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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Summer 2007

Volume 60, Number 3



Cover

The British battleship Royal Oak in 1917 or 1918, an image exemplifying the power of the “battle line.” Jon Tetsuro Sumida in this issue examines how the Royal Navy in that era addressed fundamental issues posed by emerging technology for the employment of gunnery in naval combat. From the collection of Kenneth Watson of New Canaan, Connecticut, courtesy of the Naval War College Museum, to which the collection was donated through the Naval War College Foundation. Volume 108, “Royal Navy—Battleships. No. 8” (RN BB 8).

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FROM THE EDITORS

As the Navy continues to grapple with its priorities and overall direction in the context of its ongoing work on a new Maritime Strategy, it is worthwhile taking a fresh look at the complex of issues connected with what is perhaps best referred to as “disorder at sea.” The most potentially threatening form of disorder at sea is maritime terrorism, including not only terrorist attacks on shipping but the use of the maritime domain to transport terrorists or weapons or to mount attacks from the sea against coastal targets. However, there is a range of other activities that fall into this category as well, from illegal fishing to the smuggling of goods and people to piracy. The strategic environment that has confronted us following the events of 9/11 has caused a bright light to play on this shadowy world, and many improvements have been made in the ability of the United States and the larger global community of seafaring nations to monitor and counter such activities. For understandable reasons, many continue to sound alarms about the severity of the threat and the adequacy of the response. Nevertheless, at a time when many demands are being levied on American military forces and resources, it is important not to overstate the problem. Two contributors to this issue provide useful perspective for understanding the problem of disorder at sea and evaluating the American response to it. Martin Murphy and Richard Farrell are in broad agreement that elements of the threat—particularly piracy and the use of LNG tankers as weapons of mass destruction—have too often been grossly exaggerated. But Murphy also makes a compelling case for a renewed commitment to naval presence and maritime security cooperation as indispensable components of an increasingly fragile global maritime order.

ASIA EYES AMERICA

Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Jonathan D. Pollack, is in preparation for release in late summer 2007. This third book in our Policy Studies Series extends the East Asia focus of the first two volumes, *Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century* and *Korea: The East Asian Pivot*, also edited by Dr. Pollack. A highly distinguished assemblage of international scholars and analysts presented these papers at the Naval War College’s Asia-Pacific Forum of

4–5 May 2006. They examine a contemporary Asia marked by increased competence, confidence, and resilience, and in which the U.S. role is a major variable. This book is a groundbreaking contribution to the study of the contemporary Asia-Pacific and to the wider debate on fundamental issues of national strategy and policy. The book will be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office, through its online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/.

TO OUR INTERNATIONAL READERS

Sharp increases in the cost of international mailing oblige us to consider less expensive ways of serving our international readers. Our present plan is, beginning with the Winter 2008 issue, to mail the *Review* outside the United States in print form only to institutional subscribers (libraries, etc.), supplying it to individual readers, whether subscribers or requesters, on CD-ROM. Exceptions will be considered: individual subscribers who cannot, for whatever reason, read the journal in CD format are invited to contact the Press editorial office. The same policy will apply to our Newport Paper monographs, beginning with the next Paper, number 29, expected this fall. Readers within the United States are not affected in either case.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AWARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL WRITING

Among the winners of nineteen prizes for course papers written during the Naval War College's recently completed 2006–2007 academic year were two that became the bases for articles in the *Naval War College Review*: “Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” by Lieutenant Michael C. Grubb, USN, winning the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize and appearing in our Winter 2007 issue; and “Dragon with a Heart of Peacefulness? China and United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa,” by Lieutenant Colonel Philippe D. Rogers, USMC, winning the Jerome E. Levy Economic Geography and World Order Prize and published as “China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa” in our Spring 2007 issue.

SAILING TO A NEW PORT

Commencement address delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, on 15 June 2007, by Admiral James G. Stavridis

When Admiral Shuford asked me to make a trip to Newport, it brought back wonderful memories of my time here as a junior officer, with Lieutenant Jake Shuford. I can't say much more about that, mostly on advice of counsel, but suffice to say it was a wonderful time and involved jazz festivals, a lot of time on the tennis court, sailing, and an occasional cold beer.

It's wonderful and inspiring to see what a joint, interagency, and international event this is today. I do want to begin with a story which illustrates a bit about each of the services.

One day, three colonels were hiking together and unexpectedly came upon a wide, raging, violent river. They needed to get to the other side but had no idea how to do so. The Air Force colonel called out to God, praying, "Please God, give me the strength to cross this river." *Poof!* God gave him big arms and strong legs, and he was able to swim across. It did, however, take him more than an hour, and he almost drowned a couple of times. Seeing this, the Army colonel prayed to God saying, "Please God, give me the strength and tools to cross this river." *Poof!* God gave him a rowboat and oars. He was able to row across, but it still took almost an hour, it was very rough, and he almost capsized several times. The Marine colonel saw how things worked out for the other two, so when he prayed to God, he said, "Please God, give me the strength, tools, and the intelligence to cross this river." *Poof!* God turned him into a Navy lieutenant—a Surface Warfare Officer, actually. He looked at the map, hiked upstream a couple of hundred yards, and walked across the bridge.

That's a true story, in case you were wondering.

And lest our colonels in the audience get discouraged, let me tell you a true story—this one really is true—about Alexander Haig's promotion ceremony from colonel to one-star general. When Haig got his first star, he was working in the White House at the National Security Council staff as Henry Kissinger's military assistant. At a little ceremony in his White House office to pin on the star,

Henry said that in his years as a professor in the national security field he had met a lot of bright colonels—but not that many bright generals. Therefore, he said, he planned to work Haig extra hard in the coming period “before the mental deterioration set in.”

Since you can only imagine the mental deterioration that has set in in my case with each subsequent promotion, I will try to be brief today.

Seriously, my intent is to take a few moments today and lay out an idea for our graduates about how the future might look for the security of the United States—essentially, how we might think about structuring ourselves. Much of my thinking is shaped and reflected by the audience today and especially the graduates—joint, interagency, and multinational. I hope to share with you a new idea, and in that context it is interesting to think for a moment about the name of this beautiful, small town on the Narragansett Bay. It is, of course, “Newport”—quite literally a *new port*—founded in 1639 after the city fathers had a political falling-out with the larger colonial community in Portsmouth. Newport offered a fresh start. Over its storied history, this city used creativity and innovation to maintain its relevance as a tolerant and forward-thinking enclave.

Of course, this Naval War College has so often been an incubator for new ideas, new concepts, new innovations, dating back to its foundations and the golden years of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Stephen B. Luce, and others. Indeed, during my thirty years’ time in the Navy, the Naval War College has been at the center of debates ranging over the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, of . . . *From the Sea* in the 1990s, and now, as Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, seeks to write a new maritime component for the national military strategy.

And so in this new port—in sight of the vibrant Naval War College, which has been involved in new ideas for its entire life—I want to talk for a moment this morning about how we need to change and grow in the way we approach national security broadly here in the United States.

This unfolding twenty-first century presents our entire national security structure in general, and U.S. Southern Command in particular, with an unprecedented opportunity to define and shape new means and capabilities that will achieve U.S. national security objectives in an era of transnational and unconventional threats. Let me explain.

We live in a dangerous age. Globally, international terrorism will be the principal national security threat to the United States for the near future. Having said that, it is clear that the risk of regional conventional conflicts, such as in Asia and the Middle East, will persist. Clearly, the United States must maintain the capability to fight and win conventional wars, although they will probably not be the defining conflicts of this age.

Rather, it is the small, radical organization that holds the most significant threat to U.S. national interests. Driven by unprecedented technological advancement, globalization will continue to simultaneously disenfranchise and empower radical actors who will attempt to coerce representative governments through terrorist tactics. Defeating terrorists is a significant challenge for the United States, because our established national security tools—centered on military-backed diplomacy—are less capable against this asymmetric threat. Of greatest concern, of course, is the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction.

Preventing terrorism and defeating terrorists requires a multifaceted approach that reduces terrorist resources and capabilities while simultaneously addressing the underlying conditions of poverty, inequality, and corruption that create the conditions that give rise to future terrorists. Currently, no single arm of the U.S. federal government has the ability or authority to coordinate the multiple entities required to execute an effective international antiterrorism campaign.

Frankly, this is not war as the U.S. military has historically envisioned it, which leads to significant challenges in training, equipping, and organizing our forces for a new sort of war. Perhaps most challenging, we in the Department of Defense must expand our understanding of conflict beyond lethal means and reenvision all our operations, including “peacetime” engagement and training activities as part of a single strategic framework. These are the new fundamental conditions of the twenty-first-century security environment:

- Attacks by radical organizations bent on religious or ideological domination
- Nation-states fighting in unconventional settings with unfamiliar tool sets
- The “war of ideas” at the root of conflicts, requiring sophisticated strategic communication
- A globalizing economy with perceived winners and losers
- Rising environmental concerns, coupled to globalization
- Miniaturizing technologies producing powerful effects
- Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction—including biological and chemical
- “24/7” news coverage with satellite radio and television
- Satellite information and instant, global communication at everyone’s fingertips
- Exploding Internet with bloggers, hackers, and chat rooms
- Cell-phone cameras and recorders, making everyone a “reporter”
- Sophisticated media engagement by transnational terrorists and organizations.

A difficult set of conditions, to be sure. Accordingly, we must clearly understand ourselves to be daily embroiled in a struggle of ideas wherein every activity attributable to the United States communicates to some audience. Therefore, exactly what we wish to communicate must be predetermined and guided through a systematic, yet flexible and effective, process.

Perhaps nowhere in the unified command system does this new set of conditions present itself more fully than in U.S. Southern Command. As a traditional military jurisdiction, its area of responsibility is notable for its current lack of conventional military threats; but the region's persistent conditions of poverty, inequality, and corruption provide fertile soil in which international criminals and terrorists can flourish.

Throughout this area of responsibility—thirty-two countries, thirteen territories, five hundred million people, fifteen million square miles—security threats most often take forms that we more readily associate with crime than war. In the region's growing gang activity, we see criminals and the disenfranchised banding together and combining traditional criminal activities in ways that threaten U.S. national security. Kidnapping, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and drug trafficking—which leads to over ten thousand deaths annually in the United States—combine with extremist ideologies to create a dangerous blend. All of these conditions can undermine fragile democracies. Ecological issues are bubbling fast, especially in South America and the Caribbean. Radical ideologues are gaining sway and putting real pressure on democratic norms in a variety of nations.

These new threats—while ultimately not susceptible to combat operations—tend to operate at our intellectual seams and thrive in our bureaucratic and cultural blind spots. Our system of legal, political, moral, and conceptual boundaries defining what constitutes combat versus criminal activity, domestic versus international jurisdiction, and governmental versus private interests all provide operational space for lethal opponents with no such boundaries to respect.

Countering such threats and reacting to the informational realities will require new organizational structures not predicated on traditional notions of war and peace. Our old model, wherein the State Department offers a “carrot” in time of peace while the Defense Department threatens the “stick” in time of war, provides solutions only when peace and war are readily distinguishable. Today they are not so neatly divided. Given an environment of unceasing microconflict and constant ideological communication, “carrot and stick” must work not merely hand in hand but hand in glove—synchronized with a single purpose and unity of effort, across national and tactical echelons—in ways previously unseen in our country's history.

Which brings me to U.S. Southern Command. We cannot expect clear transitions between peace and war, and, thus, we need to explore a new standing

organization chartered to operate within today's dynamic and changing international environment.

The Combatant Commands of today appropriately seek to maintain a vital regional perspective on security issues. However, enabling truly joint and interagency activities may require additional modalities and authorities to provide effective synchronization of various U.S. government agencies' resources. We need vastly better integration across the entire government of the United States and better coalition integration.

We need to "test drive" a new model that truly evokes joint, interagency, and international. U.S. Southern Command is well suited as a test case: it could easily transition over a relatively short period to a more integrated posture that expands its strong interagency perspective and capacity.

Specifically, we need:

- *More interagency integration*: a true interagency team, with senior representatives from each key agency and cabinet actually holding command positions throughout the organizations. We need directorates reflecting the missions of the command in the twenty-first century, including stability, prosperity, security, and intelligence.
- *State Department teaming*: Of particular note, we need greater engagement with the State Department throughout the enterprise. This should be highlighted by sending a three-star-equivalent, post-ambassador deputy to the command.
- *Combined/international partnering*: An expanded set of partnering arrangements with all the nations and territories in the region, to include more liaison officers, both military *and* civilian, from the region.
- *Strategic communication focus*: We are in a geopolitical marketplace of ideas, and strategic communication thus becomes the "main battery" of U.S. Southern Command—both in the sense of providing power like a battery *and* of sending shots downrange, as in the "main battery of a ship." At SOUTHCOM we aren't launching Tomahawk missiles—we're launching ideas. Strategic communication should therefore be a direct report to the commander and become the direct responsibility of a two-star chief of staff. In the geopolitical marketplace of ideas "down south," we must increase our market share!
- *Public/private linkages*: So much of the power of the United States to create successful partnerships in SOUTHCOM is found in the private sector. At the command, we must find ways to work with nongovernmental organizations, private charitable entities, international organizations, and the private sector. We should look for ways to do this in appropriate staff nodes.

- *High-speed staff process*: Using new methods of connection and a flattened organization, linking the staff to move at requisite speed in the era of the twenty-four-hour news cycle is also a prerequisite for success.
- *Less in Miami, more forward*: We must seek ways to place more staff resources forward with embassies, and team with the State Department and other agencies in the field.
- *Culture of both war and peace*: While remaining capable of combat operations, we should recognize that the real thrust of twenty-first-century national security in this region is not vested in war but in intelligent management of the conditions of peace in a volatile era.

We are moving in this direction now, but there is much to be done. Taking this new approach at SOUTHCOM would be a useful experiment in creating new organizations to best meet twenty-first-century security challenges. It seems clear that it is time to at least consider rethinking the fundamental structure and approach of Southern Command and then intelligently seeking to leverage the lessons learned for the future.

I want to close with some thoughts about how ideas are passed along from generation to generation.

Over a week of vacation last week, I had the chance to get to two books on my current reading list—both novels. As an aside, I am an enormous believer in reading fiction, which I think in many ways does a better job than nonfiction of capturing the real ideas of culture, history, social justice, humor, compassion, and competition—all of what makes up the fabric of our societies. I read two utterly different novels, but they had something vital in common, and I want to close on that thought.

The first is by one of the sharpest observers of U.S. culture, Christopher Buckley. It's called *Boomsday*, and with tongue firmly in cheek, he tackles key issues like social security, the aging of the baby boom, conflict between generations, pop culture, and a dozen other topics. I won't steal his thunder, but to say the least, his character's "solution" to the enormous bow wave of baby boomers headed toward social security is creative indeed.

The second novel is a dark story of life in the United States following an apocalyptic event, and it describes the wandering of a father and a young son around a country that is devastated and living in complete anarchy. It's called simply *The Road*, and it is notable in every sense, most particularly for the heartbreaking beauty of its poetic language and as well for the utterly bleak situation it portrays.

You should be wondering what on earth two novels like that have in common. The answer is simple: both are about what generations owe each other. In *Boomsday* we have a satiric vision of the cut-and-thrust between generations as

they jockey for the best life in a world of rich resources—but disagree bitterly about how to divide them. The generations must learn to work together to solve the problems they face, with creativity and innovation. In *The Road* we see the care and love—and the life lessons passed—between a father and a son in a bleak world in which there are virtually no resources to divide. Above all, the father passes to his son hope—hardest of all in the world they inhabit quite literally “on the road.”

Both Christopher Buckley and Cormac McCarthy touch the central idea I want to leave you with today—that each generation must learn and strive and accomplish but must also learn to pass along what it learns to the successors. That, as any of us with teenage children will attest, is hard work indeed. But it is vital and important to our society and our civilization.

It also has a distinct meaning within the context of this graduation day. Today, nearly six hundred new graduates of this war college will sail on, including well over a hundred distance-learning graduates. They are all part of the Class of 2007 from this College, which numbers over 1,300 graduates. They wear many different uniforms, they come from many different U.S. government agencies and many different countries, and they have each learned very different things.

But I would submit that one of the crucial things they all share is that they must return to their ships and submarines and aircraft squadrons and SEAL teams and battalions and divisions and brigades and Coast Guard cutters, their countries and their agencies and cabinet staffs, and all the rest—they must pass the spark of innovation and creativity that they have been given here, in this War College, in this New Port, in a time of seemingly infinite challenges and I believe equally extraordinary promise.

The Greeks say you never cross the same river twice—the water moves on. Sail bravely into your future! Accept each new assignment as the invigorating, life-enhancing challenge that it can be. That is what makes a life such an incredible experience to cherish, especially if you do the kinds of things all of you are about to do. Hand off your brilliant ideas to the next generation! And as all of you depart on the beautiful trajectory of your lives and careers, I am confident you will do exactly that. I wish you all Godspeed and open water in the voyage ahead.

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral Stavridis is a Surface Warfare Officer and has had multiple commands at sea. He holds a PhD in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College and a 1976 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. Admiral Stavridis assumed command of the U.S. Southern Command on 19 October 2006.



Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in 1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina. His initial assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master's degrees in public administration (finance) from Harvard and in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction.

After completing department head tours in USS Deyo (DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.

Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998, deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency "E" for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.

Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy Division as chief of staff of the Navy's Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission area. His most recent Washington assignment was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate Liaison.

In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 August 2004.

PRESIDENT'S FORUM



No college or university could have greater justification for pride in its faculty. Their outstanding service to the country is essential to ensuring that the armed services can operate effectively in the years ahead.

WHEN THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL recently visited Newport, he asked just what it was that made the Naval War College different from the other service colleges. Without hesitation, I replied: “Our faculty.” The worldwide reputation of this faculty is a source of great pride—not only to me but to the naval services and the Department of Defense. I miss no opportunity to emphasize how the talent that resides in the faculty and its tireless efforts make this College the preeminent institution that it is.

That the faculty is the key distinguishing feature of the College should surprise no one. The reputation of the Naval War College has always rested, since its founding, on the genius of the faculty. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the College’s first President, understood that the institution’s ability to carry out its vital mission would require an outstanding faculty. Luce went to great lengths to make sure that the College identified and attracted outstanding professionals, officers and scholars, to serve on the faculty. He brought aboard the very best, recruiting illustrious teachers in Tasker Bliss, James R. Soley, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. William McCarty Little and Charles Stockton soon joined the faculty as well. These giants established the reputation of the College as a world-class institution for education and research into strategy and war. Mahan’s celebrated books on the influence of sea power started as lectures on strategy to the students attending the College. These lectures, when transformed into print, had powerful and enduring impact in educating strategic leaders (such as Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill) and in changing the way the world thought about and appreciated maritime capability—far beyond

Newport.* Teaching and research thus went hand in hand, mutually supporting each other. The growing reputation of the faculty helped establish, sustain, and promote the College, transforming Luce's vision into reality.

This reputation gained fetch between the two world wars with the inclusion of the Navy's preeminent operators in the faculty, for example, Captain Raymond Spruance and Captain Richmond K. Turner. The time spent by Spruance and Turner in Newport was memorable and helped prepare them for the leadership roles that they would play in gaining the great victories of the Pacific War. Just imagine the opportunity that students had between the wars to study naval warfare and joint operational planning with the future victor of Midway and the battle of the Philippine Sea. Speaking to the tradition of academic rigor for the College, one student later recalled: "Spruance was a tough taskmaster, and the harder we worked the more he demanded of us." Turner, whose lectures predicted the leading role that carrier and amphibious warfare would play in the next war, was also a gifted but demanding teacher. One of his students stated: "He worked our pants off. It was the hardest year I ever spent. Turner corrected every estimate of the situation and final decision in red ink, and they were saturated with his caustic comment." The faculty at the College between the wars thus pushed the students to think systematically and creatively about strategy and war, preparing them for the rise of the United States to the position as the world's premier maritime power and for the leadership challenges that awaited them in the "Two-Ocean War." The victory at sea in the world war rested on the intellectual capital built up by the officers who studied with the brilliant faculty assembled at the College.

When Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner revitalized the College's educational curriculum in the early 1970s, he relied fully on his faculty to craft and implement his plan. Dr. Phil Cowl, an outstanding scholar and teacher, as well as a veteran of the final, grisly campaigns in the Pacific War, became chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department. Bill Turcotte came in to head the National Security Decision Making Department (NSDM). Drawing around them distinguished academics and serving officers, they transformed the College's curriculum, taking the College to a new level of innovation, academic rigor and discipline, and relevance. Their work proved so successful that it became the model for courses offered around the world, at universities like Yale, Harvard,

* In his book *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*, Robert Seager II relates how in August 1893 Queen Victoria asked Mahan to a dinner for Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, who was visiting England, so that the two men might meet. That meeting spawned another dinner between the two in August 1894, where Mahan learned that the kaiser was very interested in his books. By January 1898, the Imperial German Navy had ordered that a translation of the volume "be supplied to all the public libraries, schools and government institutions" in the nation. Mahan's work was widely read as well by strategists and policy makers in Great Britain, and it was a significant factor in a debate that drove new life and significant funding into the Royal Navy.

the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Boston University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as well as educational programs in the system of professional military education in our nation and partner nations around the world. This faculty has thus transformed how our country's leading universities study strategy, war, and the profession of arms.

These recent few years have witnessed another transformation of the College's programs. Charged with developing a new curriculum—building on what was best in the existing programs of study—today's faculty has taken the educational experience at the College to a new, still higher level of excellence and relevance. The faculty threw themselves at the task! The result is a new curriculum consisting of separate, distinct intermediate and senior-level courses. Noteworthy is the fact that this major restructuring was planned, coordinated, and implemented in about twenty months, while the faculty continued to teach without pause—a feat akin to turning a Schwinn bicycle into a Harley motorcycle while riding it down the highway! Despite the heavy workload, the faculty continued to produce new courses, without equal in the professional military education system, to better prepare our students to think strategically, to carry out critical analysis, and to operate with telling effect in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. Given the history of this faculty and its tradition of dedication and genius, I was not surprised at this achievement.

It is important to recognize that the College's faculty extends well beyond our campus in Newport, through the College of Distance Education (CDE). They serve effectively in the College's large and robust satellite program at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, and on twenty-two satellite campuses elsewhere around the country. The CDE faculty also teaches a Web-enabled course, as well as a CD-ROM-based course for students without routine access to the Web. The College's Distance Education faculty is hired to the same standards and processes as our resident faculty. Moreover, our Distance Education faculty participates in the curriculum development process, ensuring a sense of direct ownership and bringing additional, rich, diverse perspective and expertise to the curriculum's content. The standards to which we recruit our Distance Education faculty and the way each member is directly integrated into the College's academic processes have proven to be extraordinary strengths, called out repeatedly by both military and civilian accreditation authorities.* The Association for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT) presented its

* In March of 2005, the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Inc., issued a report to the College stating "the College is responding to the challenge of providing education at remote locations in a highly responsible way consistent with the best practices of other colleges and universities engaged in this type of activity." The head of the accreditation team added: "The Naval War College's Distance Program is second to none."

“crystal award” to CDE in 2002, representing still another independent judgment regarding the quality of the College’s distance programs.

Today’s faculty is increasingly diverse. We attract to serve on the College’s faculty professionals with the expertise required to disentangle the knotty strategic problems facing the country as it negotiates a dramatically altered international security terrain. We have experts on critical strategic regions, on warfare in the information domain, on culture and religion, on energy and resources, and on best practices in business and the management of large complex organizations, as well as historians, scholars of international relations and strategy, and warriors with extensive operational experience. This mix of talent provides a unique educational experience. The recently completed study of the College by the Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Team notes: “The faculty was consistently praised by the students as the strength of the college.” I can only concur with the accolades accorded by the students.

In research and writing, the faculty’s contribution is a catalyst for new ideas about how to understand and grapple with the security challenges that confront our country. Examples abound. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of NSDM, has produced an outstanding study, *Space as a Strategic Asset*, about this critical operating domain for our armed forces. Derek Reveron, also of NSDM, has written a valuable study, *Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism*, that could not be timelier. Meanwhile, from the Joint Military Operations Department (JMO), Milan Vego’s classic book on *Operational Warfare* is being produced in a second, updated edition that will serve as the premier text for over two dozen command and staff colleges in partner nations around the world. The hard-fought battles of the Pacific War, with their fine examples of leaders who needed to balance operational risks and strategic rewards, are ably analyzed by Douglas V. Smith of the College of Distance Education in his *Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm’s Way*. Within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), Peter Dombrowski, the chair of the Strategic Research Department, has published *Buying Military Transformation: Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry*; Carnes Lord, the editor of the *Review*, has written *The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now*; and S. Paul Kapur has completed *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia*. The Strategy and Policy Department faculty has contributed Tim Hoyt’s *Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy*, and Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes’s *Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century: The Turn to Mahan*. This prodigious output of recently published books rivals that of any major university and bolsters the impact and reputation of the College as a research institution—and at the end of the day, it is our *students* who benefit from this level of expertise.

We work hard to fight against the natural tendency, observed in many colleges and universities, for a wall to develop between faculty members who primarily teach and those who are primarily researchers. We recognize that great benefits accrue when discoveries made through research activities and practitioner experimentation are routinely disclosed alongside those made through the dynamics of student/mentor interaction in the classroom. I am pleased to note that, to a degree never before attained, our faculties work as one across departments and “codes” (deaneries) in collaborative teaching and research. To provide just a few examples, the writings of Lyle Goldstein, William Murray, and Andrew Winner of CNWS form a part of the required reading in the new strategy courses offered by the Strategy and Policy Department. In the China Maritime Security Institute, CNWS has provided an organizational home in which the faculty form partnerships in their research and writing. Professor Andrew R. Wilson of the Strategy and Policy Department, in collaboration with Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray of the Strategic Research Department, has pulled together penetrating analyses in the volume *China's Nuclear Submarine Force*, published by the Naval Institute Press. This book includes essays by Thomas G. Mahnken and Toshi Yoshihara of the Strategy and Policy Department and by Peter Dutton of JMO. Meanwhile, Bruce Elleman, in the Maritime History Department of the CNWS, wrote a pathbreaking study on the Navy's role in tsunami relief that NSDM uses as a case study. These collaborative efforts show that in their diversity the faculty is working together as one team, supporting each other in their research, writing, and teaching.

In recent years, the College has established a number of named chairs as a means of recognizing and promoting academic programs and fields of study that are consistent with our overall scholarly plans, objectives, and missions. These chair holders are responsible for contributing to the College's courses and programs by writing educational and professional materials, publishing the results of applied research, maintaining a high level of knowledge regarding current issues in their area of expertise, and developing ongoing professional relationships with faculty at other colleges and universities. These chairs, funded by the Naval War College Foundation, have provided a way for faculty to collaborate on valuable ventures of import to the Navy, the armed services, and the country. The Ruger Chair, held by the stalwart Rich Lloyd of NSDM, ran an immensely successful workshop on maritime strategy and economics. Professor Lloyd drew upon faculty members from different departments as well as outside scholars and analysts to produce a remarkable study published by the College. Some of the papers delivered at this workshop will also soon appear in print in some of the finest policy-oriented

journals of strategy and international affairs. Professor Jeff Norwitz, holder of the Brown Chair, coordinates and supports efforts across the College that examine the strategic problems posed by terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of irregular warfare. The Levy Chair holder, John Garofano, pulled together the faculty for a workshop about maritime strategy and the changing geostrategic environment in Asia. This collaboration among the faculty is paying huge dividends in supporting the teaching and analysis carried out at the College—and in advancing the world’s understanding of a host of issues in the field of security studies and geostrategy.

In this regard particularly, this past year has also witnessed an extraordinary effort on the part of the College’s faculty in support of the development of a new maritime strategy. Last June, at the College’s Current Strategy Forum, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, announced a major new initiative to develop a new maritime strategy for the country (see the “President’s Forum” in the Autumn 2006 issue). Faculty members from throughout the College took the lead in responding to this task. Professor Barney Rubel, the dean of CNWS, organized the collegewide effort. Members of the research faculty, including Peter Dombrowski, Andrew Winner, Carnes Lord, Don Marrin, and Mike Martin, as well as others from across CNWS, supported the College’s analytical process. Meanwhile, members of the teaching faculty—Scott Douglas, Tim Hoyt, and John Schindler, for example—brought their immense talent to bear in support of the analysis. Karl Walling of the Strategy and Policy Department and George Baer, author of the prizewinning book *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* and now serving with the College’s program at Monterey, gave brilliant presentations about strategy, the maritime environment, and the enduring importance of sea power as part of our public outreach effort known as the “Conversation with the Country.” Skillfully orchestrated by faculty member John Jackson, the Conversation events included participation by noted futurist and author Peter Schwartz, who noted: “These are remarkable events, unique in all the world to my knowledge. I commend the Navy for taking this innovative approach to considering the future!”

The work to develop the new maritime strategy was a team effort by the faculty across the entire College.

No college or university could have greater justification for pride in its faculty. Their outstanding service to the country is essential to ensuring that the armed services can operate effectively in the years ahead. Nevertheless, we cannot take this engine of mission success for granted. The report issued by the recent PAJE Team identified some challenges that must be addressed if the College is to continue to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding teachers and

scholars.* To address these issues, we have established faculty committees tasked to provide concrete recommendations for action in such areas as pay and compensation policy, sabbatical leave time, and publication policies. In addition, working with the Naval War College Foundation, we are exploring ways to provide greater opportunity for faculty development, including the ability to attend professional conferences, carry out research, and achieve even greater impact—particularly with regard to the College's international and regional initiatives! We owe this support to our dedicated faculty. More importantly, we owe it to the thousands of students who have passed through Newport since the College's founding, to the thousands of leaders around the world touched by their genius, and to those unknown numbers who will serve this country and our partner countries in positions of leadership and authority in the years to come.

The Naval War College is the institution that it is today because of the genius and dedication of its extraordinary faculty. In their teaching and research, the faculty is leading the way in professional military education in delivering an educational program for those who are called upon to serve in the profession of arms and diplomacy. Our students thus leave prepared to face the challenges and take on the struggles that lie before us as a Navy and a nation. The work of the faculty currently at the College stands in the finest traditions of our institution, and its legacy will prove as powerful and lasting as that of the roll call of great teachers—Mahan, Bliss, Soley, Stockton, McCarty Little, Spruance, and Turner—who came before them.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

* "Because of workload and curtailed opportunities for professional development and scholarship, the ability to recruit and retain outstanding faculty members may be compromised [in the future]. Return of professional development opportunities, time and resources for travel and scholarship, and appropriate compensation are all elements required to maintain and enhance faculty strength"—PAJE Team report.

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SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM

A Suitable Role for a Navy?

Martin N. Murphy

On 12 October 2000, two men from an organization aligned with al-Qa'ida loaded a rigid raider (a small boat with glass-reinforced-plastic hull) with explosives and drove it into the side of the guided-missile destroyer USS *Cole* (DDG 67). Seventeen sailors lost their lives. This was a seminal event. It epitomized small war versus “big” war and the threat that small-war tactics could present to “big war” fleets. It was also an echo of the U.S. Navy’s past. As the initial alarm faded, the Navy’s response became largely inward looking and defensive, limited for the most part to the implementation of more robust force-protection measures.

On 11 September 2001, al-Qa'ida operatives hijacked four civilian airliners and prepared to attack targets in the United States. Three of the planes got through. Until the attacks of 9/11 gave it context, most of the wider implications of the attack on the *Cole* were missed or ignored. It was the attacks on New York and Washington that put it back on the agenda and sparked a search for similar scenarios, a search that led ineluctably to concerns about the vulnerability of commercial shipping. From there it was merely a small conceptual hop to piracy and the fear that pirates might be in a position to teach terrorists how to use ships for a variety of purposes, including, most spectacularly, as weapons.¹ Since then the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism have been yoked together.

Is this linkage justified? Does either, separately or together, represent a serious threat to the United States or its allies? It is important to be honest. The *Cole* event was significant, but the criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity that has taken place on water both before and since has been of little strategic or political importance. There is, however, no guarantee that this benign situation will continue.

Trends in demography and economic growth and the concomitant demand for natural resources suggest that it might change.² If this is the case, is the suppression of maritime criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity a suitable role for the Navy? Is it one to which it can make a worthwhile contribution, or one it should leave to others?

This article will argue that piracy and maritime terrorism are not the main threats about which the Navy and those with interests in maritime security should be concerned.³ They are instead just two items on a longer list that can be grouped under four headings:

- Criminal/insurgent/terrorist links
- “Migration to the sea”
- Territorial expansion
- Complex maritime conflict.

It will ask whether the Navy is the most appropriate arm of U.S. national power to confront these threats. It will argue that if the service is to confront these challenges effectively, it will need to adjust to ways of warfare that are in many ways closer to those of the nineteenth than the twentieth century, albeit that the complexity of conflict has increased immeasurably.

CRIMINAL/INSURGENT/TERRORIST LINKS

Although we are quick to talk of terrorism, the current conflict is being fought not against an abstraction but against specific groups with specific motives, skills, and resources. Most acts of politically inspired violence at sea have been perpetrated by insurgent groups. Some of these have been acts of terrorism, but most have not. Giving these acts the blanket label of “terrorism” serves only to obscure their purpose and their nature.⁴ Terrorism is a tactic; an insurgency is an organized movement that is inspired by political, religious, or even quasi-criminal motives and uses war and subversion to overthrow a government and achieve power. Around the world are areas where maritime insurgency and terrorism are both problems.

In addition to political violence there is criminal violence—that is, piracy. Criminally inspired violence at sea is more common than politically inspired violence; nonetheless, piracy is a problem only in certain areas and for certain states. In addition there are areas where piracy *and* insurgency are problems. Even though there are strong grounds for considering piracy and insurgency/terrorism as two aspects of the larger phenomenon of maritime insecurity—“disorder at sea”—it is worth considering their differences before looking at where, if, and how they might come together.

Piracy

Piracy is a crime defined by geography that requires the presence of other factors, such as a permissive political environment, cultural acceptability, and the opportunity for reward, in order to flourish. Since the end of World War II such combinations have occurred in only a relatively few places: around parts of Southeast Asia and in the Bay of Bengal; off East and West Africa; and in a few ports of and off some stretches of coastline around South America. Most of the factors that encourage and sustain piracy are enduring. Although it can spring up in places where it has not been a problem historically—the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia, for example—it is generally the case that unless local or national leaders find reasons and resources to suppress it, piracy can persist in such areas, sometimes for centuries.

Piracy is an organized crime. The degree to which it is a threat at any level, from the purely local to the international, depends on the degree to which it is organized effectively. Even at the lowest level of organization, piracy, like street crime or small-scale crime anywhere, can be immensely destructive. If not confronted it can suppress economic activity and distort economic incentives, lower productivity by increasing security and replacement costs, erode confidence in authority, and undermine notions of justice. These effects can be observed along the Straits of Malacca, where gangs of largely Indonesian pirates prey regularly on fishing craft from communities on the Malaysian side of the waterway. One study of such a community, Hulan Melintang, has labeled this predation “sustainable,” in that the cost and physical danger it adds to the fishermen’s lives are never enough to stop them putting to sea completely.⁵ In other cases, however, the level of predation has become so acute—against parts of the Nigerian fishing fleet, for example—that lawful economic activity ceases, even if only for a time, and in some areas can be carried out only with great vigilance.⁶ The international fishing boats that ply their trade off part of the Somali coast need to be on almost constant alert against attack by local boats; one observer described the situation there as closer to a war than fishing.⁷ There are, however, genuine questions as to whether much of the fishing conducted by foreign boats in these waters is legal or, even if legal, should be allowed, given their rapacity.

