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## The Rise and Fall of Political Movements in the Late 19<sup>th</sup> Century and First Half of 20<sup>th</sup> Century Kurdistan (an Organisational Analysis)

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### Abstract

Kurdological literature has been mainly limited to mere historical descriptive discussions characterized by descriptive story telling about personal/private aspects of Kurdish political chiefs. This study tries to provide a new sociological analysis based on synthetic organizational model to examine the process and structure of political movement-making and the causes of their failure in all around Kurdistan in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Four organizational theories are employed in this paper: contingency, institutional, population ecology and resource dependency theories. In order to analyse the rise and demise of political movement-making in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century Kurdistan Macro level factors including exogenous factors i.e. the super-powers and central governments, Meso level factors containing socio-economic factors such as tribal-feudalism, regionalism and religion, and Micro Level factors composed of illiteracy and cultural poverty were analysed through aforementioned organizational theories. Our fundamental finding is that the endogenous and exogenous factors have mutually caused the rise and demise of political movement-making. But exogenous factors were the final determinant in shaping, reshaping, directing and finally collapsing on Kurdish movements. Finally it should be asserted that neither exogenous factors nor Endogenous factors were able to meet Kurdish political requirements; exogenous forces were temporal determinants that played their role according to

their own economic and political logic and endogenous forces such as tribal-feudalism, regionalism and religion wasted political potential in challenging with the central governments.

**Key words:** Contemporary Kurdistan; Kurdish movements; Political movements; Organisational analysis

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### INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that many studies have been conducted about the Kurdish society and culture in comparison with other ethnic groups in Iran and Middle East, most of socio-cultural and economic structures of this ethnicity still remain vague and unexplained. The dominant issue in these studies has been political nature and dynamics as if the Kurds have been the naturally born political. Both outsiders and insiders have ignored the other non-political aspects. The outsiders' studies have focused on when and how the Kurdish political movement developed while the most of insiders concentrated on the history of Kurdish kings and religious aspects.

Most researchers, who have worked on Kurdish political structure, in recent decades, have been outsiders who are not familiar with Kurdish society and culture. They have written about Kurdish society with political orientations. Their writings evolve around the tales and narratives of political rebels' history and story telling about Kurdish political leaders. We can classify most of them into political history that does not reflect significant debates or results. Most outside researchers have

engaged in research without using first hand findings or direct observations of Kurdish culture. Even some of them are repetitive documentary laden with political data. The purpose of this paper is not to underestimate these works. Of course, these raw materials could be articulated and analysed by the various perspectives, but they cannot be viewed as representative of Kurdish Society and culture. Undoubtedly, outsider works have presented a distorted and ambiguous image of Kurdish culture, which cannot help, unless to be explained and refined thorough taking new approaches and comparing them with other studies.

Our critique focuses on internal or endogenous studies as well. These studies are mostly as same as the external or exogenous studies. Most of the internal studies have also been descriptive, narrative and purely historical and have had shortcomings similar to external ones. In addition, religious and court men did these studies and were writing about the religious, feudal-tribal issues or sovereignty of Kurdish kings.

The aim of this study is to provide a new sociological analysis based on Synthetic organizational model to examine the process and structure of political movement-making and its demise in all around Kurdistan in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. It also offers a new but critical model for further studies and proves that the sociological theories can be applicable to examine the Kurdish society at every time.

The Kurdological literature has been mostly limited to historical descriptive discussion which functions as raw material that will be analysed sociologically and anthropologically in our study. Generally it could be claimed that the analytical literature of this area of interest is so limited and poor that it not possible to introduce any complete or comprehensive research. In addition, historical descriptive literature is characterized by descriptive story telling about personal/private behaviour, practices or ideas of Kurdish political chiefs. They have not spoken at the macro level of political context of wider society analytically.

This study wants to move beyond this apparent, superficial and descriptive level of explanation of the Kurdological literature to open a new critical landscape for further investigations on Kurds through new theories and methods. Therefore, it could be a starting point, despite all of its shortcomings, for other researchers who look for a new theory or methodology about Kurds or other ethnic groups.

Our fundamental proposition is that the endogenous and exogenous factors have mutually caused the rise and demise of political movement-making in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century Kurdistan. But exogenous factors were the final determinant. This study distinguishes endogenous forces from socio-economic and cultural context of society. The former refers to political

forces that oriented political actions of Kurdish leaders but the latter refers to the general public sphere of society in which both endogenous and exogenous forces played their own role. The exogenous forces which are defined as external political actors and powers intervened in the Kurdistan region remarkably.

This article will address the following questions that underlie the goals of the study:

(a) What were the greatest political movements of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century Kurdistan?

(b) What were the causes and nature of political movements in Kurdistan in that period?

(c) Did these political issues correspond with the general level of development in Kurdistan?

(d) What was the role of endogenous and exogenous factors in this case?

(e) What was the role of exogenous forces in historically political backwardness of Kurdish society in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century? What were their political interests?

(f) What were the weaknesses of Kurdish leaders during their political revolts? Why did they reach their demise?

(g) What is the future of the political fate of Kurdistan?

(h) Is there any socio-anthropological theoretical model to explain this trend?

(i) Which indicators should this model include to make clear dimensions of this historical debate?

(j) What dimensions of Kurdish movements can be explained by organizational model of study?

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## 1. THEORETICAL APPROACH

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Four organizational theories are employed in this paper: contingency, institutional, population ecology and resource dependency perspectives.

### 1.1 Contingency Theory (CT)

The contingency theory (CT) considers factors and causes that affect the organizational entity. These factors can be divided into internal and external conditions. This theory assumes that the organizations are similar to a live entity and it is determined by some environmental situation and elements. According to Lawrence and Lurch, the rate and amount of environmental changes can influence the differentiation and integration of organization. The main focus of this theory is to find out the degree to which the organizational structure was shaped to meet the needs of the environment and resulting tasks (Donaldson, 1996, p.69).

The CT distinguishes that in the rapidly changing environment, organization requires flexibility and adaptation and actors should apply their skills to fit with new positions. In this respect, Burns and Stalker maintain that different environmental conditions call for different styles of organizing (Hatch, 1996, p.77).

## 1.2 Population Ecology (PE)

Inspired by Darwin's natural selection theory, PE argues that the environment selects certain types of organisations to survive and others to perish based on the fitness between their structural characteristics and environmental ones. Focusing on the groups and populations of organizations, this theory emphasises the environment as a main determinant and maintains three organisational selection stages. Variation, selection and retention are fundamental postulates of this theory (Robbins, 1987, pp.166-167).

The organizational ecologists try to explain how socio-economic and political conditions affect the relative abundance and diversity of organisation. They try to account for their variation over time. In this respect, they assert that degree and rate of organizational founding and failure are key sources of increasing and decreasing diversity (Baum, 1996, p.77). In this theory, the environment of organizations is assumed to have the power to choose a competitor, those which meet its needs (Hatch, 1996, p.81).

In a similar way, according to PE, the environment is the final determinant in choosing organisations, which serve or adapt with its surroundings. But it should be made clear that the environment here is not used to refer in natural setting (as it is part of general environment), but it refers to a set of organizations living in the same context and strive

to compete with each other. Finally in this theory, the role of individual as the manager is very central, but they cannot always determine or predict in advance which variations will succeed or change the organizational structure and strategies (Baum, 1996, p.79).

