
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019

2009

Post-apartheid Political Culture In South Africa, 1994-2004

Andrew Kinsell
University of Central Florida



Part of the [History Commons](#)

Find similar works at: <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd>

University of Central Florida Libraries <http://library.ucf.edu>

This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation

Kinsell, Andrew, "Post-apartheid Political Culture In South Africa, 1994-2004" (2009). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019*. 4084.

<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/4084>



POST-APARTHEID POLITICAL
CULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA
1994-2004

by

ANDREW KINSELL
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2005

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of History
in the College of Arts and Humanities
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term 2009

©2009 Andrew Kinsell

ABSTRACT

Between 1994 and 2004 the African National Congress (ANC) dominated government at every level of every branch. As a result, the checks and balances that are a necessary part of any democracy were non-existent. Understanding the powerful position they occupied, the ANC increasingly acted on its own accord without any regard for the wishes of the South African populace. This lack of public consideration, coupled with the failure to economically redistribute wealth among the vast unemployed majority, turned an optimistic political culture with mass participation in 1994 into a disillusioned political culture with reduced political participation in 2004.

These economic failures, along with the rise in crime and political corruption that dominated South African politics, eroded the optimism and trust that for a short time was prevalent in South Africa. Instead, the post-apartheid political culture of South Africa resembled what it did for all of those decades under apartheid: one of disillusionment and non-participation. The following thesis will argue that during the decade following 1994, South Africans became increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with government as the divide between the small-upper class and the large-proletariat continually expanded. The various explanations for the expansion of this divide will be presented along with survey information, which will attempt to garner what the South African public perceives to be; 1) the primary threat to the long-term stability of democracy, 2) the affectiveness of government between 1994 and 2004. Most importantly, the surveys will ask South Africans who voted in 1994 but not in 2004 the reason for not voting in order to fully understand the specific cause for the decline in political participation.

For my Parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank everyone in the history department at the University of Central Florida. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Ezekiel Walker for his unwavering support and guidance. I would also like to thank Nancy Rauscher who helped me make the transition into graduate school a smooth and successful process. Within the graduate department I would like to thank my fellow classmates for their friendship. Outside of the graduate department I would like to thank Nick Cutro, Jacob Marks and Patrick Barrett for their support and friendship. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and my sister, who have stood by me in good times and bad, all the while giving me advice and support. Without you the completion of this thesis would have never been possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	viii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Literature Review	6
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA TO 1994.....	17
Dutch Colonial Era (1652-1795)	18
British Colonial Era (1795-1910)	20
Pre-apartheid Era (1910-1948)	29
Apartheid Era (1948-1994).....	35
CHAPTER THREE: INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGES FROM 1994-2004	44
Economy	44
Education	49
Healthcare	53
Human Development Index (HDI)	57
CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL CULTURE FROM 1994-2004.....	61
ANC Dominance	65
Crime and Corruption	71
Economic Shortcomings	78
Lack of Nationalism	80
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION.....	84
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL	87

APPENDIX B: SURVEY	89
APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT	92
LIST OF REFERENCES	95

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Human Development Index of South Africa, 1994-2004	58
Figure 2: Corruption Perception Index of South Africa, 1995-2004	76

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Economic Performance 1994-2004	48
Table 2: Employment/Labor/Job Creation 1994-2004	48
Table 3: Floor crossing Statistics for 2002	67
Table 4: Concern over ANC Dominance.....	70
Table 5: Concern over Crime and Corruption	77
Table 6: Concern over Economic Shortcomings	79
Table 7: Concern over Lack of Shared National Identity	82

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

When the first democratic elections were held in South Africa in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) promised that all South African citizens, regardless of their race, would have a share in determining both domestic and foreign policy. By taking this stance the ANC directly targeted the vast population of black South Africans who had been severely marginalized for over one hundred years. Indeed, this tactic succeeded as the ANC won the 1994 election and appointed Nelson Mandela as president, charging him with the responsibility to lead the first democratic government. On 9 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president of South Africa. It was at this point, during the inauguration speech, he stated that his goal was “to create jobs, promote peace and reconciliation, and to guarantee freedom,” while ending, “the widespread poverty so pervasive among the majority of our people.”¹ The response among the majority of South Africa’s black populace was euphoric, to say the least.²

A decade after his momentous speech, few of the promises made by Nelson Mandela and the ANC came to fruition. The minimal accomplishments the ANC made between 1994 and 2004 focused on economically improving the urban centers with little regard for the outlying rural areas. For instance, in rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal “close to half a million black people eke out an existence in shacks and subhuman dwellings within an area of twenty-five square

¹ Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s Address to the People of Cape Town, Grand Parade, on the Occasion of his Inauguration as State President,” Presidential Inauguration Speech, 9 May 1994, “African National Congress,” www.anc.org, [organization]; <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/inaugct.html>, accessed 2 October 2007.

² *New York Times* (New York), 3 May 1994.

miles.”³ Thus, despite promising all South Africans equality and a voice in shaping South Africa’s future, very little changed during the first decade of democratic rule.

Although the ANC has essentially turned its back on the segment of society that won them the 1994 election, it did not, and still does not, face a great deal of opposition from the black populace. While this may seem intriguing, the lack of opposition to the ANC can be explained relatively easily. First, by following a conservative and urban industrialization policy centered on the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program, the ANC continued to entrench South Africa’s rural populace in poverty. In turn, this forced the marginalized-black majority populace to focus on short term, day-to-day survival, instead of long-term improvement via political organization. Second, the ANC controlled leadership at the local and provincial levels through political pressure and acts of floor crossing.⁴ Specifically, the unification of civic associations throughout South Africa enabled the ANC to focus on controlling several key leaders instead of numerous individuals from every locality.

Finally, external and domestic monetary donations made to liberal democratic non-government organizations (NGO) have given these NGO’s the resources necessary to convince some disillusioned South Africans that democracy does not always equate with equality or even an improvement in standards of living.⁵ The indoctrination of this philosophy was a result of the combined efforts of individuals both inside and outside of South Africa. Those inside of South Africa, specifically the ANC, its supporters, and the traditionally upper-class elite, rallied around

³ Julian Kunnie, *Is Apartheid Really Dead: Pan-Africanist Working Class Cultural Critical Perspectives* (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000).

⁴ Elke Zuern, “Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid Government in South Africa,” *African Studies Review* 45, no. 1 (April 2002): 97.

⁵ Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in South Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 87 (2001): 48.

liberal procedural democracy in order to preserve the current economic structure. Those outside of South Africa, specifically Western nations and capitalistic international corporations invested in South Africa, feared a move towards socialism that social democracy and the redistribution of wealth might eventually entail.

I do not mean to suggest that there has not been any resistance to the ANC since 1994, quite the contrary. In the years following the first democratic elections, several political parties conveyed their displeasure regarding both the political culture in South Africa and the direction it was headed in general. This opposition to the ANC has grown in recent years as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Democratic Alliance (DA), have been joined by numerous other parties including the Independent Democrats (ID), which was formed in 2003. Sprinkle in several smaller parties including the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), Freedom Front Plus (FF+), and the United Democratic Movement (UDM), among others, and the picture of a convoluted, splintered political culture reveals itself. However these parties, especially the smaller parties previously listed, continually struggled to garner an adequate operating budget and the voter turnout needed to challenge the ANC due to their impoverished supporter base.⁶

Without the time, support, or financial capabilities available to them the South African populace found it difficult, if not impossible, to organize and legitimately challenge the ANC.⁷ What complicates this situation is that the ANC understood that this population did not, and still

⁶ Global Integrity, *Global Integrity Index (GII)*, 2004.

⁷ Alexander Johnston, "The 1999 Election and South Africa's Postapartheid Political Culture," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 27, no. 2 (1999).

does not, have the means to oppose it.⁸ This understanding emboldened the ANC and convinced those within the party that they could govern in whatever manner they wished because there was no need to fear their displacement from power. Hence, not only did the ANC turn its back on the aforementioned populations, but also created a political platform that purposefully and intentionally neglected them.

The lack of improvement during the first decade of democracy, coupled with the overwhelming political corruption that has dominated South African politics, eroded the optimism and trust that for a short time was apparent in South Africa. Instead between 1994 and 2004 the post-apartheid political culture resembled what it did for all of those decades under apartheid: one of disillusionment and non-participation.⁹ This thesis argues that between 1994 and 2004 the South African political culture saw a steady decline in political participation. Specifically, it will also seek to understand the degree to which ANC dominance, crime and corruption in government, economic shortcomings, and a lack of shared national identity caused the decrease in political participation. While accomplishing this main goal it will also present the various problematic issues that continue to challenge democratic stability in South Africa. In order to accomplish these tasks this thesis will incorporate a wide array of sources including the distribution and collection of surveys.

Survey data was gathered from the two largest cities in South Africa, Johannesburg and Durban. Large-urban cities were chosen as distribution sites because they encompass different segments of the populace and most affectively represent the diversity of South Africa. In Johannesburg, surveys were distributed in the financial district and surrounding strip malls which

⁸ Robert Mattes, "South Africa: Democracy Without the People," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 25.

⁹ Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 239.

are areas frequented by individuals from all races and social classes. In Durban, surveys were distributed at the Victoria Street Market and along the city's beachfront district. The Victoria Street Market was chosen as a distribution site due to its high Indian population and the need to include their opinions in the survey data. The beachfront district was chosen because, much like the financial district of Johannesburg, it is frequented by South Africans from all races and social classes. Due to the surveys subject matter and the time constraints of me only being in South Africa for 8 days, several hundred surveys were distributed however only 65 surveys met both the inclusion criteria and were completed in their entirety within the limited time period. The inclusion criteria required participants to be at least 32 years old and mandated that each participant was a citizen of South Africa in 1994. This age was utilized as a cutoff because it was the minimum age an individual could vote in the 1994 election.

The survey consisted of thirteen questions which were relegated to the period 1994 to 2004 and focused on gathering the opinions individuals have regarding the first decade of democracy in South Africa.¹⁰ This included participants rating improvements, or lack thereof, in the economic, political, and healthcare sectors between 1994 and 2004. Participants were also asked to provide what each thought of the ANC led government, along with what they deemed to be of most concern to the stability of democracy in South Africa. Namely these concerns are: economic shortcomings (failure to redistribute wealth), crime and corruption, ANC dominated government, and lack of nationalism or nationalistic identity.¹¹ Lastly, the surveys asked South

¹⁰ Because the survey was aimed at gathering information from the South African public as a single entity, demographic questions were limited to age and did not include race or gender. These requirements were mandated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) in order for the survey to gain University approval.

¹¹ A copy of the survey is included in the appendix.

Africans who voted in 1994 but did not vote in 2004 to explain why they did not vote in order to understand why there was a decline in political participation.

Furthermore, this thesis also utilizes United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO) reports, the Human Development Index (HDI), the Global Integrity Index (GII), the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), election polling results, and newspaper articles. UNDP, World Bank, and WHO reports will be used to chart the improvement, or lack thereof, in the economic, education, and healthcare sectors. Election results from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa will be presented to show voter turnout and the varying levels of political participation in South Africa between 1994 and 2004. The GII and CPI will be used to present how researchers and journalists in South Africa viewed the South African political construct, along with the GCB, which will be used to present how the South African populace viewed crime and corruption in politics. Finally, newspaper articles will be used to buttress the survey data and to provide additional insight into how the South African populace viewed and continues to view its government. These sources, along with the GCB, are especially informative as one of the key components in a political culture is the way a given populace perceives, feels, and relates with its government.

Literature Review

While there has been an increase in scholarship conducted on post-apartheid South Africa in recent years, many of these studies have focused on social and economic aspects of South African society. This is not to suggest that there have not been significant post-apartheid

political studies, quite the contrary. However, there has been a tendency for these political studies to focus on the various challenges inherent in South Africa by tracing back several hundred years. In the midst of providing this background information the analysis spent on the post-apartheid political era becomes somewhat constrained. Indeed to date there are few studies published since the second election that focus solely on some aspect of the post-apartheid political culture in South Africa. Literature written prior to the second election was excluded as the extent to which the post-apartheid political culture could be evaluated compromises their accuracy. Political scholarship that analyzes and evaluates the post-apartheid political culture will be presented in the following literature review. Respectively these publications are: “The 1999 Election and South Africa’s Post apartheid Political Culture”, “South Africa: Democracy Without the People”, “Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid Government in South Africa”, “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa”, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa”, *Politics and Society in South Africa, Politics in Southern Africa*, and *Fault-Lines in South African Democracy*.