In areas that are afflicted by piracy, small gangs can harass and board even large ships if the weather and sea conditions are right. In order to capitalize on the vulnerability of these ships and maximize the “take,” gangs need specialized marine equipment, modern arms, and a network capable of disposing of the goods and foreign currency they steal. At the highest level of organization, ships and their cargoes can be stolen to order, a process that demands close coordination between the buyer and the pirate/contractor. Piracy at this level is what it has always been, a business. Its effects therefore spread beyond the scene of the crime. Like all forms of organized criminal behavior—and when piracy reaches

this stage it ceases to be a stand-alone enterprise and becomes a subsidiary to a larger criminal concern—its most worrying effect is corruption, which, as it is argued, “is the main vehicle, and likely the most socially damaging activity, by which criminal gangs achieve their aims.”⁸ Another commentator reaches the same conclusion: “Organized crime makes systematic use of corruption,” an effect that has not been emphasized sufficiently.⁹ Small-time pirates, however, are not necessarily cut out of these more sophisticated operations; they constitute a pool of skilled labor that pirate-gang masters can call upon when needed.¹⁰

Therefore, while the highest-profile consequences of piracy are attacks on large vessels carrying cargo to international destinations, the greatest damage either is felt among already-poor local communities or results from the suborning of local and national officials, military leaders, and politicians of weak states. In other words, the number of attacks on international shipping, though it shines a useful light on the problem, is not a true measure of its effect. For example, in the last decade or so there were a number of high-profile attacks on ships transiting the Straits of Malacca. Some of these could have had disastrous consequences if control from the bridge had been lost completely, but the number of incidents as a proportion of the total international traffic using the straits, and in relation to the volume of local traffic, was and remains very small. What the presence of piracy demonstrates wherever it occurs, in this case on the Indonesian side of the strait in particular, is a worrying lack of order: if not reversed or controlled it could allow other forms of maritime-related disorder to take root and grow, but it is difficult to eradicate, because it is an outgrowth of the divisions and corruption that infect host societies more widely.

Insurgency and Terrorism

Some insurgent campaigns have been mounted on the high seas.¹¹ The majority, however, have taken place on coastal and inland waters, where their success depends on factors very similar to those that encourage and sustain piracy. Consequently, maritime insurgents operate in similar (often the same) areas as pirates and in many cases indulge in piracy on their own account. The principal reason why there have been so few maritime insurgencies is that in very few places around the world has political conflict coincided with favorable maritime geography. The main campaigns have taken place around Sri Lanka, parts of Southeast Asia, and off the Levant; lesser campaigns have occurred around the Arabian Peninsula, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Nigeria has experienced piracy and criminal violence since at least the 1970s. The new wave of violence, while it undoubtedly emerges out of political discontent and has a substantial political dimension, also has a large criminal component. Whether this wave of killings and kidnappings will develop into a major political insurgency is as yet unclear.

Although we are living in an era when some terrorist groups are prepared to embrace annihilation as a legitimate objective, the age-old hunt for publicity, the “propaganda of the deed,” remains the primary objective of any terrorist group. In a world of mass, global communication, maritime terrorism need not, unlike piracy, be defined by geography. That it has been so defined, however, is due to the fact that (with the exception of al-Qa‘ida) the groups that have employed it so far have been, like most insurgent groups, geographically specific. Furthermore, few maritime targets have propaganda value, and the groups interested in using the sea have not yet found a cost-effective way of generating desired effects from those that do. Even the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting for an independent Tamil homeland on Sri Lanka and drawing much support from the Tamil “diaspora” around the world, have not undertaken terrorist acts outside home waters.

Al-Qa‘ida has done most to shrug off the shackles of geography but has succeeded only up to a point: its three successful or near-successful attacks have taken place around what it would regard as its heartland, the Arabian Peninsula. Other al-Qa‘ida attacks around that peninsula, including an elaborate plan to attack U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz using a combination of small, fast attack craft and a mother ship laden with explosives, have been disrupted, as were an attempted attack on American and British naval vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar in 2002 and a plan to attack U.S. warships in Singapore, also in 2002. The latter was to have been carried out with the assistance of the local al-Qa‘ida affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah.

On land, al-Qa‘ida’s ideal targets mix iconic status with a high casualty potential. There are few iconic targets at sea; the main ones are warships, and since the *Cole* attack in 2000, all navies have taken additional precautions that, while far from perfect, are probably sufficient to make any repetition harder to accomplish. Passenger ferries and cruise ships would make excellent mass-casualty targets, and a very small number of cruise ships combine this quality with iconic status. Cruise ships, although not constructed to naval standards, are extraordinarily robust, with many watertight subdivisions, and are hard to sink. That, though, hardly matters if the objective is mass panic (probably resulting in large numbers of accidental deaths and injuries) and vivid media images of bomb-blackened hulls and petrified Westerners. The concerns of the insurance market are reflected in a recent RAND study pointing out that such an attack, if even minimally successful, would give rise to substantial claims and have a potentially catastrophic economic effect on the cruise industry.¹²

Al-Qa‘ida recognizes the importance of economic targets, although its attacks so far have been limited to oil-related installations. The first was on the *Limburg*, a very large crude-oil carrier, partially loaded, in 2002. This attack

hardly affected the world energy market, but it is important to note that it took place at a time of slack demand and that a similar attack (or more worryingly, multiple attacks) carried out when the market is tight might have more serious repercussions. The second attack, on the al-Basra oil terminal off Iraq, would have affected oil prices and, in addition, undermined confidence in U.S. military competence had it been successful; in fact the raiders came perilously close to reaching their objective, but they were foiled, albeit at the cost of three American lives. However, a strategy of economic dislocation focusing solely on maritime targets would be neither easy nor necessarily fruitful. It would require coordination, persistence, and probably a sophisticated understanding of market dynamics. It would also demand resources, and these are what almost all terrorist groups lack, certainly those that cannot call on state support.

These are probably among the factors that have led al-Qa'ida to concentrate on land-based economic targets in preference to those at sea. The one worthwhile example that demonstrates what could possibly be achieved using maritime targets alone was the mining of Nicaragua's harbors in the mid-1980s by "Contra" groups. This precisely targeted campaign, timed to coincide with the main export season, was designed to limit the country's vital foreign earnings, but it depended on covert American assistance for its success.

Coastal raiding is such a well established naval method that it is perhaps surprising terrorists have not used it more frequently. The Philippine Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has grabbed hostages from beach resorts on two occasions (each of which yielded a substantial profit), and the LTTE has carried out or attempted raids on Sri Lankan harbors, but no group has carried out pure *terror* raids on the beaches, hotels, resorts, or shopping malls that populate the coasts of many developed states or of Western vacation destinations.

Robbery, Kidnapping, and Logistics

Terrorists and insurgents have therefore been largely unsuccessful in their attacks on maritime targets. Certainly when measured against the criteria that matter to them—numbers of casualties and psychologically effective publicity—they have largely failed. Where they have been more successful is in robbing maritime and coastal targets and capturing hostages for ransom—acting, in other words, like pirates. Three groups—Abu Sayyaf, the Acehenese separatist group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and politico-criminal gangs operating in the Niger Delta—have successfully taken hostages from beaches, ships, or offshore oil installations and exchanged them for ransom. The actions of ASG and GAM in particular have drawn the piracy label.

Insurgents and terrorists have also used the sea successfully for logistical purposes. It is worth remembering that around 90 percent of the world's trade

moves by ship. While terrorists and insurgents are likely to move a smaller proportion of their material requirements by ship, that proportion, because of circumstances specific to each group, could still be substantial, perhaps 50 percent. Hezbollah and some of the other anti-Israeli groups move large quantities of arms into Lebanon and Gaza by sea, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates are known to have moved bomb materials by sea prior to both the East African and Bali attacks, and the LTTE, GAM, and the various Philippine groups all operate in what are essentially maritime theaters. More generally, many terrorist and insurgent groups today do not live off the local population in the same way as their forebears did (and as described by Mao Zedong). Particularly if they originate from outside an operational area, they tend to be wealthier than the indigenous population and look to external supply for the money and often sophisticated weapons they employ.

In many cases large consignments can be moved more discreetly by sea. On land, vehicles can be subjected to inspection relatively easily. In coastal waters, however, insurgents can hide among a multiplicity of small craft and fishing boats—a problem that confronts the Israeli air force and navy off the coast of Gaza, for example, as it seeks to isolate arms smugglers from ordinary fishermen. Outside territorial waters there are fewer ships, but international law can shield cargo from inspection. Unless a sea area is subject to a United Nations Security Council resolution that permits such an action, a boat or ship can be boarded only with flag-state consent unless it is of questionable nationality or is suspected of slaving, piracy, or that most heinous of international maritime crimes, illegal broadcasting.¹³ Of course, ships are boarded with the consent of their masters, but, depending upon the provisions of his own national legislation, not every master can give a boarding party permission to search; any search or seizure carried out on the basis of such consent is illegal. Such acts can yield valuable intelligence, but the advantage might be short-lived; they can provoke retaliatory harassment and international opprobrium. If a search is conducted on the basis of inaccurate information and nothing is found, the only results will be acute embarrassment, a claim for compensation, and a further erosion of international goodwill. The alternative is the “if you don’t like it sue me” position, which if carried out mid-ocean would almost certainly be acceded to but is manifestly illegal and almost inevitably involves the use or threat of force. The bottom line in most cases where boarding is refused is that “you can look but not touch.”

The Proliferation Security Initiative

What the case of the North Korean cargo vessel *So San* in 2002 demonstrated, however, is that even a boarding party that has forced itself on board, looked, touched, and found a suspicious cargo—in this case Scud missiles—cannot

confiscate it if buyer and seller are able to demonstrate that their transaction was legal.¹⁴ It was this case that spurred the George W. Bush administration to institute the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).¹⁵ This program seeks to bring together like-minded states prepared to open their own flag vessels to inspection and to interdict vessels with suspicious cargoes once they enter their territorial waters. The United States has also used its leverage with the major “open register” (that is, flag of convenience) states, such as Panama and Liberia, to sign workable ship-boarding agreements.¹⁶ Previously it had virtually forced the closure of the Tongan register on the suspicion that it might be holding the registration of several ships of which al-Qa‘ida was the beneficial owner. (The suspicion in this case appears to have been erroneous but understandable, given the often extensive measures even legitimate owners use to hide their beneficial interests in order to evade tax or other legislated obligations.) The aim of the ship-boarding agreements with the open-register states is to restrict the space in which rogue shippers can hide.

Large gaps, of course, remain. Around half of the world’s vessels are flagged in states that are not PSI signatories.¹⁷ Also, most open-register states have not signed, including some, like Cambodia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines, that have long been suspected of less than rigorous procedures. At the same time there are closed-register states, such as Iran and North Korea, that are not amenable to either pressure or persuasion; another closed-register nation, China, though sympathetic to U.S. proliferation concerns, is not persuaded of the scheme’s legality.

Blurring the Gray Area

Criminals and terrorists are not finding common cause, but they are finding reasons to cross the species barrier, whether based on the sea or on the land. The first reason is that both insurgents and terrorists are prepared to do business with criminals who have specific goods or skills they need, such as forged documents, or services that can expedite their operations, such as smuggling networks that can infiltrate operatives into specific destinations. Terrorists are known, for example, to have used the human smuggling networks that move people across the Mediterranean and into Western Europe.

The second reason is that they are acting like criminals in their own right.¹⁸ Running an insurgency or terrorist operation requires hard cash.¹⁹ It was common in the past for mature or senescent groups to turn to crime. More recent experience indicates two different trends. The first is acts of terrorist violence by small bands of individuals who, while they might share an ideology with an established group, have little or no direct connection to it, sometimes as a matter of choice. Lacking resources, they have had to resort to robbery or other crimes,

such as drug dealing, in order to buy what they need, as the German Baader-Meinhof gang did in the 1970s. The second trend has affected established groups. Historically, insurgents and terrorists have depended to a large extent on the support of sympathetic states, but as this has been reduced—although by no means eliminated, as the strong Iranian support for Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas clearly shows—such groups have turned to a variety of other income sources, of which criminal activity is one. Terrorist involvement in drug crime, for example, is well known. A Congressional Research Service report lists four reasons why criminals and terrorists might cooperate: to create chaos and instability in source and transit countries; to encourage a climate where corruption is acceptable and intimidation is unopposed; to provide cover and a common infrastructure for their joint and separate activities; and most important of all, for money.²⁰ The narcoterrorist phenomenon, as epitomized by FARC in Colombia, is merely the most obvious example of insurgent criminal behavior as groups including al-Qa'ida have become involved in a wide range of illegal enterprises, including arms trading, dealing in counterfeit goods, money laundering, and migrant smuggling. In other cases, of which the LTTE is the prime example, insurgent/terrorists have sold their services to criminals. In the LTTE's case, what they have sold has been access to their shipping network.

The range of criminal activity at sea is already large and appears to be growing. Maritime illegal activity includes arms smuggling, drug smuggling, people smuggling, toxic waste dumping, illegal fishing, and, of course, piracy. Insurgents, terrorists, and criminals are, nonetheless, wary of each other: insurgents and terrorists distrust criminals' traditionally poor operational security; criminals have traditionally been unwilling to court the additional law enforcement attention attracted by association with groups that practice politically motivated violence.²¹ When it comes to piracy itself, there is no worthwhile evidence, despite the speculation, of any cooperation between pirates and insurgent/terrorists. Even in the absence of a connection, however, criminal activity can serve the aims of terrorists and insurgents simply by masking what they do. Furthermore, the nature of criminal organization appears to be changing. Although disciplined, hierarchical, mafia-type organizations continue to flourish, more nonhierarchical groups are beginning to appear. They mirror the network structure of many terrorist or insurgent organizations. Decision making occurs on a more distributed basis, often by gang members who have less reluctance than is traditionally the case to associate with terrorists or who might, in some cases, share their aspirations and their contempt for established authority.

Several factors have influenced the growth of transnational organized crime: porous borders; the migration of ethnic groups who, once they have settled in

developed countries illegally, become vulnerable to exploitation; access to more efficient money-transfer mechanisms; and better communication. Although it is difficult to identify one that has particular application to the sea, they all revolve around movement—the movement of commodities, such as arms and drugs, and the movement of people.²² The principal medium for movement was, and remains, the sea. This increasing ease of movement has been attributed to the somewhat weightless notion of “globalization,” but there are also other trends, which, while far from criminal in themselves, suggest that the level of criminal activity at sea is likely to grow still further.

“MIGRATION TO THE SEA”

The sea’s resources have of course been exploited for centuries, but that exploitation has now reached unprecedented levels driven by the demand for resources and living space on land. It has spurred what could be described as a migration to the sea, or what one astute observer has described more graphically as a “scramble for the sea,” language chosen quite deliberately to evoke parallels with the colonial “scramble for Africa” in the nineteenth century.²³ This migration or scramble is driven by the need for energy (in the form of oil, gas, or structures that capture wind or tidal power), for minerals, for drinking water distilled from the sea, for waste disposal, and for food (harvested either from increasingly depleted fish stocks or from fish farmed in sheltered waters). It is propelled also by the urge to exploit the world’s maritime ecosphere for tourism and leisure, in some places by the need for space to live, either on reclaimed land or actually on (or perhaps under) the sea, and in others by the *desire* for such space—for example, in South Pacific island lagoons or the “palm” structures extending out from Dubai.²⁴

All of these pressures will mean that the sea will become more populated and, consequently, contested.²⁵ More people means more economic activity. More economic activity means more crime. More crime means more cover for terrorists. More people and more economic activity mean more targets. More goods in transit on fewer but larger ships passing through fewer giant ports and an unchangeable number of narrow choke points will mean that opportunities for successful interdiction by criminals or insurgents will increase.

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

Complicating this picture further is the possibility that this migration will be accompanied by the seaward extension of state territoriality. It is possible to envisage a return to the confused situation that existed prior to the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), when states claimed various degrees of territorial supervision, up to two hundred miles from their shores

and in some cases beyond. About 40 percent of the world's ocean surface lies within that two-hundred-mile limit.²⁶ The risk in the case of states that have proved unwilling or unable to discharge their security responsibilities in these maritime zones is that criminal activity and the illegal exploitation of resources will increase and what are effectively criminal and pirate sanctuaries might be created.²⁷

The law of the sea developed in a way that is very different from the law of the land, and in a way that was neither obvious nor preordained. As has been pointed out, the current position represents the “triumph of Grotius’s thesis of *mare liberum* and its concomitant prohibition on claims of territorial sovereignty. That triumph reflected not only the transitory nature of human activity at sea, but a rational conclusion that the interests of states in unrestricted access to the rest of the world outweighed their interests in restricting the access of others.”²⁸

That consensus is under pressure, perhaps most powerfully for environmental reasons, and although UNCLOS, the international treaty that currently enshrines the notion of maritime freedom, is holding for the moment, the pressures exerted for and against that freedom are finely balanced and might well become so great as to fracture it. The expectation historically would have been that the maritime powers would defend maritime freedom. Today, instead, they and the rising economic powers of Asia are ambivalent. The continuing reluctance of the United States, the current maritime hegemon, to sign UNCLOS (rather than merely, as it now does, tacitly observe its provisions), even if only to be in a position to influence what follows, is particularly puzzling and could lead to a disastrous situation where the free movement of trade and shipping is hampered.²⁹ In the waters of strong states this could take the form of authorized harassment; the proliferation of sophisticated subsurface weaponry is particularly worrying in this regard. It is worth recalling that both the USS *Pueblo* and SS *Mayaguez* incidents were sparked by differences between the United States and coastal states over the width of their territorial waters. The seizures by Iran of British Royal Marines in 2004 and a boarding party of British sailors and marines in 2007, though both clearly planned provocations, were also mounted in disputed waters.³⁰ In the case of weak states, this hampering could take the form of predation by criminally or politically motivated nonstate actors. All the inhibitions that restrain action against weak states on land could be extended to the sea.

Maritime Disorder and the Threat to Free Movement at Sea

The potential threats that therefore confront all maritime users and every power that values the freedom of the seas are not piracy or maritime terrorism alone. Those are just two among several that can be viewed collectively as problems of maritime disorder. Participants can move between activities—legal fishermen

can fish illegally, illegal fishermen can be pirates, pirates can be smugglers, smugglers can move weapons and men for terrorists, terrorists can kidnap fishermen for ransom, and so on—and each activity can influence and create opportunities for another, to a point that could spark conflict. The context within which these conflicts will take place is likely to be one of increasing legal confusion and political ambiguity as different states assert different rights over the sea space. These assertions will for the most part fall just short of actual claims of territoriality, at least for the time being, but the sum effect will be a gradual erosion of the modern world's shared understanding that movement on the high sea is free for all.

“Defense of Trade”

From at least the end of the seventeenth century, defense of “trade” was a mission central to a navy's purpose. Mahan, even though he is known more widely as the champion of fleet-on-fleet combat, recognized both that the free movement of trade was a vital sinew of national power and that the trading system upon which that power depended was far from secure. In his words, the sea was “the great highway.” He would have concurred with Sir Walter Raleigh that “whosoever commands the sea commands trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.” Even Ralph Peters, a strategic commentator with a famously “up and at 'em” view of military power, has suggested that the Navy, by focusing on neutralizing opposing naval forces and projecting expeditionary power, has overlooked its decisive role, “the ability to protect our maritime trade while interdicting that of the enemy.”³¹ For, despite the focus on instant communication, rapid travel, and global capital flows, all of which appear to be unrelated to the manufacture and distribution of physical goods, globalization is fundamentally about trade, the physical movement of weighty goods and commodities. Despite this, the very phrase “defense of trade” sounds archaic and the suggestion dated. Yet any navy that has lost sight of its economic mission to protect the seaborne commerce of its own country or the trading system to which its country belongs has become detached from its roots and reality.³²

Countering threats to free navigation, even when they come from irregular opponents such as pirates and terrorists, is a “defense of trade” task. However, “defense of trade,” with its blunt clarity, has been replaced by a term altogether more vague: maritime security. The terminological change is nonetheless justified, because the challenge has indeed become more diverse and more complex. The conflicts that will arise under the new rubric are unlikely to follow the patterns of twentieth-century naval engagement. As with the conflicts that are likely to accompany the “migration to the sea,” the chances are that they will mimic the

changing patterns of irregular war that have been the predominant form of land warfare for the last fifty years.

COMPLEX MARITIME CONFLICT

Seaward migration will mean that the human and informational terrain of coastal waters will become crowded. The conflicts there will be fought among confusing numbers of people, not all of whom will be engaged; the majority of participants, in fact, will be the partially engaged, the previously engaged, and the unengaged. David Kilcullen, a perceptive observer of the wars that land forces have found themselves fighting in just these circumstances, has urged ground commanders to think in terms of “mission space,” in which “battle spaces” erupt as part of what he has called “complex irregular warfare”:

Armed forces today must deal with many adversaries beyond their traditional opponents, the regular armed forces of nation states. These include insurgents, terrorists, organized criminals and many other actual and potential adversaries. This creates a multilateral and ambiguous environment, leading to vastly increased complexity. Instead of a traditional “bilateral” construct—two opposing sides—armed forces now find themselves in a conflict “ecosystem” that includes numerous armed or unarmed actors capable of posing a serious threat to mission success, but against whom the application of military force is at best problematic. Thus, while in a previous era of warfare armed forces sought to capture and control territory (a “terrain-centric approach”) or to destroy in battle the main forces of the enemy (an “enemy-centric approach”) they must now seek to dominate the entire environment, including a variety of disparate threat elements, and other challenges which are the result of conflict such as humanitarian and reconstruction tasks.³³

Kilcullen has two important foci here. The first is the challenges of urban conflict; his comments, however, are just as relevant for the topographically and hydrographically complex terrain of coastal waters and the adjacent land. The trends that are driving seaward migration mean that in many parts of the world these regions will develop into increasingly complex zones of conflict; and that conflict will bear the hallmarks of complex irregular warfare. The second is that technologically advanced “naval and air platforms with networked information capability to generate precision strike” is part of an approach that has not proven to be particularly workable in the face of irregular threats.³⁴

WHAT IS THE NAVY FOR?

What is a modern navy? It is a service in search of a role. With a diverse range of competitors that might need to be confronted and allies who might need to be supported, the U.S. Navy has an embarrassment of choices. Many of these choices, moreover, are potential rather than immediate. They call for investment

and preparation now for contingencies that might be realized only in years or decades.

What is so disconcerting is that the conflict the United States (and its allies) is engaged in right now has more in common with the nineteenth than the twentieth century. It is made up of overlapping small wars, each of indeterminate duration against enemies that are illusive, that some analysts have labeled “protean,” and that find shelter in weak states and operate in the anonymous alleyways of third-world cities and the urban sprawl of Western slums.³⁵ In the equally bitter domestic contest for scarce resources, navies have sought a way to demonstrate their relevance to this conflict. That, however, is not immediately apparent either to the observer who is uninformed about the enduring importance of the sea or to many in the Navy itself who have been brought up in the Mahanian tradition and are concerned that consideration is once again being given to roles it was possible to believe had been left in the wake of the Great White Fleet.

All armed services exist to advance state interests by killing people and breaking things or by threatening to kill people and break things. The paradox, however, is that for all their purposeful brutality, their continuing effectiveness depends on maintaining a delicate balance between morale and materiel. Navies, in particular, are hugely expensive organizations. Because navies are so expensive and take so long to acquire the skills and ships they need, they can often achieve their effect as much by *being* as by fighting. That is, the length of time it takes a navy to become effective means that its very existence can deter a rival. This enduring quality can often be overlooked in time of peace. In the current period of ambivalence, when people appear uncertain as to whether we are at peace or at war and wish to maintain the illusion that such neat categories are still relevant to the world in which they live, this naval myopia appears particularly acute. The consequences of uncertainty are revealed starkly in the fate of the Royal Navy, which, lacking strategic direction and political support since the end of the Cold War, has been reduced to a shadow of its former self by successive governments.³⁶ The U.S. Navy must look at it and quiver, wondering if similar strategic ignorance might infect its own political paymasters. The question those paymasters are asking, of course, and that the Navy needs to answer, is: What does it exist *for*?

A Traditional Role Restored

The purpose of this article has not been to answer that question in all its complexity but to direct attention to one aspect of a navy’s purpose, maritime security. The definition of “maritime security” as used by navies (insofar as any definition is agreed) is more restrictive than that understood generally by the wider maritime community of international organizations, law enforcement

agencies, and commercial shippers. Many would argue that “maritime security” is what navies have always done, and this lack of congruence between the two interpretations appears to underlie many of the debates about the Navy’s role in what is, without doubt, a more complex maritime environment. Furthermore, its re-introduction at a time when navies have been debating their futures has not been entirely welcome, because all three of its constituent tasks from a naval perspective—defense of trade, homeland defense, and maritime irregular warfare—demand more ships. In particular, they demand relatively unsophisticated ships. This runs counter to the acquisition policy pursued by all major navies over the past fifty years, an ever-shrinking number of higher-quality platforms, a policy driven by an enemy, the Soviet Union, whose approach to warfare followed a similar trajectory. Many current and several potential future opponents have decided, however, that, for the time being at least, this is not a race they wish to enter and that they will instead fight what the British army general Rupert Smith has called “war among the people.”³⁷

Major navies have a very real dilemma: unsophisticated ships asked to fight a sophisticated enemy are likely to be sunk. Expeditionary warfare against a capable opponent, which is what navies have focused on fighting since 1990, demands a sophisticated fleet with a full range of capabilities. The argument that these ships can be used for lesser tasks is not really sustainable. First and foremost, there are not enough of them; secondly, they are simply too expensive to be risked in low-intensity tasks, where much of their highly destructive weaponry would be inappropriate; and lastly, their crews, if they are to remain effective against sophisticated enemies, need to train continuously for the war they are intended to fight.

Nonetheless, as Clausewitz pointed out, war is a chameleon and enemies are not static. Even potential adversaries who current assessments suggest will fight conventionally are unlikely to attack Western navies at their strongest point or on the terms those navies prefer. The risk Western naval forces run is of being prepared for and focused on high-technology warfare they might never have to fight while leaving themselves underprepared and ill equipped for a form of warfare that they probably will, including the “long war” against salafist, Islamist extremism, characterized by sovereignty concerns, political and legal ambiguity, the criticality of intelligence, and the savagery of small-unit action, all played out on the big screen of the wider information war.³⁸ They are, in other words, likely to encounter more frequently and in more places Rupert Smith’s “war among the people.” As has been suggested, “The Big War paradigm might be comforting and conducive to justifying a large share of the national treasure. But its relevance to today’s geopolitical disorder is questionable.”³⁹ Furthermore, the idea that we are living in an interlude and that normal service will be resumed

when “Big War” comes back is incomplete and ahistorical. Irregular or “small” war has existed throughout history. Even as organized forces clashed at Cannae, Breitenfeld, Waterloo, Gettysburg, Verdun, and Khe Sanh, the drumbeat of conflicts on the edge of ancient empires, colonial wars, the wars of America’s westward expansion, the anticolonial wars, and the Cold War “wars of liberation” continued uninterrupted.

What Is the Source of Maritime Disorder?

Disorder at sea is multifarious. Talk of “disorder” presupposes an order, yet the notion of the freedom of the seas as articulated by the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius in 1609 depends on a very restrictive idea of order outside the narrow strip of territorial water over which each coastal state has control. The gradual acceptance of his restrictive notion created the first global “common.” Being a common, it is anarchic; even the very minimal order that has existed upon it has always been exerted by a hegemon. That order has depended, in other words, on the self-interest of an imperial or global power or powers to enforce it, either alone or with the help of regional allies. In the absence of such a self-interested power or powers, seafarers have generally been subject to the depredations of criminals or state-sponsored privateers. This is how it has always been and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Those who argue that the security of a global common can be exercised through treaties or “regimes,” rather than hegemonic power, in anything other than a limited or temporary sense have scant evidence upon which to base their faith.

In Grotius’s vision this anarchic state applied only to the high seas—that is to say, the area beyond the territorial limit. In reality it existed right up to the coast of any and every state that was unable to enforce its own will over its territorial waters. The same applies today in the case of failed states, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Papua–New Guinea.⁴⁰ In the case of weak states such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh, it can also extend right up the coast in some areas and can even affect major ports such as Chittagong or Lagos if the authorities are underfunded or corrupt. Failed and weak states can provide criminals and terrorists with sanctuary. Weak states where order is more a semblance than a reality can, ironically, provide more secure shelter for criminals and terrorists than do failed states, because weak but corruptible law enforcement can protect them from internal enemies and deter external powers and international organizations from pursuing them directly, by the fear that such action will make an already bad situation worse.

What Is the Role of the United States?

What then is the role of the United States, and what has it to do with the suppression of piracy and maritime terrorism? The United States must pursue its

self-interest; it must “please itself in the process of serving the general good”; otherwise, “a praiseworthy desire to improve conditions here or there must prove too shallow a motive to bear the traffic when unexpected costs are suffered.”⁴¹ That general good manifestly includes the maintenance of good order and freedom of movement at sea. Although the United States prides itself on its maritime heritage, it is more of a continental island than a nation that depends on the sea. Vast oceans have protected it, and it has historically been untroubled by anything other than homegrown maritime disorder. It therefore subscribes to the illusion that maritime security is at most times and in most places a law enforcement problem, one that is properly the concern of coast guards. This is strange, given that the first serious action in which the fledging U.S. Navy engaged was the suppression of Barbary piracy. But then again, perhaps not—the predators of the Barbary Coast were in fact servants of the Barbary states, who owed allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. They were, in other words, not pirates in pursuit of private gain but effectively privateers; they provided these local lords with what today would be termed “contractor support.” What the Navy was confronting then was not a law enforcement problem but a political one, because what the Barbary pirates did was perfectly legal.⁴²

Consequently, although the U.S. Coast Guard has a leading role when it comes to ensuring maritime security in home waters, it can play only a supporting role globally, because the problem, which is primarily political, is the same now as it was then. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to international waters. The suggestion that operations on inland and coastal waters are substantially different from those on deep water (and, by implication, that the former is more suited to coast-guard activity whereas the latter is the preserve of the gray-hulled navy) is seductive but wrong.⁴³ Although each venue has different operational characteristics, they are essentially a continuum that criminals, insurgents, and terrorists have no hesitation in exploiting. The Navy must do the same. The advantages cited for coast guards include a lower political profile that, it is said, is less threatening in situations where sovereignty is an issue and the fact that they are generally cheaper to establish and maintain.⁴⁴ The argument also seeks to draw a hard line between the “defense of trade” and “constabulary” missions, but this line will be increasingly hard to draw as the seas become more crowded and the operational seascape more complex.

The Political Dimension of Naval Operations

Navies are different from the other armed services. Killing people and breaking things in the service of the state constitute only part of what they do—historically, only a very small part. Navies have always been aware of the political consequences of their actions. They have therefore often been more willing than other

armed services to exert their influence politically rather than militarily. The growing political challenge will be to secure both the ocean spaces and the coastal waters, upon which human activity will encroach more and more. It will require political sensitivity more than law enforcement acumen. It will also require that all the levers of national power be applied and focused with political confidence and determination. Providing that the U.S. Navy can absorb the lessons that ground forces have learned so painfully over the last half-century and adapt its force structure and training accordingly, it has the substantially greater resources and the vital relationships with its naval counterparts that will be necessary to tackle the maritime security role effectively.

But, given the current wave of anti-Americanism that is sweeping the world, is America in a position to anchor the global maritime order? It appears that anything America touches or anything with which it is associated is tainted and provokes an immediate and negative reaction. But even if so, there is no alternative to American leadership, for the moment at least. The effect of this wave of resentment and suspicion has been to set American political and military leaders a very delicate task. When promoting the “thousand-ship navy” the United States is right to be as backward as it can be when coming forward. Necessary humility is not, however, a substitute for clear leadership. Free markets demand free movement at sea, free from harm. Subtlety is not a substitute for strength but its servant. As Teddy Roosevelt admonished: “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”

The Future of Maritime Disorder

Piracy and terrorism show no apparent links, but the presence of piracy is a possible indicator that the conditions exist for maritime insurgency or maritime terrorism to take root.⁴⁵ As the issue has been put, “While we should not take piracy as a marker for terrorism, it is a useful indicator of the level of security in the area.”⁴⁶ How maritime insurgents and terrorists might exploit opportunities in the future can only be a matter of speculation. What will motivate them, however, is quite clear. The constraints, geography and opportunity, will remain the same, and so too will the imperative: the need to respond to political circumstances on land.⁴⁷ Only if political circumstances change on land will insurgents and terrorists need to operate at sea. Among the salient characteristics of salafist, Islamist terrorism have been its mobility and its willingness to support local groups with specialist knowledge, even if that support amounts to little more than advice and political exhortation. The concern must be that unless naval forces are prepared to confront such eventualities, there is a good chance those groups will succeed.

For example, if U.S. forces are constrained to operate from sea bases because local conditions preclude secure land bases, a sea base might well become a target if it is in confined waters, such as those of the Persian Gulf or the eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁸ Alternatively, if salafist organizations are able to gain footholds in areas where political change or instability might allow them to operate with greater freedom than they do now, and where the sea might offer them significant opportunities, that combination might increase the incentive to place greater emphasis on the development of a maritime capability than is the case currently. In the first instance, it is likely that terrorists and insurgents will develop the capacity to do more of what they are doing now—moving cadres, equipment, and money. Thereafter they could possibly build on this expertise to develop an attack and area-denial capability to interdict international trade, hinder the free movement of naval forces, and impede access to littoral waters. Keeping the constraints of geography and opportunity firmly in mind, Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean are all maritime theaters surrounded by large Islamic populations, which if Islamist attitudes take hold could develop into areas of future conflict.

THE GAP IN THE CONTINUUM

Confronting these challenges is what navies do. The U.S. Navy is the international “cop on the beat.” It cannot be everywhere, but it needs to demonstrate that it recognizes that at least two aspects of maritime security—the defense of trade from criminal and political threats and the suppression of maritime insurgency—are key parts of its mission. It also needs to be able to demonstrate that it can operate across the continuum, from blue water to brown water. As Admiral Mullen has said, “We cannot sit out in the deep blue, waiting for the enemy to come to us. . . . We must go to him.”⁴⁹ To do that effectively will mean changing some of the ways it does its job. It needs to recognize that there is a significant gap in the continuum. Recent U.S. doctrine has viewed the littorals as a space over which expeditionary forces must leap from the fleet to the land, rather than a vital human and economic space that is often poorly secured, to the point that disruptive, subversive, and criminal elements can operate in it to their advantage and to the detriment of the host nation and the international community.

Intelligence is key. Technical intelligence-gathering methods might provide the Navy with a vital edge, or they might not. Currently a heavy investment is being made in a system of fused sensors to deliver “maritime domain awareness.” Modern warships depend increasingly on their sensors to interrogate their environment. However, in any “war among the people,” empathy is as important as data.⁵⁰ Dependence on technical intelligence can make any force deaf to the human factor.⁵¹ Once deaf to that, it is blind to complexity.

The only way navies will be able to gather this human intelligence is to behave like their nineteenth-century predecessors by stepping off their ships into boats and onto land. Sailors will need to recognize that, like ground forces, they will have to sacrifice a degree of force protection in order to gather information and interact with the people they are there to win over.

The need, in other words, is to redevelop the old naval virtue of presence. Not merely persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the current grail of the intelligence community, but physical presence—ships regularly on station demonstrating particular interest in, and commitment to, the sea peoples of weak and failing states. It cannot fulfill this task alone, which is why it needs to develop close relationships with navies around the world and develop workable and interoperable tactics, techniques, and procedures with navies in critical and vulnerable areas. The thousand-ship-navy concept encapsulates this idea. It is an idea that has been misunderstood or mischievously misrepresented but that if taken forward on the terms of broad equality outlined at the outset could provide a workable platform for the suppression of maritime disorder.⁵²

The presence of pirates and terrorists is a wake-up call. Their activities serve to remind the Navy that it cannot stand offshore immune to the complex forms of warfare that have appeared on land, where the lines between the criminal and the political have been blurred. The heightened political content of that warfare also means that the Navy cannot interpret the adjective “maritime,” as in “maritime counterterrorism,” or even the broad sweep of “maritime security” as “naval” and therefore take the lead role. It has a role, in many cases an underestimated one, but as part of a larger interagency force that, under clear political leadership, is able to draw on all elements of national power, including diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational. For a navy like the U.S. Navy, though, working with all these elements is hard-wired into its blood.