## 1.3 Institutional Theory (IT)

Many regarded Philip Selznick as the founder of IT who believes that organizations adapt, not only to the strivings of their internal groups, but also to the values of external society. Berger and Luckman identified institutionalization as a core process in the creation and perpetuation of enduring social groups. To realize institutionalization, every organization should undergo some paths as follows:

Habitualization involving the generation of (new) structural arrangements to respond to a specific organisational need or problem; Objectification involving the development of social conformity among organizational decision-makers and objectification of organisational rules in form of externality; Sedimentation refers to finalise the style of internalization and institutionalization of rules and resources of an organisation by their agents and actors.

The following table depicts the stages of Institutionalisation. This model can be used as an ideal type for evaluating the processes and stages of institutionalization trend in all organizations.

**Table 1**  
**The Stages of Institutionalisation in Institutional Theory**


Dimensions	Pre-institutionalization stage	Semi-institutionalization stage	Full-institutionalization stage
Process	Habitualization	Objectification	Sedimentation
Characteristics of adaptors	Homogenous	Heterogonous	Heterogeneous
Impetuses for diffusion	Imitation	Imitative/normative	Normative
Theorization activity	None	High	Low
Variance in implementation	High	Moderate	Low
Structure failure rate	High	Moderate	Low

*Note.* From Tolbert & Zucker, 1996.

## 1.4 Resource Dependency (RD)

In contrast with PE, which draws attention towards the environment context in choosing the best and the fittest organisations to be held, RD provides a perspective of top management looking outward from the organization to its surrounding environment. In this theory the environment is replaced by the organization. Also the environment is a storage containing many materials and potentials in which organisation take advantage of them to their survival

(Hatch, 1996, p.86). In this theory, in spite of depending of organizations on their environment as resource storage, the environment does not act in a way that explicates it as a natural selection. Managers as organisational agents can learn to investigate the harsh sea of environmental dominate on. This theory emphasizes the individual ability to take advantage of their environment. Therefore managers are able to employ environmental capacities to serve their organizations (Hatch, 1996, p.78).



**Figure 1**  
**Synthetic Theoretical Model of Study**

## 2. THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE LATE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY AND FIRST HALF OF 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY KURDISTAN

Why have the Kurds who constitute the largest ethnic bloc after the Arabs, Persians and Turks in the Middle East were relatively late in developing a modern nationalist movement? The geography of the region and the nomadic lifestyle of Kurds for long periods strengthened the divergence of several Kurdish dialects. Many of them are not readily mutually comprehensible in political terms. For at least the past five hundred years, the Kurds have been divided between Persian and Ottoman Empires. These political divisions, not surprisingly, have seriously constrained opportunities to develop a more comprehensive national vision. At the same time, the states involved, intended to inhibit Kurdish nationalism within their borders (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p.6).

At the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the economy of the Kurdish tribes was still dominated by nomadic sheep breeding, as Lazarev has noted. Kurdistan in that period was based on the traditional and tribal way of life; politically it was replete with multiple tribes and pastoralists who had their own territory and rule. Each of them dominated one part of the region and constituted a politically local sovereignty. Accordingly in socio-cultural dimension, it characterizes illiterate and uneducated structure. The main form of social organization was confined to tribe unity, which in turn led to create a feudal social stratification. Therefore it is evident that they will be prevented from an

advent of any conscious national identity to be operated in the form of united government. That is why most of rebellions could not reach their purpose building a united ideology and action (White, 1998; Jalil, 2002, p.20; Kendal et al., 1991, p.54).

Although tribalism was the main feature of social organization among the Kurds during the nineteenth century, developments in the Ottoman Empire at that time had a profound impact on Kurdish society. Kurdish derebays, or princes, who had dominated Kurdish traditional societies for centuries, were destroyed and Sufi and Sheikhs, who were more concerned with religion than nationalism, became the most powerful men in the region. These profound developments in Iraqi-Kurdistan (southern Kurdistan) were directly due to the implementation of Tanzimat (Ottoman reforms 1839-1876) in Iraq (Othman, 1997, p.1).

Some scholars and historians have portrayed the Kurdistan of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century as Feudal Kurdistan in which all of socio-economic and political relationships were produced and reproduced by Feudalist mode of production. Despite of being a traditional society, there was a great deal of progress and advancement in some social dimension. The culture and economy were expanded considerably and some appropriate conditions were created for Kurds. It was in this period that there appeared several achievements in Northern Kurdistan in literature, art and poetry. For example cities such as Jazire, Betlis and Hakkari became Kurdistan academic centres. Some historians call 19<sup>th</sup> century as the golden age of Kurdish people in which the traditional Kurdish society was

experiencing a great onward transformation in its own structure. But it should be said that this region was not united territorially and politically (Kendal et al., 1991, p.36, 53).

Parallel with the emergence of the Safavieh dynasty in Iran, the entire Kurdistan was only a part of Iran. After coming to throne, the Safavieh government made its first war with the Ottoman Empire in Chaldoran region. About two third of Kurdistan region was annexed to the Ottoman Empire. During this period that lasted more than a century, both Safavieh and Ottoman competing gave Kurds political privileges and economic grants to encourage them to be annexed to either of them. It was why the Kurds established some semi-independent regional sovereignty (Senjagh) in Iran and Ottoman and take advantage of this political opportunity. After the collapse of Safavieh and advent of Qajar dynasty, this situation continued for Kurds to some extent, but the new governments of Qajar and Ottoman did not want Kurds to have any dependent political arrangement. Both of them tried to limit and somehow destroy these Kurdish semi-states in Iran and Ottoman.

These governments sought to constitute centralised states, which can unify all of their ethnic groups into a united and powerful system. It was precisely at that time that there were several socio-political movements against central government by Kurds to restore previous ethnical semi-states. The most important of them were Sheikh Obeidolla Nahri in Ottoman in 1880, Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji (after the Ottoman collapse), Smaeil Agh Simko in Iran in 1921, Sheikh said Piran in Turkey in 1925 and later Qazi Mohammad revolt which led to creation of the Mahabad Republic in Iran in 1946 (Molla Omar Isa, 2001, p.42). The Ottoman Empire was collapsing. There were many factors responsible for its destruction such as political intervention of Ottoman in internal and ethnical affairs of Kurds, its disability to adopt the industrial revolution and the technological elements of the West, preservation of a great number of armies without any financial resources and the land-system of this time.

Moreover, the lack of ethnical and religious tolerance led to the collapse of Ottoman Empire in twentieth century. Also in Iran under the Qajar dynasty, many factors were responsible for Kurdish revolts. One of the most important of them was political pressure on Kurdish semi-states to be integrated into a centralised political system. Moreover, Qajar dynasty endeavoured to convince Kurdish tribal leaders to be dominated by Iranian government (Kendal, 1991, p.47). Qajar government, despite its political weaknesses and its dependence on the ethnic power to hold their government, was attempting to mix Kurds in their political system. Sometimes they got married with the tribe's landlord's girls and created kin relationships with them to take advantage of their tribal supports. The final purpose of Qajar government

was to integrate not only Kurds but also all ethnic groups as a united political entity. They tried to realize this idea by every possible means ranging from making familial kinship to forceful strategies (McDowall, 2002, p.41).

In this era, there were many challenges and strives among Kurdish tribes to obtain territorial and economic-political interests from Qajar government. These challenges and strives were supported by Qajar government in order to prevent their unity. On the other hand, they had another kind of quarrel with each other to take possession of grass, live stocks or land. Occasionally they were stimulated to fight together with the central government. The tribal quarrels between Mangoor and Mamash tribes of Mahabad, the plundering and killing of Armenian people by Shikak tribes, tribal revolts in Kermanshah province are only a few examples of tribal disturbance in Iranian Kurdistan (McDowall, 2002, pp.41, 42, 45,150-151).

