording of ‘peace,’ ‘cooperation,’ and ‘war prevention,’ hegemonic thinking remains its main thread.” The analysts see the United States as unwilling to abandon the traditional “hegemony” and “sea control” that its capabilities have long afforded it. Wang judges that the United States retains a long-standing “maritime hegemonic mentality,” which he traces to Mahanian thought, and that the nation remains “the only superpower in the world today.” He adds: “Because the United States . . . places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than safeguarding the world maritime order.” Lu charges that “the hegemonic U.S. thinking of dominating the world’s oceans has not changed at all.” In his view, “what is behind ‘cooperation’ is America’s interests[;] having ‘partners or the participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.”

The Chinese analysts here are expressing concern that the United States retains power to threaten core Chinese interests. These interests include reunification with Taiwan, assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands (and associated resources, as well as air and water space) on China’s maritime periphery, and ultimately some form of sea-lane security and regional maritime influence. Chinese concerns in this area offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the near term.

DIVERGING VIEWPOINTS

Despite these shared viewpoints, there are identifiable differences in focus and interpretation among the three analysts. By chance, the maritime strategy’s promulgation has coincided with a vigorous and unprecedented debate within China concerning its own maritime development. The three Chinese assessments of the U.S. strategy, particularly in their judgments about the contours and directions of American strategy, cannot help but influence that debate.

A Model for PLAN Development?

Lu’s lengthy, complex analysis contains apparent attempts to use the new maritime strategy, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of an elevated position of influence for the U.S. Navy. Lu writes that the new maritime strategy of the United States demonstrates that its Navy “has been placed in an extremely prominent position” and “continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S.

global strategy.” While the latter point may seem optimistic to some, this formulation does describe realistically the character of U.S. power projection from Lu’s strategic vantage point in maritime East Asia. Even with its current fiscal difficulties, the U.S. Navy, in terms of capabilities alone, must seem very impressive to the PLAN. Such a portrayal of American naval power and influence is consistent with Lu’s longtime advocacy of rapid, robust Chinese maritime development.

There are several indications that his evaluation, in addition to educating PLAN officers about the U.S. maritime strategy, may also contain an implicit ar-

. . . 如此构想，不能不说是 在单边主义和先发制人战略遭受挫折之后，对运用军事手段实现国家利益认识上的重大变化。

This new concept . . . can only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.

gument for a similar increase in the PLAN’s mission from access denial to blue-water defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as consistent with China’s growing interests as a great power.²⁸ More than Su or even Wang, Lu appears to believe that “the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry.” He notes that “the Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among nations for maritime sovereignty,” that it “has the highest concentration and fastest growth in terms of the world’s naval forces,” and that it “is the sea area where the U.S. military conducts the largest and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies.” Lu appears also to hint that PLAN development must inevitably be used to balance against American naval power projection. “Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess nuclear weapons,” he notes elliptically; “they will directly influence and challenge American hegemony.”

Here Lu may be arguing implicitly for some form of PLAN power-projection capability, perhaps in the form of deck aviation (as might be broadly surmised from the context). In East Asia, he emphasizes, the United States “dispatches carrier battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness.” Were it operationally feasible, one might infer, China could benefit from similar capabilities to protect its sovereignty claims. Also, “by setting up pointed defenses and carrying out strategic deployment, the United States is prepared to act at any time and to intervene” in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, where China has similar interests in SLOC security and energy access.

In time, at least by Lu’s ambitious standards, China might likewise benefit from a navy that could maximize its forward presence while minimizing its international footprint to avoid the tremendous political risk of overseas bases—which the PRC has foresworn since its founding in 1949. This would seem to

allow for a Chinese approach to power projection: respecting sovereignty while influencing events ashore. Wang and Su do not appear to share Lu's emphasis or advocacy. But Lu's arguments should not be dismissed as mere naval promotion. While likely reflecting the PLAN's bureaucratic interests, naval advocates like Lu publishing in official forums must defer to the guidance promulgated by China's civilian leadership. The real danger here is that if Chinese naval development were to be inspired by that of the United States, as would be manifest in internal bureaucratic debates and budgetary battles, there would be a risk of the sort of interaction effects that have triggered arms races.²⁹

Seeking Explanations in Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics

Wang describes the new maritime strategy as not only representing a major departure from the tone of previous security documents issued by the George W. Bush administration but as "one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last twenty years." He sees it as the logical outcome of three major factors: military reversals in Iraq, the failures of transformation in that conflict, and the need for the Navy to justify its share of the defense budget. "The '9/11' terrorist attacks produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept," Wang observes, in wording akin to Lu's; "the U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly." The Iraq war experience, Wang states, is teaching America the importance of combining hard and soft power to develop "rational strength." This strategic rethinking, and the concepts of the "thousand-ship navy" and Global Fleet Stations, "can only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy."³⁰ According to Wang, "As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral Michael] Mullen repeatedly suggested that 'the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other countries to maintain freedom of passage.' It is precisely through his promotion that the new 'maritime strategy' was introduced."

Wang's charge of strategic overreach is broadly compatible with Su's less abrasive assessment, but it stands in contrast to Lu's, which focuses more on U.S. capabilities than limitations. Wang's third conclusion is based on a sophisticated understanding of the American defense establishment and its policy processes: "For the maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending pie, they must lead strategic thinking and initiatives," Wang maintains. At the same time, like many of his peers, he also alleges that "some people and military industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a 'Chinese naval threat theory.'"

Strategic Coherence

Su's largely descriptive article contains a fairly favorable assessment of U.S. maritime power and intentions. Su sees the United States as developing a coherent maritime policy in which the maritime strategy and "the so-called 'Thousand Ship Navy' concept currently being deliberated in U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin." He relates that at a 2007 Naval War College conference, "Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with China," at which he presented an academic paper, "prospects for cooperation were optimistically forecast." This

尽管美军新的“海上战略”阐述了“国际合作”的重要性，但并没有使其完全放弃海上霸权思维。

Although the U.S. military's new "maritime strategy" elaborates on the importance of "international cooperation," it has not given up its maritime hegemonic mentality.

"atmosphere," Su concludes, "is consistent with" the maritime strategy "and reflects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United States." Where Lu sees a model for PLAN development and Wang sees responses within the U.S. military bureaucracy to changing conditions and failed policies, Su sees a carefully calibrated and coordinated diplomatic message.

ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED

For all their insights, the three analysts display limited understanding of the bureaucratic context behind the strategy's development. They collectively fail to recognize (at least in print) that the new U.S. maritime strategy is not a stand-alone document, even in the American domestic bureaucratic context. While they offer interpretations of the historical background and strategic circumstances of its formulation, they do not mention that the new strategy was guided by the objectives set out in the *U.S. National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, and the *National Strategy for Maritime Security*.³¹

Moreover, a number of key uncertainties are neither mentioned nor investigated by the analysts. U.S. Navy modernization goals would have seemed another potential subject for inquiry, especially as the U.S. Navy appears first (in 2005) to have derived a goal of increasing its 281-ship fleet to 313 vessels by 2020, and then to have developed a strategy for their use.³² These ambiguities in the relationship between the ends and means of American policy are not explored.

The maritime strategy was issued late in the second Bush administration, yet the analysts seem to assume that it will serve as a precursor of future policy

regardless of subsequent changes in U.S. government leadership. The strategy seems to be portrayed more as authoritative policy than as a “trial balloon,” yet these analysts give few indications as to how they believe it will actually shape U.S. policy. Most American analysts, by contrast, believe that the specific effects of the document on future U.S. maritime policy are not yet certain.³³ Within the Navy, continued support by the Chief of Naval Operations and the appearance of the maritime strategy’s principles in key service planning documents (as well as national strategy pillar documents) will provide important barometers of success.³⁴ None of these documents are mentioned directly by the Chinese analysts.³⁵

As in the past, reactions from other military services, Congress, and the media will signal policy and monetary support for relevant programs. Wang appears to allude to this when he states that a major rethinking of military and foreign policy remains under way: “The U.S. intellectual elite is in the process of comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact on policy-making departments.” Implementation of the new strategy is certain to be subject to budgetary limitations, particularly given the ongoing challenges associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From Wang’s perspective, by contrast, “whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party comes to power, adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign policy are inevitable.” Wang and Su seem to appreciate the fiscal challenges that may impact American military spending. None of the analysts appear to entertain the idea, however, that funding constraints might limit the development of nontraditional low-end capabilities to support the maritime strategy.

Are the Chinese analysts “mirror imaging,” assuming that the strategy is a more authoritative document than it may actually be on the basis of their own experience with a more centralized policy process? Might their view reflect a superficial understanding of some aspects of the U.S. policy process? Perhaps. But just as the strategy cannot be expected to address all possible issues or contingencies in detail—this would take too much space and risk its soon becoming outdated—the three analysts cannot be expected to address all of its contents and related issues. All three emphasize, however, a most important point, that a broad acceptance of and participation in the Global Maritime Partnership initiative by the international community will be essential if the strategy is to fulfill its intended goals. Nevertheless, these collective omissions suggest that the analyses represent a “first cut” at understanding the strategy and how it may affect China. The objective seems to be to consider some initial implications for maritime development in the United States and China, as well as the prospects for future bilateral relations.

TRUE TO ITS WORDS AND RESOLUTE IN ITS DEEDS

The Chinese analysts obviously have major concerns regarding the intentions behind U.S. military strategy. With respect to the maritime strategy in particular, they worry that beneath a veneer of cooperative rhetoric, they are being asked to tolerate, or even directly acquiesce in, projection of U.S. power in a manner

全世界人民乐见其战略思维的改变，更拭目以待，企盼其真正行动，取得实际效果。
The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.

that they believe threatens China's core national interests. Here the cooperative implications of the strategy may run against the grain of much Chinese thinking regarding the United States, particularly its armed forces.

At the same time, the Chinese analysts are heartened by the new American emphasis on cooperation. While retaining concerns about U.S. strategic objectives, they do not dismiss the strategy outright. For Lu, Washington stands at a strategic crossroads, at which it must demonstrate its true strategic intentions to Beijing. On one hand, Lu is concerned about the frequent "transnational and multinational maritime military exercises" in East Asia that, he believes, constitute "evidence that the new U.S. maritime strategy has already been put into effect." On the other hand, the new cooperative approach may truly represent "a major change in the U.S. military's maritime strategy," Lu allows. "It must receive the affirmation of all the world's nations."

The election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in March 2008 has placed cross-strait relations on an improved trajectory after eight years of instability under Chen Shui-bian. Meanwhile, recent developments suggest that PLAN missions may become increasingly compatible with the maritime strategy's focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At an expanded Central Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman Hu Jintao introduced a new military policy that defines the four new missions of the PLA, one of them being to "play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development."³⁶ PLAN writings are operationalizing both this theme and Hu's recent guidance that China's military should pay attention to "diversified military tasks" (多样化任务).³⁷ Such factors may well support mission convergence and increase strategic space for Sino-American maritime cooperation, though it will take substantial effort from both sides to exploit opportunities, and it will not be easy.

Chinese analysts will therefore likely watch the concrete actions on the part of the United States to see how they affect Beijing's core strategic concerns. In future discussions with their American counterparts, they will probably continue to probe for U.S. willingness to commit to actions that would make China

feel strategically more assured. They will undoubtedly be looking for the United States to, in the words of a Chinese proverb, “言必信，行必果”—to be true to its words and resolute in its deeds. As Lu puts it, “The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.”

NOTES

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The views expressed here are solely those of the translator and do not represent the estimates or policies of the U.S. Navy or of any other organization of the U.S. government.

1. See, for example, Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “China on the March,” *National Interest* 88 (March/April 2007), pp. 16–22; Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 81–126; and Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45.
2. For an early analysis of Chinese reactions to the maritime strategy, see “New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses,” *China Security* 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 40–61, available at www.wsichina.org/cs8_3.pdf. This article has been translated into Chinese as 汪北哲译 [Wang Beizhe, trans.], “美 <中国安全>: 中国谨慎应对美海洋战略” [U.S. <China Security>: China Reacts Cautiously to the U.S. Maritime Strategy], 环球时报 [Global Times], 18 December 2007, available at china.huanqiu.com/eyes_on_china/2007-12/36152.html.
3. See Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981), pp. 8–12.
4. These new trends were reinforced by three major factors: a higher level of functional and technical specialization and bureaucratic differentiation required by Deng's more complex nation-building tasks; the gradual replacement of Maoist revolutionaries by new generations of technocrats devoted to resolving specific administrative and technical problems; and gradual institutionalization of research on policy and technical issues. This paragraph draws heavily on an unpublished manuscript on Chinese civil-military relations by Nan Li.
5. Experts at key think tanks may be more influential in general than those at teaching institutions, but their writings on the maritime strategy were not available as this article went to press.
6. For further background, see Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China's New Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 22–35; David Shambaugh, “China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure

- and Process,” *China Quarterly* 171 (2002), pp. 575–96.
7. See, for example, “中美海军上将握手大洋” [The Chiefs of the Chinese and U.S. Navies Shake Hands over the Ocean], 当代海军 [Modern Navy] (October 2007), title and facing page; 杨晴川 [Yang Qingchuan], “美国海上力量‘三巨头’—海军作战部长拉夫黑德, 海军陆战队司令康韦和海岸警卫队司令艾伦共同出现在罗得岛州纽波特海军战争学院举行的国际海军研讨会上, 向与会的100多个国家和地区的海军首脑隆重推出美国新版的海上战略” [The “Three Magnates” of U.S. Sea Power—Adm. Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. James T. Conway, Marine Corps Commandant; and Adm. Thad W. Allen, Coast Guard Commandant, Presented the Strategy to Maritime Leaders from More Than 100 Countries Attending the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.], 国际先驱导报 [International Herald Leader (Beijing)], 17 October 2007, available at www.chinesenewsnet.com.
 8. See, for example, “针对台湾与朝鲜问题美军增兵太平洋将不‘太平’” [The Increase of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific to Counter the Taiwan and North Korean Problems Will Not Be “Peaceful”], 环球时报 [Global Times], 12 November 2007, available at www.sxgov.cn/jstd/jsrd/501023.shtml.
 9. See, for example, 刘华, 吴强 [Liu Hua and Wu Qiang], “美国通过新海上战略 指导美军重返菲律宾” [Through the New Maritime Strategy, the U.S. Directs Its Military to Return to the Philippines], 国际先驱导报 [International Herald Leader], 24 October 2007, available at www1.chinataiwan.org; 杨晴川, 王薇 [Yang Qingchuan and Wang Wei], “美国推出新的海上战略—遏制潜在竞争对手” [The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy—Containing Potential Competitors], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 18 October 2007, available at www.pladaily.com.cn; 邢蓬宇 [Xing Pengyu], “美国新海上战略: 以合作之名谋强权之实” [The United States’ New Maritime Strategy: Solidifying Its Might under the Banner of Cooperation], 人民网军事频道 [People’s Daily Online: Military Affairs Section], 24 October 2007, available at military.people.com.cn.
 10. This article was originally published as 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “美海上新战略浮出水面” [The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 27 November 2007, p. 3. Lu’s home institution is perhaps most similar to the U.S. Naval Academy (though this comparison has significant limitations, in part because Chinese professional military education is dispersed among a wider range of schools than is the case in the United States).
 11. Lu is the author of 中国走向还海洋 [China Advances on the Sea], 海潮出版社 [Sea Tide Press] (1998), and 当代海洋知识丛书(共5册) [Modern Maritime Knowledge series, 5 volumes] (Dalian: 大连海事学院出版社 [Dalian Maritime Academy Press], 2005–2006). He has published such monographs as *Operation and Collision Avoidance for Naval Vessels*, *China Moves toward the Ocean*, and *Ocean. Nation. Seapower*. Lu’s scholarship has been covered by Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast programs. Lu’s more than one hundred articles are featured prominently in the PLA publications *Liberation Army Daily* and *Modern Navy*, as well as in such newspapers and periodicals as *China National Defense News*, *China Soft Science*, *People’s Daily*, and *China Youth Daily*. See, for example, “实施海洋强国战略的若干问题” [A Number of Issues in Carrying Out a Strong Sea Power Strategy], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development & Management], no. 1 (2002), pp. 62–63; “中国为啥要去南极?” [Why Must China Go to the South Pole?], 解放军报 [Liberation Army Daily], 26 February 2001, p. 9; with 刘永路 [Liu Yonglu]; “一位80岁老海军的传奇人生” [The Legendary Life of an Eighty-Year-Old Old Navy (Officer)], 当代海军 [Modern Navy], no. 4 (2001), pp. 35–36; “创新做大 加快步伐” [Blaze Great New Trails, Quicken the Pace], 大连日报 [Dalian Daily], 20 April 2006, p. B04; “树立海洋战略意识建设海上经济强国” [Establish a Maritime Strategic Consciousness, Build a Maritime Economic Power], 中国软科学 [China Soft Science] (April 1997), pp. 13–17; “从国际海洋法谈新的国土观念” [From the International Law of the Sea a Discussion of the New Concept

- of Territory], 中国软科学 [China Soft Science], no. 9 (1996), pp. 19–22.
12. Lu was born in Shanghai in 1937. His early PLAN duties included patrolling the East China Sea; later, in 1985, he had the opportunity to “sail each of the world’s great oceans” and join China’s highly decorated first mission to the South Pole to establish the “Great Wall” science observation station. At Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, Lu successively served as instructor, chair of the teaching and research section, and chair of the navigation department. He has also held academic positions in the Beijing Polytechnic University Radio Department and the Naval Command College Campaign Command Class. In addition to these core duties, Lu has also held the concurrent posts of Director, China Oceanic Navigation Society; Member, Oceanic Navigation Education Guidance Committee for Colleges and Universities; Member, Examination and Approval Committee for Navigation Science Terms; Visiting Researcher, Beijing Ceyuandi Institute for Comprehensive National Power; Special Researcher, Zheng He Research Society; Senior Researcher, China Management Science and Technology Research Institute; and Reporter, Dalian Municipality Political Ideology Education Reporting Organization. In 2000, Lu was recognized as a “Liaoning Province Advanced Worker for General Science Education” and a “Dalian City Advanced Individual for General Science Education.” 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “实施海洋强国战略的若干问题” [Problems with Implementing a Great Sea Power Strategy], 2002中国未来与发展研究报告 [2002 Research Report on China’s Future and Development], 北京理工大学无线电系 [Beijing Management Engineering University Radio Department] (2002), p. 997, available at www.amazon.cn/mn.
 13. See also 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “在大战略中给中国海权定位” [Defining Sea Power in China’s Grand Strategy], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 6 June 2007, p. 4.
 14. This article was originally published as 王宝付 [Wang Baofu], “美军‘海上战略’与未来军事转型” [The U.S. Military’s “Maritime Strategy” and Future Transformation], 学习时报 [Study Times], 22 January 2008, www.lianghui.org.cn.
 15. See Xiao Wei, ed., “Chinese Military Analysts on U.S. Expanding Military Targets,” CCTV.com, 29 March 2003, www.cctv.com/english/news/TVNews/NoonNews. Wang Baofu, “PLA Warship’s Visit to Japan of Far-Reaching Significance,” *People’s Daily Online*, 29 November 2007, english.people.com.cn; “Russia No Longer Shows Forbearance,” *People’s Daily Online*, 17 July 2007, english.people.com.cn; “Outer Space Not Let to Overcast with ‘War Clouds,’” *People’s Daily Online*, 3 April 2007, english.people.com.cn; “No Winner in Indian-Pakistani Conflicts,” *Beijing Review*, 28 February 2002, p. 13 (all Wang Baofu). Wang Baofu et al., “Can India Become a Military Power?” *Beijing Review*, 28 February 2002, pp. 13–15; and 王宝付 [Wang Baofu], 美国特种作战部队与特种作战 [U.S. Special Forces and Special Warfare] (Beijing: 国防大学出版社 [National Defense University Press], 1995).
 16. “War on Iraq Opens Pandora [sic] Box,” Xinhua, 25 March 2003, available at wcm.fmprc.gov.cn.
 17. This article was originally published as 苏浩: 外交学院外交学系教授; 吴兵: 外交学院外交学系博士生 [Su Hao, Professor of Diplomacy, China Foreign Affairs University; Wu Bing, Doctoral Student, China Foreign Affairs University], “美国海上战略新思路—《21世纪海权的合作战略》报告评述” [The U.S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking—Reviewing the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”], 领导者 [Leaders], no. 19 (December 2007), pp. 29–30.
 18. Su is the acting chairman of China Foreign Affairs University’s Diplomacy Department and director of its China’s Foreign Relations Section. He is a member of the Chinese Committee, Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP); and a board member of China Association of Arms Control and Disarmament, the China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies, China Association of Asian-African Development Exchange, and the China Association of China-ASEAN. Su received his BA and MA in

- history and international relations from Beijing Normal University and PhD in international relations from China Foreign Affairs University. He pursued advanced studies in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, in 1993–95 and was a Fulbright Scholar in 2001–2002, at both Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies and the University of California at Berkeley's Institute of East Asian Studies. In 2004 Su served as a visiting professor in Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research (Sweden). He teaches and conducts research on China's diplomatic history, strategic studies and international security, and politics and economics in the Asia-Pacific region. Su has published several books and many articles concerning China's foreign policy, security issues, international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, and on East Asian cooperation.
19. For Su's analysis of China's overall geostrategic position, see 苏浩 [Su Hao], “地缘重心与世界政治的支点” [Geogravitational Centers and World Political Fulcrums], *现代国际关系* [Contemporary International Relations], no. 4 (2004), pp. 54–61.
 20. 吴兵, 母耕源, 钟龙彪翻译, 苏浩审校 [Wu Bing, Mu Gengyuan, Zhong Longbiao (trans.), and Su Hao (proofreader)], “21世纪海权的合作战略—首开历史先河: 21世纪海权的合作战略” [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: For the First Time in History—a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower], *领导者* [Leaders], no. 19 (December 2007), pp. 21–28.
 21. For Chinese assessments of these maritime strategies, see 许世勇 [Xu Shiyong], “美海军实施网络反潜新战略” [The U.S. Navy Implements a New Network Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy], *当代海军* [Modern Navy] (September 2006); 李杰 [Li Jie], “重视前沿存在, 强调联合作战—十年来美国海军战略的调整变化及特点” [Attach Importance to Forward Presence, Emphasize Joint Operations: The Revision, Change and Characteristics of U.S. Naval Strategy over the Past Fifteen Years], *现代舰船* [Modern Ships], no. 1 (2003), pp. 13–14.
 22. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., *The Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), pp. 439–43; 徐起 [Xu Qi], “21世纪初海上地缘战略与中国海军的发展” [Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century], *中国军事科学* [China Military Science] 17, no. 4 (2004), pp. 75–81, reprinted (trans. Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein) in *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 46–67.
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THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY SURFACES

Lu Rude

In order to cope with threats and safeguard U.S. interests, the new U.S. maritime strategy puts forward six major missions for sea power: deploy decisive sea power in a forward position in limited conflicts of regional scale; deter war between major powers; win wars for the nation; safeguard homeland security from long-distance; promote and maintain cooperative relationships with more international partners; and prevent or eliminate regional destruction before it affects the international system. To accomplish these six missions, U.S. sea power must possess the corresponding six core capabilities, including the capability to be in a forward position (present global deployment), deterrence capability, sea control capability, force projection capability, the capability to safeguard public order at sea, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.

SPECIAL TEXT FOR THIS PAGE

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the latest put forward by the United States, represents the first major revision of [U.S.] maritime strategy in twenty years. The 1986 Maritime Strategy was essentially a Cold War era strategy with “war as the nucleus,” mainly for establishing sea supremacy. The objective was global confrontation with the Soviet Navy. Obviously, with the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the Soviet Navy’s decline, the “1986 edition” of the U.S. maritime strategy was already obsolete. Faced with the new international situation of counterterrorism following the “9/11” incident and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the rapid rise of developing nations and the formation of a multipolar world, [and] as a result of over two years of debate and discussion by the U.S. Navy’s theoretical circle, the “2007 edition” of the maritime strategy, which brandishes the great banner of “international cooperation” and a plausible new face, was finally issued.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is composed of six sections: introduction, challenges for the new era, maritime strategic concepts, strategic implementation, tasks prioritized for implementation, and conclusion. This essay gives a brief analysis to offer insights into the new trends of the U.S. Navy.

A DUALITY OF THE ANGLE OF VIEW: PREVENTING AND WINNING WAR ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT

In the introduction to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, there is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing and Winning War Are Equally Important.” In the past, the U.S. Navy’s strategy emphasized “gain the initiative by striking first” and “win by war,” and it was all about warfare preparations and operations planning. The new strategy believes that “maritime power should both be devoted to winning wars decisively, and to increasing war prevention capability,” thus attaching importance to containing war before it occurs. Elevating war prevention to the same strategic status of importance as winning war in military theory represents a major change in the U.S. naval strategy. This is a reaffirmation of the internationally and universally recognized “maritime military operations other than war.” It can be foreseen that henceforth the international cooperation and noncombat use of navies will increase. This will become a new common bright point for activities at sea by the world’s navies.

AN ENTIRELY NEW WAY OF THINKING: MARITIME INTERESTS CANNOT BE DICTATED BY ONE COUNTRY

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower describes the current and future threats facing the United States as “the continuous increase of transnational actors, rogue states, proliferation of weapon technologies and information, and natural disasters.” “The vast majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred kilometers from the sea. This necessitates an entirely new way of thinking about the role of maritime power.” Following the implementation of *The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea*, world oceanic trends have experienced a great change, and the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry. The United States recognized that “no one country alone has sufficient resources to guarantee the security of the entire maritime space.” Therefore, this strategy “appeals to every government, non-governmental organization, international organization and private institution to develop partnership relationships based on common interests to address the frequently occurring new threats.”

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. strategic goals were confused for a while. Following the “9/11” incident, however, the United States has regained its sense, “enemies can very well use unconventional warfare to win over America’s superior military strength.” This has forced the United States to rethink its maritime strategy and realize that the U.S. homeland and global strategic interests were no longer threatened by a fixed strategic opponent. Rather, the United States faces a multitude of potential threats.

The United States is the promoter of unipolarity, all along relying on its powerful naval fleets to dominate the seas and safeguard America's own interests. But the tremendous change in the international system makes it begin to think reasonably that the present maritime issues affect each nation's interests, that no

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The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy.

one country can dominate, and that all forces must be mobilized in the world to jointly safeguard the "common interests" at sea. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* clearly proposes that "collective security activities will be conducted to address common threats and assemble common interests in an open and multipolar world, and maritime power will be used to build confidence and mutual trust among nations." It is important to note that this is the first time that U.S. official writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition to multipolarity and the construction of "cooperative partnerships" based on maritime common interests.

In the section on strategy implementation, the new maritime strategy has clear differences from the "1986 edition," placing the utmost emphasis on "war prevention through cooperation in each region, and not waiting for war to break out to win it. Particularly when confronting the threat of terrorism, we must use forward deployed forces to stop terrorism as far away from the U.S. coastline as possible, thus guaranteeing the absolute security of the U.S. homeland."

One can see that the new U.S. maritime strategy emphasizes "military software" such as "humanitarian rescue missions and improving cooperative relations between the United States and every country," thus attempting to achieve the goals of preventing war and maintaining peace. If it can be achieved, this is a rational choice suitable for the present international circumstances. All countries have a great need to explore the new thinking of developing mutual assistance and common prosperity to remove divergences and jointly safeguard the peace of the oceans. This is also the international obligation of "peaceful use of the oceans" and "joint management of the oceans" advocated in the *U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea*.

This could be a major change in the U.S. military's maritime strategy. It must receive the affirmation of all the world's nations.

STRATEGIC FOCUS: SHIFT FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states: from now on, U.S. military strength will be concentrated in "areas where tension escalates, or in regions in which we hope to demonstrate to friendly nations and allies the U.S.

resolve to maintain stability, and regions where the U.S. realizes its obligations to its allies.” “The U.S. will continue to deploy strong operational power in the Western Pacific, and the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, to safeguard U.S. and allied interests and to deter potential competitors.” In fact, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy declared: the new strategy “not only discusses things that we want to do, we have already begun to do some of these things,” such as having already deployed forces in these two regions of strategic importance.

The Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are the “energy lifelines,” and they constitute a strategic thoroughfare that America’s global strategy must guarantee. The Middle East is a “powder keg,” and these seas were the maritime battlegrounds of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraq “War to Overthrow Saddam” and the Afghan War. Moreover, these are regions in which several countries possess nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear proliferation exists. By setting up pointed defenses and carrying out strategic deployment, the United States is prepared to act at any time and to intervene.

The Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among nations for maritime sovereignty. It is also a region that has the highest concentration and fastest growth in terms of the world’s naval forces. Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them; they will directly influence and challenge American hegemony. Moreover, Asia is the region in which the United States has concluded and signed the highest number of defense treaties, an important sea area in which the United States has implemented island chain defense. Therefore, according to the new U.S. strategy, the Western Pacific is determined to be “a region of high tension” where the United States has the responsibility to “carry out treaty obligations” to its allies and to “contain potential strategic competitors.”

Consequently, the United States not only increases its military strength on the Japanese mainland and in the Ryukyu Islands, it also dispatches carrier battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness. For “humanitarian objectives” and “the requirements of international cooperation,” the Western Pacific is the sea area where the U.S. military conducts the largest and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies. Such frequent transnational and multinational maritime military exercises were not possible more than a decade ago, and this is the evidence that the new U.S. maritime strategy has already been put into effect.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENT: STRATEGY TO DOMINATE THE OCEAN CAN BE TRACED TO THE SAME ORIGIN

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower believes: major changes have taken place in the global strategic environment, and the United States faces threats dispersed all over the world. Therefore, it is necessary to give full play to the “expeditionary” and “multi-role” characteristics of sea power, and adopt globally “dispersed deployment to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens, and promote our interests on a global scale.”

Obviously, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* has not changed the [U.S.] strategic goal of dominating the world’s oceans. The United States still attempts to rely on its formidable sea power to control the world’s oceans, carry

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Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them; they will directly influence and challenge American hegemony.

out global deployments, [and] continue to brandish military force to “deter wars between great powers,” thus maintaining its domination of the world’s oceans. The new maritime strategy pointedly emphasizes “forward deployment” and seeks to implement “expeditionary” and “multi-role” [capabilities], thus striving to keep the battlefield far away from the American homeland so that U.S. security and interests can be realized.

Over the course of the “9/11” incident and the Afghan and Iraq wars, from international counterterrorism operations the U.S. Navy recognized that the terror wars it confronted were completely different from traditional wars. There was uncertainty concerning the combat opponents, the areas of operations, the methods of engagement, and the triggering events. There were neither clear boundary lines between countries and regions nor conventional precursors of war. The “Chief planner” of U.S. military strategy, [former] Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Hoehn, believes: “terrorism has unprecedented destructiveness, and it travels and connects various continents and regions. To deal with it, you must wage a global war.” As a result, “counterterrorism” war must use the “great dragnet” of international cooperation for global defense.

The new U.S. maritime strategic concept holds that even if a regional war is limited, it is still very difficult to achieve complete victory without international support, so only through international cooperation can “terror war” be prevented and peace obtained. The new strategic concept integrates such clauses as “promoting and maintaining cooperative relations with more international partners,” and asserts that “emphasis will be placed on

conflict prevention through humanitarian rescue and assistance operations and strengthening international cooperation.” It emphasizes that preventing war is as important as preventing war from expanding, and that preventing war from expanding requires international cooperation, so as to avoid affecting the global system and American interests. This is a transformation that has caught people’s attention.