NOTES

1. For an example of the continuing vibrancy of this hypothesis see Dan Ephron, “Could al-Qaeda Infiltrate Somali Pirates?” MSNBC.com, 11 April 2006.
2. Office of Naval Intelligence and Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, *Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020* (Washington, D.C.: 1 March 1999), chap. 3, available at www.fas.org/irp/threat/maritime2020/chapter3.htm.
3. Portions of this article are based on, and build on, chapter 3 of Martin N. Murphy, *Small Boats, Weak States and Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism’s Threat to International Security*, Adelphi Paper 387 (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2007).
4. The importance of this point has been emphasized by Michael F. Morris, who in an important article provides a succinct summary of the differences between insurgency and

- terrorism, as well as a strong argument in favor of treating al-Qa'ida as an insurgent movement. See his "Al Qaeda as an Insurgency," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 39 (Fourth Quarter 2005), pp. 41–50, available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1039.pdf.
5. J. N. Mak, "Pirates, Renegades and Fishermen: The Politics of 'Sustainable' Piracy in the Strait of Malacca," in *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 199–223.
 6. On the problem in Nigeria see Office of Naval Intelligence, *Worldwide Threat to Shipping Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy Dept., 14 July 2006).
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MARITIME TERRORISM

Focusing on the Probable

Richard Farrell

As groups prepare to memorialize the sixth anniversary of 9/11, Americans seem to have forgotten that terrorism has long had a prominent role in American history. Geoffrey Blainey describes American anarchists and assassins in the 1900s who were the equivalent of modern suicide bombers.¹ Blainey reminds us that terrorism killed an American president (William McKinley) in 1901, a hundred years before 9/11.

Currently, there is a great deal of angst about maritime terrorism, but is it justified? Fueling the anxiety is the fact that the world's oceans sustain the global economy. At any given time, forty thousand vessels are chugging across the world's oceans—globalization's superhighway—employing more than a million seafarers of virtually every nationality. Over the last four decades, seaborne trade has nearly quadrupled.² The U.S. Maritime Administration reports that more than seven million shipping containers enter American ports each year.³

Concerns about maritime security and the vulnerability of maritime assets were reinforced by an incident in October 2001. At the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro, a suspected al-Qa'ida terrorist was found inside a maritime shipping container, equipped for the duration of the container's intended voyage. Intelligence sources say other containers similarly fitted out were found at the Italian port. This alarming discovery underlined the tension between the needs of international security, economic freedom, and global trade.⁴

Despite the headlines, articles, and books written since 9/11, however, a terrorist attack at sea is not

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necessarily imminent. Various terrorism studies, particularly a RAND Corporation analysis in 1983, argue that terrorism is overwhelmingly a land-based phenomenon.⁵ The National Targeting Center documented 651 terrorist attacks in 2004; however, only two were maritime attacks. The first was a suicide attack initially intended for Iraq's Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal but actually conducted against a small boat from the coastal patrol ship USS *Firebolt* (PC 10); the second was the bombing of the *Superferry 14* in Manila Bay, in the Philippines.⁶ Why were there only two attacks in the seemingly vulnerable maritime domain? Given the small percentage of terrorist acts at sea, is increased attention of limited maritime forces justified?

Several Department of Defense officials and executives in other government agencies believe that tracking all worldwide maritime vessels is the key to defeating terrorism at sea. While having visibility of ship locations is an important piece of the puzzle, however, more focus is needed on a different aspect of terrorism at sea. Maritime counterterrorism and antiterrorism should concentrate on *disrupting the movement of people, terror-related cargo, and financial support* of terror groups. Rather than using ships as weapons or targets, terrorists are using criminal activities at sea to support land-based terrorism.

WHY DOES THIS MATTER?

Because of the requirement to capture headlines, terrorists are under constant pressure to do something new. Terror groups also have access to media reports detailing the economic impact of maritime trade on globalization. Consequently, some maritime experts claim that a single well-aimed terrorist attack could paralyze global maritime commerce.⁷ Others observe that most of the world's manufacturing capability is dependent on just-in-time delivery of components; they claim that a major attack on shipping could interrupt just-in-time deliveries and strike a staggering blow to the global economy.⁸

In contrast, this article seeks to show that a major maritime attack is not preordained. Maritime targets are harder to attack than those on land, and most terror groups do not have the experience or expertise to do so successfully. The few terror groups that do have maritime skills are unable to project their power past their home turf and depend enormously upon their relationship with locals to "blend into the crowd" after an attack.

The real issue to be confronted is the conservation of resources. The West has a fixed stock of resources, people, and platforms with which to counter global terrorism. The United States and its partners must focus on land-based terrorism and sever its support rather than invest maritime resources against unlikely terrorist actions at sea.

* * * * *

This is not to say that terror groups do not consider seaports, commercial shipping, and international cruise lines attractive targets.⁹ Al-Qa'ida initiated a maritime terror campaign several months before 9/11, and many Americans believe that it has the capability to conduct successful attacks on maritime targets today. They assert that the suicide attacks in Yemen and the Persian Gulf demonstrate al-Qa'ida's ability to terrorize global shipping.¹⁰ In January 2000, a U.S. Navy warship made a port call in Yemen as part of a Central Command effort to increase military-to-military contacts and cooperation.¹¹ The guided-missile destroyer USS *The Sullivans* (DDG 68) found itself in al-Qa'ida's crosshairs: a small boat loaded with explosives was prepared to ram into the destroyer. The would-be suicide bombers pushed the boat down the landing and into the water. However, the explosives weighed too much and sank the boat.¹²

The al-Qa'ida cell involved held a meeting in Malaysia just days after the *Sullivans* failure. Tawfiq bin Attash, an Osama Bin Laden lieutenant and primary maritime planner, flew to Malaysia to attend the meeting and set up another attack on a U.S. warship.¹³ That October, having reviewed tactics at the Malaysia meeting, the cell pursued a second attack, in Aden, Yemen. This time it was successful; a small-boat attack against the USS *Cole* (DDG 67) killed seventeen sailors and severely damaged the ship.¹⁴

Another scheme to attack American warships was discovered in Singapore. The cell planning the Singapore attacks was affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamic terror group with links to al-Qa'ida.¹⁵ Jemaah Islamiyah planned to attack ships steaming along Sembawang, on Singapore's north coast. Mirroring the *Cole* tactics, the markings on a captured Jemaah Islamiyah map identified a strategic kill zone where the channel was narrow. A warship would not have room to avoid a collision with an explosive-filled suicide boat. Still, the attacks were not accomplished, because the Jemaah Islamiyah cell could not implement the plan by itself, lacking maritime capability and expertise. The plot was disrupted shortly after 9/11, along with plans to conduct land-based terrorism against American businessmen.¹⁶

In October 2002, the *Limburg*, a 299,000-ton oil tanker, was attacked during an approach to the pilot station at Mina Al-Dabah, Yemen.¹⁷ One crew member died, and ninety thousand barrels of crude spilled into the sea. Investigations confirmed that a boat filled with explosives had rammed the vessel after failing to find a U.S. warship.¹⁸ The most recent attack against American ships occurred in August 2005. In it, al-Qa'ida's targets were the amphibious assault ship USS *Kearsarge* (LHD 3) and dock landing ship USS *Ashland* (LSD 48) alongside a pier in Aquaba, Jordan.¹⁹ The terrorists failed, killing a Jordanian guard but no Americans.

MARITIME TERROR GROUPS

One major reason for the small number of maritime attacks is that only a few terror organizations have the capability to conduct them, even in their own areas of influence. However, one terror organization with vigorous maritime expertise is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Its maritime branch, the Sea Tigers, has pioneered modern maritime terrorism. LTTE's struggle for an independent Hindu Tamil homeland in northern Sri Lanka has included hundreds of maritime attacks and suicide bombings that have killed more than sixty-four thousand people.²⁰

The Sea Tigers have successfully executed small-boat suicide attacks since 1984. The Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs declares that the Sea Tigers "have taken on the Sri Lankan Navy with unprecedented success." Its study claims that they have destroyed 30 to 50 percent of Sri Lanka's naval coastal craft, an impressive statistic, as patrol boats are the mainstay of the Sri Lankan navy.²¹ The Sea Tigers' maritime terror tactics, wealth of experience, and success with maritime terror have been studied by other terrorist groups, although the LTTE's own terror operations have been confined to Sri Lanka.²²

Maritime terrorism is a serious regional security concern in Southeast Asia as well. This area is of critical importance to the United States, because of the amount of maritime trade passing through and its significance in its own right to the global economy. Southeast Asia has a terrorist organization that possessed, until recently, robust maritime capabilities, the Abu Sayyaf Group, operating out of the Philippines. It conducted maritime attacks in the region for years. The group followed an effective maritime attack doctrine. It executed well-planned mobile operations and was adept in guerrilla tactics. It had rapport with and support from local fighters. It skillfully dispersed into small groups when pursued and blended in with sympathetic local civilians. Abu Sayyaf demonstrated a gruesome willingness to kill or injure Muslims in urban terror operations designed to divert government attention from its own mountain hideouts. It conducted information operations, including dissemination of false information on VHF radio.²³

Abu Sayyaf members and followers (regardless of faction) belong to Muslim families with strong, centuries-old seafaring traditions. This is an important distinction, one that separates the organization from al-Qa'ida and other major Islamic terror groups. Its mastery of the maritime domain and support of the local population gave it ample capability to conduct maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. In May 2001, Abu Sayyaf abducted three American citizens and seventeen Filipinos at the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan. The incident received international coverage because several of the victims, including one of the Americans, were murdered and beheaded.²⁴ The Dos Palmas incident triggered

BALIKATAN 02-1, a joint operation aimed at destroying Abu Sayyaf. The end result was the neutralization of many Abu Sayyaf members in 2002, including the reported death of one of its main leaders, Abu Sabaya, and the eventual death of the head of the Sulu faction, known as Commander Robot.²⁵ With their downfall, a great deal of expertise on how to execute maritime terrorist attacks was lost.

Various analysts have examined Abu Sayyaf's historical and financial ties with al-Qa'ida.²⁶ While connections are clearly documented, not much has come of al-Qa'ida's outreach to Abu Sayyaf. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad were sent before 9/11 to work with Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and create an al-Qa'ida spin-off.²⁷ Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began training Abu Sayyaf members, and with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, he helped set up the first al-Qa'ida cell in the Philippines. However, in 1995 an accidental fire in their safe house compromised their plots and plans. Ramzi Yousef was captured, convicted, and incarcerated in 1998;²⁸ Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was captured in Pakistan in 2003.²⁹

MARITIME THREAT SCENARIOS

If few terror groups have expertise at sea, what are the threats to the maritime domain? Concern has been voiced about several scenarios: smuggling terrorists, weapons of mass destruction or WMD components in containers, dangerous cargo ships used as weapons, attacks on oil tankers to disrupt global oil trade, attacks on infrastructure around ports, and terrorist attacks on ferries.³⁰

The George W. Bush administration gives WMD top priority, a concern reflected in the *National Strategy for Maritime Security*.³¹ The smuggling of a WMD or components in a shipping container into a U.S. port is one of the most specifically and frequently mentioned scenarios by legislators in Washington, D.C.³² That is in concert with the president's Maritime Security Strategy, but the probability of a WMD attack via a container, though it cannot be reliably estimated, is certainly lower than the probability of any other type of terrorist attack.³³ However, the potential consequences require serious attention, and the United States has taken steps to mitigate the WMD threat.

Experts and legislators are concerned about a WMD smuggled in a container on a truck, ship, or railroad; however, effective response is a double-edged blade. Standardized shipboard containers have revolutionized maritime cargo. Because they can be off-loaded quickly from ships and loaded easily onto trucks or rail cars, standardized containers have become indispensable to world commerce, as well as targets for crime and terrorism.³⁴ Tracking shipboard containers is complicated by the amount of paperwork and the number of people involved. The movement of each container is part of a transaction that can involve up to twenty-five different parties: buyers, sellers, inland freighters and

shipping lines, customs and cargo brokers, financiers and governments. A single trade can generate thirty to forty documents, and each container can carry cargo for several customers. A typical large containership can carry up to six thousand twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEU),* associated with up to forty thousand documents. Approximately seven million TEUs arrived in America's container ports by sea in 2006, which translates into around seventeen thousand actual boxes a day.³⁵ To reduce the manpower required to process the numerous documents, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has accelerated development of a new information management system, the Automated Commercial Environment. It will enable CBP to automate evaluation of high-risk shipments, including cargo containers, as well as speed up customs filing processes for American importers.³⁶

Another major issue is that containers are "intermodal"—they can travel by sea or on land, by road or rail. An intermodal system is difficult to regulate, because it crosses jurisdictional boundaries. On a ship at sea, a container comes under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations body. On land or in a seaport, these containers pass into the hands of national governments, which may have separate legislation for different transport modes. All this creates a problem in implementing international regulations.³⁷ Despite these challenges, in December 2002 the IMO adopted more stringent international standards for the security of ports and vessels, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code; however, some skeptics believe the IMO lacks the resolve to enforce the code.³⁸

Augmenting the IMO's international security actions, the U.S. government has taken several steps to keep track of container contents arriving in U.S. ports. Programs such as the Container Security Initiative, the twenty-four-hour rule,[†] and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism have increased the difficulty of smuggling a WMD or components into American ports.³⁹ Additionally, Operation SAFE COMMERCE, a pilot project conducted by the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), verifies the contents of sea containers at their point of loading, ensures their physical security in transit, and tracks them to their final destinations.⁴⁰

Container issues aside, terrorist groups face several technical challenges in obtaining working WMD devices. First, it is difficult for them to get weaponized nuclear, biological, or chemical materials.⁴¹ Additionally, as the North Koreans

* A TEU is a container of standard size: twenty feet long, eight feet wide, and eight feet, six inches high.

† Information about an ocean shipment must be transmitted to CBP twenty-four hours before the cargo is loaded in a foreign port onto a U.S.-bound vessel.

showed the world, it is extremely challenging to produce a substantial nuclear yield even in highly controlled conditions.⁴² Also, attempting to build or detonate a WMD device for terror attack is fraught with health hazards. If the WMD materials are not assembled and conveyed in secure spaces or behind shielding, the builders will be exposed to lethal doses of biological agents, toxic chemicals, or radiation, or will suffer severe burns.⁴³ Few nations, much less transnational terror groups, have the facilities to create, assemble, or ship nuclear or biological weapons safely. Finally, a nuclear device would likely require so much shielding that it would be nearly impossible to move or hide from port authorities.⁴⁴

Another container-related smuggling threat is a relatively weak radiological bomb, or “dirty bomb.” Radiological bombs, made from less radioactive and more common materials than standard nuclear weapons, are easier to build and deploy. However, they would produce a much smaller physical impact and cause fewer human casualties.⁴⁵ They are adequate “fear” weapons but would not inflict the spectacular results that al-Qa’ida seeks. Consequently, most terror attacks are planned and executed with relatively accessible conventional explosives.

Dangerous Cargo Ships

Another hot topic of maritime vulnerability concerns ships carrying dangerous cargo. The Homeland Security Council has specifically included terrorist attacks on ships with flammable and toxic cargos in its national preparedness standards.⁴⁶ One author believes that a single LNG tanker exploding in Boston Harbor would wipe out the city’s downtown areas.⁴⁷ Some maritime experts disagree, acknowledging the security information about LNG tankers provided by several government agencies but believing the concern overstated.⁴⁸

A recent study by the ioMosaic Corporation draws upon field measurements, operational information, and engineering information on LNG vessels gathered over the last sixty years.⁴⁹ It takes into account terrorism and other twenty-first-century threats. The overall conclusion is straightforward—that in the highly unlikely event of a very large scale release of liquified natural gas on land or water, significant effects will be felt in the immediate vicinity.⁵⁰ However, the zone of impact would not extend anywhere close to the thirty miles predicted by some groups.⁵¹ As long as an LNG vapor cloud is unconfined, it will not explode. A cloud reaching a populated area would quickly find an ignition source and burn back to the spill site before it could cover large numbers of people. If inflicting mass casualties is the terrorist goal, LNG facilities and tankers are not good targets.⁵²

Experts believe, however, that other dangerous cargos—such as poisonous gas, ammonium nitrate, and other volatile chemicals—in bulk carriers could pose a serious threat if the ships were seized by terrorists and used as weapons.

Certain dangerous-cargo ships have come under close scrutiny from the Department of Homeland Security, in particular by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has created security teams to assess fifty-five militarily and economically strategic ports. It has also completed special assessments of several classes of vessels, including ferries, LNG tankers, certain dangerous-cargo barges, and single-skin tank vessels. Based upon these assessments, the Coast Guard will escort vessels that are potential security threats; further, it has developed a port security risk-assessment tool to establish risk-based profiles of incoming vessels.⁵³

Tankers in Port or Offshore Facilities

A common scenario in Department of Defense exercises is an attack on an oil tanker or coastal petroleum facility to disrupt oil trade. According to the *Los Angeles Times* the *Limburg* attack may have been conducted to do just that, by causing consternation among oil tanker operators.⁵⁴ The bombing caused insurance rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300 percent and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50 percent.⁵⁵ Still, while this was bad news for Yemen, it did not bring the global oil economy to its knees.

Contrast the *Limburg* incident with the Tanker War between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf between 1984 and 1987. Lloyd's of London estimates that the Tanker War seriously damaged 546 commercial vessels, killed about 430 civilian mariners, and critically damaged the oil infrastructure in Iraq and Iran.⁵⁶ But if the campaign effectively crippled the Iranian oil industry for years, it encouraged oil stock building elsewhere, a rise in industrial production in consumer countries, and an increase in production by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to stabilize global oil production and consumption.⁵⁷ A study on the five most recent shocks to the oil economy finds, "It is remarkable, looking back at that turbulent period [1980–87] that the major stock market indexes in the U.S. were little affected by the events in the oil market."⁵⁸ Given, then, that an all-out war between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf, with nearly indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping, causing the loss of over five hundred oil tankers, did not cripple the oil economy, it is a stretch to believe that an isolated terror attack against an oil tanker could strangle it today. Certainly, oil prices might spike; however, during the past five years shocks to the global oil economy increased petroleum prices, but in each case market pressures eventually subsided and oil prices slid back to almost preshock values.⁵⁹

Infrastructure around Ports

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the security of ports themselves has emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on homeland security. Many security experts believe ports are vulnerable to terrorist attack because of their

size, their easy accessibility by water and land, and the tremendous amount of cargo they handle.⁶⁰

As a result of all this attention, U.S. ports have taken enormous strides to reduce their vulnerabilities. The Coast Guard has provided for each a “captain of the port,” the lead federal official for the security and safety of the vessels and waterways in his or her geographic zone;⁶¹ the arrangement would streamline the command and control of any federal response. The Coast Guard and CBP have improved the quality and timing of information to be provided by shippers and carriers with which the vulnerability of ports and the terrorist risk to ships are evaluated.⁶² In addition to Operation SAFE COMMERCE the TSA has fielded the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), a tamper-resistant biometric badge for workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities, outer continental shelf facilities, or vessels.⁶³ The TWIC is currently on track with an initial enrollment at a select few ports in March 2007. The Transportation Safety Administration predicts that it will be operational in 2007.⁶⁴

Enforcement resources cannot be everywhere at all times. Security forces must be enduring, sustainable, and able to accommodate both local and regional requirements. On top of this, they must be flexible enough to adjust to changing security levels. The post-9/11 environment has produced marine enforcement units with a special operations flavor, as opposed to merely patrolling. For example, the Coast Guard has created active-duty, multimission, mobile teams with specialized capabilities to close critical security gaps in the nation’s strategic seaports.⁶⁵

Despite the progress that has been made in strengthening port security, many officials still describe seaports as “wide open” and “very vulnerable” to a terrorist attack.⁶⁶ In contrast to this claim is the fact that Congress provided over \$650 million through fiscal year 2005 in direct federal grants to ports to improve operational and physical security. This “plus-up” was in addition to the budgets of the Coast Guard, CBP, TSA, and other federal agencies involved in port security.⁶⁷ Efforts by the U.S. government and the international community to improve port security are proceeding at an unprecedented pace.⁶⁸

Ferry Attacks

Policy makers and government officials frequently cite passenger ferries as a key maritime security concern. In 2005, a congressman declared, “There is a serious security gap in our ferry systems and we need to ensure that passengers on our nation’s waterways are protected.”⁶⁹ A RAND study in 2006 argued that attacks on passenger ferries in the United States might be highly attractive to terrorists, since they would be easy to execute, could kill many people, would likely draw

significant media attention, and could demonstrate a terrorist group's salience and vibrancy.⁷⁰

In a 2006 report, the Department of Justice identified ferry bombing as among the most likely types of maritime terror attacks.⁷¹ It reached this conclusion largely on the basis of the number of suspicious incidents reported at marine facilities in the Seattle area. However, the Seattle office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has suggested that the Justice Department's high ranking of the passenger ferry threat arises from more aggressive reporting of suspicious incidents in that region than elsewhere in the country.⁷² FBI officials stated that they have never been able to tie a specific suspicious incident to a terrorist group or plan in the United States.⁷³ While there appears to be a logical case for ferries as a terrorist target, then, questions remain about actual terrorist activities related to American ferries.⁷⁴ Two positive by-products of all this attention are that it has caused law enforcement to focus on ferries and that it has raised citizen awareness with respect to out-of-the-ordinary activities on and near ferries. These two trends will reduce the ability of terrorists to carry out a surprise attack on a ferry.

The fundamental implication of the attention and money being spent on the previous scenarios is best summed up by a recent Congressional Research Service report: "An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the global maritime threat should be driven by what is probable rather than what is merely possible. Sober analysis of the issue has been clouded amid anxiety created by the global security climate with much of the discussion based on the notion that maritime terrorists can strike any target with virtually any means available."⁷⁵

Specifically—ships are being used as vectors for smuggling people and cargo and laundering money to support *land*-based terrorism. Terrorist organizations, finding maritime attacks beyond their capability, are using maritime cargo and ships as conveyances rather than as floating weapons. Like drug smugglers, terrorists are trying to blend in with the environment and not draw attention to their human cargo, containers, and financial support.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Thus, efforts to combat terrorism at sea should be focused on interdicting terrorists attempting to sneak into the United States via a ship and on intercepting terror-related materials aboard ships. By tracking people, cargo, and money, we can disrupt a plan to use a small boat laden with explosives rather than simply react to the attack.

Robert Bonner, former head of the Customs Service, has proposed that America create a new "electronic" (rather than physical), border, profiling the contents of

containers in sophisticated data banks that collect and combine electronic documents existing in both government and commercial sources.⁷⁶ He wants to concentrate on the top ten container ports; focusing on a few key ports and making shipping companies face expensive delays unless they can validate cargo security, he argues, are critical steps if the United States is to control containers.⁷⁷

A great deal of information analysis on smuggled terrorists is still manpower intensive. We need to leverage information technology and automate all sources of maritime intelligence, freeing maritime analysts and operators to analyze the bits of information that trickle in rather than having first to find the data and package it in a usable format. As we share more information, we will have to automate its products in order to give everyone involved the ability to see the big picture and find previously hidden patterns or suspicious activities. We need to automate our intelligence and operational inputs to enable peer-group review of all source information.

Another issue absorbing a great deal of manpower is the attempt to find anomalous behaviors. Terror groups, as we have seen, are interested in smuggling their operatives and terror-related materials and protecting their financial backing, not in disrupting their primary method of transport. Like drug smugglers, they want to act in as normal and outwardly law-abiding a way as possible, in order not to draw attention from authorities. Therefore, spending precious capital on finding overt anomalies distracts from the war on terror and will likely find only errant fishing vessels.

The war against terrorism is primarily a war of information. Interagency and international cooperation is critical to putting together the pieces of the intelligence puzzle. Progress has been made in breaking down the “stovepipes,” but much more cooperation and free flow of information need to occur. The new threat environment requires that the government not keep its security cards close to its chest.⁷⁸ Cooperation between credentialed agencies would help solve a key problem—the inability of law enforcement officials and investigators in the field to share their information with one another or other nations.⁷⁹ Overclassification also requires attention. It is easy to stamp documents with high classifications, to be “safe rather than sorry”; however, in doing so we cheat ourselves out of the benefit of another organization’s analysis and viewpoint. We need to move from a mind-set of “need to know” to one of “need to share.”

Another area requiring consistent American support is international collaboration of maritime forces. U.S. maritime forces cannot be everywhere; they must rely on partnerships for presence, information, and infrastructure. An example of successful American outreach involves the Yemeni coast guard. Modeling itself on the U.S. Coast Guard, Yemen’s coast guard has established district bases in the ports of Hodeidah and Aden. The three-year-old fleet has had a string of

interdiction successes and has gained a regional reputation for tough law enforcement, particularly among those transporting undocumented workers.⁸⁰

The United States must continue to take advantage of maritime forces offered by international partnerships. For example, NATO ships are patrolling throughout the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to nonmilitary traffic through the Strait of Gibraltar to help detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity. The operation, called ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, has evolved out of NATO's immediate response to 9/11.⁸¹ The alliance deployed its Standing Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean on 6 October 2001 in a demonstration of resolve and solidarity in the wake of the attacks, following the invocation of Article 5, the collective-defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁸²

Recognizing critical gaps in their ability to identify and prioritize maritime threats in the Malacca Straits, a zone of worldwide importance, several U.S. combatant commands have partnered with the Republic of Singapore in an initiative called Comprehensive Maritime Awareness. The project utilizes technology and information sharing to enhance maritime domain awareness in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.⁸³ Singapore's involvement is critical; it is astride major shipping lanes adjacent to the Strait of Malacca. This kind of international program for information sharing, technology, and maritime partnership will help close the seams in Southeast Asia. If this initiative works, it will need to be exported to all global shipping choke points.

We have made great strides in force protection, port security measures, and multiagency cooperation, but we have accomplished only the easiest tasks. Agencies, governments, and businesses in the maritime environment need to reach out to each other and collaborate effectively. They need also to recognize that disruption of criminal enterprises at sea is a lynchpin of security. Terrorists use smuggling, covert financial mechanisms, and other criminal enterprises to support their land-based activities.⁸⁴ Turning a ship into a floating bomb may appear to be attractive to a terror organization, but actually doing it is much more difficult than attacking a land target. We must focus antiterror and counterterror efforts on what is most probable—criminal activities at sea that support terrorism on land—rather than on such a long-shot terror option as using a ship as a weapon.

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U.S. NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE BLACK SEA

Sending Mixed Messages

Deborah Sanders

Naval diplomacy—the use of naval power in peacetime to secure influence—by contemporary navies is seen by many as playing a vital and unique role in promoting the international aims of governments.¹ The U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, clearly recognizes the diplomatic utility of naval power: “Navies are not only critical, decisive, and enabling in times of war, but they may be even more important in maintaining the peace.”² Naval diplomacy includes what Sir James Cable calls “gunboat diplomacy,” which is “the use of threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.”³

Naval diplomacy allows states to signal national interests in a particular region, and through naval presence, navies can also act as subtle reminders of their states’ military might and commitment.⁴ Naval diplomacy can support allies, in-

fluence neutrals, deter potential enemies, protect interests, and uphold international law.⁵ American naval diplomacy and foreign policy goals were clearly linked in the 1994 strategic concept paper *Forward . . . from the Sea*: “Naval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument of American foreign policy. From conducting routine ship visits to nations and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger demonstrations of support to long standing regional security interests. . . . US naval forces underscore US

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diplomatic initiatives overseas.”⁶ Naval diplomacy, then, is a way in which the United States can use its naval power to achieve desired effects and advance foreign policy goals.

Or so, at least, it is widely assumed. Using American naval diplomacy in the Black Sea during the summer of 2006 as a case study, this article questions the generally accepted view of the diplomatic utility of naval power. It argues that naval diplomacy can be counterproductive: that it can not only fail to produce desired political effects but cause unintended and unforeseen damage. In the Black Sea, the fallout of naval presence may ultimately damage American interests. This article, focusing on the preparations for a joint U.S.-Ukrainian multinational exercise, will illustrate how diplomatic goals of American naval diplomacy were thwarted by Ukrainian domestic politics and how naval presence itself exacerbated already poor relations between Russia and Ukraine.

EXERCISE SEA BREEZE

American foreign policy objectives in the Black Sea are to secure the region from terrorists and other security threats, promote democracy and stability, and ensure the free flow of goods and energy in this closed sea.⁷ The establishment of U.S. military bases in Bulgaria and Romania signals the American geostrategic stake.⁸ In theory, naval presence operates along a spectrum of influence, by means of, variously, coercion (deterrence or compellence), “picture building” (that is, a mental picture, conveyed to potential objects of coercion), and coalition building.⁹ Lacking declared adversaries in the Black Sea, U.S. naval presence here has no intended coercive role—though, as will be seen, that is perceived differently in Russia.

The United States does, however, face a number of security challenges in this region: illegal migration, human trafficking, and drugs and weapon smuggling, as well as “a potential front in the global war against terrorism.”¹⁰ In addition, the Black Sea has become a vital route for energy and goods.¹¹

It is in this broad context that U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea pursues the third fundamental task, coalition building—“a range of activity expressly intended to secure foreign policy objectives not by threatening potential adversaries but by influencing the behavior of allies and potentially friendly by-standers”—through sending messages, reducing risk of conflict, offering reassurance, improving interoperability, and allowing states to act jointly against common threats.¹² An important vehicle for coalition building in the Black Sea has been, since 1997, SEA BREEZE, a joint and combined maritime and land exercise with the principal goal of enhancing the interoperability and maritime capabilities of Black Sea states.

In the summer of 2006, SEA BREEZE was to be hosted by Ukraine and the United States and conducted off the Crimea with seventeen participating states.¹³ The American embassy in Ukraine stated in a press release that the exercise was “designed to improve cooperation and coordination between countries in the Black Sea Region.”¹⁴ An additional aim was to support the Ukrainian government, engaged in the complex task of building democracy after the Orange Revolution of 2004. The United States was among the first states to reject the fraudulent presidential elections in Ukraine in November 2004, and since then it has actively encouraged state building at all levels, including military.¹⁵ For its part, Ukraine sees multinational exercises like SEA BREEZE as aiding its own foreign policy objective of NATO membership, demonstrating progress in military modernization, and increasing interoperability with NATO forces.

The United States began preparations for SEA BREEZE 2006 by hosting an Initial Planning Conference at the Ukrainian Naval Institute in Sevastopol in October 2005.¹⁶ The objectives were to establish each participating nation’s training needs, a plan of action and milestones, manpower and equipment requirements, cost estimates and funding availability, host-nation capabilities and logistical needs, and a command and control structure, as well as to draft exercise scenarios.¹⁷ Such preliminaries are vital, but it appears that neither U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), directly responsible for the exercise, nor the U.S. embassy in Kiev thought through the likely effect of the upcoming Ukrainian parliamentary elections on the exercise or American coalition building.

THE EFFECT OF U.S. NAVAL DIPLOMACY ON UKRAINE

The relationship between naval diplomacy and domestic political factors is complex. It has been argued that success is in the eyes of the “locals,” that the psychological environment of a “target” state affects its decision makers and “internal opinion forming groups.”¹⁸ Naval diplomacy, then, must take account of a state’s political, historical, economic, and military worldview;¹⁹ domestic politics—the policy environment, the decision-making arena, and internal pressures—shape the parameters and likelihood of what can be achieved.²⁰ The routine planning and routine preparation for SEA BREEZE 2006, which were to be caught up in a messy political crisis in Ukraine, became a case in point.

On 26 March 2006 Ukraine held parliamentary elections to decide the composition and priorities of its government. After the Orange Revolution a constitutional package of reform had been agreed upon whereby Ukraine would move toward a parliamentary, as opposed to a presidential, system of government after the March elections. The new prime minister, who would form a cabinet to run the government, would no longer be appointed by the president but instead be drawn from the political party with the most seats in the Ukrainian parliament,



the Rada, and would have significantly increased powers. The recently elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, however, would continue to direct Ukraine's foreign policy and in addition would appoint three members to the new cabinet—for the interior, foreign, and defense ministries.

In the parliamentary election the Party of Regions, associated with Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko's discredited rival in the October 2004 presidential elections, won the most seats. With more than 32 percent of the popular vote Yanukovych's party took 186 out of the 450 Rada seats. He was closely followed by the party of Yulia Tymoshenko (Yushchenko's former prime minister, who had been unceremoniously sacked), which won more than 22 percent of the popular vote and 129 seats. In a sign of growing discontent with the pace and shape of the Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko's own party, Our Ukraine, received a mere 14 percent of the vote and eighty-one Rada seats. Finally, the Socialist party, which would later prove crucial, won thirty-three seats.

No party, then, had won a clear majority in the Rada. The new prime minister found himself unable to form a new government, creating a stalemate. Yushchenko held exhaustive talks with his former ally Tymoshenko about joining their respective parties to form the next government. Personal animosity and mistrust as well as differences over priorities ultimately thwarted the attempt, producing a political stalemate that threatened the sustainability of democracy

in Ukraine when it became clear that rather than accept Viktor Yanukovich as the next prime minister, the president was seriously considering dissolving parliament and calling for fresh elections.

It was during this political impasse—when the absence of either a working government or parliament made impossible the constitutionally required parliamentary authorization of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil—that, on 27 May 2006, the U.S.-flag merchant ship *Advantage* arrived at Feodosiya with five hundred tons of construction material and equipment for use in that year's SEA BREEZE exercise. The cargo was for a temporary multinational training base to be built at Starry Krym in the Crimea. U.S. Marine reservists and Navy personnel were also deployed to help the Ukrainian navy assemble hangar-type canteens and utility rooms.²¹

Inevitably, SEA BREEZE 2006 became a hostage to the political crisis in Kiev over the formation of a new coalition government.²² Within two weeks the ship would be forced out of port, its equipment and cargo impounded by Ukrainian customs, and the reservists forced to fly home, their mission unachieved. Absent parliamentary approval of the exercise, the legality and constitutionality of preparations for it were soon questioned. This political ambiguity and postelection infighting created an ideal opportunity for the opposition party to criticize the government. The Party of Regions called the unloading of *Advantage* in Feodosiya an example of “brutal contempt” by the government for the constitution. Amid similar media allegations, the foreign and defense ministers (appointed by the president), as well as the prosecutor general, were forced to declare on their own authority these preparations permissible under Ukrainian law.²³ The foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, stated that no Ukrainian law had been breached, as *Advantage* was “a civil ship and consequently . . . subject to international trade law.”²⁴

If the preparations for the exercise (largely involving the landing of foreign military forces) were permissible under the constitution, formal authorization would still be needed from the Rada. The foreign minister agreed that the exercise could only begin after parliament had given its approval. On 4 August 2006 the Rada finally met and authorized the landing of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory for the purpose of multinational exercises. But it was too late—SEA BREEZE had been scheduled to begin two weeks before: the political atmosphere had been poisoned, Yushchenko's bargaining position in the formation of the postelection government had been weakened, and discontent over Ukraine's foreign policy orientation had been brought to the surface.