By the end of nineteenth century, a new socio-political condition, The Constitutional Revolution, emerges in Iran in which Kurds did not take part in large numbers. Therefore they remained as a marginalized ethnic group in the later political climate in Iran. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran prepared a historical starting-point to create a democratic social entity in which Kurds could follow their political interests without any political movements but they did not do so. In following, brief discussion on Iranian society in the period of Constitutional Revolution and role of Kurds in this revolutionary context is presented.

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### **3. CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (CR) AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONTEXT FOR EMERGING POLITICAL ACTION IN IRAN**

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The twentieth century brought the profound and striking conditions not only to Iranian Kurds but also to political orientation in Iran. The advent of CR later enthroning of Reza Shah in Iran in parallel with Ottoman Empire collapse in the Middle East has been the important macro-socio-economic transformations in which Kurds could declare their existence. These changes and the conditions that led to these changes were culminated in some socio-political, in particular, tribal revolts among Kurds. Sheikh Obeidolla Nahri in Ottoman in 1880, Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji (after the Ottoman collapse), Smaeil Agh Simko in Iran in 1921, Sheikh said Piran in Turkey in 1925, later Qazi Mohammad in Iran in 1946, and finally Molla Mustafa Barzani were most important revolts in the range of less than a century. It may be better to have a glance on Kurdistan under CR and also political role and positions of Kurds in this great movement. The CR has been a key context for political Movement-making in Iran even in the contemporary period and also it could serve to shape a political/national ideology of Kurds. Therefore,

these contemporary movements are described, and then the parallel movements of Turkey and Iraqi Kurds are addressed in brief.

Undoubtedly, many socio-political movements have existed in the long history of Iran, but most of them cannot be called movements in the real meaning, because they had not enough indices to be referred to as a movement. Historically and more evidently, the political movements in Iran were to some extent tribal or peasantry but the late 19<sup>th</sup> century was historically a key period to prepare some foundations for political-Movement making in Iran.

Some historians and sociologists emphasize that the CR was stimulated by some reformists and intellectuals who were aware of the liberal/democratic and political-social systems of Western society. In this case, it should be asserted that CR was the first socio-political movement in Iranian history that aimed to exert law and replace absolute state with democratic one (Katouzian, 2002, p.52). The CR was an urban rebellion against the state, in which, the Iranian intellectuals and educated people participated and they believed that most of Ulama are their supporters. The CR occurred when Qajar government was weak and unstable to resist internal challenges. Despite the participation of the majority of society parts, after their relative achievement, none of political parties accepted to cooperate with each other and to manage general problems stemming from the CR. Traditional challenges came to birth and negative political competitions began to extend. Therefore, it is not wonderful that CR couldn't survive more than a few years after its beginning (Katouzian, 2002, p.158).

So far, the formation and nature of CR have been briefly discussed. Here, the main questions are "What was the role of Iranian Kurds?" and "What was their political position and orientation?" In the age of CR, economically, Kurdistan was grounded in agro-ranching/substantive economic structure, except some regions such as Sannandaj, Kermanshah, Mahabad and some other parts. There wasn't any urban area in which Middle class emerges. On other hand, Kurdish landlords who had their common interests in co-operating with Qajar government were against CR so as to preserve their traditional resources of wealth and power. Generally the traditional structure of Kurdistan in that period did not permit Kurds culturally and socially to enter this political struggle. In this case, Kasravy says "the Kurdish tribe chiefs retained their relationships with despotic adherence and protected Qajar government to repress revolutionary agents" (Borzouei, 1999, pp.115-130). Despite this fact that Tehran had political centrality to guide and direct CR and revolutionary agents, the new Constitutional Government sent many representatives to other regions of Iran to propagate revolutionary ideology and this issue demonstrated the national character of the movement. But Kurdistan seemed not to be affected by it (Digar, 1998, p.34).

The question is "Why did the Kurds not want to take part in CR?" It could have been a historical opportunity for Kurds to enter into civil/political discourse and to build political parties without trying to begin any civil war with their government that started after Reza Shah came to throne for less than one century. Abase Vali, in this respect points out that one of the reasons that Kurds did not participate in the CR was this fact that the hyper-class of Kurds, merchants and traders familiar with reformation and development through trade relationships with Russia and Ottoman were so few that they were not able to support and advocate ideas of CR. As Vali asserts rightly Kurdish society, in contrast with Turkish counterpart lacked a matured intellectual class to accept and spread any revolutionary ideology.

In contrast with Abase Vali, McDowall argues that the Kurds tended to escape from Qajar. Therefore, in some urban centres such as Mahabad, Urumiyeh, Sannandaj and Kermanshah some political activities were organized in coordination with CR, but the opponents of CR were Kurdish chiefs and landlords who feared to lose their own interests. The tribe chiefs were considered as an inseparable component of the governmental system. In general, as McDowall asserts, tribal chiefs disagreed both with CR and increasing political and economic interventions of Qajarieh government in their regions (McDowall, 2002, p.54). It shows that their only interest was even beyond any political transformations whether in Iran or Kurdistan.

In another analysis, the feudalism and tribalism as macro historical characteristics of Kurdish society have acted to prevent this movement to flourish in Kurdistan. To explain factors affecting the non-participation of Kurds in CR, some additional factors such as cultural and economic poverty, and relative illiteracy should be taken into account. In spite of the role of such socio-economic and political obstacles in falling of CR ideology in Kurdistan, the role of tribe-feudalism as a key part of political/historical structure of Kurdistan was more important and considerable in comparison with other dimensions. It was this sub-structure that retarded Kurdistan and provided a close society that was not able to adopt new conditions of the modern world as it is today. The Kurds have not been and still are not united.

In general, the history of Kurds indicated the existence of multiple factors that could impact on the formation and production of political ideology in Kurdistan. In our case, we believe that there were some obstacles leading to non-participation of Kurdish in CR as following:

- (a) In the historical area: tribal-feudalism in parallel with external intervention
- (b) In cultural area: illiteracy and cultural poverty
- (c) In socio-political area: feudalistic stratification and tribe-based political system
- (d) In economic area: agro-ranching based substantive economy.

In addition, we should add some modifiers as important determinants in this process such as ethnic identity. Kurds conceived themselves as a separated and distinctive ethnic in identity and religion. Therefore they did not tend to step toward co-operating with Iranian society. That was why the Kurds were, to some extent, as partial or marginal agents in most of socio-political movements of Iran.

Finally, the CR was beaten by government and after a few years, Iran entered into a new dynasty, which was dominated by Reza Shah, a founder of Pahlavi dynasty. Iranian society and especially Kurdistan was replete with socio-political disturbances in this period. Reza Shah came to the throne by serious support of the United States and Britain. Initially Reza Shah began to conduct some general reforms imitated or inspired by Western societies that led to the emergence of several rural-urban revolts. In that period, most parts of Iranian society still were traditional and incapable of new political transformation, which was practised by Reza Shah. The Iranian economic structure was still based on the three modes of productions i.e. agriculture, pastorals and limited sector of trade. The pastorals were about more than 0.35 of society (Foran, 1999). The traditional economic system of Iran

evidently represented incapability and non-necessity of the reforms done by Reza Shah. The reformist actions done by Reza Shah such as extension of Western cloths, creating compulsory military-service, making sedentary of pastorals or compulsory decamping were imposed by three main instruments i.e. new-constituted and regulated Army, Curt and Bureaucracy (Abrahamian, 1998; Digar, 1998). During this period, there occurred many socio-political revolts/movements in Iranian Kurdistan. In following section, it is tried to outline and explain the most important of them, namely, Smaeil Agha Simko movement.