As previously mentioned, the historiography that solely focuses on South Africa’s post-apartheid political culture after the second election is somewhat limited. One of the first publications written after the second election is an article written by Alexander Johnston entitled “The 1999 Election and South Africa’s postapartheid Political Culture” (1999). Johnston begins this article by stating his belief that democracy has been consolidated in South Africa and overall the process has been a relatively smooth one. To support this perspective he points to the 1999 election, which was conducted without large-scale opposition and with the results being overwhelmingly in favor of the ANC. That said, he does point to some problems with the political culture and the direction it is headed in general. Specifically, Johnston argues that the

ANC has been limited to the extent that they could advocate nationalism because of the fear that nationalistic appeals would not garner support from neo-nationalist and post-nationalist individuals. He emphasizes that because of this lack of nationalistic rhetoric, the South African political culture does not have a nationalistic or unified identity. Instead, he concludes that it is actually more fragmented than it was in 1994. Another main problem that Johnston argues has plagued the South African political culture regards the inability for the ANC to make difficult decisions. He notes that since taking over in 1994, the ANC has continually followed a policy of compromise and has avoided or delayed making difficult decisions.¹²

For instance, Johnston points out that the ANC has been unwilling to alter the government's position on organized labor versus mass job creation for the unemployed because of the formers role during the years of apartheid. Elaborating on this point Johnston states that the "political costs of long-term unemployment have been more acceptable than the risk of upheaval from any disruption to government's relationship with organized labor."¹³ In other words, Johnston believes that the ANC has decided that protecting its own legitimacy, both presently and in the future, is more important than addressing the most pressing national issue; mass unemployment. He argues that by taking this self-serving stance the ANC has created a political culture of citizens who lack moral cohesion, a common purpose, and a nationalistic or unified identity.

In *Politics and Society in South Africa* (2001) Daryl Glaser discusses the process by which racial and class order was constructed in South Africa. He accomplishes this task by explaining the various tactics through which the Afrikaner populace splintered the non-white

¹² Alexander Johnston, "The 1999 Election and South Africa's Postapartheid Political Culture," 23.

¹³ Johnston, "The 1999 Election," 20.

populace into ethnic and racial sects. The intention of this explanation is to present a society that, entering into the 1994 election, was and had been split along racial, class, and ethnic lines for several decades. He concludes that identifying the differences between classes in particular could assist the struggle for a non-racial and classless society.¹⁴ While the background information provided by Glaser is useful for those both unfamiliar and familiar with South African history, it is the final sections on the post-apartheid political culture that is of particular interest.

Glaser begins his discussion of the post-apartheid political culture by pointing out the several conditions he believes are necessary in order for a society to become democratized. Namely these requirements are that a political culture must have: democratic experience, an alterable public opinion, crosscutting of social cleavages, and widely shared values and identities.¹⁵ Glaser believes that, to a certain degree, the post-apartheid political culture has fulfilled all of these requirements and that democratic consolidation has taken place. Furthermore, he believes the main problems with the post-apartheid political culture, non-participation and disillusionment, stem from the widespread crime and corruption that dominates the South African landscape. It is a point of interest that Glaser argues that corruption comes not from the ANC but from the local governments and is a result of the autonomy they receive from the central organization of the ANC.

Contrastingly, Elke Zuern argues that the corruption and ineffective governance set forth by local governments is not a result of the autonomy that they receive from the ANC but rather a lack thereof. In his article entitled “Fighting for Democracy” (2002), Zuern points out that once

¹⁴ Daryl Glaser, *Politics and Society in South Africa* (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 111.

¹⁵ Glaser, *Politics and Society*, 216.

the ANC ascended to power they unified the numerous independent civic associations under one organization named the South African National Civic Organization (Sanco).¹⁶ By combining these associations it was easier for the ANC to affectively control the grassroots leadership while also securing the support of the rural black majority. Furthermore, with the leaders of Sanco under their control the ANC was able to continually garner electoral support despite enacting legislature, such as GEAR, that failed to assist this voter base.

Zuern goes on to stress that the dominance of the ANC, and the collusion between the ANC and Sanco, at both the local and national level, has disillusioned the rural black populace and has made participation in government and politics challenging for the common individual.¹⁷ He argues that this lack of participation and disillusionment in the ANC is the most troubling aspect of the post-apartheid political culture as it was this very grassroots segment of South African society that assisted the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement. However, while Zuern believes the ANC has failed to uphold many of its promises he argues that democratic consolidation has taken place in South Africa. That said, he emphasizes that the long-term success of this democracy rests on the ability for the ANC to appeal and relate with the whole South African populace.¹⁸

Although the unification of civic associations under Sanco allowed the ANC to concert their efforts on fewer individuals, it was, and has been, the promotion of procedural democracy by NGO's and civil society organizations (CSO) that has, and continues to, quell widespread protest. Julie Hearn argues in "The 'Uses and Abuses' of Civil Society in Africa" that civil

¹⁶ Elke Zuern, "Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid Government in South Africa," 83.

¹⁷ Zuern, "Fighting for Democracy," 83.

¹⁸ Zuern, "Fighting for Democracy," 81.

society must be autonomous and should not be manipulated by the government or used to stabilize its position.¹⁹ However, it is in her article “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa,” where Hearn focuses specifically on South Africa and the process by which, and ramifications of, a populace that has been manipulated by NGO’s and CSO’s.

She notes that since 1994, the NGO’s and CSO’s who receive by far the most funding are advocates of procedural democracy, which the ANC has continued to adhere to, instead of social democracy, which was the platform the ANC initially promised to follow.²⁰ These organizations include the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Idasa, and the South African Institute for Race Relations; all of which have received several million dollars from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Hearn points out that because the South African civil society has been indoctrinated by these well-funded NGO’s and CGO’s, the ANC has retained support among the South African voter base. Resultantly, the government has not faced widespread opposition despite preserving the same exploitative apartheid era economic system the ANC assured would change.²¹

Regarding democratic consolidation, Hearn believes that democracy has been successfully emplaced but it is not the democracy the ANC had initially promised to instill. And while liberal NGO’s and CSO’s have successfully altered the mindset of many individuals, half of the South African populace continues to equate democracy with economic improvement made possible via social democracy. That said, although the divide over what form of democracy to practice is troubling, even more concerning is the fact that “autonomous social forces are more

¹⁹ Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa,” 44.

²⁰ Julie Hearn, “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa,” *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2000): 826.

²¹ Hearn, “Aiding Democracy?,” 829.

urgently needed than ever before,” but “are as absent as never before”.²² From this statement it can be deduced that Hearn believes the most threatening aspect to the stability of the post-apartheid political culture is the dominance by the ANC, particularly over civil society.

Bolstering the argument that democratic consolidation has taken place in post-apartheid South Africa is *Fault-Lines in South African Democracy* (2003), by Fred Hendricks. Hendricks agrees with Johnston and Glaser that democracy has been instilled in South Africa but that it has not been carried over into the economic realm. Specifically, he argues that all South Africans regardless of race or class have freedoms of speech, religion, and organization but do not have equality in employment, education, and land ownership.²³ For instance, in a 1998 report released by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality, 61% of black South Africans lived in poverty while only 1% of white South Africans were impoverished. He concludes that these economic disparities, along with the lack of persistence by the government to address these shortcomings, are the main obstacles in the way of the successful continuation of a democratic political culture.²⁴

In contrast to scholars such as Johnston, Glaser, Zuern, and Hendricks, Robert Mattes does not believe democratic consolidation has taken place in post-apartheid South Africa. In his article entitled “South Africa: Democracy Without the People?” (2002), Mattes argues that South Africans are not fully behind the democratic government which is apparent as there has been a decrease in political participation.²⁵ He notes that this is due to several reasons including the fact

²² Julie Hearn, “The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa,” 52.

²³ Fred Hendricks, *Fault-Lines in South African Democracy: Continuing Crises of Inequality and Injustice*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003), 9.

²⁴ Hendricks, *Fault-Lines*, 28.

²⁵ Robert Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy Without the People?,” 23.

that over 500,000 jobs have been lost since 1995 and that economic growth has been at 3% annum despite requiring 6-7% annum in order to cut unemployment and reduce inequality.²⁶ More importantly these economic shortcomings are coupled by political domination by the ANC. For instance, amendments made to the constitution since 1994 have enabled the ANC to determine the makeup of provincial governments and designate local mayoralties. Furthermore, any checks made by oversight committees on the ANC have resulted in alienation from party lines and expulsion, such as in the case of Bantu Holomisa.²⁷

Mattes argues that because a political culture is shaped by both political and economic trends, support for the government is fleeting. Indeed, “the web of organizations and the impressive tradition of popular participation that emerged to challenge the apartheid systems have withered.”²⁸ This loss of trust and participation is much more concerning than the lack of a national identity. Indeed, Mattes points towards polls conducted since 1995 that show that there is an agreement among the populace of the presence of a common identity that overcomes economic and racial divides.²⁹ Yet again this is in contrast to the theories disseminated by scholars such as Johnston and Glaser. In other words, Mattes believes that the most concerning issue regarding the post-apartheid political culture is the manner in which the ANC has governed rather than the question of nationalism or the problems of crime and corruption.

²⁶ Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 23.

²⁷ Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 25.

²⁸ Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 29.

²⁹ Mattes, “South Africa: Democracy,” 29.

In congruence with Mattes, Gretchen Bauer and Scott Taylor also argue that democratic consolidation has not taken place in South Africa since 1994.³⁰ In *Politics in South Africa* (2005), they argue that the ANC has emplaced a one-party government much like the apartheid-era system and have consolidated power at every level of government. One example of this dominance is their direct defiance of the South African populace's wishes. For instance, Bauer and Taylor point out the passing of legislation that legalized floor crossing by the Constitutional Court in 2003. Despite a three to one popular vote opposing the legalization of floor crossing, the court passed the legislation, which promptly gave the ANC nine new members in Parliament and an overall majority in the National Assembly.³¹ Bauer and Taylor believe that this reluctance to abide to the people's wishes, along with the lack of economic and social improvements, is the main cause of the disillusionment that has run rampant in the political culture of South Africa. Also like Mattes, Bauer and Taylor believe that while there is a lack of nationalistic identity in South Africa the most pressing concern in the political culture is ANC dominance and the resulting disillusionment of the populace to their so-called democratic government.³²

Summarily, scholarship on the first decade of the post-apartheid political culture can be separated along two distinct lines: the question of democratic consolidation and the ongoing debate regarding which factor is the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy. Those scholars who believe democratic consolidation has occurred include but are not limited to Fred Hendricks, Alexander Johnston, Elke Zuern, Julie Hearn, and Daryl Glaser. On the

³⁰ Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, 258.

³¹ Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, 260.

³² Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, 274.

opposite side of the aisle are scholars such as Robert Mattes, Scott Taylor, and Gretchen Bauer. The second determinant, what is the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy, is harder to delineate. Respectively the primary concerns are: the lack of nationalism or nationalistic identity (Johnston), one-party dominance by the ANC (Bauer, Taylor, Mattes, Zuern, and Hearn), crime and corruption (Glaser), and economic shortcomings (Hendricks). That said there is an agreement among scholars that the post-apartheid political culture has seen an ever-enlarging segment of the population that is disillusioned to the point of non-participation. This is undoubtedly the biggest concern of all involved and understanding the cause of the decline in political participation between 1994 and 2004 is essential.

The following thesis will seek to discern the primary reason for the decline in political participation and the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy via a unique combination of sources-which together-have not been utilized. This includes the aforementioned surveys, which specifically ask South Africans who did not vote in 2004 to explain why they did not vote in order to understand the reason there was a decline in political participation. Secondly, the surveys also inquire as to what each South African believes to be the primary concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. Furthermore, sources that have never been incorporated into the post-apartheid political culture historiography will be included to provide fresh insight and include the GII, CPI, and GCB. These newly utilized sources will be combined with UNDP, WHO, and World Bank reports which will produce a unique integration of information and a historical understanding for the decline of political participation in South Africa.

However, in order to fully understand the post-apartheid political culture one must fully understand the complex history of South Africa, improvements-or lack thereof-made in the

economic, educational, and healthcare sectors, and the South African publics' perception of politics and government between 1994 and 2004. Chapter Two will present a chronological overview of South African history since the arrival of Europeans at the Cape, in 1652, with an emphasis on race relations and how race influenced politics and the political culture. Specifically, Chapter Two will stress the importance of a political culture with mass political participation and the role it played in ending apartheid. Chapter Three will present the improvements, or lack thereof, made in the economic, educational, and healthcare sectors between 1994 and 2004. Because the ANC garnered widespread public support by promising the end of racial inequality, it was essential that racial inequality was reduced to some extent in order to retain an active political culture. With the important sectors of post-apartheid South Africa presented in Chapter Three, Chapter Four will provide an overview of political participation between 1994 and 2004. Furthermore, Chapter Four will explain the various causes for the decline of political participation in South Africa while attempting to garner the main reason an active and optimistic political culture transformed into one with high levels of disillusionment and low levels of political participation only ten years later. Finally, Chapter Five will reiterate the points made in Chapter Three and Four along with the conclusions that were attained.

CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA TO 1994

When the Zulu empire finally succumbed to British forces at the Battle of Ulundi on 4 July 1879, the last African force standing in the way of British expansion in southern Africa had been defeated. Nearly five years later European powers would meet in Berlin, Germany to discuss the partitioning of Africa. At the Berlin Africa Conference, it was decided that African lands were open to any European nation given that it had not been claimed by another European nation. By taking this approach, it was hoped that European conflict over trade and territory in Africa would be eliminated, while also depriving “indigenous leaders of the possibility of alternative European allies, and confronted with a single European nation, their potential bargaining strength.”³³ The consensus reached at this conference established the guidelines for rapid European expansion and what is now commonly referred to as Bismarck’s ‘Scramble for Africa’.³⁴

The ensuing decades saw the manifestation of this imperialistic ideology as black Africans were stripped of their land by newly arrived Europeans and displaced to poor-barren tracts of land. The disparity inherent in this construct continued in South Africa throughout the twentieth century under the policy of apartheid. However, the groundwork for apartheid had been laid during nearly three centuries of colonialism. Thus, in order to fully understand the far-reaching racial divisions that continue to plague South Africa, and the challenges present in 1994, it is necessary to trace back to the first settlement established by the Dutch in 1652.