The declared foreign policy goals of President Yushchenko were (and remain today) full European Union and NATO membership, closer relations with the United States, and, at the same time, a strategic partnership with Russia. His

government had, however, been heavily criticized for failure to inform the public of, and gain its support for, the plans to join NATO.²⁵ Surveys in Ukraine have shown that the majority of the Ukrainian people are opposed to NATO membership, especially in the eastern part of the country and in the Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based. The government's attempt in this context to secure parliamentary approval for the off-loading of *Advantage* became a lightning rod for a widespread campaign against the government's proposed foreign policy in general. Residents of Feodosiya blockaded the city's port, protesting what they saw as an attempt by NATO to establish a presence in the Black Sea. Displaying placards with anti-NATO slogans, pickets prevented the American reservists from preparing for the exercise, ultimately forcing them to abandon the attempt. Within two days of the arrival of *Advantage* the Ukrainian defense minister was forced to deny media reports that its landing party was to build a NATO base near Feodosiya.²⁶ Nonetheless, the public perception of SEA BREEZE as a NATO rather than a multilateral, U.S.-sponsored operation took hold; the day after the arrival of *Advantage* the Feodosiya town council declared the town a "NATO-free area";²⁷ a week later the Crimean parliament declared the peninsula a "NATO-free territory."²⁸

The acrimonious debate about NATO membership soon spread to the feuding political parties in Kiev. Public discontent in the Crimea was exploited fully by opposition parties in the capital to embarrass the government and to force concessions on NATO membership. Yevhen Kushnaryov, Rada member from the Party of Regions, told a public protest at the Feodosiya seaport that Ukraine was "faced with attempts to bring NATO into Ukraine by force."²⁹

Allegations in the press that Yushchenko's government reacted too slowly to the public protests now damaged the president. It took Yushchenko almost a week to sign measures to deal with the crisis and decree preparations for the exercise. Only on 3 June did he confirm the exercise, call upon local councils to abide by Ukrainian law, and direct local governments to take urgent measures to maintain public order.³⁰ The authorities in Kiev were also censured for failure to provide sufficient information or counter misinformation about the planned exercise.³¹ President Yushchenko blamed a lack of military coordination and failure of the defense ministry to settle all the details of the exercise with local authorities and international parties.³²

The Party of Regions called for a referendum on NATO membership; Viktor Yanukovich—finally seated as prime minister on 4 August on the basis of a coalition with the Socialist Party—signaled that membership was unlikely to take place for two or three years.³³ In fact, the accord between the Party of Regions and the Socialists spoke of "advancing" toward, rather than joining, NATO.³⁴ In 2005 President Yushchenko and his team had worked tirelessly to fulfill the

NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and had committed themselves to signing a NATO Membership Action Plan by the end of 2006. Prime Minister Yanukovich and his cabinet have radically altered that policy. During a visit to Brussels in September 2006, Prime Minister Yanukovich stated that Ukraine was not yet ready to implement a formal plan for NATO membership; instead, Ukraine would focus on deepening its partnership with the alliance.³⁵

CASTING A SHADOW: THE EFFECT ON NEIGHBORS

The strategic importance to Moscow of the Black Sea should not be underestimated. Russia has more than twenty-five thousand personnel and almost two hundred ships in the Black Sea. President Vladimir Putin declared that the “Azov–Black Sea basin is in Russia’s zone of strategic interests”; the Black Sea, he explained, “provides Russia with direct access to the most important global transport routes, including economic ones.”³⁶ Russia’s interest in the Black Sea can also be explained by the historical importance of the Crimea, in particular the port of Sevastopol, to its national identity. The Crimea is intrinsically connected to the Russian nation’s foundational myths, some of them propagated by the Soviet Union and then taken up by the Russian Federation.

Uneasy at the American presence in the Black Sea, the Russian Federation refused to take part in the first SEA BREEZE, in 1997. A foreign ministry spokesman stated that it would send only observers: “Russia still does not agree with the idea of holding the exercises and has no plans to participate in them.”³⁷ More recently, poor relations between Russia and the United States in general, as well as NATO and U.S. attempts to secure interests in the Black Sea, have increased Russian sensitivity to American naval presence in the region. Attempts by Russia to build a strategic partnership after the 9/11 attacks failed, and U.S. support of the democratic revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan strained relations. By May 2006 Vice President Richard Cheney was accusing Russia of backpedaling on democracy and using its oil and gas to blackmail neighbors.³⁸

The idea of pursuing an integrated Western strategy toward the Black Sea region has in fact steadily gained ground since the NATO Istanbul Summit of July 2004. The enlargement of the alliance to include Bulgaria and Romania raised the issue of how it was to protect security and stability in the Black Sea. Responding to this prospect, the Russian defense minister, Sergey Ivanov, at a meeting with his Turkish counterpart challenged expansion of NATO naval patrols to the Black Sea; regional security, he declared, “should be ensured by the forces of the Black Sea states.”³⁹ Subsequent American efforts to initiate alliance counterterrorism patrols have been blocked by active Russian participation in the Black Sea Force—established in 2001 by the six littoral states for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine clearance, environmental protection, and

goodwill visits. In July 2006 the Russian navy, represented by a large assault ship, took part in the sixth iteration of a Black Sea Force exercise series, with Bulgaria, Georgia, Turkey, Romania, and Ukraine.⁴⁰

Russia has also been an avid supporter of Black Sea Harmony, a Turkish initiative to set up a naval force to combat terrorism in the region. In September 2006, under that rubric, Russian ships conducted a joint mission with the Turkish navy.⁴¹ This patrol was specifically meant to “demonstrate Russian naval presence in the Black Sea navigation areas.”⁴² It was to be, said Sergey Ivanov, the Russian defense minister, Russia and Turkey, the two Black Sea countries possessing modern navies, that “are responsible for security in the Black Sea area.”⁴³ Black Sea Harmony is accordingly viewed by many as an attempt to prevent NATO from extending its successful multinational ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR series from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea.⁴⁴

If this exercise in naval diplomacy was casting a shadow over Ukraine’s neighbors, it was also exacerbating already difficult relations between Ukraine and those neighbors. Relations between Russia and Ukraine had been particularly strained. Even a deputy in the Russian Duma (parliament), Vladimir Ryzhkov, acknowledged that meddling by President Putin in the Ukrainian 2004 presidential election had alienated millions of Ukrainians.⁴⁵ Also, in early 2006 the Russian Gas Company, Gazprom, announced that it had cut off supplies of gas to Ukraine. Only under pressure from Europe could Russia and Ukraine work out a compromise.⁴⁶ The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the Russian government of economic pressure and blackmail.⁴⁷

Feelings were still raw when the arrival of *Advantage* produced public protests. The Duma, aided by the Russian media, saw an opportunity to criticize Ukraine’s NATO orientation directly. The Ukrainian defense minister, in turn, alleged that the protests showed that certain Russian forces were meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs.⁴⁸ The Ukrainian Security Council too believed that foreigners, particularly Russians, were participating in the demonstrations in the Crimea. The Russian media were also accused of whipping up public feeling about NATO;⁴⁹ for instance, Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies found themselves forced to deny Russian media reports that Ukrainian special forces had been sent to Feodosiya to deal with the anti-NATO protests.⁵⁰

The chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations, Andrey Kokoshin, cautioned against what he saw as attempts by politicians in Ukraine to drag the country into NATO.⁵¹ The Duma itself went even farther, resolving that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would “lead to very negative consequences for relations between our fraternal peoples.”⁵² The Ukrainian foreign ministry replied that the “edifying tone of the commentaries in the context of cooperation of Ukraine with NATO used by the Russia side [during this

crisis] exceeds the limits of common international communication standards.”⁵³ It asserted that as a sovereign democratic state Ukraine had an inherent right to make its own decisions about security and which security structures it would join.⁵⁴

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Plainly, navies need to prepare for and conduct presence operations more effectively than was done in this case study if they are to achieve desired diplomatic effects. The first lesson to emerge from this case study has already been recognized by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy—the need to improve cultural awareness within the service. Admiral Mullen envisions that American sailors “will be expected to understand and foster cooperation in cultures far different than our own.”⁵⁵ Military personnel engaged in planning for and participating in future coalition-building exercises will clearly need to understand the culture, history, and sensitivities of host states as well as of their neighbors. In Ukraine, plans for future exercises will need to consider the complex and rapidly changing political environment in the former Soviet Union as well as Ukraine’s difficult relations with its larger neighbor—the Russian Federation.

The second lesson is the danger inherent in the “routinization” of naval diplomacy. The mechanics of deploying assets into a theater to prepare for naval diplomacy tend to become standardized, but the political contexts in which exercises take place are inherently dynamic, if not volatile. Consideration needs to be given to the political contexts in which even smaller, more routine recurring exercises are conducted.

Third, some agency must be made responsible for developing and implementing a vigorous information campaign to support an exercise. During the crisis over the arrival of *Advantage*, both U.S. European Command and the American embassy in Kiev produced detailed press briefings in an attempt to contradict media misinformation and address general lack of public understanding of SEA BREEZE. However, this effort was too little and too late to challenge the campaign of opportunists to damage the Ukrainian government and its foreign policy.⁵⁶ To be effective—that is, to ensure that the correct message is being sent and being understood—naval diplomacy must be supported by an extensive and well thought out information campaign within the recipient state, a program that targets the media, security stakeholders, the public, political factions, and interest groups.

Fourth, the United States would do well to encourage states with which it engages in coalition-building exercises to undertake public-awareness campaigns detailing the domestic advantages of participation. In the absence of a Ukrainian public information campaign about SEA BREEZE, the public was easily confused

by suggestions in the local and Russian media that the operation was actually an attempt to build a permanent NATO base in the Crimea.

During 2006 European Command held workshops with Russian leaders aimed at fostering military relations and planning bilateral training events for 2007.⁵⁷ These meetings suggest that there is already recognition within the United States of the last, fifth, lesson—the need to reach out to neighboring states that might be affected by littoral operations. Problems with SEA BREEZE 2006 suggest that such outreach is a vital element of any successful naval presence operation, certainly in the Black Sea—to overcome and mitigate the “shadow” effect. One such meeting was held in May 2006, before SEA BREEZE. Rear Admiral Dick Gallagher, director of European Command’s European Plans and Operations Center, commented that during four years of high-level meetings with the Russian Federation military he had come to recognize the desire on both sides to “not only communicate but to actively understand each other.”⁵⁸

NOTES

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NAVAL RESPONSE TO A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Maritime Security in the Mediterranean

Commander Alan Lee Boyer, U.S. Navy

EUCOM's greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield.

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES

The capacity of the European Command to contribute to security and stability in its Mediterranean area of responsibility depends on its ability to develop and execute operational concepts and capabilities that are appropriate to the security environment in which it operates.¹ In the maritime domain of the Mediterranean, the threats are largely transnational in character and can be effectively dealt with only in cooperation with regional partners. The central challenge is not in locating and destroying enemy naval forces but in maintaining good order at sea.² Essentially, the task is to ensure access to the maritime commons by all lawful actors and to inhibit the activities of illegal or hostile ones. If European Command (EUCOM) and its partners are able to do that, the common interests of security and peaceful economic use of the Mediterranean Sea will be advanced.

The key issue for EUCOM is: What concepts and type of forces should it pursue in this connection? This question is best answered through the logic depicted in figure 1.³ By following this logic, strategic and operational planners should be able

to assess where they are today and determine what type of forces will be needed in the future. The first step consists of two parts: assessing the security environment and determining strategic objectives and requirements. Requirements are derived from objectives and are based on threats. Typically they come from official security strategies or policy statements. The next step is to determine the nature of the strategic and operational challenges that must be overcome. The planner can

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then go about how to deal with them. This is done by developing operational concepts.⁴ The operational concept, in turn, gives rise to required capabilities, which can, finally, be used to determine the forces or means the combatant commander will need.

FIGURE 1
PLANNING METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS



Note: An expanded view of the third box in Owens, "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning," fig. 2, "The Logic of Force Planning," p. 490.

This article applies that methodology to the role of naval power in the Mediterranean over the next five to fifteen years. In doing so, it will address the following questions:

- What operational concepts should be developed to meet the operational challenges of a security environment largely determined by transnational threats and globalization?
- What capabilities do such concepts require the United States and its partners to develop?

The goal of this paper is to come to grips with how to think about the process of developing operational concepts for the use of naval power in the Mediterranean area.

NATURE OF THE MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Mediterranean Basin is geographically, culturally, and politically diverse (see table 1). At its center is the Mediterranean Sea itself, which connects the

TABLE 1
PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

Features	Data
Countries (21)	Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Serbia and Montenegro, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia, plus the Gaza Strip
Sea surface	965,000 sq. miles or 2,500,000 km ²
Length (east–west)	2,500 miles or 4,000 km
Width (north–south)	500 miles or 800 km
Total length of coastline	27,963 miles or 45,000 km
Population of coastal nations (mid-2005)	461,300,000
Depth of water	Average 1,500 meters, deepest point 5,267 meters (about 3.27 miles) in the Calypso Deep in the Ionian Sea
Urbanization of coastline	65 percent in 2000
Major straits	Strait of Gibraltar, Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits, Suez Canal
Institutions involved in security	NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, International Maritime Organization (IMO)

Source: United Nations Environmental Program, *White Paper: Coastal Management in the Mediterranean* (Split, Croatia: Priority Actions Programme, 2001), p. 7; Population Reference Bureau, *2005 World Population Data Sheet* (Washington, D.C.: 2005), pp. 6–12.

Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea and Red Sea variously through the Strait of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and the Suez Canal. Along its northern shore are several liberal democracies, of which Turkey is the region's only secular democracy with a Muslim majority. Its eastern shore is occupied by two liberal democracies, Israel and Lebanon, and the authoritarian state of Syria. Several authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states dominated by large Muslim populations occupy the Mediterranean's southern shores.

The basin's diversity and history have created two distinct approaches to dealing with security challenges. Northern states generally take a cooperative-security approach, creating a web of institutions, organizations, and frameworks—for instance, NATO, the European Union (EU), Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Barcelona Process (Euro-Med partnership), 5+5 Dialogue, and Conference of Interior Ministers of the Western Mediterranean. Southern states, which generally distrust their neighbors, historically have tended either to go it alone or form short-term alignments with like-minded states. They have generally viewed cooperative-security forums and arrangements with suspicion due to their strong focus on national sovereignty.⁵ However, over the last decade, as problems fueled by globalization have arisen, intraregional political and security cooperation has increased on both sides of the Mediterranean, especially through the Barcelona Process and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.⁶

MAP 1 MEDITERRANEAN REGION



Economically, the Mediterranean Sea functions mainly as a resource and a medium of transportation. As a resource, it provides food and supports local economies through its fisheries and mineral resources in the seabed. Over forty thousand boats fish the waters of the Mediterranean, harvesting around 500,000 tons annually.⁷ The primary minerals extracted are oil and natural gas, mostly found off the shores of North African states, with smaller amounts near southern Europe.⁸

The Mediterranean's importance as a maritime highway has increased over the last two decades due to globalization. Between 1990 and 2004, American, European, and North African seaborne trade increased 71, 45, and 9 percent, respectively. The quantity of crude oil and crude-oil products—which constitute over 40 percent of world seaborne trade—increased by 42 percent during the same period.⁹ Approximately 7.3 million barrels per day of oil (17 percent of seaborne oil) transits the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, Sumed pipeline, and Bosphorus Strait.¹⁰ In addition to oil, large amounts of natural gas are moved across the Mediterranean.¹¹ According to the European Commission, nearly 90 percent of the external trade of the EU and 40 percent of its internal trade goes by sea.¹²

The globalization of trade has not only driven up the volume of Mediterranean seaborne transport but changed its nature. Mediterranean transport is no longer primarily regional or even European; it is now an integral part of a transnational global maritime system. This development has decreased the cost of

sea-based trade; dramatically increased the volume of goods moved by sea;¹³ facilitated a “just enough, just in time” operating philosophy;¹⁴ and dispersed the ownership of the world’s merchant fleet away from major traders like the United States.¹⁵

Past and Current Threats

Until the 1990s, the operational priority of the U.S. and Mediterranean navies was finding and defeating hostile naval forces of other states. In World War II, this involved everything from escorting merchant ships to sinking warships and submarines. During the Cold War, missions evolved to locating, tracking, and collecting intelligence on other naval forces, primarily those of the Soviet Union, but they still focused on state actors and the threats they posed.

Since the end of the Cold War, the focus has been changed by globalization and the demise of great-power competition among European states. These phenomena have moved the security focus to threats emanating from weak states and transnational actors. In March 2005, General James L. Jones, the EUCOM commander, described the changed security environment in this way: “The new security menace is transnational and characterized by enemies without territory, borders, or fixed bases. Threats include the export and franchising of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, uncontrolled refugee flow, illegal immigration and piracy on the seas.”¹⁶

While these transnational threats have, of course, existed for some time, the changing structure of the international economic and political system has rendered them more likely to affect adversely the security and the economic prosperity of the United States and Mediterranean nations.

Specific Maritime Security Threats and Challenges

Mediterranean maritime threats and challenges fall into four broad areas: terrorism, immigration and human trafficking, illicit trafficking in drugs and conventional weapons, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Terrorism. Maritime terrorist attacks have been rare, especially in the Mediterranean. Yet terrorists have been active in the region. Such groups as the Kurdish PKK, Hezbollah, and Hamas have used the sea to channel funds and materiel for operations in Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel and the Palestinian territories, respectively. More recently, al-Qa‘ida has used the Mediterranean to support operations ashore and has planned attacks on ships in the Mediterranean.

In February and August 2001, al-Qa‘ida operatives were found by Italian authorities aboard two Tonga-flagged vessels. In May and June 2002, Morocco captured three Saudi men—led by Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, Osama Bin Laden’s former chief of maritime operations—who were actively plotting suicide attacks against U.S. and British warships in the Strait of

Gibraltar.¹⁷ According to intelligence officials, Al-Nasheri's maritime strategy had four major elements. The first was to use inflatable Zodiac-type speedboats to attack ships. The second was to blow up medium-sized vessels near other ships, including passenger liners if warships became too difficult to approach. The third involved private planes (bought or stolen from flying clubs and small airports) loaded with explosives. The last called for training underwater demolition teams to attack ships.¹⁸

An additional concern is that al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups might procure commercial vessels to carry legitimate cargo in order to raise money for their operations. These vessels could ferry personnel, weapons, and information for their organizations or other paying terrorist groups. Terrorists and other illegal actors might also infiltrate the ranks of the world's 1.2 million seafarers. Recent International Maritime Organization (IMO) studies have shown that it is fairly easy for unscrupulous persons to acquire forged or falsified seafarer certificates and identity documents.¹⁹ Governments have traditionally granted relatively liberal travel rights to seafarers through non-immigrant crew-list visas or simply upon presentation of their documents, potentially affording terrorists a way to bypass normal immigration and visitor controls.

Immigration and Human Trafficking. A major humanitarian, economic, and security challenge for the Mediterranean region is the movement of people. Every year hundreds of millions pass through the region's ports.²⁰ Most are legal travelers, but hundreds of thousands attempt to cross borders illegally. Italy estimates that approximately seventy thousand illegal aliens enter across its sea borders annually.²¹ Morocco arrested 28,500 illegal immigrants between January and November 2005, and Libya stopped over forty thousand that year. The majority originate from sub-Saharan Africa, but they also come from Asia, the Maghreb, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, and India. The major transit routes are across the Strait of Gibraltar, especially through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta (a ninety-minute ferry ride to the Spanish coast) and Melilla, from Libya and Tunisia (via the island of Lampedusa and Malta to Italy), from the Canary Islands, from Albania and the Balkans (across the Adriatic to Italy, from Turkey toward Calabria and Sicily), and across the Adriatic from Greece. Several thousand vessels smuggle illegals across the Mediterranean each year.²² Many are overloaded or in poor condition, resulting in hundreds of immigrant deaths every year.

Human trafficking is big business in the region. Those seeking illegal passage reportedly pay between two and six thousand euros to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa.²³ Spanish authorities estimate that attempts to cross the Strait of Gibraltar generate annual net turnover of thirty million euros.²⁴ Transporters range from small-time operators in the west to transnational criminal networks in

the east. Terrorist organizations like the Kurdish PKK and al-Qa'ida reportedly engage in human trafficking to fund their primary operations.²⁵

Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and Conventional Weapons. Migrants are not the only illicit traffic in the region; also in play are drugs and conventional weapons. Europe consumes approximately 33 percent of the world's illicit drugs.²⁶ Most of its drugs transported by sea flow into southern Europe. Some, like cocaine, come from as far away as Colombia. Cocaine shipments usually travel through Brazil to the Canary Islands, where they are typically smuggled by Moroccan middlemen into Spain. Other drugs, such as cannabis resin, originate mainly in Morocco. Heroin is customarily routed by sea from Asia through Turkey to Italy and other parts of Europe.²⁷ Drug trafficking, based on cases recorded, is one of the most important activities of organized crime groups and networks in Europe; it is a major criminal problem in Armenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.²⁸

The Mediterranean also has a long history of trafficking in conventional weapons and explosives. In recent years most of this activity has occurred in the eastern Mediterranean, due to armed conflicts in the Balkans and the Palestinian territories.²⁹ Weapons traffickers include small freelancers as well as larger and more sophisticated transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups. Evidence of illicit weapons trading includes the April 2004 seizure by Italian police of a United States-bound Turkish-flagged ship carrying eight thousand AK-47 rifles and the discovery by Turkish authorities of a Paraguay-bound container holding five hundred AK-47s. Perhaps the largest case involved the Comoros-flagged vessel *Baltic Sky* in June 2003. Acting on intelligence from NATO, the Greek coast guard seized the *Baltic Sky* en route from Tunis to Sudan and found undeclared cargo comprising 680 tons of industrial-grade explosives and eight thousand detonators.³⁰

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A major security objective for the United States and its regional partners is nonproliferation. In the maritime domain, the problem has two dimensions. First, hostile nonstate actors may exploit the sea to transport WMD for use against the United States and its allies.³¹ Second, states and entities acting under state cover could use the sea to transport WMD materials. A good example was the network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan; it frequently used merchant vessels to transport WMD materials between states and other entities.³²

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS

In addition to understanding the security environment, planners must identify the strategic objectives and requirements they must pursue. The two sources of

strategic guidance for European Command planners are American and NATO security strategies and policies. Consideration should also be given to the security strategies of U.S. partners, in order to identify where they are consistent with or conflict with U.S. and alliance documents.³³

The primary unclassified American strategic documents relevant to naval planners are the *National Defense Strategy*, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, *National Military Strategy*, *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, and *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*.³⁴ The key NATO policy documents are the *NATO Partnership Plan against Terrorism*, *NATO's Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism*, *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, the alliance's *Strategic Concept*, and the *Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue*.³⁵ The *EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP* (European Security and Defense Policy) of 16 December 2002 and *European Security Strategy* of 12 December 2003 also provide valuable information on EU and NATO cooperation and security priorities.

American strategic requirements are threefold.* The first requirement is to prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, criminals, or hostile states to commit terrorist, criminal, or hostile acts against the United States, its people, economy, property, territory, allies, or friends.³⁶ Strengthening alliances and partnerships is the second requirement.³⁷ The third requirement is to defend the United States forward—that is, to prevent enemies from attacking the homeland by defeating them overseas.³⁸

NATO requirements since 2001 have focused heavily on the threat of terrorism and WMD.³⁹ Like the United States, NATO views the security environment as changed and the main security threats as stemming from nonstate actors and weak or failing states. A primary objective of the alliance is to detect and deter terrorist activity and prevent the proliferation of WMD. A second objective is to strengthen security and build stability through stronger relationships and cooperation on security concerns that NATO shares with the EU, Russia, Ukraine, the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and those of the Mediterranean and broader Middle East.⁴⁰ A major NATO goal for cooperation is to develop the capabilities of its partners to deal with security threats, whether in partnership with NATO or by themselves. Improving interoperability and transforming existing military capabilities to meet the changing security environment is the alliance's final objective.†

Strategic guidance is important because it tells EUCOM planners what is important and in what priority. By matching the strategic guidance against an

* U.S. strategic requirements are presented in more detail in [table A-1](#), available in the online version of this article.

† For additional detail on NATO requirements, see [table A-2](#) in the online version of this article.

assessment of the security environment, planners can determine the nature and types of challenges they must overcome. Some of the challenges will be strategic, others operational.

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

Many of the maritime challenges facing EUCOM arise from the nature of the security environment in the Mediterranean. The first challenge is geography. The Mediterranean Sea has twenty-eight thousand miles of coastline. Any effort to try to control or regulate it has to deal with the reality of hundreds of points from which vessels can get to sea.

The second challenge concerns the type of threats that must be combated. Essentially there are two, threats to vessels on the sea and threats from the sea. Though related, they require different responses. Protection of vessels at sea, due to the globalization of maritime transport and trade system and the transnational nature of the threat, is no longer just about protecting vessels flagged by one's own country. Because goods transported to a country are often not carried by vessels flying that nation's flag, major trading nations like the United States must now be concerned about vessels under the flags of states like Panama, Bahamas, Cyprus, and Liberia, with neither the means nor will to protect them.⁴¹ This means the challenge is about how to ensure that vessels vital to the global economy and the prosperity of the United States can transit the maritime commons without being harmed. Relatedly, it is about how the United States and its partners can prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from using the sea to do harm ashore or to fund their operations.

In both cases the maritime paths and means employed by criminals and illegal immigrants are likely to be the same ones used by terrorists and WMD proliferators, all these among the tens of thousands of ships navigating the waters of the Mediterranean every year. Sorting through thousands of contacts to identify the handful engaged in harmful or illicit activities can be very problematic.⁴²

The third challenge is political. The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by twenty-one countries. Their national governments and numerous organizations, such as NATO, the EU, and IMO, deal with security in the Mediterranean. Any effort to secure the maritime commons will involve multiple jurisdictions and stakeholders. In this light, a central question arises: Are there common interests sufficient to generate the political will that can bring cooperation and action? Two common interests that might anchor a "maritime consortium" as a basis for action are prosperity and security.⁴³ Even if all parties agree to take such action, however, there remains the challenge of developing a strategy that will assure interoperability among numerous civilian and military security organizations and national jurisdictions.

Interoperability is largely a political problem that manifests itself in rules of engagement, legal structures, and resource allocations, but it also has an important technical component.⁴⁴ Any concept of operations that relies on cooperation to deal with maritime threats in the Mediterranean must not only be able to generate and sustain the political will to act but address the technological issues that follow.

As figure 2 shows, the technical impediments to interoperability are numerous. The main challenge is how to create, with current and future technologies, “situational awareness,” which in this connection is the ability to identify, process, and comprehend critical elements of information in and around the maritime domain.⁴⁵ Two elements are needed: a complete intelligence picture and a real-time operational picture. Information, data-management, and communications systems support both. The problem is connecting the sources of information to decision-support systems in ways that enable decision makers to deploy

**FIGURE 2
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO CREATING INTEROPERABILITY**

- Technology gap between the United States and its partners
- Multiple communications systems and a lack of common IT architecture accessible by the United States and partners
- Correlation of data from multiple sources and types of databases (civilian, government agencies, military, and coast guards)
- Information systems that can be controlled, handled, or used with ease by coalition partners
- Information systems unable to display or manage details on vessels or their cargoes, crews, and passengers
- Displaying, tracking, and providing real-time information on thousands of maritime contacts
- Decision-making tools able to distinguish abnormal, hostile, or illegal activity from peaceful/lawful
- Information assurance that supports the sharing of information across classified and unclassified systems
- Rapid communication of transit information between commercial vessels and military, coast guard, and customs units
- Operational units without broadband systems or the bandwidth needed to access the COP
- Response forces with the right technologies to respond rapidly with the correct level of force.

operational forces against correct targets at the right time. In an ideal world, a single database would contain all information on the maritime domain, and a single communications system would give decision makers and operational units access to a common operational picture (COP) and associated intelligence.⁴⁶ For EUCOM and NATO to create such a network, connecting all twenty-one regional nations, NATO, the EU, and numerous private-sector actors, may be a “bridge too far,” for both political and technical reasons. If so, a less centralized network will be needed that is capable of getting the right information to the right decision makers in a timely manner. Either way, the technology used needs to be interoperable across the entire spectrum of cooperation. This means it must be able to connect information from commercial sources to police and naval forces at the national, regional, and international levels.

A subelement of the technological problem is classification and protection of sensitive information. The United States and every other nation operating in the Mediterranean uses classified display and information systems; many NATO and other partners cannot access certain alliance or other national systems. So the network to be created must operate at the unclassified level and protect sensitive information.

Once the political and technological obstacles to a COP and complete intelligence picture are solved, there remains the challenge of how to preempt or rapidly respond to threats at sea and from the littorals. One answer might be a larger U.S. naval presence. However, much of the work will likely take place in territorial waters (within twelve nautical miles of land). Even if coastal nations let American or NATO units take initial action in their territorial waters, legal disposition of apprehended vessels and persons presents a problem. It requires legal authority and a place to incarcerate persons and securely store seized material. NATO, *per se*, does not have territory on the Mediterranean—its members do; therefore, it must rely on the willingness of its members to act and follow through—which is not always forthcoming.

The last challenge EUCOM must address is resources. European Command and its partners operate in a resource-constrained environment. Defense spending in Europe is down, and the U.S. defense budget, while it has increased dramatically since 2000, is not likely to continue to rise.⁴⁷ EUCOM, NATO, and EU planners will have to find a way to use current assets more effectively and apply future resources to the capabilities needed to support the operational concepts they develop.

CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

European Command’s current operational concept for maritime security is to use existing operations and security arrangements to improve cooperation in

order to combat terrorism and other illicit activities at or from sea, build the capacity of partners, and improve information sharing. By leveraging such security frameworks as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue, and bilateral arrangements, EUCOM is attempting to build on past cooperation and common interests.⁴⁸

The main operation being used is Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE). OAE was launched in October 2001 by NATO, under Article V of the Washington Treaty, as a part of its response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States.⁴⁹ OAE's stated purpose was to detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity. Initially, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR focused on naval presence and surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea using naval forces assigned to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

In February 2003, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expanded the operation to include escorting merchant shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.⁵⁰ One of the main reasons was to prevent further terrorist operations like the attack on the French oil tanker *Limburg* off the coast of Yemen on 6 October 2002. The thirty-six-mile-long Strait of Gibraltar is vulnerable due to its narrowness and the large volume of commercial traffic.⁵¹ Escort operations were suspended on 10 December 2003, recommenced on 29 January 2004, and were again suspended on 29 May 2004.⁵²

In April 2003, the NAC decided to expand OAE's mandate to vessel queries and compliant boardings.⁵³ Typically, queries are conducted by aircraft and surface units assigned to Joint Task Force ENDEAVOUR. All information gathered is passed to the Maritime Component Command Headquarters in Naples (CC-MAR Naples) and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, United Kingdom. If anything suspicious is learned, the vessel in question may be boarded and inspected by NATO forces. Where there is intelligence or evidence of terrorist-related activity, OAE forces are deployed to the area and readied for action, which must be authorized by the NAC. During compliant boardings, if irregularities unrelated to terrorism are found the information is passed to law enforcement authorities for action at the vessel's next port of call. OAE forces shadow the vessel until action is taken or it enters territorial waters on its way into port. When a vessel refuses boarding, NATO works with national authorities to see that it is inspected once it enters an alliance member's territorial waters.⁵⁴

On 16 March 2004, the NAC expanded OAE operations yet again to cover the entire Mediterranean Sea, and in October NATO adopted a new operational pattern. Since then, according the joint task force commander, Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti,

the focus has been on gathering and processing information and intelligence so as to target specific vessels of interest. In this way, it is now possible to deploy surface forces as reaction units to conduct specific tasks such as tracking and boarding of vessels. The new operational pattern maintains a proactive posture. Moreover, resources may be supplemented in periodic surge operations. At these times, augmentation forces, such as one of the Standing Maritime Groups of the NATO Response Force, join Task Force Endeavour to provide an enhanced presence and more intensive surveillance capability.⁵⁵

Based on this pattern of operations, OAE forces are utilized for the following tasks: helping deter and disrupt any action supporting terrorism at or from the sea; controlling choke points—the most important passages and harbors—by deploying minehunters from Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Groups to carry out preparatory route surveys; providing escorts through the Strait of Gibraltar when necessary; and enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue and other NATO programs to promote bilateral and multilateral relations.⁵⁶

Typically around a dozen ships from NATO navies are assigned to Joint Task Force ENDEAVOUR. This dedicated force gives NATO a visible presence at sea to deter terrorism and other illicit activities in the sea lanes and to react to a broad range of contingencies, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.⁵⁷ In addition, the operation also improves interoperability, builds capacity, and generates cooperation and information sharing.

At the strategic level, NATO also uses ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR as a vehicle for political engagement with non-NATO states. The June 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul invited non-NATO countries (among them Russia, Ukraine, and Mediterranean Dialogue countries) to participate in OAE. Since then, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Israel, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Albania, Croatia, Sweden, and Finland have expressed interest in joining the operation on some level. Levels of participation include political discussions and intelligence sharing as well as providing forces. Ukraine formally agreed to participate in OAE at the 21 April 2005 meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Vilnius.⁵⁸ It will share intelligence and send surface units to OAE and Strait of Gibraltar operations in 2007.⁵⁹ Russian participation has consisted of the assignment of a liaison officer to the Joint Informational Analysis Center (JIAC), at-sea training, and surface patrols by the Black Sea Fleet frigate *Pitlivy* in September 2006. Russia has also delegated to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet authority to approve compliant boardings of Russian vessels by OAE forces. Georgia's participation so far has been limited to coordination and information sharing. The Albanian military has committed itself to sharing of intelligence with NATO. Of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, Israel and Morocco have been the most active. In February 2006, Israel agreed to share intelligence with NATO, send an officer to

the JIAC, and provide logistical support by allowing OAE forces to make port calls in Haifa without diplomatic clearance. It also finalized an Individual Cooperation Program with NATO, under an enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue arrangement, on 16 October 2006. Morocco has been sharing information with NATO. Tunisia has established daily information sharing via secure fax between its maritime operations center and CC-MAR Naples. Finally, at a 7 April 2006 meeting in Rabat between NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Israel, and Morocco agreed to join in naval counterterrorism patrols.

An OAE-affiliated undertaking, Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH), was launched on 1 March 2004 by the Turkish navy. The objective is to ensure the “smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish straits as well as maintaining navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea maritime domain” until a Black Sea Force is able to assume this and other maritime security duties on a permanent basis.⁶⁰ Turkey is attempting to use OBSH as a way to bring regional cooperation to the support of security and stability in the Black Sea. Russia and Ukraine have formally announced their intentions to participate.

OAE-OBSH cooperation consists of shadowing and trailing contacts of interest and suspect ships, as well as information exchange—primarily via NATO C4I* channels. In this way the United States is able to leverage its NATO relationship with Turkey to obtain more information on Black Sea traffic before it arrives in the Mediterranean. NATO also uses OBSH as another way to build capacity within regional navies (in this case, those of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine).

Both the United States and NATO have been hoping to expand OAE into the Black Sea since 2005. The United States officially requested that OAE’s mandate cover the Black Sea on 23 February 2006. Two months later Washington reversed its position and dropped the idea.⁶¹ Turkey has opposed such an expansion, fearing it would threaten the 1936 Montreux Treaty, and has declared that existing Black Sea naval structures are more than able to provide security in the region.⁶²

Another significant government activity in the Mediterranean is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The focus of the PSI is to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. So far, over sixty countries have indicated support and over forty have participated in nineteen training exercises.⁶³ Between September 2003 and June 2006, six PSI maritime exercises took place in the Mediterranean.⁶⁴ PSI represents another way in which European Command can generate practical cooperation and interoperability with NATO and non-NATO partners in the Mediterranean.

* C4I: command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.