In objectively analyzing the U.S. *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, one can see that the “2007 edition” of the new maritime strategy is relatively moderate compared to the previous version in its use of words and style. It holds high the great banner of “cooperation,” elevates preventing war to the same strategic status as winning war, and takes it as an important mission for U.S. maritime power. For the first time, it acknowledges that the present world is “multipolar,” and believes that no country alone is capable of safeguarding the world’s maritime areas from terrorism and other threats. This thinking is suited to dealing concretely with world conditions. But the hegemonic U.S. thinking of dominating the world’s oceans has not changed at all. While the new strategy has produced some rhetorical changes, what it enumerates are essentially responses to the current global security situation and [consequent] requirements for America’s own interests. Its emphasis on “international cooperation” and demand for “allied participation” serve the U.S. global strategy. The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.

NEWS BACKGROUND

On 17 November, at the “International Seapower” Symposium held in the U.S. state of Rhode Island, a report entitled *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* was rapidly transmitted all over the world, arousing a high degree of attention among the world’s navies. Many articles have been written by military-theoretical circles to interpret and comment on the report. Why did this alarm the world? First, this document was jointly signed and issued by the three leading figures of U.S. maritime power—Chief of Naval Operations Roughead, Marine Corps Commandant Conway, and Coast Guard Commandant Allen—a rare occurrence. Second, at the Naval War College’s international naval symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, the new U.S. maritime strategy was announced in front of the heads of navies from over one hundred nations and regions. This is the first time in U.S. history that America’s maritime forces—the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard—jointly formulated and publicly announced a unified maritime strategy at an “international conference.”

AUTHOR'S COMMENTARY: THE NAVY, DARING VANGUARD OF U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY

The conclusion of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* points out: “this strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear; and on confidence—not doubt. . . . In the future, the navy will continue to unite in executing this strategy. U.S. maritime forces will always safeguard the nation and its major interests.” Obviously, the new U.S. maritime strategy’s issuance demonstrates that the strategic status of U.S. maritime forces has been further elevated. This is also the motivating reason and the result of the ability of the three U.S. maritime forces to work together to issue the new maritime strategy.

The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy. The new strategy is absolutely unequivocal: “From now on, U.S. sea power will be concentrated in areas that have heightened tension or require the United States to fulfill commitments to allies. The United States will continue to deploy powerful operational forces in the Western Pacific, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean to protect U.S. and allied interests, and contain potential competitors.” The U.S. Navy is hoisting the banner of “humanitarian assistance operations and strengthening international cooperation,” and continuing “forward deployment” in maritime hotspots. Wherever a crisis emerges, U.S. carrier battle group[s] will appear there; this kind of strategic deployment cannot change.

Although *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* projects the pleasant wording of “peace,” “cooperation,” and “war prevention,” hegemonic thinking remains its main thread. For example, “we cannot permit a circumstance to arise in which our maritime power is deprived of mobility and freedom to operate in the sea lanes. Similarly, we cannot permit any enemy to attempt to block or disrupt major channels of maritime commerce or communication, thereby cutting off global supply lines. In circumstances of necessity, we have the capacity to control maritime space in any region, ideally with partners or allies participating, but alone when necessary.” Clearly, what is behind “cooperation” is America’s interests, having “partners or the participation of allies” likewise serves America’s global interests.

Strengthening “dynamic deployment.” As a result of the current uncertainty concerning maritime crises, the “static deployment mode” of large, fixed military bases is already unsuited to the requirements of the “war against terror.” The U.S. Navy’s overseas bases are decreasing in number, and it is shifting toward a “dynamic projection mode” of small-scale and temporary bases and globally deployed fleets. In line with the new maritime strategy, through “regular, temporary operations” such as joint military exercises and provision of humanitarian assistance, the U.S. military can leave behind a small number of important

military officials and turn places of strategic importance into “semi-permanent” bases; thus maintaining de facto military presence, still firmly withholding the U.S. global military strategic network, and implementing strategic encirclement of different kinds of maritime flashpoints and “potential enemy” through military deployment in “chokepoints” of navigation and strategic nodes. In this way, [the United States] can not only continue to preserve its military presence in strategic areas, but also avoid the “tremendous political risk” from maintaining overseas military bases. [The United States] can thus “kill two birds with one stone.”

Playing the leading role in the “war against terror.” Because of the navy’s special characteristics—such as its mobility, which gives it the ability to advance and withdraw, to deter and fight—naval fleets necessarily receive favorable attention. The exceptional document, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, formulated jointly by America’s three maritime forces, demonstrates that [the Navy] has been placed in an extremely prominent position. In peacetime, through “forward deployment,” the fleet “places the city under siege” in its deterrent effect. At the outset of war, warships shoot the “first shot” by launching guided missiles. In the course of war, naval vessels are both weapon launching platforms and mobile arsenals. At the conclusion of war, they can rapidly leave the battleground. In the Iraq “War to Overthrow Saddam,” the naval fleet was thoroughly brought into play with essential functions. In the domains of war time and space, the Navy has an indispensable role and achieves results that capture the attention of the world and receive “acclaim” from the U.S. authorities and the military, and it is regarded as an indispensable “trump card” for future “anti-terrorism” operations.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

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THE U.S. MILITARY'S "MARITIME STRATEGY" AND FUTURE TRANSFORMATION

Wang Baofu

In October 2007, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard jointly released the "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," which aroused widespread attention in international military circles. The new U.S. "maritime strategy" focuses on future security threats. It not only puts forward some new concepts, but also demonstrates many aspects of future military strategic adjustment and the development trends of military transformation.

1. THE U.S. MILITARY'S "MARITIME STRATEGY" IS PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCED BY [AMERICA'S] SEA POWER TRADITION

The United States is a country with a tradition of being a "sea power." It can be said that the ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its understanding of the oceans, its comprehension of sea power, and [its] emphasis on maritime force development. And this tradition originates from the prominent American geostrategic scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan's "Sea Power" thinking had long-term influence on the development and evolution of U.S. maritime strategy. This point can be seen very clearly from America's modern development and historical trajectory.

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. maritime strategy was repeatedly revised, but never separated itself from Mahan's sea power theory. In 1991, in order to adapt to changes in the maritime security environment, and more effectively use maritime power, the United States specially established a "naval strategic research group" and quickly introduced the maritime strategy white paper "From Sea to Land," [thereby] revising the long-adhered-to "Maritime Strategy." "Forward deployment" changed to "forward presence," having a foothold in "maritime operations" changed to "from sea to land," [and] "independently implementing large-scale sea warfare" changed to "support army and air force joint operations."

The "9/11" terrorist attacks produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept. National security and military strategy underwent a major adjustment. The U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly. It put forward the goal of constructing naval forces possessing information superiority; devoted to developing forward presence, maritime capability for comprehensive superiority

in land assault, and information warfare; and addressing twenty-first century maritime security threats.

This time, the introduction of the U.S. military's new "maritime strategy" can be said to be one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last twenty years. It not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use military power to meet national security objectives. This is the greatest distinction between the new "maritime strategy" and its predecessor.

2. THE U.S. "MARITIME STRATEGY" PUTS FORWARD NEW THINKING REGARDING HOW TO ADDRESS SECURITY THREATS

The most prominent feature of the U.S. military's new "maritime strategy" is to put "preventing war and winning war" in equally important positions. The pursuit of absolute military superiority, stressing the defeat of any opponent, has always been the core of U.S. military strategy. The objective of using military force to prevent war is embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence theory, but it is very rarely placed at the same level as winning wars in important strategic documents. In the new "maritime strategy," this type of overbearing, offensive language is relatively reduced, and there is noticeably more emphasis on "strategic cooperation" to jointly address future maritime security threats.

The concept of "cooperation" put forward by the new strategy refers not only to cooperation among the three strategic forces of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, but also to military strength and national cooperation in the fields of diplomacy, etc.; even more important is the emphasis on international cooperation. The new strategy stresses that the majority of the world's population lives within several hundred kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a direct bearing on the American people's way of life. Faced with the increasingly serious maritime threats, "no country [in the world] has adequate resources or forces to ensure the security of the entire maritime area," no single country has the ability to deal with international terrorism single-handedly. Therefore, international "strategic cooperation" is an important way to achieve maritime security. Likewise, developments in globalization and informatization* will also propel the evolution of naval strategies.

* Chinese sources use the term "informatization" [信息化] to describe the utilization of information technology, networks, and even command automation to improve military performance. For details on the role of "informatization" in transforming China's navy, see Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase, "Information Technology and China's Naval Modernization," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2008), pp. 24–30; and "PLA Navy Modernization: Preparing for 'Informatized' War at Sea," Jamestown Foundation *China Brief* 8, no. 5 (29 February 2008), pp. 2–5, available at www.jamestown.org.

To implement the new “maritime strategy,” the U.S. military proposed huge programs to develop a “thousand-ship Navy,” [and] build “Global Fleet Stations.” The purpose for developing the “thousand-ship Navy” is to strengthen allied naval cooperation and communication, through joint maritime operations involving each nation, and deal with the increasingly complex maritime security environment. By building “Global Fleet Stations,” naval forces will provide global protection. To achieve this goal, the U.S. military has already begun to deploy new “Fleet Stations” in world focal point regions. This new concept

. . . 美国能够成为世界霸权国家与其 . . . 对海上力量发展的重视有直接关系. . . 马汉的“海权”思想对美国海上战略的发展演变产生了长远的影响.

The ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . emphasis on maritime force development. . . Mahan’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term influence on the development and evolution of U.S. maritime strategy.

advanced in the strategic documents of the U.S. military can only be regarded as a major transformation in its understanding of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.

Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the importance of “international cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hegemonic mentality. Regarding core national interests at sea, such as the right to freedom of action at sea, sea lane control, and deploying forces in important strategic regions, the new strategy and the three sea power principles put forward by Mahan of maritime military strength, overseas military bases, and sea line control are exactly the same; it can [therefore] be said that the U.S. “maritime strategy” has the same spirit.

3. THE “MARITIME STRATEGY” INDICATES SOME CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY’S FUTURE EVOLUTION

The U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” was deliberated for two years before being issued. This period coincided with a time during which the United States was bogged down in a quagmire in the war in Iraq and intense conflicts were breaking out between the ruling and opposition parties. Within the Bush administration, the neoconservatives fell into disgrace, and a number of individuals at the helm of the Defense Department such as [Donald] Rumsfeld and [Paul] Wolfowitz left one after the other. Regarding such major issues as the Iraq War, military transformation, and future military development, many people have undergone [a transition to] new thinking. Although the new “maritime strategy” is not the result of systematic reflection, in many ways it has already revealed these development trends.

The new “maritime strategy” indicates a transformation in U.S. thinking concerning the use of military force. As the only superpower in the world today, on the basis of comprehensive national strength, the United States obviously enjoys a superior status. No one doubts U.S. hard power, especially its powerful military strength. However, since “9/11,” the United States has pursued a unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve all security problems, not only damaging its hard power, but also seriously setting back its soft power. Damage to hard power can possibly be recovered from in a relatively short period, but damage to soft power requires not only a long period of great exertion but also policy changes. Since 2007, around the issue of the use of soft power, the U.S. academic community carried out an unprecedented great discussion. The renowned U.S. think tank “Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)” held special seminars [in which] former major government officials and expert scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Armitage, [and] Joseph Nye proposed that in order for the U.S. government to extend its hegemonic rule the United States must attach great importance to the coordinated use of hard and soft power. [They] proposed to use hard and soft power in coordination as “rational strength” [smart power] in order to realize strategic national security goals. This is the context in which the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” was introduced; and many of its proposals reflect this new way of thinking about achieving national security objectives and safeguarding national strategic interests.

The new “maritime strategy” reflects tentative rethinking of the Iraq War. As the Iraq War enters its fifth year, the United States has already expended the high cost of nearly four thousand human lives and five hundred billion U.S. dollars. Because the war is still continuing, it is difficult to predict its future development. The U.S. military still cannot, and does not, have a systematic summation of conditions in progress, but the U.S. intellectual elite is in the process of comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact on policy-making departments. At the beginning of the Iraq War, in the face of universal opposition from the international community, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld advanced the unyielding position that “it is not the coalition that determines the mission, but the mission that determines the coalition.” Through the passage of time and events, today the U.S. military’s “maritime strategy” has already taken “international cooperation” as an important principle. This contrast indicates that the United States security and military strategy will face a major new adjustment. The U.S. presidential election has already begun, and “change” has already become a demand of mainstream American society. Regardless of whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party

comes to power, adjustments and changes in the U.S. government's foreign policy are inevitable.

The new "maritime strategy" indicates that future U.S. military transformation will have new changes. U.S. military transformation issues were already mentioned as early as during the Clinton administration, but really started in a comprehensive manner after Rumsfeld entered the Pentagon. To promote transformation, Rumsfeld put forward a series of radical measures, causing enormous controversy at the high levels of the U.S. military. The war in Iraq, in fact, became a testing ground for U.S. military transformation. Rumsfeld advanced restructuring measures, such as large-scale reduction of the army, the reduction of large-scale combat platforms, and adjustment of the structure and composi-

作为世界军事变革的领头羊，美国海上战略变化值得关注。

As a bellwether of world military transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits close scrutiny.

tion of troops, etc.; many of which were overturned in the course of the Iraq War. The newly appointed U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral [Michael] Mullen is not only the new strategy's planner and organizer, but also has maintained independent thinking as one of the senior high ranking military officers. As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral] Mullen repeatedly suggested that "the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other countries to maintain freedom of passage." It is precisely through his promotion that the new "maritime strategy" was introduced.

Without any doubt, the U.S. Navy chose the timing of the promulgation of the new "maritime strategy" to promote its own interests. Military spending has always been the focus of competition among the armed services. For the maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending pie, they must lead strategic thinking and initiatives. Six years after the "9/11" incident, it is difficult to convince people that emphasizing naval development is important to combat international terrorism. Precisely because of this, some people and military industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a "Chinese naval threat theory" or "Russian maritime threat" argument.

Because of its wide-ranging mobility, the Navy is known as the "international service." This distinguishing feature of maritime forces gives them the advantage of viewing the world from a global perspective. In a period of relative peace and stability, how to employ maritime forces to safeguard national security is the common task facing each nation's naval construction. Because the United States is a country that places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy

can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than safeguarding the world maritime order. As a bellwether of world military transformation, [therefore], U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits close scrutiny.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

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THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY'S NEW THINKING REVIEWING THE
"COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER"

Su Hao

On 17 October 2007, the new maritime strategy, jointly drafted by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, was formally introduced at the United States Naval War College in Rhode Island. The U.S. Department of Defense website published the full text simultaneously. This important strategic report is titled "21st Century Sea Power Cooperation Strategy" [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower]. This is the first time in history that the three joint forces have formulated a unified maritime strategy. This strategy report represents the first major revision of U.S. maritime strategy in over twenty years. The 1986 U.S. maritime strategy was developed in the latter part of the Cold War, and was a strategy of "war at the core," for the purpose of establishing maritime hegemony for the global fight against the Soviet navy. Obviously, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Soviet navy, the "1986 Edition" of the U.S. maritime strategy has become obsolete. U.S. Navy theoretical circles were faced with the new situation of international antiterrorism and the rapid rise of emerging countries and the formation of an international multipolar world, in the face of various kinds of traditional security and nontraditional security threats after the "9/11" incident, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. After more than two years of debate and discussion, the new maritime strategy was introduced under the great banner of "cooperation."

The report contains a total of sixteen pages, divided into five parts: Introduction, Challenges of a New Era, Maritime Strategic Principles, Implementing the Strategy, and Conclusion. In the introduction, the new strategy puts forward its central viewpoint: that coordination and cooperation must be strengthened among the maritime forces of each military service and each domestic department, [as well as among] all international allies. Mutual confidence and trust must [likewise] be fostered to [further common interests in] answer[ing] common threats. For a prosperous future, sea power must be a unified force. Another important point is that preventing wars and winning wars are equally important. The new strategy holds that naval forces should be committed to decisively win the war, but at the same time it is also necessary to enhance the capacity to prevent war [from occurring]. The report emphasizes that

preventing war has been elevated to the same [level of] importance as winning war. This is a major bright spot of the strategy.

In the section on Challenges of a New Era, the new strategy systematically analyzes each potential threat facing the United States, including the continuous growth of transnational actors, and the proliferation of weapons technology and information, [as well as of] natural disasters, etc. The new strategy believes that the future is full of uncertainties, particularly [with] the vast majority of the world's population living in areas within several hundred kilometers of the ocean, which requires a whole new way of thinking about the role of sea power. It stressed that no country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security of the entire maritime area. The strategy therefore calls upon each nation's government, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector to develop partnerships [based on] common interests to deal with the new threats constantly emerging.

In its section on Maritime Strategic Principles, the new strategy puts forward [the following]: In order to fulfill the United States' commitments to the security and stability of its allies, U.S. maritime forces will be concentrated and forward deployed in order to restrict the area of conflict, [and thereby] prevent large-scale war. In the future, U.S. maritime forces will focus on areas in which there is tension or in which the United States is required to fulfill commitments to its allies. The United States will continue to deploy powerful combat forces in the western Pacific, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean in order to protect the interests of the United States and its allies and contain potential competitors. But in the new environment, the United States is facing a variety of threats around the world; it should therefore make full use of the expeditionary and multirole uses of maritime power and globally distribute forces in a task-oriented manner in order to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens and promote U.S. national interests around the world. The report consequently puts forward six strategic missions at the regional and global level: make use of forward deployment, limit regional conflict with decisive maritime power, prevent war between great powers, win wars, expand the degree of depth for national homeland defense, and develop and preserve a cooperative system with even more allies; it is necessary to prevent and contain the damage and instability in some areas to prevent endangering the stability of the global system.

The section on the Implementation of the Strategy puts forward six major missions for maritime power, including forward deployment, deterrence, sea control, force delivery, maritime security and humanitarian assistance, etc. The new strategy calls for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to jointly expand their core capabilities of maritime power. In order to increase its operability, the new strategy explicitly requires that three aspects be regarded as the

highest priority missions for maritime power at present: enhancing integration and coordinated combat capability, maritime security awareness, and personnel preparation.

The conclusion stresses that this strategy is issued based on a comprehensive assessment of the nation's security requirements. It does not assume conflict, but also recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically maintained. It requires building a series of core competencies from a broad, long-range perspective, [and] proactively seizing opportunities to protect the vital interests of the United States. It recognizes that in this era of rapid changes [the United States] face[s] uncertain factors that give rise to challenges. It points out, moreover, the importance in the twenty-first century of U.S. naval forces working together with other countries to promote global security and prosperity while simultaneously defending the nation's vital national interests.

报告与美国海军界正在酝酿的所谓“千舰海军”的概念有异曲同工之处。
The [maritime strategy] and the so-called “Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliberated within U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin.

Overall, this report has the following characteristics: First, it prominently emphasizes maritime security cooperation. The report is entitled “[a] cooperative strategy,” and its content places a great deal of emphasis on “cooperation” at two different levels: domestically, coordination and cooperation among each maritime force and maritime affairs department; and globally, cooperation among sea allies and partners. Second, it is the first multiservice maritime strategic report. This is the first time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report. The report makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three maritime forces. Third, [the report] attaches importance to global maritime security and partnership. The report not only stresses cooperation with allies, but also advocates forming partnerships with other nations that possess common interests in maritime affairs. Fourth, new maritime opponents. While attaching importance to traditional state military opponents, it also attaches tremendous importance to threats from nonstate actors, and stresses that the latter cause a series of nontraditional security [threats], [which] will determine [useful areas for] the maritime security cooperation. Fifth, the strategic means of diversification. In maintaining maritime security means, the report stresses the combination of hard and soft power, and attaches importance to both the forward deployment of military forces and information gathering capacity building. It also emphasizes humanitarian assistance to establish a good international image. Sixth, prevent the outbreak of conflicts. Although the report adheres to the viewpoint of winning wars, what is worth noting is that it places a great deal of

emphasis on preventing the outbreak of conflict, and specially emphasizes using powerful force to deter war.

As can be seen from the report, in the face of the complex intertwining of current traditional threats and nontraditional threats in the international security situation, the United States seems to have felt to some extent that its ability is not equal to its ambition. It therefore needs to cooperate with its allies and other partner countries to jointly build a stable maritime security order. The report stressed that this maritime order will be beneficial to protecting the United States' own maritime interests, by working together with other countries to pro-

这 . . . 体现出美国海军方面试图将中国视为海上合作的伙伴, 将中国拉入到美国主导的海洋安全秩序之中.

[This] reflects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United States.

mote global security and prosperity. For this reason, the report and the so-called "Thousand Ship Navy" concept currently being deliberated within U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin.

On 5–6 December [2007], I attended an academic conference at the U.S. Naval War College, entitled "Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with China." This is the first symposium on Sino-U.S. maritime security cooperation held by the U.S. Navy. Conference topics included: Sino-U.S. relations and common global maritime interests, maritime awareness, maritime legal issues and humanitarian operations, regional security challenges, and the future of Sino-U.S. maritime security cooperation. The conference revolved around in-depth discussion of these subjects; proposals for various ways for maritime security cooperation between the two countries were put forward, and prospects for cooperation were optimistically forecast. In fact, the atmosphere of the conference is consistent with the new strategic report recently published by the United States, and reflects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United States.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

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FORTUITOUS ENDEAVOR

Intelligence and Deception in Operation TORCH

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In the European theater of World War II, 1942 marked the nadir of Allied fortunes. German forces in the Soviet Union had reached Stalingrad and threatened the oil fields of the Caucasus; Axis forces in Africa seemed on the verge of pushing the British out of Egypt; and German U-boat wolf packs preyed on Allied shipping with relative impunity. Late in 1942, however, two significant Allied successes served to turn the tide against the Axis powers. At El Alamein, a British offensive defeated General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps, while almost simultaneously a huge Anglo-American force landed in North Africa to contest Axis control. These two actions led to a final thrust toward Italy through Sicily in

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1943, greatly facilitating the eventual Allied victory. The North African and Mediterranean Allied campaign, however, was also significant for different, very secret reasons that have only come to light in full detail in recent decades.

This article will demonstrate that the Anglo-American TORCH effort was a hallmark of effective combined operational planning and execution—facilitated by military deception informed by proven intelligence. Specifically, examining TORCH through the new historical lens provided by decrypts of German signals intelligence (SIGINT) cements the contemporary principle that intelligence preparation of the environment, if done artfully, not only provides enemy order of battle intelligence but reveals exploitable adversary perceptions.

In this case, SIGINT not only assisted in the unmolested Atlantic and Mediterranean passage of immense convoys but effectively gauged Axis capabilities and intentions, as well as the reactions to Allied deception measures, prior to and during the operation. Thus, the Allies effected the largest-scale combined joint undertaking in the history of warfare by 1942 virtually unopposed, due largely to consistent “reading of the enemy’s mail.”¹

A brief introduction of Allied signals intelligence in World War II, a TORCH overview, and a detailed look at SIGINT sources help place the operation in context. Then, an analysis of the threat-assessment process illustrates how insights into German perceptions helped shape the operational plan. Next, recently declassified decrypts fill in historical gaps to show how the Allies used focused intelligence efforts to conceal force movements for the operation and gauge the efficacy of the deception stratagem. These decrypts also reveal the Axis response as the landings occurred and help explain Allied countermoves. The role of “all-source intelligence fusion” in the strategic deception effort is then related. Finally, a discussion of TORCH as a model for intelligence and deception in operational planning and execution offers lessons for contemporary maritime planners, warfighters, and intelligence leaders.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Allied signals intelligence dramatically expanded during TORCH planning. Breakthroughs earlier in the war by British cryptanalysts at the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS) at Bletchley Park led to the breaking of high-grade German ciphers, based on the ENIGMA machine, and in turn a new source of intelligence information known as ULTRA. Moreover, similar American cryptanalytic efforts led to several significant additions to the many British special-intelligence sources. The North African and Mediterranean campaign of 1942 under General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) represents the first actual, operational use of ULTRA and other special intelligence in the planning and execution of large-scale campaigns and the first instance of Allied collaborative strategic deception. Indeed, TORCH represents a vehicle for the practical application of signals intelligence to an Allied campaign that became the model for future operations, such as HUSKY in Sicily and OVERLORD on the beaches of Normandy.

The Allies formed AFHQ in August 1942, after a July Anglo-American decision that the invasion of northwest Africa should be made before any attempt to execute a cross-channel offensive against German-occupied France. Originally, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, were against any offensive not directly aimed at the German heartland, but London’s persistent and frank assessment of the limitations of

Allied forces actually available vis-à-vis expected German opposition convinced them otherwise.² The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) then agreed upon a fall offensive, under the code name TORCH, to capitalize on German preoccupation with the Russian theater, thus initiating the “second front” so desperately needed by the Soviet Union.

The envisioned TORCH plan was ambitious, considering the obvious dangers associated with Allied transatlantic and Mediterranean convoys in 1942. For instance, the plan eventually called for over 1,400 ships to sail from American and British ports carrying enough men and materiel to support an extended campaign in foreign territory and passing through U-boat-infested waters and Axis-controlled sea-lanes. Historian F. H. Hinsley declares that “the scale of the Allied undertaking was without previous parallel in the war, indeed in the history of warfare: never before had states collaborated in dispatching such huge armadas over thousands of miles of ocean and landing so large an expedition in hostile or potentially hostile territory.”³

The scheme required that Allied forces establish a base on Africa’s Atlantic coast from which to launch a campaign aimed at Tunisia through Algeria. The final plan envisioned three separate amphibious assaults in the vicinity of Casablanca (in French Morocco), and upon Oran and Algiers on the Mediterranean coast. The plan called for three task forces: the Western Task Force from the American east coast and the Central and Eastern task forces from the United Kingdom. Finally, a concerted Allied push eastward along the North African coast from Algiers, along with increasing pressure from the east by Montgomery’s Eighth Army, was expected to force an engagement with and then crush the remaining Axis forces in Tunisia. Berlin, however, could potentially array a substantial order of battle against TORCH forces.

The primary threat to the task forces was Axis sea- and airpower, though the potential hostile reaction of French military forces in the African colonies could not be discounted. As for Axis strength, Italian forces in the Mediterranean, though not formidable in themselves, could doom the operation if used in a concerted effort to attack the convoys. These forces consisted mainly of a small surface fleet with a few capital ships, several torpedo boats, a few submarines, and limited aircraft for patrol and attack. The Germans, on the other hand, had numerous long-range patrol and attack aircraft in Sardinia and Sicily (which might operate out of French Mediterranean bases), many U-boats operating in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Rommel’s armored formations in Tunisia. Additionally, Germany could order the reluctant Vichy French forces, particularly the fleet in Toulon, into action. These consisted mostly of French warships, small army garrisons, and shore batteries. Last, the threat of hostilities with heretofore neutral Spain existed, but Washington seems to have consistently

overemphasized it. Planners knew that ultimately the speed and stealth of the Allied operation would decide what additional Axis forces Berlin deployed in response to the invasion.

Various sources of SIGINT provided the intelligence that TORCH planners used to estimate enemy forces and intentions. Most of these sources were British, but there were several American ones as well. First (listing the sources in relative importance, from least to most valuable), the Signal Intelligence Service broke Vichy French weather ciphers broadcast from North Africa and France in July 1942.⁴ These decrypts provided valuable up-to-date weather assessments of the proposed invasion sites, as the success of amphibious assaults was (and still is) extremely dependent on weather. Additionally, after September 1942 GCCS was reading the German air force (Luftwaffe) counterpart to Vichy weather signals, encoded in a system known to the British as CELERY, providing current weather data difficult or impossible to gather otherwise.⁵ Although weather reporting was not considered “special intelligence,” it was important nonetheless. Eisenhower, for example, frequently expressed his vexations with weather as D-day approached, in one instance declaring, “I fear nothing except bad weather and possibly large losses due to submarines”—the latter phrase a seeming understatement.⁶

Second, Vichy authorities continued to use many of the same naval codes the French had used before German occupation, an apparent Axis oversight that produced a consistent SIGINT source. Vichy forces did attempt some novel encoding, but the sophisticated GCCS apparatus had no trouble with it, since the basic ciphers had been in British hands since 1940, when several French warships sailed to the United Kingdom instead of capitulating to the Nazis.⁷ By the time TORCH planning began, GCCS was also decrypting similar Vichy air force signals that described air assets available in North Africa.

Third, several Italian codes also provided important special intelligence to invasion planners. GCCS had in 1941 broken the C38M medium-grade cipher, which was used and routinely decrypted until the war’s end.⁸ This naval cipher, used primarily for Mediterranean shipping, provided special intelligence on Italian naval forces and intentions—though usually only after the Italians had organized combined actions with the Germans. Further, the Italian air force high-grade “book” cipher was broken prior to TORCH and provided similar information on aircraft disposition; however, Italian aircraft played a minor role before and during TORCH, only to come into action in reinforcing Tunisia after the landings.⁹

Another key special-intelligence source involved Axis and Vichy French diplomatic decrypts. By far the most consistently decrypted and utilized of these, the Japanese diplomatic PURPLE ciphers, which had been broken by American

cryptanalysts in 1940, offered consistent insights into the German high command's intentions and its reactions to Allied moves. These decrypts, distributed as "MAGIC Summaries," provided reliable accounts of Axis order of battle, and, further, vital feedback as to the efficacy of Allied deception measures from the highest levels. Until November 1942 the Allies also read Vichy diplomatic ciphers, deriving additional insight into French forces and government disposition and confirming other sources of intelligence on possible future reactions. Italian and German diplomatic ciphers, however, were not broken consistently enough to contribute to TORCH planning, the former becoming unreadable after the summer of 1942 and the latter not being decrypted usefully before 1943.

GCCS consistently broke the German military intelligence ciphers of the Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the intelligence services of, respectively, the armed forces and the Nazi Party (and thereby the SS). From them it gleaned even more information on intentions against, and perceptions of, Allied operations. Abwehr ENIGMA ciphers known as "ISK" and "GGG" were broken after February 1942, providing key glimpses of the effectiveness of various deception and cover plans for TORCH.¹⁰ SD decrypts represented vital corroboration of other special intelligence, particularly on Vichy French and Spanish government reactions after the initial landings. Moreover, SD decrypts proved particularly useful in gauging the effectiveness of false information planted via double agents, as they contained detailed reports sent to Berlin from Nazi agents in the field.

Thus, several reliable special-intelligence sources gave Allied planners valuable information on critical Axis moves and countermoves. Another vital source of intelligence, however, was that referred to as "Y." Y intelligence was battlefield-level, raw information gained by listening posts and small units intercepting radio transmissions in low- and medium-grade codes and ciphers, as well as uncoded messages. It was useful for identifying the constitutions, locations, and unit call signs of enemy forces, as well as for confirming and complementing other, higher-grade signals intelligence. ULTRA and other special intelligence could sometimes make sense of otherwise useless Y information. However, even when successful cryptanalysis eluded GCCS, the presence of Y signals and wireless transmissions generally—particularly fitting known trends of format, signature, or volume—could (through "traffic analysis") indicate enemy activity of a certain nature. Peter Calvocoressi comments in his *Top Secret Ultra* that effective "SIGINT—independent of any deciphering—may bring an element of intelligibility to the babble of the ether and transform it into a picture of the realities on the ground."¹¹ TORCH appears to be the first effective Allied fusion of ULTRA and Y for operational planning and execution.¹² From such fusion flows a greater understanding of how component elements form a system network, revealing element criticality and potential vulnerabilities (nodal analysis).