As a starting-point to explain Kurdistan Political system, it should be mentioned that this society was politically composed of two main sub-systems; i.e. Feudal sub-system and religious sub-system. The former as political economic mode of production was grounded to power and wealth and the latter, as socio-cultural model of integration was grounded on public structure and mass ideas. These two sub-systems had a mutual relationship for their survival. In this context, most of political leaders of Kurdistan belonged to one or both of two above categories as it is shown in the following chart:

**Table 2**  
**Main Characteristics of Some Political Movements in Contemporary Kurdistan**

Main leaders	Feudal subsystem	Religious subsystem
Sheikh Obeidollah (Ottoman Kurdistan)	-	+
Skeikh Mahmood (Iraqi Kurdistan)	-	+
Simko (Iranian Kurdistan)	+	-
Sheikh Said Piran (Turkish Kurdistan)	-	+
Qazi Mohammad (Iranian Kurdistan)	+	+

#### 4. REZA SHAH AND SMAEIL AGHA SIMKO: BETWEEN TRIBALISM AND QUASI-NATIONALISM

During 1920s-1930s, the political situation of Kurdistan was intensely influenced by Pahlavi government. The Pahlavi government was so powerful, at the beginning of emergence that it imposed its impact on the Kurdistan region by force. In this respect, the urgent action was to repress the feudal and local forces and to prevent paths of tribe's migrations. The Pahalavi state arranged to settle down them in rural or urban centres. The most important factor in this process which was employed for first time, was new technological instrument of war weapon by which Reza Shah could dominate himself on the pastoral system of Iran as it was used to defeat the Kurd pastorals of Sahneh (McDowall, 2002, p.372). Of course some historians consider Reza Shah's actions as positive and have admired his political actions as to improve Iranian traditional society and his forcedly efforts to enter Iran into new modern world. They indicate to his positive

reforms as unprecedented in Iranian history such as, settling of pastorals, constitution of schools, promoting trade and industry by creating roads and railways, cancelling of capitulation privilege etc.. (Digar, 1998, p.86)

By contrast, in spite of Reza Shah's positive actions, there are many historians and scholars who think of Reza Shah Period as a closed system to any freedom and improvement. According to Abrahamian, during Reza Shah Rule every effort toward political Movement-making was forbidden and there was no room for freedom and public view, but despite his actions, there existed many parties. In sum his political actions were oscillating between reformism and repressing (Abrahamian, 1998, p.169).

At the beginning of Pahlavi government in 1920s, Iranian Kurdistan was replete with tribes and pastoralist nomads who had their own territory. They rebel against Reza Shah. In this period, the most important movement was of Simko. Let me outline his political career and goals and then try to explain whether his revolts can be

assessed as a national movement or mere tribal rebellion. Smaeil Agha Simko was the chief of tribal confederation of Shikak in West Azerbaijan Province as second great confederation after Ardalan. In May 1919, Britain, anxious to restore calmness, seems to have favoured the appointment of Simko as Governor of Urumiyeh, an action that in the government view would have made West Azarbaijan as an independent province. Under pressure from Britain, the Iranian authorities agreed in July to a settlement that recognized Simko as warden of certain highways in the locality and of the frontier districts of Dilman and Lahijan (McDowall, 2002, p.374). After his appointment, Simko started to plunder villages and even some urban regions of West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. It seems that Simko's actions were not taken seriously by central government and it appears that it was one of the factors for Simko to be reinforced militarily and politically. Simko was supported by many northern Kurdistan tribes such as Harki, Mamash, Mangoor and Pejdari (Borzoei, 1999, p.211). During his rule on the West Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, he plundered a lot of Kurdish cities such as Mahabad, Baneh, Saqez, Urumiyeh and other regions. Some scholars maintain that the nature and process of Simko's rebel can be summarized in this brief statement: "Creation of disorder, stealing and plundering of people's properties and assets, killing them and effort to build feudal system".

Also about Simko's plundering, Ali Azizi writes: "After getting five thousand tomans from Lakestan and Ghara Geshlagh people, he desisted from his tournaments, but after a short time, he messaged them, that if they do not send him enough bullets and also their guns with some of their chiefs, he will annihilate all of them including children and women". In addition, Mehrdad Izady describes Simko as a brutal man and says: "Simko can be compared with the cruelest people in the world in brutality and cruelty" (Ahmadi, 1999, p.252).

Simko's rebel had two characteristics which of course led to his annihilation; Requisition of West Azarbaijan, Kurdistan and Armenian territory and assets and insistence on this matter that these regions should be managed by him. In his meeting in 1921, he deceitfully told Mustafa Pasha:

At this time, there is not any political organization in Kurdistan. I am the only person in the whole who rules on it. I have no will to be leader of it but about the flag and something like this, I do not need them. (Kochera, 1994, p.65)

There are several opinions about the nature and purpose of Simko's movement. Bruinessen simply think of Simko's plundering as a way for tax-gathering to manage his army i.e. he was just trying to manage his army financially. Our question is that, if Simko was the national leader of Kurds, as Bruinessen simply thinks, then why he plundered Mahabad and other Kurdish regions and their assets, and killed hundreds and thousands of Kurds?

As Abdollah Nahid says, "Simko was nothing but short of Qajarian government in sedition and destruction of Kurdish properties and assets." If Simko was really intended to build a united Kurdistan, why he did not try to improve situation of poor-farmers and provide them with security condition to revive agriculture and livestock which were key elements for Kurdistan development? Why he attempted to annihilate economic structure of West and East Azerbaijan by pressuring people to escape from these regions. In this respect Asan Aref says:

When we took possession of Razaieih (Urumiyeh) in 1921 again, a lot of people came to welcome us, only about four to five thousand have survived from its 25,000 population of this region, rest of them had been killed or escaped from there, before our attack. They had been attacked by Armenians, then by Kurds. More than three hundred villages have been eradicated. It took many years to make it inhabitable and to flourish agriculture and ranching. (Borzoei, 1999, p.222)

Many interpretations have been offered about Simko's revolt by Outsider and Insider scholars. Nadir Entesar maintains that Simko's movement was the first one, which was created by Kurds to constitute a united government. But Bruinessen recognizes it as national action, although it was not so different from usual tribal revolts. Also McDowall argues that Simko's nationalism had more economic dimension than ethnical one. In contrast and rightly, Abbas Vali truly considers it as a tribal rebellion and a kind of political stubbornness. In his perspective, it was Reza Shah who treated it as a national movement, while Simko's rebellion essentially was just tribal (Olson, 2001, p.40).

About nature and origins of his rebellion, we precisely agree with Abbas Vail's idea who maintains that Simko's ideology was tribal but Pahalavi government took it into account as a national issue. Moreover, we think that Simko's ideology can be put between tribal-feudalism and quasi-nationalism. When Iranian society was entering into modern structure of the political system by Reza Shah, it was evident that there would be several tribal and quasi-nationalism revolts to restore their territory, feudal and quasi-national interests. Simko's movement was one of them. Of course, there existed many other rebellions in Kurdistan, such as Amar Pasha and Molla Khalil in Sardasht and another parts of Kurdistan but they could not expand their political scope (Mohammadpur, 2001).

Simko was defeated in his plan, because he lacked public legitimation and characteristics required to be accepted among masses of Kurds, Simko was appointed by the British to meet their political interests during his period. In one hand, he introduced himself as a national leader and on the other hand his actions demonstrated him as a brutal Killer.