An international initiative by which EUCOM is attempting to improve its maritime domain awareness is the International Maritime Organization's Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) initiative. Regulations adopted by the IMO in 2000 required ships to carry AIS—a shipboard broadcast system, a continuous and autonomous transponder, operating in the VHF maritime band.⁶⁵ AIS allows ships to track and identify each other and exchange pertinent navigation information with one another or facilities ashore. Transmissions vary from two seconds to six minutes depending on the ship's speed and the type of data. AIS information can be graphically displayed on a computer or overlaid onto a radar display or electronic chart display and information system. Many coastal countries and commercial companies maintain shore-based AIS receivers to monitor shipping traffic. Several commercial companies also provide access to near-real-time AIS data over the Internet for an annual fee.⁶⁶

By providing valuable information about routes, cargo, and ships themselves, AIS can increase situational awareness, efficiency, and safety, and decrease the burden of monitoring and controlling coastal and offshore waterways. Naval forces and command centers can merge AIS into the common operational picture. Since 2006 European Command, with the assistance of the Department of Transportation's Volpe Center, has been testing ways to integrate AIS data and other commercial data streams into American and NATO C4I systems. Recent successes include live transmission of data from a cell phone in Egypt and the direct feed of AIS data from a submarine under way.


The use of Automatic Identification Systems does not guarantee "visibility" of all vessels; ships engaged in illicit activity can always turn their AIS off. Even if all vessels keep their AIS on, there is no guarantee that their transmissions will be picked up, for two reasons. First, AIS transponders transmit their information in the VHF band, meaning that vessels well out to sea may not be in range of a shore station; second, no international mandate requires countries to build such stations, and there are not now enough to provide for 100 percent coverage. Nevertheless, by comparing whatever AIS data is received to other sensor input, maritime security forces can identify neutral and friendly contacts and eliminate them from consideration, focusing on a smaller number of unidentified contacts.

FUTURE EUCOM MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Any future operational concept for maritime security must make assumptions and predictions on how future security trends and strategic requirements may evolve. The best way to reduce uncertainty in this process is to examine how the sea has been used in the past and is being used at present for human development. As depicted in figure 3, there are five such means, or ways. By examining

how society values each use, planners can make reasonable projections on the capabilities required in the near and middle terms.

If society is to enjoy all five uses, someone must maintain good order at sea. “Good order at sea requires a range of activities extending from law enforcement at one end of the spectrum to the defense of security at the other.”⁶⁷ Naval and coast guard forces and civilian agencies all have responsibilities along this spectrum. The key challenge for naval planners and their partners is to determine which should be conducted by naval forces and which by others.

FIGURE 3
GOOD ORDER AT SEA



Note: How the sea has been and is now used to advance human development. Threats to the use of the sea for exchanging information not listed; they would include anything that impedes the passage of vessels. Adapted from figure 10.3 in Till, *Seapower*, p. 310.

Traditionally the focus for Western navies has been the use of the sea to advance political power or dominion. The sea has typically been seen as a battleground in the struggle for power between states, or occasionally nonstate entities. The business of navies was to fight other navies and carry out naval diplomacy;⁶⁸ responsibility for ensuring good order for all other purposes has been generally assigned to coast guards and civilian agencies. Historically this outlook dominated

the creation of maritime operational concepts for Western navies, but since the end of the Cold War and especially since 2001, operational concepts have changed.⁶⁹ Of the remaining uses of the sea, two—the sea as an environment and a resource—have increased in importance over the last several decades.⁷⁰ The last use—the sea as a primary means of exchanging information and values between societies and nations—has decreased in importance, and its influence will be more indirect than in the past, due to the advent of inexpensive air travel, television, satellite communications, large undersea cable networks, and cyberspace.⁷¹

Recent maritime operations in the Mediterranean have reflected the changing order of importance in the five uses of the sea. As a result, EUCOM’s maritime

concept of operations has been changing. In the next decade it is likely that a new operational concept will emerge, one built on three pillars. The first pillar, leveraging existing security frameworks to build cooperation and capacity, will be a continuation of the current concept. NATO will continue to be central to this pillar, and a further maturing of cooperation between NATO, the European Union, and other partners can be expected.


Pillar two—creating maritime domain awareness, or MDA, in a coalition environment—will be at the heart of any new concept of operations. MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the nation.⁷² It creates the situational awareness needed to allow the United States, its allies, and its partners to take early actions against hostile actors and guarantee access to the maritime commons.

The third pillar, the ability to preempt and respond rapidly to threats at sea and from the littorals, is enabled by the first two: cooperation and MDA together create the ability to deter, preempt, interdict, and respond to maritime threats. Some of this capacity will reside in American units, but the majority will have to come from regional navies, coast guards, customs services, and other national security services.⁷³ As we have seen, a larger U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean region will not, of itself, dramatically improve the ability of the United States or the alliance to preempt, interdict, or respond to maritime threats, because most of the work would take place in territorial waters. European Command's capacity to respond will therefore depend on its own ability to conduct combined operations and on the capabilities of its partners.

If this concept (figure 4) is to work, several things need to happen. First, cooperation and information sharing between Mediterranean nations, private shipping companies, port authorities, NATO, EU, EUCOM, and international institutions and agencies will have to become routine, the normal way of doing business. The military task of collecting knowledge about maritime activity, establishing a baseline upon the basis of which intelligence can be analyzed and unusual activity be revealed, can be completed only in close cooperation with the commercial sector.⁷⁴

Second, the United States, either the European Command or working in the NATO framework, will need to take the lead in creating a multinational inter-agency network that links all the elements, from sensors to decision makers to operational forces. Central to this process will be improving the effectiveness of the Joint Information Analysis Center in Naples.⁷⁵ JIAC will need to capitalize upon initiatives like the Italian navy's Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre;⁷⁶ it must also connect with regional military command centers and such nonmilitary entities as the Western Sea Border Centre, Eastern Mediterranean

FIGURE 4
CURRENT AND FUTURE MARITIME SECURITY
OPERATING CONCEPTS



Sea Borders Centre, and the European Union’s FRONTEX.⁷⁷ So far, JIAC’s ability to collate and analyze data and disseminate it as actionable intelligence has not met expectations, largely as a result of a lack of focus on the maritime domain and small maritime analysis capability.⁷⁸

Third, the concept should not solely focus on terrorism. The sea is a medium for transport and, inevitably, numerous illicit activities. Often the means and paths

traveled by criminals and illegal immigrants are used also by terrorists and WMD proliferators. It can be hard from a distance to distinguish one illicit activity from another. Making good order at sea—that is, the elimination of illicit activity—the objective of the concept is likely to produce better results and may be the best way to guarantee long-term political buy-in by Mediterranean states.⁷⁹

Fourth, the concept needs to develop technological and political means to generate complete operational and intelligence pictures. The system will have to operate at the unclassified level but use secure links, processing large volumes of information and passing it quickly to a large number of users. Traditional classified systems are not a viable option; classified information is not actionable in the multinational and interagency environment. Whether the network uses commercial encryption methods, Internet protocols, or some other technology, it must be affordable, reliable, easy to use, and widely accessible, and it must provide enough security to allow confidence in the data it contains. The United States and other nations will still have and use their own classified systems, but the network that enables MDA cannot be based solely on them. How well its protocols and procedures handle sensitive and classified information will be critical to success.

Lastly, political understandings and legal authorizations need to be in place at the international, regional, and national levels. The situational awareness offered by MDA is of no value if executives lack legal authority or organizational

arrangements to take action. Operationally, this means military and civilian forces must be free to cooperate across jurisdictions without constant requests for permission. Considerable progress has been made over the last few years, but much more work needs to be done.⁸⁰

Required Capabilities and Attributes

Future American and allied forces will need a wide range of capabilities to implement such a maritime security operational concept.⁸¹ These capabilities must lead to unity of effort between U.S. forces and their partners and to a focus on good order at sea. They fall into four areas. The first is cooperation and integration between U.S. forces and their military and civilian partners. Knowledge of capabilities, political restrictions, and legal authorities is the second capability area.

Generating actionable intelligence through MDA is the third.⁸² Within it are eleven subordinate capabilities:

- “Long-dwell-time” surveillance of major choke points, high-traffic zones, and areas of interest
- Detection and monitoring of a large number of vessels, people, cargoes, and activity at sea and in port, in real or near-real time
- Integration of JIAC with other regional maritime command and coordination centers and development of a maritime analysis capability at the JIAC
- Information connectivity to decision makers and operating forces in a multinational and interagency environment
- Analysis and decision-making tools to sort abnormal from normal activity (e.g., unclassified data mining and anomaly detection)
- Wide-area telecommunications
- Common database sharing
- Fusion of the intelligence picture with the common operational picture
- Accessibility of the COP to all partners (civilian and military)
- Display and integration of commercial AIS data in the COP
- Real-time access by boarding teams to biometric and other databases allowing them to identify terrorist and criminal suspects immediately (implying an ability to collect biometric information).⁸³

The last capability needed to support a maritime security operational concept as envisioned here is deterrence, preemption, and interdiction of, and response to, illicit activity at sea and in the littorals. This point too has subordinate capabilities. The first is the ability to deploy force packages tailored to specific

threats (right type and amount of force at right time). To this end operational forces need to be fast, scalable, networked, and interoperable. Interoperability between U.S. naval forces and the NATO Response Force is a subcapability in itself, as would be a NATO Response Force capable of operations at sea ranging from law enforcement–related actions, such as boardings, to more traditional combat missions. Response forces generally must be able to respond to threats in the littorals, close to shore, in straits, pierside or at anchor, and, as noted, must be able to receive and transmit biometric data.

These capabilities and their component tasks constitute a framework upon which planners can determine what they will need to combat maritime threats in the Mediterranean. Force structures may vary, but all will have to be networked, interoperable, and adaptable.⁸⁴

Risks and Uncertainty

No operational concept can be complete without addressing risk and uncertainty. Clearly, no one can predict the future with complete accuracy.⁸⁵ However, the central challenge of ensuring good order at sea will remain. The tools that globalization provides transnational actors will continue to challenge states. Accordingly, the number of different paths that events will take over the next five to fifteen years is limited. The real uncertainty lies not in what will need to be done but in the ability of the United States to create a maritime coalition capable of dealing with what the future brings.

So the question is: Can the United States, specifically European Command, create a coalition with the right capabilities to deal with maritime threats to American and allied interests? The answer depends on how well EUCOM understands the limitations of the United States and of its partners and how well it mitigates risk. The cooperation needed to build domain awareness and the capacity to respond to threats in a multinational environment are difficult to create. Any concept of operations that relies on multiple partners to deliver on their promises is bound to be problematic, for reasons ranging from a lack of political will to a lack of resources on the part of any player, including the United States. Local corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, friction, chance, differing interests, and the difficulty of keeping track of constantly moving vessels, cargoes, and people at sea also threaten the ability to execute the concept.⁸⁶

The risk can be reduced and chances of success improved by a combination of strategies. First, the concept should not have an “American face”: U.S. planners should support NATO, allied, and private initiatives whenever possible. Second, priority for resources should go to assets that will enable others to succeed and to capabilities partners cannot develop themselves—for instance, bandwidth needed to connect a regional MDA network, software to manage and

disseminate (without cost to users) a common operational picture, AIS stations, and certain operational expenses of partners. Third, surveillance and tracking should focus on contacts of interest and anomalies, not attempt to follow every vessel under way in the Mediterranean; normal behavior and lists of trusted vessels can filter out vessels that need not be watched. Fourth, international and regional maritime initiatives (like AIS and the Marine Electronic Highway program) that create greater transparency in the maritime domain and promote cooperation between commercial and government sectors should be encouraged and supported.⁸⁷ Lastly, the decision-making process in planning and execution should be open, including partners at all levels and stages and respecting their interests and sensitivities.

Today's security environment presents many challenges for U.S. combatant commands. To overcome them these commands must craft and execute operational concepts that align strategic requirements with resources. In the maritime domain, their concepts should produce forces and procedures flexible enough to respond to changes in how the sea is used for human development. Naval planners need to develop a broader perspective of maritime activities; all are interrelated. They also need to remember that naval forces are a means to an end—to advance American interests. In the Mediterranean, this means maintaining good order at sea in order to ensure economic prosperity and defense of the United States and its regional allies against those who threaten them. This task is not one the United States can accomplish on its own.⁸⁸ NATO, regional states, commercial enterprises, and other regional and international entities all have roles to play.

NOTES

1. Epigraph: James L. Jones, Commander United States European Command, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2005*, p. 3, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/.
2. Good order at sea is about safeguarding the sea from misuse of all sorts. In some cases this means protecting commercial vessels from piracy and in others it may mean protecting fisheries or interdicting terrorists. Good order at sea is grounded in the historical fact that human development has always been and continues to be tied to the sea. The sea's past and continuing contribution to human development is based on how the sea has been used, namely: for the resources it contained; for its utility as a means of transportation and trade; for its importance as a means of exchanging information; and as a source of power and domination. Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 310–50.
3. The logic of figure 1 is described in greater detail in Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning," in *Strategy and Force Planning*, ed. Security, Strategy, and

- Forces Faculty, 4th ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2004), pp. 488–90.
4. “A concept is a notion or statement of an idea—an expression of how something might be done. A concept may, after further development, experimentation, assessment and refinement, lead to an accepted way of doing something.” U.S. Defense Dept., *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, August 2005), p. 3.
 5. Fulvio Attinà, “The Building of Regional Security Partnership and the Security Culture Divide in the Mediterranean Region,” *Institute of European Studies*, Paper 040508 (8 May 2004), p. 24, available at repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040508.
 6. Globalization is best viewed as a spatial phenomenon in which individual, local, national, regional, and global forces “are all in play, often at the same time.” It refers to network connections and relationships at multi-continental distances. Basically, globalization is a “worldwide network of interdependence” that is creating increasingly complex networks and linkages at all levels. Victor D. Cha, “Globalization and the Study of International Security,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (May 2000), p. 392; Ellen L. Frost, “Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Agenda,” in *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security Volume I*, ed. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 2001), p. 37; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 81, 190.
 7. EUROSTAT, *Fisheries Statistics: Data 1994–2004* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005), pp. 24, 46.
 8. Italy extracts around 200 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas from the Adriatic Sea, and Greece extracts small amounts of oil from the Aegean Sea. In 2005, Algeria and Egypt were the fourth- and sixth-largest producers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world, respectively. Over 96 percent of Algeria’s export earnings come from hydrocarbon exports. Egypt did not start exporting LNG until 2005. Some 24 percent of the world’s LNG originated in the Mediterranean in 2004. Approximately 8 percent of it goes to the United States, with most of the remainder going to European countries. These figures are the author’s calculations based on Energy Information Administration data sheets available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/gastrade.html.
 9. Two-thirds of the world’s crude oil, approximately 43 million barrels per day (bbl/d), travels by sea. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport, 2005*, document UNCTAD/RMT/2005 (New York: 2005), pp. 16–17.
 10. The Sumed pipeline links the Ain Sukhna terminal in the Gulf of Suez with the Sidi Kerir terminal in Egypt. It allows oil aboard tankers too large to pass through the Suez Canal to reach the Mediterranean for further transport. Most of its oil originates in Saudi Arabia (2.5 million bbl/d). Energy Information Administration, *World Oil Transit Chokepoints*, Country Analysis Briefs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Dept., November 2005), available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html.
 11. While most of the region’s natural gas moves through undersea pipelines from Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia to Spain and Italy, the region has also seen a large growth in the movement of natural gas in the form of LNG on tankers.
 12. European Commission, *Overview: Maritime Transport* (Brussels: 2005), available at europa.eu.int/comm/transport/maritime/index_en.htm.
 13. In 1991 the world merchant fleet was 436,027 gross tons (GT). By 2004, it had increased to 633,321 GT, or by 145 percent, for an average yearly increase of 3.2 percent. “The U.S. and World Fleets, 1914 to the Present,” *Maritime Business Strategies, LLC*, www.coltoncompany.com/shipping/statistics/wldfltgrowth.htm.
 14. Till, *Seapower*, p. 314; Andrew Krepinevich, *The Quadrennial Defense Review: Rethinking the U.S. Military Posture* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2005), p. 70. According to Till, these characteristics make today’s shipping system much more fragile and less resilient than it once was.
 15. In 2004, only 2 percent of the world’s merchant fleet was U.S. flagged. “The U.S. and World Fleets, 1914 to the Present,” *Maritime Business Strategies, LLC*, www.coltoncompany.com/shipping/statistics/wldflht.htm.

16. Jones, *Statement*, p. 3.
17. Al-Nasheri was captured in Yemen in November 2002. He has reportedly admitted playing a key role in organizing the attacks on the USS *Cole* and M/V *Limburg*. U.S. Justice Dept., statement, "Al Qaeda Associates Charged in Attack on USS *Cole*, Attempted Attack on Another U.S. Naval Vessel," 15 May 2003, available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/.
18. Christopher Dickey, "High-Seas Terrorism," *Newsweek*, 27 January 2003, p. 8.
19. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact* (Paris: OECD, July 2003), p. 14.
20. In 2001, of the 325 million people who transited through European ports, 7.3 million came from non-European ports. About 2.8 million passengers pass through Spain's North African ports of Ceuta and Melilla every year. Council of Europe, "Feasibility Study of the European Union's Maritime Borders," Project 114410 (Brussels: 19 September 2003), p. 4.
21. Vincenzo Delicato, "National Legislation and Good Practices in the Fight against Illegal Migration—Italian Model," paper presented at CARDS Police Regional Project, "Development of Reliable and Functioning Policing Systems, and Enhancing of Combating Main Criminal Activities and Police Co-operation," Study Visit in Rome, 1 October 2004, available at www.belgium.iom.int/CardsRegional2002/.
22. In 2003, more than 650 vessels were intercepted with illegal immigrants by Spain. Council of Europe, *Organized Crime Situation Report 2005* (Strasbourg, Fr.: Department of Crime Problems, December 2005), p. 39.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Council of Europe, "Feasibility Study of the European Union's Maritime Borders," p. 19.
25. Ali M. Koknar, "Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO," *Energy Focus*, 24 January 2005, available at www.iags.org/n0124051.htm; Luke Baker, "Italy Study Sees Al Qaeda Link to Human Trafficking," Reuters, 7 August 2003.
26. Office of Drug and Crime, *2005 World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 128.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
28. Council of Europe, *Organized Crime Situation Report 2005*, p. 30.
29. Since 1997 Albania has had a flourishing weapons trade. In 1997 hundreds of thousands of weapons were looted from government stockpiles during riots from antigovernment protests. Over 300,000 weapons and 700 million rounds of ammunition are still unaccounted for. Center for Peace and Disarmament Education and Saferworld, *Turning the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania* (London: December 2005), p. 7, available at www.saferworld.org.uk/.
30. According to *Baltic Sky's* manifest, the cargo was destined for a company with a non-existent Khartoum post office box. Helena Smith, "NATO 'Terror' Tipoff on Explosives Ship Sailing to Sudan," *Guardian Unlimited*, 24 June 2003, available at www.guardian.co.uk/.
31. "Maritime Security Policy," in *National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 21 December 2004), p. 4.
32. In October 2003, the M/V *BBC China* was intercepted carrying a shipment of thousands of centrifuge parts bound for Libya.
33. In many ways, U.S. and European perceptions are very similar. They both see terrorism and proliferation of WMD as their greatest threats and are concerned that terrorists may acquire and use WMD. Both see regional conflicts and weak/failed states as major threats. Europeans have a more "expansive" view of the security challenges, including also organized crime and problems like global warming. Europeans also view security more from a standpoint of human security than of traditional security. European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels: 2003), pp. 3–4; *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006), p. 12.
34. Two other subordinate strategies related to terrorism and WMD include U.S. Defense Dept., *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: 1 February 2006), and *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, D.C.: 13 February 2006).

35. All of these documents can be found in the documents section of NATO's website, www.nato.int.
36. "Maritime Security Policy," p. 2.
37. U.S. Defense Dept., *The National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: 2005), p. i.
38. *Ibid.*; *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2005), p. 9; U.S. Defense Dept., *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: 2004), p. 2.
39. NATO's Strategic Concept, approved in April 1999, also provides policy guidance. Specifically, "[the alliance] must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions." *Readers Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington* (Brussels: NATO, 1999), p. 47.
40. *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide* (Brussels: NATO, 2004), p. 8.
41. As of 1 January 2005, 14,480 merchant ships, 65.1 percent of total tonnage, were not registered in the country of domicile of the owner but flagged out. Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, "Ownership Patterns of the World Merchant Fleet," *ISL Market Analysis 2005*, available at www.isl.org/products_services/shop/enindex.htm.
42. Approximately eighty-two thousand vessels transit the Strait of Gibraltar every year (Admiral Fernando Armada Vadillo, "Active Endeavor in the Strait of Gibraltar," presentation to the Fifth Regional Seapower Symposium, 14 October 2004, available at www.marina.difesa.it/symposium/programma14.htm). Fifty thousand vessels annually, including 5,500 oil tankers, transit the Bosphorus Strait (Energy Information Administration, *World Oil Transit Chokepoints*).
43. Till, *Seapower*, pp. 361–66.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 364; Eric Larson, Gustav Lindstrom, Myron Hura, Ken Gardiner, Jim Keffer, and Bill Little, *Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), p. 46.
45. A widely used definition describes situational awareness as "the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future." M. R. Endsley, "Design and Evaluation for Situation Awareness Enhancement," *Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 32nd Annual Meeting* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Human Factors Society, 1988), pp. 97–101.
46. Common operational picture is defined as "a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness." U.S. Defense Dept., *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub. 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 12 April 2001, amended through 31 August 2005), p. 105.
47. In October 2005 Deputy Secretary of Defense England signed a memorandum instructing the services to cut some \$32 billion in projected spending through 2011. European defense spending has been decreasing as a percent of GDP since 1997. In 1997, EU nations spent 2 percent of their GDP on defense; by 2003 it was down to 1.7 percent. Jonathan Karp, Andy Pasztor, and Greg Jaffe, "Pentagon Weighs Personnel Cuts to Pay for Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, 5 December 2005, available at online.wsj.com; Gustav Lindstrom, *EU-US Burdensharing: Who Does What?* Chaillot Paper 82 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p. 28.
48. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO. It allows partner countries to build up individual relationships with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. PfP was launched in 1994; currently, twenty countries participate. "Partnership for Peace," *NATO Topics*, www.nato.int/issues/pfp/. Mediterranean Dialogue partners include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.
49. Article V states that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North

- America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Article V, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949, available at www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm.
50. The NAC is the most important decision-making body within NATO. The only body established by the North Atlantic Treaty (under Article 9), it is invested with the authority to set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary for the purposes of implementing the treaty. It oversees political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole alliance. *NATO Topics*, available at www.nato.int/issues/nac/.
51. The strait's width ranges from eight miles (12.9 kilometers) off Point Marroquí to twenty-seven miles (forty-three kilometers) at the western entrance. Approximately three thousand vessels transit the Strait of Gibraltar every day. "Combating Terrorism at Sea," NATO Briefing, April 2004, p. 3, available at www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea-e.pdf.
52. As of 15 September 2005, 488 noncombatant escorts had been conducted through the Strait of Gibraltar. Roberto Cesaretti, "Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean," *NATO Review* (Autumn 2005), available at www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art4.html.
53. The first compliant boarding was conducted on 29 April 2003. As of January 2006, approximately seventy-four thousand vessels had been queried and a hundred boarded. NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour Boardings Reaches 100," Allied Maritime Component Command Naples Press Release, 16 January 2006, available at www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/PressReleases/.
54. Cesaretti, "Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean."
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. It was not the original purpose of OAE to conduct search-and-rescue, humanitarian, or disaster-relief operations; the ability to conduct such operations is an unexpected benefit. An example took place on 4 December 2001, when the Standing Task Force Mediterranean ships *Aliseo*, *Formion*, and *Elrod* were called to assist in the rescue of eighty-four civilians from a stricken oil rig in high winds and heavy seas. *Aliseo's* embarked helicopter removed all eighty-four in fourteen flights. NATO ships have also been involved in the countering of illegal immigration. On 23 March 2006, OAE ships conducting counter-terrorist patrols in the Mediterranean spotted suspicious movement on the M/V *Crystal* and began tracking the vessel. They notified the Hellenic Coast Guard, which intercepted the vessel as it approached Greek waters. Greek authorities boarded the vessel and subsequently arrested the captain, crew, and 126 illegal immigrants.
58. In December 2005, NATO officials visited Sevastopol to discuss Ukrainian fleet preparations for participation in OAE. On 27 January 2006, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree approving the Vilnius agreement, which will allow Ukrainian forces to participate in OAE.
59. If Strait of Gibraltar escort operations recommence, Ukraine has pledged to contribute forces.
60. Cem Gürdeniz, "Transformation in the Black Sea and Caucasus Regions," speech to the Third Annual Security Conference: Security Risks and Transformation-Euro-Atlantic and Regional Perspectives, Center for the Study of Democracy, 19 November 2005, available at www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=6781. The Black Sea Group of the Navy Forces partnership was created by a 2000 treaty between Turkey and other states of the region. Its tasks were search and rescue, humanitarian assistance operations, mine countermeasures, environmental protection operations, goodwill visits, and other tasks, like peace support operations, agreed by all parties.
61. Russia also opposes an expanded U.S. or NATO role in the Black Sea. The real reason behind Turkish and Russian opposition to

Washington's plan may be that both countries "likely perceive U.S. policies in the Black Sea and Caucasus region as being potentially destabilizing to their vital interests." Igor Torbakov, "Turkey Sides with Moscow against Washington on Black Sea Force," *EURASIA Daily Monitor*, 3 March 2006, available at www.jamestown.org/.

62. Turkey attaches great importance to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the access of the warships of nonlittoral states to the Black Sea. The treaty guarantees free passage to all merchant vessels and defines the terms and sets tonnage limits (fifteen thousand tons per ship, aggregate not to exceed thirty thousand tons) on the passage of military vessels through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Matt Bryza, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, stated on 29 March 2006 that even though the United States seeks to improve security in the Black Sea region, it has no intention of violating the convention.
63. The PSI is not a formal institution, nor is it a treaty body. It is a statement of purpose, an activity. The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states able and willing to take steps to stop the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials at sea, in the air or on the land. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles," 4 September 2003, available at www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm; "Exercises," *Proliferation Security Initiative*, www.proliferationsecurity.info/exercises.html.
64. Mediterranean PSI exercises conducted were SANSO '03 (Spain), BASILIC '03 (France), AIRBRAKE '03 (Italy), CLEVER SENTINEL (Italy), BLUE ACTION '05 (Spain), and ANATOLIAN SUN '06 (Turkey).
65. Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) states that AIS shall provide information—including the ship's identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status, and other safety-related information—automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft; receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships; monitor and track ships; and exchange data with shore-based facilities. All vessels built after 1 July 2002 and those built before then that are engaged in international voyages, with the exception of ships less than three hundred gross tons (other than passenger vessels and tankers), are required to carry AIS. International Maritime Organization, "AIS Transponders," www.imo.org/Safety/.
66. For example, AISLive provides this service for \$1,320 per user per year. The five-user license costs \$2,275.
67. Till, *Seapower*, p. 342.
68. This does not mean navies did not conduct other actions, like patrolling fisheries and intercepting drug smugglers, only that such missions have not shaped naval strategy and operational concepts.
69. The rise of a near-peer competitor could bring dominion once again to the forefront of naval planning, but most experts do not see the rise of a military peer competitor in the Mediterranean any time soon. Douglas E. Streusand, "Geopolitics versus Globalization," in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 49–53.
70. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, *An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 1–16, 384; Till, *Seapower*, pp. 311–14.
71. The function of the sea as a means of exchanging information and values has largely been overtaken by the globalization of modern information technology and aviation transportation systems. Cyberspace is now the dominant medium of global communications. See Till, *Seapower*, p. 353; James J. Wirtz, "Will Globalization Sink the Navy?" in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Tangredi, p. 556.
72. *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2005), p. 1.
73. As of late 2006 the U.S. Navy had only two ships permanently stationed in the Mediterranean, a command ship and a tender; all other U.S. naval combatants in the Mediterranean deploy there from elsewhere. Typically at least one ship is assigned to Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. Often naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean are redeployed to other theaters, especially the Arabian Gulf. Typically, the only time aircraft carriers spend in the Mediterranean is in transit to the Arabian Gulf.

74. Vice Admiral Timothy P. McClement, OBE, "The Asymmetric Threat in the Maritime Environment—a Military Perspective," presentation to the Fifth Regional Seapower Symposium, 14 October 2004, available at www.marina.difesa.it/symposium/programma14.htm.
75. The purpose of the JIAC is the active promotion of common information collection and reporting and coordination. Cesaretti, "Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean."
76. According to Admiral Sergio Biraghi, the chief of staff of the Italian navy, the purpose of the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (V-RMTC) is to increase coordination of maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean. V-RMTC is intended to provide naval forces with information on traffic in the Mediterranean in real time, by secure Internet links. As of late 2006, twenty-six navies were participating in the project. Assembly of the Western European Union, "The Assembly Advocates the Use of Naval Defence Forces in Missions That Are Not Strictly Military in Character," WEU press release, 7 December 2005, available at www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/presse/cp/2005/44.html. See also www.marina.difesa.it/vrmtc/en/vrmtc.htm.
77. The Western Sea Borders Centre (WSBC) in Madrid, Spain, is responsible for surveillance of the Baltic and western Mediterranean. The Eastern Sea Borders Centre (ESBC) in Piraeus, Greece, is responsible for the eastern Mediterranean. FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) became operational on 1 May 2005. Its purpose is to coordinate among and assist the competent services of the member states responsible for implementing the Schengen *acquis* on control of persons at the external borders. Its tasks include coordinating operational cooperation between member states in the field of management of external borders (land and sea); cooperation is envisaged with Europol, international organizations, and third countries. Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly, *Surveillance of the Maritime and Coastal Areas of European States*, Document A/1920 (Paris: Assembly of Western European Union, 6 December 2005), pp. 8–9.
78. Operational effectiveness in maritime areas largely depends on having the right personnel in place at the JIAC. The JIAC has done a much better job of collating, analyzing, and disseminating data as actionable intelligence for Balkan, Afghanistan, and other primarily land operations.
79. Most Mediterranean navies view terrorism as a threat, but more often than not they see the threat in the much broader context of illicit activity in general. See presentations by General Mohand Tahar Yala (commander of Algerian naval forces), Rear Admiral Abdelaziz Aichouche (Royal Moroccan Navy), Rear Admiral Mohamed Kamel Bouhaouala (Tunisian navy), and several of the other presenters at the Fifth Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice, Italy, on 14 October 2004, available at www.marina.difesa.it/symposium/programma14.htm.
80. Examples of the progress in this area include the 2005 amendments to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention, consensual boarding agreements with flag-of-convenience countries like Panama as part of the PSI, and the signing of numerous memorandums of understanding on sharing classified information among the United States, NATO, and most of the states that border the Mediterranean.
81. A capability is "the ability to achieve desired operating effects under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks." Ryan Henry, "Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review," *Parameters* (Winter 2005/06), p. 12.
82. Capability 3 (develop and maintain shared situational awareness and understanding) in section 5 of the *Command and Control Joint Integrating Concept* contains a more detailed discussion on this capability. U.S. Defense Dept., *Command and Control Joint Integrating Concept* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2005), pp. 23–24.
83. *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*, p. 16.
84. Examples of this process and a more detailed discussion of many of the above capabilities can be found in the *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, U.S. Navy's *FORCENet Functional Concept, Command and Control*

Joint Integrating Concept, and *Command and Control Joint Functional Concept*. All joint concepts are available at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/index.html#, and *FORCENet Functional Concept* at forcenet.navy.mil/concepts/fn-concept-final.pdf.

85. Colin Gray, "How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters* (Spring 2005), p. 16.
86. Friction "is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 121.
87. A marine electronic highway (MEH) is a system of technology, people, and processes that enables third-party access to marine environmental and operational data and information in real or near-real time. It embodies tools to record, store, manage, model, analyze, and access oceanographic and other data and to present the results as textual and graphical information to a broad base of expert and nonexpert users. The first MEH demonstration project (2004–2008) is being conducted in the Straits of Malacca by the IMO, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, funded by the World Bank's Global Environmental Faculty. Randy Gillespie, "Global Marine Electronic Highway: Proposed Vision and Architecture," Canadian GeoProject Centre, available at www.acops.org/Gillespie.pdf.
88. U.S. Defense Dept., *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, p. 19.

TABLE A-1
U.S. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND OBJECTIVES

National Defense Strategy (NDS)

Key objectives relevant to the maritime domain

- Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
“We will promote the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.”
 - Strengthen alliances and partnerships
“Expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us, and we will help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.”
-

National Military Strategy (NMS)

Objectives:^a

- Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression
“Our first line of defense is abroad and includes mutually supporting activities with U.S. allies to counter threats close to their source.”
 - Prevent conflict and surprise attack
“Achieving this objective includes actions to shape the security environment in ways that enhance and expand multinational partnerships.”
 - Prevail against adversaries
-

National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)

Principles that provide overarching guidance to the NSMS (p. 7):

1. Preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national priority.
2. Facilitate and defend commerce to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping.
3. Facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material.

Objectives relevant to EUCOM

- Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts
“Detect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in the maritime domain, and prevent its unlawful exploitation for those purposes” (p. 8).
“If terrorists cannot be deterred by the layered maritime security, then they must be interdicted and defeated, preferably overseas” (p. 9).
- Protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures

Strategic actions to achieve NSMS objectives (p. 13)

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| • Enhance international cooperation | • Deploy layered security |
| • Maximize domain awareness | • Assure continuity of the marine transportation system |
| • Embed security into commercial practices | |
-

National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (NPMDA)^b

The oceans are global thoroughfares that sustain our national prosperity and are vital for our national security (p. 2).

Purpose of MDA: to facilitate timely, accurate decision making (p. 7)

MDA Goals:

- Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter, and defeat threats as early and distant from U.S. interests as possible;
 - Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the full spectrum of maritime threats;
 - Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and the efficient flow of commerce.
“First step . . . is to ensure GMCOI stakeholders, at all levels, know what they can do to help, how they can do it and, most importantly why Maritime Domain Awareness is in their collective best interest” (p. 3).
“MDA is the critical enabler that allows leaders at all levels to make effective decisions and act early against a vast array of threats to the security of the United States, its interests, allies, and friends” (p. 20).
-

Notes

a. *National Military Strategy of the United States*, pp. 2–3.

b. *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*, pp. 2–20.

TABLE A-2
NATO STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND OBJECTIVES

Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism—Prague Summit (21 November 2002)

Specific actions listed in the Action Plan (paragraph 16):

- Intensify consultations and information sharing
- Enhance preparedness for combating terrorism
- Impede support for terrorist groups
- Enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management
- Assistance to partners' efforts against terrorism

NATO Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism (NMCDAT)

Roles for NATO Military:

1. Antiterrorism (defensive/passive measures)
2. Consequence management
3. Counterterrorism (offensive/active measures)
4. Military cooperation—Specifically stated, NATO must harmonize its procedures and efforts with civil authorities within nations in order to maximize its effectiveness against terrorism.

Istanbul Summit Communiqué and Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, July 2004

1. Elevated the MD to a genuine partnership whose overall aim will be to contribute toward regional security and stability and complement other international efforts through enhanced practical cooperation, and whose objectives include:
 - enhancing the existing political dialogue;
 - achieving interoperability;
 - developing defense reform;
 - contributing to the fight against terrorism.
2. Formulated basic strategy: expand and strengthen practical cooperation in priority areas. Specifically:
 - a. Military-to-military cooperation in order to achieve interoperability
 - b. Combating terrorism and new security threats: intelligence sharing, participation in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (detect, defend, deter, and disrupt terrorist activity in Mediterranean), preventing the proliferation of WMD and its means of delivery
 - c. Border security
 - d. Civil emergency planning
 - e. Defense reform.
3. Established the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative—Goal to offer cooperation to Middle East Region.