Further, German army ENIGMA ciphers, known to GCCS as CHAFFINCH I, II, and III, provided another source of signals intelligence peculiar to the Afrika Korps. These ciphers were broken consistently after April 1942, producing material on logistics, tactics, and strategy.¹³ For instance, CHAFFINCH contributed directly to the success of the British offensive at El Alamein by disclosing specific tactics and confirming Rommel's desperate supply situation. German high command signals also gave clues as to intentions and capabilities for the Mediterranean and African theaters.

Other German ciphers, however, would prove much more useful in the planning and execution of TORCH. German navy ENIGMA ciphers, for example, were critical for gauging shipping and naval movements, as well as maritime shore activities during the critical weeks just before the invasion. GCCS decrypted PORPOISE ciphers after August 1942, generating information on trans-Mediterranean traffic before and during the operation.¹⁴ Additionally, DOLPHIN, read after August 1941, provided information on German home-waters shipping, occasionally imparting snippets of intelligence relevant to TORCH.¹⁵ Furthermore, these decrypts provided routine summaries of Italian admiralty intelligence assessments—significant in that Italy operated far more warships, transports, and merchant ships in the Mediterranean than did Germany. By evaluating the sources and locations of German concerns in such decrypts, the Allies went far toward accurate assessments of Axis intentions and capabilities in the Mediterranean.

Finally, by far the most reliable and accurate source of ULTRA comprised Luftwaffe ENIGMA ciphers. Aside from U-boats, Luftwaffe patrol and attack aircraft posed the most dangerous threat to the invasion convoys and forces. Accordingly, GCCS relied heavily upon Luftwaffe signals for indications of movements and intentions. It read LOCUST ciphers, for instance, after January 1942, deriving from them detailed information on the locations and employment of Luftwaffe assets in Sicily and Sardinia.¹⁶ A factor that made these signals so valuable was that all Mediterranean reconnaissance and attack aircraft reported findings via Luftwaffe ENIGMA, making them a vital source of data for planning Allied operations and deceptions. This traffic provided the bulk of indications as to Axis discernment of TORCH, such as convoy sightings and estimates of destinations.

GERMAN PERCEPTIONS

Revelations of key German perceptions shaped the operational plan. Before formulating any concrete operational invasion plan for North Africa, AFHQ had to conduct a detailed assessment of Axis intentions and capabilities in the Mediterranean theater. This assessment was largely a British one, as American

intelligence agencies had little information to work with beyond general impressions gleaned from MAGIC decrypts. Some divergence, in fact, still existed between the two allies as to TORCH's basic purpose. As the two nations' military relationship developed through the CCS and AFHQ, however, so did their ability to learn from each other. A closer exchange of special intelligence at the higher-levels invasion planning led on the American side to an appreciation of the more realistic British assessments. American leaders, however, remained concerned about the contingency of Spanish hostility, and the final draft plan considered this point. Intelligence from proven SIGINT sources assuaged some of Marshall's and Eisenhower's apprehensions.

Early on, GCCS focused on Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypts. The Air Intelligence Section at GCCS had established a good baseline of Luftwaffe information by the summer of 1942 from longer-term analytical studies. In fact, the director of this branch described the picture obtained from Luftwaffe decrypts as the most complete ULTRA source: "The intentions of the German Air Force were the intentions of the German Armed Forces as a whole."¹⁷ He took this knowledge with him to Eisenhower's staff at Norfolk House in London.

Specifically, Luftwaffe decrypts provided telling evidence that up to D-day the enemy had little information on the TORCH plan, affording Armed Forces Headquarters the advantage of confidently shaping the operation around known enemy understandings. The gradual but extensive buildup of the British base at Gibraltar in preparation for the operation, for example, could not long be hidden from the Axis powers. Luftwaffe decrypts revealed, however, that Berlin was misinterpreting it as staging for either a Malta resupply convoy via the Cape of Good Hope or a landing in Tripolitania or Tobruk in support of the British Eighth Army.¹⁸ Decrypts also immediately revealed Luftwaffe movements or reinforcements and their intentions—often, in fact, stating their objectives. With European and African Axis force disposition known to TORCH planners, Armed Forces Headquarters calculated that if operational security could be maintained, the operation could succeed.

An item of particular strategic value that special intelligence provided to TORCH planners was information on Axis anxiety over the possibility of Allied invasion. For instance, German references in MAGIC to forces massing in the United Kingdom and to an apparently impending Allied offensive—presumably a second front to ease the burden on the Soviet Union—repeatedly mentioned specific locations of interest. In fact, disturbingly accurate MAGIC signals in early October projected Allied intentions to invade Africa to open the second front.¹⁹ The Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi, exchanged such information routinely with German military and diplomatic leaders. Nevertheless, it appears that a myriad of other sources of information, combined

with the self-perceived superiority of German intelligence, prevented any Axis response—a fact revealed, again, by ULTRA. Oshima's accurate reports on Axis intentions and disposition were often based directly on discussions with the highest levels of German leadership, even Hitler himself.²⁰ Similarly, repeated references in high-grade SIGINT throughout the summer and autumn of 1942 revealed Axis concern about an Allied threat to northwest Europe, Norway, and the Aegean.²¹ Finally, diplomatic signals between Madrid and the Spanish embassy in Washington before the North African landing showed that although the “neutral” Spaniards discerned the probability of the Allies' alighting somewhere in North Africa, they knew not when or where.²² Certainly, such information on Axis European strategy was useful to both operational and deception schemers, permitting them to orchestrate an operation in the assurance that the geographical area was receiving less than maximal Axis scrutiny.

These intelligence sources, then, allowed AFHQ to mold an offensive with the highest probability of success. By October, TORCH planners assessed the following: that German forces were tied down in the Soviet Union at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, with no prospect of victory in the foreseeable future; that the war in the African desert was taxing Axis resources—some of them sent to the bottom of the Mediterranean by ULTRA-forewarned aircraft and submarines from Malta; that generalized Axis apprehension existed about an Allied offensive in Europe or the Mediterranean; and that few reinforcements were being diverted toward the Mediterranean or to support any move into Spain.²³

Armed Forces Headquarters drew these conclusions from specific, corroborated intelligence on enemy intentions. For instance, by October, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Axis commander in the Mediterranean, predicted that Allied forces would likely land somewhere in North Africa but he was much distracted by the stalwart British outpost of Malta; repeated bombing and invasion attempts had failed to dislodge its entrenched garrison, and Royal Air Force sorties from Malta were consistently interdicting his seaborne logistics train. Furthermore, Hitler's reliance on his own intuition (vice the more prudent counsel of his marshals) in dismissing Italian warnings of the imminent invasion in North Africa denied Kesselring assets that he urgently requested.²⁴ Anxious as AFHQ leaders were, therefore, about the threats to the extensive TORCH flotillas, the realities of an enemy both materially preoccupied with a fluid front line some 1,500 miles away and focused locally on the struggle in Egypt reassured them.

Once the Allies reached the major strategy decisions and AFHQ staff solidified under Eisenhower, the Americans began to come more fully into the fold of British special intelligence, thoroughly appreciating as they did its depth and its significance to TORCH. Indeed, it was the imminence of the invasion that brought the introduction of American officers to Britain's most highly guarded secret.²⁵ By

September American analysts served at GCCS, participating fully in cryptanalysis, signal watches, and research functions in a cooperative Allied effort.²⁶

By August, a TORCH intelligence picture had been produced that was truly a combined Anglo-American effort. The first study, dated 7 August, dealt with three primary issues: the likely reaction of Vichy French forces, the threat of Spanish hostility and a possible German thrust through Spain, and the forms and extents of other potential Axis responses.²⁷ The assessment, informed by special intelligence, predicted the following: Vichy forces would resist only until a resolute attack demonstrated Allied supremacy; Spain would resist German pressure to move against Gibraltar unless that pressure were backed by force; Italy would not send forces to Tunisia to reinforce Rommel or, probably, risk its navy beyond the air cover of home waters; German U-boats could not be rapidly reinforced; and the speed of the Allied advance to Tunisia would dictate the magnitude of Axis response.

By early August, realizing the need to filter the deluge of intercepted signals down to a usable core of data, AFHQ G-2 (intelligence) staff had focused on Axis presence in the Mediterranean. While the Allied picture of enemy intentions was good, order-of-battle information was in short supply. Over time, Luftwaffe ENIGMA, Italian C38M, and Italian air force high-grade cipher decrypts provided a coherent picture of Axis forces. The fact that the draft TORCH naval operational plan, dated 3 October, indicated specific locations, numbers, and types of Axis and Vichy aircraft and naval units demonstrates that intelligence efforts had achieved a high degree of success. These forces amounted to the following: the small but capable Vichy fleet in Toulon and the meager naval forces in French North Africa; several hundred aged French fighters and bombers at North African airfields; the reticent Italian fleet, spread among Taranto, Messina, and Naples; roughly sixteen German U-boats operating out of Greece and Italy and a few E-boats in the same areas; 170 Luftwaffe fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Sicily and Sardinia; three hundred less capable Italian air force bombers and fighters located in Sicily, Sardinia, and Tripolitania; and Rommel's Afrika Korps.

The October study concluded that the only serious opposition to the landings themselves would be offered by Vichy forces, as the distant German forces in the central Mediterranean could do little without reinforcements. TORCH planners gauged the Axis aircraft in Sicilian and Sardinian bases to be the greatest air threat to the operation and shaped the operation around this factor, but they estimated that Berlin would send no reinforcements to the Luftwaffe until "D minus 4" (that is, four days before the planned invasion date) and that seaborne reinforcements to Rommel could not arrive until two weeks after the invasion commenced.²⁸ The reinforcement estimates, however, proved illusory, as Armed

Forces Headquarters based them not on quantifiable data but on conservative estimates of German responsiveness—not considering the possibility that Hitler would be unwilling to accept the loss of North Africa. In any case, Luftwaffe flexibility and resilience ultimately proved the planners wrong on this point. On balance, though, Eisenhower's draft plan for the operation assessed enemy capabilities fairly accurately on the basis of early October special intelligence.

CONCEALMENT AND ASSESSMENT

Focused Allied deception efforts concealed force movements, and intelligence gauged the stratagem's efficacy. After the October assessment, GCCS and Armed Forces Headquarters scrutinized special intelligence for movements or buildups of Axis Mediterranean forces. Especially important was any transfer of aircraft to Luftwaffe Mediterranean airfields from other theaters or between the fields themselves. AFHQ was also seriously concerned about Luftwaffe and U-boat buildups in the Mediterranean as TORCH preparations moved forward; ULTRA, however, indicated no significant reinforcement of the former, and Admiralty U-boat tracking rooms reported no sign of the latter. In fact, a transfer of Luftwaffe assets from Sicily to the Aegean on 29 October strengthened Allied confidence in the lack of Axis foreknowledge of the invasion and, in fact, supported deception plans.²⁹ A previous transfer of Luftwaffe aircraft to Norway in the spring of 1942 had also fit Allied interpretations of German invasion fears for northwest Europe—these aircraft did not return to Kesselring's command until early November. Such knowledge was invaluable.³⁰

When in late October Allied forces prepared for sailing, U-boats became a paramount concern. Armed Forces Headquarters ordered Anglo-American manpower and materiel assembled only just in time for October sailings; the final TORCH plan established 7 November as D-day. Just before the huge fleet began to move, AFHQ focused on timing the convoys to avoid the U-boat threat. Unfortunately, this was the one area of German military operations in which GCCS could provide little signals intelligence to assist the invasion planners.

Two significant cryptologic successes on the German side allowed the U-boats to operate with such impunity in 1942 that by December they had sunk 1,160 ships, totaling over six million tons. First, for operational security, the German navy in February 1942 switched to a four-wheel ENIGMA machine for U-boat signals. This new key, known to GCCS as SHARK, impeded greatly the ability of the current code-breaking machinery to decrypt signals.³¹ German U-boat ciphers were unbroken until December 1942; in the meantime other, less exact means had to be used to locate the many U-boats and evaluate their threat to Allied shipping. This absence of U-boat special intelligence created a major risk for TORCH commanders, in that the sinking of even a few critical vessels could jeopardize the entire operation.

Second, the German naval intelligence branch, the Beobachtungsdienst, broke British Naval Cipher Number 3 consistently from February 1942 until June 1943.³² This was the primary cipher used for communication with, and the routing of, Anglo-U.S.-Canadian merchant convoys across the Atlantic. Admiral Karl Doenitz's wolf packs exploited this precious intelligence on the locations and timing of Allied convoys, as well as on Allied estimates of German U-boat dispositions. The commander of the first TORCH convoy to leave the United Kingdom commented that he "would consider his task successful if he got half of his convoy to Algiers and Oran through the expected gauntlet of Luftwaffe dive-bombers and U-boat wolf packs in the Mediterranean."³³ The collaborative means by which the Allies evaded the wolf packs on this occasion are notable. First, DOLPHIN ciphers were still being consistently broken and provided at least some intelligence on U-boat activity in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.³⁴ Second, combined Admiralty and U.S. Navy submarine tracking rooms used these decrypts in conjunction with sighting reports, direction finding, traffic analysis, and any other available information to establish a picture for both the Atlantic and Mediterranean. These organizations were amazingly successful in routing and rerouting convoys, directing convoy escorts and air support to engage U-boats, and managing photoreconnaissance assets. Complex traffic-analysis techniques took advantage of frequent reports required from U-boats to Doenitz's command center, and of its replies, to follow individual submarines. Furthermore, special intelligence disclosed to TORCH planners that in response to Kesselring's insistent requests for reinforcements, long-range reconnaissance aircraft in Norway and Bordeaux were shifted to the Mediterranean theater just before the invasion force sailed; consequently British TORCH convoys were not observed while in the Atlantic en route to Africa.³⁵ The Allies avoided coordinated U-boat attacks partly because of resulting Axis intelligence gaps. Last, the highly secure cryptographic and wireless-traffic arrangements made long beforehand, along with stringent radio silence observed by all ships, provided little signals traffic for the enemy to intercept, much less analyze. The propitious environment for TORCH sailings was the result of the strategic denial of intelligence to the enemy thanks to the Allied tracking rooms' efficacy—all the more impressive in light of estimates that ninety-four U-boats were operating in or en route to the Atlantic at the time.³⁶

Moreover, beyond the invaluable tracking room assistance, a U-boat confrontation with a non-TORCH British merchant convoy off West Africa proved highly fortuitous for the Allied fleets nearing the Azores. Instead of keeping the ten U-boats of Group Streitaxt on station outside the Strait of Gibraltar, Doenitz ordered them south to Madeira to attack northbound British convoy SL-125, sighted on 27 October.³⁷ The U-boats pursued and fired torpedoes at this empty

convoy returning from Sierra Leone for seven days, sinking thirteen ships. To this day it is unknown as to whether this was a strategic sacrifice on the part of Allied commanders or simply fortuitous; regardless, it was fortunate for TORCH, in that the diversion pulled the U-boats well south at a critical time, allowing invasion convoys safe passage.

Finally, events in the Mediterranean, partly because of deception operations, drew U-boats to the east away from invasion shipping arriving in the theater. On 5 November, the bulk of initial British TORCH convoys passed Gibraltar into the Mediterranean, where the seventeen U-boats alerted to their presence were preparing for coordinated attacks. Special intelligence revealed that Axis photoreconnaissance aircraft had sighted the convoys and that Berlin expected them to proceed to Malta.³⁸ Seeing the need to reinforce the Mediterranean but not divining the purpose of these unexpected convoys, Doenitz ordered seven U-boats from Biscay ports to sail for the Mediterranean on 4 November—too late to oppose the successful landings on the 8th. Doenitz then positioned nine Mediterranean U-boats in a line from Cartagena to Oran in anticipation of the passing convoys. These U-boats, however, did not intercept the TORCH convoys, as British naval activity near Cyprus and Port Said caused Doenitz to shift them eastward to intercept traffic to Malta from either east or west. Finally, a heavy concentration of antisubmarine ships and aircraft supporting invasion shipping prevented the few U-boats that actually sighted the convoys from attacking effectively. Only one, in fact, was able to loose any torpedoes at all, managing only to disable a U.S. transport.

Strict operational security was a key factor in the flow of this intelligence from Bletchley Park to TORCH operational commanders. While some Americans considered the stringent British security measures an obstacle to operational use, the strict accountability procedures and destruction by burning immediately after briefings to cleared parties protected sources and deception schemes and so contributed materially to operational success.

Thus, the passage of the invasion flotilla without the loss of a single ship before the landings was due to a combination of special intelligence, skillful convoy routing, energetic operational security and deception measures, relentless Allied anti-submarine warfare, and plain good luck—what Eisenhower called an “effective scheme for helping get our convoys through the submarine-infested zone.”³⁹

AXIS RESPONSES

Insights into the Axis response to TORCH landings informed Allied operational decisions. Signals intelligence was of prime importance in gauging the Axis response after the discovery of the invasion convoys. For instance, although special intelligence revealed Axis intelligence had noted the gradual buildup of air

and naval forces at Gibraltar, Berlin took little action beyond the aforementioned minor Luftwaffe reinforcements. A reason might have been a German assessment that the arrivals and departures were connected with routine exercises, as suggested in several decrypted German situation reports of 30 and 31 October.⁴⁰ As TORCH shipping began passing the strait en masse, however, AFHQ became acutely concerned that early detection would bring an air onslaught that could endanger the entire operation. After 5 November, repeated German decrypts announced convoy sightings by agents in Spain and Spanish Morocco as well as by Italian and German air patrols, all reporting an easterly or northeasterly course toward the Mediterranean. Kesselring began to realize that something larger than a Malta resupply effort could be under way. Invasion commanders must have been relieved, however, when his response—known via Luftwaffe ENIGMA—was to await the convoys west of the Sicilian channel and attack on the morning of the 8th with reinforced aircraft based nearby.⁴¹ The Eastern and Central task forces instead turned due south toward Algiers and Oran under cover of darkness on 7 November. The Axis inability to ascertain the objective of the convoys and Kesselring's limited response to sightings allowed them to pass unhindered to North Africa.

There were other reactions than Kesselring's reinforcements of fighter and long-range bomber aircraft to Sicily and Sardinia, and special intelligence revealed them. For example, knowledge of the specific areas in which Kesselring had concentrated air and surface reconnaissance warned the Allies what sectors to avoid. Additionally, special Italian naval wireless service orders in a 7 November decrypt placed aircraft in Sardinia and Sicily into a "state of readiness," disclosing preparations to meet the convoys near Sicily and suggesting the likelihood of imminent sailings from Italian ports.⁴² These decrypts all helped confirm that Axis attention was focused well away from actual objectives.

After TORCH convoys reached their destinations in Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers and began the landings, Armed Forces Headquarters was primarily concerned with how the Axis powers would react once they grasped the full scope of the invasion. The earliest decrypts mentioning the actual landing sites appeared in an 8 November situation report with incomplete information on "attempted landings" near Oran and Algiers.⁴³ Berlin quickly appreciated the immense scale of the landings, however, when follow-up reports gave the numbers of ships involved. In fact, when briefed on the armada's size by General Albert Jodl, chief of the armed forces operations staff, Hitler declared, "If these reports are true, this is the greatest fleet in the history of the world."⁴⁴ Signals after 8 November revealed the beginnings of a massive Tunisian reinforcement, with Luftwaffe decrypts ordering transfers of fighters and dive-bombers from all fronts, including Russia. Similarly, an 11 November PORPOISE decrypt specifically stated an intent

to form a bridgehead in Tunisia, with orders from Hitler to hold the North Africa position against Allied invasion.⁴⁵ Likewise, Luftwaffe ENIGMA disclosed seizure of airfields near Tunis and Bizerte for air resupply of the bridgehead and an order from Berlin for a panzer regiment to reinforce Rommel.⁴⁶ Thus, special intelligence provided early and unambiguous indication that Axis powers would fight for Tunisia. Unfortunately, Allied slowness in acting on that indication led to a winter stalemate in North Africa.

Armed Forces Headquarters also needed intelligence on the possible Vichy French reaction. A covert plan by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sought to foment an uprising in the objective area of pro-Allied groups to seize control of local authorities, media, and power stations in hopes of minimizing local opposition. Special intelligence from Vichy diplomatic ciphers gave mixed indications on the possible response, but a late-breaking OSS report that the deputy prime minister of Vichy France, Admiral François Darlan, was in Algiers gave AFHQ reason to hope for a quick capitulation. Additionally, Armed Forces Headquarters hoped that inflated figures being circulated on the British victory at El Alamein would demonstrate an Allied victory on that continent and lessen Vichy concern for German reaction to perceived collusion with the Allies.⁴⁷ Eisenhower's TORCH deputy, Major General Mark Clark, engineered some adventurous diplomacy in the French colonies that finally led to the surrender to Allied forces under Darlan's orders. Special intelligence, then, assisted AFHQ in a classic combined political and military effort, praised by William Casey in *The Secret War against Hitler* as a successful meshing of intelligence and diplomacy in supporting operational success.⁴⁸

Just after the landings, special intelligence quickly disclosed German orders to Vichy France and actions taken in French territory. Diplomatic decrypts revealed German pressure on the Vichy French to oppose the Allies at all costs and an offer of German assistance to expel them.⁴⁹ The Vichy response was largely as predicted in the initial TORCH study, except for the Casablanca landings, where General George Patton, Jr., encountered dogged if confused resistance by French naval units and shore batteries. Algiers fell on 8 November, Oran on the 10th, and Casablanca on the 11th. It is noteworthy that because during the initial landings in all three locations the reports of subordinate commanders were sketchy at best, the clearest picture of events available to Armed Forces Headquarters was provided by French naval and diplomatic decrypts.⁵⁰ Decrypts of reports to the Abwehr of a Vichy agent, as well as MAGIC reports from Oshima, confirmed that the French fleet in Toulon had not sailed in opposition to the landings. Moreover, the same sources later disclosed Vichy government vacillation after news of Darlan's armistice, and an additional PORPOISE decrypt spelled out specific German orders to occupy the whole of France in response.⁵¹

Finally, special intelligence gave Armed Forces Headquarters important information on German occupation of French Mediterranean air bases and Hitler's order to seize the Toulon fleet, which led to the immediate scuttling of the ships by the French navy.⁵²

Special intelligence also proved critical in judging the Spanish reaction to TORCH, about which Eisenhower had agonized up to the day of the landings. The Allies sought to avoid any action that might sway Madrid toward the Axis powers and invite aggression against the Allies, especially against Gibraltar. For instance, Armed Forces Headquarters directed the purposeful exaggeration of the Allied victory at El Alamein among the Spanish population to demonstrate Allied commitment to final victory and to guarantee freedom of operation from the Gibraltar outpost.⁵³ Abwehr decrypts had previously revealed that with Spanish assistance the Germans had by late 1941 established observation posts close to the strait, in Spanish territory, providing highly accurate shipping reports. Significantly, special intelligence disclosed a reliable and accurate Axis capability to gauge the nature of shipping movements even in low visibility or fog—the decrypts revealing the existence of new, highly sophisticated infrared and low-light systems that caused the Allies grave concern.⁵⁴ Moreover, London exploited this knowledge in a formal protest to Madrid regarding Spanish neutrality, a *démarche* that ultimately led to the disruption of the German posts' operations just before TORCH convoys slipped into the Mediterranean.⁵⁵ Last, after the landings, Axis diplomatic decrypts expressly stated that no cross-Spanish invasion or combined attacks on Gibraltar would occur, finally allaying American fears of a two-front North African operation.⁵⁶

ALL-SOURCE FUSION

All-source intelligence fusion integrated with operations shaped strategic deception. Special intelligence facilitated the application of a deception scheme that clouded for the enemy the nature and destination of the offensive, aiding in the venture's success. Although operational security was vital, TORCH's success was more than simply the "triumph of security" hailed by some World War II historians.⁵⁷ The steady flow of special intelligence to the London Controlling Station (LCS, the British strategic deception center) let that organization assess the efficacy of its measures to confuse the enemy. This first Allied marriage of special intelligence and strategic deception was vital to TORCH's success.

To begin with, detailed knowledge of Axis capabilities, intentions, and anxieties provided an excellent framework within which invasion planners could develop a viable deception plan. The deception stratagem involved multiple scenarios and substantial resources, with the prime objective of achieving surprise in the North Africa invasion. Though the value of deception has been

stressed since the age of Sun Tzu, stratagems on the scale of those managed by LCS were unprecedented. The task of hiding the buildup and movement of the vast TORCH forces from enemy eyes was daunting indeed. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was to describe in his memoirs his personal concern at the scope and complexity of the problem.⁵⁸ The fundamental precept of the preinvasion deception plan was to cause Germany to disperse forces to prevent concentration at the place and time of greatest Allied vulnerability—with surprise as a guarantee of safe maritime passage, not a force multiplier.⁵⁹

From this precept flowed other deception tasks. Playing on German apprehension about potential Allied offensives in Norway, the Aegean, or North Africa or across the English Channel, LCS established three supporting objectives: to tie down European Axis forces while TORCH convoys made the passage, to discourage Axis and Vichy defensive preparations in French North Africa, and most important, to conceal the destination of the expedition even past Gibraltar.⁶⁰ In the event, intimate knowledge of German perceptions allowed LCS to formulate a scheme that fed the expectations of the German intelligence services and General Staff.

The Allies exploited varied means to broadcast false information to Axis intelligence services. The British painstakingly established a network of “turned” foreign agents that not only provided intelligence but disseminated false intelligence amid carefully selected bits of truth. The highly secret “XX Committee,” charged with feeding Berlin misleading information on Allied order of battle, controlled these agents, unbeknownst to their Axis handlers. Berlin relied upon this spy network, which ringed the Mediterranean, as a prime source of military intelligence, particularly due to the dearth of German cryptanalytic breakthroughs. The closely managed double operatives selectively planted just enough bogus information to be believable, often disclosing noncritical or time-late information on classified Allied activity to maintain credibility. Physical evidence, other agents’ reports, or various other means usually were arranged for to corroborate Allied deception themes. The XX Committee also occasionally dabbled in cryptologic methods, such as the transmission on several occasions of fraudulent intelligence via ciphers known to be compromised, contributing to the authenticity in enemy eyes of TORCH deception schemes.⁶¹

The Americans were far less adept at the counterintelligence game, relying heavily on London, but they too took certain measures to contribute to the mystery surrounding the huge buildup across the Atlantic. The United States dispersed its forces along the East Coast so as not to arouse suspicion, even sending the air group to Bermuda to embark once the fleet was under way from Hampton Roads, and dispatching the covering group to the Caribbean to await the main sailings. Shipping also steered false courses when near land to simulate

convoys to the West Indies or on North Atlantic routes to England. The fleets maintained strict operational security in transit, to the extent of boarding and commandeering any vessels encountered and shooting down aircraft on sight.⁶²

LCS, however, controlled the brunt of the strategic deception effort particular to Europe. During mid-August, LCS put into effect Operation OVERTHROW, the first component of the three-tiered TORCH deception and cover plan, specifically designed to mislead the enemy on the reason behind the extensive buildup of Allied shipping in Britain. This was an attempt to convince Berlin that it was seeing a prelude to the long-awaited Allied thrust into the European continent to push the Axis out of France.⁶³ LCS used the extensive double-agent system to circulate false reports, and Britain staged large numbers of landing craft, barges, and any other shipping not dedicated to TORCH to suggest an imminent amphibious operation. Repeated mention in Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypts from ubiquitous Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance missions near the channel confirmed enemy awareness of this buildup; LCS measured success by the fact that German forces in northwest Europe remained on alert and that none moved to the western Mediterranean until early November.⁶⁴

LCS designed the next deception phase to deceive the Axis regarding the concentration and subsequent movement of the Allied shipping to the invasion zone from Britain. Operation SOLO I sought to give Germany the impression that a massive naval operation was under way to invade Norway to safeguard the northern flank of the convoy route to the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ The capture of the strategic port of Narvik was included in false reports generated by the many turned agents to suggest an Allied attempt to strangle the flow of Swedish iron ore into Germany. These reports, combined with the reality of a large Allied naval force embarking from Britain, clearly had the German high command concerned. The LCS plan also called for Canadian troops not earmarked for TORCH to conduct conspicuous amphibious exercises in the northern United Kingdom just before the sailings to suggest rehearsals for cold-weather operations. Moreover, fast invasion convoys were to remain in port until only eight days before the landings, and the follow-up convoys until four days prior, in hope of keeping Berlin in suspense over a possible Norway offensive even after the bulk of the TORCH fleet had turned south.⁶⁶ Last, spurious wireless transmissions reported the arrival of fighter-bombers and other aircraft in a Scottish assembly area.⁶⁷ The first two parts of the overall deception plan, then, complemented one another and used many of the same assets to obfuscate Berlin's assessment of Allied intentions. Once Germany discovered the convoys were en route to the Mediterranean, however, LCS had to implement the next phase of the deception scenario.

Events unfolding in northeast Africa—the British Eighth Army offensive near El Alamein—also contributed to Axis confusion before and after the British

sailings. British tactical teams were busy launching a related deception scheme, code name BERTRAM, from the Middle East headquarters in support of Montgomery.⁶⁸ The ubiquitous British agents disseminated an array of false information on troop movements, force dispositions, and concentrations in Syria and Cyprus, as well as counterfeit reports of poor readiness among British Middle East forces. Backed up with extensive visual evidence from Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance, these “plants” misled the Germans into a preoccupation with a possible Allied offensive against Crete, causing them to transfer an entire air-landing division there instead of to the Afrika Korps.⁶⁹ This shift of attention away from Malta allowed both renewed resupply via submarines and fast convoys and continued air assaults on the Italian supply lines to Rommel. Last, offshore barges loaded with flares, smoke pots, burning drums of diesel fuel, and amplified recordings of gunfire and explosions were employed as a tactical ruse suggesting an impending amphibious assault near Marsa Matruh; supported by planted British media stories, this evidence of a nonexistent assault temporarily distracted Kesselring’s staff, as illustrated in a 25 October decrypt.⁷⁰ Thus, a collective of exaggerated and false activity reports in the eastern Mediterranean contributed to the Axis intelligence quandary surrounding TORCH.

The final phase of the LCS deception plan, called SOLO II, reinforced German misperceptions on the purpose of the massed Allied forces. First, it called for the misinformation of British personnel that their ultimate destination was Malta, by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Second, agents disseminated false reports that the Gibraltar fleet buildup was associated with a massive Malta resupply effort from the east, to be made after the Cape expedition made its way northward through the Suez Canal.⁷¹ This attempted to capitalize on German impressions that Malta was in a desperate plight about food, fuel, and ammunition—a situation that had in fact existed but was reversed just before the invasion by tactical deception operations and dogged Royal Navy resupply from Egypt. SOLO II appears, based on German high command presuppositions revealed by consistent signals intelligence, to have enjoyed the success of other such deception efforts. Decrypts as late as 6 November revealed German ignorance as to the objective of the convoys entering the Mediterranean, relating that the “strength and composition of British forces were such that, apart from supplying Malta, [the] possibility of landing in Tripoli–Benghazi area or in Sardinia or Sicily had to be taken into account.”⁷² Last, Mediterranean TORCH shipping strictly adhered to AFHQ-ordered measures such as deceptive courses meant to dupe Axis air reconnaissance and false wireless transmissions that Kesselring’s staff associated with Malta convoys.