³³ Ronald Robinson, ed., *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 21.

³⁴ Otto Von Bismarck was the President of Prussia and organized the Berlin Africa Conference; where European nations met and decided on how to settle disputes on trading and territorial entitlements.

Dutch Colonial Era (1652-1795)

As trade between Europe and the Far East increased during the seventeenth century, the traffic passing south of the Cape of Good Hope increased as well. Resultantly, in 1652 the Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Company (VOC) established a refreshing station near the cape at Table Bay. The station sought to provide a secure waypoint for sailors while also limiting their consumption of valuable goods and resources. Upon establishment, the VOC ordered that all of its employees should avoid conflict with the Khoisan, the colonial term given to the Khoi and San, the native peoples who inhabited the areas surrounding the Cape. However, as VOC employees completed their contracts and were granted permission to settle around the station as farmers, also known as freeburghers, disputes between the VOC and the Khoisan over land ownership arose. Consequently, in 1660 the Khoisan were informed that they would need to leave the areas surrounding the station; the Khoisan complied with this demand. It is important to note that this series of events can be seen as a microcosm of South African race relations, as less than twenty years after the establishment of Table Bay the native Khoisan had already been dispossessed of a valuable tract of land by the newly arrived Europeans.

Seeking to capitalize on the resources offered by the Cape, the VOC encouraged the expansion of the agricultural industry. This encouragement led to the rise in the number of freeburghers; for example, in 1731, 435 farms received permits, in stark contrast to the 50 that were granted in 1682.³⁵ In order to fulfill the growing demand for labor the VOC began importing slaves and free white laborers, known as knechts. By 1808, nearly 63,000 slaves had

³⁵ Sampie Terreblanche, *History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002*, (Pietermaritzburg, ZA: University of Natal Press, 2002), 155.

been imported to the Cape, with predominantly Indian slaves prior to 1750 and African slaves thereafter. While slaves were under permanent servitude, knechts usually worked for five years before receiving a farm of their own; producing a steady demand for land and cheap labor. This continual demand for more land was further exacerbated by the abandonment of tilling farming in favor of pastoral farming, which requires more land for each farm. Moreover, because early farmers were given no restriction on farm sizes, arable land surrounding the Cape soon became a valuable commodity.³⁶

The search for fresh grazing lands led the descendants of freeburghers, known as boers, further and further away from Cape Town as they unceasingly pushed into what they considered the frontier. Because the boers constantly progressed eastward into un-chartered lands they adopted a system of trekking during the day and allowing their cattle to graze at night. This earned them the name trekboers, as they were farmers who constantly trekked into the frontier. However, to look solely through the eyes of trekboers as they pushed into un-chartered territories fails to recognize the multitude of African peoples who had occupied these lands for centuries. This included not only the Khoi and San, whom were previously mentioned, but also the Bushman, Tswana, Xhosa, and Bantu. To these African peoples the land was not un-chartered nor was there any semblance of a frontier. Furthermore, they saw the trekboers not as farmers but as invaders “whose slow but relentless advance threatened the settled ways of all who stood in their path.”³⁷ Despite intermittent periods of resistance and conflict, by 1786 trekboers seeking unclaimed land had crossed the Fish River, which is over 800 kilometers east of the

³⁶ P. J. van der Merwe, *the Migrant Farmer in the History of the Cape Colony 1657-1842*, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1995), 62.

³⁷ Norman Etherington, *the Great Trek: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854* (London: Longman Publishers, 2001), 48.

Cape.³⁸ The steady influx of settlers and slaves, along with the move towards pastoral farming, produced an ever-expanding and diversified colony comprised of indigenous peoples; migrants from throughout Europe, including notable numbers of German, French, Dutch, and British settlers; and slaves from India, Indonesia, and East Africa. More importantly, it was during this period that the groundwork for a racial hierarchy was established as whites developed “a sense of their physical and cultural difference from racial ‘others’; and difference generally meant superiority.”³⁹

British Colonial Era (1795-1910)

During the trekboer expansion east, French forces briefly seized Cape Town as Napoleon sought to strategically interrupt British trade and challenge their naval supremacy. In order to prevent the French from returning, Britain decided to send a military detachment to occupy the Cape Colony in 1795. This occupation lasted until 1803 when the Treaty of Amiens was signed, which briefly gave sole control of Cape Colony back to the Dutch. However, three years later the British returned after France threatened to make a concerted push into the region of southern Africa. Between 1795 and 1814, Britain was unsure of their long-term involvement in South Africa and as a result did not alter or implement any change of consequence. For instance, although the slave trade was officially banned throughout the British Empire in 1807, the slave populace continued to rise in Cape Town.

³⁸ Merwe, *the Migrant Farmer in the History of the Cape Colony 1657-1842*, 129.

³⁹ Paul Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past: The history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 66.

This period of lax control ended when Britain formally and permanently assumed control of Cape Colony with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814. British authorities began by implementing British policies and trade restrictions before turning their attention to the issue of race and labor constructs. The shift in racial ideology was fueled by the Enlightenment and humanistic ideals espoused by such scholars as John Locke, along with efforts by newly-arrived missionaries such as Minister William Shaw. Shaw was especially outspoken about the treatment of Africans pointing out “how strange that the *pride of colour* should even infect *good men*, and they themselves at the same time appear not to be sensible that they act under the influence of this baneful prejudice.”⁴⁰ As a result of this racial activism, laws that specifically focused on improving the treatment of slaves in the colony were enacted.

For example, in 1823 the British colonial office began allowing slaves to appear in court and marry, while placing a limit on the duration of forced labor and the use of corporal punishment by slave owners. A proclamation made three years later went even further and allowed all slaves to buy their freedom. In 1828, the colonial office began permitting Xhosa’s seeking employment entrance in Cape Town while allowing free-colored individuals the rights to own land and travel without a pass.⁴¹ These proclamations, along with the decision to begin the emancipation of all slaves in the British Empire in 1834, caused a rift to develop between the crown and Cape settlers as the British drastically altered how power, labor patterns, and race relations were structured in the Cape.⁴² The trekboers understood the implications of these changes all too well and in 1837 a large group made the decision to leave the realm of the Cape

⁴⁰ William Shaw, *The journal of William Shaw*, (Cape Town, ZA: A. A. Balkema, 1972), 180.

⁴¹ T.R.H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 48.

⁴² Terreblanche, *History of Inequality in South Africa*, 180.

and the control of British authorities. This decision resulted with a massive exodus of settlers who migrated northeast, which is now known as the Great Trek.

Between 1837 and 1843, upwards of 15,000 Afrikaner farmers left the Cape in search of the autonomy that their ancestors had enjoyed under Dutch colonialism. The initial party, led by Piet Retief, made its way eastward until they reached Port Natal several months later. There they came into contact with the most powerful empire in South Africa, the Zulu. The Zulu empire developed during the decades before the Great Trek. The 1820s and 1830s had been dominated by a period of unrest and turmoil known as the mfecane, as the emerging Zulu empire sought to consolidate neighboring peoples into their ranks. After initially coming to an uneasy truce with the Zulu, specifically King Shaka, Piet Retief and a small party of Afrikaners were ambushed and killed during peace talks. In response to this perceived treachery, the Afrikaners moved north, crossing the Blood River and defeating the Zulu army in convincing fashion at the Battle of Blood River.⁴³ The victory at Blood River exemplified the advantage of European firearms and provided stability in Natal, enabling the foundation of the Natalia Republic in 1838.

While the Boers resorted to warfare against the Zulu, for the most part “throughout their travels, the emigrants showed a preference for negotiation and treaty-making with African chiefs.”⁴⁴ Ironically, the relative ease of the trek was made possible by the Zulu, as much of the interior of South Africa was not heavily populated due to Zulu military prowess. Zulu battles against other African groups during the mfecane were usually very one-sided due to advancements made by Shaka. This included the development of specialized regiments called *impis*, the introduction of boys who carried soldiers’ equipment called *uDibi*, and the

⁴³ Etherington, *the Great Trek*, 281.

⁴⁴ Timothy Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order*, (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 202.

implementation of a short-broad bladed assegai, which replaced the light-throwing and flimsy assegai used by neighboring armies. Lastly, Shaka developed a military formation called the horns of the buffalo, which was crescent-shaped and “consisted of several densely packed regiments in the center, or head, and one regiment on each side forming the horns.”⁴⁵ The implementation of these advances almost always resulted in either the opposition’s complete annihilation or assimilation into the Zulu ranks. Indeed, Shaka “fought for total annihilation.”⁴⁶

Henry Francis Fynn, an early settler of Natal, described an 1826 Zulu battle where:

The remnants of the enemy’s army sought shelter in an adjoining wood, out of which they were soon driven. Then began a slaughter of the women and children. They were all put to death. The cattle being taken by the different regiments were driven to the kraal lately occupied by Sikhunyana. The battle, from the commencement to the close, did not last more than an hour and a half. The numbers of the hostile tribe, including women and children, could not have been less than 40,000. The number of cattle taken was estimated at 60,000.⁴⁷

Because of such battles, when the British annexed the Natalia Republic in 1843 and the Boers left Natal to be free of British control, they faced little opposition during the subsequent establishment of the Orange Free State and South Africa Republic. This is not to suggest that the Boers did not face any opposition during the early years of these republics; the Ndebele and Zulu put up valiant campaigns during periods of warfare against the Boers.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, by 1850 African resistance had been broken and the permanent presence of Europeans was assured in the Highveld. This was a major turning point in South African history as the establishment of the Boer republics, along with the permanent presence of Europeans in the heart of Africa, greatly

⁴⁵ Roger Beck, *The history of South Africa*, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2000), 62.

⁴⁶ Donald Morris, *The Washing of the Spears*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 46.

⁴⁷ Henry Francis Fynn, *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, (Pietermaritzburg, ZA: Shuter and Shooter, 1950), 126.

⁴⁸ John Laband, *The Transvaal Rebellion*, (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman Publishers, 2005), 65.

expedited European economic and infrastructural expansion into the interior of southern Africa.⁴⁹

As the nineteenth century progressed, mercantilism as an economic system began to fall out of favor. In turn, colonial officials began requiring its colonies to become self-sufficient; the Cape Colony included. This increased demand for monetary profit led to an expansion in the agricultural production of the Cape including the wine and wool industry, which demanded both more land and more labor. In order to satisfy these requirements, British authorities began a systematic reversal of race relations as officials sought to dispossess Africans, specifically the Xhosa from the Eastern Cape, of their lands. An example of this change in policy is the Vagrancy Act of 1834, which stipulated that all Africans living or hunting on ‘unused’ lands were considered criminals and were to be arrested. The motivation behind this piece of legislature was clear; to discourage Africans from living independently in ‘rogue’ communities and force them to become landless laborers for white farmers. In 1841, the Masters and Servants Act was passed which was aimed at coloured workers and mandated severe criminal sanctions to any worker who was in breach of contract or was disobedient to their employer. Specifically, the law “sought to buttress the racial hierarchy and to reinforce the subordination of coloured workers.”⁵⁰ Indeed, by the 1840’s the humanistic ideals of the Enlightenment and Great Awakening had given way to the need for land and a large dependent labor class, which required Africans to be inferior in order to justify their exploitation.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, 204.

⁵⁰ Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, 126.

⁵¹ Clifton C. Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 129.

In response to this swift reversal of policy, many Africans resisted efforts to include them in the system of racial capitalism as landless laborers. They recognized the hypocrisy behind racial capitalistic ideology, and on a larger scale, the colonial regime. After all, only a decade earlier the same office had abolished slavery, which had included emancipating many of the fathers of the young Africans who were being conscripted as landless laborers.⁵² Resistance to racial capitalism and the encroachment of European settlers into the Eastern Cape included thievery and sabotage. These crimes were used by whites to reinforce the image of the African as uncivilized, treacherous and mischievous. The escalating conflict between Africans and Europeans reached a boiling point with the Khoisan Rebellion of 1851. The rebellion, led by a prophet named Mlanjeni, erupted as a result of the enactment of the Squatter's Ordinance of 1850. This act outlawed independent African settlements such as the Kat River settlement.

Although initially Mlanjeni and his followers earned early victories against both European settlers and the British, by the beginning of 1852 the tide had drastically turned. As had happened in the 'Great Trek' and the previous frontier wars, including those of 1834 and 1846, the British once again overpowered the African resistance with the assistance of superior military firepower. More important than the outcome was the fact that for the first time since 1799, the Khoisan had fought with the Xhosa against the whites.⁵³ This signified a turning point regarding race as it was clear South African society had fully reverted back to white versus black; the 'civilized' versus the 'other'. Furthermore, following the war the British dispossessed land from those who participated in the uprising and created a Royal Reserve within which

⁵² Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance*, 178.

⁵³ Terreblanche, *History of Inequality in South Africa*, 198.