In Iran, after resignation of Reza Shah, there existed a kind of democracy and the public sphere like what had occurred during the constitutional revolution but there emerged disorders and anomies among the tribes



and counties. British penetration in Iran for oil interests integrated Iranian people during Reza Shah Period. But it did not mean that there were no tribe-state conflicts (Katozian, 2002, p.34). After Reza Shah, Kurds in south-north Kurdistan began to revolt and Russia's support of Azerbaijan separation provided Kurds with an exceptional opportunity to build a nationalistic ideology for creating the first political movement in Kurdistan and constituting the first Kurdish government in the Middle East. It was in this period that many Kurdish tribal chiefs were able to return from their banishment period by British financial and political support. Mohammad Rashid Baneh and Mahmood Khan Dezeli, were among of these chiefs (Borzoei, 1999, p.271).

It is true that the Reza Shah's period was a decline time of tribal and pastoralist systems. But as some historians such as Digar say, "His period was the starting point to Iranian modernization and he impels Iran toward civilization." He further adds,

Ending of Reza Shah period caused revival of communist and nationalist political movement. Undoubtedly, Reza Shah cruelly repressed tribes and made the Iranian social structure to be modernized but in all, his contribution to development and modernization of Iran can not be ignored. (Digar, 1998, pp.123-124)

So far we have discussed about Simko's movement as a most important rebellion of Iranian Kurds in the Reza Shah period. But it is clear that there were other small movements such as Amar Pasha and Molla Khalil in Sardasht but we will not discuss them here. By the end of Reza Shah's Period, we look at the Mohammad Reza Shah period and also Kurdish movements at that time. The Mahabad Republic was the key and important movement in that period which we will focus on in the next section.

## 5. MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH AND THE MAHABAD REPUBLIC

Although the bureaucracy, court and army were three important foundations of Pahlavi period, Mohammad Reza Shah, in contrast with his father (Reza Shah), was seeking to create a fourth foundation: a non-movement state. Kingdom System, Constitutionalism and Revolution were three political goals of Mohammad Reza Shah. The political system of Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah could be best described as "politics of system preservation" (Abrahamian, 1998, pp.239-403). The features most characteristic of Iranian Bureaucracy period were centralisation of decision-making and frequent displacement of political appointees. Of course, as it is clear Iran under Reza Shah was undergoing through modern period. It was weak and damageable and therefore, the tribal and feudal rebellions could imperil Reza Shah Government. This political system was empowered and integrated during Mohammed Reza Shah

period. He followed his father's plans and expanded his power to create public sphere. The political system of Iran under MR was more flexible and coherent than Reza Shah's.

But the occupation of Iran in 1940 was a starting-point for Soviet in north and British in the south. Penetration of Soviet in southern counties of Iran including West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan has had a long-term political tradition. USSR was supporting Azarians and Kurds to be independent. This traditional position remained throughout the MR period. It was under Russian impact that Iranian Kurdish movements took communist orientation. USSR had great influence on the formation of political parties and its goal was to struggle for emancipation and freedom of under-classes. Ezbe Komala founded by Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji in 1938, Ezbe Hiwa by Rafiq Elmi in 1939, Ezbe Komala JK by Qazi Mohammad in 1942 and Rezgari in 1948 were parties which were inspired by communist ideology of Russia and thus had not their roots in the local, regional or historical context of Kurdish social life. Therefore as we will turn to it, The USSR and UK roles in political Movement-making of Kurdistan should be considered as critical (Moll, 2001, p.83).

Let's discuss Kurdish political activities in MR period. The most important political movement of Kurds was an effort to constitute an independent Kurdish state. But this aim was very onerous and difficult. McDowall believes that the impulse of Kurdish ethnic nationalism first found full expression in Iran where the Kurds were weaker than in either Iraq or Turkey. This condition was created by World War II, which resulted in political weakness and power vacuum in Iranian political system (McDowall, 2002, p.395). In this period the Mahabad Republic was founded and stabilized by Qazi Mohammad; the landlord and Judge of Mahabad. Qazi Mohammad was accepted as the leader of Komala which had less communist orientation at first and was trying to contact with Azerbaijan Movement (Digar, 1998, p.131). Soviet invited Qazi Mohammad and thirty of his followers to travel to Bakoo. In this travel the Kurd's representatives were stimulated to pronounce the independent Kurdistan. Qazi Mohammad, during his career as a leader of Movement of Kurdistan, had many travels to Soviet to observe communist progresses. But he did not accept to be integrated with Azerbaijan (McDowall, 2002, p.402; Digar, 1998, p.131). Since Russia was influencing the northern Iran, it was encouraging Azarians and Kurds to form separate states. This action pressured Iran to grant Russia some oil privileges. In fact the Kurds were economic exchange instruments by which USSR could obtain its interests (McDowall, 2002, p.409). Indeed, it was the British-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 that led to movements including the declaration of the so-called "the Mahabad Republic" in early 1946 and had not their roots in the local, regional or historical context

of Kurdish social life. Therefore it is not surprising that after Iran crisis ended, in parallel with Soviet withdrawal from Iran in May, Mahabad regime and its twin in Tabriz (Azerbaijan) were doomed and both fell in late 1946 (Muller, 2000, p.1).

## 6. QAZI MOHAMMAD, COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENT

Undoubtedly Qazi Mohammad sought to build an independent Kurdistan, but his biggest mistake was to count on foreign countries particularly Soviet. His travel to Soviet to familiarise with its development and progress under communist ideology motivated him to welcome this ideology as emancipatory and also progressive. He tended to adopt this kind of government as a model to operate in Kurdistan but finally he did not succeed. The following words express his tendency to Soviet model of government. He Says:

In Soviet there are various ethnic groups and nations who are living in this large territory which had not any mutual and positive interactions in the past but thanks to Russian revolution and governmental aids they have gained freedom and equality. They are undergoing development and advancement in all dimensions and they have reached to a cultural, civilization and economic stage that has not been seen before. (Borzoei, 1999, p.322)

Marxist political model which was accepted by Qazi Mohammad stimulated Iranian government reactions. Prime Minister, Ahmad Ghavam, prevented communist penetration and simultaneously opposed Kurdistan Democratic Movement. He constituted the Todeh Movement and ramified it into all Iranian provinces. Until that time Iran was not able to fight with Mahabad Republic explicitly because USSR was supporting it (Digar, 1998, p.132). In return Qazi Mohammad promised Soviet to allow their interference in Kurdistan. Also, Moscow tried to encourage Kurdish leaders to segregate from Iran and furthermore attempted to unite Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions. Qazi Mohammad tended to spread his ideology to Southern Kurdistan and Kermanshah province as well. Therefore, the Iranian government attempted to restrain southern tribes to join Mahabad movement because it was a big danger for Iran if Qazi Mohammad could justify Kurdish tribes to joint him (Borzoei, 1999, p.347). Then, central government decided to give Russia some more oil grants to prevent it from intervening in northern Iran. Therefore, since Soviet was able to attain its oil interests, it was disinterested to Kurdish goals and fate. Rahim Qazi in his interview with Qazi Mohammad wrote: "Qazi Mohammad, trusted to Soviet till latest moments", it shows his loyalty to Soviet policies along with his efforts to constitute a society based on the Soviet political pattern (Mahdavi, 2001, p.321). Soviet helped Qazi to find MR and promoted Molla Mustafa Barzai as General of Qazi

Mohammad's army and dressed his soldiers by Soviet uniform (Mahdavi, 2001, p.107). After Soviet withdrawal from Iran, following their agreement, Iranian government could attack MR and destroyed this local state. Barzai escaped and Qazi were arrested and were hanged in 1946 in Mahabad. This political action unmasked Soviet role in rise and fall of the most important Kurdish movement in that century. Economic interest versus national autonomy was the hallmark of MR and it can be a critical point to predict future political activities of Kurds. About the key role of Soviet in Kurdistan, Barzai who was the military leader of MR says in a very interesting statement: "It was not Kurds and Qazi who were defeated by Mohammad Reza Shah (Iran) but it was Soviet that was beaten by the U.S" (Kochera, 1994, p.225). USSR oscillation in its politics toward Kurds affected Kurdish socio-political life dramatically. But overall there have been many defects that led to collapse of the Mahabad Republic:

(a) Non-realisation of Soviet aids and its intensification supports Kurds.