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EXPECTATION, ADAPTATION, AND RESIGNATION

British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914–April 1916

Jon Tetsuro Sumida

In mid-July 1914, a trial mobilization of the active and reserve warships of the Royal Navy, which had been planned the previous fall, put virtually all of Britain's effective naval forces on a war footing. This event coincided with the increasingly rancorous great-power dispute precipitated by the Balkans crisis. The deteriorating European political situation prompted the Admiralty to delay the dispersal of the bulk of the fleet after the conclusion of the exercise. On 28 July, with hostilities against Germany a strong possibility, Britain's manned and ready naval forces were ordered to their war stations. On 4 August, war between Britain and Germany began. Fortuitous preparedness foreclosed the possibility of naval debacle from surprise attack. With Britain's first-line naval strength poised to fight, the stage was set for a full-scale encounter with the German battle fleet. Many on both sides expected a major battle to take place within days, but the German navy did not sortie. Subsequent German operational reticence would

keep its main body beyond the reach of British guns for nearly two years.

For much of this time, the Royal Navy entertained hopes of fighting and winning a decisive battle. By the spring of 1916, however, the vision of achieving an industrial Trafalgar had been given up, replaced by the view that such a victory was not worth the risks that would have to be taken to impose action on an unwilling opponent. In May 1916, however, chance and circumstance resulted in a major encounter between the main naval forces of Britain and Germany off the

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coast of Denmark. The outcome of the battle of Jutland, however, was inconclusive. In spite of large superiorities in numbers and firepower, moreover, the British battle fleet not only failed to destroy its adversary, but suffered heavier losses. Historians have attributed the causes of this unsatisfactory result to several factors, including weaknesses in British operational command and Admiralty organization, and defective materiel.¹ In addition, much has been made of what can be called British tactical sterility—that is to say, British battle fleet tactics of the period are portrayed as simple, unimaginative, and, above all, unchanging.

The present article will challenge the conventional portrayal of early British wartime naval tactical planning by considering the interlocking technical, strategic, operational, and intelligence factors that shaped tactical intent. The examination of the interior mind of Britain's naval leadership is based on the author's recently published findings on prewar British naval tactical planning, and mainly primary sources covering the war. The inquiry will address the following three questions: What form did the leadership of the Royal Navy expect a major fleet action to take, and why? When reality did not correspond to expectations, how did the leadership of the Royal Navy respond? And finally, what circumstances conditioned the responses? The story to be told is not one of action but of the changing attitudes that informed potential action.²

Arthur J. Marder, the author of the standard account of early-twentieth-century naval policy, depicted a Royal Navy that on the outbreak of war was commanded by admirals who were tactically unprogressive, self-satisfied, and thoughtless.³ Marder's assessment was based upon the memoirs of prominent naval officers and politicians.⁴ Such apparently authoritative testimony was, however, corrupted by a combination of partisanship, ignorance, and perhaps fading memory. A considerable body of documentary evidence supports a very different view of the state of tactical thinking in the Royal Navy in 1914. By this time, more than a decade of rapid technical development and comprehensive tactical experiment had provided the basis for two different tactical outlooks. The first school of thought, which will be called the "agnostic opportunists," believed that a future major sea battle with the German navy could take any number of different forms and that the British fleet thus needed to be prepared to operate effectively under a broad range of tactical conditions. The second school of thought, which will be called the "clandestine preempters," believed that the Germans would seek to fight the one kind of naval battle in which they could expect to achieve major success in spite of their inferiorities in numbers and firepower and that the British battle fleet should thus develop specific countermeasures in secret in order to surprise and thereby defeat its opponent under these particular circumstances.

The agnostic opportunists were centered in the First Fleet of the Home Fleet. Their titular and spiritual leader was Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, its commander in chief. Callaghan had taken this position in November 1911 and served until July 1914. The timing and span of Callaghan's tenure in command of the Home Fleet is significant. At the beginning of his tour, much fewer than half of his first-line capital units consisted of all-big-gun battleships; in 1913, two out of his four battleship squadrons were still made up of the older predreadnought-type battleships; and in July 1914, the third dreadnought battleship squadron was still at half strength. Dreadnought battleships were much more heavily armed and faster than their predreadnought stablemates, but the combination of the two types in a single formation meant that full advantage could not be taken of the dreadnought's superior qualities. Callaghan also had to contend with the fact that gunnery efficiency changed considerably over his term of office. In 1911, shortcomings in gunnery equipment and technique had raised serious questions about big-gun effectiveness. While these difficulties were largely rectified by prototypes of improved materiel and the development of new methods of firing, as late as July 1914 only half the available dreadnought battleships were equipped and trained to achieve what was believed to be state-of-the-art gunnery. The wide disparity in gunnery capability even among the dreadnought battleships thus further complicated tactical preparation. Finally, beginning in 1912, the introduction of torpedoes whose range at high speed was much greater than that of their predecessors greatly increased the vulnerability of the battle line to serious losses from underwater ordnance fired from either enemy battleships or destroyers.⁵

Callaghan was responsible for Britain's main battle fleet in the event of war, which could come at any time. His problem insofar as tactical planning was concerned, therefore, was immediate—how to fight with the forces in hand. Given the combination of difficult circumstances facing him in the moment, Callaghan appears to have focused his energies on maximizing technical efficiency—that is, getting each of the differing elements of his command to realize its highest attainable level of combat capability—rather than on formulating a tightly integrated tactical scheme.⁶ This loose functional arrangement allowed new ships and improved equipment and technique to be introduced with minimal disruption of readiness to fight. Tactical coherence, to the degree that it existed, was a matter of shared attitude in three general areas. In the first place, Callaghan believed that a fleet action would involve considerable sparring at a distance as well as the possibility of a hammer-and-tongs slugfest at medium and short ranges, which caused him to order a substantial increase in the amount of ammunition issued to all dreadnoughts.⁷ In the second place, Callaghan was by no means confident that even the latest methods of gunnery were applicable under all the

various conditions of range and visibility that were likely to occur in a real naval battle, and he thus insisted that his gunners keep up practice in a variety of methods of gunlaying (that is, pointing) and fire control.⁸ In the third place, Callaghan was convinced that under favorable circumstances destroyers could sink battleships with torpedoes; as a consequence, he planned to attach substantial flotilla forces to the battle line and use them offensively.⁹ A measure of tactical success, if not decisive victory, was to be achieved by a combination of propitious circumstances and general competence in gunnery and fleet maneuver.

The clandestine preempters were based at the Admiralty. Their de facto chief was Vice Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, most of whose career as a flag officer had been spent at the Admiralty as director of naval ordnance from 1905 to 1907, Third Sea Lord and controller (that is, overseer of navy materiel procurement) from 1908 to 1910, and Second Sea Lord (that is, in effect, director of naval personnel)

from 1912 to July 1914, with only short breaks in between with the fleet. While in charge of the Admiralty's technical departments as DNO and controller, Jellicoe had directed the course of improvement in gunnery materiel and technique.

By late 1915 Jellicoe had decided to fight a long-range engagement to disrupt German intentions but also under the right conditions to resort to a medium-range fight to achieve a decisive victory.

From late 1911 through mid-1912 he had commanded a battleship squadron that spent much of its time testing new gunnery equipment and methods. Where Callaghan's main concerns about tactical practice were immediate, Jellicoe's were prospective. For most of the decade that preceded the outbreak of war, his attention day to day had been devoted to the advancement of gunnery capability beyond a state of critical imperfection. For years Jellicoe had struggled with recalcitrant technical problems in gunlaying, fire control, ordnance, and warship design. Overcoming these difficulties, he believed, was vital in order to deal with two major threats to Britain's battle fleet. The first, which has already been mentioned, was the danger posed by long-range torpedoes. The second, which requires explanation, was what was believed to be the German intention to fight a medium-range action with a combination of big guns, quick-firing guns, and torpedoes.

Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the state secretary of the Imperial Naval Office and the driving force behind German naval expansion, was an outspoken proponent of aggressive tactics. Tirpitz, who was responsible for naval administration and shipbuilding, had no control over operations. His views on how the battle fleet should be used nevertheless shaped British assessments of German operational intentions. British naval intelligence reported that the Germans

believed that their fleet would be able to win a decisive battle at medium ranges (roughly seven to eight thousand yards). The Germans were apparently convinced that their ships would be able to close to medium ranges without suffering significant damage because British gunnery would be thrown off by the quick change of range during the approach. After closing, the Germans would turn onto a course parallel to the British line, which would keep the range constant and thus maximize the accuracy of fire. At this point, the German fleet—with its faster-firing though lighter-caliber big guns, a large superiority in medium-caliber guns, and battleship torpedo batteries that were twice the size of their British counterparts—would be capable in theory of inflicting much greater damage than it would suffer in return in spite of its numerical inferiority.¹⁰ To counter this threat the British fleet either had to develop the capacity to hit when ranges were long and changing, and thus stop or cripple the German fleet before it could bring its weapons into action, or devise means to fight and win a medium-range action without suffering heavy losses from German gunnery and torpedoes. The third possibility, retreat in the face of a German advance, was rejected as morally unacceptable.¹¹

For several years, Jellicoe favored efforts to accomplish the first of the two alternatives, namely, to hit effectively at long ranges that were changing.¹² But in 1912 he concluded that recently adopted and forthcoming new gunnery equipment and methods would not only enable a British battle line to overpower a German opponent at medium ranges but would do so in a way that neutralized the torpedo threat. Improved gunlaying and sight-setting equipment promised a dramatic increase in the Royal Navy's practical rate of accurate big-gun fire at short and medium ranges. The introduction of heavier-caliber big guns and better armor-piercing projectiles would make the more accurate and rapid fire even more deadly. Also, defensive deployment of all available cruisers and destroyers was to provide the means of stopping at a distance German flotilla attacks on the battle line, whose shooting would thus be undisturbed by maneuvering to avoid torpedoes. The prospective net gain in firepower was enormous: with the proper gunnery equipment and well-drilled crews, the British dreadnoughts coming into service from 1912 onward could, when steaming on a straight course, place more than ten times the weight of projectile on target than earlier dreadnoughts. This would be enough to shatter the German battle line in no more than six minutes, which was less time than it took for a high-speed torpedo to traverse the distance between the opposed forces at medium range. On the assumptions that German gunnery technique was no better than that of the Royal Navy before 1912, that tight British security had concealed the improvement in British gunnery, and that accordingly the Germans would seek a medium-range engagement on parallel courses, the British battle fleet

would be able to deliver an overwhelming hail of fire, after which all ships could turn simultaneously in response to a single signal to avoid oncoming torpedoes. Following this turn, the line could be reformed by a second signal, which would be made in the absence of firing and thus under conditions that favored accurate transmission and receipt of the order.¹³

Jellicoe's scheme must have been attractive for several reasons. The agnostic opportunists envisioned a battle of complex offensive maneuver by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Coordinating such an action required a very high degree of tactical skill throughout the fleet, as well as complicated signaling. Tactical errors by subordinate commanders or breakdowns in communications would produce at the very least some confusion, at worst complete disorganization, which would open the possibility of defeat in detail. Even if order was maintained, British gun crews that had been trained to fire at long as well as medium ranges might lack the practiced skill required to outshoot or even match opponents who had concentrated all their energy on maximizing speed and accuracy at medium range. If the British battle line stayed on the same course for much longer than six minutes at medium range, it was likely to suffer heavily from torpedoes as well as gunfire. The program of the clandestine preemptors, in contrast, called for offensive action by battleships that did not maneuver, with cruisers and destroyers providing a defensive screen; that approach posed relatively simpler command and control problems, called for gunnery methods that would give the British battle line firepower superiority under the very tactical conditions that would be sought by their German opponents, and offered a remedy to the torpedo threat.

A consensus within the Admiralty in favor of Jellicoe's tactical scheme appears to have been formed in late 1912. Because German cognizance of the Royal Navy's plan and the capabilities upon which it was based would compromise its effectiveness, knowledge of its existence was restricted to a select few. Keeping the plan secret was made easier by the fact that the British fleet was ill prepared to execute it. By mid-1913, only one battleship squadron out of the four in the First Fleet of the Home Fleet was made up of ships suitable to fight the kind of medium-range battle envisioned by Jellicoe. But ships under construction that would come into service in the next two years could be formed into a second squadron, while the older, less heavily armed dreadnought battleships could be given the new sight-setting equipment, which would enhance significantly their ability to shoot accurately and rapidly at medium ranges. In the spring of 1914, Jellicoe was informed that he would succeed Callaghan as commander in chief of the Home Fleet at the end of the year. By this time, the Home Fleet would be only a few months away from having a second full squadron of battleships fitted with state-of-the-art gunlaying and sight-setting equipment and armed for the

most part with big guns that were much larger than those in the German fleet. The remaining dreadnoughts would, had the war not begun in August, most likely have been fitted with the new sight-setting equipment;¹⁴ only one squadron would have been made up of predreadnoughts. With all that brought to fruition and three-quarters of the battle fleet thus more or less appropriately equipped, Jellicoe would have commanded a force with a credible capacity to execute his vision of decisive battle at medium range.

By the spring of 1914, the British view of a medium-range engagement had been broadened to include the possibility of an engagement between two lines of battleships on parallel courses but moving in opposite directions. Little attention had been given to this contingency until Captain William Wordsworth Fisher, commander of the dreadnought battleship *St. Vincent*, submitted a memorandum on the subject to Callaghan in April 1914. Callaghan observed that "action on opposite courses at medium range will afford excellent opportunities for long range torpedo fire." This was because the opposed fleets would be advancing rapidly toward torpedoes launched by their opponent, which meant that the distance the torpedo had traveled by the point of impact would be much less than the range to the target had been at the point of firing. The threat of torpedoes under the circumstances described could not "be eliminated short of leading the van out of torpedo range," which "might be impossible without exposing the rear to the fire of a larger number of enemy ships." That being said, Callaghan believed that superior British gunfire would be capable of rendering the enemy battleships incapable of either effective gunfire or torpedo attack, although he did not mention the greater difficulty of aiming guns when the change-of-range rate was high, as would be the case when fleets were steaming on opposed courses. He was convinced, moreover, that such an action would give the British forces an opportunity to smash the leading ships of the German battle line and thus disrupt the entire enemy formation. Callaghan concluded that battle on opposite courses was possible either in the form of a meeting engagement in bad weather or in good weather through deliberate action (for unspecified reasons). What Callaghan may have had in mind was the transformation of a pursuit action into a battle on opposite courses by a simultaneous turn by a retreating German fleet, whose motive was to maximize the effectiveness of its superior torpedo armament.¹⁵

The orderly transition from one tactical regime to another that was planned for late 1914 was disrupted by the decision of the Admiralty in the last week of July to replace Callaghan with Jellicoe immediately in the likely event of war with Germany. Jellicoe objected strenuously to this ruling, and with cause. He could not fight the kind of battle that he wanted with the fleet that existed. If a major engagement against the German navy was to be fought in the near term, it would have to be executed along the lines worked on by Callaghan, in which case

the incumbent admiral, with two years' experience in office and the confidence of his subordinates, was the better choice. Winston Churchill, the First Lord, rejected Jellicoe's demurrals, however, and Jellicoe reluctantly accepted the appointment, which became effective on 4 August, the day war was declared.¹⁶ On this date he took command of the first-line fighting ships of the Home Fleet, a force that was designated the Grand Fleet. The Admiralty's reasoning is still mysterious. It may well be that Britain's naval leadership believed that the Germans would keep their navy in port during the early months of the war and that Jellicoe, as the leader of the clandestine preempters, was the best man to use the time to prepare the just-mobilized battle fleet to achieve a decisive victory along the lines formulated in 1912. In any case, German operational reticence, compounded by British operational caution, practically eliminated the possibility of a major fleet action in the fall of 1914.

Although Tirpitz called for the immediate offensive deployment of the battle fleet, he was unable to persuade the operational leadership of the German navy to risk a major clash prior to the reduction of the Grand Fleet's numerical advantage by the action of German destroyers, submarines, and mines.¹⁷ Conversely, Jellicoe feared that British losses to those threats would set the stage for a German sortie to fight a battle at medium range, the outcome of which might well be unfavorable, given yet-to-be rectified materiel shortcomings.¹⁸ He thus instructed his command in August and September that he would exercise caution when threatened by torpedo attack or mines, even to the point of giving up what appeared to be opportunities for decisive action. In contrast to Callaghan, Jellicoe made it clear that the primary function of destroyers was to prevent or disrupt enemy destroyer attacks on the battle line. Jellicoe stated a general intention to fight at what could be called "very high medium range"—that is, nine to twelve thousand yards. But he also warned that "it may be necessary to close the range or otherwise maneuver the fleet to avoid indecisive action." Nevertheless, Jellicoe called for deliberate shooting at ranges that were well above ten thousand yards, in the hopes of throwing the German fleet "into partial confusion before its attack can be developed, with consequent loss of initiative and interference with their prearranged plan [i.e., closing to medium range]."¹⁹

In October, Jellicoe expressed these same views to the Admiralty, after which he declared his intention to "pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy's battle fleet, without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism."²⁰ The short-term prospects of achieving this objective, however, were not good. In October, the Grand Fleet lost one of its dreadnought battleships to a mine, three more were crippled by engine defects, and a fifth was in dock refitting. All five vessels, moreover, were of the latest type, which thus cut the battleship force capable of using the new methods of gunnery

to full effect by half. In November, yet another first-class dreadnought battleship was disabled by engine trouble, and in December two others (including one of the units that had suffered engine problems in October) were damaged by collision. These losses were mitigated by the addition of four new battleships, which required, however, some months to work up to the same standards of efficiency as older units.²¹ Thus the Grand Fleet's ability—measured in battleships of the appropriate kind and level of effectiveness—to fight a medium-range engagement effectively was even less during the last three months of 1914 than it had been at the beginning of the war. In late December, indeed, the Second Battle Squadron—the only unit that was fully equipped and trained to execute Jellicoe's tactical ideas—was at half strength (see table). These circumstances were exacerbated by a severe shortage of destroyers. In early December, Jellicoe reported that in view of

COMPOSITION OF BRITISH BATTLE SQUADRONS IN TERMS OF GUNNERY EFFECTIVENESS AT MEDIUM RANGE, AUGUST 1914–JANUARY 1916

Units	Actual Early August 1914	Actual Late November 1914	Actual Late December 1914	Actual Late January 1915	Nominal January 1915	Nominal January 1916
1st Battle Squadron	1 A 2 B 5 C	1 A 2 B 4 C	1 A 2 B 5 C	1 A 2 B 4 C	1 A 2 B 5 C	1 A 2 B 5 C+
2nd Battle Squadron	8 A	7 A	4 A	6 A	8 A	8 A
3rd Battle Squadron	8 D	7 D	7 D	6 D	8 D	7 D
4th Battle Squadron	1 A 1 B- 3 C	1 A/1 A- 1 B 3 C	2 A/2 A- 1 B 3 C	3 A 1 B 3 C	4 A 1 B 3 C	4 A 1 B 3 C+
5th Battle Squadron	*	*	*	*	*	3 A
Total by Category	10 A 2 B 1 B- 8 C 8 D	9 A/1 A- 3 B 7 C 7 D	7 A/2 A- 3 B 8 C 7 D	10 A 3 B 7 C 6 D	13 A 3 B 8 C 8 D	16 A 3 B 8 C+ 7 D
Total Effective Units [A, B, C+] at Medium Range	12	12	10	13	16	27

LEGEND

Maximum effectiveness [proper guns, mountings, fire control] = A

Maximum effectiveness but not worked up = A-

High effectiveness [proper mountings, fire control] = B

High effectiveness but not worked up = B-

Good effectiveness [proper fire control] = C+

Poor effectiveness [lack of proper guns, mountings, fire control] = C

Very poor effectiveness [predreadnought] = D

Note: C units were probably being upgraded to C+ as they refitted from the fall of 1914 through 1915. Actual figures take into account ships under repair or re-fit. Nominal figures do not.

Sources: F. J. Dittmar and J. J. Colledge, *British Warships 1914–1919* (London: Ian Allan, 1972), pp. 15–19; Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, pp. 168, 185, 199.

the more than two-to-one superiority in destroyer numbers enjoyed by the Germans, he would have no choice but to “adopt the objectionable and difficult one of turning the battle fleet away when the attack takes place.” This, he observed, would upset gunfire and possibly forfeit “a position of tactical advantage.”²²

During the first five months of the war, the German navy’s decision to confine its operations to battle-cruiser raids and forays with submarines and light surface craft while keeping the battle fleet back meant that the Grand Fleet’s weaknesses with respect to a medium-range battle did not matter. The Admiralty, however, did not believe that German operational diffidence would last. By as early as October 1914, according to the official history of the Royal Navy, Britain’s naval leadership had concluded that the Germans would

husband their fleet for some sudden blow when the long winter nights would give them the best chance of evasion and surprise. Now that their failures in France had forced them to recognize that the war would not be the short and brilliant affair they had expected, they were already having to give anxious attention to the question of food supply, and however prudently inclined the High Command of the navy might be, its hand might at any time be forced into some desperate attempt to diminish the stringency of the blockade, or to deter us from sending further troops to France.²³

By early 1915, the Grand Fleet’s ability to fight a medium-range engagement had improved significantly, for several reasons. First, the four new battleships had completed their workups and could be considered fully effective. Second, by late 1914, British naval signals intelligence was able to give warning of German warship movements, which enabled Jellicoe to reduce the time spent at sea in anticipation of enemy activity, with the result that the crippling loss rate of the previous fall from engine wear decreased substantially.²⁴ Third, the ability of perhaps at least a few of the older dreadnoughts to fight at medium ranges had been much improved by new-model fire control equipment, the fitting of which had been given a high priority after the outbreak of war;²⁵ as a consequence, the Grand Fleet from January 1915 onward almost certainly had available a significantly greater number of all-big-gun battleships that were more or less equipped to hit hard and rapidly at medium ranges than it had had in late 1914 (see table). Fourth, destroyer reinforcements to the Grand Fleet substantially reduced the German advantage in this category of warship.²⁶

On 12 January 1915, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, informed Jellicoe that there was “some ‘movement’ going on in the German High Seas Fleet—nothing at all definite, but nevertheless enough to arouse suspicion.”²⁷ The Admiralty also had good reason to believe that when the Germans acted, they would seek a medium-range engagement. Notice to the Grand Fleet was given in the form of a complete translation of a recent redaction of the *German*

Tactical Orders, which was taken seriously by Jellicoe.²⁸ This pamphlet, which was printed for distribution in January 1915, stated that German battleships would close to fight at ranges of 8,800 to 6,600 yards, that torpedoes would be fired at this range, and that decisive victory at any cost was the objective.²⁹ Jellicoe may also have been influenced by intelligence reports indicating that the German battle fleet had devoted considerable time to practicing rapid course reversals through simultaneous turns;³⁰ that could have indicated a German intention to transform a retreat into a medium-range battle on opposite courses.³¹ The Second Battle Squadron was best equipped to deal with the high and varying change-of-range rates that would characterize such conditions; for this and other reasons it may have been designated to lead the fleet into battle, as was to be the case at Jutland.³²

Jellicoe seems to have responded with an instruction to the Grand Fleet prescribing methods of gunnery that were suitable for a medium-range battle and conversely discouraging the use of director firing, a centralized system of aiming all the guns of the main battery of a capital ship, which was essential for accurate shooting at long range.³³ Moreover, Jellicoe stressed not only the general importance of fast firing but its specific importance with respect to those battleships that were best equipped to carry it out. This instruction, dated 18 January 1915, stated that

experience has shown that under really favourable conditions firing by direct gunlaying is superior to director firing both as regards rapidity and accuracy of fire, markedly so in the matter of rapidity in ships fitted with quick elevating valves and presses [to train, elevate, and depress the gun barrels], as are the latest ships, if there is an awkward yaw [lateral motion of the ship's bow] and roll. . . . The fact is that in a turret ship the director is in some respects more difficult to handle well than is a gun, and therefore an awkward motion, yaw, turns, particularly with a second-rate director layer, often results in inaccurate or a reduced rate of fire. . . . It cannot be too strongly emphasized that volume of accurate fire is the object to be aimed at—the ship which *first* succeeds in hitting hard gets halfway to victory. We know the Germans shoot well, no one doubts that the advantage of early hits is thoroughly appreciated by them, and that they will do their utmost to develop initial superiority of fire by rapidity, which as our guns are more powerful, is their *only* chance of succeeding. . . . It follows, therefore, that our system must be that which, under the condition existing at the time, will enable the highest rate of accurate fire to be developed.³⁴

In February 1915, following the tactical victory of the British battle cruisers under the command of Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty over their German counterparts at Dogger Bank, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the commander of the German battle fleet, was replaced by Admiral Hugo von Pohl. During the first two weeks of March, the combination of signals intelligence and this change in

leadership prompted the Admiralty to warn Jellicoe of a possible German battle fleet sortie.³⁵ In the meanwhile, the Grand Fleet conducted gunnery exercises replicating the conditions of a medium-range fight.³⁶ An exercise of 9 March envisioned an action in which a fleet that “desires to engage at long range” was opposed by one that “desires to close to 11,000 yards or less.” The exercise of 12 March involved a battle in which visibility was assumed to be only ten thousand yards.³⁷ Following these experiments, Jellicoe added a gunnery addendum to the Grand Fleet Battle Orders on 20 March 1915. “At all ranges,” he declared, “the early development of accurate rapid fire is the object to be kept in view.” Jellicoe made clear that he expected gunners to resort to rapid independent fire, a method of shooting that was most effective at medium ranges, as well as rapid

Tabletop war games in the battleship Benbow explored an engagement between the British and German battle fleets at eighteen thousand yards.

salvos. Also, given the likelihood that the poor visibility conditions typical of the North Sea might restrict shooting to medium ranges, he insisted that “ships must be prepared to open rapid fire from

the outset in order to make sure of establishing initial superiority.”³⁸ Jellicoe’s misgivings about director gunnery were also still in evidence in the late spring. On 20 April, Jellicoe discouraged the use of directors improvised because of delays in the supply of factory models “except under conditions when the ordinary method of firing [that is, direct laying, in which each turret’s crew aimed its own guns] cannot be employed.”³⁹ It is, he observed on 27 May, “more difficult to handle a director well than it is to lay a gun.”⁴⁰

British expectations that the Germans would seek a decisive fleet action peaked in April. “In my view,” Fisher wrote to Churchill, the First Lord, on 31 March, “there are many indications—of which the recent cruise of the German Fleet is an example—that under their new Commander-in-Chief we may anticipate a more forward and aggressive policy in the North Sea, and therefore we must be prepared for all eventualities.”⁴¹ In mid-April, the crisis seemed to have arrived. On 15 April, Fisher warned Jellicoe that “VON POHL HAS SOMETHING ON! That is quite certain!”⁴² The next day, Fisher wrote, “Von Pohl is assuredly up to something.”⁴³ The Germans, however, aborted their deployment. “We really thought,” Fisher confided to Jellicoe on 17 April, “the battle would be joined to-day! Everything pointed to it. . . . They had arranged not to return till dawn of [the] 19th or night of [the] 19th, and suddenly a very urgent and immediate order [was] given for the whole Fleet to return home.”⁴⁴ A second scare followed a week later, but again the German fleet withdrew to its base after staying well beyond the reach of Jellicoe’s forces.⁴⁵ These events convinced Fisher that a battle fleet showdown with the Germans was unlikely. There would, he declared to

Jellicoe on 23 April, “NEVER be a battle with the German High Seas Fleet unless von Pohl goes north specially to fight you, *and that he never will!* That’s the situation and you can’t alter it!”⁴⁶

There remained the possibility that luck or good intelligence would enable Jellicoe to intercept the German battle fleet, which might then be engaged at a distance as it attempted to withdraw. As early as 2 April, the Grand Fleet carried out a gunnery exercise in which battleships fired at sixteen thousand yards.⁴⁷ It should be noted, however, that Jellicoe restricted ships whose gun crews had not been fully worked up to methods of firing best suited to a medium-range fight, a decision implying that mastery of these techniques had priority over those needed for effective gunnery at long range.⁴⁸ Gunnery exercises on 6 June were carried out at no more than twelve thousand yards, and perhaps less, with apparently good results.⁴⁹ Jellicoe thus informed Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, on 16 June, “If only we could get our chance to finish off the High Seas Fleet now, I feel we are in the pink of condition. But we must exercise patience.”⁵⁰ In late June, tabletop war games in the battleship *Benbow* explored the nature of an engagement between the British and German battle fleets at eighteen thousand yards, with the former in pursuit of the latter.⁵¹ There are no records of the proceedings, but on 23 June 1915 Jellicoe informed Beatty that the participants had “certainly learned lessons.”⁵² In early August, the Grand Fleet carried out gunnery exercises that involved shooting at seventeen thousand yards for newer dreadnoughts and twelve thousand for the older units, whose main-battery guns were smaller.⁵³ This was followed in early September by an exercise at sea that dealt with the case of a retiring German fleet.⁵⁴

Firing at extended ranges, where the percentage of hits to rounds fired would be low and thus quick decisions would be improbable, meant that pursuit, even if successful, would be protracted. This would give the Germans ample opportunity to launch attacks with their destroyers and possibly even to maneuver in ways that would draw the Grand Fleet into a minefield or submarine ambush.⁵⁵ Arthur James Balfour, Churchill’s successor as First Lord, advised Jellicoe that he was convinced that the problem posed by a German retreat covered by mines and submarines was insoluble. Jellicoe, in his reply of 10 July, did not answer his chief’s concerns directly but did make it clear that he would never advance without a full destroyer screen.⁵⁶

Given his record of caution and recent declaration of prudent conduct in the face of threats from underwater ordnance, Jellicoe must have been surprised and offended by a suggestion from Beatty in early August that the Grand Fleet had focused on the use of heavy guns to the point of denying the powers of the mine and torpedo their due. This provoked a strong response from Jellicoe on 7 August. He insisted that he had been “most fully alive, ever since the war began, to

the extremely important part which mines and submarines are likely to play in the fleet action, if fought where the Germans want it.”⁵⁷ At the same time, Jellicoe categorically rejected the charge that the Grand Fleet was “obsessed with the idea . . . that we place reliance in our guns alone,” insisting that indeed some members of his command placed “too little reliance on the gun.”⁵⁸ Given the German numerical superiority in destroyers, Jellicoe believed he had no choice but to deploy his own flotilla defensively, which meant that decisive victory, if it was to be had at all, would have to be produced by the action of heavy gunnery. Beatty, in his reply to what he regarded as a rebuke for perceived defeatism, conceded on 12 August that the Grand Fleet’s gunnery advantage was “at present . . . our only asset” and endorsed the proposition that “decisive victory is the only thing to aim at.”⁵⁹

Looking to effective gunnery as the main source of decisive victory, however, raised difficult issues. In September 1915, Frederic Dreyer, the captain of a battleship in the Second Battle Squadron and Jellicoe’s chief gunnery adviser, observed that the “experience of the War must have shown the Germans that they have little or no hope in clear weather of getting their Battle Line to so close a range as 8,800 to 6,000 yards from the Grand Fleet.” Dreyer argued that British rangefinders and associated fire control equipment could in clear weather produce “excellent results” at up to fifteen thousand yards and “good results” from fifteen to seventeen thousand yards.⁶⁰ But poor weather conditions in the North Sea limited visibility more often than not, and in any case the rate of hitting from above ten thousand yards was far less, even under ideal conditions, than it was at seven to nine thousand. This meant that British ships would require a much longer time to inflict heavy damage while steaming on a straight course than in a medium-range engagement, which would expose them to torpedoes fired by German battleships or destroyers. German torpedoes at their high-speed setting had a maximum range of roughly ten thousand yards. Dreyer thus argued that the British battle line should maintain a distance of 13,500 yards from German battleships and accompanying destroyers, which was far enough to avoid torpedoes from the former and allow defensive action by British cruisers and destroyers against the latter. Should the British screening units fail to intercept the attacking German flotilla, Dreyer insisted that the Grand Fleet “*must* turn away . . . even if this means losing the High Sea [*sic*] Fleet (better than losing the Grand Fleet).” Dreyer concluded, “If we deployed at 18,000 yards in very clear weather we should, with our superior Fleet speed, be able to close in to 13,500 yards with all guns bearing . . . —before Fire is ordered to be opened at about 15,000 yards— unless the Germans open fire before we arrive at that range.”⁶¹

Dreyer’s counsel, which by his own admission represented a compromise between countering the torpedo threat and meeting the requirements of gunnery,

offered little hope of decisive results. Commander Roger Backhouse, a member of Jellicoe's staff, believed, on one hand, that 13,500 yards was too low to ensure security against German destroyers, while on the other hand, he was convinced that assuming the German flotilla threat could be neutralized the fighting range should be from ten to twelve thousand yards. This, he argued, would allow decisive results to be obtained in good time.⁶² Jellicoe, for his part, had no alternative but to accept action that would most likely have to take place at ranges considerably greater than those at which his main batteries could hit consistently. Although the documentary record is sparse for the fall of 1915, it appears that gunnery exercises in October and later were for the most part carried out at ranges above fifteen thousand yards.⁶³ By this time, long-range hitting capability had been greatly improved by the fitting of directors in the majority of the dreadnought battleships.⁶⁴ That being said, continued belief in the possibility of a medium-range engagement seems to have prompted a test of the Grand Fleet's capacity to shoot accurately with methods of fire control that facilitated high rates of shooting. This exercise, which took place in late December, was apparently reassuring.⁶⁵

The general revised edition of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders of December 1915 established rules of engagement that balanced the views of both Dreyer and Backhouse. "In weather of good visibility," Jellicoe maintained, "the range should be between 15,000 and 10,000 yards; the later being reached as the enemy's fire is overcome; in the *early* stages of action I do not desire to close the range much inside 14,000 yards."⁶⁶ The torpedo threat was to be avoided by keeping the range long. "The torpedo menace," Jellicoe warned,

must always be borne in mind. . . . Until the enemy is beaten by gunfire it is not my intention to risk attack from his torpedoes, although [it] is always possible that if we were inferior in strength on meeting it might become necessary to close sufficiently to attack by torpedoes. Such a movement would, however, be ordered by me, and generally speaking it is to be understood that my intention is to keep outside torpedo range of the enemy's battle line.⁶⁷

Jellicoe made it clear, as he had in his instructions of August 1914, that effective long-range shooting was important in order to disrupt German deployment for a medium-range engagement.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, Jellicoe added to the orders a section declaring that circumstances could arise in which the leading squadron would be "gradually closing with a view to obtaining decisive results with gunfire and for the purpose of firing their torpedoes, but not being followed to that closer range by our center or rear."⁶⁹ Here again Jellicoe may have been thinking specifically of the Second Battle Squadron, at this date still the only squadron of the Grand Fleet made up completely of ships with heavier main batteries

and, with one exception, the latest fire control equipment (see table and note 32), and which would, as noted, be deployed in the lead at the battle of Jutland in 1916.