Africans could not live in villages larger than twenty huts, had to pay an annual rent of ten shillings, and could not own more than twenty cattle per hut.⁵⁴

Between the 1850s and 1880s the Orange Free State and South African Republic struggled financially. Suitable grazing was somewhat limited due to unprecedented periods of drought and African peoples were unwilling to serve as a docile labor force. The failed proletarianisation of Africans forced Afrikaners to attain cheap labor via slave raiding despite agreeing not to as stipulated in the Sand River Convention of 1852.⁵⁵ In response to slave raiding, the dispossession of land, and forced monetary tribute, many Africans perceived the presence of the republics themselves as an act of warfare and continually resisted the Afrikaners. This not only includes the previously mentioned Basotho kingdom, but the Sekhukhune and the Pedi, whom the Afrikaners required the assistance of black soldiers to attain victory against.⁵⁶ Resistance did not stop with armed conflict but also included sabotage, thievery and the destruction of property, which further hurt the Boer republics financially. However, African opposition did not stop the accrument of lands by whites as, for example, by 1878 Europeans possessed roughly 420,000 of the less than 520,000 acres of land in Griqualand.⁵⁷ These numbers stress both the extent to which Africans were dispossessed of land and the speed by which Europeans absorbed the land.

⁵⁴ Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance*, 197.

⁵⁵ Anthony Nutting, *Scramble for Africa: The Great Trek to the Boer War*, (London: Constable & Company Ltd, 1970), 59.

⁵⁶ Laband, *The Transvaal Rebellion*, 62.

⁵⁷ C.W. De Kiewiet, *The Imperial Factor in South Africa*, (London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd, 1937), 185.

In 1886, the financial state of the South African Republic vastly improved following the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand, which had a far larger gold deposit than those previously found in the Transvaal during the 1870s. The plethora of gold found in the Witwatersrand transformed the Transvaal “from a state of chronic semi-bankruptcy” into “the richest country of the entire continent, let alone South Africa.”⁵⁸ Seeing an opportunity to capitalize on this market many British settlers traveled from the Cape to the Transvaal. By 1895, these foreign settlers called uitlanders had settled in the Transvaal to such an extent that they threatened the stability of Afrikaner control in the Transvaal. Paul Kruger, long time president of the South African Republic, foresaw this development and provided governmental representation to uitlanders in 1890.⁵⁹ However, representation itself was not enough for uitlanders. Led by Sir Henry Loch and motivated by promises of British assistance from Cecil Rhodes, they attempted to seize Johannesburg in 1895. The Jameson Raid of 1895, as the attempted takeover is called, ended in failure as Loch did not wait for British assistance and attempted the feat on his own.

Already on board with the attempted takeover of the South African Republic in 1895, it did not take long for Britain to decide on a timetable for dealing with the Boer republics. In order to protect the rich mineral deposits from other European nations, specifically Germany, and seeking to instill racial capitalism to more efficiently mine gold and diamonds, the British began a concerted effort to yet again annex the Transvaal.⁶⁰ By 1899 this effort resulted in the Anglo-Boer war, which devastated all levels of society and impoverished both Afrikaners and Africans alike. With victory over the republics and the Afrikaner threat affectively dissolved, the

⁵⁸ Nutting, *Scramble for Africa*, 148.

⁵⁹ Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 218.

⁶⁰ Between 1877 and 1881 the British annexed the Transvaal before losing the Anglo-Boer war (1880-1881).

British sought to make amends and unite with the Boers along racial lines. Indeed, after signing the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902, Afrikaners were allowed to keep their firearms, property, and language in school and court.⁶¹

More importantly, the British did not provide Africans with the right to vote, as had been done in the Cape, with the decree that the issue would be resolved only after the republics once again had self-government. By following this agenda the British ensured control of the mines, an alliance with Afrikaners, and the creation of a large-black proletariat class much like had been created during the 1840s in the Cape. However, some white South Africans believed that this social hierarchy and economic exploitation would lead to long-term problems in the Transvaal. For instance, in 1907 Afrikaner J. West Ridgeway stated:

As long as these native races were uncivilised, and even savage, it was right to withhold privileges from them. But now these races are rapidly progressing in education, in wealth, in Enlightenment, and last, but not least, in appreciation of their own rights and power. This problem must be dealt with, and promptly dealt with; otherwise there will be a terrible day of reckoning, and a most disastrous Nemesis may yet descend upon the white races of South Africa.⁶²

In 1906, the British accorded the Boer republics self-government to assure the continuation of social stability. Three years later, the British Parliament passed the Act of Westminster of 1909, which decreed that white settlers, both Afrikaners and British, would assume control of South Africa. This stipulation ensured “white political domination, and affectively disenfranchised blacks in South Africa.”⁶³ As dictated in the Peace of Vereeniging, white South Africans had the opportunity to extend voting rights to coloureds and Africans living

⁶¹ Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 234.

⁶² J. West Ridgeway, “The Future of the Transvaal,” *Journal of the Royal African Society* 6, no. 22 (January 1907): 160.

⁶³ Terreblanche, *Inequality in South Africa*, 247.

in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. However, white South Africans did not, and for nearly seventy years would not, give Africans the right to vote. Understandably, white South Africans did not intend on sharing power or undermining a racial capitalistic system that greatly benefited them.

Pre-apartheid Era (1910-1948)

Despite losing the Anglo-Boer war, the successful migration and subsequent survival in the heart of Africa amongst a wealth of African peoples would be used by Afrikaners during the twentieth century to not only promote Afrikaner nationalism, but to exemplify their triumph over the uncivilized savages.⁶⁴ This ideological superiority and entitlement manifested itself immediately following the Union of South Africa as Afrikaners pressured newly elected Prime Minister Louis Botha to address white unemployment. As a result of this pressure, Botha enacted two laws that marginalized and pigeonholed black South Africans while also establishing the precedence for racially unequal legislature. Signed in 1911, the Mines and Works Act stipulated that black South Africans could not work or be employed in skilled positions; while the Native Labour Regulation Act prohibited black contract workers from striking or organizing and made any breach of contract illegal. Together these laws ensured that “people of colour could not acquire mining licenses or trade in minerals; and they could only work on the gold mines in the service of whites.”⁶⁵ The financial as well as political impact

⁶⁴ Etherington, *the Great Trek*, 343.

⁶⁵ Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past*, 122.

these laws had on African society, through the instillation of a racial division of labor in the most profitable South African industry, cannot be underemphasized. Indeed, within a year of the passing of these laws the first national political organization dedicated to protecting African rights was founded.

On 8 January 1912 the South African Native National Congress, which would later become the ANC, was established to oppose the aforementioned laws and white domination that accompanied them. Because the early leaders of the ANC were Christian educated, they believed that resistance should focus on non-violent reasoning and the persuasion of officials to alter discriminating laws. However, this practice proved ineffective at both improving the African position and rallying widespread African support. Another hindrance to African support was the degree to which many Africans were impoverished and were forced to focus on subsistence instead of political organization.⁶⁶ As a result, for the first thirty years of its existence the ANC remained weak, as its membership was overwhelmingly restricted to the small-formally educated black bourgeois.

In 1913 the Native Land Act was enacted. This piece of legislature carried over the racial divisions of labor stipulated in the Mines and Works Act and the Native Labour Regulation Act, and extended it to racially dividing land. While the dispossession of African land was certainly not a new thing in South Africa, as mentioned earlier it dates back to the 1660s when freeburghers in the Cape encroached on and took Khoisan lands, the act legally and systematically authorized land dispossession. Specifically, it sought to “get rid of those features of African land ownership and share-cropping which white farmers found undesirable, and

⁶⁶ Dale T. McKinley, *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle*, (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 9.

enlarge reserves to ease congestion and facilitate the recruiting of labour for the mines.”⁶⁷

Furthermore, the Native Land Act built upon the Glen Grey Act and encouraged the employment of migrant laborers subsisting in the rural native reserves.⁶⁸

While the Mines and Works Act and Native Labour Regulation Act protected skilled positions for Afrikaners, they failed to protect semi-skilled positions and were primarily aimed at improving the monetary profit of British owned mines. Despite the enactment of these laws, the large Afrikaner proletariat that had emerged as a result of the Anglo-Boer war continued to struggle and became increasingly frustrated. This frustration culminated with the 1922 Rand Revolt as Afrikaners, angered by the fact that they were being replaced by blacks in semi-skilled mining positions, sought to protect their labor position in the racial hierarchy.⁶⁹ Although this strike was resolved it exemplified the need for the Union government to appeal to the Afrikaner populace and protect their position from black competition.

In order to accomplish these tasks a coalition government led by James Barry Munnik Hertzog, and which appealed to both British and Afrikaner interests, was elected. The ‘Pact Government’, as it was to be called, created several laws that sought to ensure that white workers would remain dominant over African workers. The first law, the Industrial Conciliation Act, was enacted just before the Pact Government was inaugurated in 1924. This act gave official recognition to both mixed and white trade unions, while excluding Africans from joining these unions and prohibiting the creation of black unions. Thus, white and coloured workers were guaranteed a binding minimum wage for all types of work while Africans received no minimum

⁶⁷ Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 271.

⁶⁸ Terreblanche, *Inequality in South Africa*, 261.

⁶⁹ Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past*, 243.

wage for any type of work.⁷⁰ The second law was an amendment to the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and reinforced racial segregation in the mining industry.

Resultantly, “by the 1930s, it was becoming increasingly clear that segregation was being implemented, under Afrikaner nationalist patronage, to counter English liberal hegemony and to ensure continued white dominance over blacks.”⁷¹ However, while Hertzog and the Pact Government had succeeded in appealing to Afrikaners, the laws themselves failed to improve white unemployment and poverty. This failure was magnified by falling wages resulting from the collapse of the New York stock exchange in 1929. A 1932 report released by the Carnegie Commission “found that one-third of Afrikaners were ‘desperately poor’, while another third were classified as ‘poor’.”⁷² Against the backdrop of financial angst and angered by African urbanization, Afrikaner scholars and intellectuals began propagating anti-British imperialism, Afrikaner superiority, and African inferiority.⁷³

One of the byproducts of the Afrikaner nationalistic movement was the formation of the ‘purified’ National Party (NP) in 1933. Led by D. F. Malan, the NP spoke out against the influx of Africans into urban areas and sought to instill Afrikaner dominance throughout South African society, particularly in both the economic and political sectors. Many Afrikaners feared that “white self-determination was neither politically secure nor morally defensible in the midst of

⁷⁰ Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, *Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 78.

⁷¹ Alan Lester, *From Colonization to Democracy: A New Historical Geography of South Africa*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 79.

⁷² Lester, *From Colonization to Democracy*, 96.

⁷³ P. Eric Louw, *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*, (London: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 24.

the renewed ‘economic integration’ of Africans in the ‘white’ areas of the country.”⁷⁴ As a response to the threat posed by this nationalistic movement, Hertzog and Smutz merged parties and created the Unified Party (UP) in 1934. The decision to unify parties along with the passing of several anti-African laws in 1936 and 1937, allowed the UP to stay in power until 1948. These anti-African laws included the Native Trust and Land Act (1936) which expanded the African rural reserves, and the Native Laws Amendment Act (1937) which sought to control the African presence in urban areas. However these laws did not successfully segregate South African society and failed to keep Africans from ‘encroaching’ into urban centers. Indeed from 1936 to 1946 the African urban populace increased by over 57%.⁷⁵

Coinciding with African urbanization was the development of strong opposition from the African, Coloured, and Indian populaces. Seeking to capitalize on this increased political activity the ANC, in one of its earliest significant accomplishments, convened the All Africa Convention (AAC) in 1935. For the first time, the AAC combined the separate efforts of the marginalized populaces in an attempt to provide a unified front to fight white domination. Over 400 delegates from every province in South Africa attended this meeting in hopes of protecting the voting rights of those in the Cape while extending voting rights to those in the other three provinces.⁷⁶ Despite requests for militant action, the older leaders of the ANC continued to adhere to a policy of non-violent reasoning and the AAC ended without making any real progress.

⁷⁴ Deborah Posel, *The making of Apartheid 1948-1961*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 51.

⁷⁵ Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past*, 192.

⁷⁶ Deborah Posel, *The making of Apartheid 1948-1961*, 51.

Although the AAC did not directly accomplish anything of consequence, it set the precedence for a nationally unified black political culture and its failure eventually led to the creation of the ANC Youth League. Many of the younger members of the ANC, including Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela, believed that the policy of persuasion was futile, as evident by the failure of the AAC, and that direct large scale protest was necessary for change. A year after the establishment of the ANC Youth League the change in policy advocated by these young leaders became indirectly evident with the Mineworker's Strike of 1946. Led by individuals from the Community Party of South Africa (CPSA), the Mineworker's Strike of 1946 saw over 70,000 African miners refuse to work unless the African Mineworkers' Union was recognized and workers were paid 10 shillings per day.⁷⁷ While neither of these demands was met, the ANC recognized both the abilities of the CPSA and the presence of a large populace willing to actively oppose the South African government. This realization solidified the decision by the ANC to ally with the CPSA in order to accrue a larger support base and adopt a more direct, large-scale activist approach.

Unfortunately for the UP, the Mineworker's Strike and other instances of protest coincided with widespread Afrikaner poverty, fears of financial security, British economic domination, and repeated failures by the UP to prevent African urbanization. Together these factors painted a landscape that Afrikaner's deemed unacceptable in both the immediacy and the long term. The response by the majority of Afrikaner's was made apparent in the 1948 election when the NP was overwhelmingly elected and implemented a platform that promised to correct the aforementioned problems. Called apartheid, the platform was aimed at separating races at

⁷⁷ Saunders and Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 358.

every level of South African society in order to preserve the different, especially Afrikaner, cultures in South Africa.