(b) Opposition of tribes and landlords of southern Kurdistan.

(c) Weakness of Democratic Movement to interact with masses and its limit to northern Kurdistan particularly in Mahabad as Abdolla Pejdari says:

The Democratic Movement of Iranian Kurdistan did not have enough activists among the farmer and labour class. It had not taken any sufficient steps to organise and involve them in revolutionary struggles. No movement will be able to resist against political and militaristic threat unless they are based on the local and endogenous foundation.

(d) Role of Hama Rashid Baneh, who was appointed as the governor and leader of Bookan by Qazi Mohammad. Then he escaped to Iraq without Qazi Mohammad's consent. Hamid Moemeni declares: "At the beginning of declaration of MR, Hama Rashid who was a British spy was tending to debilitate it". He also speaks about some documents, which prove his contact with British and Soviet. Hama Rashid who was the chief of Baneh, during this period killed and burned Baneh and Saqez inhabitants. He betrayed Qazi Mohammad and fled to Iraq. Britain tried to employ him to conspire against Mosaddeq as well (Prime Minister of Iran) but was not successful (Borzoei, 1999).

In general, the MR can be described as a product of exogenous and politically motivated movement. To some extent, it was a political game between Iran and Soviet. Mehrdad Izady correctly writes: "In fact, the Mahabad Republic was created by Soviet occupation forces which constituted the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan as well. It is vain if we think that the Mahabad Republic could survive after Soviet withdrawal from Iran" (Ahmadi, 1999, p.314).

The events of this period explain the circumstances upon which foreign politics were made. The MR emerged

when Iran was not only politically and militarily weak but also when Shah did not intend to assign any economic-oil grants to Soviet. After the insurance of Soviet interests in Iran, along with the U.S pressures on the Soviet, MR was annihilated by Iranian government. On the one hand, MR can be considered as an external-oriented movement but on the other hand it expressed the Kurdish efforts to obtain their historical right. But the point is that the dependence on foreign aids and exogenous forces that have shaped Kurdish nationalism had been key historical features of all movements in this period. Now it would be better to look at another part of Kurdistan: Turkish Kurdistan which had been pioneer in political movements and most of Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish movements have been inspired by it.

## 7. TURKEY: KURDISH NATIONALISM, POLITICAL MOVEMENT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In fact all the Kurdish political movements are rooted in the period when the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War. However many educated Kurds, albeit a small proportion of the whole Kurdish population, were inspired by the idea of a Kurdish national entity. An opportunity to give this idea a form arose when the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the post-war period of 1918-1922 but proved unsuccessful (McDowall, 1991, p.295).

From the 1920s onwards, Turkey as a product of Ottoman collapse, Iraq and Iran had embarked upon policies designated to transform their ethnically mixed populations into cohesive civil nation. It is true that there were by the early 1920s Kurdish nationalists among the educated class and there existed Kurdish nationalist associations with different regional backgrounds and religious affiliations. However, their influence among the Kurdish population at large was quite limited unless they allied themselves with religious and regional authorisation (Bruinessen, 1998). In fact it could be strongly asserted that tribal and religious motivation of Kurdish movement has been determinant not only in Iranian Kurdistan but also in Turkey. Of course the Turkish Kurds ethnic assimilation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire which was characterised by violent and intense oppression is very different from moderate and soft ethnic assimilation and oppression in Iran. After the First World War, which resulted in Ottoman destruction and change of political boundaries of the Middle East, there occurred some political events that ranged from the declaration of independent Kurdistan to political revolts. In the next part of paper, we will outline critical points of these historical trends.

Until 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Kurdistan social formation was called feudal Kurdistan, the feudal context of social life created a tribal social system. The feudalism was a key determinant of social stratification. As a mode of

production, feudalism constituted farming and herding based economic structure and the illiterate society. The tribalism prevented to provide a national awareness. Therefore tribal feudalism was a big barrier to Kurdish movement progress. But it appeared that there was an appropriate mutual interaction between the Kurds and Ottoman. By the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century and early twentieth century there emerged many political issues that led to collapse of Ottoman. Ottoman was experiencing kind of destruction and finally it collapsed in 20<sup>th</sup> century (Kendal, 1991).

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed after Second World War, the Kurdish political and territorial fate became a regional and national problem that they had to solve it urgently. Therefore, the Coalition Forces tried to penetrate in the region and it was the result of their political action, which culminated in new division of the Middle East. Thus, on August 10<sup>th</sup> 1920, a political commission was erected by Britain, France and Italy that determined the fate of Kurdistan. They were responsible for the establishment of Kurdish independent government in six months.

This commission approved an agreement, the so-called "Sever Agreement" upon which the Kurds must have their own political system. But this plan remained unperformed and none of mentioned countries stepped forward to practice program of "Sever Agreement". Finally in July 24<sup>th</sup> 1923, the Kurdistan region was divided among Syria, Iraq and Turkey. In "Lozano Agreement", the Kurds were negotiated without their presence (Molla, 2001). About the Sever Agreement (SA) we maintain that it was a plan to delay Kurdish nationalist movements. During the SA, coalition forces promised Kurds to stabilise them by autonomous government but after coming to agreement with regional forces, they sold ethnical identity of Kurds for economic-oil interests. There were several factors that broke SA and put into practice "Lozano Agreement". Some of can be summarized as follow:

(a) Solution of Kurd's problem would lead to be solved most of the issues in Middle East. Therefore, there would have been no pretexts or justification to the intervention of super-powers in the region.

(b) The Kurdistan region could dominate over its oil resources. Therefore, super-powers could not obtain their economic interest easily.

(c) The division of Kurdistan was giving cause to retain convulsions that was helping super-powers to intervene in the Middle East countries.

(d) Iraq, Turkey and Syria gave some economic and political grants to foreign countries to conceal "Sever Agreement".

(e) Creation of Kurdish united political system may have resulted in rebellions of other ethnics and minorities of Middle East and may have imperilled regional and national security.

(f) The independent Kurdish government might have endangered interests of super-powers by dismissing its political relationship with them.

(g) Super-powers feared of Kurdistan to be militarily empowered as it could create political difficulties for them to follow their intentions.

Britain aimed to create one or several semi-independent governments with unstable political nature. About the Turkish Kurdistan, it was why Britain was sometimes creating a local government and raising somebody as local and regional leader of Kurdistan (Kendal, 1991).