As elements of the Allied armada slipped quietly into the Mediterranean, German reactions, revealed through signals intelligence, allowed for an

extension of the deception plans beyond those earlier planned. For instance, Dennis Wheatley, an LCS operative, later recalled,

When the expedition entered the Strait of Gibraltar we informed the enemy that its objective was the east of Sicily. Kesselring gave orders that no aircraft should go up on Saturday, 7 November, but every plane available should take to the air on Sunday to blow the convoys to hell as they passed through the Straits of Bon. At midnight our ships turned back and the following morning landed at Algiers without opposition.⁷³

In late October, Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypts also had revealed that Rome reported “very heavy W/T [wireless telegraphy] communication of an operational nature between Malta, Gibraltar, and the Admiralty,” which convinced Kesselring that a Gibraltar–Malta convoy was possible.⁷⁴ Further, LCS engineered a late development on 6 November, convincing Armed Forces Headquarters to send a bogus unencrypted SOS from the destroyer HMS *Janine* reporting that it was sinking after a bombing attack at coordinates far to the east of TORCH convoys—an attempt to corroborate the German estimate of an eastern Mediterranean destination.⁷⁵ Finally, November PORPOISE ciphers began to disclose Kesselring’s concern over British activity in the eastern Mediterranean and his personal conclusion that the convoys were linked with the British offensive under way against Rommel.⁷⁶ It is likely this change in focus toward the eastern Mediterranean alerted LCS to increase Allied deceptive activity there to support Kesselring’s conclusions and divert attention and forces from the western Mediterranean. Indeed, after the war Kesselring admitted that on the eve of the assault he had felt that the invasion convoys were “strategically coordinated with the movements of the British Eighth Army in North Africa [and that] therefore a landing on the African west coast was unlikely.”⁷⁷ In effect, the sum of intelligence the enemy received gave cause only to reinforce the aircraft in Sardinia and Sicily in preparation to assault the shipping when it passed through “Bomb Alley,” just east of the Sicilian straits.

Analysis of German decrypts during TORCH sailings and landings underscores the effectiveness of Allied deception. Oblique references to actual operations in the eastern Mediterranean designed to divert Axis attention and forces are on record. For example, the final deception and cover plan, dated 20 August, stated, “Further genuine or deception operations with the object of containing Axis Naval and Air Forces in the eastern Mediterranean are under consideration.”⁷⁸ Additionally, TORCH naval operational orders of 3 October stipulated that “Mediterranean Fleet (Eastern Mediterranean) will operate as requisite to cause diversion in the Eastern Mediterranean, possibly based on Malta.”⁷⁹ Whether or not all this was part of a coordinated Allied deception program remains to be seen, but collectively it drew Axis attention to the eastern

Mediterranean, diverting precious resources (e.g., the U-boats previously stationed in the western Mediterranean) and contributing to the TORCH armada's safe passage. It is intriguing that aside from the British land advance in Egypt, this eastern Mediterranean activity is mentioned only briefly in one secondary historical source.⁸⁰ None of the many works on TORCH and deception in World War II mention it.

The evidence, therefore, that Allied forces operated purposefully to draw German attention eastward and away from the invasion lies largely in an amalgam of ENIGMA decrypts viewed collectively. Certain other instances of special intelligence also lend credence to this idea. For example, an Italian admiralty appreciation in a 5 November Luftwaffe report that, along with the flow of Allied shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar, "numerous [Allied] submarines" were on patrol in the central Mediterranean, and that "cruisers and destroyers had been active in eastern Mediterranean during [the] previous night" demonstrates a degree of concern for events there.⁸¹ Hinsley's reference to events in the eastern Mediterranean cites a 6 November PORPOISE decrypt implying that Allied forces in Palestine, Syria, and Cyprus supported operations associated with the Egypt offensive.⁸² In another decrypt Rome warned all eastern Mediterranean Italian commands to expect "acts of sabotage, air attacks, and parachutist-landings against naval bases" in view of "present enemy operations."⁸³ Moreover, a 7 November Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypt has Kesselring ordering the same day his air force "to give photo recce of Cyprus and Suez precedence over other recce tasks in the eastern Mediterranean," implying Allied activity in the region.⁸⁴ An undated decrypt (with a sequence number placing it in the first few days of November) details the refusal of a request to move the Italian destroyer *Hermes* from the Aegean because of "the enemy situation in the eastern Mediterranean."⁸⁵ Last, by October, SIGINT revealed that the Afrika Korps faced an extreme predicament regarding fuel and ammunition, largely due to Allied air attacks from Malta, forcing Kesselring to dedicate assets to the protection of Italian resupply shipping.

The most valuable aspect of special intelligence to LCS deception managers, however, was the ability it gave them to measure success by the absence of references to certain TORCH features. It helped confirm that their goals and plans were secure—the lack of references to friendly objectives was useful "negative intelligence." The goal of deception is to divert attention away from friendly objectives, and signals intelligence allowed the Allies to "check and recheck the degree of success of their deception plans and then to modify them accordingly in order to render them even more effective."⁸⁶ Abwehr ciphers demonstrated both the progressive dislocation of German intelligence from TORCH's true objective and the failure of cryptanalysis in Berlin to discern the operation's secrets.⁸⁷ One

Abwehr decrypt provided compelling assurance of operational security when it reported a failed German attempt to exploit documents retrieved from a crashed Allied aircraft.⁸⁸ Special intelligence from ULTRA produced such negative intelligence of the highest value.⁸⁹ Doenitz pointed to the deception's effectiveness in his memoirs, where he admitted that German high command knew nothing of TORCH objectives, and "thanks to the conflicting reports deliberately put out by the enemy," precautionary concentration of U-boats had been made effectively impossible.⁹⁰

SUN TZU WOULD BE PROUD

TORCH planners' and operational commanders' use of signals intelligence served as a model for future Allied operations. Signals intelligence provided insight into the highest levels of Axis leadership decision making and guided Anglo-American military operational decisions in the first successful marriage of combined operations with theater operational deception. The TORCH example shows that an intimate intelligence/operations relationship can be a key to operational success. The Allies repeated this success in later operations, reducing loss of life and shortening the war. The eventual Allied thrust into Sicily during Operation HUSKY proved again that special intelligence could be successfully wedded to operational planning and execution, and in it deception measures again achieved surprise. Indeed, as one historian asserted, Allied employment of signals intelligence in World War II "rendered invalid the theory that intelligence is less necessary to the offence than to the defense."⁹¹

In the final assessment, a combination of detailed planning, aggressive signals intelligence efforts, a viable deception scheme, a high degree of operational security, and fortuitous events produced operational surprise that in turn facilitated an Allied bridgehead into northwest Africa. This combination not only demonstrated the resolve of the Allies to fight to the finish but hoodwinked the previously undefeated military machine of Hitler's Third Reich. After the landings, intelligence and operational failures reminded the Allies that it was an error to become too comfortable, that Hitler's war machine remained potent and resolute, and that the road to Berlin would be long and tortuous.

Operation TORCH provides relevant contemporary lessons in how effective "intelligence preparation of the environment" provides specific insights into not just enemy order of battle but exploitable adversary perceptions. These are worth briefly listing:

- The art and science of traffic and nodal analysis of adversary information/intelligence networks is as critical as the decrypts themselves.

- Understanding adversary civil-maritime and merchant marine shipping is sometimes as critical as warship order of battle.
- Collaborative allied intelligence is a force multiplier; Washington would never have penetrated the adversary so thoroughly without the masterful intelligence tradecraft and deep European cultural insights of the British.
- Leaders must strategically manage and deeply integrate deception operations with intelligence efforts.
- Grooming the deception stratagem over time requires expert all-source intelligence fusion.
- Operations and deception driven by credible intelligence will fail absent strict operational security.
- Solid intelligence preparation of the environment yields well-sourced local intelligence, providing rapid feedback during tactical operations that support strategic decision making.
- To be effective, deception efforts must target both adversary and friendly forces.
- The value of continuity and consistency that can be expected from a long-service cadre of intelligence, planning, and operations staff cannot be overstated.

Indeed, the TORCH experience reflects most of the tenets of operational deception found in current joint doctrine. The six principles of military deception outlined in U.S. doctrinal publication *Military Deception* are focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration.⁹² All of these fundamentals can be found in TORCH planning and execution.

On balance, Sun Tzu would be proud. The invasion's accomplishment of initial objectives without significant loss was an achievement not often repeated. Sadly, there seem to be few post-World War II instances of similar success, based on smoothly integrated intelligence, operations, and deception. Milan Vego, historian and scholar of operational art, argues that deception as an element of the art of war has gone out of fashion in recent decades, that despite its proven historical value, it generates little enthusiasm in the U.S. military today.⁹³ One must hope that Sun Tzu's countrymen and successors are not the only generals and admirals studying the historical efficacy of artful deception stratagems.

NOTES

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
4. George F. Howe, “American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe,” SRH-391, in *Top Secret Studies of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II*, part 2, *The European Theater* (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America for the Old Dominion University Library, 1989), declassified microfilm, p. 17, reel 5, frame 0839 [hereafter SRH-391, with filing designations in this three-part microfilm series].
5. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 665.
6. J. P. Hobbs, *Dear General: Eisenhower’s War-time Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1971), p. 55.
7. SRH-391, p. 17, reel 5, frame 0839.
8. John Winton, *Ultra at Sea: How Breaking the Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval Strategy during World War II* (New York: William Morrow, 1988), p. 166.
9. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 490. In a book cipher, messages are transmitted as row-and-column references to letter or word tables in identical books held by the sender and addressee.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 668.
11. Peter Calvocoressi, *Top Secret Ultra* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 45.
12. “Reports Received by U.S. War Department on Use of Ultra in the European Theater, World War II,” SRH-037, p. 16, reel 2, frame 0897.
13. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 423.
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15. *Ibid.*, p. 663.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 661.
17. R. H. Humphreys, “The Use of ‘U’ in the Mediterranean and Northwest African Theaters of War,” SRH-037, p. 16, reel 2, frame 0897.
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20. See Carl Boyd, *Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945* (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993).
21. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 479.
22. Denis Smyth, “Screening ‘Torch’: Allied Counter-intelligence and the Spanish Threat to the Secrecy of the Allied Invasion of French North Africa in November, 1942,” *Intelligence and National Security* 4, no. 2 (April 1989), p. 352.
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24. Norman Gelb, *Desperate Venture: The Story of Operation Torch, the Allied Invasion of North Africa* (New York: William Morrow, 1992), p. 170.
25. Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 238.
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27. *Ibid.*, p. 464.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
29. Ralph Bennett, *Ultra and the Mediterranean Strategy* (New York: William Morrow, 1989), p. 185.
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32. *Ibid.*, p. 636.
33. William B. Breuer, *Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985), p. 82.

34. Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War*, p. 210.
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38. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 481.
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40. ZTPGM/2863, 2864, in *ULTRA: Secret German Messages from World War II—Military and Naval Signals* (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America for the Old Dominion University Library, 1989), declassified microfilm, pp. 1025–26, reel 156 [hereafter ZTPGM, with filing designations in this one-part microfilm series].
41. CX/MSS/1635/T18, in *ULTRA*, reel 99 [hereafter CX/MSS, with filing designations in this one-part microfilm series; no page numbers on reel 99].
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43. ZTPGM/3396, p. 449, reel 156.
44. Breuer, *Operation Torch*, p. 106.
45. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 486.
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48. William Casey, *The Secret War against Hitler* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988), p. 17.
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“CATCHING THE FOX UNAWARE”

Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Robert J. Hanyok

The attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet by the aircraft of the Japanese Striking Force (Kido Butai) at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a total surprise to the American commands in Hawaii and Washington. The completeness of the operational surprise—the Imperial Japanese Navy had gathered the force, trained it, concentrated it, and sent it to the launch point without discovery by American intelligence, especially its radio component—was due largely to the success of the Japanese cover plan of radio denial and deception in hiding the existence, makeup, purpose, and timing of the attack. The Japanese navy’s denial and deception plan left American radio intelligence, known also as “communications intelligence,” with only scraps of information about the Japanese fleet’s movements during the weeks prior to the attack.

Even these wisps were intentionally misleading. Planners from Tokyo’s Naval General Staff and on the Combined Fleet (Kaigun) staff had developed a syn-

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chronized plan for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force that combined the three elements of radio silence, active radio deception, and radio intelligence in a way that assured Tokyo that the U.S. Pacific Fleet was unaware of the approaching Kido Butai. Furthermore (and this is the subtle part of the Japanese planning) that the attack remained a complete surprise owed much to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s scheme of supplanting the traditional strategic “decisive engagement”—a mid-ocean surface battle with the Pacific

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Fleet—with a preemptive strike. The measure of the plan's success was simply that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and his command and intelligence staffs expected no attack, despite projections of air assaults on Hawaii as well as suspicious activity that morning.¹

Technical parts of the radio deception and silence plan (the latter known as “denial” in modern military parlance) were executed in such a manner as to leave the American naval radio and fleet intelligence officers swaying between uncertainty as to the location of the Imperial Japanese Navy's carriers and conviction that these ships had remained in home waters in accordance with traditional Japanese doctrine and decades of exercises. The possibility that the Americans might have been victims of “self-deception,” the tendency of intelligence analysts to rely on assumptions in accommodating new data, as later claimed, does not mitigate the fact that the Japanese fed the Americans false data that the latter accepted as valid intelligence.

Some claim that the Striking Force did not maintain complete radio silence or that Tokyo's radio deception failed to fool the Americans. This dissent comes from two quarters: recent writings on the subject of Pearl Harbor intelligence and the statements of certain intelligence officers assigned to Hawaii at the time. The first group's claim can be dismissed easily. Its thesis is that the Kido Butai transmitted radio messages as it crossed the Pacific and was tracked by the U.S. Navy.² Its evidence has been expertly dismantled in books and articles.³

The second dissenting group consists of Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, the chief of Station H (or “Hypo”), the U.S. 14th Naval District's radio intelligence center, and Commander Edwin Layton, the fleet intelligence officer to Admiral Kimmel at the time. In statements and writings after Pearl Harbor, both officers insisted that the Japanese, though sailing in complete radio silence, could not have pulled off a successful radio deception against the U.S. Navy's Pacific area radio intelligence centers at Pearl Harbor and at Cavite (Station C, or “Cast”), in the Philippines.⁴ Because of the prominent roles of both men in the events leading up to the Japanese attack, their claims will be considered against the evidence presented later in this article.

This article is based largely on extant Japanese and American records. While the Japanese destroyed the majority of their wartime records, some material relevant to Pearl Harbor was captured during the conflict. Another source comprises debriefs gathered during and after the war of knowledgeable Japanese prisoners of war and other personnel. More information emerged from the postwar decryption and translation of Japanese naval messages intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor. These translations, completed between late 1945 and early 1946, provide substantial insight and detail into the planning

for the Pearl Harbor strike, including aspects of the denial and deception plan.

This article will first briefly consider major changes the Japanese navy made to its strategy and to the operational organization of its carrier forces and how these changes facilitated the denial and deception plan. Second, it will examine the technical and operational details of the Japanese plans for radio silence, deception, and monitoring. Finally, the article steps through the chronology of the Japanese denial and deception, beginning with the Kido Butai rendezvous at Saeki Bay in the second week of November 1941 and following it to the attack. As we recount the Japanese actions, we also will consider the American intelligence estimates of those actions produced in the Pacific and Asiatic Fleet commands, as well as in Washington, D.C. This parallel examination should illustrate how the Japanese convinced American intelligence that their carriers, the spear point of the Imperial Japanese Navy, were still in the home islands on 7 December 1941.

THE IMPERIAL NAVY CHANGES ITS STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION, 1941

The success of the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor began with strategic and organizational innovations mandated for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by Admiral Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, during the first four months of 1941. American naval intelligence did not detect these changes, much less recognize their implications. These shifts, especially in strategy, were to leave American intelligence critically susceptible to the radio denial and deception tactics used by the Japanese to protect the Striking Force.

For decades, the Japanese had planned for an encounter with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Under the standard plan, while elements of the IJN would attack targets elsewhere, mostly to the south, the major part of the battle fleet, encompassing most of its carriers and battleships, would remain in home waters awaiting the expected riposte by the Pacific Fleet. (In fact, the American plan for a naval war with Japan, Plan ORANGE, envisioned in its most common form a phased movement westward, seizing Japanese-held islands along the way.)⁵ The IJN would engage the Americans, when they arrived, in “decisive battle”—a concept that envisioned the attrition and eventual destruction in detail of an enemy fleet—somewhere in the Pacific Ocean east of the home islands. During the 1930s, as its carrier arm was expanded and modernized, the IJN’s exercises visualized the decisive battle taking place farther to the east than originally; by 1938, it was expected to happen near the Mariana Islands. But, no matter where the decisive battle was to be fought under successive versions of the Japanese war plan, the fleet always initially awaited in home waters for the approaching Americans.⁶

In January 1941, Yamamoto reversed this traditional “defensive-reactive” strategy: his carriers would strike first across the Pacific at the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Naval General Staff opposed Yamamoto’s plan, but by September 1941 it had agreed to his operation against Hawaii, war games having indicated a good chance for success with two new fleet carriers, *Zuikaku* and *Shokaku*.⁷

American naval intelligence missed this polar change and it continued to attribute a defensive character to Japanese planning. This view was based on long experience in analyzing Japanese fleet exercises. Since 1927, U.S. radio intelligence had eavesdropped and reported on the Japanese navy’s grand maneuvers in which the latter exercised its defensive strategy.⁸ Even the most recent fleet maneuvers had run this same scenario. In early 1941, American naval radio intelligence still analyzed Japanese actions within the context of the old defensive strategy, wherein the main striking force of the Combined Fleet, which included the carrier divisions, would remain in home waters, refusing to gamble away the defense of the home islands.⁹

Yamamoto made a second significant change as well: reorganization of the Japanese carrier force. For more than a decade, the carriers had been operated in divisions of two flattops with their escorts. In the fleet maneuvers the carrier divisions had been allocated to the various fleets, sometimes in the roles of escorts or scouts but largely staying with the main force near Japan. However, in April 1941 all eight Japanese carriers (including those fitting out), plus their escorts and plane-guard ships, were formed into a new command, the First Air Fleet (1st AF, or *Itikoukuu Kantai*). This organization gave the Combined Fleet a mobile air force of nearly four hundred strike aircraft, under one commander.

Such an operational structure was totally innovative; Britain’s Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy still kept their carriers in small detachments and relegated them to the roles of raiders or scouts. For instance, the November 1940 British attack on the Italian naval base at Taranto was a one-carrier raid.¹⁰ The 1st AF, in contrast, was a standing force and represented a concentration of naval air- and firepower that could sweep the seas—as it would, during the first four months of the war.¹¹ The six main carriers of the First Air Fleet, drawn from its 1st, 2nd, and 5th carrier divisions, constituted the heart of the *Kido Butai*. Other Striking Force ships were drawn from various surface combat units as escorts, along with a number of merchant vessels (*marus*) as the fleet train.

U.S. naval radio intelligence recovered a reference to the 1st AF on 3 November 1941 but, as reported in a Pacific Fleet Communications Intelligence Summary of that date, could not ascertain its significance other than that the formation “seemed to be in a high position” in the Japanese naval air hierarchy.¹² The U.S. failure to discover and understand the Imperial Japanese Navy’s radical

turns in strategy and organization left American naval radio intelligence vulnerable to the later Japanese radio silence and deception. The radio “picture” the Japanese were to present would seem to fit all too well with the decades-old, standard Japanese naval strategy.

THE JAPANESE PLANS FOR RADIO DENIAL AND DECEPTION

From the surviving Japanese records, it is difficult to pinpoint when the Japanese began planning radio denial and deception for the Pearl Harbor attack. It is likely that the plan incubated in the Combined Fleet during the late summer or early fall of 1941 and culminated in the October conference mentioned below. The plan, which incorporated a mix of techniques and procedures, grew from a tradition of communications security that had been a fundamental tenet of the IJN since the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and had been featured in naval maneuvers preceding World War II.¹³

Much of the impetus for communications security arose from the high Japanese regard for American and British radio intelligence in the Far East. This respect was based on the success that Tokyo’s own radio intelligence element—the Fourth Bureau of the Naval General Staff—had achieved against Western naval communications in the 1930s. Specifically, it was an incident in mid-1941, when deception planning for the Pearl Harbor attack probably had started, that convinced the Japanese of the necessity of an effective radio denial and deception plan.

In early July, Japan occupied French bases, airfields, and other military facilities near Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay, in southern Indochina. To support the operation, the 2nd Carrier Division (*Hiryu and Soryu*) sailed south toward Formosa under radio silence. The Japanese communications plan called for the 1st Carrier Division (centered on *Akagi* and *Kaga*) to receive traffic for the 2nd Carrier Division, but not for *Hiryu* and *Soryu* themselves. Somewhere near Formosa, one of the carriers of the 2nd Carrier Division transmitted urgent messages to Tokyo. The British radio-intercept site in Hong Kong, on Stonecutter’s Island, was listening; it located the Japanese carriers and sent the information to the British Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore. A Japanese radio intelligence team aboard *Soryu*, in turn, intercepted the British direction-finding message. According to a Japanese officer, this incident taught the IJN that although the British could not read its codes, “they could plot and follow ship movement.”¹⁴

This insight reinforced the Japanese naval leadership’s healthy regard for British, as well as American, radio intelligence, which posed the main threat to the secure movement of the Pearl Harbor Striking Force. As we shall see, they incorporated a number of denial and deception measures to beat it. But was this high regard warranted?

AMERICAN NAVAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE, 1941


In late 1941, the American naval radio intelligence against Japan was conducted by the U.S. Navy's cryptologic organization, OP-20-G. The effort was anchored at three major sites: Washington, D.C. (whose station was known as "N," or "Negat"), Hawaii, and the Philippines. These three stations were involved in the collection and analysis of Japanese communications. All shared intelligence on the Japanese navy. Some of the intelligence was exchanged over radio circuits, among all three stations and to their supported commands. However, the bulk of the collected intelligence—transcripts of Japanese encrypted messages—was sent by mail to Washington for analysis. Other intercept, notably call signs, direction-finding results, and "operator chatter," was radioed to other centers only. The stations in the Pacific—in Hawaii and the Philippines—directly attacked current Japanese naval communications and message traffic. In Hawaii, the radio intelligence was performed at "Hypo" (or Station "H"), under Lieutenant Commander Rochefort. Hypo, though actually subordinate to the commander of the 14th Naval District, shared its work with Admiral Husband Kimmel's Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas Hart's Asiatic Fleet, and the 16th Naval District. Station "Cast," at Cavite, near Manila, was charged with solving the newest version of the IJN's main fleet operational code, known at the time as "AN-1." Little progress was made on this code, even with help from the British Far East Combined Bureau.¹⁵

Three main methods were used to gather radio intelligence against the Japanese navy: radio direction finding, traffic analysis, and cryptanalysis. In late 1941, these techniques produced a mixed bag of results. Radio direction finding (RDF, or DF) is the attempt to locate a radio station by determining the direction, or bearing, of its emissions relative to the monitoring site. Joseph Rochefort would testify during one of the Pearl Harbor investigations that the mid-Pacific DF net (which consisted of DF listening posts in Hawaii, Samoa, and the Aleutians) was not "as efficient or productive of results as it might have been. It lacked equipment and trained operators and the long distances involved [over two thousand miles] which rendered an efficient RDF operation rather difficult."¹⁶ Ideally, all three DF posts would take bearings on a Japanese ship or station while it transmitted a message; the three bearings would intersect where the transmitter was. For a number of technical reasons, however, such as distance, propagation characteristics, and a lack of timely communications for coordination, this ability was available only occasionally.¹⁷ Station Cast had a DF capability and was part of a separate western Pacific DF net with posts in Guam and Shanghai. It typically was able to obtain at least usable single bearings on Japanese naval transmissions from the home islands. Rochefort relied heavily on its results to assess Japanese naval activities. But a

single bearing is limited, since it gives only the direction, not the distance or location, of a transmitter.

DF bearings from Cast consistently placed the Japanese carriers within an arc between 20 and 35 degrees wide, which covered the Japanese home islands.¹⁸ On the basis of these bearings and analysis of message traffic patterns, over the summer and fall of 1941 U.S. naval analysts at Hypo and Cast developed a composite profile of Japanese carriers. The ships, they found, routinely operated from various bases—such as Kure, Sasebo, and Yokosuka—in the Japanese home islands and near Formosa. In late November and early December 1941, the consistent plotting of the call signs of the Japanese carriers within this arc would be crucial in U.S. assessments of the ships' status.

**COMPOSITE DF BEARINGS
15 OCTOBER–6 DECEMBER 1941**



Traffic analysis—the exploitation of “external” aspects of encrypted messages, such as call signs, volume of traffic, addresses, and relationships between recipients (but not code breaking to read the messages themselves, which is the province of cryptanalysis)—is dependent on the amount of radio traffic sent. In October 1941, Rochefort later stated, analysis of IJN communications was good, but in the month prior to Pearl Harbor information grew scarce, as the amount of exploitable communications decreased.¹⁹ In addition, because intelligence derived from traffic analysis (or radio intelligence generally) is largely inferential, sometimes information was interpreted differently by Cast and Hypo.²⁰

The two Pacific sites reported their traffic-analysis intelligence to commanders through technical summaries: Cavite issued TESTMs (apparently for “Technical Estimate Messages”), while Hypo distributed a daily “H Chronology.” The Pacific Fleet intelligence officer, Commander Layton, passed along a daily “Communications Intelligence Summary” to Admiral Kimmel based on the two stations’ reports. The Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington used the TESTMs, chronologies, and COMINT summaries to issue every Monday an estimate of Japanese ship locations.

In the all-important area of cryptanalysis, the U.S. Navy was still trying to exploit the current version of AN-1 (in mid-1942 redesignated “JN-25B”), which

had been put into effect in December 1940. This system used some thirty-three thousand code groups, with several thousand additional groups for commonly used words, all of which were further encrypted with an additive key. The additive system had been solved, but this advance had revealed only the underlying code groups. Recovery of the plaintext values of the code groups, called “book breaking,” required officers who knew Japanese. Even with the cooperation of the Far East Combined Bureau, the far more difficult job of recovering the groups’ actual meanings had advanced only marginally after a year’s labor. Translators had made a partial recovery of about four thousand groups (about 10 percent of the total), but these consisted mostly of digits, phrases, and words from standardized, pro forma messages, such as ship movement reports.²¹ Even this, however, did not mean that 10 percent of the contents of the Japanese messages, or 10 percent of all messages, could be exploited. The problem was far more difficult: it was analogous to trying to read a foreign-language tract with a dictionary in which only a random 10 percent of the words are defined.

The bottom line was that the American naval radio intelligence was fairly good at deriving useful information from analysis of Japanese communications and direction finding of the transmitters, provided messages were available in sufficient quantity and identities could be recovered. When Japanese communications were curtailed, usable radio intelligence declined. American naval intelligence needed other sources to fill the gap—aerial reconnaissance, visual observation, espionage, or open sources, such as newspapers. Unfortunately, due to stringent Japanese security measures and a lack of U.S. aviation resources, none of these were available. Foreign observers, like naval attachés, diplomats, and journalists, were kept away from the navy yards and training areas near Kyushu and the Inland Sea.²² Japanese newspapers were censored. Foreign ships were screened from the sensitive zone. Those that got too close were held up in port, as happened in Naha, Okinawa, when, on 1 December, a Philippines-registered freighter was ordered held by the Sasebo Navy District headquarters and its radio sealed.²³ Attempts to elicit intelligence from Japanese sailors was pointless; most of the Pearl Harbor force’s personnel were not told of their target until the final assembly at Hitokappu Wan (Bay) on 22 November.²⁴

As a result, as one assessment of U.S. intelligence stated at the end of November 1941, Washington’s and Hawaii’s estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces were “almost totally dependent on R[adio] I[n]telligence.”²⁵ This reliance on a single source would be the decisive vulnerability of American intelligence in the Pacific during late 1941.

THE JAPANESE NAVY INSTITUTES NEW COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MEASURES, 1941

For Japanese planners, the perceived American exploitation of their general naval communications system remained a constant and paramount worry. In early November 1941, the IJN instituted new general security features in its communications structure. First, a new fleet call-sign system, HYOO9 (producing kana-kana-numeral combinations, such as “HA FU 6”), came into operation on 1 November. This new system hampered the efforts of OP-20-G’s analysts in Washington, Hawaii, and the Philippines to identify Japanese ships, command, and stations. Fortunately for the U.S. analysts, the Japanese navy continued to use the previous call signs (“drill” call signs, sometimes called “secret” calls—numeral-kana-kana combinations like “8 YU NE”) in exercises and training.²⁶

More important, though, was the 5 November change to Tokyo’s naval communications procedure. Prior to this date, Tokyo had transmitted messages specifically to recipients, using their individual call signs. Now it sent all messages to single general or collective call signs, such as for all ships or a shore-based radio station, listing actual, intended recipients only in the encrypted text. When Joseph Rochefort saw this new address system, he speculated that it signified the end of all message headings.²⁷ In postwar testimony, Edwin Layton characterized the traffic that resulted as “calls addressed to nobody from nobody; which everyone [Japanese] copied, and when they do that nobody is being talked to that you can identify and therefore the forces are pretty hard to identify in traffic.”²⁸

The Kido Butai also received supplementary and detailed communications changes intended for it alone. These specific elements were integrated into the denial and deception plan most likely developed at a conference on force communications in Tokyo on 27 October attended by representatives of the Naval General Staff, the First Air Force, the Combined Fleet, and the Eleventh Air Fleet, along with the chiefs of staff of the other major fleets.²⁹ This meeting may have made use of the results of two Combined Fleet communications tests held from 18 through 24 October, which focused in major part on transmissions of the Kido Butai.³⁰

ELEMENTS OF THE KIDO BUTAI’S DENIAL AND DECEPTION PLAN

Although no copy of the resulting denial and deception plan for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force exists—most Japanese records were destroyed at the end of the war—much of it can be reconstructed from interviews with IJN officers, captured documents, and intercepts by the U.S. Navy’s radio-intercept stations. What emerges is a plan, consisting of three complementary parts, designed not only to hide the Kido Butai from American naval radio intelligence but to

monitor the latter's communications from Pearl Harbor so as to track the scheme's effectiveness. These parts were radio silence, radio deception, and radio monitoring.

Radio Silence

Imperial Japanese Navy doctrine had long made provision for radio silence. The 1937 Standard Communications Procedures divided communications into two categories. In the first, known as "general," case, a communication between two navy ships or stations was complete when the receiving entity acknowledged receipt. However, a second method, "special communications," involved unilateral broadcasting; message acknowledgment was "not required from the radio receiving ship or station."³¹ This method ensured that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force remained silent.