Apartheid Era (1948-1994)

By far the most well-known and discussed topic in South African history is apartheid. It is also quite possibly the most misunderstood topic. Most individuals discuss apartheid as if it; 1) was a continuous event that followed a single ‘Grand Plan’ until its dismantlement in 1994, and 2) was initially created primarily for the purpose of disenfranchising and oppressing the non-white populace. Both of these conclusions are inaccurate and their fallacies must be addressed before the chronological presentation of South African history can continue.

To begin with, contrary to traditional interpretations apartheid was not a continuous event and changed drastically between its early years under Malan and its final years under De Klerk. Under the guidance of Malan (1948-1954), the NP followed a policy of economic integration which required the presence and employment of a significant urbanized black populace. However, under Malan’s predecessor Verwoerd (1958-1966), the NP ended economic integration and “no longer accorded employers the right to stipulate the number of African workers they required” while incorporating “drastic methods to reduce the urbanized African population.”⁷⁸ These important changes made to apartheid during its first decade pale in comparison to the even more significant alterations made to apartheid during the Botha (1978-1989) and De Klerk (1989-1994) administrations. This includes the NP making important

⁷⁸ Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961*, 228.

concessions to anti-apartheid groups and negotiating the release of anti-apartheid prisoners in order to begin the process of ending apartheid in the early 1980s.

Secondly, apartheid was not initially created for the purpose of disenfranchising and oppressing the non-white populace. For instance, as early as 1948 Malan repeatedly argued against the UP and its platform of horizontal domination “in which whites ruled over blacks” and instead proposed the system of apartheid “because it involved separating ethnic groups so each could develop separately in its own cultural space.”⁷⁹ Indeed, Malan was more concerned with replacing the Anglo controlled government with an Afrikaner government, than he was with the oppression of other races.⁸⁰ Only when the NP had legitimized its position in government did it change its policy regarding economic integration and the acceptance of an urbanized black population. However, the shift in policy did not occur until 1958 when then Prime Minister Verwoerd created independent African states in order to disenfranchise and affectively negate the African vote. Thus, apartheid was not initially aimed at disenfranchising the non-white population nor did it follow the continual ‘Grand Plan’ of oppression as it is so commonly described as following.

With these inaccuracies clarified, the chronological presentation of South African history can continue. As was mentioned earlier, the main thesis of apartheid centered on the separation of different ethnicities and races at every level of society in order to preserve each of the different cultures. This goal was affectively addressed when the NP enacted the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) which outlawed interracial marriages; the Population Registration Act (1950) which classified South Africans by race; and the Group Areas Act (1950) which

⁷⁹ Louw, *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*, 30.

⁸⁰ Louw, *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*, 60.

outlawed interracial communities and created single-race communities. Together these laws succeeded, for the most part, in separating South African society by race. Again, as mentioned earlier, under Malan the NP permitted Africans to live in white urban areas as long as their employment was deemed by their employer as necessary to industry. The economic success of these industries legitimized NP power and encouraged international investments and multi-million dollar loans from the World Bank.⁸¹

Immediately following the ascendance of the NP, the ANC drafted the Programme of Action in 1949. The Programme of Action sought to unify the oppressed races in South Africa by formulating a common strategy to fight the apartheid state and called for international support, protests, strikes and boycotts. Resulting from this declaration were three large interracial demonstrations held in 1950: the Freedom of Speech Convention, May Day, and the National Day of Protest.⁸² While these demonstrations were milestones for mass-interracial protests they were quickly put down by the NP. Regarding international support, pleas made by the ANC to the international community calling for an embargo on South African goods failed to materialize any assistance.⁸³ These pleas were extended to the United Nations General Assembly who failed to issue any trade sanctions on South Africa until 1977.⁸⁴ Faced with a strong government supported by the international community, including the United States of America, the ANC allied with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African

⁸¹ Dale T. McKinley, *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle*, (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 14.

⁸² Leo Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 98, 99.

⁸³ The ANC requested the United States of America to aid in the anti-apartheid struggle and place an embargo on South Africa in order to pressure the NP. However, as late as 1982 the American government was criticized by the United Nations General Assembly for providing support and encouragement to the South African government. United Nations *United Nations General Assembly*, 1982.

⁸⁴ McKinley, *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle*, 94.

Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO) and the Congress of Democrats (COD) in 1955. Now known as the Congress of the People, this alliance produced the Freedom Charter, which borrowed the ideals of racial equality from the Programme of Action and went one step further demanding both financial and land redistribution.⁸⁵

The Freedom Charter drastically changed the political culture of South Africa by encouraging more direct forms of protest and participation on a larger scale. Up to 1955 there had been instances of mass-protest but not nearly to the extent or regularity as during the ensuing decades. This includes the infamous 1960 Sharpeville shootings where 69 people, comprised of mostly women and children, were shot and killed by the police. The Sharpeville massacre triggered riots throughout South Africa and forced the NP to respond by banning the ANC, which led the initial protest in Sharpeville, and arrest over 2,000 of its members including Nelson Mandela.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Sharpeville permanently escalated conflict in South Africa as following 1960 "extra-legal activity commenced on a wide scale, both by black opposition movements and by the state's own security forces."⁸⁷ The heightened crackdown on resistance to the apartheid state was solidified when South Africa declared itself an independent republic in 1961. The aggressive response by the NP resulted in the 1961 formation of an anti-apartheid militant group called Umkhonto we Sizwe, translated as the 'Spear of the Nation' or (MK). The MK was organized and led by Nelson Mandela, along with Joe Slovo from the SACP, and

⁸⁵ Saunders and Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 404.

⁸⁶ Francis Meli, *South Africa Belongs to Us*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), 140, 143.

⁸⁷ Lester, *From Colonization to Democracy*, 143.

targeted government buildings and military installations in hopes of bringing the NP to its senses.⁸⁸

With assistance from the SACP, the MK sought to procure international support from the Soviet Union as well as Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, and East Germany. However, the arrest of Nelson Mandela in 1962 was a significant blow to the accomplishment of this endeavor and the overall strength of the ANC and the MK. The international assistance received was minimal and, while the MK successfully carried out many sabotage missions, the impact on the apartheid state was negligible. More importantly, the focus of black resistance on garnering international support and resisting via a small-armed front virtually extinguished the mass participation that had been fostered in South Africa during the 1950s.⁸⁹ For the remainder of the 1960s the ANC, the MK, and the overall non-white resistance struggled to survive amidst strong NP crackdowns. This shift towards more aggressive policing was further intensified as a result of the General Laws Amendment Acts, which were passed between 1962 and 1964. Specifically, these laws increased the power and size of the police and defense force while giving the police the authority to imprison suspected agitators up to 90 days without bail.

The intensification by both the NP and anti-apartheid groups continued from the early 1960s and ended well into the late 1980s. During this period whenever the NP “faced mounting internal resistance, so did it depend more and more on extra-judicial procedures, the brute power of the police force, and other repressive apparatus.”⁹⁰ In 1966, Prime Minister Verwoerd was assassinated ending a period of strict adherence by the NP against economic integration.

⁸⁸ Scott Thomas, *Tie Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign relations of the ANC since 1960*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 7.

⁸⁹ McKinley, *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle*, 31, 32.

⁹⁰ Maylam, *South Africa’s Racial Past*, 185.

Verwoerd's predecessor Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster immediately took steps to improve the economic state of South Africa by ending job reservations for whites. Vorster also came to the conclusion that Verwoerd's policies on African urbanization and resistance were not succeeding. As a result, by the early 1970s the NP began intensifying influx controls and sped up the construction of industry near black homelands.⁹¹

Interestingly, the change in NP policy shortly followed a change in ANC policy. In 1969, the ANC had adopted a policy entitled 'Strategy and Tactics', which called for a renewal of mass mobilization in South Africa and heightened international pressure on the apartheid regime. The encouragement of mass mobilization was furthered by the 'Black Consciousness Movement' which called for world-wide black solidarity. Thus, the intensification of influx controls and the continued relocation of Africans to rural townships came at a time when there had recently been a renewal of anti-apartheid rhetoric aimed at increasing black resistance to apartheid. The result of these colliding forces was evident in 1976 with the Soweto uprising.

The Soweto uprising initially began as a peaceful student demonstration aimed at protesting the decision by the government that African students would be required to learn the Afrikaner language in school. Organized by the Soweto Student's Representative Council, approximately twenty thousand students marched towards Orlando Stadium on 16 June 1976.⁹² After repeated orders by police to disperse, the police fired into the crowd killing dozens of students and injuring many more. In response to the shooting, Africans throughout South Africa rioted drawing widespread international attention while forever escalating both the internal and

⁹¹ Louw, *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*, 68.

⁹² Meli, *South Africa Belongs to Us*, 186.

external struggle against apartheid.⁹³ Internally, thousands of Africans subsequently left South Africa to join the ANC or the MK. Externally, the United Nations responded by convening the Special Committee against Apartheid, which met on 3 August 1976. In a report released following the hearing the committee stated that Soweto has “shown that there can be no solution to the grave situation in South Africa without the replacement of the minority racist regime.”⁹⁴ From this point on the United Nations called for the end of apartheid and the support of anti-apartheid groups.

The Soweto Uprising made it clear that the strength and resolve of the urban black populace was, and would continue to, damage South Africa’s infrastructure and its economy; Prime Minister Botha was no exception. Following Soweto, Botha abandoned the use of Afrikaner nationalistic rhetoric that his predecessors had expounded while also coming to the realization that apartheid could not survive in the long-term. In 1982, Botha began a concerted effort to implement consociationalism, a power-sharing representative form of government which mandates governmental representation of all races. For the next seven years, Botha lobbied consociationalism to both the international community and the non-white population in South Africa. Unwilling to allow any form of apartheid to persist, the anti-apartheid resistance denounced consociationalism arguing that it was simply a continuation of apartheid under a different guise and escalated their opposition as evidenced by the 1984 Township Revolt.. Furthermore, the United Nations stated in 1984 that it was convinced that consociationalism would “further entrench apartheid” and is aimed at “dividing the unity of the oppressed people of

⁹³ Terreblanche, *Inequality in South Africa*, 308, 352.

⁹⁴ United Nations, *Special Committee against Apartheid: Special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid on “The Soweto massacre and its aftermath”*, 3 August 1976.

South Africa.”⁹⁵ Thus, despite his sincere efforts “Botha’s attempts at ending Verwoerdian apartheid created not consociational democracy, but rather produced the most violent and brutal period of apartheid.”⁹⁶

On 20 June 1986, the United Nations convened the World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa in Paris, France. At the conference the United Nations called for the immediate end to apartheid while commenting that the “growing scope and intensity of the struggle in South Africa have shown that for the struggling people of South Africa there is no turning back and that they will continue the fight, enduring suffering and facing death until victory is won and the evil of apartheid is vanquished.”⁹⁷ Together, pressure from international bodies along with continued anti-apartheid resistance convinced Botha that attempts to garner support for consociationalism would be fruitless. Beginning in 1987, both Botha and his predecessor de Klerk worked with anti-apartheid leaders, including then imprisoned Nelson Mandela, to negotiate an end to apartheid. As is well known, these negotiations successfully led to the end of apartheid in 1994 and the promise of equality for all South African citizens regardless of race or ethnicity.

This chapter has sought to provide a brief presentation of the long and complex racial history of South Africa. Thus, there has been a tendency to focus on the process by which South Africa developed a complex racial makeup along with how the construct, interpretation, and meaning of race have repeatedly changed since 1652. In the midst of providing this overview, there have undoubtedly been several important events that were either not discussed or not

⁹⁵ United Nations, *Special Committee against Apartheid: Appeal by the Special Committee against Apartheid to the cities of the world*, 4 April 1984.

⁹⁶ Louw, *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*, 74.

⁹⁷ United Nations, *World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa: Declaration adopted by the World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa*, Paris, 20 June 1986.

explained to the fullest extent; this is unavoidable due to the constraints and focus of this thesis.

The points that are important to understand are: 1) the role a political culture with mass participation played in ending apartheid while also establishing the first true democratic government and 2) the numerous challenges that were presented to the post-apartheid government, the ANC, and Nelson Mandela when he was inaugurated as president. Specifically, the difficult challenge of uniting an unequal society that had been segregated for so long and to such an extent cannot be underestimated. Indeed, it was this very challenge that required the redistribution of wealth, land, and the end of racial inequality-especially regarding poverty and unemployment-which Nelson Mandela promised to address in 1994.

CHAPTER THREE: INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGES FROM 1994-2004

Referring back to the well-known inaugural address given by Nelson Mandela, promises of equality and a better life for all South Africans played a crucial role in garnering widespread support for himself and the ANC. And although a better life is an ambiguous and immeasurable concept, the curtailing of poverty and inequality is not. With this in mind, it should not be surprising that most individuals would feel dismayed if these problems were not affectively addressed in a timely and sustainable manner. Thus, while it is plausible that a better life could be elongated to those of future generations, the reduction of poverty and inequality cannot. The ANC therefore put itself in the position that all South Africans would experience improvements in the immediacy, not in the future. The following chapter will present the improvements, or lack thereof, made to some of the key areas necessary for the end of poverty and inequality in South Africa. Specifically, these areas are the economic, education, and healthcare sectors.