It would thus appear that by late 1915 Jellicoe had decided to fight a long-range engagement to disrupt German intentions of fighting at medium range with both their battleships and flotillas, but also under the right conditions to resort to a medium-range fight with his best squadron to achieve a decisive victory. The fact that a medium-range battle was still considered a serious possibility would explain why the revised edition of the Royal Navy's *Manual of Gunnery*, which was released in January 1916, covered fire control methods and gunlaying practices that were appropriate to a medium-range as well as

The British dreadnoughts coming into service from 1912 onward could place more than ten times the weight of projectile on target than earlier dreadnoughts.

long-range battle.⁷⁰ Also, Jellicoe at this point probably had reasons to believe that the German battle fleet might seek action in the near future. The Germans' abandonment of their unrestricted subma-

rine campaign against merchant shipping in September 1915, after the objection of neutral powers, most likely prompted some expectation of compensatory aggressive action by the surface fleet. The onset of the second winter of the war may also, as in the year before, have given rise to the belief that the Germans would exploit bad weather and poor visibility to conduct battle fleet operations. Finally, British intelligence may have learned of the bitter dissent in Germany between proponents of action and advocates of caution in the government and fleet.⁷¹

By the spring of 1916, the inactivity of the German battle fleet through the very season that in theory most favored the success of an inferior force had at last convinced the leaders of the Grand Fleet that decisive battle was unobtainable. Queried by Jellicoe on the issue, Beatty replied on 14 April 1916, "I think the German Fleet will come out *only* on its own initiative when the right time comes," by which he meant a sortie to engage an inferior British force. "I am firmly convinced," Beatty added, "that under no circumstances could we ever by taking the initiative induce them to commit themselves to an action which in any way could be considered decisive."⁷² Two days before, Jellicoe had informed Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, that all the important strategic benefits of destroying the German battle fleet were being achieved by its confinement to harbor. For this reason, Jellicoe argued, "it is not, in my opinion, wise to risk unduly the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet in an attempt to hasten the end of the High Seas Fleet, particularly if the risks come, not from the High Seas Fleet itself, but from such attributes as mines and submarines."⁷³ The balance of his letter was devoted to examining the chances of attacking the German battle fleet in its

harbors or home waters with aircraft and mines. The prospects for achieving major success with such operations, Jellicoe concluded, were not good.⁷⁴

The belief that the Germans would sooner or later seek a decisive engagement at medium range largely determined the character of British tactical thinking about a battle fleet action in the North Sea during the first twenty months of the war. British tactical preparation during this period went through four stages. From August to December 1914, the Grand Fleet lacked the material means for the decisive victory at medium range envisioned by the clandestine preempters prior to hostilities. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commander in chief of the Grand Fleet and the leader of the clandestine preempters, was thus compelled to adopt a cautious battle plan based upon fighting at long range, which made a decisive action in the near term unlikely. From January to May 1915 the Grand Fleet's ability to fight the medium-range action called for by the clandestine preempters before the war was improved significantly by the commissioning of new battleships, reduced losses from mechanical defects, modernization of older units, and destroyer reinforcements. During this time, Jellicoe welcomed the prospect of a head-to-head encounter with the German battle fleet, and he was probably prepared to commit his command to a medium-range battle in order to achieve a decisive victory. German refusal to challenge British control of the North Sea with their battle fleet, however, forced Jellicoe to modify his tactical planning. From June through October 1915 the Grand Fleet conducted a series of gunnery and tactical experiments to explore the possibilities of fighting a long-range action against a German opponent who was unwilling to fight at medium range, while simultaneously maintaining the capacity to fight a medium-range battle in the event of a German change of heart or a meeting engagement in poor visibility. From November 1915 to April 1916, the Grand Fleet was more or less prepared to fight either a medium-range or a long-range engagement depending on circumstances, adopting what was to a degree the approach of the agnostic opportunists.

Six assessments can be made on the basis of the foregoing analytical summary. First, British tactical preparations before and during the war were driven by the need to address the threat posed by a specific enemy whose tactical intentions were highly dangerous. Second, during the war, British tactical practice altered when the German navy did not behave as expected, which is to say that in spite of the lack of a major battle, British tactical thought was dynamic, not static. Third, the development and maintenance of the capability to outfight the German battle fleet at medium range was the primary objective of British tactical preparation up to the end of 1915, and probably through the spring of 1916; meeting the requirements of a long-range action took second place, which may

explain the defects in British gunnery at long range eventually exposed by the battle of Jutland. Fourth, the response of the clandestine preempters to the threat posed by a German fleet determined to fight a medium-range engagement was well advised, because the German navy's operational leadership might have decided to heed Tirpitz's call for a naval offensive, in which case a British battle fleet unprepared to fight at medium range could have been roughly handled, if not defeated. Fifth, the fact that the British battle fleet was ill prepared to fight a medium-range action in the first five months of the war suggests that Tirpitz's argument for the aggressive deployment of the German battle fleet had more in its favor than has previously been supposed. Sixth and finally, given the effort invested in developing and maintaining the ability to fight effectively at medium range, it seems likely that had the opportunity presented itself at the battle of Jutland, Jellicoe would have reached for decisive victory through a medium-range fight.

The story of Britain's naval "agnostic opportunists" and "clandestine preempters" in the early twentieth century illustrates what might be described as the fundamental dilemma of operational planning. On the one hand, belief that future hostilities will pose a range of different circumstances can promote preparation of the armed forces for a diverse set of actions, with the drawback that the consequent division of effort with respect to both equipment and training will preclude the achievement of levels of tactical proficiency needed to achieve decisive victory. On the other, the conviction that the future is predictable can lead to the preparation of the armed forces to fight one kind of engagement, but at the risk that such a course will produce serious or even critical weaknesses should events transpire differently than had been anticipated. Choice of operational approach, in other words, is a matter of having to consider the advantages and drawbacks of two problematical alternatives. This policy quandary might be expressed in terms of the opposition of two well-known maxims, Jomini's insistence upon concentration of force as the basis of all military success, and Voltaire's observation that "the best is the enemy of the good."

NOTES

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2. For the most recent serious consideration of naval action in the North Sea during the first six months of the war, see James Goldrick, *The King's Ships Were at Sea: The War in the North Sea August 1914–February 1915* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984).
3. Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919*, 5 vols. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961–70), vol. 1, pp. 395–404.
4. K. G. B. Dewar, *The Navy from Within* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), pp. 122–23, 133–34, 153; Lord Chatfield, *The Navy and Defence: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield* (London: William Heinemann, 1942), p. 114; and Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 6 vols. (New York: Scribner's, 1923–31), vol. 3, p. 131.
5. See Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "The Quest for Reach: The Development of Long-Range Naval Gunnery in the Royal Navy, 1901–1912," in *Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Military History Symposium of the United States Air Force*, ed. Stephen Chiabotti (Chicago: Imprint, 1996), pp. 49–96, and "A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912–1916," *Journal of Military History* 67 (January 2003), pp. 85–136.
6. Memorandum HF 0235, "Remarks on the Conduct of a Fleet in Action, Based on the Experience Gained in the Maneuvers and Exercises of the Home Fleets during the Year 1913," 5 December 1913; and Memorandum HF 03, "Conduct of a Fleet in Action. Commander-in-Chiefs Instructions," 14 March 1914; both T25346-T25410, Backhouse Papers, Naval Library, Ministry of Defence.
7. Nicholas A. Lambert, "'Our Bloody Ships' or 'Our Bloody System'? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916," *Journal of Military History* 62 (January 1998), pp. 32–33.
8. G. A. Callaghan, "Remarks on Rangefinder Control," *Home Fleets General Orders No. 14*, 5 November 1913, DRAX 1/9, Drax Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, U.K.
9. Nicholas A. Lambert, *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 287–88.
10. See Sumida, "Matter of Timing," p. 100, note 42; Patrick J. Kelly, "Strategy, Tactics, and Turf Wars: Tirpitz and the Oberkommando der Marine, 1892–1895," *Journal of Military History* 66 (October 2002), p. 1048.
11. Arthur Hungerford Pollen, "Of War and the Rate of Change," December 1910–January 1911, in *The Pollen Papers: The Privately Circulated Printed Works of Arthur Hungerford Pollen, 1901–1916*, ed. Jon Tetsuro Sumida (London: Navy Records Society, 1984), pp. 281–82, 286–87.
12. See, for example, J. R. Jellicoe, "Type of Gun to Be Adopted for the Armoured Vessels of the 1907–08 Programme. Whether a 13.5" Gun or a 12" Triple Gun Turret," 21 June 1906, Ship's Cover vol. 223 (HMS *Bellerophon*), National Maritime Museum, Woolwich.
13. See Sumida, "Matter of Timing."
14. "Rangefinder Mountings," CP 19513/14, 30 July 1914; and "Table Shewing Number of Rangefinder Operators Who Will Be Required for the Fleet in the Near Future," 8 November 1913; both in *Important Questions Dealt with by D.N.O.; Copies, Precise, &c.; Vol. III: 1914*, Naval Library, Ministry of Defence.
15. W. W. Fisher, "Two Fleets in Single Line Ahead Engaged on Opposite Course," n.d.; [Probably Cdr. Roger Backhouse], "Action on Opposite Courses," n.d.; G. A. Callaghan, "Memorandum: Tactics of Two Fleets Engaged on Opposite Courses," 20 April 1914; all Backhouse Papers.
16. A. Temple Patterson, ed., *The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of Scapa*, 2 vols. (London: Navy Records Society, 1966–69), vol. 1, pp. 41–42.
17. Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 39.
18. Adm. Sir John Fisher, Jellicoe's patron, warned him not to expose his fleet to German flotilla attacks, for which see Fisher to Jellicoe, 29 August 1914, in *Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone*, ed. Arthur J. Marder, 3 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952–59), vol. 3, p. 56.
19. "Addendum No. 5" [n.d. but September 1914], *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, p. 63.

20. Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 30 October 1914, *ibid.*, p. 76.
21. Halpern, *Naval History of World War I*, p. 38. For the up-to-date character of the gun mountings of at least one of the foreign battle-ships taken over by the Royal Navy in 1914, see Vickers Limited, Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., Ltd., *Specification of Armament for a First-Class Battleship for the Imperial Ottoman Government*, n.d., p. 34, Naval Library, Ministry of Defence, JA 353.
22. Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 4 December 1914, *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, p. 102.
23. Sir Julian S. Corbett and Sir Henry S. Newbolt, *Naval Operations*, 5 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920–31), vol. 2, p. 4. See also Fisher to Jellicoe, 17 November 1914; Jellicoe to Fisher, 2 December 1914; Fisher to Vice Adm. Sir David Beatty, 7 December 1914; Fisher to Jellicoe, 21 January 1915; Fisher to Jellicoe, 8 March 1915; all *Fear God and Dread Nought*, ed. Marder, vol. 3, pp. 74, 85–86, 89–90, 142, 163, respectively.
24. Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet 1914–16: Its Creation, Development and Work* (London: Cassell, 1919), p. 188.
25. See Sumida, “Matter of Timing,” p. 116.
26. Fisher to Winston Churchill, 20 January 1915, *Fear God and Dread Nought*, ed. Marder, vol. 3, pp. 137–38; and Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, p. 396.
27. Marder, ed., *Fear God and Dread Nought*, vol. 3, p. 129.
28. Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, p. 393; and see Dreyer remarks in September 1915 below.
29. Great Britain, Admiralty, Intelligence Department, *German Tactical Orders*, January 1915, pp. 5–8, ADM 137/17, Public Record Office, Kew.
30. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, vol. 3, rev. ed., p. 119 note 33.
31. See note 15.
32. Of the eight ships in the Second Battle Squadron, four were equipped with the Argo Clock Mark IV. This machine was more effective under conditions of high and changing change-of-range rates than the computing devices in the Dreyer tables that were standard in most of the battle fleet. Three of the four remaining ships were fitted with the better of the two main forms of computing mechanisms to be found in Dreyer tables. For the two systems compared, see Sumida, “Quest for Reach,” pp. 69–72.
33. For director firing and other gunnery issues, see Sumida, “Matter of Timing,” pp. 134–46.
34. “Remarks on the Use of Director Firing from the Main Armament,” 18 January 1915, ADM 137/199S, Public Record Office, Kew. I am indebted to Dr. Nicholas Lambert for this reference.
35. Fisher to Jellicoe, 8 March 1915; Fisher to Jellicoe, 16 March 1915; Fisher to Jellicoe, 17 March 1915; all *Fear God and Dread Nought*, ed. Marder, vol. 3, pp. 163, 166.
36. Documentary information on gunnery exercises prior to the battle of Jutland is sparse, for which see Great Britain, Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division, *Extract of Gunnery Practices in Grand Fleet, 1914 to 1918: Battleships and Battle Cruisers*, March 1922, p. 2, ADM 137/4822, Public Record Office, Kew. That being said, probably a great deal of gunnery practice, if not the majority, was devoted to medium-range firing—that is, shooting at ten thousand yards or less. Practice at longer ranges in 1914 appears to have been opportunistic and, in two out of the three recorded cases, at stationary targets, for which see Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, pp. 147–48, 156, 158, and 182, and Admiral Sir Frederic C. Dreyer, *The Sea Heritage: A Study of Maritime Warfare* (London: Museum, 1955), pp. 89, 90, and 91. According to Jellicoe, practice at ranges above ten thousand yards did not begin in earnest until the late summer of 1915, for which see Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, p. 65.
37. Memorandum HF 0037/1, 6 March 1915, and HF 0037/2 Memorandum “Exercise C,” 12 March 1915, both Backhouse Papers.
38. Gunnery Addendum, 20 March 1915, in Naval Staff, T. and S.D. Division, *Grand Fleet Battle Orders*, vol. 1, *August 1914 to May 31st 1916*, p. 96, Naval Library, Admiralty, London.
39. “Section ‘B.’ Grand Fleet Orders. 1915,” April–September 1915, p. 33, ADM 137/4051, Public Record Office, Kew.
40. “Section ‘B.’ Grand Fleet Orders,” p. 47.
41. Marder, ed., *Fear God and Dread Nought*, vol. 3, p. 179.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 196 [uppercase in the original].
43. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
45. Fisher to Jellicoe, 21 and 23 April 1915, *Fear God and Dread Nought*, ed. Marder, vol. 3, pp. 199, 200, respectively.
46. Marder, ed., *Fear God and Dread Nought*, vol. 3, p. 200 [uppercase and italics in the original].
47. Memorandum HF 0034/1, "Grand Fleet Firings—5th April 1915," 2 April 1915, Backhouse Papers.
48. Jellicoe specifically prohibited certain ships from using director fire, prescribing instead the "gunlayers system"—that is, direct laying, which allowed faster shooting.
49. Memorandum HF 0037/7, "Enclosure No. 1," in "Orders for Full Calibre Day Firing," 6 June 1915, Backhouse Papers.
50. Jellicoe to Adm. Sir Henry Jackson, 16 June 1915, *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, p. 167.
51. Memorandum HF 0037/19, 10 July 1915, "War Game Carried Out on *Benbow* on 22 and 23 June 1915," ADM 137/2020, Public Record Office, Kew.
52. Jellicoe to Beatty, 23 June 1915, *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, p. 168.
53. Memorandum HF 44/59, "Orders for Target Practice from Cromarty, Monday, 2nd August," 30 July 1915, Backhouse Papers; and Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, pp. 236–37.
54. Memorandum HF 0011/17, 31 August 1915, Backhouse Papers; and Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, p. 245.
55. For the British fear that Zeppelin reconnaissance would enable the Germans to set up such attacks, see Beatty to Jellicoe, 12 August 1915, in *The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty*, ed. B. McL. Ranft, 2 vols. (Aldershot, U.K.: Scholar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1989–93), vol. 1, pp. 279–80.
56. Jellicoe to Balfour, 10 July 1915, *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, p. 172.
57. Jellicoe to Beatty, 7 August 1915, *ibid.*, p. 175.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
59. Beatty to Jellicoe, 12 August 1915, *Beatty Papers*, ed. Ranft, vol. 1, p. 281.
60. Dreyer was being more than optimistic, for which see Lt. J. W. Rivett-Carnac (one of Dreyer's subordinates in the battleship *Orion*), "Notes on Rangefinders and Their Operators in H.M. Ships of the Grand Fleet," 29 March 1915, ADM 137/199S [I am indebted to Dr. Nicholas Lambert for this reference], and "Report of Proceedings by Commander Richard T. Down, R.N. during visit to Washington—6th May to 27th June," 27 June 1917, pp. 5–6, ADM 137/1621, Public Record Office, Kew.
61. Capt. Frederic Dreyer, "A Few Notes on the Determination of the Most Advantageous Range at Which the Grand Fleet Should Engage the High Seas Fleet" [n.d. but September 1915, for which see Roger Backhouse response dated 15 September 1915], Jellicoe Papers, Additional Manuscripts 49012, British Museum, London [italics in the original].
62. Roger Backhouse minute, 14 September 1915, Jellicoe Papers, Additional Manuscripts 49012, British Museum, London.
63. Memorandum HF 44/88, "Orders for Full Calibre Target Practice from Cromarty, Tuesday, 5th October, 1915," 29 September 1915, Backhouse Papers; and Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, pp. 65, 252–63.
64. In August 1914, eight dreadnought battleships had been fitted with directors, as opposed to nineteen in December 1915, for which see Great Britain, Admiralty, Technical History Section, *Fire Control in H.M. Ships*, December 1919, pp. 10–11, Naval Library, Ministry of Defence.
65. Memorandum HF 44/134, "Full Calibre Target Practice in the Moray Firth, Monday, 20th December, 1915," 14 December 1915, ADM 137/2020, Public Record Office, Kew; Jellicoe to Beatty, 22 December 1915, *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, pp. 190–91; Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, pp. 262–63; and *Extract of Gunnery Practices in Grand Fleet*, p. 2. Jellicoe's remarks in his memoirs are probably misleading, and they should be compared with the referenced documents and correspondence.
66. Great Britain, Admiralty, Naval Staff, T. and S.D. Division, *Grand Fleet Battle Orders*, vol.

1, *August 1914–May 31st 1916*, p. 294, ADM 116/341, Public Record Office, Kew [emphasis original].

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid. Jellicoe might even have ordered a deployment that brought the center and rear of the Grand Fleet within torpedo range, for which see Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, p. 407.

70. Great Britain, Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, *Manual of Gunnery (Volume III) for His*

Majesty's Fleet, 1915, January 1916, Naval Library, Ministry of Defence.

71. Halpern, *Naval History of World War I*, pp. 302–303.

72. Ranft, ed., *Beatty Papers*, vol. 1., p. 303 [italics in the original]; also Patterson, ed., *Jellicoe Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 235–56.

73. Jellicoe to Jackson, 12 April 1916, *Jellicoe Papers*, ed. Patterson, vol. 1, p. 232.

74. Jellicoe to Jackson, 12 April 1916, *ibid.*, pp. 232–34.

REVIEW ESSAY

THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGY

William C. Martel

Ikenberry, G. John, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. *Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century: Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security (plus seven Working Group Reports)*. Princeton, N.J.: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 27 September 2006. 96pp. Available at www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report.html

The Princeton Project on National Security describes itself as a “three-year, bipartisan initiative to develop a sustainable and effective national security strategy for the United States of America.” Consisting of the final report and seven working group reports (on Grand Strategic Choices, State Security and Trans-

national Threats, Economics and National Security, Reconstruction and Development, Anti-Americanism, Relative Threat Assessment, and Foreign Infrastructure and Global Institutions), this study, like so many others, wrestles with the great unresolved problem that plagues contemporary policy makers and scholars: What is the central organizing principle behind American national security policy?

Declaring that their aim was to “write a collective ‘X article’” (a reference to George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947), the codirectors of the Princeton Project sought to “do together what no one person in our highly specialized and rapidly changing world

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could hope to do alone.” The central arguments of this study fall into several predictable categories. Beginning with the premise that the world lacks a “single organizing principle for foreign policy” and seeking to remedy this deficiency by bringing order to the chaos surrounding grand strategy, the project stipulates that the “basic objective of U.S. strategy” is to “protect the American people and the American way of life.” It describes “three more specific aims” of American strategy as a “secure homeland,” “healthy global economy,” and “benign international environment.”

The study goes on to define “six basic criteria” that must be implemented. This strategy must be “multidimensional,” “integrated,” “interest-based rather than threat-based,” “grounded in hope rather than fear,” “pursued inside-out,” and “adapted to the information age.” What emerges from this framework is the commonsensical and unremarkable conclusion about the fundamental principle of American foreign policy—that “America must stand for, seek, and secure a world of liberty under law,” because a world inhabited by “mature liberal democracies” will make the American people “safer, richer, and healthier.” To implement “liberty under law,” the project proposes three broad sets of policies.

First, governments must be brought up to PAR (acronym for “popular, accountable, and rights-regarding governments”). Reaffirming that “democracy is the best instrument that humans have devised for ensuring individual liberty,” U.S. strategy must foster the “preconditions” necessary for successful liberal democracies, and those conditions go “far beyond” merely holding elections.

Second, a liberal order must be built that, resting on a system of international institutions, diminishes the ability of one state to wield unilaterally the power that breeds “resentment, fear, and resistance.” The ability to build this liberal order depends on establishing a global “concert of democracies” that will “institutionalize and ratify the ‘democratic peace.’”

Third, the United States, and presumably the self-selected members of the concert of democracies, must rethink the role of force in international politics. Beyond the sensible argument that “liberty and law must be backed up by force,” the study holds that the United States must retreat from the principle of military primacy, while building the collective military might of the liberal democracies. If successful, the United States can avoid the destabilizing consequences that flowed from great-power competition during the Cold War. In practical terms, the study recommends that policy makers and scholars update the doctrine of deterrence and “develop new guidelines on the preventive use of force against terrorists and extreme states.”

The analytical framework developed in *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* concludes with a discussion of “major threats and challenges,” which fall into the usual categories of the Middle East, global terror networks, the proliferation and

transfer of nuclear weapons, the rise of China and order in East Asia, global pandemics, sources of energy, and a protective infrastructure.

In addition to the final report, several of the working group reports also merit examination. The report of the working group on grand strategic choices, cochaired by Francis Fukuyama of Johns Hopkins University and G. John Ikenberry of Princeton, focuses on the eminently worthy question: "Toward what ends should America use its power, invest its resources, and concert its energies?" Among its several key findings are that "East Asia is likely to pose the greatest challenges to the United States"; that Washington needs to "move toward an Asia-centric grand strategy"; and that the "ongoing war in Iraq" is the "main stumbling block" toward a strategic shift in American strategy. If these conclusions appear commonplace, so too are some of the report's recommendations—such as that the United States "ought to be very careful" about the preemptive and preventive use of force, "institutions are the tools of American power [and] we must relearn the benefits of multilateralism," and the war on terrorism is a "global counterinsurgency" rather than a "clash of civilizations." The argument that the United States should rebuild a "series of new grand bargains" with other democracies, however, is worthy of deeper consideration.

The report of the working group on anti-Americanism, cochaired by Tod Lindberg of the Hoover Institution and Suzanne Nossel of the Security and Peace Institute, examines the rise of anti-Americanism and its effects on American policy. It discusses the varieties of anti-Americanism, its effects and implications for violence and its economic and political impacts, responses to anti-Americanism, and recommendations for dealing with the problem. Not a systematic analysis of global public opinion, this report essentially restates data collected by the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys since the late 1990s. Its entirely predictable conclusion is that "many forms of anti-Americanism may be addressed only through changes in substantive U.S. policies." However, since this analysis concludes that it is "difficult to measure how much tangible friction anti-Americanism" creates for U.S. foreign policy, its broad observations are hardly reassuring unless we know whether anti-Americanism is a transient phenomenon or simply a reaction to Washington's current policies toward Iraq and in waging the global war on terror.

By far the most analytical and interesting report is that on economics and national security, cochaired by Adam Posen of the Institute for International Economics and Daniel K. Tarullo of Georgetown University. Against the backdrop of the relative economic influence of Asian states whose power is "shifting gradually but steadily," the report proposes that the United States integrate economic policy into national security policy in its governmental and interagency processes, arguing that the importance of integrating these policies is "self-evident."

It discusses the reasons for integration and examines impediments and challenges to the United States in formulating and implementing global economic policy. Also outlined are suggestions for strengthening linkages between economic and national security policies. Fundamentally, the report suggests that “traditional foreign policy thinking [about economics as a tool of statecraft] must change” because the influence of economics in national security is on the ascent.

Outlined are four “generally valid assumptions”: “globalization of the economy increases both U.S. capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities”; Washington’s “ability to restrict commerce and technology transfer to other countries is more limited”; “international economic development and integration should enhance U.S. national security”; and “U.S. economic policy mistakes” affect national security. Also examined are five “mistaken or misleading assumptions” about economics and national security: American security is “threatened by relatively faster economic growth in other parts of the world”; “economic development policies abroad” enhance U.S. security; globalization has made the U.S. economy “vulnerable to the fate, practices, and whims of other countries”; as has been prosaically observed, “economic trends and capabilities are changing rapidly”; and as has been more trenchantly noted, economic globalization makes “economic sanctions and similar measures applied by the United States . . . more effective.” As the study concludes, “it is more accurate to say that a globalized economy magnified the effects of our own policies, positive and negative.”

Each of these developments has had profound consequences for national security. One is that U.S. interagency processes fail to integrate economic policy into the “guiding principles” that policy makers should use to balance properly economic and traditional security interests. Arguing that policy makers have generally dismissed economic policy as a “lower” form of security policy, this report identifies the National Economic Council as precisely the type of “institutional bridge” needed to integrate economics and foreign policy. This report also outlines significant economic problems facing the United States, notably budget deficits, low personal savings rate, its status as the world’s largest debtor nation, and Washington’s dependence on global markets for investing in the United States and thereby supporting its spending habits. All these trends mask the dangerous possibility that the ability of the United States to harness its economic power in pursuit of global “goods” is in decline. In addition, highlighted by China’s gradual ascent into the ranks of the most powerful states, the report examines how China’s growth as a potential global superpower could have significant implications for U.S. policies. In broad terms, it argues that Washington must carefully redefine how it uses economic power to support a broad global agenda.

All in all, *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* offers a comprehensive analysis of how to organize American thinking in the aftermath of the Cold War. The architects of this study are to be commended for the breadth and depth of their systematic efforts to examine the principal problems in global politics. That said, policy makers and scholars must consider several criticisms as they contemplate whether this study provides the intellectual foundations for a fundamental realignment of U.S. national security policy.

The study elevates the idea of promoting liberal democracies and organizing them into a “concert of democracies” as the paramount objective of American strategy. However, this emphasis on democracy, liberty, and the rule of law is a long-standing principle in American strategy. The defeat of totalitarian regimes in World War II, the Marshall Plan, NATO and various other alliances, and the enduring legacy of promoting and supporting democracies are as central to American foreign policy as any principle in the history of the republic. Thus, the Princeton Project’s proposal that the pursuit of liberty under law establishes a “grand strategy for making America more secure” merely reaffirms a deeply enshrined precept in this society’s core beliefs about foreign policy, but does not represent a new organizing principle for U.S. strategy or a conceptual breakthrough.

A problem with the Princeton Project’s emphasis on liberty under law and its corollary, liberal democracy, is its decidedly imperial overtones, implying the need to exercise imperial oversight for countries that have yet to “make the grade” to democracy. Two prominent examples: the United States must bring “governments up to PAR,” and Washington’s role is critical because “without U.S. leadership and determination, the best we can hope for is a series of half measures.” While this is not to suggest that U.S. strategy should avoid serious commitments and responsibilities in its efforts to promote freedom and liberty, policy makers and scholars are prudent to avoid any language or intonations that others could interpret as evidence of an imperial design in American foreign policy. Such undercurrents only erode support for American policies.

The section on the role of force appears determined to strike out in new directions. However, most of its thinking is derived from classic approaches to strategic analysis. Beginning with the unremarkable proposition that “liberty and law must be backed up by force,” this study proposes that the United States “should work to sustain the military predominance of liberal democracies” in order to “prevent a return to great power security competition.” But is it consistent, much less prudent, as the study seems to imply, for the United States to maintain a “high level of U.S. defense spending” while shifting decisions about military intervention in this “cooperative rules-based order” to the judgment of such liberal democracies as, say, France?

In its analysis of the role of force, the study's conclusion that "deterrence is out of fashion" rests on the truisms that bipolar competition between nuclear-armed superpowers is no longer the central organizing principle of deterrence and that the intersection of such terrorist organizations as al-Qa'ida and nuclear weapons is the stuff of which international catastrophes are made. It is confusing, however, when the study declares that deterrence is no longer fashionable and then asserts quite reasonably that "the United States must ensure that our deterrent remains credible." Which principle is true? Either deterrence is out of fashion or deterrent forces must remain credible. The study's analysis of the conditions that ought to govern the use of force—last resort, "overwhelming confidence in the intelligence and in the prospects for success," the ability to "deal adequately with the aftermath," and "approval from the U.N. Security Council" or "broadly representative multilateral body, such as NATO" (all transparent references to the 2003 invasion of Iraq)—is neither innovative nor terribly illuminating.

Indeed, the discussion on military force draws so heavily from present American difficulties in Iraq that its conclusions on defense planning seem more like generalities or mere clichés than serious analytical propositions. One exception, however, is the section that discusses the "preventive and preemptive uses of force." This argument is thought provoking, because it means that policy makers should understand the differences between using preventive force against terrorists and using it against states.

This work is notable for the panoply of problems addressed and its proposed range of solutions. Sometimes there is so much detail (almost at an engineering level, in contrast with Kennan's far simpler and more elegant style) that the reader is easily distracted. Since the study virtually leaves no problem in contemporary international politics untouched, one wonders if such a broad focus weakens the overall impact of its analysis. On the editorial level, the profusion of clever phrases in the study, such as "bringing government up to PAR," is unnecessary and distracting.

To understand to what extent *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* succeeds in developing an intellectual architecture for American national security policy, let us consider its strengths and weaknesses. There are several notable strengths.

The study tackles what virtually all scholars, strategists, and policy makers see as the central intellectual challenge created by the current strategic vacuum. Simply put, there is no more important problem to be addressed by the American national security and foreign policy communities than establishing the organizing principles of American foreign and national security policies. But perhaps of greater analytical importance, the Princeton Project elevates one strategic principle above all others in the conduct of foreign policy. That is, it argues, to the virtual exclusion of competing principles, that the unifying purpose

of American policy is to promote democracy, liberty, and a shared sense of multilateralism and cooperation. This precept correctly defines, to my mind, the central organizing principle on which Washington ought to base its policies for dealing with the rest of the world. The study's emphasis on multilateralism and cooperation is consistent with well established, if atrophied, principles in international politics. Its examination of this critical problem is, even by the standards of such studies, comprehensive and detailed. The study's final report is brimming with positive principles, suggestions, and policies for redefining the core concepts in U.S. national security, reorganizing the institutions and processes that govern statecraft, and ensuring their effective implementation.

As to weaknesses, although the project's authors planned to write a historically transcendent and innovative study, the work often borders on a pretentious and excessively self-conscious tone. The problem is that studies become historically significant more often by accident than by deliberate intent to write a "monumental" document. That is, it is preferable to write the study that helps to define American strategy than to declare one's intention to do so. Frankly, the argument is unconvincing, as the study states, that the world is too complex for one individual to bring order to strategy. This is, of course, the nature of conventional thinking until someone, in fact, fills the intellectual void.

One is struck, for instance, by George Kennan's modest and elegantly written article (only seven thousand words), which established in analytically concise terms the basis for the Cold War policy of containment. His aim was simply to understand and effectively counter "official Soviet conduct." The resulting policy of containment was predicated on the "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Implicit was the principle that the struggle with the Soviet Union ultimately threatened the survival of the United States. By contrast, the challenges in the current international order, while significant, hardly put at risk the *survival* of the United States, unless one concludes that al-Qa'ida's as yet unfulfilled desire to acquire nuclear weapons poses an existential threat to the United States. Since *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* deals with a world where challenges reside more on the managerial than the existential side of the ledger, the problem is how best to manage American power and responsibilities, not steeling the nation's resolve to contain a military superpower bent upon our destruction.

This study's suggested framework for American strategy, which it elevates above other approaches in grand strategy, promotes democracy and "liberty under law." But American strategy, at least since the end of World War II and arguably throughout the twentieth century, has been entirely and thoroughly consistent with the broad historical architecture of promoting democratic values. As noted earlier, many instruments of American policy consciously and

explicitly promoted the development of an international order based on liberty and freedom. To cite one prominent example, the Atlantic Charter, signed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 14 August 1941, declared that war was the only choice if the principles of democracy, freedom, and self-determination were to be defended (see the full text at www.politicalresource.net/atlantic_charter.html).

More recently, President George W. Bush's second inaugural address reaffirmed the nation's fundamental declarative policy as one of promoting liberty and freedom (which the study does not mention). On 20 January 2005, Bush declared that since the "survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands . . . it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture." It is permissible to debate the finer points of its implementation, but how much more clearly could the principle of promoting liberty and freedom be stated?

The Princeton Project argues that "the United States lacks a clear statement of national security principles with broad bipartisan support" for governing its behavior and policies. We can debate whether the United States needs new strategic principles and whether partisanship weakens the nation's foreign policy, but it is difficult to defend the proposition that liberty and freedom constitute a new strategy for the United States. In fact, the Bush administration's decision to promote liberty and freedom as a declaratory policy is a counterpoint to the argument that promoting liberty is somehow novel. The study could be interpreted to mean that the United States should rededicate its foreign policy to liberty and freedom; analytically, however, this is a bit of a stretch.

This study relies unnecessarily on rhetorical flourishes to imply that current U.S. policies are misguided and misdirected. Its authors can be forgiven for harboring this sentiment. From the occupation of Iraq, the global war on terrorism, and general discontent with American policies globally (drawing on the analysis presented in the working group report on anti-Americanism), one senses in American politics a weariness among both the public and the intelligentsia. By virtue of its discontent with the tenor and direction of American policy, the Princeton Project manifests unhappiness with the Bush administration through subtle yet systematic criticisms of current U.S. policies. While this tendency is understandable, the study's inclination to criticize current policies is disconcerting and distracting, for two reasons. First, to establish new principles for and a bipartisan consensus on national security a study ought to draw credibility and unanimity *entirely and singularly* from its analysis of international events and its implications for the United States, rather than criticize the current policy. The other criticism is historical in nature. Consider the neutral, analytical tone

adopted by Kennan, who never criticized President Truman's policies when, in the late 1940s, the administration and Congress had just begun to formalize the policy of containment. How easy it would have been to cavil as evidence mounted that Washington lacked a coherent policy for confronting the historically daunting challenges posed by Stalin's policies and about which Churchill had been warning Roosevelt since 1943.*

This study's overall impact is weakened by the uneven style in the working group reports and the lack of evident, systematic connections with the final report. Those linkages are missing, opaque, or simply unclear. Those reports unfortunately follow their own approach and organization; their overall quality and impact would have been immeasurably greater had they followed the same format. For example, some contain summaries of key findings and some do not. Some articulate major principles, some do not. This masks a more worrisome problem, however: since the final report putatively draws substantively from the efforts of the working groups, it is difficult to explain why disparate approaches and styles were not discouraged.

I offer three broad principles to help scholars, policy makers, and the public evaluate the value of *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* in charting new directions for American national security. One is that while this study reviews in normative terms the broad intellectual outlines of its preferred vision of American foreign policy, it is striking and in a sense reassuring just how conventional its thinking really is. The emphasis on promoting democratic principles is hardly new or revolutionary, and its analysis of the principles that should guide military intervention is similarly conventional. A notable exception is the study's analysis of the dangers posed by what it called "major threats and challenges," which merit serious consideration.

In strategic terms, the study draws essentially the same conclusions previously drawn about American foreign policy. Is it perhaps the case that despite the current partisan divide over Iraq, American policy might after all be more on track with this polity's historic approach to foreign policy than we realize? While I understand that this observation is debatable, we have an obligation to acknowledge that possibility.

The project's objective is so important in historical terms that while one can raise serious analytic questions about its weaknesses, the broader purpose that animated this study suggests that all observers should reflect carefully on its

* John Colville, *The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), reports (p. 479) that in March 1944, "The P.M. . . . said that it was now obvious our efforts to forge a Soviet-Polish agreement had failed and that he would soon have to make a cold announcement in Parliament to this effect. It all seems to augur ill for the future of relations between this country and the U.S.S.R."

arguments and conclusions. If participants in the defense and foreign policy communities were to focus their energies on defining American strategy rather than debating partisan differences, the tone enveloping foreign policy debates would likely become more balanced. If this study represents an early step toward transcending domestic differences about foreign policy, and if it helps steer American society toward a new bipartisan consensus on grand strategy, it will have been a significant accomplishment.