General communications instructions were later amended to give commanders more leeway. In early 1940, the naval Wireless Procedure Rules allowed the chiefs of staff of independent forces to issue their own orders for communications, within IJN guidelines.³² By 1941, standard IJN-wide regulations mandated three degrees of radio silence, of which the two highest, "very strict" and "strict" radio silence, prohibited all communications from a unit or fleet except in emergency. In all three situations, local commanders controlled their own communications.³³

For the attack on Pearl Harbor, known as the "Hawaiian Operation" (Hawai Sakusen), that commander was Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. On 5 November, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet Secret Order 1, of which section 4 stipulated that the Striking Force, in accordance with instructions to be detailed by its commander, would maintain strict radio silence from the time of departure from the Inland Sea.³⁴ Admiral Nagumo reiterated these instructions, adding only the simple stricture "All transmissions of messages are strictly forbidden."³⁵ This radio silence was accomplished at two levels: by cessation of transmissions by individual ships and through the use of broadcast, or one-way, communications.

When the Striking Force deployed in mid-November to Hitokappu Wan, all shipboard radio transmitters were disabled or secured. All naval radio traffic was sent in manual Morse code; slips of paper were inserted between the contacts of transmitting keys to prevent emissions.³⁶ In other cases, fuses or portions of circuitry were removed from transmitters to make them unusable. The communications officer of the battleship *Hiei* put the transmitter key in a box, which he used as a pillow.³⁷ The day before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the transmitters having been shut down for almost twenty days, it was decided to test them on closed circuits ("dummy loads"). The radiomen found that many transmitters had been made inoperative by paper residue or rust buildup on the contacts of

hand keys. This testing perhaps saved the task force problems on the day of the attack, when it finally communicated with Tokyo and the tankers in its fuel train.³⁸

A new detail of the radio silence plan was added at Hitokappu Wan. Initially, plans called for reconnaissance aircraft from the carriers to search ahead for enemy or neutral ships that might discover the Striking Force. However, the force's air chief, Commander Minor Genda, considered this a security risk. Genda argued that pilots might get lost and ask for navigational beacons or radio directions; the Americans would hear these transmissions.³⁹ His argument won out; the carriers would instead keep six planes ready on their flight decks to respond to emergencies.⁴⁰ The only reconnaissance aircraft dispatched were the scout planes from the cruisers *Tone* and *Chikuma* on the morning of the attack. Their reports were sent to the Striking Force "in the blind"—that is, without expecting acknowledgment. (These transmissions were not heard by the Americans.)

The major problem remaining was how to update the Kido Butai with new intelligence, weather, and orders as it sailed east. The Naval General Staff solved it by resorting to the naval broadcast method—one-way transmission to a ship or fleet using multiple frequencies and transmitters and the repeat of messages. Shore stations transmit messages several times on different frequencies; the receiving audience does not acknowledge the messages, but reception of at least one repetition, on at least one frequency, is considered all but guaranteed. All navies at the time used this method. The main Tokyo naval communications station would send messages to the Striking Force several times a day, on as many as three separate frequencies in the high-frequency (HF) band, 3–30 MHz, and another in the very-low-frequency (VLF, 3–30 KHz) range. U.S. radio intelligence in Hawaii noticed the repeat traffic but concluded that the Japanese were disguising traffic levels for security reasons.

Ultimate responsibility for reception and distribution coverage of broadcast messages belonged to the refitted battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima*, of the 3rd Battleship Division, since they had the largest and most sensitive antennas and receivers. Once a message had been copied and decoded aboard one of these ships, its contents were disseminated throughout the Kido Butai, by semaphore flags during the day or narrow-beam signal lamps by night.⁴¹ The ships sailed close enough to one another, usually less than a kilometer, to relay messages by visual means through the formation. The same signaling methods were used to arrange refueling and repositioning of ships.

To ensure further that all traffic was received, however, every ship was required to listen to the broadcast. Many copied the same messages, if at different times. For example, Combined Fleet Order 11, the 3 December notification from Admiral Yamamoto to the Imperial Japanese Navy that all vessels

belonging to Panama, Norway, Denmark, and Greece were to be treated as enemy, was received by the 5th Carrier Division flagship on 4 December at 1130 (11:30 AM, Tokyo time) and by the 1st Destroyer Squadron flag at 1350 (1:50 PM) on 3 December.⁴²

Not all American intelligence officers were convinced the broadcast method was used to communicate to the Striking Force. Edwin Layton admitted after the war to a joint congressional committee that he had believed that the radio silence went “both ways”—that Tokyo had not transmitted anything, even the famous “Climb Mount Niitaka” (actually, Niitakayama) order. Or, he speculated, the Japanese might have used special antennas with narrow beams.⁴³ Neither was the case. In fact, the ships of the Kido Butai sailed silently eastward to Pearl Harbor, receiving current intelligence and orders as they went.

Radio Deception

Radio silence could shield the Striking Force from detection by the American listening posts spread around the Pacific. But Japanese naval officers feared that the abrupt and continued complete cessation of radio traffic by the ships, especially after a period of training that had featured extensive communications, would catch American attention and perhaps tip off the operation. It was not the silence itself that concerned the Japanese but what the Americans might deduce from it—that the carriers were on the move.⁴⁴ The only way to convince the Americans that the ships of most interest to the U.S. Navy, the carriers of the First Air Fleet, were still at their ports or active in the Inland Sea was through radio deception. A subtle and extensive radio deception plan was put into motion that allowed for a seamless shift to false radio traffic when the carriers went silent, followed by seemingly real transmissions until the Kido Butai reached Hawaii.⁴⁵

To set the stage for the deception, in early November 1941 the Naval General Staff ordered the First Air Fleet and other ships, under the direction of the DF Control Center of the 1st Combined Communications (that is, radio intelligence) Unit in Tokyo, to establish a regular schedule of drill communications. From 8 November through the 13th, *Akagi*, *Hiei* (the flagship of the 3rd Battleship Division), and the 24th Division of Ships (Destroyers) were to communicate with the Tokyo communications center three times a day—at 0600, 1200 (noon), and 2000 (8 PM), all Tokyo time. The participation of the DF Control Center was significant, suggesting that it was monitoring the radio traffic for purposes of evaluating the transmissions for later imitation, as well as for security.⁴⁶

On 15 November, the Combined Fleet discreetly substituted new drill call signs for the various task forces, including the Striking Force.⁴⁷ The stations involved in the radio deception were to use the old drill calls of the carriers, principally *Akagi*, and other ships of the Kido Butai for the next three weeks. These

false communications were to be sent by regular radio operators from the major ships of the Kido Butai who had been sent ashore to bases at Kure, Sasebo, and Yokosuka. A communicator's "fist," or the characteristic unique way a radioman taps out characters on Morse keys, was a method of identifying operators and, by extension, their ships. So, when American listening posts heard the familiar fist of an operator known to have sent messages from *Akagi*, using that ship's call sign, they construed the carrier to be on the bearing taken of his transmissions—in this case, in the direction of one of the home-island bases.

As the carriers departed the Inland Sea and their air squadrons flew out to join them, other aircraft, from the 12th Combined Air Group, arrived at the newly vacated air bases. Their role was to keep up flight activity levels and associated radio traffic with the carriers and bases, as if the previous several weeks of training were continuing. The false traffic included call signs, procedural chatter, and dummy messages between notional aircraft and carriers, along with communications with other vessels. This "useless" traffic was sent according to guidelines set out in the "Naval Dummy Messages and Jamming Rules" (Kaigun Giden Booghin Kitei) promulgated by the Navy Ministry on 4 November 1941. In order to avoid confusion or inadvertent compromise of actual information, all false traffic consisted of dummy groups or meaningless text.⁴⁸

The Japanese did not, however, reassign the carrier call signs to destroyers stationed in the Inland Sea. This claim was made after the war. Edwin Layton responded in an April 1942 memorandum that stated the Japanese shifted the Striking Force carrier radio calls to "fishing boats in the Mandated Islands."⁴⁹ Both assertions were wrong.

While the radio silence hid the Kido Butai's location, then, radio deception strove to convince American communications intelligence that the strike element of the Combined Fleet, its carriers, was still in home waters.

Radio Monitoring

With the radio-silence and deception parts of the plan in operation, the Japanese needed a way to verify that the plan was working and that the Americans at Pearl Harbor remained unaware of the approaching task force. The Naval General Staff in Tokyo accordingly tasked its own radio intelligence units to monitor American naval communications from Hawaii for any indication of an alert. The principal Japanese intercept station that covered Pearl Harbor communications, Detachment 1 of the 6th Communications Unit, was on Kwajalein Island with the IJN radio communications station. While the Japanese could not read encrypted U.S. naval messages, they could identify urgent messages and individual ships, units, and aircraft, as well as locate Pacific Fleet ships and planes via direction finding. American patrol aircraft were of special concern, since aerial

searches north of the Hawaiian Islands might detect the Kido Butai. The Japanese analyzed communications for any change in the Pacific Fleet's operational readiness; this information would be relayed to the Striking Force.⁵⁰

A small radio-intercept detachment aboard *Akagi* performed the same mission. When the Kido Butai approached Pearl Harbor, this unit also monitored Hawaiian commercial radio stations, KGU and KGMB, for any hint that the Americans were aware of the approaching task force.⁵¹

DENIAL, DECEPTION, AND AMERICAN REACTION, 8 NOVEMBER–7 DECEMBER 1941

After Admiral Yamamoto issued his secret order dictating radio silence once the task force departed for the Kurile Islands, the Kido Butai began a period of training, replenishment, and redeployment to the final assembly point at Saeki Wan, in the Oita Prefecture, in northeast Kyushu. First, from 6 to 9 November, most of the major units of the force headed for Kure or Sasebo to make ready for the operation. *Kaga* arrived at Sasebo on 7 November, *Akagi* on the 9th. The 5th Carrier Division's *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* made Kure on 9 November. *Hiryu*, under way for Kure, lost an anchor and had to return to Sasebo on 10 November. Escort cruisers and destroyers sailed to Kure on 9 November.

It was during this repositioning that the Tokyo DF Control Center–managed communications drill involving the Tokyo communications center, the carrier *Akagi*, *Hiei*, and the 24th Division began. From 8 through 13 November, as noted, these ships communicated three times a day with Tokyo. The Americans monitored these communications, and the 10 November Pacific Fleet Communications Intelligence Summary correctly reported *Akagi* at Sasebo and other carriers at Kure.⁵²

On 12 November, the 16th Naval District reported Admiral Yamamoto's flagship, the battleship *Nagato* (call sign 9 HE FU), near Kure. Actually, the ship, with Yamamoto embarked, was at the Iwakuni Naval Air Station, about thirty miles west of Kure; but this was close enough, based on the DF bearing of 30 degrees taken by Cavite.⁵³

The next day, Cavite reported *Akagi* near Sasebo. The carrier had left the base that day to pick up its aircraft complement near Kagoshima, about sixty miles to the south. Whether the DF bearing of 27 degrees was of *Akagi* or a station deceptively using its call sign depends upon when the transmission was heard. This information, though, is not in the report; it is possible that the bearing was taken on 14 November. If this interpretation is correct, the transmission should be considered deceptive, since at the time the ship actually was heading to the rendezvous at Saeki Wan to pick up the Striking Force

commander, Admiral Nagumo, and his staff.⁵⁴ The Pacific Fleet COMINT summary reported that the carriers were relatively “inactive” and had been in home waters from 13 to 15 November.⁵⁵

On 14 November, units of the Kido Butai assembled at Saeki Wan and the nearby port of Beppu, except for the battleship *Hiei*, which had sailed northeast to Yokosuka to pick up staff intelligence officers before continuing to Hitokappu Wan. For the next three days the ships stayed at Saeki, and the Pacific Fleet COMINT summaries reported that “the carriers are mostly in the Kure and Sasebo and with the exception of a few in the Kyushu area.”⁵⁶ While this statement could be interpreted as covering all the possibilities, the specific locations mentioned were centers for radio deception, and this suggests that false radio traffic may have supported Hawaii’s conclusion.

In the midafternoon of 17 November, Admiral Yamamoto, aboard *Nagato*, arrived at Saeki Wan for one last meeting with many of the staff and officers of the Kido Butai. He spoke to them of his confidence in the success of the mission. Around 1600 (4 PM), the first ships of the task force, the 2nd Carrier Division (*Soryu*, *Hiryu*) and their escorting destroyers, slipped out of Saeki Wan, headed southeast out the Bungo Strait past Okino Shima Island, and then turned northeast toward Hitokappu Wan in the Kuriles. The rest of the Striking Force followed in groups of two or four ships.

For the next few days, the Pacific Fleet intelligence barely mentioned the Japanese carriers. The COMINT summary of 16 November associated unspecified carrier divisions with the 1st Destroyer Squadron, in the Mandates. The destroyer unit was believed to have worked previously with the carriers and the 3rd Battleship Division.⁵⁷ The 18 November summary placed the carrier divisions—again, which ones were not specified—with the same battleship division but this time the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. This summary added that the commander of the Japanese Second Fleet may have been in command of a large task force with elements of the Third Fleet, combined air fleets, some carrier divisions, and the 3rd Battleship Division.⁵⁸ The same COMINT summary situated the 4th Carrier Division, specifically the carriers *Zuikaku* and *Shokaku* (the latter, call sign SI TI 4), near Jaluit Island in the Marshalls, two thousand miles southeast of Japan.⁵⁹ The summary assessed these latter identifications of the carriers as doubtful.⁶⁰

As the ships sailed north to the cold and foggy Kuriles, the Tokyo broadcast sent out a message from Commander, Carrier Divisions of the Combined Fleet to all carrier units, Commander, 1st Destroyer Squadron, and Commander, 3rd Battleship Division that beginning at midnight 19 November Tokyo time, fleet frequencies in the HF band would be on “Battle Control” status, while those in VLF would assume “Alert Control.” This order, Striking Force Operational Order 1, meant that the HF broadcast would carry operational traffic, while the

VLF broadcast would transmit if the traffic volume became excessive.⁶¹ It did not order radio silence—the ships already had been ordered into HF silence, and they could not transmit on VLF frequencies.

Japanese radio deception may have begun to bear fruit by this time. The 19 November Pacific Fleet COMINT summary observed that *Hiei* “appears today at Sasebo”—that is, on the southwest coast of Kyushu.⁶² In reality, as we have seen, *Hiei* was in Yokosuka, on the east coast of Honshu, several hundred miles northeast of Sasebo.⁶³

From 20 to 23 November, the ships of the Kido Butai slipped into Hitokappu Wan, an isolated bay at Etorofu Island, in the southern Kuriles. The last ships to arrive were the Striking Force’s three submarines, *I-19*, *I-20*, and *I-23*, and the carrier *Kaga*. The gunboat *Kumajiri*, entering the bay ahead of the force, had ordered the local post office to curtail post, telephone, and telegraph service. When the task force itself arrived, all shipping activity at the harbor was suspended. Back in the home islands, further communications drills for the Combined Fleet—except for the Striking Force—were ordered to begin on 22 November. One drill was set to run two days, while an air-defense communications exercise involving the naval district at Sasebo and the Eleventh Air Fleet was scheduled to last three weeks.⁶⁴

The clouds of secrecy created by the silence and deception now descended to shroud the Kido Butai from American naval intelligence. On 22 November, Cavite took a bearing of 28 degrees on *Akagi* (call sign 8 YU NA), which placed the carrier in Sasebo. On the same day, Cavite took a bearing of 40 degrees on SO SA 2, the fleet call sign of the commander of the First Air Fleet, and placed him in Yokosuka.⁶⁵ Of course, at the time Admiral Nagumo was at Hitokappu Wan, aboard *Akagi*, where he was conducting meetings to incorporate recent intelligence about Pearl Harbor into the attack plan.⁶⁶

On 23 November, Cavite reported that the drill call sign (1 KI RA) of the large carrier *Zuikaku* bore 30 degrees, which placed it at the naval base of Kure.⁶⁷ The COMINT summary for that day had little to say, except that the “carrier divisions were relatively quiet, but that Carrier Division Three was definitely associated with 2nd Fleet operations.” The summary added that the identifications remained valid, although there were indications of an imminent move to the south and of the massing of additional covering forces in the Mandates.⁶⁸

For the next two days, Nagumo and his staff aboard *Akagi* were briefed on the latest Pearl Harbor intelligence by an officer from Yokosuka brought by *Hiei*. The Striking Force’s air chief, Genda, put the naval pilots through classroom briefings and training in flight formations and tactics to be used in the attack. The necessity for radio silence during the voyage to Hawaii and the flight to Pearl Harbor was emphasized.⁶⁹

On 24 November, Cavite took another bearing of 28 degrees on *Akagi*, call sign 8 YU NA, locating it at Kure. Given the vagaries of direction finding, which had placed the ship in Sasebo two days earlier, Cast concluded that it was in the Inland Sea.⁷⁰ The Pacific Fleet COMINT summaries for 24 and 25 November carried minimal information on the all-important carriers. That of the 24th reported “no definite indications of locations [for the carriers].”⁷¹ The next day’s summary mentioned that the fleet radio traffic level was still high and that one or more carrier divisions were “present in the Mandates.”⁷² On 25 November, the Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence (OP-16-F2), headed by Commander Arthur McCollum, issued its weekly location of the Japanese fleet, placing all Japanese carriers in the ports of Sasebo or Kure.⁷³

On the same day, Tokyo broadcast Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet Operational Order 5 ordering the Striking Force to depart with the “utmost secrecy” the next day and advance to its standby point northwest of Hawaii, to arrive by the evening of 3 December.⁷⁴ At six o’clock on 26 November, the ships of the *Kido Butai* raised their anchors, slowly steamed into the northern Pacific, and settled into a cruising formation, within a box some thirty kilometers on a side. Initially, the three submarines scouted ahead on the surface. (The submarines were later pulled back, because high swells and mist slowed them and hindered their ability to sight ships.) The six carriers followed behind a screen of destroyers and cruisers in line abreast. The battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima* tailed the flattops by six kilometers. The seven tankers were spread among the formation. The Striking Force sailed in complete radio silence, its transmitters disabled or disconnected. The only connection to Tokyo was the broadcast, which continued to repeat vital traffic.

American intelligence reports for 26 and 27 November, each covering the previous twenty-four hours of intercept, reflected the continuing effectiveness of Japanese radio deception. The 16th Naval District transmitted an intelligence summary stating that “our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers are still in the Sasebo–Kure area.”⁷⁵ On 25 November, Hypo, Rochefort’s unit in Hawaii, noted that *Kirishima* was believed to be in Yokosuka. On 26 November, “H” reported that “several carriers were near Sasebo, including Car[rier] Div[ision] 4” (*Zuikaku* and *Shokaku*, which was call sign NE RU 8). Rochefort also reported that during the evening the carriers were heard using their “secret [drill] calls” on 4963 kilohertz, a tactical frequency, but that no bearings were available.⁷⁶ The Pacific Fleet COMINT summary for 26 November mentioned no carriers but commented that the Third Fleet, with which the carriers usually were associated, had not yet left the Sasebo area.⁷⁷

At about the 1000 (Tokyo) on 27 November, Cavite took bearings of 30 degrees on the drill call signs for *Akagi* and *Hiryu* (9 RU SI), which put them in the

Kure area. Cavite also heard on the same bearing the call sign 8 RO SA, which it identified as the “carrier” *Koryu*; an unidentified merchant ship (6 MI TA); and another, unidentified, call sign, 7 ME NE—placing them all in the Kure area.⁷⁸ Station H still plotted the carriers at Sasebo with the Third Fleet but noted that activity at the base was “light.”⁷⁹

The Pacific Fleet Communications Intelligence Summary of 27 November carried an entry that “an air unit in Takao [Taihoku, on Formosa] addressed a message to the *Koryu* and *Shokaku*. The carriers are still in the Home Waters.”⁸⁰ The Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington added in its report for that day that all carriers were in the “Sasebo–Kure area” (see the figure—the bases are nearly two hundred miles apart, on different islands, but are on nearly the same bearing as measured from Cavite) with the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet.⁸¹ In reality, by this date the Striking Force had been at sea a day and was some thousand miles to the northeast.

On 28 November, Hawaii repeated Cavite’s previous day’s bearing reports and supplemented them with the assessment that Commander, Carrier Division and “several” carriers were in the Kyushu area. Rochefort also stated two additional items: that the commander of Carrier Division 4 was at Sasebo and that the “secret” (or drill) call sign for the Combined Air Fleet was being heard on two different frequencies.⁸² Later that day Cavite reported no new bearings, and 16th Naval District had nothing else either. The Pacific Fleet COMINT summary reported that messages had been sent to Carrier Divisions 5 and 7, the latter probably an error in identification.⁸³

Through 30 November, the Kido Butai continued to push eastward, reaching on that day “Point B,” nearly a thousand miles east of the Kuriles. The sailors and airmen kept reviewing their attack plans, while the staff received updates via the Tokyo broadcast about the weather along the intended course, orders, updates on the diplomatic fencing between Washington and Tokyo, intelligence from the consulate in Honolulu, and radio intelligence from Kwajalein. Among other items passed by from the latter was that American reconnaissance planes still patrolled only to the south and west of Pearl Harbor—that is, the area to the north, from which the air strike was to be launched, was not being searched.

Going into the last day of November, American estimates still placed the all-important carriers in Japanese waters. The COMINT summary stated that *Hiei* had exchanged messages with elements of the Second and Third fleets.⁸⁴ Station H placed the carriers in the Kyushu area.⁸⁵ On that day, in the 1000 hour (Tokyo), perhaps the most critical deceptive Japanese transmission was picked up by the Americans. Cavite heard *Akagi* and an unidentified station (call sign 8 RO TA), perhaps a *maru*, on a bearing of 27 degrees, placing them near Sasebo. These call signs were heard on the same tactical frequency, 4963 kilohertz, as

before. The summary added that the carrier had been in contact with several *marus*.⁸⁶ Rochefort and Layton interpreted this new intercept differently; but neither suspected that the transmission might have been phony. In testimony in mid-1945 before the Hewitt Inquiry, one of the Pearl Harbor hearings conducted by the Navy, Rochefort suggested that the radio activity on the tactical circuit indicated that some sort of exercise or operation, like a fleet problem or maneuver, was beginning.⁸⁷ Layton, testifying in 1946 before the joint congressional Pearl Harbor investigation, said he had told Admiral Kimmel that he thought *Akagi* was talking to “some tanker *Marus*.”⁸⁸ (Thirty years later, Layton changed his story, claiming that Cavite had misidentified the call sign 8 YU NA [it had not] and that the carrier had been in radio silence—thereby implicitly refusing to acknowledge the Japanese deception.)⁸⁹

On 1 December, the Japanese completely replaced the current service, or fleet, call-sign system. This change hindered recovery of ship and formation identity and, coming only a month after the previous, expected call-sign replacement, led Layton and Rochefort to believe the Japanese were “preparing for active operations on a large scale.”⁹⁰ They also observed that four to five days prior to the change the Japanese stations had been repeating old messages to the old call signs, probably in an attempt to minimize undelivered traffic. The COMINT summary reported “no change” with respect to the carriers.⁹¹

Despite the paucity of intercepted carrier communications—or, conversely, and more likely, because of the very same handful of apparently valid intercepts and DF bearings—U.S. naval intelligence estimates at all levels continued to place the Japanese carriers in home waters, with one or two possibly near the Marshall Islands. Layton, in his 1 December location report, placed at least four carriers near Formosa and one in the Marshall Islands. When asked by Admiral Kimmel about the other carriers, he said he had no current information but that if pressed, he believed they were in the Kure area, probably refitting from operations six weeks earlier.⁹² For Kimmel’s command, the main interest was the “all important Japanese naval movements south,” whereas the carriers seemed to be in Japanese waters.⁹³

In Washington on the 1st, Commander McCollum published his weekly estimate, placing all six of the Kido Butai carriers in Kyushu or Kure and the battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima* in Sasebo or Kure.⁹⁴ This estimate was passed to the Chief of Naval Operations. Down the hall from McCollum, Captain Richmond Kelly Turner, head of War Plans, placed three Japanese carriers in the Mandates, in his Daily Information Summary.⁹⁵

For the next six days the Pacific Fleet’s radio intelligence and other intelligence centers maintained the same estimate, that the majority of Japanese flat-tops were in home waters while a few light carriers of the Carrier Division 3 or 4

had deployed to the Mandates or near Formosa. The only additional intercept of note was a DF bearing by Cavite of 30 degrees on *Akagi*'s call sign on 4 December in the noon hour (Tokyo), which placed the carrier near Kure.⁹⁶ Cavite's 5 December TESTM reported an odd incident, that it had heard the fleet call sign YU NE 8, which was not identified at the time. Why this call sign, which was in fact the First Air Fleet's call under the new system that became effective 1 December, had been used is unclear; it might have been an oversight or an intentional twist in the deception plan by the radio operator. The remainder of the reports and summaries during this last week before the attack had little different to offer. Station H on 3 December "believed the carriers are in Sasebo." On 4 December the carriers were plotted in the "vicinity of Kyushu," and on 5 December Hypo reported that "it is believed they [carriers] remain in the vicinity of Kyushu."⁹⁷ Layton's COMINT summaries during this period did, however, note how "silent" the carriers had become. The 2 December summary reported a "complete blank of information on the carriers," followed by "no information" on 3 December and by a 5 December report of "no traffic from the Commander Carriers." It seemed that the Japanese flattops had disappeared.⁹⁸ The "silence" of the carriers and the lack of traffic or information are relative statements. The "transmissions" that were believed to be emanating from the carriers had declined in volume, and it was to this situation that Layton's comments referred.

Yet the carriers' silence did not unduly disturb Layton, Rochefort, or Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel, in his statement to the 1946 congressional investigating committee, suggested the absence of Japanese carrier radio traffic after 1 December was "not [an] unusual condition since during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor when there were seven periods of similar uncertainty."⁹⁹ The fact that the carriers were not originating radio traffic, he added, did not mean that the carriers were on a secret mission.¹⁰⁰ In 1944, Rochefort stated before the Hart Inquiry, a wartime hearing on Pearl Harbor by the Navy, that while "there was great unease over the lack of [carrier] traffic . . . [,] the inability to locate more . . . carriers was not considered in itself, as a bad sign."¹⁰¹ Layton added a technical nuance to this rationalization: "Radio silence would have been a 'give-off' if they had been in the traffic, but they were not in the traffic at all though the fact that the carriers were not addressed had led us to the belief erroneous as it was, that they were unconcerned and were remaining in home waters."¹⁰² Layton also considered that silence might have indicated preparations for future operations.

Another possibility, according to testimony by Rochefort and Layton, was that the Japanese had been holding the carriers back because they could not afford to lose them in the initial fighting and would need them for the "decisive" battle.¹⁰³ That the Japanese had never before attempted such a large-scale radio silence was discussed at the time, but the implications were not addressed. The

few intercepts and less than a dozen DF bearings on various Japanese carriers placing them in home waters only reinforced the above impression of the disposition of the Japanese flattops.

Meanwhile, as the Striking Force moved closer to Hawaii, Japanese radio intelligence gathered up tidbits from American transmissions indicating that the deception was holding. On 4 December the Japanese intercepted an urgent, priority message from the commander of the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) to a number of ships and local commands. Although the Japanese analysts could not read the message, they believed that it might have been related to the sighting of an oil slick from a submarine. The Japanese had seen this type of message a month earlier. However, there was no evidence that the Striking Force had been compromised, and this reassurance was broadcast to it.¹⁰⁴ Through 6 December, Japanese radio intelligence detected no special alerts. Patrol planes continued to fly south of the islands, and a few had deployed to Midway and Johnston islands. Aboard *Akagi*, the Japanese team monitoring the Honolulu commercial radio stations detected no evidence of an alert in the American fleet. The path was clear.

On the morning of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Cavite took a bearing on what it believed was *Akagi* and reported that the flagship of the First Air Fleet was in the area of the Nansei Islands, south of Kyushu. This item was reported to Kimmel's command just as the first wave of torpedo and dive-bombers hit the anchored American fleet.¹⁰⁵

In Washington, just about three hours before the attack, Secretary of State Cordell Hull met with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to review the latest Japanese diplomatic messages and intelligence. Among the papers in their folders was a report on the location of combat ships of nations around the world, including Japan. Compiled by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the report combined recent information that, in turn, primarily relied on radio intelligence reports from Hawaii and the Philippines. It placed all six carriers and the two battleships of the Striking Force in either Sasebo or Kure.¹⁰⁶

About six hours later, after the Japanese attack, American naval radio monitors on Oahu intercepted the Kido Butai's first transmission since mid-November—a message from the commander of the First Air Fleet aboard *Akagi* to its supply train organizing a refueling rendezvous. But efforts to pursue the Japanese went awry, because the U.S. Navy's DF equipment could not discriminate between the transmission's "front and rear azimuth"—that is, whether the transmission had come from north or south of Pearl Harbor. Layton would say later that Kimmel eventually decided to send search planes to the south, because of earlier intelligence of possible carriers in the Marshall Islands.¹⁰⁷

In early 1941, Admiral Yamamoto's chief of staff, Admiral Shigano Fukudome, speculated about the plan to attack Pearl Harbor: "But to carry the war to the threshold of the enemy's power, he must catch the fox unaware." The radio silence and deception plan supporting the Pearl Harbor Striking Force worked as well as any of the Japanese planners could have hoped. The American command at Pearl Harbor was caught totally unaware. Even the last-moment discovery of a Japanese minisubmarine could not crack the conventional assessment by the Americans that the Japanese navy was set in its prewar defensive posture. American naval intelligence held to this view largely because the Japanese radio silence and deception supplied seemingly valid intelligence that substantiated it.

The individual techniques of the denial and deception parts of the plan would never have worked as effectively had it not been for the complete change in Japanese strategy and the organization of the carrier force carried out under Admiral Yamamoto in early 1941. U.S. naval intelligence missed that change and clung to the opinion that Japan's navy would act as it had exercised over the previous decade—the carrier force would remain with the bulk of the Combined Fleet awaiting the American Navy's move across the Pacific.¹⁰⁸ In late 1941 the intelligence officers and analysts in Cavite, Pearl Harbor, and Washington interpreted the carriers' seeming inaction and radio silence, as well as the occasional intercepts and DF bearings of carrier transmissions, in that light—as indications that they were still in home waters, awaiting orders or preparing for the probable foray against Japan by the Pacific Fleet.

Even the fact that relatively few deceptive transmissions were intercepted by the Americans—a dozen at best—may have worked in favor of the Japanese. Such limited intelligence would not move the Americans from their conclusion that the carriers were still in Japanese waters. The impression the deceptive transmissions created moved right up the chain of American naval intelligence reporting—from field-site messages to fleet summaries to the estimates created in the intelligence and planning staffs of the Navy Department—and was presented to the leadership of the Roosevelt administration as late as the morning of the attack. In a sense, Joseph Rochefort was correct in that there was an element of "self-deception" here. The self-deception, though, was grounded in intelligence that seemed valid within the context of presumed Japanese strategy. The only problem for the Americans was that Yamamoto had changed the script.

In postwar testimony before the various Pearl Harbor hearings, Rochefort, Layton, and others suggested that they had not been certain at the time of Pearl Harbor about what the radio intelligence implied about the carriers' actions. Yet nowhere do their prewar reports reflect any question, doubt, or suspicion about the validity of any of the intercepts or bearings. If there was doubt or

uncertainty, it arose because the carriers were not heard for a few days. Layton and Rochefort later admitted that there had never been any sense that the carriers might be involved in a surprise attack. In any case, their conclusions about the location of the carriers in Japanese waters were accepted at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Pearl Harbor and in the Chief of Naval Operations staff in Washington. In the weeks leading to 7 December, all levels of American naval intelligence unanimously reported to their seniors that the main Japanese carrier forces were at their bases in Japan.