Economy

At the forefront of the many promises made by Nelson Mandela in 1994 was that the ANC would “create jobs” while ending “the widespread poverty so pervasive among the majority of” South Africans.⁹⁸ The fulfillment of this promise naturally required the equal redistribution of wealth to those previously oppressed along with a reduction in both unemployment and racial

⁹⁸ Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s Address to the People of Cape Town, Grand Parade, on the Occasion of his Inauguration as State President,” Presidential Inauguration Speech, 9 May 1994, “African National Congress,” www.anc.org, [organization]; <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/inaugct.html>, accessed 2 October 2007.

inequality. From 1994 to 2004, none of these requirements were sufficiently met. A 1998 report released by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality stated that 61% of black South Africans lived in poverty while only 1% of white South Africans were impoverished.⁹⁹ One explanation for the lack of monetary redistribution was the adherence by the government to the conservative economic growth policy, Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program. Specifically, GEAR called for a tight monetary policy centered on fiscal contraction and aimed at decreasing national debt. Proponents argued that by concentrating on the gradual construction of a stable economy there would be an influx of foreign investment and subsequently employment opportunities.¹⁰⁰ And while the policies of GEAR underscored the reality that the ANC was steering away from social democracy in favor of procedural democracy, supporters of GEAR stressed that improvements stemming from GEAR would be experienced by 2001.¹⁰¹

However despite implementing the strategies and policies that comprised GEAR, between 1994 and 2000 South Africa “performed substantially worse in terms of GDP growth, levels of investment and unemployment than other transitional economies such as Malaysia, Chile, South Korea, Egypt, and Brazil.”¹⁰² A 1998 report released by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that unemployment in South Africa had climbed to

⁹⁹ Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality, *Poverty and Inequality in South Africa*, summary report, 1998, accessed 25 November 2008, <http://www.queensu.ca/sarc/Projects/AIDS/Poverty.htm>.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *South Africa: the Challenge of Sustainable Development*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), national report, 40.

¹⁰¹ UNDP, 2003, national report, 40.

¹⁰² Stefan Andreasson, “The African National Congress and its Critics: ‘Predator Liberalism’ Black Empowerment and Intra-Alliance Tensions in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” *Democratization* 13, no. 2 (April 2006): 308.

30% and that growing numbers of poor South African families relied on pensioners or the unpaid labor of their grandchildren for subsistence.¹⁰³ Buttressing these findings, the 1998 Poverty and Inequality Report released comparable data while also concluding that poverty continued to fall along regional and racial lines as 71% of the overwhelmingly black rural populace was impoverished.¹⁰⁴ A follow-up report released in 2000 by the UNDP concluded that unemployment had increased in South Africa and over 18 million South Africans were living in poverty.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, conservative official measures placed unemployment at 16% in 1995 and at around 30% in 2002.¹⁰⁶

The release of the aforementioned reports, not to mention the visual evidence of the unemployed that increasingly dominated the South African landscape, should have made it clear to the government that unemployment and racial inequality were not being affectively addressed. However, despite the indicators adequate measures to correct these problems were not taken. A 2003 report released by the UNDP stated that “unemployment continues to rise unabated” despite the fact that “between 1996 and 2002, the unemployment rate increased from 19.3 per cent to 30.5 per cent.”¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the 2003 UNDP report found that unemployment stood at 31.2 % and roughly 48.5% of the population (21.9 million people) lived under the poverty line.¹⁰⁸ These statistics clearly emphasize that proper steps were not taken by the ANC to ensure

¹⁰³ UNDP, *HIV/AIDS & Human Development: South Africa*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), national report, 1998.

¹⁰⁴ Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality, *Poverty and Inequality in South Africa*.

¹⁰⁵ UNDP, *South Africa: Transformation for Human Development*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), national report, 2000, x.

¹⁰⁶ Anthony Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 67.

¹⁰⁷ UNDP, 2003, national report, 12.

¹⁰⁸ UNDP, 2003, national report, 12.

the fulfillment of the promises made by Nelson Mandela in 1994, nor were proper steps taken to curb rising unemployment. As a result, at the end of the first decade under ANC leadership unemployment had risen in South Africa by roughly 13% and nearly half of the population lived under the poverty line compared to only 23.7% in 1994.¹⁰⁹

While for the most part GEAR failed to create enough jobs to reduce both unemployment and racial inequality, there were accomplishments made in the economic arena between 1994 and 2004. This includes the creation of formal employment positions which have produced a legitimate and sizeable black bourgeoisie. Another accomplishment was a reduction in debt resulting from tighter fiscal spending; South Africa's overall budget balance in 1990 was -4.1% which was reduced to -3.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 1997.¹¹⁰ Other successes regard gross foreign direct investment, which increased from .2% of the GDP in 1990 to 10.9% in 2001, and average annual GDP growth, which increased from 1% between 1980 and 1990 to 2.1% between 1990 and 2001.¹¹¹ However annual GDP growth, as Robert Mattes has noted, needed to be between 6 and 7 percent to curtail unemployment and end racial inequality.¹¹²

The question remains as to how the South African public views both economic performance and job creation during the first decade of democracy in South Africa. In order to garner some insight concerning this question, a survey I conducted in 2009 asked 65 South African citizens over the age of 32 to evaluate the affectiveness of the government regarding

¹⁰⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a human face*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), global report, 147.

¹¹⁰ UNDP, 1999, global report, 186.

¹¹¹ The World Bank, *2003 World Development Indicators*, (Washington D.C.: the World Bank, 2003), global report, 188, 312.

¹¹² Robert Mattes, "South Africa: Democracy Without the People?," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 23.

economic performance and job creation between 1994 and 2004. As the statistics in Table 1 show, results regarding overall economic performance vary.

Table 1: Economic Performance 1994-2004

<u>Poor</u>	<u>Unsatisfactory</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Satisfactory</u>	<u>Good</u>
7	8	25	16	9

With the inequality that continues to persist in South Africa, differing opinions on overall economic performance between 1994 and 2004 is understandable. Indeed, an individual with adequate finances and a steady job between 1994 and 2004 is less likely to be critical of the economy than an unemployed individual in financial despair. However, when a specific question concerning economic performance was asked far more congruent results were produced. Table 2 presents the results in regards to employment/labor/job creation from 1994 to 2004.

Table 2: Employment/Labor/Job Creation 1994-2004

<u>Poor</u>	<u>Unsatisfactory</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Satisfactory</u>	<u>Good</u>
17	22	18	8	0

The statistics in Table 2 show that 60% of those polled believed the government performed at a poor or unsatisfactory level regarding job creation while only 12% believed the government performed satisfactorily. The overwhelming percentage of South Africans who responded critically regarding job creation indicates that there is a consensus, which crosses both racial and class lines. Thus, although the South African government attracted foreign investment the monetary influx failed to translate into enough new employment opportunities necessary to curb unemployment and reduce inequality. The results from Table 2 indicate that these failures are understood by the South African public regardless of their specific financial situation. And considering the fact that ending poverty and reducing unemployment and inequality were two of the main platforms the ANC ran on in 1994, the period between 1994 and 2004 should be deemed as being unsuccessful.

Education

Education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that a son of a mineworker can become the head of the mine, that a child of farm workers can become the president of a great nation.

-Nelson Mandela

One of the main strategies used by the apartheid government to preserve both white dominance and the NP agenda centered on racially dividing the educational system of South

Africa.¹¹³ Like in most other aspects of society, education was racially separated with the passing of the Bantu Education Act (1953) and the Extension of University Act (1959). Specifically, the Bantu Education Act restructured the educational system so that: 1) African education was the responsibility of the Native Affairs Department instead of the Provincial Councils, which would still be responsible for the education of Europeans, Coloureds and Indians; and 2) churches and missionary groups would be relieved from their burden of educating the Bantu and that the Bantu would now be responsible for their own education.¹¹⁴ Supporters of the act explained that placing the education of black children under African leadership would increase pride and subsequently the quality of education. Contrastingly, detractors questioned how a largely illiterate segment of society could command a modern educational system without any transitional period.¹¹⁵ Caught in the crosshairs, many Africans saw the act as it was, an attempt to “train the majority of African children for a position in life which has been assigned to them-an inferior status.”¹¹⁶

The Extension of University Act took the policies from the Bantu Education Act and carried them over to institutions of higher learning. By extending a racially segregated educational system to the arena of higher learning, the apartheid government sought to limit black opposition by limiting the growth potential of educated black South Africans. Indeed, the act ensured that “Black universities were established as teaching institutions intended to prepare graduates for entrance into the work force” while ensuring that “research activities were never

¹¹³ Kimberly Lenease King, ed., *Apartheid No More* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 2001), 159.

¹¹⁴ R. H. W. Shepherd, “The South African Bantu Education Act,” *African Affairs* 54, no. 215 (1955): 138.

¹¹⁵ Shepherd, “The South African Bantu Education Act,” 141.

¹¹⁶ Shepherd, “The South African Bantu Education Act,” 139.

integrated into the mission of these universities.”¹¹⁷ In other words, the goal of black universities was to take intelligent and driven young black South Africans and mold them into obedient civil servants who would maintain peace in the homelands.¹¹⁸ While the passing of this act caused controversy regarding its true aim, much like the Bantu Education Act, there is little debate regarding the impact both acts had on South African society. Indeed, during their existence white South Africans were provided far better education than coloured or Indian South Africans, who were provided far better education than black South Africans. With the ANC victory in 1994, the remnants of this unequal system were expected to be washed away.

Accordingly, following the end of apartheid many improvements were made in the educational system of South Africa. These improvements undoubtedly stem from policies included in the Higher Education Act (1997) and the Green and White Papers (1997), as well as efforts made by the National Commission of Higher Education (NCHE). Created in 1995, the NCHE was charged with the task of reconciling the racially divided educational system while modernizing the curriculum in order to prepare South Africans for the twenty-first century.¹¹⁹ As a result of the aforementioned measures, the literacy rate steadily increased between 1994 and 2004, as did the number of South Africans who pursued higher education. The annual 2003 World Bank report concluded that the adult illiteracy rate declined in South Africa from 19% in 1990 to 14.5% in 2001.¹²⁰ Buttressing this finding, a 1997 UNDP report placed the literacy rate

¹¹⁷ Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Kimberly Lenease King, *Apartheid No More*, xv.

¹¹⁸ Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Kimberly Lenease Kings, *Apartheid No More*, xvi.

¹¹⁹ Paula Ensor, “Contesting Discourses in Higher Education Curriculum Restructuring in South Africa,” *Higher Education* 48, no. 3 (October 2004): 341.

¹²⁰ The World Bank, 2003, global report, 90.

at 81.4% in 1994.¹²¹ Subsequent UNDP reports released in 1999 and 2004 found that the literacy rate had increased in South Africa to 84% in 1997¹²² and 86% in 2002.¹²³ Regarding higher education, many universities and colleges in South Africa have seen an increase in black student enrollment since 1994. For instance, in 1999 the University of Port Elizabeth (UPE) reported a student body that was made up of 60% black students, a far cry from the less than 10% black student enrollment during apartheid.¹²⁴

However, many remnants of the past educational system continued to persist. The Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) for example, continued to employ a predominantly white faculty despite holding a respected position in South Africa for its proactive multi-cultural policies. In 1999, black faculty members comprised only 9.5% of the total faculty, despite RAU having a 51% black student body.¹²⁵ Furthermore, between 1994 and 2004 traditionally black universities continued to be provided less government funding than their white counterparts, such as the University of Cape Town and University of Stellenbosch. Lastly, the educational system continued to be plagued by disputes regarding the restructuring of university curriculum. Supporters of traditional discourse, in which a student concentrates on one specific field or major, continually argued with those who called for the implementation of credit exchange or interdisciplinary discourse, in which a student picks and chooses classes based on individual

¹²¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1997: Human Development to Eradicate Poverty*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), global report, 147.

¹²² UNDP, 1999, global report, 140.

¹²³ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), global report, 141.

¹²⁴ Anne E. Austin, *Apartheid No More*, ed. Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Kimberly Lenease King (Westport, CT: 2001), 11.

¹²⁵ Doria Daniels, *Apartheid No More*, ed. Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Kimberly Lenease King (Westport, CT: 2001), 39, 42.

preference. Caught in the middle, the NCHE did not firmly settle the dispute over curriculum and what constituted an academic program, leaving ambiguity in higher learning policy.

Without concrete guidelines “different institutions invested these features [educational goals] with very different meanings.”¹²⁶ Indeed, the lack of consistency between institutions of higher learning is one of the main problems that continued to hinder the educational system of South Africa, as universities exploited ambiguous policies and interpreted them as they saw fit.

Healthcare

In 1994 South Africa did not have a nationally uniformed healthcare system nor was there any semblance of cohesion among provinces to address nationwide problems such as HIV/AIDS. The lack of a nationally uniformed healthcare system also caused South Africa to have gross disparities between regions regarding healthcare facilities and quality of service. The government responded by adopting a national platform that sought to improve healthcare through specialization, which included the creation of pediatric, women’s health, and HIV/AIDS centers.¹²⁷ In 1998, the South African Department of Health conducted a survey to measure the status of the healthcare system in South Africa entitled the *South African Demographic and Health Survey* (SADHS). The 1998 SADHS acquired information by interviewing 17,500 individuals over the age of fifteen from all nine provinces in South Africa.