After division of Kurdistan among three countries of Middle East, there were several movements in the regions. But the important issue is that these movements in these countries were socio-politically interrelated. At first, the role of exogenous factors in conducting and destructing them should be known and evaluated as have mentioned about Iranian Kurdistan movements. Although, we do not tend to deny the role of Kurdish people in political movements in Kurdistan but it could be claimed that foreign countries such as Britain and the United States guided the Turkish and Iraqi movements remarkably. For example, Russia was fermenting trouble and unrest amongst Kurdish tribes in the Ottoman period at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century by encouraging them to challenge Ottoman authority. More recently in 1945 the Soviet encouraged the establishment of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran. In the 1960s both Israel and the U.S encouraged the Kurds of Iraq to rebel against Baghdad and at the time of negotiations between 1970 and 1974, they were supporting Barzani and helped to re-arm him in the case of failure of the negotiations (McDowall, 1991). In what follows we will have glance at the most important movements of Turkish Kurdistan in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

## 8. SHEIKH OBEIDOLLAH'S MOVEMENT AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Sheikh Obeidollah Nahri's revolt, in 1880, was the latest Kurdish revolt before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He belonged to Naghshbandi Sheikhes, the most powerful and influential religious sect of Ottoman that spread in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Sheikh Obeidollah rose against Ottoman penetration in Kurdish emirates and tended to attack Iran as well. The Ottoman Empire decided to appoint Turks in the Kurdish regions and it was an important factor to rise against Ottoman. Naghshbandieh sect, which Obeidollah was one of its powerful chief, in spite of weakness of Kurdish Emirate (States), retained their traditional power and authority of the First World War (Kendal, 1991).

In 1880, Sheikh Obeidollah began his revolt. He had a great metaphysical and charismatic authority on his followers. His authority was due to his religious charisma,

but some historians think that Obeidolla was a selfish and deceitful leader who abused people's religious appertains. In this respect, the Author of Sheikh Obeidollah Biography writes: "Now and then, Sheikh Obeidollah put somebody in his father's tomb (Sheikh Taher) then, he stood in front of the tomb and pretended to discuss with his father, and he motivated people by saying, "Sheikh Taher told me to gather tribes and attack Iran to get its government in order to prevail justice and God and Prophet Mohammad's instructions". Then, Obeidollah stimulated tribes and people by the declaration of Holy War and his rule was spread in the entire region (Borzoei, 1999).

By using his charismatic characteristics Obeidolla tried to unite Iranian and Turkish Kurdistan. His revolts were based on three bases: economic, class and religious motivations. One of his personal economic motivations in his opposition to the Iranian government was that Iranian officials tended to take possession of his personal properties and also levy taxes on his lands. Besides, since he was Sunni, he had many reasons to oppose with Qajarieh government. He mobilized Sunni Kurds against government forces and also made them to attack the Ottoman Empire. Western historians such as Minorsky, Nikitin and Kochera considered Obeidollah as "the father of Kurdish and Iranian Kurdish nationalism" But no valid document exists to prove this claim.

Sheikh Obeidollah by his appealing religious charisma and supports of British and Ottoman, attacked Iranian frontiers, and simultaneously, under British influence, he was fighting with Ottoman and on the other hand he fought against Russia in defence of the Ottoman Empire. Sheikh Obeidollah for two reasons took part in Ottoman war against Russia actively. Firstly, he has the same religion as the Ottoman Empire (Sunni). Secondly, his religious commitment, supporting Muslims against Non-Muslims, impelled him to participate in this war (Borzoei, 1999, pp.55-58). Then, ideological anarchism can be best title for his movement. As it was about Simko, Obeidollah's movement was directed by Britain as an exogenous factor. Since it was not rooted in the local and endogenous context, he was defeated by the Ottoman Empire. This judgement can be right about another movement of Turkish Kurds by Sheikh Said Piran. In this context, both Sheikh Said Piran and Sheikh Obeidollah Nahri are evaluated as neither purely religious nor purely nationalist. In fact the important difference between Iranian and Turkish Kurds movements was religion factor. The Turkish Kurds' movements were affected by religion and most of their political leaders were religious ones but the Iranian Kurds' leaders were tribal and feudalist ones. On the other hand, religion played a significant role in failure of Kurdish political movements in Turkey. Since the Kurdish movement leaders had common religion with the Ottoman Empire, in final stance, there were some religious considerations that prevented success of these movements. This factor exhausted revolutionary

potentials and provided some difficulties to choose between nationalism and Islamism as this was a case about Obeidollah's war against Russia in defence of the Ottoman Empire, while Ottoman was an old enemy of Kurdish/Sunni nationalism.

## 9. IRAQI KURDISTAN, KURDISH NATIONALISM AND SHEIKH MAHMOOD BARZENJI

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century many political movements occurred in Kurdish society as a whole. They were created at once but they had the same relative characteristics. Being directed under the same political and ideological circumstances, the tribal-feudal origins, externally-directed nature and quick destruction were main the particularities of them.

In 20<sup>th</sup> century Iraqi Kurdistan, the most important socio-political movement was by Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji. Of its religious nature and foreign intervention, it was the same as Sheikh Nahri's and Sheikh Said's movements. In fact the religious factor is a key concept to study the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century movements of Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. The most basic reason is that the religious sects such as Ghaderieh and Naghshbandieh had rooted historically in this region. This religious system is transformed into the tribal-feudalist property system and mixed with the political structure. Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji like Nahri and Piran was from such a religious sect family.

After the First World War and after Ottoman was divided, Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji started his efforts to make Kurdistan independent. He came to the throne as the first king of Iraqi Kurdistan. But he was defeated soon (Molla, 2001, p.44). In the first stage, Sheikh Mahmood was raised by British and was appointed as a Sulaymaniyah ruler. In this respect Britain's purpose was to erect a government under its domination and also to create a political, national and ethnical enemy for Turkey because Turkey was claiming to restore southern Kurdish provinces of Iraq as its historical territory. The Iraqi Kurdistan was and is one of the great oil resources. Therefore, the British interests were being imperilled by Turkey.

British control of the southern parts of Kurdistan made the Kurds feel ever more optimistic as they perceived the British, in particular, to be their saviours from the Ottoman or other countries. The events in 1919 illustrated how premature Kurdish optimism was (Eskandar, 2000, p.162). In the beginning of Barzenenji Movement, Sheikh Mahmood played a significant role in shaping early British-Kurdish relations, by virtue of his outstanding religious position as a head of the Ghaderieh Sufi Sect and his social position as a landlord aristocrat. On the eve of the First World War Mahmood made his first contact with

European powers via mixed British-Russian boundary commission which attempted to resolve outstanding boundary dispute between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian kingdom (Eskandar, 2000, pp.141-142). As it was said Sheikh Mahmood was appointed as a governor of Sulaymaniyah by Britain. He tried to build a united Kurdistan and tried to expand his territory without British support and interference. Since he pronounced himself as a leader of independent kingdom of Kurdistan and separated his goals from British, he was attacked by British-Iraq armies and was beaten. When Sheikh Mahmood was called to court, he said about his purposes and ambiguous role of Britain in Southern Kurdistan:

I concluded a contract with you just according to my nation's request and to get freedom for my nation. I permitted you to enter our region provided that you are guarantor of this freedom. You lied; you had bad intentions in your mind. It was in my line of duty to prevent your abuse because I was my nation's representative. You behaved so negatively that there remained nothing more than war for us. Right now, I am your captive and I do not expect my enemy and my nation's enemy to forgive me; I am ready to die in sake of my nation. (Molla Omar Isa, 2001, p.44)

As this written statement shows, the British had a great and determinant role in the rise and fall of Kurdish political movements in all parts of Kurdistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Therefore this short introduction on Barzenji nationalist effort will prove our idea about remarkable role of exogenous forces in political Movement-making in Kurdistan in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Let us theorise and discuss these debates according to our theoretical model to reach a general conclusion.