NOTES

1. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 129–32.
2. Principally Robert B. Stinnett, *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 43–47, 182–85, inter alia; Timothy Wilford, “Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence before Pearl Harbor,” *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 141–50. A variant of this revisionist thesis is that the British were reading JN-25B at the time and this exploitation enabled them to track the Kido Butai across the Pacific. This claim is presented in James Rusbridgers and Eric Nave, *Betrayed at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II* (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 133–34, inter alia.
3. See Philip H. Jacobsen, “Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 695–718; “Pearl Harbor: Who Deceived Whom?” *Naval History* (December 2003), pp. 27–32, and “Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers,” *Cryptologia* 31, no. 3 (July 2007), pp. 223–32; Stephen Budiansky, “Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor,” *Cryptologia* 24, no. 2 (April 2000), pp. 119–30; and Marty Bollinger, “Did a Soviet Merchant Ship Encounter the Pearl Harbor Strike Force?” *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007).
4. U.S. Congress, *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Cong. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946) [hereafter PHH], part 36, p. 37, and pp. 128–30; Edwin T. Layton, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), pp. 228–29.
5. American naval planning took its cues from plans at different echelons of command, from RAINBOW FIVE to War Plan PACIFIC-46. See Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 286–312.
6. Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, pp. 285–91; Gordon W. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 10–15; Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, eds., *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans* (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, 2000) [hereafter PHP], pp. 5–7.
7. Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, pp. 286–91, 471–77; Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, pp. 15–19.
8. See U.S. National Security Agency [hereafter NSA], *Report on the Japanese Grand Fleet Maneuvers, May–June 1930*, Special Research History [SRH] 222 (Fort George G. Meade, Md.: OP-20, 12 January 1983), *Various Reports on Japanese Grand Fleet Maneuvers, June–August 1933*, SRH-223 (13 January 1983), and *Various Reports on Japanese Grand Fleet Maneuvers (July–September 1935)*, SRH-225 (18 January 1983).
9. PHH, part 32, p. 582.
10. Lt. Col. Angelo N. Caravaggio, Canadian Forces, “The Attack at Taranto,” *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 3 (Summer 2006).

11. Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, p. 349.
12. NSA, *Traffic Intelligence Summaries with Comments by CINCPAC War Plans/Fleet Intelligence Sections, 16 July 1941—31 December 1941*, SRMN-012 (Fort George G. Meade, Md.: 14th Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit, 6 September 1985), part 1, Communications Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941, p. 196.
13. Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, pp. 84, 428.
14. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, pp. 166–67. This incident is also reported in Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, *Operational History of Naval Communications, December 1941—August 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 68–69. This latter version places the incident in January 1941, when the Japanese dispatched naval forces to pressure both Thailand and French Indochina to end the border conflict in eastern Cambodia.
15. For more on the concurrent British effort and sharing of information with the Americans see H. L. Shaw, *History of HMS Anderson* (1946), chap. 3, The National Archives: Public Record Office, HW/4/25.
16. PHH, part 26, p. 223.
17. There were other U.S. naval DF stations along the U.S. west coast, assigned to the 12th and 13th naval districts. These stations were tasked primarily with locating Japanese merchant ships and the occasional opportunistic Japanese naval transmission.
18. “Translations of Intercepted Enemy Radio Traffic and Miscellaneous World War II Documentation,” National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. [hereafter NARA], record group [RG] 38, entry 344, box 1356, “Akagi.”
19. *Ibid.*
20. PHH, part 29, p. 2362.
21. “GY-1 History,” NARA, RG 38, entry 1040, box 115, folder 5750/198, “OP-20-GY History”; “History of the Able and Baker Solutions,” NARA, RG 38, entry 1040, box 116, folder 5750/202, “History of GYP-1,” pp. 25–26. For a good summary of these files see Stephen Budiansky, “Too Late for Pearl Harbor,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (December 1999), pp. 47–51. The tally of JN-25B (AN-1) code recoveries (vice additives used to encrypt code groups) from a report of December 1941 shows that while 2,380 groups were recovered during the month of December 1941, the total recoveries as of 31 December 1941 were 6,180, indicating that a little fewer than four thousand groups could be read prior to Pearl Harbor.
22. Thomas G. Mahnken, *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 81–82. Also see “Tokyo to Washington, 17 November 1941,” 711.94/2447, PHH, part 14, pp. 1058–60, in which Ambassador Grew reports restrictions on attachés.
23. Japanese Naval Translations [SRN] 117693, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
24. PHP, pp. 149, 181.
25. PHH, part 36, p. 14.
26. Japanese navy numeral-kana-kana calls were generally referred to as “drill calls,” being used in fleet maneuvers, but OP-20-GT (Traffic Analysis Section) preferred the term “tactical calls.” See “GZ” comments to Japanese navy translation GZ 0107Z, 12/04/1945, NARA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1457, “Z Translations.”
27. SRMN-012, 6 November 1941, p. 199.
28. PHH, part 10, p. 4893.
29. SRN 115957, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
30. SRNs 117143–4 and SRN 117089, issued 3 April and 5 April 1946, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
31. Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, *Operational History of Naval Communications*, pp. 190–91.
32. “Navy Wireless Procedure Rules,” 1940, NARA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 203, folder 991.
33. Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, *Operational History of Naval Communications*, p. 41.
34. NARA, RG 38, Commander Naval Security Group [CNSG] Library, box 94, folder 5750/37.
35. PHH, part 13, JCC exhibit 8, p. 717.
36. PHP, p. 296.

37. David Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (New York: Scribner's, 1996), p. 33.
38. PHP, p. 296.
39. During the Battle of the Coral Sea, U.S. radio monitors detected the carrier *Shokaku* transmitting a homing beacon and thereby located the ship. See CINCPAC messages 071852 and 071031, 7 May 1942. Author's personal collection.
40. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, p. 227.
41. PHP, pp. 135, 238.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 223, 240.
43. PHH, part 10, p. 4906.
44. *Ibid.*, part 6, pp. 2522–23, for Admiral Kimmel's take on the silent Japanese carrier force.
45. PHP, p. 143; PHH, part 13, p. 715.
46. SRN 116602, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
47. SRN 115428, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
48. "Naval Dummy Messages and Jamming Rules," TR/PJ/491/NID 15.9.45, NARA, RG 457, entry 9032, folder 1007.
49. Layton, *And I Was There*, p. 227; "Black Magic in Communications," CSP 1494(A), 15 April 1942, NARA, RG 38, entry 1029 (Crane Library), box 66.
50. See "CI Activities of the Japanese Navy," NARA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1343; and "Japanese Analysis of US Message Headings—November 1941," NARA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 151, folder 646.
51. "PH Investigations: Interrogation Reports of Japanese Personnel, Interrogation 10, 28 November 1945, Captain Minoru Genda," NARA, RG 38, CNSG Library, box 167, folder 5830/78.
52. SRN 116602; PHH, part 35, p. 66.
53. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, p. 340; Cavite TESTM 141511, NARA, RG 38, box 15, folder 2000/1, "Inactive Stations," "SI Genser" message files.
54. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, p. 341.
55. PHP, pp. 67–68.
56. PHH, part 35, p. 70.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
59. American naval intelligence confused the Japanese 5th Carrier Division with the 4th. This error was due to lack of current intelligence on the status of the carriers *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku*.
60. PHH, part 35, p. 71.
61. SRN 115397, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
62. PHH, part 35, p. 71.
63. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, p. 348.
64. SRNs 15678 and 117814, NARA, RG 457, entry 9014.
65. Philip Jacobsen, "No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force: No Conspiracy!" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18, no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 142–49.
66. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, pp. 366–68.
67. Jacobsen, "No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force."
68. PHH, part 35, p. 74.
69. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, pp. 376–79.
70. Jacobsen, "Pearl Harbor," p. 30.
71. PHH, part 35, p. 75.
72. *Ibid.*
73. PHH, part 15, pp. 1882–83.
74. PHP, p. 105.
75. PHH, part 37, p. 1060.
76. "Ops Logs—Stations H, M, S, W & J, 24 November—6 December 1941," NARA, RG 38, CNSG Library, box 164, folder 5830/58, "Station 'H' Chronology."
77. PHH, part 35, p. 76.
78. TESTM 281511, NARA, RG 38, box 15, folder 2000/1, "Inactive Stations," "SI Genser" message files.
79. "Ops Logs—Stations H, M, S, W & J, 24 November—6 December 1941."
80. SRMN-012, 27 November, p. 224.
81. PHH, part 15, pp. 1889–90.
82. "Station 'H' Chronology," NARA, RG 38.
83. PHH, part 36, pp. 76–77.
84. *Ibid.*, part 35, pp. 77–78.
85. "Station 'H' Chronology."
86. PHH, part 35, p. 78.
87. *Ibid.*, part 36, p. 36.

88. Ibid., part 10, pp. 4835–36.
89. Layton, *And I Was There*, p. 227.
90. PHH, part 35, p. 79.
91. Ibid.
92. PHH, part 16, p. 2359.
93. Ibid., part 26, pp. 232–33.
94. Ibid., part 15, pp. 1895–96.
95. “1 December Information Summary,” NARA, RG 80, entry 167, box 4.
96. TESTM 1544, NARA, RG 38, box 15, “Inactive Stations.”
97. “Station ‘H’ Chronologies,” 2, 3, and 5 December 1941, NARA, RG 38, CNSG Library, box 164.
98. SRMN-012, pp. 230–34.
99. U.S. Congress, *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20 July 1946), pp. 155–57; also PHH, part 6, p. 2523.
100. PHH, part 10, pp. 4839–40, and part 15, pp. 1895–96.
101. Ibid., part 26, pp. 220–23.
102. Ibid., part 10, p. 4903.
103. Ibid., part 26, p. 235; part 10, p. 4840; and part 32, p. 582.
104. PHP, p. 226.
105. Dispatch, COM 16 to OPNAV, info CINCPAC, 8 December 1941, 08033, NARA, RG 38, entry 1030, box 161; also PHH, part 6, p. 2522.
106. “Locations of U.S. Naval Forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East: Also Foreign Naval Forces in the Pacific and Far East: As of 7 Dec. 1941,” PHH, part 20, pp. 4121–31.
107. PHH, part 10, pp. 4906–907.
108. “War Plan Pacific 46,” NARA, RG 80, Pearl Harbor Liaison Office, entry 167EE, box 120, Exhibit 114, p. 21.

EASTERN EXIT

Rescue “. . . From the Sea”

Gary J. Ohls

Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spent considerable time and energy attempting to define their roles in a new security environment created by the end of the Cold War. The decline of Soviet power, accentuated by large cutbacks in military spending and a withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, left the United States without a peer competitor—politically, diplomatically, or militarily—on the world scene.¹ As ideas and concepts churned throughout the Department of Defense, the Navy and Marine Corps issued a series of strategic and operational concept papers that defined the new security environment along with the roles and missions of the sea services. The Department of the Navy issued the most relevant of these documents during the first half of the 1990s.

Perhaps the most important paper to address post–Cold War security concerns was the September 1992 document entitled “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.” This concept paper clearly identified a new direction for the naval services and defined a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps.² Unlike some earlier efforts, “. . . From the Sea” became widely influential within the naval services and throughout the Department of Defense.³

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Among other things, it expressed the expeditionary nature of the post–Cold War mission for both the Navy and Marine Corps while capturing the strategic temper of the time. It also reiterated the uncertainty that existed within the operational environment as leaders attempted to recalibrate their thinking.⁴ But if uncertainty existed

at the operational and strategic levels in the minds of some, “. . . From the Sea” clarified the direction for the sea services during that period and for the near-term future. It unequivocally directed the Navy and Marine Corps team to provide the nation with “Naval Expeditionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Operations—Operating Forward from the Sea—Tailored for National Needs.” Its strategic message emphasized the shift “away from open-ocean warfighting *on* the sea toward joint operations *from* the sea.”⁵ The word “from” constituted the key term in this new naval concept statement and thereby elevated the role of the U.S. Marine Corps within the larger naval mission of the time.⁶ Yet even as naval thinkers codified in their policy statements the concepts of littoral-focused expeditionary warfare and sea-based forward presence, the Navy and Marine Corps embodied these concepts through numerous incursions in Somalia, on the Horn of Africa.⁷

Among other things, “. . . From the Sea” emphasized the importance of unobtrusive forward presence—as opposed to the forward defense concept of the Cold War—and the flexibility of sea-based forces. That meant that naval expeditionary forces could not only come from the sea and return to the sea but also be sustained from the sea. This approach offers policy flexibility, because sea-based expeditionary forces can project either power or assistance ashore yet do not encroach on the sovereignty of nations while at sea.⁸ Once ashore, naval expeditionary forces present a relatively small “footprint,” because their support is based at sea, thereby reducing exposure, vulnerability, and host-nation resentment.⁹ By concentrating on the littoral regions of the world and recognizing the importance of power projection and maneuver from the sea, “. . . From the Sea” reinforced the importance of the Navy and Marine Corps team as an integrated element of sea power.¹⁰

In January 1996, the Marine Corps issued a document that augmented “. . . From the Sea”; it was entitled “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” or, as it became known, simply OMFTS. Although the paper was published after the last American incursion in Somalia, its ideas and concepts expressed were greatly influenced by those operations as well as other actions occurring in the early 1990s.¹¹ Many officers within the Navy and Marine Corps contributed to the development of these various concepts, but one of the earliest inputs to OMFTS resulted from the experiences of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and in the evacuation of the American embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia—Operation EASTERN EXIT. In a 1991 memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jenkins emphasized that future operations—either combat or humanitarian—should involve very rapid, long-range insertions at points along the coastline where gaps in coastal defenses would permit the avoidance of enemy strength. Speed of maneuver and

flexibility in the location of the launching point (that is, distance from the shoreline) constituted key elements of Jenkins's precepts. Although this approach would ultimately require development of new equipment, it also involved a new application of existing systems and a change in the mind-sets of leaders. He suggested the concept be named "Maneuver from the Sea," or perhaps "Maneuver War from the Sea."¹² Five years later, the Commandant published the OMFTS concept paper, which included all of Jenkins's ideas. The concepts of ". . . From the Sea" and OMFTS are clearly demonstrated in the series of incursions into Somalia early in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first of those events—known as Operation EASTERN EXIT—proved to be as dramatic as it was proficient.

During December 1990 the eyes of the world and the attention of its leaders focused on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. For months, the United States had been building a strong naval and military presence throughout the region in response to Saddam Hussein's 2 August 1990 attack upon and occupation of Kuwait. Under the leadership of vice admirals Henry H. Mauz, Jr., and Stanley R. Arthur, NAVCENT (that is, the naval component of U.S. Central Command) had created a force in excess of a hundred ships, the largest American fleet assembled since World War II.¹³ The buildup had begun under Admiral Mauz and continued with Arthur, who assumed command of NAVCENT just six weeks before the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Despite that cutoff date, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso II, did not consider war to liberate Kuwait as imminent and chose to implement the already-planned change of command at NAVCENT on 1 December 1990. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command, considered Arthur one of the most aggressive admirals he knew and interposed no objection. Additionally, Arthur had considerable experience within this operational area, having created the post of NAVCENT back in 1983.¹⁴

When Arthur took command of NAVCENT in December 1990, Rear Admiral John B. "Bat" LaPlante commanded its amphibious element, which would ultimately consist of thirty-one ships, loaded with two Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) and one special-operations-capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU [SOC])—roughly seventeen thousand Marines. LaPlante's Marine counterpart, Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., commanded both the 4th MEB and, as senior Marine officer afloat, the overall Marine landing force, which ultimately included 5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC).¹⁵ In the language of doctrine, LaPlante served as Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Jenkins as Commander, Landing Force (CLF).¹⁶ (The Marine element afloat under Jenkins's command should not be confused with the I Marine Expeditionary Force—I MEF, pronounced

“One MEF”—ashore, under Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer; it had a different mission and reporting structure.)¹⁷ The primary role of LaPlante as Commander, Task Force (CTF) 156, the amphibious task force, and Jenkins as CTF 158, commanding the embarked Marines, involved preparing for an amphibious assault against Iraqi positions on the Kuwaiti coastline in the upcoming Operation DESERT STORM. This required planning and operational rehearsals, the capstone event being a major landing exercise in Oman during late January 1991, designated SEA SOLDIER IV. This rehearsal included the entire force under LaPlante and Jenkins, and it would constitute the largest amphibious landing since Exercise STEEL PIKE in October 1964.¹⁸

Schwarzkopf often impressed on Arthur the importance of convincing Iraqi commanders that an amphibious landing would be part of any future war for Kuwait.¹⁹ Although the threatened landing was intended primarily as a deception, LaPlante and Jenkins needed to prepare for an actual assault landing should the course of war so dictate. With proper training, including large-scale rehearsals, the amphibious force would be capable of both deception and combat.²⁰ The importance of this exercise, coupled with firm arrangements coordinated through Omani and U.S. State Department representatives, caused both Arthur and LaPlante to consider the exercise dates for SEA SOLDIER IV as fixed and definite. They also believed that the entire amphibious force must participate in the landing, to achieve NAVCENT training objectives.²¹ The diversion of ships or Marines for any cause—no matter how important—would disrupt their planning and degrade combat readiness. This issue would influence the thinking of Arthur and LaPlante when conditions within Somalia necessitated an American rescue mission in the days just preceding DESERT STORM.²²

As events eventually played out, LaPlante and Jenkins did not conduct an amphibious landing during DESERT STORM. But as a deception, their operations constituted the most successful undertaking since the Second World War.²³ The major reasons for its success include the degree to which the Navy and Marine Corps prepared for the landing, especially the SEA SOLDIER IV rehearsal. Leaders at Central Command also provided the American news media opportunities to observe and report on the amphibious preparations. The film footage taken during their visits to the fleet showed up on television newscasts throughout the period leading up to the DESERT STORM ground attack. The fact that only the highest levels of command knew the amphibious landing was actually a ruse contributed as well. Even Jenkins—the senior Marine officer afloat—was not informed, although he had suspicions for various reasons, including the constant press coverage. The deception tied down five or six divisions (depending on the time frame) along the coast of Kuwait and drew an Iraqi reaction every time LaPlante and Jenkins made a move in the Persian Gulf.²⁴ The key commanders

believed that the hard training by the amphibious force during Operation DESERT SHIELD—capped by SEA SOLDIER IV—established the credibility that fooled Iraqi leaders.²⁵

Amphibious Squadron 6 (PHIBRON 6), commanded by Captain Alan B. Moser, had been among the first naval forces to sail to the Arabian Sea after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Moser's squadron consisted of five ships loaded with some 2,100 Marines from units of Jenkins's 4th MEB. By January 1991 they had been at sea over four months, conducting training and preparing for the looming battle with Iraq. Prior to deploying for DESERT SHIELD, Moser's squadron had spent only a few weeks in port at Norfolk, Virginia, following a routine Mediterranean deployment.²⁶ PHIBRON 6 was typical of the Navy and Marine forces that deployed for DESERT SHIELD, in that its elements responded to the crisis on very short notice and in various stages of training.²⁷ But during their time at sea the sailors and Marines of the amphibious task force conducted a series of training exercises, including IMMINENT THUNDER and SEA SOLDIER I–III, and achieved a high level of preparedness.²⁸ Nevertheless, they urgently needed the training of SEA SOLDIER IV to ensure their ability to conduct a large-scale landing if required.²⁹ SEA SOLDIER IV was particularly critical because Jenkins's landing force consisted of three distinct elements (4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU [SOC]) that did not have a common higher headquarters. It amounted to a command roughly the size of a small Marine expeditionary force but without a MEF headquarters to structure and direct it.³⁰ Therefore, when LaPlante and Moser received the warning order to prepare for an amphibious evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, their immediate concern involved the new operation's impact on this critical exercise and subsequent combat landings should such action become necessary during the impending war with Iraq.³¹

On 1 January 1991, as LaPlante increased the tempo of war preparation, NAVCENT received an alert message indicating that civil war and internal clan conflict in Somalia might endanger U.S. citizens and require a military response.³² This warning did not surprise Arthur, who had been monitoring message traffic from Somalia and had noticed in it an increasing sense of urgency.³³ The following day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in Mogadishu requested military assistance to evacuate Americans from the U.S. embassy there due to the chaotic violence occurring throughout the city.³⁴ The Pentagon immediately directed Central Command to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to rescue American citizens from Somalia.³⁵ Arthur tasked LaPlante with planning the NEO and proposing a contingency task force to execute the mission. LaPlante summoned Moser to a meeting on his flagship, the amphibious assault ship USS *Nassau* (LHA 4), then in port at Dubai. Having limited knowledge of conditions “on the ground” in Mogadishu, the two commanders envisioned a

force capable of performing missions across the entire range of amphibious operations, including both surface and air actions. (Only later in the planning process did it become obvious that a surface evacuation across the beach would not be practicable.) In addition to identifying the necessary amphibious ships and Marines for the mission, they proposed the assignment of two destroyers, which could provide fire support and electronic warfare capability, should that become necessary.³⁶

Despite the irregular nature of the fighting in Mogadishu, amphibious commanders were seriously concerned that sophisticated weapons systems might be present, particularly within the government faction. During much of the 1970s Somalia had been a Cold War ally of the Soviet Union and had received both modern weapons and advisers.³⁷ That relationship had soured and the Soviets had eventually withdrawn their support, but American commanders needed to consider the possibility that Cold War weapons—especially surface-to-air missiles and electronic warfare equipment—remained in Somali hands and could threaten their rescue mission.³⁸ LaPlante therefore recommended a seven-ship response force—four amphibious ships, two destroyer escorts, and one oiler—to conduct the operation, under Moser's command.³⁹

Concurrent with LaPlante's planning, Jenkins considered issues relating to the landing force that would conduct the operation on the ground. He tasked Colonel James J. Doyle, Jr., the commander of Brigade Service Support Group 4, then located on the amphibious dock transport USS *Trenton* (LPD 14), to serve as commander of the mission to Mogadishu. Jenkins instructed Doyle to create a special-purpose command element—designated 4th MEB, Detachment 1—aboard the amphibious assault ship (and helicopter carrier) USS *Guam* (LPH 9) to plan the operation and exercise command and control during its execution. Doyle relocated from *Trenton* to *Guam*, taking several key members of his Brigade Service Support Group 4 staff, which he integrated with officers from various headquarters elements to create an even more experienced, professional, and eager group.⁴⁰ Equally important, *Guam*'s commanding officer, Captain Charles R. Saffell, Jr., and the Marine commander of troops aboard *Guam*, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, along with their staffs, began planning for the operation even before the arrival of Doyle and Moser. Once the two commanders arrived on *Guam* with their own skeleton staffs, they could take advantage of work already advanced. The staff planning and subsequent execution thus amounted to a collaborative effort among Navy and Marine officers who knew their jobs, knew their doctrine and procedures, and in many cases knew each other personally.⁴¹

Arthur recognized the importance of rescuing Americans in Somalia but did not want to send seven ships to do the job. He viewed the action as strictly an



USS *Trenton* (LPD 14) (U.S. Navy)

extraction operation, to get people out of and away from Mogadishu. There would be no ongoing operation ashore in Somalia or afloat in the Indian Ocean. At least, Arthur hoped to limit the mission to that role, because he needed all his ships for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—including the critical SEA SOLDIER IV workup. Once he sent ships out of the operational area, Arthur and his commanders knew, getting them back could be a problem. For example, the evacuees coming out

of Mogadishu would require transfer to a safe port. Could he bring them back to Oman, or would he have to send his ships to other locations—such as Mombasa, Kenya, or the island of Diego Garcia—even farther from the scene of action? Additionally, commanders throughout the fleet remembered the 1990 evacuation



USS *Guam* (LPD 9) (U.S. Navy)

of Americans in Liberia, Operation SHARP EDGE, which had lasted five months and ultimately involved four ships and some 2,100 Marines. Not wanting to degrade combat readiness in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf any more than absolutely necessary, Arthur decided that a two-ship

amphibious task force with the right mix of helicopters and Marines could accomplish the mission in Somalia.⁴² Two of the amphibious ships at anchorage near Masirah, Oman—*Guam* and *Trenton*—not only had the necessary configuration but also were located nearest to the Horn of Africa.⁴³ LaPlante assigned these two ships to conduct the operation and sent Moser—whom he held in high esteem and hated to lose—to act as commodore of the amphibious task force.⁴⁴

The need for this rescue mission to Somalia had resulted from the breakdown of governmental control and subsequent social strife throughout that nation, especially in the capital city of Mogadishu.⁴⁵ By 1989, twenty years of dictatorial rule under President Mahammad Siad Barre had produced three substantial

clan-based rebel factions, including the Somali National Movement (SNM), active in northern Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), primarily in the south; and the United Somali Congress (USC), focused in Mogadishu and central Somalia.⁴⁶ Over the next two years, political turmoil became increasingly fierce, spawning clan warfare and rampant criminal activity. As Siad Barre lost grip on power in Somalia, the rebel elements further broke down into subclan conflict, increasing the bloodshed and undercutting efforts at unification.⁴⁷ In early December 1990, conditions had deteriorated to the point that Ambassador Bishop evacuated nonessential embassy personnel and called on all American citizens to leave the country. He even sent his wife and daughter out of Somalia, to underscore the seriousness of the situation and encourage others to depart.⁴⁸ Most foreign missions in Mogadishu took similar actions as the fighting increased and social disintegration worsened. Although not specifically targeted by any Somali faction, the U.S. embassy and its staff often became the victims of gunfire and random acts of violence.⁴⁹

After meeting with the Somali president and prime minister in the closing days of December, Bishop concluded that the government had neither a plan nor the ability to control the growing crisis. As carnage and lawlessness spread, the need to evacuate remaining Americans increased, while the ability to do so decreased. The situation constituted the kind of “chaos in the littorals” that the OMFTS concept paper would later decry as a war of “all against all.”⁵⁰ In response, Bishop moved Americans into relatively secure areas in and around the embassy, while Italian officials made a fruitless effort to arrange a cease-fire among the factions. With the failure of this effort, the American ambassador realized his options were narrowing, and on 2 January he requested military assistance to evacuate the U.S. embassy. On the following day Bishop perceived that conditions were so bad that only a helicopter-borne evacuation had any chance of rescuing the remaining Americans from Mogadishu.⁵¹ His urgent request for help received immediate attention in Washington and set in motion the planning and execution of Operation EASTERN EXIT, which came to be considered by many a model for this type of action.⁵²

In response to the Pentagon’s execution order for EASTERN EXIT, officers at Central Command deployed two C-130 and one AC-130 aircraft to Kenya and ordered *Guam* and *Trenton* to set sail toward Mogadishu. In reality, commanders at Central Command had already initiated these actions, in anticipation of orders from the National Command Authority. After meeting with LaPlante aboard *Nassau*, Moser took five members of his squadron staff and four officers from Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 to Masirah in a P-3 Orion and then helicoptered aboard *Guam*.⁵³ Doyle had already arrived, and the two commanders collocated their operations center in the ship’s Supporting Arms

Control Center. Although this arrangement appears somewhat ad hoc, creating special-purpose organizations for various expeditionary actions is normal for Marine and naval officers of the amphibious service.⁵⁴ The officers assembling on *Guam* to plan and execute this rescue mission had considerable experience in this type of operation, and many had worked together before.⁵⁵ The planning began immediately upon receipt of the warning order and continued after the two ships departed Masirah just before midnight on 2 January 1991.⁵⁶


With the amphibious force in motion, officers at Central Command and NAVCENT continued to consider alternative methods for conducting the evacuation. In fact, various possibilities had been under consideration at all levels of command from the beginning of the crisis, and it had not yet become clear that only one option remained viable. Initially, the preferred course of action involved sending aircraft with security detachments on board into the Mogadishu airport and flying American evacuees out of the country. Several other foreign missions had done exactly that during the last few days of December.⁵⁷ But this required a permissive environment, and leaders at Central Command came to realize from Bishop's messages that such conditions no longer existed.⁵⁸ The embassy could not even communicate with the Mogadishu airport to obtain permission for landing evacuation aircraft, because the telephone lines were all down. More important, the airport was nearly two miles from the U.S. embassy, and Bishop did not believe Americans could move safely on the city streets, due to the extreme violence. Central Command also considered the use of special operations forces, going so far as to direct that six MH-53 Pave Low helicopters with tanker support be prepared to conduct the evacuation.⁵⁹ This option never progressed beyond the initial concept, because the Pave Low helicopters were preparing for the imminent launching of DESERT STORM.⁶⁰ Additionally, the special operations forces were heavily committed along the Iraqi border and in the western desert looking for Scud missiles.⁶¹ It now became apparent that only an amphibious evacuation by ship-based helicopters remained viable and offered a prospect for success regardless of the situation on the ground.⁶²

By 4 January, conditions had deteriorated so much that Bishop requested two platoons of paratroopers be dropped to protect Americans until the amphibious task force could arrive.⁶³ Colonel Doyle and other commanders considered it a bad idea, because the space available for a drop zone was so small that paratroopers might be scattered outside the embassy. Such an operation also increased the number of people requiring evacuation.⁶⁴ More important, by the time Bishop made his request events had outpaced its rationale: Moser's task force was nearing a position to launch its helicopters, sooner than Bishop had expected, and the rescue team would likely arrive before paratroops could be

delivered.⁶⁵ Fortunately for all concerned, Schwarzkopf refused to authorize the paratroop drop.⁶⁶

When *Guam* and *Trenton* originally received orders to sail, they were located in the northern Arabian Sea off the coast of Masirah, Oman, approximately 1,500 miles from Mogadishu. *Guam* had a top speed of twenty-four knots, whereas *Trenton* could make about eighteen knots maximum. There was no requirement to keep the ships together, and initially *Guam* steamed at near maximum speed, outpacing *Trenton*. Saffell received orders to slow to a more fuel-efficient speed, with which he complied. But as the situation in Mogadishu became clear, the ship resumed its initial speed. Neither Moser nor Saffell was concerned about fuel usage, because they had plenty on board and could replenish in Mombasa if necessary.⁶⁷ In any case, it had become essential that the ships close the distance to Somalia as fast as possible and that imperative trumped fuel economy.