¹²⁶ Ensor, “Contesting Discourses in Higher Education Curriculum Restructuring in South Africa,” 350.

¹²⁷ Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), *Country Situational Analysis*, accessed 25 October 2008, <http://www.unaidsrstes.org/countries/south-africa>.

The survey found that 75% of whites have access to government sponsored medical aid compared to only 8% of Africans.¹²⁸ Furthermore, 12% of South Africans who went to a public health facility were dissatisfied with the quality of service compared to only 7% who went to a private facility, with 17.3% of the coloured populace and 14.4% of the urban black populace reporting dissatisfaction with public healthcare.¹²⁹ Additionally, the annual 1998 report released by the UNDP found that “significant regional disparities persist in terms of access to basic health and welfare services” as for instance the “Northern Province has a population of 4.7 million people served by only 350 doctors and 240 social workers.”¹³⁰ These statistics suggest that there continued to be a racial and regional disparity in the quality of healthcare received. Whether the racial disparity regarding the quality of healthcare was improved is unknown, as interestingly the 2003 SADHS survey failed to acquire any information on the quality of healthcare in South Africa. This discrepancy should not be overlooked and deemed as simply being an error as every other category included in the 1998 SADHS survey was included in the 2003 SADHS survey. Rather it could be inferred that an underlying motivation for its absence was a failure to adequately address racial inequality regarding the quality of healthcare between 1998 and 2003.

Another inadequacy in South African healthcare was the failure to curtail the rapid increase of HIV/AIDS between 1994 and 2004. Indeed, the 1994 UNDP global report estimated that 1.7 out of every 100,000 (.0017%) South Africans had HIV/AIDS in 1992.¹³¹ In 1996, the

¹²⁸ South African Department of Health, *South African Demographic and Health Survey (SADHS)*, 1998, national report, 195.

¹²⁹ SADHS, 1998, national report, 193, 194.

¹³⁰ UNDP, 1998, national report.

¹³¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), global report, 152.

WHO released an annual report estimating that 650,000 out of a total population of 41,465,000 (1.56%) South Africans were infected with HIV or AIDS in 1996.¹³² The number of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS rose dramatically in the years following these estimations. For instance, a 2008 report released by the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that the total number of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS had risen from 650,000 in 1996 to 4,700,000 in 2001, an increase of over 4,050,000 cases.¹³³ Considering the fact that the total population of South Africa in 2001 was estimated to be 43,200,000, the percentage of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS had increased tenfold to roughly 10.9% in a span of five years.¹³⁴ However, even more troubling was the increase of pregnant women infected with HIV/AIDS during this period. According to Avert.org, the prevalence of pregnant women infected with HIV or AIDS in 1993 was 4.3%. This percentage rose dramatically to a staggering 22.4% in 1999 and 27.9% in 2003.¹³⁵

A main reason for the increased prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa was the large discrepancy in HIV/AIDS knowledge. Indeed, the 2003 SADHS survey concluded that knowledge and prevention of HIV fell along educational, racial and regional lines. Specifically, the 2003 SADHS stated that “men and women who have no education exhibit considerably lower levels of knowledge of HIV and AIDS prevention than those with some education” while

¹³² World Health Organization (WHO), *The World Health Report 1996: Fighting Disease, Fostering Development*, (Geneva: World Health Organization Press, 1996), global report, 121, 125.

¹³³ UNAIDS, *2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic*, (Geneva: UNAIDS Press, 2008), global report, 214.

¹³⁴ The World Bank, 2003, global report, 40.

¹³⁵ Avert.org is an international organization dedicated to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. Formerly known as the AIDS Education and Trust Act the organization strives to improve education of HIV/AIDS while funding research to find a cure for the disease. Avert.org, *HIV & AIDS in South Africa*, accessed 23 October 2008, <http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm>.

“Asian and white respondents tend to be better informed about HIV prevention methods than African or coloured respondents.”¹³⁶ A main causal factor for this discrepancy was that there was a lack of HIV/AIDS education in rural areas where HIV/AIDS is much more prevalent. Moreover, what information many Africans did receive about HIV prevention was not always accurate. For instance, an educational play called *Sarafina II*, which was aimed at curbing the spread of HIV, contained numerous inaccuracies regarding the disease. This caused AIDS activists to comment that “the play sent vague and confusing signals about the disease” including a scene when “one victim limps and walks doubled-over in the second act, symptoms not generally considered consequences of AIDS.”¹³⁷ Another example of the dissemination of false information was when then ANC President Jacob Zuma stated that taking a shower after having unprotected sex prevented the transmission of HIV.¹³⁸ Undoubtedly, erroneous statements made by prominent figures such as these played a part in the steady increase of HIV/AIDS infections between 1994 and 2004.

Lastly, healthcare shortcomings during this period do not end at the inability to curb the HIV/AIDS infection rate but also include the failure to reduce the infant mortality rate and increase life expectancy. In regards to infant mortality, the annual 1996 WHO report concluded that the infant mortality rate in 1994 was 50 for every 1,000 live births.¹³⁹ Despite technological advancements made in healthcare between 1994 and 2005, the annual 2007 WHO report

¹³⁶ SADHS, 2003, national report, 14.

¹³⁷ *New York Times* (New York), 8 October 1996.

¹³⁸ *South African* (London), 15 January 2008.

¹³⁹ WHO, 1996, global report, 121.

concluded that the infant mortality rate had increased to 51 for every 1,000 live births in 2005.¹⁴⁰ The 1996 WHO report also determined that the average life expectancy for South Africans born in 1995 was 64.¹⁴¹ The 2007 WHO report found that this number had fallen dramatically to an average life expectancy of 51 for South Africans born in 2005.¹⁴² Thus, due to inadequate funding of the healthcare sector between 1994 and 2004, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS increased exponentially, life expectancy decreased by over a decade, and the infant mortality rate increased by one.

Human Development Index (HDI)

As previously noted, the decision by the ANC to adopt GEAR and fiscal conservatism meant that funding needed to improve the quality of life in South Africa would be limited. Resultantly, between 1994 and 2004 South Africa not only experienced a period of relative stagnation, but also a reduction in equality and quality of life. This is clearly evident with the continual decline of South Africa's Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI, created by the United Nations to measure the development and equality of a specific country, measures and averages three components. Respectively, these three components are: 1) income, 2) life expectancy at birth, and 3) educational attainment, which takes into account adult literacy and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment ratio. In layman's words, the HDI

¹⁴⁰ WHO, *the World Health Report 2007-A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century*, (Geneva: WHO Press, 2007), global report, 28.

¹⁴¹ WHO, 1996, global report, 121.

¹⁴² WHO report, 2007, global report, 28.

estimates an individual's "ability to lead a long and healthy life, the ability to be knowledgeable and the ability to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living."¹⁴³ Thus, by analyzing several HDI ratings over an extended period of time, it is possible to see trends, either positive or negative, of a given country. As presented in Figure 1, South Africa's case from 1994 to 2004 was one of disappointment as the period saw the country continue along a negative path.




Figure 1: Human Development Index of South Africa, 1994-2004

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Reports* (1997, pp 147; 1999, pp 136; 2002, pp 155; 2005, 225)

¹⁴³ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995: Gender and Human Development*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), global report, 18.

When Nelson Mandela and the ANC instilled democracy in South Africa in 1994, South Africa had an HDI of .716 and was ranked 90th in the world.¹⁴⁴ Three years later this rating had fallen to .695 and South Africa dropped to a ranking of 101st in the world.¹⁴⁵ As noted in Figure 1, the HDI leveled off and between 1997 and 2000 remaining at .695. Although the HDI did not decline during this period of stagnation, South Africa's world ranking dropped to 107th as other developing nations including El Salvador, Tunisia, and Algeria, surpassed South Africa. However, while the first six years following 1994 saw South Africa's HDI drop by .021 and its world ranking fall by 17 positions, it was the period between 2000 and 2003 that saw the most dramatic decline. Indeed, in 2005 the UN calculated that the HDI of South Africa in 2003 had fallen to .658, as the country dropped 13 positions to a 120th world ranking. Countries that overtook South Africa in the HDI world ranking between 2000 and 2003 included Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.

When South Africa's 2003 HDI is compared to its 2003 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, the disparity in rank is -68.¹⁴⁶ A -68 disparity means that South Africa's GDP per capita was ranked 68 spots higher than its HDI ranking. To put this statistic into perspective, in 2003 South Africa had the third largest HDI/GDP discrepancy in the world, behind only Equatorial Guinea and Botswana. Comparatively, countries strife with civil unrest and turmoil in 2003, such as Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, had negative HDI/GDP disparities of -1, -6, and -20 respectively.¹⁴⁷ Thus, a disparity of -68 indicates that South African society continued

¹⁴⁴ UNDP, 1997, global report, 147.

¹⁴⁵ UNDP, 1999, global report, 136.

¹⁴⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005: International cooperation at a crossroads, Aid, trade and security in an unequal world*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), global report, 221.

¹⁴⁷ UNDP, 2005, global report, 221, 222.

to be drastically unequal as “almost half of the country’s people live in poverty with access to neither money nor credit.”¹⁴⁸ Summarily, after the first decade of ANC-led democracy in South Africa its HDI decreased by .058, its world-ranking fell by 30 positions, and it had a HDI/GDP disparity indicative of being one of the most unequal countries in the world.

The decline of South Africa’s HDI and the increased levels of unemployment, poverty, and HIV/AIDS were negative developments that are important to take into account in order to fully understand the decline of political participation in South Africa. Chapter Three presented these trends along with their respective sectors solely to accomplish this task and their inclusion was not aimed at being overly critical of the ANC or to suggest that South Africans lived a better life during apartheid. The momentous steps forward made in the human rights sector, including the right to free speech and right to collectively organize, far outweigh any of the negative trends experienced between 1994 and 2004. Every one of the improvements noted in Chapter Three, including the increase of black students enrolled in higher education, would never have been possible if apartheid had continued. However, every one of the negative trends would have been exacerbated had apartheid not been dismantled.

¹⁴⁸ Anthony Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, 66.

CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL CULTURE FROM 1994-2004

As noted in the introduction, the first decade of democracy in post-apartheid South Africans saw: 1) the unification of civic associations and organizations under one body (Sanco), 2) collusion between NGO's that support procedural democracy and the ANC, and 3) numerous instances of floor crossing accompanied by large-scale corruption. First, by unifying independent civic associations and organizations under Sanco, the ANC quelled oppositional support and reduced the number of political outlets previously accorded to South Africans. Subsequently, the decision to create a single national civic body, at both the local and national level, disillusioned the rural black populace and made participation in government and politics challenging for the common individual.¹⁴⁹ In other words, the creation of Sanco made it much more difficult for South Africans to organize and collectively voice their frustration with government.

While Sanco greatly limited mass political participation in South Africa, collusion by liberal NGO's and the ANC sought to indoctrinate the remaining opposition to procedural democracy.¹⁵⁰ Because the ANC originally campaigned and was elected under a platform proposing social democracy, which would increase the money earmarked for social and welfare programs, the South African government attempted to convince its populace that improvements experienced in the long-term via procedural democracy should take priority over any improvements felt in the short-term via social democracy. A perfect example of this policy shift was the adoption of the economic policy GEAR, which was discussed in Chapter Three.

¹⁴⁹ Zuern, "Fighting for Democracy," 83.

¹⁵⁰ Hearn, "Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa," 826.

In addition to the creation of Sanco and allocation of financial support for liberal NGO's, numerous instances of floor crossing also reinforced and preserved the dominant position held by the ANC. As a result of these factors, between 1994 and 2004 fewer and fewer South Africans actively participated in politics. In turn, the political culture went from being one that had mass political participation and an optimistic citizenry, to one of reduced political participation with a sizably disillusioned populace who feels its vote would not make a difference.¹⁵¹ This change in the South African political culture can be seen in the decline in political participation, as is evident when electoral poll results gathered by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) are compared between 1994 and 2004.¹⁵²

The IEC is a permanent organization that was created under provisions made in the 1993 Constitution. Its sole purpose is to ensure free and fair elections in South Africa and therefore operates independently from the South African government. According to IEC electoral reports, 19,533,498 South Africans voted in the 1994 national election.¹⁵³ However, the number of South Africans who voted in the 1999 election dropped significantly to 15,977,142-a decrease of 3,556,656 votes or roughly 18%.¹⁵⁴ This drop-off in political participation continued as evidenced by the lack of participation in the 2000 municipal election. As stated in the 2000 Voter Turnout Report, only 48.07% of the South African populace voted in the 2000 municipal

¹⁵¹ *New York Times* (New York), 16 April 2004.

¹⁵² The electoral statistics do not take into account subsequent instances of floor crossing which alters the political power structure suggested by the polls.

¹⁵³ Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), *National Elections Report*, 1994, www.elections.org.za [organization], <http://www.elections.org.za/elections94.asp>, accessed 15 November 2008.

¹⁵⁴ IEC, *National Results*, 1999, <http://www.elections.org.za/results/natperparty.asp>, accessed 15 November 2008.

elections.¹⁵⁵ The lack of voter turnout at the municipal level indicates that disillusionment spread from the upper echelon's of politics down to the localities. This is troubling because it suggests that South Africans believe that they not only had little control over national policies and politics but that they did not have control over decisions made at the micro level; in towns and cities.