This is an important work in the field of national security. Despite several analytic weaknesses, it explicitly tackles the transcendent problem of redefining the foundations of American grand strategy. It also contributes to the ongoing search for new organizing principles for security at a moment when various forces threaten U.S. security. While it has by no means resolved this central problem, *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* is a notable accomplishment in the continuing intellectual search for the principles that will define American strategy in a world whose forces must be restrained.

BOOK REVIEWS

AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT

Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. *The Science of Military Strategy*. Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005. 504pp. \$40

This first English-language volume on strategy by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) was translated by a team of experts at the Academy of Military Sciences from the original Chinese-language version (*Zhanlüexue*, 2001). Edited by two major generals with significant ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers to China's powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Committee, this volume undoubtedly reflects elements of critical policy trends in Beijing and hence merits close examination by foreign researchers and policy makers. Since this book has deliberately been made accessible to an overseas audience, it is important to reflect on what message its English-language publication may be intended to convey.

The 2001 Chinese-language version is used to educate senior PLA decision makers, including those on the CMC, as well as officers who may become China's future strategic planners. Now in its fourth printing, it can be read along with a variety of other texts, such as the more operationally and tactically focused *Science of Campaigns* (*Zhanyixue*),

published by China's National Defense University in 2000, the better to understand actual PLA doctrine. The closest U.S. equivalent to these volumes collectively might be *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0).

Part One surveys China's historical experience and development of military theory. The authors describe the current age as an "era of sea," in which maritime states, like their predecessors, will employ Mahanian and other strategies to "actively develop comprehensive sea power" and "expand strategic depth at sea." Part Two offers Chinese perspectives on the laws and conduct of war. Chapter 9, on "Strategic Deterrence," deserves particular attention, as it clearly provides a rationale for many elements of the PLA's modernization program that have been overlooked by many foreign analysts. Part Three examines future warfare and the implications for China, including recent PLA experience and combat guidelines. Throughout the volume, the continuing relevance of the People's War is emphasized as a foundation of Chinese military strategy.

It is this third section that will be of greatest interest to Western scholars seeking insights into PLA thinking about China's strategic situation. The authors of this volume believe that China, both a land and a sea power, faces multifaceted strategic opportunities and challenges. Despite its eighteen-thousand-kilometer coastline, China is currently constrained by the world's longest island chain, centering on strategically, politically, and economically vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from China's only disputed territory, however: "1,000,000 square kilometers" of maritime territory, "one ninth of China's national land territory," remains under contention. The authors also identify energy supply security as critical to China's national development. Their statement that the South China Sea possesses "rich oil reserves equivalent to that of [the] Middle East" conflicts with Western assessments, however, leaving the reader wondering about the true strategic underpinnings of Beijing's claims.

The authors foresee possible threats to China's "sovereignty, maritime rights, and great cause of reunification," threats that, should all other measures fail, may necessitate a defensive (and therefore inherently just) war on China's "borderlines, seacoasts, and air spaces." The resulting "high-tech local wars" may well require the PLA to confront a technologically superior adversary. Accordingly, the authors suggest emphasizing preemption; employment of a broad spectrum of military technologies, including asymmetric "trump card" weapons; and integration of civilian and military forces in missions (e.g., "guerrilla warfare on the sea") that incorporate political, economic, and legal

warfare. While this volume raises as many questions as it answers, it is nevertheless a welcome contribution to a vital field in which so little authoritative information is available.

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Howarth, Peter. *China's Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy's Submarine Challenge*. New York: Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. \$125

Peter Howarth, an Australian former diplomat and intelligence analyst, presents an excellent mix of strategic theory, political dynamics, and tactical detail in considering the Chinese submarine fleet. His treatment demonstrates a keen understanding of both parts of the phrase "politico-military strategy," and it is the type of thinking that Jeffrey Record of the Air War College recently opined is too often missing in the American community. Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if only because one gets to visit so many old friends in strategic theory, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie, Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu.

Like so many others who write about China's navy since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sensational claims on the subject, presumably thereby justifying the work and attracting attention. However, what distinguishes Howarth from so many others who have searched and found reasons to be alarmed at the conventional naval power of China is that he

tempers the sensational with frank assessments of China's limitations.

At the heart of this examination of Chinese submarines, practically speaking, is the potential showdown over Taiwan. While Howarth notes that "China, like Germany, is handicapped by geography," he points out that the defense of Taiwan is equally handicapped by oceanography: its narrow and crowded seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His frankness, however, about such U.S. problems as naval drawdown, global responsibility, vulnerability of surface ships to missile saturation, and the difficulties of operations in narrow seas gives one new pause.

As an example of what is best about his work, Howarth considers not only the tactical problems for China, Taiwan, and the United States (including the exact requirements for successful submarine warfare against a carrier-based navy) but also the proper political context of that potential conflict—that a politically free and economically prosperous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at the heart of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to the intersection of tactics and strategic judgment, Howarth includes in his final chapter an economical summary of the logic by which Chinese decision makers might be optimistic enough about their chances for success to initiate a conflict with Taiwan.

One weakness in this confluence of politics, strategy, and tactical matchups is that Howarth exaggerates the strategic influence of the great thinkers on policy. His demonstration of how submarine warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches, suggesting as it does that submarine warfare fits perfectly with preformed Chinese strategic preferences. The logic

of a preemptive surprise attack is part of the Chinese strategic culture, he says, but one does not have to cite the number of wars per year in which the Ming dynasty engaged, for example, in order to support the conclusion that "the Pentagon has some justification in considering that the risk of Beijing resorting to force to try to resolve the Taiwan issue is growing with the modernization and transformation of the PRC's military capabilities."

Howarth is better off with his more elegant logic that submarines are designed for the task of concealment and surprise and that surprise is a good tactic when one's forces are inferior. Eastern and Western war planners have both made use of the submarine and have appreciated it for the qualities for which it is designed, regardless of whether they were Chinese or their ancient ancestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.

Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to blend classic strategic thinking with current politics and tactical complexities that is informative, intelligent, and provocative in this book. It is recommended for any library on naval affairs or Asian conflict, and good reading for both U.S. and Chinese war planners.

PETER J. WOOLLEY
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Cole, Bernard D. *Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects*. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp. \$125

Given the importance of the Taiwan issue for U.S. foreign and security policy in East Asia, it is striking that relatively little has been written on Taiwan's defense reform and modernization

programs, especially in contrast to the substantial amount of work scholars and policy analysts have produced in recent years on Chinese military modernization and its implications for regional security. Bernard Cole's *Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects*, which provides a comprehensive and well-written assessment of recent developments in Taiwan's defense establishment, represents an important step in filling this gap.

In this work, Cole—a respected China scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for thirty years and is now professor of international history at the National War College—examines the changes currently under way in Taiwan's armed forces and defense bureaucracy. The main purpose of Cole's thorough and well-researched study is to assess changes in Taiwan's defense posture and their implications for the island's security. After presenting a brief history of Taiwan's military and an overview of the Chinese military threat, Cole explains that Taiwan in recent years has been unwilling to increase the level of resources devoted to its own military capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorganizing its defense bureaucracy and its military is professional and well trained, the growing asymmetry in defense spending between Taiwan and China is resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan's long-standing qualitative edge over the Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues quite persuasively that the cross-strait military balance is tipping toward China as a result of Taiwan's relatively modest response to the growing security challenge represented by the acceleration of Chinese military modernization. Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend itself on its own and may not even be

able to hold out until the U.S. military could intervene decisively.

Cole also includes a brief discussion of the factors underlying Taiwan's unwillingness to do more to counter China's growing military capability. He argues, first, that many officials in Taiwan believe Chinese military threats lack credibility and, second, that decision makers in Taipei are convinced that the United States would come to Taiwan's assistance even if they turn out to have underestimated China's willingness to use force. According to Cole, the U.S. decision to send two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan would likely result in American military intervention but also led Taipei to the same conclusion. Given the assumptions that China lacks the willingness to use force and that U.S. intervention is virtually assured in the unlikely event of a cross-strait conflict, many politicians in Taiwan conclude that the island does not really need to invest its own scarce resources in defense. In all, *Taiwan's Security* makes an important contribution to scholarship and policy analysis by providing a readable and informative assessment of a previously understudied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship.

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Asada, Sadao. *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006. 385pp. \$36.95

Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of China commonly compare this emerging Asian titan to imperial Germany, whose unification upset the European great-power concert ushered in after Waterloo, and for good reason. Naval enthusiasts like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, their imaginations fired by the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, hurled Germany into naval competition with Great Britain, the dominant naval power of the day, with fateful results. References to Mahan are now routine among Chinese strategic thinkers. Will China’s Mahanians prod Beijing onto a similar path to sea power, and will similar results ensue?

Along comes Sadao Asada, an emeritus professor at Japan’s Doshisha University. Asada’s masterful book *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* reminds us that Asian maritime history also offers compelling lessons on how the rise of a new sea power, in this case imperial Japan, can disturb a settled nautical equilibrium. In effect, the book is an intellectual history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). As the title suggests, the book traces the influence of Mahanian theory on Japanese naval thinkers in the decades after *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* appeared in 1890.

Asada attributes the IJN’s use and misuse of Mahan to a combination of factors—bureaucratic rivalry between the army and the navy, groupthink within the naval hierarchy, and an abdication of leadership by senior officials, to name three. By the onset of World War II, the navy had convinced itself that war with the United States was fated and that Japan could overcome America’s overwhelming material superiority

by cultivating a warrior ethos in the ranks. Perversely, IJN leaders disregarded key aspects of Mahanian theory, in particular the material foundations of sea power, as they contemplated Mahanian naval warfare in the Pacific.

From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes an ideal companion to David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie’s *Kaigun*, which reviews the strategies, tactics, and technologies deployed by the IJN between the service’s inception in Meiji Japan and the outbreak of World War II. Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command*, a spirited defense of Mahan against his detractors, would make a useful supplement and counterpoint to Asada’s analysis.

Asada’s account is not impervious to criticism. First, linking deeds with words and words with thoughts is no simple matter for historians. His many references to Japanese officers, say, “echoing” Mahan or acting out of “Mahanian navalism” invite critics to quibble. The author establishes that many Japanese mariners were reared on Mahan, but how do we know they were acting on Mahanian precepts *on some particular occasion* if they did not say so? Second, Mahan was prone less to “stark racism” than to the clash-of-civilizations rhetoric that dominated fin de siècle Americans’ views of Asia.

Still, these are minor faults in an invaluable work. Will China, like imperial Japan, succumb to Mahanian determinism? How should America respond? These are questions worth pondering, and *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* makes a good place to start.

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King, Iain, and Whit Mason. *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006. 228pp. \$27.95

Iraq's undiminished insurgency has cast an unmistakable pall over the U.S. military's nation-building mission, which until recently seemed a core competency for the Department of Defense. Both advocates and critics of America's efforts to bring peace, order, and good government to Baghdad agree that the aftermath of the Balkan wars of the 1990s offers examples of what was *not* done in the wake of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM'S epic Phase III success in spring 2003. The idea that extended U.S. military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have resulted in long-term political successes built on well executed nation-building is accepted almost without question. But is it so?

Peace at Any Price poses that difficult question and provides a richly disturbing series of answers that should be of interest to anyone concerned with the ability of Western governments and organizations to bring stability to failed states, even with overwhelming military force at their disposal. The authors, both veterans of UN nation-building in Kosovo, dissent from received wisdom in their survey of Kosovo after more than five years of NATO protection and UN largesse.

What King and Mason find in that troubled, unstable, and impoverished Balkan statelet (which is legally part of Serbia but under international occupation, now inching painfully toward independence) is a witches' brew of nationalism, corruption, and criminality that bodes ill for the future of Kosovo and surrounding states. The authors begin with a close

look at the mid-March 2004 mass rioting that swept through Kosovo, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties and large-scale destruction of property and, above all, shattering any hope of reconciliation between Kosovo's Albanian majority and dwindling Serb minority. Five years after launching Operation ALLIED FORCE to save the Albanians from the Serbs, NATO troops had to defend the Serbs from the Albanians, and not always with much ardor or success.

King and Mason's account is balanced and just, sparing no group, least of all the UN, the European Union, or NATO, from fair criticism as to how Kosovo has been governed since mid-1999. This is not a history text—it leaves out all but a limited, necessary understanding of how Kosovo became so troubled by the end of the 1990s—but rather a detailed telling of how ineffective Western political and military institutions have been at transforming Kosovo into anything resembling a law-abiding or self-sustaining society. The authors spend considerable time detailing the depths of interethnic hatreds, from the grand to the petty, that continue to cripple daily life in Kosovo, while refusing to spare Western nongovernmental organizations from critiques of their naïveté and ineffectiveness in dealing with mutual Albanian-Serb fear and loathing.

Peace at Any Price ends with a helpful guide on how the international community can do better the next time it is confronted with a Kosovo. King and Mason's counsel is wise and well taken, ranging from how to improve war termination to ensure a lasting peace, to how security and the rule of law must be established before democracy can take root, and above all to how "bad habits," including local "traditions" of

banditry, criminality, and interethnic violence must be altered, by force if necessary, if Western governments and organizations expect to make failed, war-torn states into bona fide members of the international community.

One only wishes that this little gem of a book had been published earlier.

JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College



Loveman, Brian, ed. *Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 367pp. \$27.95

It does not take exceptional analytical talent to recognize that U.S. policies in the Andean region of South America face severe challenges, especially those dealing with the war on drugs. Neither does it take an exceptional historian to recognize that the United States has all too often paid insufficient attention to its regional neighbors and partners. Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery of international relations to recognize that South America is becoming increasingly important to the safety, well-being, and future prosperity of the United States. For all these reasons, a clear explanation of U.S. policies in the region and evaluation of those policies' track records and potential future consequences are especially welcome.

To a degree, and despite a somewhat incendiary title, *Addicted to Failure* provides a portion of the needed understanding. Its editor asked a rather impressively credentialed group of analysts to examine each of the countries in the Andean region and the role that U.S. policy has had in shaping those

states' political futures. These analyses follow Brian Loveman's own overview of U.S. policies in the entire region. A chapter devoted to the European Union's efforts follows a state-by-state review, and the book concludes with an examination of a possible preemptive U.S. intervention in Colombia on the scale of operations currently being conducted in Iraq.

However, this volume is not a resounding success. Loveman's introductory chapter is a case in point. His basic argument seems to be that U.S. policy, whether crafted by Republican or Democratic presidents, formed during or after the Cold War, altruistic or operational in nature, intentional or accidental, has been consistently wrong. U.S. policy, Loveman argues, has for decades made matters worse for Andean states. There are two problems here. First, Loveman's disdain for past and present U.S. actions actually begins to obstruct and detract from his central argument. Readers expecting to find a more academic and objective analysis may question the objectivity of the author at the expense of the merit of his argument. The second problem is even more serious. Loveman seeks to prove his contention with official U.S. reports and documents, but the quotations are highly selective and all too often presented without context. Indeed, had an equally passionate voice argued the distaff side of Loveman's argument, this would have been a most interesting volume.

Luckily, the next six chapters are different. Authored by well known and respected scholars, they draw a compelling picture of U.S. policy in the Andean region. Although all are worthy, Orlando Perez's evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan policy and Enrique Obando's analysis

of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high points of the book. Obando does an especially fine job reviewing the successes and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug policies.

Addicted to Failure effectively raises several significant issues for the reader to mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug policy been a costly failure that has made the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier? Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats to the United States beyond those associated with drug trafficking? If the current policies are counterproductive, what are the correct policies? Loveman does not provide convincing answers to the first two questions and does not address the third.

At the end of the day, *Addicted to Failure* is a book that should not be disregarded. It encourages readers to plunge deeper into the complexities of South America. For while Loveman and his authors may not offer any answers, it is clear that the United States will face increasingly complex challenges from this part of the world in the years ahead.

RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College



Taylor, Lewis. *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980–1997*. Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2006. 232pp. \$32.50

In *Shining Path* Lewis Taylor provides compelling evidence that the attitude of the people can be decisive in war. That point will not surprise students of warfare; they will recall that two great strategists stressed the central importance of having the people on your side. Focusing

primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl von Clausewitz coined the notion that war's dominant tendencies make a "paradoxical trinity," of which one pole comprises primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, a blind natural force. The passions, Clausewitz wrote, "that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people." Concentrating on guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung famously wrote that "in the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops, the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish that inhabit it."

In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to understand and respect the rural population on the parts of the guerrillas (the Sendero Luminoso, or "Shining Path") led by Abimael Guzmán and of the government of Peru came close to dooming the efforts of both sides in the bloody conflict. After the end of hostilities, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that more than sixty-nine thousand Peruvians had been killed in the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the Shining Path responsible for the majority of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao made clear that the end of warfare was not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor shows how close the combatants came, through their own excesses, to defeating their own causes.

Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin American sociology at the University of Liverpool, does not adequately highlight the strategic implications of his subject. In fact, reading his book leaves unanswered the questions of why he wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses his study narrowly on the northern highlands of Peru, which were a particularly brutal locus of armed action. Although he acknowledges that generalized

violence occurred in 1992 in twenty-one of Peru's twenty-four departments, he ignores other important areas of the conflict. He also writes as though the war in Peru proceeded without an international context, except for the intellectual contribution of Mao Tse-tung. True, the Cold War had ended by the time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán, but many observers think the agents could not have succeeded without the help of outside intelligence. In addition, U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs not only disrupted a source of support to the Shining Path but also relieved economic pressure on the government of Peru when it was sorely stressed by the conflict.

The Peruvian war provides insights for the future of revolutionary movements in Latin America—in countries with elected governments and when no support will be available from a Cuba or a Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold War. Fortunately, any reader interested in those issues, as well as in a systematic treatment of the strategic lessons of two decades of conflict in Peru, can find an excellent source in Cynthia McClintock's 1998 *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*, published by the United States Institute of Peace Press.

PAUL D. TAYLOR
Naval War College



Matheson, Michael J. *Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. 422pp. \$19.95

When a longtime Department of State attorney and former member of the prestigious International Law Commission takes the time to recount his considerable firsthand observations of the performance of the United Nations, *Naval War College Review* readers do well to take notice. At a time when a new U.S. geographic command is being stood up in Africa and military forces find their planning and operations centers increasingly visited by coalition, interagency, international, and non-governmental organizational representatives, it is indispensable to have a clear understanding of the evolving role of the UN Security Council and its technical commissions and tribunal investigators. Matheson provides us with an insightful description, one that nicely serves that purpose.

The book is arranged in seven chapters and five appendixes. The first chapter provides a straightforward description of the UN Charter provisions that serve as the framework for action by the Security Council. It is complemented by chapter 2, which describes the council's jurisdiction and mandate as the institution charged with the "primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security." The next three chapters provide general descriptions of the three principal modalities of Security Council actions: sanctions, peacekeeping and governance, and use of force. The growing importance of UN technical commissions is then described, followed by an examination of the UN role in prosecuting international crimes. The book is well indexed and includes summaries of some of the key council resolutions and a bibliography that will prove useful to those seeking more detailed coverage.

Matheson documents most of the recurring concerns in sanctions (problems with enforcement, collateral consequences, and possible legal limits on sanctions), peacekeeping operations (tensions produced by the principles of consent and impartiality applicable to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations), and the use of force. Also provided is a most welcome description of the various UN technical commissions and of the criminal tribunals established by the Security Council to address crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. His descriptions are concise, accurate, and well documented.

This book admirably serves its descriptive role and supports the author's thesis regarding the council's post-Cold War renaissance. In the end, however, one comes away feeling that the UN has been largely spared critical scrutiny in this book, that the writer, though eminently well qualified to take us through a more focused and prescriptive treatment of this vital international institution, stopped short. Now that Matheson has piqued our interest, perhaps he will provide us with those additional insights in a sequel—one that draws out the lessons to be learned from the “re-nascent” Security Council's response to the acknowledged threats to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear programs and the genocide in Darfur.

CRAIG H. ALLEN
Naval War College



Reveron, Derek S., ed. *America's Viceroy: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 214pp. \$75

In 2000, *Washington Post* reporter Dana Priest wrote a series of articles on the rising importance of the regional combatant commanders, comparing them to modern-day “proconsuls” whose Roman forebears served as regional governors and commanders in chief of their military forces. Reveron's *America's Viceroy*s examines this comparison, providing a historical and contemporary analysis of contemporary regional combatant commanders and their rising influence in the foreign policy-making arena. (While the implications of this rising trend are left to the reader, nowhere does the book imply that our combatant commanders are present-day Caesars, about to cross the Rubicon and seize Rome.) The last chapter of Reveron's book expertly examines their rising power and influence on traditional civil-military relations. In short, he finds, administrations use the military in non-warfighting ways, because of its size, capabilities, and “can-do” culture.

It is somewhat ironic that it was the military services and the Pentagon that fought hardest to prevent the ascendancy of the regional combatant commanders. Four decades of legislative changes to the Department of Defense and military mistakes from World War II to DESERT ONE finally culminated in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act finally gave unity of command to the combatant commanders and reduced the service chiefs to the secondary role of training and equipping their forces. In hindsight, however, it was the Department of State, not the service chiefs, who suffered the greatest loss of influence with this change.

The regional combatant commanders today are considered by many within the U.S. government to be policy entrepreneurs. Each commands a large staff, oversees a huge budget, and travels frequently within his region to promote U.S. interests. In fact, our national security strategy now directs regional combatant commanders to engage with regional allies and promote theater security cooperation. A regional viewpoint and focus, instead of the country-specific view represented by U.S. ambassadors, makes combatant commanders ideally suited to promote and implement security agreements with heads of state. Their enormous resources and regional access dwarf the capabilities of the State Department, whose process of policy formulation still resides in Washington, D.C. In contrast, regional commanders are out on the ramparts daily, just like the proconsuls or British viceroys in the days of empire.

In this aspect, readers will find much of value in the book. As Reveron points out, there is a paucity of scholarly research on the subject of foreign policy making by regional combatant commanders and their subsequent encroachment into traditional fields of international relations. Anthony Zinni, a retired Marine Corps general and former commander of U.S. Central Command, describes the book in these terms: "Derek Reveron has put together an excellent work describing the controversial role of our nation's combatant commanders. It is an insightful, accurate, and provocative presentation of the issues and history done by first-rate contributors who clearly know the subject." The book is well suited for midcareer officers and students of

international relations who are about to enter the field of national security policy making. While the cost of the hardcover edition will certainly deter all but the most avid readers of foreign policy, the paperback is now available for \$26.95.

DONALD K. HANSEN

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps



Gillespie, Paul G. *Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions*. Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 2006. 232pp. \$35

At least since medieval expert Lynn White's controversial argument that the stirrup was responsible for the demise of feudalism, historians have highlighted the seminal role of technology in social change. Paul Gillespie's compelling, compact history of precision guided munitions (PGMs) is unlikely to raise such an acrimonious debate, but he has provided a valuable contribution to the study of technology and society and, more specifically, to the rapidly growing body of literature concerning the "revolution in military affairs."

The great advantage of Gillespie's book is its focus on a single, obviously significant military technology and on that technology's effect on national security policy. The book traces the history of PGMs from World War I; the grainy picture of a destroyed bridge on the dust cover turns out to be, somewhat surprisingly, not the "Vietnam poster child" for PGMs (the notorious Thanh Hoa Bridge) but a bridge destroyed by an early guided bomb in Burma during World War II. Some readers may find a few of Gillespie's claims a bit too "Air Force laudatory," but one should expect

at least a bit of airpower advocacy from a professor of history who teaches at the Air Force Academy. Gillespie's account is on the whole balanced and well documented, and his frank discussion of some of the less-than-favorable impacts of PGMs on national security policy makes it clear he is not a complete airpower zealot.

Nearly as valuable as the technology-policy linkage is the detailed and intimate look at the technology innovation process itself. Perhaps the best chapter is the author's account of the mid-1960s development of the Paveway laser-guided bomb. Gillespie makes it clear that this was not the work of an "individual inventive genius" but rather the product of a host of factors ranging from changes in national policy (i.e., "flexible response"), newly available supporting technologies (the laser and integrated circuit), an innovative engineering team from a minor defense contractor (Texas Instruments), and a persistent and bureaucratically adept Air Force colonel.

The biggest disappointment with this work is that despite its October 2006 release date, the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are treated almost as afterthoughts. There are PGM successes that could be amplified from these conflicts (e.g., the evolution of "urban close air support" and even the demise of the terrorist al-Zarqawi), and a fuller treatment would reinforce Gillespie's central contribution.

Weapons of Choice makes a good case that PGMs have indeed altered the American approach to war as "policy-makers have seized upon precision guided munitions as the key to more humane war." Gillespie makes clear this is not a wholly positive development,

because "an anemic, casualty-averse policy is unlikely to deter or defeat the determined, resourceful foe," and perhaps more importantly, because "winning and maintaining the peace" has proven much more difficult than destroying targets. While he could have made his argument even stronger, Paul Gillespie makes clear (with apologies to Abraham Maslow) that the mere presence of an elegant hammer could cause policy makers to overlook all but the nails. Iraq and Afghanistan may further reinforce Paul Gillespie's assertion that "technology best serves those who thoughtfully implement it."

DAVID BUCKWALTER
Naval War College



Burrows, William E. *The Survival Imperative: Using Space to Protect the Earth*. New York: Forge Books, 2006. 306pp. \$24.95

Nowadays we take for granted that space assets are necessary for military operations, but the nonmilitary use of space has also passed into the realm of the necessary. While the use of space assets, and thus access to space, is of vital importance to the nation, there is no watershed work that unites the political, economic, industrial, and military aspects into a single vision. Space policy, in other words, is still waiting for its Mahan.

If he is not quite Mahan, veteran space writer William E. Burrows lays a very good foundation for what could evolve into a national (or even international) policy—planetary protection. The author unites two major themes under this concept: protecting the earth from asteroid or comet strikes and monitoring the

global environment to ward off an ecological disaster.

Burrows provides an excellent summary of asteroid strikes, from the dinosaur killer to the 1908 Tunguska impact. But is he overstating the threat? Imagine Katrina on a global scale, or a nuclear power mistaking an asteroid for a nuclear attack and retaliating. A large enough strike could devastate the planet, and, without warning, we could do nothing to prevent it.

Burrows, who also wrote *Deep Black* (1988), argues that overhead reconnaissance systems represent the perfect tool for monitoring the global environment. He asserts that these types of assets can provide early warning of ecological devastation (such as deforestation and overfishing), enabling more effective protection of the environment.

Burrows makes a number of recommendations. He argues for expanded and continued support for ongoing efforts to monitor “near earth objects” and supports a U.S. interagency effort for monitoring the global environment. In the long term, he believes, establishing a human presence in space will be necessary. Unlike other visionaries (such as Gerard K. O’Neill and G. Harry Stine), Burrows declares that permanent human presence in space will follow an economic need, rather than the other way round. His wedge into space is building a data warehouse on the moon to preserve humanity’s cultural and technological heritage. On the moon its contents would be accessible to anyone on earth who could rig a relatively simple communications site.

The author also provides a superb political and social history of the space program, up to the present, and provides

critical insights on the political drivers for the space program.

Is Burrows’s premise farfetched? The 5 December 2006 edition of the *Washington Times* quoted the December issue of *Popular Mechanics* that on Friday, 13 April 2029, a twenty-five-million-ton asteroid will pass the earth less than twenty-one thousand miles away. At least, scientists claimed there was a 99.7 percent chance the asteroid will miss.

JOHN R. ARPIN
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Klein, John J. *Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy*. Space Power and Politics Series. New York: Routledge, 2006. 196pp. \$110

We are a nation inextricably linked to space. Every instrument of our national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic—relies to some degree on access to and unimpeded use of space. *Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy* uses this fact to illustrate its author’s point that despite an increasing reliance on space capabilities, the United States has yet to develop a comprehensive space-power theory. Klein has written extensively on space-power theory, and this book builds upon many of his previous works, addressing the need for a national space strategy that adequately links space operations with national interests.

Throughout *Space Warfare* Klein astutely draws numerous parallels with space as a medium of national power similar to those of air, land, and the sea as viewed and utilized by independent states. As space capabilities increase in importance in relation to national

power and security around the world, Klein reasons, space will become an arena where states will protect their space assets in the same manner that they protect their sovereign airspace, land, and territorial seas. To this end, he draws upon the historical context of Sir Julian Corbett's maritime strategy theory as a basis on which to build a comprehensive space strategy. Previous attempts at space strategies have hinged upon using air or naval strategies, or a combination of the two. Klein argues that simply using air or naval strategies is too restrictive and does not adequately capture the uniqueness of space operations. Air and naval strategies in his view are too militarily focused, specifically on offensive weapons, or lack the proper linkage to the instruments of national power. For these reasons he turns to Corbett's maritime theory, which describes the relationship between land and sea as vital and also serves well as a model for development of space strategy.

This unique approach may be criticized by some. However, these same critics would do well to understand Klein's use of Corbett not as the be-all and end-all approach to space strategy but rather as a framework upon which to build. In fact, Klein himself admits that his approach to a space strategy largely agrees with current joint doctrine, the *Space Commission Report*, and other publications. However, his treatment highlights some areas deserving more debate, such as a better understanding of the defense of high-value positions in space and access to what he calls "celestial lines of communication," a phrase adapted from classic Corbett.

Klein's Corbett-based space strategy is presented in a fairly easy-to-read way,

although some of his basic premises are quite repetitive. Additionally, a few of his recommendations may be viewed as incredibly challenging, if not impossible, from technological and fiscal perspectives.

This is a must-read for military and nonmilitary strategic thinkers with interests or stakes in space operations. While it is sure to raise some eyebrows, particularly in the air and space communities, this book does what it is supposed to do: raise the level of debate on the formulation of a sound space strategy. This is a critically important subject, one that if not properly implemented and understood could have disastrous consequences on our national interests.

DANA E. STRUCKMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Naval War College



Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Knopf, 2006. 480pp. \$27.95

Lawrence Wright has provided the military professional an excellent primer into the world of those who see the United States as a threat. The Arab world remains little understood by most Americans. It takes Wright nearly five hundred pages to lay out the complex tale of modern Islamic fundamentalism. It is no surprise that Osama Bin Laden is a key player, and Wright gives him center stage. Bin Laden is the son of a wealthy Yemeni who through grit and hard work earned the favor of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia for boldness in civil engineering projects that helped Saudi Arabia advance into the twentieth century.

The 1980s saw the first true conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and a major power, the ten-year war waged by the mujahideen in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, having suffered an unexpected drubbing. Emboldened by their victory against one superpower, many mujahideen, under the spiritual leadership of Osama Bin Laden (who spent some time in Afghanistan during the war), turned to fighting the new threat to Islam posed by the United States. The organization formed from disparate jihadist groups in Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan to meet this task was one whose name would become synonymous with the most violent form of anti-American Islamic fundamentalism—al-Qa‘ida (the Base). Ironically, it was the United States that, through the CIA, had largely financed and equipped the mujahideen and other anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The Looming Tower is truly a book for our time. The *New York Times* agrees; it selected it as one of the ten best books of 2006. Drawing upon expertise gained from living and teaching in the Middle East, Wright has written a succinct and engaging work on the history, religion, and temperament of a people who remain at best enigmatic to most Americans. More importantly, Wright’s narrative characterizes the path to September 11th as a lengthy and convoluted one, a journey that started long ago. The attacks on that day were the next step in an irrevocable conflict between elements of radical Islam and the country they saw as a threat to their existence.

The lessons of *The Looming Tower* are many. The United States can succeed in its fight against the radicals of Islam only if it is completely united, with all

internal barriers swept aside. Much has been done in the years since that clear, blue Tuesday morning in September to reconcile that environment. The other take-away is that Bin Laden and his ilk are more complex than their rhetoric would have us believe. His followers, however, see him as a devout Muslim, pure in thought and strident in deed, out to defend his faith from foreign influences bent on its destruction. So as long as the United States remains engaged in that vital region, his likes will remain ever present and ever the threat.

DAVID L. TESKA
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve



Key, Joshua, and Lawrence Hill. *The Deserter’s Tale: The Story of an Ordinary Soldier Who Walked Away from the War in Iraq*. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2007. 237pp. \$23

Joshua Key is a young married man with four children who joined the U.S. Army to escape the grinding poverty of his life in Guthrie, Oklahoma. In 2003, he was deployed to Iraq with the 43rd Combat Engineer Company. At the end of seven months, Key had become so disillusioned with the Army and the Iraq war that he deserted while on leave in the United States. He ultimately made his way to Canada to ask for asylum. Lawrence Hill, a Canadian writer and journalist, put Key’s story into coherent form.

Although the book is well written, it is actually hard to read, because of the U.S. Army’s allegations of Key’s disloyalty, dishonesty, disrespect, selfishness, dishonor, lack of integrity, and cowardice, particularly during his first deployment with the 3rd Armored Cavalry

Regiment to Iraq. Also, like others who have served for many years in the military, I find it tough to read about the wrong-headed thinking and excuses of a deserter.

Yet this is a book that we must read, if for no other reason than not to allow Private Key's allegations to go unanswered. Consider, for example, that this book sells in Costco's and is listed as one of its best sellers.

Is Joshua Key a weak man who was pressured by his wife to desert, exaggerating or lying outright about his experience in Iraq to justify his desertion and gain sympathy from the Canadian authorities? Or is Private Key a naive, trusting, moral man who could no longer stomach participation in a constant series of immoral, unethical, and sometimes illegal acts in Iraq? These are the

questions that many may ask themselves when reading this book. Further, as a result of this work these troublesome allegations now reside in the public domain. The Army should determine the truth. The outcome will determine if the allegations are to be refuted or if serious soul-searching and significant changes in Army culture, training, and leadership must be pursued.

The Deserter's Tale does a credible job explaining Joshua Key's action, and it provides some serious food for thought about how the United States has been selecting, training, and leading its soldiers. However, unfortunately, the book fails to provide a good reason for Private Key's act of desertion.

THOMAS MOORE
Monterey, California

OF SPECIAL INTEREST

STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY

To commemorate the U.S. Air Force's sixtieth anniversary, the Air University has announced the inauguration of *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, a peer-reviewed forum for ideas on strategy, international security, defense policy, and the contributions of air, space, and cyberspace power. Prospective authors are invited to submit five-to-fifteen-thousand-word articles for consideration, in MS Word-compatible format, to strategicstudiesquarterly@maxwell.af.mil or via mail (please include disk) to Managing Editor, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 36112-6427.

OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARITIME HISTORY

John B. Hattendorf, the College's first Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History and chairman of the Maritime History Department, is editor in chief of *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History*, which appeared in April 2007. It is the first scholarly reference encyclopedia for the global field of maritime history to be published in English. The four-volume, 2,800-page set weighs eighteen pounds; it includes 942 articles by more than 850 authors from fifty countries. Professor Hattendorf contributed fifteen articles, on topics ranging from "Fiction: Naval Novel" to "A. T. Mahan," "Charles Stockton," "Gibraltar," and "Astronomers and Cosmographers."

As the Oxford University Press describes it, this is an encyclopedia of maritime history that in scope and depth rivals the expansiveness of the sea itself. Placing maritime affairs in their larger historical context, the *Encyclopedia* shows how seafaring has reflected and influenced major economic, cultural, military, and political developments in world history. The *Encyclopedia* offers a uniquely integrated approach, emphasizing the connections between maritime history and many other fields. In this single reference work lies a wealth of information that would otherwise require an extensive library. Its A-Z organization, clear writing, plentiful illustrations, cross-references, bibliographies, synoptic outline, and topical index make *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History* an inviting, easy-to-use reference for researchers and enthusiasts alike.