Planning and conducting operations had become second nature to Moser, Doyle, their staffs, the officers of the ships, and the embarked Marines. In addition, existing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and training in rapid planning techniques greatly facilitated their effort and ensured the prompt issuance of well conceived orders.⁶⁸ The question of when to launch the rescue force



remained under discussion, but Bishop's anxious messages forced the issue into the forefront. While Moser and Doyle prepared for the evacuation in Mogadishu, LaPlante and Jenkins—exhibiting high confidence in their subordinates—monitored events from *Nassau* and continued preparation for SEA SOLDIER IV, scheduled to begin in Oman on 19 January 1991.⁶⁹

In the early morning hours of 5 January 1991, two Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters lifted a small

amphibious force from *Guam*'s deck and headed for Mogadishu, 466 miles to the southwest.⁷⁰ It was now clearer than ever that only the helicopter-borne amphibious option offered any hope for saving the Americans in time.⁷¹ The CH-53Es, because they were designed to conduct in-flight refueling, had a long-range insertion capability; they remain today the only U.S. heavy-lift helicopters that can fly into an uncertain environment at such a long distance.⁷² Although assigned to *Trenton*, these two helicopters cross-decked to *Guam* to load the evacuation force and then launch for Mogadishu.⁷³ The Super Stallions carried a sixty-man force consisting of forty-seven Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (an element of Jenkins's 4th MEB), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, and four Marines from Doyle's headquarters elements. It also included a nine-man Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team under Commander Stephen R. Louma, USN.⁷⁴ McAleer's 1st Battalion had been the helicopter-borne assault element of Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2), composed primarily of the 2nd Marine Regiment.⁷⁵ As such, McAleer's Marines had become very proficient in helicopter operations from the many exercises and rehearsals conducted at sea. Additionally, their predeployment training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, had included noncombatant evacuation exercises.⁷⁶

Doyle ordered McAleer to accompany his Marines into Mogadishu, while he remained at sea, where he could keep close contact with Moser and have better communications.⁷⁷ In addition to assigning McAleer to command the Marines and SEALs under Louma, Doyle appointed Lieutenant Colonel Willard D. Oats as overall commander of the forward element.⁷⁸ Oats would be the senior officer on the ground in Mogadishu, working primarily with the ambassador after arriving at the embassy. Major William N. Saunders served as the logistician for the mission and specifically supervised the evacuation control center (ECC), which would process evacuees and prepare them for departure.


Sending two lieutenant colonels, one Navy commander (Louma accompanied the SEAL team), and a major in addition to the normal complement of officers and noncommissioned officers seems excessively top heavy. But Doyle considered this "an unconventional operation with potentially extraordinary consequences" and wanted a "few guys with gray hair" in the landing zone. Loss of American life in the embassy at Mogadishu would distract the nation as it approached the critical point of war in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Doyle clearly remembered the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and how it had constrained American action for 444 days. Either scenario could unhinge DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM planning, resulting in unthinkable consequences.⁷⁹

Essentially, Doyle organized the NEO team in a Marine air-ground task force structure, as illustrated in the figure below. In Doyle's organizational plan, Oats functioned as the senior officer ashore, although McAleer held the

same rank and commanded most of the Marines. Fortunately, command issues never became a problem, despite the large number of high-ranking officers ashore, because Oats and McAleer tended to be of one mind throughout the operation.⁸⁰ Additionally, Bishop clearly understood his role in the operation and remained firmly in control of events throughout.⁸¹ The ambassador had been involved in the evacuation at Monrovia, Liberia (Operation SHARP EDGE), a few months earlier and EASTERN EXIT clearly benefited from his experience.⁸²

While evaluating alternate courses of action, Moser and Doyle considered launching the helicopters directly from their initial positions in the northern Arabian Sea, some 1,500 miles from the target area. They again considered it when the ships reached a point 890 miles away, but ultimately, as noted above, they launched the aircraft from a distance of 466 nautical miles.⁸³ In addition to Bishop's distressed calls for help, a number of issues contributed to the decision to send the helicopters at this juncture, including in-flight refueling requirements, the availability of tanker support, the arrival time over Mogadishu, and the availability of AC-130 gunships to provide cover.⁸⁴ Anticipating the need for in-flight refueling, Arthur had earlier contacted U.S. Air Force representatives at Central Command and learned that they could not provide tanker support, due

FIGURE 3
DOYLE'S MAGTF STRUCTURE FOR ORGANIZING THE MOGADISHU NEO FORCE



Source: Doyle interview, 20 October 2008; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp.16, 18, 21.

to other commitments. He had then approached Major General Royal N. Moore, commanding general of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and arranged for Marine Corps KC-130 tankers to refuel the Super Stallions.⁸⁵ This proved challenging enough, as the 466-nautical-mile flight meant refueling twice, over open water at night, by pilots who had not recently practiced the procedure.⁸⁶ The first refueling would enable the helicopters to arrive at Mogadishu, and it occurred at a point that would allow the helicopters to return to *Guam* should the effort prove unsuccessful. The second refueling provided sufficient fuel for locating the embassy and ensuring that the outbound flight could clear the Somali coastline.⁸⁷

In the event, aerial refueling proved difficult, for a variety of reasons. The lack of night-vision capability in the KC-130 tankers (one pilot in each of the CH-53Es wore night-vision goggles) made it difficult for their crews to see the helicopters at the rendezvous point. It had been over a year since the helicopter pilots practiced refueling, not having anticipated any such requirement during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. They had even taken the refueling probes off their aircraft, making it necessary to reinstall them prior to takeoff. Fortunately, Captain Saffell was himself an aviator and was acutely attuned to the problems and risks of nighttime refueling over an open ocean.⁸⁸ He delayed the helicopter launch until he saw the KC-130s on radar and then tracked both groups to ensure a rendezvous.⁸⁹ One helicopter experienced a fuel leak while refueling, which the crew chief repaired in flight, but not before the Marines and SEALs received a good dousing of gas. It appears that the air crew had not only removed the probes but failed to service the equipment.⁹⁰ The second refueling, just fifty-three nautical miles from Mogadishu, went somewhat more smoothly and provided enough fuel to locate the embassy and depart from Mogadishu. Yet another refueling would be required during the flight back to *Guam*, which proved successful though problematic.⁹¹

Another source of problems during the flight to Mogadishu was navigation, because the Omega navigation system on the CH-53Es could not always acquire the three land-based signals it needed. The part of the Indian Ocean in which the task force operated had dead spaces, resulting in inconsistent fixes.⁹² As a result, the pilots relied on dead reckoning (based on preflight calculations), pathfinding support from the KC-130 refuelers, and positive control from the ships while within radar range.⁹³ When the Omega could obtain fixes, the pilots used them as backups.

Launching beyond 466 miles would have multiplied the problems faced by the pilots in conducting the long-range insertion due to the additional refueling requirements and navigational complications. Conversely, waiting for a closer departure point would very likely have proved disastrous for the embassy personnel, as local conditions continued to worsen. In retrospect, it seems that

Moser, Doyle, and the planners of EASTERN EXIT aboard *Guam* calculated the launch point just about right.⁹⁴

After receiving the last inbound refueling and a final fix on their position from the KC-130s, the helicopter pilots began their approach into the city. If navigating across part of the Indian Ocean had been difficult, locating the embassy proved equally vexing. The initial information available during the planning phase regarding the location and configuration of the compound proved to be out of date and inaccurate.⁹⁵ A Marine warrant officer who accompanied Doyle from *Trenton* had served on the Marine security guard detachment in Somalia several years earlier, and he pointed out that the embassy had moved inland from the position indicated on their maps and planning documents.⁹⁶ Updated coordinates and an aerial photograph were received later in the planning process and proved helpful in identifying the new embassy location. They also eliminated any residual consideration of landing over the beach with surface forces, because the Marines would likely have had to fight their way across Mogadishu, and American leaders wanted to avoid becoming involved in Somalia's civil war. Despite updated information, the embassy compound proved difficult to identify from the air, particularly at low altitude in the early morning light.⁹⁷ The pilots spent nearly twenty minutes flying over Mogadishu and eventually made a second approach from the sea before finding their objective.⁹⁸

As the Super Stallions arrived over the U.S. embassy at approximately 0620 in the morning of 5 January, the compound was receiving a large volume of gunfire, and some 150 Somalis with ladders had gathered at one of the embassy walls.⁹⁹ Flying low into the cantonment area, the helicopters scattered the assembled miscreants and landed within the embassy grounds.¹⁰⁰ The Marines disembarked and established a perimeter to defend the compound and protect subsequent evacuations.¹⁰¹ The SEAL team assumed responsibility for protecting the ambassador and reinforced the Marine security guard detachment (Marines permanently stationed at the embassy, as opposed to those arriving in helicopters) protecting the chancery building.¹⁰²

The two helicopters remained on the ground for approximately one hour, as an Air Force AC-130 gunship loitered overhead to gather intelligence and offer fire support if required. The Super Stallions took off for their return flight to *Guam*—now some 350 miles away—with sixty-one evacuees, including all non-official Americans in the compound; the ambassadors from Nigeria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; and the Omani chargé d'affaires.¹⁰³ The original plan called for the CH-53Es to return to *Guam* and bring a second echelon of Marines into the embassy; Oats believed he needed another forty-four Marines to ensure security and process the evacuees efficiently and effectively. But when the two CH-53E helicopters departed with the evacuees, it would be a one-way trip.

After another difficult refueling in route, the Sea Stallions landed on the deck of *Guam* just under eight hours after their initial departure from the ship. They would not return to Mogadishu with reinforcements but rather fly to *Trenton*, where their role in the mission ended.¹⁰⁴

Doyle did not perceive a direct threat against the evacuation force in Mogadishu and, in conjunction with Moser, chose not to dispatch additional Marines.¹⁰⁵ Sending in more troops implied a longer operation and increased the number of people needing evacuation from the embassy. Although it was a risky call, events once again bore out Doyle's judgment. Even had Doyle wanted to insert the additional Marines, he would not have been able to do so with the CH-53Es, because their crews were exhausted from the wearing flight in and out of Mogadishu and not yet capable of another demanding mission. With the Super Stallions back on *Trenton*, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters stationed on board *Guam* would carry out subsequent evacuations, once the ships brought them within range of the embassy.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, Marines and embassy employees in Mogadishu prepared for subsequent evacuations, although the shortage of staff to operate the ECC severely hindered the process. With conditions worsening in the city, security remained marginal despite the arrival of the Navy and Marine Corps team. There had not been enough Marines on the helicopters to process evacuees efficiently and provide adequate security as well.¹⁰⁷ This had motivated Oats to request the forty-four additional Marines. He did not want to weaken perimeter security by using McAleer's Marines in the ECC but eventually felt it necessary to do so. The final decision not to send more troops into Mogadishu forced Bishop, Oats, and the other hard-pressed Americans to complete their tasks with the personnel on hand.¹⁰⁸ Doyle realized that Oats's job was difficult, but absent a concerted effort to storm the embassy he felt another high-risk insertion flight could not be justified.¹⁰⁹

Conditions worsened throughout Mogadishu, and consular representatives from numerous nations sought refuge in and evacuation through the American embassy. Bishop at first required foreign nationals to make their own ways to the embassy, but when the Soviet ambassador declared that he and his remaining staff would require assistance, Bishop agreed to escort them with permanent embassy security personnel. To augment this force he contracted the Somali police, under a Major Sayed, who agreed to support the effort for a fee. The ambassador used a similar approach in escorting members of the British mission into the American embassy.¹¹⁰ On one occasion, a team of Marines, SEALs, and embassy security personnel ventured into Mogadishu in hardened vehicles to rescue twenty-two people from the Office of Military Cooperation and return them safely to the embassy grounds.¹¹¹ The twenty-two included Colonel David

Stanley, the chief of the office, along with the ambassador from Kenya and members of his family and staff.¹¹²

The understaffed ECC established by Saunders on the embassy grounds worked hard to identify and process evacuees under difficult circumstances. Since augmentation of the evacuation force had been denied, Oats utilized members of the embassy staff along with, as noted, some of McAleer's Marines to provide administrative help (checking identities, screening potential evacuees, creating manifests, etc.), as best they could. Although ultimately successful, the preparation of evacuees for movement out of Mogadishu fell far short of ideal, causing problems at the departure site and aboard the ships—particularly in identifying and accounting for authorized evacuees.¹¹³ As the Marines within the embassy struggled with their problems, the officers and crews of *Guam* and *Trenton* began addressing the needs of evacuees. This included establishing a medical triage station, arranging berthing for both genders, caring for children, protecting individual property, accounting for evacuees by nationality and status, and providing food and clothing, while at the same time supporting operations ashore.¹¹⁴

As night approached on 5 January, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters—flying in four waves of five aircraft each—commenced evacuation operation off the decks of *Guam*, now positioned approximately thirty miles at sea. To minimize the risk of hostile fire, all evacuation flights by the Sea Knight helicopters occurred at night, with the embassy compound darkened. The Marine pilots and infantrymen used night-vision devices.¹¹⁵ Even with such equipment flight operations at night in an uncertain environment can be very dangerous, but the Marines believed they had better control of these complications than they would have had over the hostile elements that freely operated during daylight.¹¹⁶ The evacuation started smoothly until Major Sayed, who had earlier assisted in the transportation of foreign consular personnel into the American embassy, suddenly arrived with two trucks full of soldiers. Carrying a radio and hand grenade, Sayed demanded that the evacuation cease immediately—his government had not approved the flights.¹¹⁷ Bishop and Oats refused to halt the operations, and the ambassador ultimately persuaded the Somali officer not to interfere.¹¹⁸ Bishop accomplished this through skillful negotiation, the help of several thousand dollars, and the keys to an embassy automobile of Sayed's choice. In the process, Bishop managed to take possession of the major's radio, to prevent him from calling antiaircraft fire on the departing helicopters.¹¹⁹

This incident created some confusion in the last evacuation waves, because Bishop insisted on remaining in the compound so as to be available to handle such problems through the end of the evacuation. He and his security team had been scheduled to depart in the third wave, but his decision to remain to the end

meant that only four helicopters on the third wave were full and departed as planned. The fifth helicopter remained on the ground until the arrival of the fourth wave. Having an extra helicopter in the final wave created confusion, causing inaccuracies in the serial manifests and the helicopter loading plan. That confusion in turn nearly resulted in a small communications team's missing the last flight out of Mogadishu (the crew chief on one of the Sea Knights spotted the Marines and placed them aboard his aircraft).¹²⁰ Ultimately, all personnel approved or designated for evacuation, including the entire NEO force, departed safely and arrived on board *Guam* or *Trenton*.¹²¹ As the last helicopter departed, a large mob entered the embassy grounds, looting and destroying everything in sight. Well before sunrise on 6 January 1991, the last Sea Knight set down on the deck of *Guam* and Ambassador Bishop declared the evacuation complete.¹²²

The final evacuation flight occurred without the support of the AC-130, because the gunship had detected a radar of the type associated with a Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missile site tracking it and had moved off station. The presence of SA-2 missiles confirmed the commanders' concerns about the presence of sophisticated weapons in Somalia. The SA-2 posed a definite threat to the AC-130 aircraft, but Doyle had not been concerned for the CH-46 helicopters, because he believed they would fly too low to be tracked by its radars.¹²³

The amphibious evacuation in Mogadishu ultimately extracted 281 people, including sixty-one Americans, thirty-nine Soviet citizens, seventeen British citizens, twenty-six Germans, and various numbers from twenty-eight other nations.¹²⁴ This included twelve heads of diplomatic missions—eight ambassadors and four *chargés d'affaires*. Unfortunately, Bishop had determined that none of the many Somali foreign service nationals in the embassy compound could be evacuated, although they had remained loyal. Bishop did not even have enough cash to pay all their wages due. Though they faced an uncertain future, the Somalis accepted their fate, remained on their job to the end, and never attempted to rush the helicopters or create serious problems for the evacuation effort.¹²⁵

The influx of civilians on *Guam* and *Trenton* severely taxed their resources and ability to provide support, of course. But Saffell described the response of the sailors and Marines as "awesome," noting that they gladly gave berthing space and personal items to ease the plight of the evacuees.¹²⁶ Additionally, the *Guam's* medical staff treated one evacuee with an abdominal gunshot wound and another with a knife wound.¹²⁷ Also, the Sudanese ambassador's wife gave birth to a baby boy on board *Guam*. (In keeping with an old Navy tradition, the lad's name was engraved on the inside of the ship's bell.)¹²⁸

On 11 January *Trenton* and *Guam* off-loaded their passengers in Muscat, Oman, without fanfare and resumed their duties in support of DESERT SHIELD

and DESERT STORM. Bishop had wanted the evacuees transported to Mombasa, but Schwarzkopf ordered the ships back into the area of impending conflict in the Gulf of Oman.¹²⁹ Omani officials were at first reluctant to accept the refugees, but stellar work by the American ambassador in Oman persuaded them to do so. Before taking leave of the sailors and Marines, Ambassador Bishop praised their competence and professionalism, concluding his remarks by saying, “Few of us would have been alive today if we had been outside your reach. It was only due to your efforts that we made it.”¹³⁰

In many ways, EASTERN EXIT is a textbook example of how to conduct an amphibious evacuation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, General Alfred Gray, referred to it as a “very complex and somewhat dangerous mission.”¹³¹ Gray should know about complex and dangerous NEOs, since he played a prominent role in the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975.¹³² Although Gray also called the mission “flawless,” many problems arose throughout the action. But the professionalism of Marines and sailors overcame those obstacles with solutions sufficient to ensure success.¹³³ The operation demonstrated that the amphibious capability of the United States could respond to nearly any exigency virtually anywhere in the world, even when distracted by larger and more important missions, such as DESERT SHIELD and the upcoming DESERT STORM. Navy and Marine Corps leaders considered EASTERN EXIT a demonstration of the excellence of the sea services and an example of the value of amphibious capability within the expeditionary environment. The operation also demonstrated that modern amphibious actions depend as much on aviation assets—particularly helicopters—as on traditional surface landing vehicles. This is not surprising, considering that the U.S. Marine Corps pioneered the military use of helicopters for a variety of applications, including vertical assault during the Korean War.¹³⁴

As part of the complete revision of Marine Corps doctrine that occurred during the second half of the 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant from 1995 to 1999, used EASTERN EXIT as a case study for understanding and implementing expeditionary concepts in the emerging new world order.¹³⁵ More important, EASTERN EXIT made clear that the professional Navy and Marine Corps team that had matured over several hundred years continued to provide American political and diplomatic leaders with a range of military options unknown anywhere else in the world, or at any other time in history.¹³⁶ The commitment of forces to EASTERN EXIT had no impact on the subsequent war with Iraq. After off-loading the evacuees in Oman, the entire task force returned to normal duty and fully participated in SEA SOLDIER IV, the important final workup for DESERT STORM.¹³⁷ As subsequent events showed, Schwarzkopf’s air and ground war

proved sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein's forces—with a little help from the amphibious feint of LaPlante and Jenkins. The ability to move seamlessly from DESERT SHIELD to EASTERN EXIT to SEA SOLDIER IV and on to DESERT STORM clearly illustrates the capabilities needed to implement the operational and strategic concepts espoused in “. . . From the Sea” and “Operational Maneuver from the Sea.”

EASTERN EXIT received little press coverage due to the larger events of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, yet many in the Department of Defense appreciated its significance. Not only did the Marine Corps include it as a case study in subsequent doctrinal publications, but the Navy also mentioned it in Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*.¹³⁸ Captain Moser assisted in the lessons-learned process by preparing an instructional seminar that became part of the curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College, in Norfolk, Virginia.¹³⁹ Lieutenant Colonel McAleer also created a briefing, which he presented to the Landing Force Training Commands at the amphibious bases in Little Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California.¹⁴⁰ More notably, he briefed the material to Captain Braden J. Phillips, Colonel Michael W. Hagee, and the 11th MEU (SOC) staff during their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. As commanders of Amphibious Squadron 1 and 11th MEU (SOC), respectively, Phillips and Hagee led the next Navy and Marine Corps team to implement the precepts of “. . . From the Sea.” In August 1992, the United States returned to Somalia to assist in humanitarian relief during operation PROVIDE RELIEF—a precursor to Operation RESTORE HOPE. That September, the PHIBRON 1 and 11th MEU (SOC) team deployed to the Indian Ocean and returned to the Horn of Africa as the United States attempted to help a nation in crisis.¹⁴¹

After the American evacuation of its embassy in Mogadishu, conditions had continued to deteriorate in Somalia. To some extent, the large quantities of weapons and ammunition previously supplied by the Soviet Union and later by the United States fueled the fighting. As rebel factions gained ground against Siad Barre, they often captured armories and munitions supply centers with which to arm their forces and allies.¹⁴² By late January 1991—about two weeks after the evacuation and just as General Schwarzkopf began the air operations phase of DESERT STORM—forces under Mohamed Farah Aideed drove Siad Barre from Mogadishu and, by May 1992, into exile in Kenya and Nigeria. Although many factors contributed to the defeat of Siad Barre and the collapse of his rule, Aideed was largely responsible for the final victory. He not only drove Siad Barre out of Somalia but also defeated his three subsequent efforts to regain control. Aideed believed this success earned him the right to lead the nation, but other warlords disagreed. The clans could not unite to form a new government; warfare continued, and chaotic conditions persisted. The extreme violence

made food distribution difficult, creating critical shortages in many parts of Somalia. Reports fostered an impression of widespread starvation, causing the United Nations to request international intervention to alleviate suffering and restore order. It was for this reason that, a year and a half after EASTERN EXIT, American naval expeditionary forces would return to Somalia and once again apply the concepts of “. . . From the Sea.”¹⁴³

NOTES

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 1990); *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: White House, August 1991); Michael Klase, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Rogue Doctrine’: The Pentagon’s Quest for a Post-Cold War Military Strategy,” *Middle East Report* (Fall 1998), pp. 12–15, 47.
2. U.S. Navy Dept., “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century” (Washington, D.C.: September 1992), signature page (unnumbered) reprinted in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents*, ed. John B. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp. 87–99; Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 2004), pp. 77–78.
3. Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s*, pp. 14, 87–88.
4. The term “expeditionary” is subject to various interpretations, but for purposes of this article it “implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly on short notice to crises in distant lands.” “Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unobtrusive forward presence, which may be intensified or withdrawn as required on short notice” (U.S. Navy Dept., “. . . From the Sea,” p. 5).
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–7.
6. E. T. O’Brien, “From the Sea—to Where?” (thesis paper, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 1993), p. 6.
7. Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet to Chief of Naval Operations, *Draft CJCS Report on Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 31 December 1992, folder 00 Subject filed, 3000–5000 Jan–Mar 1993, 5000 folder, Jan–Mar 1993, Naval Historical Center [hereafter NHC], Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
8. Norman E. Ehlert, “Naval Expeditionary Forces and Crisis Response,” in *Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy*, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 211–12.
9. Gary I. Wilson, Chris Yunker, and Franklin C. Spinney, “OMFTS: Innovation, Deep Maneuver, and Aviation,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1997), p. 21.
10. U.S. Navy Dept., “. . . From the Sea,” pp. 5, 9–10.
11. Maj. Gen. Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., USMC (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, Chantilly, Virginia, 11 February 2008.
12. Maj. Gen. Henry W. Jenkins, Jr., to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, memorandum, 16 December 1991 (copy provided to the author by Major General Jenkins).
13. Adm. Stanley R. Arthur, USN (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, Newport, Rhode Island, 21 November 2007; Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller, Jr., *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: NHC, 1998), pp. 52, 110, 325.
14. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007; Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, pp. 16–17, 135–40, 366; Marvin Pokrant, *Desert Shield at Sea: What the Navy Really Did* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1999), pp. 169–71, 173–74; H. Norman Schwarzkopf

- and Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 437.
15. The amphibious force ultimately consisted of Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU) 2 (thirteen ships), PHIBGRU 3 (thirteen ships), PHIBRON 5 (five ships), 4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU (SOC), totaling thirty-one ships and some seventeen thousand Marines afloat. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; Vice Adm. John B. "Bat" LaPlante, USN (Ret.), to Gary J. Ohls, 3 October 2007; Pokrant, *Desert Shield at Sea*, pp. 78–86, 164–68, 238.
 16. *Department of Defense: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, as amended through 14 September 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 12 April 2001), p. 103; Ronald J. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1998), p. 103.
 17. Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, p. 254.
 18. LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007; Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 104, 107.
 19. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007.
 20. Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, pp. 149–50; Pokrant, *Desert Storm at Sea*, pp. 100, 238.
 21. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
 22. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
 23. Rear Adm. Charles R. Saffell, Jr., USN (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, Fairfax, Virginia, 11 February 2008.
 24. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008.
 25. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007; Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
 26. Capt. Alan B. Moser, USN (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, 13 October 2007, Virginia Beach, Virginia, Commander, Amphibious Squadron Six, *Command History for 1991 (OPNAV Report 5750-1)*, 17 March 1992, Post 1990 Command File, Type, Amphibious, CH1991, NHC Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
 27. Col. Robert P. McAleer, USMC (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, Newport, Rhode Island, 28 November 2007; Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
 28. Col. James J. Doyle, Jr., USMC (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, Valley Forge Military Academy and College, Wayne, Pennsylvania, 20 October 2007; Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, p. 150.
 29. LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
 30. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
 31. LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
 32. Adam B. Siegel, "Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991" (professional paper, Strike and Amphibious Warfare Department, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, October 1991), p. 8.
 33. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007.
 34. James K. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," *Foreign Service Journal* (March 1991), p. 27.
 35. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 11.
 36. Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 12.
 37. Terrance Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 15; Moser interview, 13 October 2007.
 38. LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007; Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 15–17.
 39. Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 12–13.
 40. Doyle interview, 20 October 2007; Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 13, 15.
 41. Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
 42. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007; Moser

- interview, 13 October 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 12; T. W. Parker, "Operation Sharp Edge," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (May 1991), pp. 102–106; James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe, *On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990–2003* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2004), pp. 129–32.
43. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007; Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
44. LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007; Commander, Amphibious Squadron Six, *Command History for 1991*.
45. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 27.
46. Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, pp. 17–19; Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp. 6–11; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 7; Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates, "My Clan against the World": *U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992–1994*, with Versalle F. Washington (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp. 15–16.
47. Robert J. Schneller, Jr., *Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet* (Washington, D.C.: NHC, 2007), p. 48; Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, pp. 19–21; Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu*, p. 36.
48. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 27.
49. Robert A. Doss, "Out of Africa: Rescue from Mogadishu," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (May 1992), p. 104; Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," pp. 27–28.
50. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 10–12; Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (Washington, D.C.: January 1996), pp. 1–3.
51. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," pp. 27–29.
52. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 7–9, 11; Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Warfare*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3 (Washington, D.C.: 16 April 1998), pp. 35, 77, 111–15.
53. Capt. Alan B. Moser, USN (Ret.), to Gary J. Ohls, 5 February 2008.
54. Doyle interview, 20 October 2007; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
55. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 84; Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Doyle interview, 20 October 2007.
56. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 85.
57. Jane Perlez, "Effort to Evacuate Foreigners from Somalia Stalls," *New York Times*, 4 January 1991.
58. When considering incursions into areas not controlled by friendly forces, the U.S. military categorizes the threat environment as permissive, uncertain, or hostile as a means of determining the degree of force necessary to accomplish its mission. Joint Publication 1-02, p. 390.
59. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 81.
60. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), p. 209.
61. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008.
62. Saffell interview, 11 February 2008; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 3, 5, 11–12.
63. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 29; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
64. Doyle interview, 20 October 2007.
65. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 29.
66. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008.
67. Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
68. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 85; Doyle interview, 20 October 2007; Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 11–15.
69. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 104, 107; LaPlante to Ohls, 3 October 2007.
70. For air and sea navigation, the U.S. military services measure distance in nautical miles, which are slightly longer than statute miles (1 nautical mile = 1.150779 statute miles). One nautical mile is equal to one minute of arc on the earth's surface, or 1,852 meters. All U.S. operations since 1954 have utilized nautical

- miles. Joint Publication 1-02, p. 363; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 22.
71. Ray L. Clark, Jr., "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Major Considerations for the Operational Commander" (professional paper, Naval War College, 16 June 1995), p. 14; Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 87; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 2–3, 11.
 72. William S. Bradley and Richard D. Mullen, "Marine Super Stallions to the Rescue," *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1991), p. 56.
 73. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 87.
 74. Col. Robert P. McAleer, USMC (Ret.), to Gary J. Ohls, 3 June 2008; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 18.
 75. In Marine Corps tradition, the term "Marines" when used in conjunction with a unit designation refers to a regiment. For example, "2nd Marines" means 2nd Marine Regiment. A regimental landing team is a reinforced regiment that takes the numerical designator of the base regiment. Therefore, when the 2nd Marines is reinforced and designated a regimental landing team, it becomes RLT-2.
 76. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
 77. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
 78. Oats was a member of 4th MEB, G-3 section, who had been assigned to *Guam* due to space limitations aboard *Nassau*. Any such MEB staff officer located on *Guam* was available to assist Doyle in both the planning and actual operations associated with EASTERN EXIT. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008.
 79. Doyle interview, 20 October 2007; Col. James J. Doyle, Jr., USMC (Ret.), to Gary J. Ohls, 9 June 2008.
 80. Doyle to Ohls, 9 June 2008; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
 81. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 42.
 82. Deborah Schmidt, "Marines Evacuate 260 from Embassy in Somalia," *Navy Times*, 21 January 1991, p. 4; Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 90–91.
 83. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 86.
 84. Moser interview, 13 October 2007; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
 85. Arthur interview, 21 November 2007.
 86. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 22 note, 44.
 87. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 88.
 88. The captains of both ships involved in the NEO—Saffell of *Guam* and Capt. James A. Curtis of *Trenton*—were naval aviators, which proved very helpful throughout the operation. Doyle to Ohls, 9 June 2008.
 89. Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
 90. Ibid.
 91. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 3, 23, 25, 44.
 92. C. W. D'Ambra, "The Need for Improved Helicopter Navigation Systems" (Marine Corps Command and Staff College paper, Quantico, Virginia, 1992), p. 7.
 93. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 88; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 3, 22–23, 26; Clark, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," p. 16.
 94. Bradley and Mullen, "Marine Super Stallions to the Rescue," p. 56.
 95. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 85; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. vi, 3.
 96. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 16, 20.
 97. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 89.
 98. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 24, 26.
 99. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," pp. 26, 30.
 100. Bradley and Mullen, "Marine Super Stallions to the Rescue," p. 57.
 101. Adam B. Siegel, "Lessons Learned from Operation Eastern Exit," *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1992), pp. 75–76.
 102. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 87, 89; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 28.
 103. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 30; Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 89; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007; Jane Perlez, "U.S. and Italy Evacuating Foreigners in Somalia," *New York Times*, 6 January 1991.

104. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 24–25.
105. Doyle interview, 20 October 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 30.
106. Jenkins interview, 11 February 2008.
107. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 32.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 32.
109. Doyle interview, 20 October 2007; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
110. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 30; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
111. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 28–29.
112. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 26; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
113. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 30–32.
114. Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
115. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 33, 35, 45.
116. Doss, "Out of Africa," p. 104.
117. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," pp. 26, 30; Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 93.
118. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
119. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 30.
120. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 33–34.
121. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
122. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 91–92; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 2, 33–34.
123. Doss, "Out of Africa," p. 105; Doyle interview, 20 October 2007.
124. Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 38.
125. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu" p. 30; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
126. Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
127. Clark, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," pp. 12–13; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," p. 1.
128. Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
129. Bishop, "Escape from Mogadishu," p. 31.
130. Adam B. Siegel, "An American Entebbe," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (May 1992), pp. 99–100.
131. Schmidt, "Marines Evacuate 260 from Embassy in Somalia," p. 4.
132. Richard E. Carey and D. A. Quinlan, "Operation Frequent Wind," *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 1976), pp. 22, 24, and (April 1976), p. 40.
133. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 80; Siegel, "Eastern Exit," pp. 41–47; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
134. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 1, p. 50; and *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 4, pp. 163–65, 186–90, 206–12; both (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, 1954).
135. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3, pp. 111–15.
136. Siegel, "An American Entebbe," p. 100.
137. McAleer interview, 28 November 2007; Saffell interview, 11 February 2008.
138. See U.S. Navy Dept., *Naval Warfare*, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: 28 March 1994), p. 11; Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3, pp. 111–15.
139. Moser to Ohls, 5 February 2008.
140. In 1994, these two commands were renamed "Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups" as a result of the shift in focus embodied within "... From the Sea."
141. Capt. Braden J. Phillips, USN (Ret.), interview with Gary J. Ohls, 14 March 2008, Long Beach, California; Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview with Gary J. Ohls, 23 October 2007; McAleer interview, 28 November 2007.
142. Sahnoun, *Somalia*, p. 17; David Volman, "Africa and the New World Order," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (March 1993), p. 5.
143. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, p. 95; Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, pp. 12–16.