## 10. CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHAT HAVE KURDS DONE?

In this short study, we tried to demarcate our area of interest, then, we constructed an organisational model to describe and explicate how organisational factors could historically affect the political Movement-making in Kurdistan. Therefore, we proffered a brief description on historical and political rising and purposes of main movements, and documented them by referring to reliable resources.

According to the contingency theory, the exogenous forces such as foreign contingent impacts have been the most important factors in shaping, reshaping and directing of Kurdish movements but all the factors that have an effect on Kurdistan were not political. They can be categorised in three levels; Macro level including exogenous factors, Meso level, containing socio-economic factors such as tribal-feudalism and regionalism and Micro Level, composed of cultural factors including illiteracy and cultural poverty. Exogenous Forces (political conditions) are the most determinant factor. In summery, the combination of these levels prevented creation of

political endeavour of the Kurds. Political forces directed by external pressures were critical but since these forces were not corresponded with other dimensions and levels, it led to wastage of historical potential of the Kurds to transform their ethnic identity to political practices. Regionalism; small and limited size of political and military groups, lack of modern technology (weapon and program) are other factors that played an important role in this trend. As it was said, this theory can explain just a part of reality and other theories will be able to make clear other parts.

The Population ecology theory, in contrast, considers political movements of the Kurds in the general environmental context, by using another perspective. The Kurdish political movements could not fulfil environmental needs. Their actions were performed in particular-small regions and in limited range and were based on ethnic and regional ideology. Since the environment required a greater, wider and stronger movement, it tended to fail all the limited and unnecessary ones. Then according to this theory political Kurdistan movements were regional and non-political because they did not want and could not be able to unite all Kurdish regions, parts, sects and ideologies. According to this theory, the Kurds could have adapted to the environment successfully if they had been able to compete; but they struggled and did not survive. In fact, the population ecology theory regards human issues as a natural selection and condemns all social entities that can not compete. Generally, this theory gives us two principle rules, which are as follows:

(a) In the political struggle the Kurds could not compete and fulfil their environmental obligations.

(b) They were not able to adapt to their environment to sustain their own entity and identity.

We believe that there were many factors that culminated Kurds not to be successful and adaptive. These factors were naturally political.

The political climate in Kurdistan in the studied period was a combination of three main factors, the exogenous forces (EF), the states and the ethnics (tribes). These political factors were constraining each other. Each of them was influenced by the other two. The EF was pressuring the states and the ethnic groups. In the same way it was influenced by the states and the ethnic groups simultaneously. The ethnic groups were also under pressure from the states as well. In brief there was a kind of threefold the mutual relationship. The ethnics (Kurds) lacked any technology and integrated ideology. They had fragmented in tribally regional divisions. Generally it could be claimed that they were suffering in three ways; the pressure of the states, the exogenous forces, and the internal pressures (tribal-feudalism- regionalism). Therefore it was very predictable that the Kurds would become political losers.

To compete or to sustain in the natural selection, the Kurds must have had two opportunities. On the one hand, they must have been equal in access to scarce resources such as technology, international consideration or political consciousness, and on the other hand, they must have had a socially, economically and politically integrated society (community). They must have been equipped with united ethnic identity—ideology, social solidarity, spontaneous political action and hen-tribalism. Since they did not provide themselves with these two factors, they were defeated.

The Institutionalisation Theory (IT) turns its attention to Kurdish political movement in another distinctive way. In this perspective, an important point is that why the Kurdish political endeavours during its long history did not become institutionalised. In fact this theory draws our attention to institutional Macro-Micro obstacles of Kurdish political efforts which led to their fast rise and fast failure. According to our findings and regarding to IT theoretical implications, Kurdish political efforts can be explained as follows: The Kurdish movements remained in the habitualization process and did not objectify their efforts to institutionalise their political ideology. Kurd leaders were composed of homogenous actors, namely, tribal–feudal or religious–feudal leaders that originated from various regional and territorial contexts. In other words, Kurdish leaders were those who searched for their own political and tribal interests along with quasi-national ideology while Kurdistan in that period demanded a variety of intellectual and political elites to be equipped with national and trans-regional ideology to follow Kurdish political interests and to compete with other political forces.

Kurdish leaders did not constitute real nationalism. They frequently attempted to compromise with exogenous factors. Therefore, a kind of imitation or low initiative process appears among these movements. Kurdish leaders used old-tested ways of trusting on exogenous factors and repeated the past mistakes frequently. Kurds' real nationalism has never been imitated by Kurdish leaders satisfactorily. It has had regional and territorial motivation as all regions or tribes claimed to be independent. Besides, it was naturally encouraged and stimulated more and more by external constraints and Kurdish leaders brought into the scene old ways of relying on external supports. Finally, these external supports had culminated in failure and frustration of Kurdish movements. Furthermore, the lack of theorisation process to find an appropriate way to compete or struggle accelerated the failure of these movements.

Dependency perspective considers general resources that Kurds had depended on. By using this theory, we can conclude that there have been several resources, which Kurdish leaders appealed to in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. They can be divided into

two general segments: external resources including exogenous forces, that we discussed earlier and internal resources including endogenous factors such as tribal, regional and religious supports. It should be asserted that none of these resources were able to meet Kurdish political requirements; exogenous forces were temporal determinants that played their role according to their own economic and political logic. On the one hand, they were compromising with the Kurds to grant them their rights and on the other hand, by negotiating with the states, they began to undermine Kurdish movements. Their positions were vague and ambivalent and oriented toward their political grants, as it was about MR. Endogenous forces such as tribalism and religious supports wasted political potential in challenging with the states. Tribe chiefs were land-territory-oriented and they easily betrayed each other. Moreover religious origins of many Kurdish political leaders made Kurdish leaders to compromise with their historical enemies against their foreign enemies as it was about Obeidollah and Sheikh Said in Turkey. Then, according to the resource dependency theory, organisational structure of Kurdish movements was unstable and incoherent because their resources depended on those who were in oscillation and were unconfident and changeable.

As it mentioned, each theory was able to explain one or some aspects of political movements in Kurdistan. Also it became specified that they can provide us with a synthetic model, as a new sociological persuasion to discuss the political studies without being involved in mere political debates. Unfortunately, the performed studies related to the Kurdish political problem have always headed to some historical tales or personal actions. There are only few studies that have drawn their attention to socio-anthropological factors. There is an explicit demand to use a scientific sociological vision and to avoid mere and simple political justifications and arguments.

To conclude, the theoretical discussion is summarized as follows:

The Contingency Theory can be an explanatory analytical model that regards exogenous and endogenous critical factors as structural obstacles in the process of political movement-making and considers macro, mesa and micro levels of analysis.

The population ecology concentrated on the Kurdish political ideology, action to compete, struggle or adapt with political environments. According to this theory, the Kurds could have adapted to the environment successfully if they had been able to compete; but they struggled and did not survive.

The Institutional Theory focused on why the Kurdish ideology was not able to realize in a form of institutionally stable structure and to objectify its identity as a formal configuration. It argued that habitualisation, composition

of Kurd leaders of regional actors, imitated ideology and lack of theoretical and conceptual theorisation led to this situation.

Resource dependency theory claimed that historical trends in political actions of the Kurds have often been dependent on the unstable and ambivalent exogenous and endogenous resources. To get to their goals, Kurds should separate themselves from socio-political dependency and try to be self-dependent.

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