BOOK REVIEWS

NEW INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ORDER

Klare, Michael T. *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008. 352pp. \$26

In this timely volume, Michael Klare, author of thirteen books, including *Resource Wars* and *Blood and Oil*, provides in-depth projections of global demand and supply for all forms of energy, including petroleum, natural gas, coal, and uranium. A key theme is the confluence of two troubling trends. The first is the unprecedented height of future energy demand (one estimate foresees a 57 percent increase in global energy consumption by 2030). China and India are expected to account for nearly half of this increase. “Peak oil” is shorthand for the second trend. The world has been “seeking more” and “finding less.” “Easy oil” is displaced with higher-cost “tough oil,” found in unstable or inaccessible regions and therefore more difficult or expensive to extract. Other nonrenewable energy resources show a similar trend. Further, increasing carbon emissions make the use of more abundant coal resources problematic.

Klare assesses in detail the geopolitics of energy region by region, with a replay of “the Great Game,” as nations compete for access, power, and control.

Russia’s rise as “an energy juggernaut” under former president Vladimir Putin is particularly impressive. Putin concluded that energy was the key strategic factor in securing Russia’s economic security, and as such must be commanded by the state. Klare details how Putin successfully renationalized control of energy resources, with the value of Gazprom (the largest Russian extractor of natural gas in the world) rising from \$9 billion in 2000 to \$250–\$300 billion in 2006.

To avoid a replay of Cold War–like energy competition, Klare argues, cooperation between nations is necessary—and should begin between the United States and China, which will account for 39 percent of international energy consumption by 2030. Proposals he discusses include developing petroleum alternatives; increased industrial efficiency; climate-friendly coal; and collaborative efforts in these and other areas with Russia, Japan, India, and Europe. Klare’s comprehensive assessment of a “new international energy order” will be invaluable to strategists as they strive to better understand what is

driving nation-states and international relations today.

RICHMOND M. LLOYD
Naval War College



Smith, Paul. *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007. 258pp. \$79.95

Paul Smith's *The Terrorism Ahead* is a superbly written blend of history, contemporary analysis, and personal reflection. It is the product of thorough research and study plus a decade's worth of vigorous debate with an international cast of students, colleagues (Smith is currently a professor at the Naval War College), counterterrorism practitioners, and academic specialists. The author's arguments thus merit serious and thoughtful consideration. As a participant in many of these debates (I am a former colleague of Smith's, and we did not always agree), I can attest to the "trials by fire" to which the ideas expressed in this book were subjected.

The Terrorism Ahead provides a comprehensive, balanced, yet succinct overview of the key contemporary debates in terrorism studies. Smith skillfully examines terrorism in its wider historical, geopolitical, and technological contexts. This contextualization of the global environment in which terrorism lives and evolves is the book's great strength, and what makes it a valuable contribution to the literature.

Chapter 2, "Historical Evolution," is one of the best one-stop short histories of terrorism in print. One might also single out chapter 8, where Smith tackles terrorism financing and associated

legal issues. The closing chapter presents a compelling analysis of the "root causes" debate and its implications for U.S. policy, plus a thought-provoking look at the future. In this chapter, Smith argues that five conditions will shape terrorism in the years ahead: demography, globalization, transnational crime, weak/failed states, and climate change. Smith is one of the few people working in terrorism studies to seriously consider the implications of climate change.

Throughout the work, Smith also explains how changes in communications, information, and weapons technologies have helped shape the conduct of terrorism. It would have been interesting, therefore, if he had added a discussion of emerging and predicted advances in technologies—such as nanotechnology and genetic engineering—that may provide future tools for terrorists.

All in all, *The Terrorism Ahead* is an engaging, comprehensive, and thoughtful consideration of the challenge of terrorism. It should find itself equally at home on the bookshelves of specialists, general readers, and students.

CHRISTOPHER JASPARRO
U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia



Cordesman, Anthony. *Salvaging American Defense: The Challenge of Strategic Overstretch*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007. 488pp. \$49.95

Anthony Cordesman, current holder of the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for International and Security Studies in Washington, D.C., is one of the most prolific defense analysts in the United States today. *Salvaging*

American Defense is much like the extant body of research produced by Cordesman over the last few decades. It is filled with information that is intended to be comprehensive, even encyclopedic. Yet this approach can have its drawbacks. The book's subtitle promises to discuss "the challenge of strategic overstretch" and its chapters are organized around ten specific challenges, yet the author fails to offer a sustained argument about how to grapple with them. Instead, the chapters offer program-by-program vignettes, military service-by-military service comparisons, and agency-by-agency descriptions of difficulties. Within the vignettes, comparisons, and descriptions are piecemeal solutions—some of which make an enormous amount of sense, while others smack of improvisation or are contradictory to diagnoses and solutions offered pages earlier.

Evaluating the individual parts of so massive a work is difficult. Absent expert knowledge of an extremely wide range of issues and programs, this reviewer is left to seek out those modest areas of national security where he has some competence or general insight. Here the news is largely positive. Cordesman's discussions of U.S. Navy force structure, policies, and programs seem largely sensible, even when his language is somewhat intemperate. It is hard to argue with the author's diagnoses and solutions when he uses the words of public officials and military officers, not to mention the analyses of seasoned analysts, to underpin his arguments. His account of military "transformation" is reasoned, although in my judgment Cordesman may be a bit too enamored of the promised benefits of transformation and too hopeful that the

national security establishment can overcome what is perhaps the largest problem with transformation: "It is brutally clear that strategy and planning documents that are not integrated with force planning and long-term budgets become hollow wish lists or—at the minimum—more of a problem than part of the solution."

Like many defense experts, Cordesman is not shy about offering recommendations to fix what is wrong with U.S. national security policy. In his final chapter, he offers fourteen "major changes," all of which are ambitious. Unsurprisingly, given the enormous scope of these recommendations, Cordesman offers few details about how they might be implemented.

PETER DOMBROWSKI
Naval War College



Thornton, Rod. *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2007. 256pp. \$69.95

Asymmetric warfare, although anything but new, is among the current political-military hot topics of the day. The success of al-Qa'ida in striking the World Trade Center, and the difficulties encountered by the United States and its partner countries in achieving stability and security in Iraq and Afghanistan, has convinced some observers that those who would wage asymmetric warfare against powerful states may now have the upper hand. Other analysts, less willing to go quite so far, agree that asymmetry will be a notable facet of most military conflicts for the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, discussions of asymmetric warfare all too often devolve into efforts to push pet programs or ideas, attack or defend political leaders, and substitute emotion for understanding. Thankfully, *Asymmetric Warfare* is cut from a different cloth. Dr. Rod Thornton, an authority on security issues at King's College London, has produced a practical and useful primer on this important subject. In doing so, he also dispels several common misconceptions, including the ideas that *asymmetric* means *unequal*, and that asymmetric warfare is solely a tool of the weak.

While asymmetric warfare can be practiced by any actor, it is the modern terrorist who creates the most concern. Thornton takes a close look at terrorists as adversaries and how "new" terrorists differ from their historical predecessors. He identifies three characteristics as particularly important: an increased degree of fervor, an increased ability to implement attacks, and an increased ability to cause mass casualties. The author takes the time to explain why these changes have occurred and how they might manifest themselves in future attacks.

Thornton does not overlook the relationship among terrorism and asymmetric warfare and strategic communication. In addition, he explores how an asymmetric opponent would seek to win a war through attacks on infrastructure and the use of deception, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. Each of these issues is dealt with in some detail.

Asymmetric Warfare is not a perfect book. A deeper discussion of historical examples of asymmetric warfare would have been a powerful addition to the work. It may also be that Thornton

overstates the vulnerabilities of some of the unmanned systems he examines. However, these flaws are minor at best. *Asymmetric Warfare* is a valuable addition to current security-related literature. It is especially useful for readers new to the field who are seeking a cogent and readable description of asymmetric warfare, its various facets and aspects, and potential methods that might be used to deal with asymmetric foes.

RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College



Kamphausen, Roy, and Andrew Scobell, eds. *Right-Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military*. Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College, 2007. 582pp. (Information about free copies can be obtained at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs.)

This edited volume combines high-level inquiry into the larger purposes and dimensions of People's Liberation Army (PLA) reforms with fresh data that are difficult to find elsewhere. Its overall theme, the likely future dimensions and missions of China's military, is addressed in contributions from leading experts in the field.

The chapters, organized by service, are solidly grounded in Chinese sources and knowledge of Chinese organizations. In a characteristically sound overview of China's national military strategy, David Finkelstein is scrupulous in his explanation of the relative authority of various Chinese military documents. Evan Medeiros assesses that while Chinese nuclear doctrine has become increasingly sophisticated (while remaining opaque to foreign analysts, particularly in the

area of “no first use”), “the development of conventional missile doctrine is . . . potentially incomplete.”

There is attention to both hardware and software, with particular focus on the human dimension of PLA capabilities. In a persuasive defense of the value of open-source research, Dennis Blasko explains that the ground forces, which still dominate the PLA, are modernizing and undertaking new nontraditional missions, including domestic and international humanitarian operations. While restructuring and modernization are likely to occupy the ground forces for years, Blasko notes that salaries for many PLA personnel doubled in 2006.

A wide range of possibilities is considered. Phillip Saunders and Erik Quam offer several alternative scenarios for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) force structure, and insights into the key factors that shape them. In assessing future PLAAF operational concepts, Kevin Lanzit and Kenneth Allen state that the PLAAF is trying “to become actively involved in managing China’s military space program with an emphasis on the informatization aspects.”

While the authors are careful to offer balanced assessments of capabilities and limitations, it is clear that dramatic new possibilities are emerging for the PLA. In his chapter on command, control, and targeting, Larry Wortzel judges that PLA “informatization” could be remarkably rapid and successful. “PLA officers seem convinced that using ballistic missiles to attack naval battle groups is a viable concept, and they obviously are actively pursuing the capability,” Wortzel asserts, adding that “the PLA will have near real-time regional intelligence collection capability from space in a few short years, if it does not already have it.” On this note, Michael McDevitt estimates that China “currently

has seven satellites in orbit that can contribute to ocean surveillance.” China’s first radar satellite, launched in 2006, “can probably inspect objects as small as twenty meters in length and is thus excellent for identifying ships.” While Chinese nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) development faces a high barrier to entry in terms of acoustic signature reduction, McDevitt judges, China’s navy may be preparing “to arm nuclear attack submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.” Bernard Cole projects that, despite current limitations in naval aviation and training, “the PLAN of 2016–17, at three times its present size, will dominate East Asian navies, with the possible exception of the JMSDF [Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force] . . . and will offer a very serious challenge to the U.S. Navy when it operates in those waters.”

In the final chapter, Ellis Joffe concludes that the need to deter Taiwan from declaring independence has driven much of China’s recent military modernization, and Beijing is growing increasingly confident in this regard. Yet Beijing remains far from reaching its presumed goal of achieving a “paramount position in the East Asian region.” It is hoped that this volume’s contributors will continue to probe the possibility of such a transition occurring—with the understanding that much may remain unclear to Beijing’s leaders themselves.

ANDREW S. ERICKSON
Naval War College



Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes, eds. *Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008. 226pp. \$49.95

As the first decade of the twenty-first century draws to a close, the most

comprehensive changes in global economic activity, the global correlation of military force, and relationships among globally significant political actors are taking place in Asia. The fact that so many Asian nations rely heavily on oceanborne commerce for petroleum is but one reason why the course of these developments must depend on how the parties concerned exercise sea power. Thus, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes's volume of essays by leading academics on Asian nations' experiences and practices of maritime strategy is timely. Yoshihara sets a high standard for the other authors in his introduction, where he specifies issues he intends for the work to address, and identifies the key questions hanging over contemporary Asian maritime affairs with unusual clarity of thought and equally exceptional clarity of expression.

Different chapters address Yoshihara's questions from different perspectives. Chapter 2 presents a broad narrative of Chinese maritime activity, while chapters 3 and 4 present detailed historical studies of Anglo-Japanese relations and the U.S. Navy's operations in the Pacific region, respectively. The book then returns to twenty-first-century concerns, with chapters on the People's Republic of China's (PRC) ongoing naval buildup, the PRC's oil tanker fleet, Indian maritime activity, Japanese maritime thought, and China's maritime relations with Southeast Asia.

All these chapters are relevant to Yoshihara's initial questions. The questions, however, raise more issues than any book could possibly address. Readers of Gabriel Collins's study of the PRC's tanker fleet, for instance, are likely to want a comparative analysis of how other Asian countries transport

their oil. Chapters on India, Japan, and Southeast Asia are invaluable, but Russia, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea surely deserve attention as well. Numerous authors mention Alfred Thayer Mahan, but none explore the points he raises in *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Politics* (Little, Brown, 1905). *The Problem of Asia* emphasizes the importance of Africa and the Middle East to what twenty-first-century writers might call Asia's sea lines of communication. A chapter on the PRC's trade and diplomatic activity in those regions could have been revealing, whether or not the author shares Mahan's views. Since this book could never have covered all aspects of Asian maritime strategy completely, Yoshihara might have helped readers understand its particular contribution by including a conclusion summarizing the steps the authors had taken toward that goal. Readers are, however, almost certain to find this book valuable in their own studies of sea power in Asia.

THOMAS M. KANE
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The University of Hull



Oren, Michael B. *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2007. 800pp. \$17.95

Michael Oren's *Power, Faith, and Fantasy* is an indispensable historical account of America's encounters with the volatile Middle East. A renowned historian, Oren fills a vacuum in the literature, as most of it dates to the post-World War II era.

Oren begins by identifying the central motifs (the "golden threads") of America's involvement in the region since the

1700s. As he notes, “The most tangible and pervasive of [these] themes is power.” During the Barbary Wars, the United States Navy displayed its newfound power to good effect. The second theme is faith. He portrays this in his description of the countless American missionaries who toiled under the harshest conditions. The third theme is fantasy—that is, the region’s exotic and mysterious images and stereotypes. Consistent throughout the book is the discussion of how crucial the U.S. Navy was to the region. Naval War College readers will enjoy the insight into the Navy’s earliest ventures and missions in the Middle East.

In spite of the massive changes that have occurred in the region since 1776 or indeed over the last century—the discovery of oil, the two world wars, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the peace process, and terrorism—Oren makes a good case that today’s problems between the United States and its various Middle Eastern partners and adversaries revolve around these same intersecting threads. He emphasizes in particular the dire need to make a shift from “fantasy” to reality in U.S.–Middle East relations generally.

This extensively researched book is well written, comprehensive, and fascinating. Given our dilemmas in U.S.–Middle East relations today, policy makers and the general public alike will benefit greatly by reading it.

HAYAT ALVI-AZIZ
Naval War College



Bodansky, Yossef. *Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda's Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror*. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. 464pp. \$27.95

The importance to the global jihad of the Chechen wars that have roiled the Caucasus region for more than fifteen years is something Western commentators on terrorism persistently underestimate. For most Western observers, the battle for Chechnya has more to do with tribal-cum-national conflicts and human rights abuses than fighting against the forces of armed radical Islam. Russian claims that it, too, is waging its own “war on terror” (a view that held currency in the United States only briefly after 9/11) now fall on deaf ears. For most people outside the former Soviet Union, the arduous Russian struggle against Chechen mujahideen has evaporated from the headlines and amounts to a forgotten war.

This is unfortunate for many reasons, not least that al-Qa‘ida considers the jihad in the Caucasus to be a major front in its global campaign. The first Chechen war (1994 to 1996) was a humiliating debacle for Moscow that resulted in the establishment of a Chechen pseudostate, which soon fell under the influence of Islamic radicalism. Al-Qa‘ida believed this to be a clear win for its cause.

The second Chechen war, which began in 1999 and coincided with the rise of Vladimir Putin, presents a much different picture. For all intents and purposes, Russia has won—Moscow has successfully reestablished its authority over most of the breakaway region. For al-Qa‘ida, by the same token, Chechnya today is a much less promising venue than it was a decade ago.

The continuing neglect of Chechnya in the “terrorism studies” canon is, therefore, a problem. Chechnya has much to teach Western counterterrorists about

effective tactics, techniques, and procedures against the mujahideen. Russia's trial-and-error efforts there could prove important to Western audiences. A good book on this subject is therefore something very much to be desired.

Unfortunately, Yossef Bodansky's *Chechen Jihad* is not that book. The author is a prolific writer on terrorism in general and its radical Islamic variant in particular, but his viewpoint lacks perspective and subtlety. Bodansky's treatment of the Chechen conflict follows his usual pattern of offering a detailed, chronological narrative, veering into a "you are there" account, devoid of any real analysis. Moreover, the author boasts of many unnamed sources in Moscow's security and intelligence agencies that have given him the "real" story to which others are not privy. The reader is bluntly told that all is to be taken on faith, with no endnotes, as is customary in Bodansky's writings, so as to protect his sources. It is, therefore, impossible to determine where the author gets his material or what its validity may be. In this connection, Bodansky's silence on many controversies relating to Russian intelligence in its struggle with the mujahideen is both revealing and troubling.

In spite of all this, however, a close examination by anyone well versed in the subject will reveal that most of Bodansky's information is in fact gleaned not from clandestine meetings in dark alleys but from (translated) press accounts (it appears that Bodansky knows none of the relevant languages). In other words, the author is relying on practices associated with sensationalist journalism, not serious analysis, much less scholarship.

Chechen Jihad is best left on the shelf; it

has nothing of substance to offer serious students of al-Qa'ida and terrorism.

JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College



Scahill, Jeremy. *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. New York: Nation Books, 2007. 480pp. \$26.95

Jeremy Scahill, an investigative journalist for *The Nation*, takes on Blackwater and the privatization of war and security with a vengeance. His fervor and intensity, no doubt prized characteristics in the world of investigative journalism, are on display here in spades. Scahill deconstructs the legal, political, and moral issues that are interwoven with the use of private security contractors like Blackwater Lodge & Training Center, Inc., in admirable fashion, pointing out the substantial and vexing issues that are presented by corporations engaging in activities formerly and traditionally reserved for the armed forces of nation-states. Regrettably, however, his passion generates stray voltage as his manuscript degenerates into an attack on the Bush administration's Iraq war policy, and further regresses into an assault on the Bush administration generally, political conservatism, and the Christian right. By the final pages, Scahill's vitriol discredits him and takes the wind out of the sails of any reasonable argument he otherwise presents regarding the dangers posed by Blackwater and its sister companies. This is too bad, because the author's meticulous research and willingness to take on an administration patsy are commendable and necessary.

A cursory review of Scahill's online postings, blogs, and congressional testimony reveals a clear and evident bias. But hardly any reasonable military professional would argue that the actions of companies like Blackwater have not harmed the coalition forces' counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Downstream and third-order effects of these sometimes reckless and frequently arrogant mercenaries are not part of the calculation—they get paid for keeping the principal alive and unharmed. On the other hand, Scahill's rejection of private security companies as a *concept* leaves little room for the possibility that companies like Blackwater could be useful in the national security apparatus if future administrations and Congress could muster the political will to control them under an effective and feasible system of accountability. Moreover, while there is plenty to condemn about Blackwater's legacy, tactics, and management, that is only half of Scahill's story. That Blackwater founder Erik Prince is a deeply and evidently religious conservative is *prima facie* evidence, according to Scahill, that he and his business is or should be thoroughly discredited.

Finally, Scahill laments that Blackwater has been able to recruit seasoned intelligence and operational professionals, such as Cofer Black, without acknowledging that it is a common practice for corporations to recruit talent from the government, and vice versa. He paints Black, in particular, as a sellout, when Black's hiring by Blackwater only follows the typical pattern of Washington professionals across many vocations. Faulting his decision to move to the private sector is shallow and naive.

The bottom line on *Blackwater* is that it is worth reading. The book is a useful

medium to take stock of the myriad issues that confront policy makers on this controversial subject. Yet Scahill's antipathy toward all things Bush, Republican, and the Christian right ultimately takes over. Coupled with untidy organization and the author's tendency to repeat himself, this renders his work less constructive and credible than it otherwise might have been.

R. G. BRACKNELL
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Regimental Judge Advocate,
Regimental Combat Team 5, Al Asad, Iraq



Slim, Hugo. *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008. 300pp. \$29.95

Hugo Slim has written a remarkable and disturbing book that everyone concerned with the safety of "civilians" should read—and then join the public debate about protecting them. Slim states that while the word "civilian" has long been an ambiguous concept, it is one we must do more to support because it is grounded in basic Western values. He encourages wide public discussion about defending and expanding the civilian concept in an age of terrorism, failing states, and ethnic strife. He has fulfilled this purpose admirably, with a deep and wide breadth of scholarship that should spark serious debate at all levels.

This book is remarkable because the author, who has worked in humanitarian assistance for more than twenty years, tells of the horrendous evil that men do with a dispassionate tone that allows both the deadly logic of civilian killing and its terrible results to seep into the reader's mind. It is disturbing. This

reader was taken aback to realize that rather than build revulsion, the accumulation of damning evidence created the same “not my job” effect that allows nations to ignore atrocities against whole peoples.

Slim describes in detail the “seven spheres of civilian suffering”: direct violence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and sexual violence, forced movement, impoverishment, famine and disease, emotional suffering, and postwar suffering. The book’s most disturbing aspect is the six chapters that describe the painful details about civilian killing. Only one chapter is dedicated to promoting civilian protection. This offers practical expressions of philosopher Howard Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing human minds as Slim’s answer to the dilemma: reason, research, resonance (emotion and morality), representational redescription (shared identity), resources and rewards, real world events, and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions as to how to apply these levers, such as international criminal courts, fail to resonate with the same passion as the myriad justifications for civilian killing. But this may be the point: killing results from the strongest passions, while the act of sparing life results from the more enduring, yet more difficult to evoke, feelings of mercy, compassion, and love.

ROBERT L. PERRY
Naval War College



Gati, Charles. *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt*. Cold War International History Project. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 264pp. \$49.95

Historians are charged with applying twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents that, at the time, seem to be only a curious combination of blurring events. Charles Gati, a leading commentator on Central European history and politics, does just that in *Failed Illusions*, his study of the abortive Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the Soviet Union. His book was fifty years in the making, partly because many of his primary sources have only recently been made available. Although he was a firsthand observer of events in Hungary in the 1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure that it reflected an appropriate level of objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the time of the revolution, having recently been fired from a state-run newspaper for no ostensible reason. While this made him sympathetic to the revolution, he readily admits to a certain naiveté about why it was happening. This work is largely a result of his personal quest to retrospectively understand this seminal event that shaped his life. He emigrated to the United States shortly after the revolution.

Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary and the leader of the revolution, is the story’s protagonist. Through superb usage of primary and personal sources, Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic figure. The book’s most profound insights are in its handling of the decision makers in Moscow and Washington. Moscow possessed the ultimate power and was responsible for the decisions that led to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956. However, Gati’s use of recently opened records proves conclusively that Soviet leadership was not “trigger happy.” It is eye opening to see just how close the Soviet politburo came to allowing Hungary to

embark on its “Titoist” escapade. The de-Stalinization theme set by the Twentieth Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in February 1956 made a major impact on Soviet thinking. Nikita Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and even such hard-liners as Mikhail Suslov seemed predisposed to allow Budapest a significant degree of autonomy in its interpretation of communism. Were it not for the massacre of party officials in Budapest’s Republic Square, Gati argues, the revolution stood an excellent chance to succeed.

Perhaps the bigger nemesis was Washington. The combined incompetence of the Central Intelligence Agency; the misguided, provocative propaganda of the Radio Free Europe (RFE) team in Munich; and the White House refusal to focus on the plight of Budapest during the Suez crisis created a “perfect storm”—encouraging the Hungarian Revolution without any serious thought of ever supporting it. This would not have been so painful had not 96 percent of all Hungarians, most of whom ravenously devoured the RFE reports, thought that the United States would provide unlimited support for the revolution.

This account certainly warrants reading by history buffs and public policy makers alike. Gati has a way of personalizing the day-by-day accounts of the action in Budapest that makes for an easy read. However, the reader is left with a series of provocative questions. What made the Soviet politburo overturn its decision and ultimately send in tanks to Hungary? Was Washington capable of focusing on more than one flash point at a time? Would at least one fluent Hungarian-speaking CIA agent in Hungary have made a difference in U.S. policy? Fortunately for his readership, Gati

is not short of hindsight on any of these questions.

TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College



Pearlman, Michael D. *Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008. 352pp. \$29.95

Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as professor of history at the Army Command and General Staff College. He now offers a complete history of the political, diplomatic, and military factors leading to President Harry S. Truman’s April 1951 firing of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Far East. A presentation at times overdone for general readers, this scholarly work will interest those who specialize in American strategic and diplomatic decision making from post–World War II through the Korean War.

Problems between Truman and his viceroy in Asia began early in the Korean War. In August 1950 Truman ordered MacArthur to rescind a public statement sent to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in which MacArthur advocated preserving Taiwan for a future attack on mainland China. This statement was in direct conflict with White House policy to keep the war in Korea limited.

Late in December 1950, after the Chinese attacked across the Yalu River in Korea, MacArthur responded to a Joint Chiefs of Staff message with a counterproposal. He advocated these decisive destructive blows: a blockade of Chinese coastal areas, destruction of Chinese industrial capacities to wage

war, and Nationalist Chinese forces to counterattack on the mainland.

Early in 1951, when the Chinese communist forces began to falter in the face of tougher American and allied resistance, MacArthur became bolder and attacked the Truman administration's concept of limited war in Korea. On 24 March MacArthur preempted the administration by announcing his willingness to negotiate with enemy commanders.

Truman conferred with his key advisers and a consensus emerged that MacArthur's insubordination called for his dismissal. The occasion, though not the cause, was a letter from MacArthur to Joseph Martin, the senior Republican in the House of Representatives. The letter, which praised a speech of Martin's calling for a second front in China, was read into *The Congressional Record* on 5 April. Six days later, MacArthur was fired.

Pearlman's credentials are manifest. He has produced a thorough account of decision making, bureaucratic and partisan politics, and old grudges and resentments. The latter are sometimes extraneous, but to his credit, he also examines another aspect of the Korean conflict—events behind closed doors in Beijing and Moscow. The work offers valuable information on Sino-Soviet relations during this period, though the author might have expanded on this subject beyond the limited issues of Stalin's fear of an American nuclear attack and his sales of arms to Mao Tse-tung.

In sum, this is a first-rate research effort by a distinguished historian, writing in a lively style that somewhat counterbalances the book's density, and of considerable value and interest to students of the period.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont

IN MY VIEW

AN END TO UNPLEASANT BEHAVIORS

Sir:

In his brief review of Diana West's *The Death of the Grown-Up: How America's Arrested Development Is Bringing Down Western Civilization* (Spring 2008, pp. 138–39), Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz of the Naval War College failed to alert readers to the controversial nature of West's argument. West's position is that one factor—the lack of self-discipline—is the basic cause of the decline of American influence in the world. Now, according to West, the United States lacks the ability to deal effectively with attacks on it and on its allies by organizations (al Qaeda and related terrorist groups) that do in fact have a sense of self-discipline and shared commitment. For that reason, *The Death of the Grown-Up* calls for an end to what Professor Norwitz calls “decades of immature behavior.”

The weakness of Diana West's argument is that it attributes a wide range of unpleasant behaviors and unsuccessful government policies to one single factor—the “death” of the ideal of the adult as a responsible, self-disciplined, and self-sacrificing individual. This intense focus on one cause of social decline and moral decay is echoed, ironically enough, by Osama bin Laden and his allies. The western world, according to bin Laden and al Qaeda, lacks discipline and order. The West, especially the United States, poses a direct threat to Muslims everywhere because the West attacks the order present in Islam directly, through the occupation of Muslim lands, and indirectly, through modern media, through modern ideas about the role of women in society and the family, and through systems of education that denigrate religion and respect for traditional wisdom.

Diana West and bin Laden might seem strange intellectual companions, but they have famous (or infamous, as the case may be) company—Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, to name just two intellectuals who made the mistake of ascribing the ills of the world to a single factor. In the case of Marx, the single factor

was the means of production and distribution. For Freud, it was the great inner tension between the desires of the individual psyche and the demands of an ordered society. Like Ms. West, both Marx and Freud pointed to a factor that mattered. But also like her, Marx and Freud laid too much responsibility at the feet of one variable or cause of behavior.

If serious studies of contemporary societies have shown anything, it is that most individual behavior within a society, its institutions, and its organizations is shaped by many factors that interact with one another. We are not beings driven only by our economic environment or by our psychological desires or by the ways we have been raised. We are interesting, puzzling, and frustrating creatures because our behavior is often difficult to predict and because it is often impossible to show that how our societies fare is the result of some one behavior or psychological factor.

Just as bin Laden's view of the world is flawed, so is West's. But does that mean neither should be read? Absolutely not. Yet it's important to note that *all* single-factor explanations for social or political behavior should be evaluated with great caution. I can't think of one that has proven correct or has been shown to be the one and only key to understanding the complexities of human social, economic, and political behavior. Consequently, we should beware of embracing *any* single-factor explanation for present or past events, no matter how much that explanation appeals to us.

TOM HONE

Naval War College

Professor Norwitz replies:

In criticizing my book review of Diana West's *The Death of the Grown-Up: How America's Arrested Development Is Bringing Down Western Civilization* (*Naval War College Review*, Spring 2008, pp. 138–39), Professor Tom Hone missed the point of both and, in doing so, misrepresented West's book as a simplistically narrow homily on what ails society. He could not be more mistaken.

Professor Hone erroneously decries West for isolating a "single factor" responsible for her warning about western civilization's decline. Were that true, then his objection would be justified. However, saying that West and Osama bin

Laden are “intellectual companions” is indefensible and shocking, given West’s reputation as a voice for a muscular approach to radical Islam. The fact of the matter is that West drives deeply into the erosion of personal, family, and societal values with astute analysis and convincing evidence that *many factors* are responsible. Even a cursory read of the book discloses that the author examines post–World War II attitudes, business strategy to celebrate youth, print media, music and movie industries, and even the law as separate factors. And it is an easy step to the realization that each of these elements has multiple root causes.

West yearns for societal maturity evidenced by sound decision-making principles, proven core values, critical analysis, lessons learned, embrace of history, reevaluation based on success and failure, movement past self-gratification to selfless service, and acceptance that complex problems require complex solutions. Is the book controversial? Only to those who sense West’s rapier-like finger poking them in the chest.

JEFFREY H. NORWITZ

Naval War College

RECENT BOOKS

Polmar, Norman. *Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events*, vol. 2, 1946–2006.

Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2008. 560pp. \$49.95

Norman Polmar needs no introduction to readers of the *Review*, and neither, probably, does volume 1 of this work (published in 2006 and covering the years 1909 to 1945). The present book brings the carrier and carrier-aviation stories up

through 2006, with looks farther ahead: the early Cold War years, Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, the advent of the “super-carriers” and subsequent periodic debates on fundamentals, the nuclear mission, and others. Particularly interesting chapters focus on costs and on Soviet-Russian work and experimentation in the type. Five appendices, and 350 (often very striking) photographs, many tables and maps.