The drop-off in political participation did not end in 2000 and continued to plague the South African political culture as indicated by a reduction in total votes garnered in the 2004 elections. This is especially troubling due to the fact that the reduction in political participation occurred despite South Africa possessing a larger populace eligible to vote and “a strenuous effort to increase the number of registered voters by the IEC” which included “incentives such as free identification books, an expansion of registration points, two major registration drives and continued registration at municipal offices.”¹⁵⁶ Indeed, although South Africa experienced significant population growth between 1994 and 2004, which stemmed from higher birth rates and an influx of immigrants from surrounding countries-notably Zimbabwe-only 15,863,558 South Africans voted in the 2004 election-a decrease of 113,584 from the 1999 election.¹⁵⁷ The implications for the drop-off in political participation between 1994 and 2004 is magnified due to the governmental structure South Africa adopted in 1994; proportional representation. Proportional representation allocates seats in government based on the percentage of votes each political party garners at both the national and municipal level. Therefore, South Africans who failed to vote not only robbed themselves of the opportunity to have an input in politics, but

¹⁵⁵ IEC, *Voter Turnout Report*, 2001, http://www.elections.org.za/iecweb/Other/LGE_reports_PercPoll_ViewAll.html, accessed 16 November 2008.

¹⁵⁶ *Socialist World Network* (London), 21 April 2004.

¹⁵⁷ IEC, *National Election, Regional Summary*, 2004, http://www.elections.org.za/Elections2004_static.asp, accessed 18 November 2008.

oppositional political parties of seats that would have been accordingly allocated based on the number of votes attained.

Results from a survey I conducted in South Africa mirrors the decline in political participation noted in the electoral polls. The survey questioned 65 South Africans who were eligible to vote in both the 1994 and 2004 elections. Out of the 65 South Africans polled, 9 voted in 1994 but not in 2004. Thus, roughly 14% of those polled failed to participate in the 2004 election despite participating in the 1994 election. While the specific reasons given for not voting in the 2004 election vary, there is a general overlap that notes the failure of government, in one aspect or another, as the primary reason.

For instance, several respondents explained that displeasure with post-apartheid social policies, specifically the lack or ineptitude of welfare programs created, was the reason they did not vote in 2004. Other South Africans explained that post-apartheid economic policies and the subsequent economic recession forced them to seek employment outside of the country for subsistence; in turn lessening any motivation they had for political participation in South Africa. Lastly, some South Africans noted problems with the government itself, whether it be the fact that the ANC dominated politics between 1994 and 2004 or the crime and corruption in government that plagued the respective period. In the following chapter, the specific responses given by participants will be presented in congruence with an overview of the various areas South Africans expressed concern with both between 1994 and 2004, as well as in the immediate future. Respectively, these areas are: ANC dominance, crime and corruption in government, economic shortcomings, and lack of nationalism or shared national identity.

ANC Dominance

The dominant position held by the ANC between 1994 and 2004 is unarguable. Amidst widespread criticism over its policies and corruption in government, the ANC maintained its stranglehold over South Africa, which was made possible through not only the creation of Sanco and support of liberal NGO's, but the nature of proportional representation. As previously noted, 19,533,498 South Africans voted in the 1994 national election with the ANC receiving 62% of the total votes cast.¹⁵⁸ Five years later the number of South Africans who participated in the 1999 election and voted dropped to 15,977,142 with the ANC garnering 66% of the votes.¹⁵⁹ Thus, as the total number of South Africans who voted decreased, support for the ANC increased, in turn increasing the number of seats allocated to the ANC. These figures indicate South Africans who supported or were affiliated with the ANC voted in the 1999 election, while South Africans who failed to vote were, for the most part, those who supported a different party. This trend continued as although only 15,863,558 South Africans voted in the 2004 election-a decrease of 113,584 from the 1999 election-the ANC obtained 69% of the total votes cast, an increase of 3%.¹⁶⁰

Another main reason the ANC continued to strengthen its position in government between 1994 and 2004 was through the employment of floor crossing. As previously mentioned, floor crossing refers to politicians switching political party affiliation once elected

¹⁵⁸ IEC, *National Elections Report*, 1994, <http://www.elections.org.za/elections94.asp>, accessed 15 November 2008.

¹⁵⁹ IEC, *National Results*, 1999, <http://www.elections.org.za/results/natperparty.asp>, accessed 15 November 2008.

¹⁶⁰ IEC, *National Election, Regional Summary*, 2004, http://www.elections.org.za/Elections2004_static.asp, accessed 18 November 2008.

into office. While floor crossing provides standing politicians the opportunity to support newly created political parties, it also accords dominant parties the opportunity to lure politicians away from smaller parties with the promise of advancement and the benefits of membership. Between 1994 and 2004, the latter occurred more frequently as politicians from smaller parties dramatically altered their principles to conform to ANC platforms.¹⁶¹ Thus, in situations when floor crossing occurred, political parties that garnered enough support to elect a politician in office ended up losing its representation in government. Moreover, not only did the party lose a seat in government but usually one of its leaders, which both strengthened the ANC and weakened the respective party. As a result, floor crossing effected party representation in government which caused higher levels of voter apathy.¹⁶² Table 3 presents the number of seats both lost and gained by each party as a result of floor crossing in 2002.

¹⁶¹ *The Mercury* (Durban), 16 April 2003.

¹⁶² *The Star* (Johannesburg), 13 April 2004.

Table 3: Floor crossing Statistics for 2002

<u>Political Party</u>	<u># of Seats Gained</u>	<u># of Seats Lost</u>	<u>Disparity</u>
Action Independent People's Party	0	1	-1
African Christian Democratic Party	2	4	-2
Alliance 2000+	0	1	-1
Alliance for the Community	0	6	-6
Alliance of Independents Midvaal	0	1	-1
African National Congress	131	16	+115
Azanian People's Organisation	0	6	-6
Belastingbetalersvereniging Van Parys	1	0	+1
Black Consciousness Forum	5	0	+5
Breedevallei Onafhanklik	1	2	-1
Christian Democratic Party	5	0	+5
Civic Alliance	0	1	-1
Democratic Alliance	17	420	-403
The Conservative Party of South Africa	2	0	+2
East Rand Forum	0	2	-2
Greater Brits Civic Organisation	0	1	-1
George Community Initiative	0	3	-3
Inkatha Freedom Party	9	10	-1
Independents	19	7	+12
Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa	0	2	-2
Independent Heritage South Party	1	0	+1
Independent Sport Party	1	0	+1
Inwoners/Citizens' Forum	0	1	-1

<u>Political Party</u>	<u># of Seats Gained</u>	<u># of Seats Lost</u>	<u>Disparity</u>
Jansenville Klipplaat Alliansie	0	1	-1
Kouga 2000+	0	1	-1
Middelburg Residents Organisation	0	1	-1
Mosselbaai Gemeenskapsforum	0	1	-1
Nasionale aksie	1	0	+1
New National Party	356	0	+356
Noordwes Forum	0	2	-2
Oudtshoorn Aksie 2000	0	2	-2
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	0	12	-12
People's Forum	0	1	-1
Phumelela Ratepayers' Association	1	0	+1
Postmasburg Olifantshoek Resident Association	0	4	-4
Potchefstroom Inwonersvereniging	1	0	+1
United Christian Democratic Party	1	25	-24
United Democratic Movement	11	21	-10
United Independent Front	0	1	-1
Universal Party	1	0	+1
Verenigde Gemeenskap Organisasie	0	1	-1
Vision-Visie 2000+	0	2	-2
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	0	1	-1
Witzenberg Onafhanklike Vereniging	0	1	-1
Ximoko Party	0	4	-4
Zimbabeleni Development Organisation	0	1	-1

Source: IEC, *Floor crossing Report*, <http://www.elections.org.za/papers/23/DetailedFCRpt.xls>

The column to the far right of Table 3 indicates the number of seats lost or gained by each party after floor crossing during the 2002 calendar year. As shown in Table 3, the number of politicians who joined smaller parties, such as the Independent Sport Party and Phumelela Ratepayers' Association, was far fewer than those who joined larger parties, like the ANC and NNP. Subsequently, many smaller parties, including the Azanian People's Organisation and Ximoko Party, lost numerous seats while failing to gain a single seat. Indeed, in 2002 the ANC attracted more members due to floor crossing than all other parties combined with the exception of the NNP, which subsequently merged with the ANC in 2005.¹⁶³

When the South African populace was presented with the opportunity to voice their opinion over the formal legalization of floor crossing in 2003, the populace voted overwhelmingly against its legalization. However, despite a three to one popular vote opposing the legalization of floor crossing, the Constitutional Court passed the legislation, which promptly gave the ANC nine new members in Parliament and an overall majority in the National Assembly.¹⁶⁴ As a result of its formal legalization, floor crossing was not limited to the period 1994-2003 and continued to play a large role in maintaining ANC dominance in government. For instance, a 2004 summary report released by the IEC concluded that the dominant political party in ten municipalities changed as a result of floor crossing. While the ANC was the dominant party in none of the ten municipalities before floor crossing, it became the dominant party in eight of the ten municipalities after floor crossing. Contrastingly, the NNP was the dominant party in five of the municipalities before floor crossing, four of which were taken over

¹⁶³ *Sunday Tribune* (Durban), 17 April 2005.

¹⁶⁴ Bauer and Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa*, 260.

by the ANC.¹⁶⁵ The loss of dominant positions, this time at the local level, was one of the main reasons the NNP merged with the ANC less than one year later. Thus, floor crossing not only preserved ANC dominance, but led to the demise of a main oppositional party whose members chose to join the ANC instead of continue to fight it.

However to what extent did ANC dominance in government contribute to dwindling political participation in South Africa? Also, how concerned are South Africans regarding ANC dominance in government as it pertains to the acceptance and long-term survival of democracy in South Africa? Results from a survey I conducted sought to provide insight into these questions and are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Concern over ANC Dominance

<u>No Concern</u>	<u>Minor Concern</u>	<u>Moderate Concern</u>	<u>Major Concern</u>	<u>Immediate Concern</u>
6	3	12	25	19

Evident in Table 4 is the fact that 67.7% of the South Africans polled believe ANC dominance is either an immediate or major concern regarding the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. While the sample size was somewhat numerically limited, a proportion over two-thirds is overwhelming enough to conclude that most South Africans believe ANC dominance to be a problem effecting the political culture of South Africa. Furthermore,

¹⁶⁵ IEC, *Summary Report on Floor Crossing*, 2004, <http://www.elections.org.za/papers/130/Floor%20Crossing%202004%20Results.xls>, accessed 18 November 2008.

when South Africans who voted in 1994 but did not vote in 2004 were asked why they failed to vote, many provided an answer pointing towards ANC dominance.

For instance, one respondent plainly stated “dominance of ANC” as the reason for not voting in 2004, while another individual noted being “not happy with floor crossing” as the reason for not voting. These answers, although brief, clearly express displeasure with ANC dominance in government. One answer given by a respondent who did not vote in 2004 was not brief and explicitly voiced disappointment with the ANC. Specifically, the respondent stated “I had high hopes and aspirations of a change in government style. But the ANC’s apartheid is similar or even worse than the Nationalist apartheid.” Lastly, one respondent explained the failure to vote in 2004 despite voting in 1994 was “because there was no party to vote for”, which alludes to the fact that the ANC is “progressively closing down opposition and building the foundations of a new authoritarianism.”¹⁶⁶

Crime and Corruption

Due to the fact that the ANC comprised, and continues to comprise, the majority of positions in South Africa’s government, between 1994 and 2004 crime and corruption in government was closely tied with the ANC and its members. A byproduct of this affiliation was the perception by the public that checks and balances were null in void, as it was viewed unlikely an oversight committee chaired and comprised of mostly ANC members would criticize or

¹⁶⁶ Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, 119.

question another ANC member.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, the “ANC’s domination of the public sector calls into question the efficacy of governmental-oversight mechanisms.”¹⁶⁸ This notion was reinforced, in part, by the case of Bantu Holomisa. Holomisa, once a close friend and supporter of Nelson Mandela, was expelled from the ANC after speaking to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) and discussing acts of corruption by ANC members. Specifically, he mentioned then Minister of Public Enterprises Stella Sigcau, noting that she had received part of a \$50,000 bribe to allow the construction of a casino and the granting of a casino license to Sol Kerzner.¹⁶⁹ The circumstances surrounding Holimisa’s dismissal stressed the extent to which South African politics had become corrupted and the length the ANC would go to close ranks.

Another instance of corruption by a political official was an arms scandal involving then Deputy President Jacob Zuma and Schabir Shaik. Shaik, a long-time friend and financial advisor to Zuma, pled guilty in 2005 for offering Zuma a 500,000 rand per year bribe for his silence during an investigation into a multibillion-rand arms deal involving Shaik’s company, Thint.¹⁷⁰ Shaik also pled guilty to making 238 payments between 1995 and 2002 to Zuma, in the sum of over 1,300,000 rand, so he could use his name and political influence for business purposes.¹⁷¹ However, despite Shaik pleading guilty to both charges and the prosecution holding an encrypted fax that detailed corrupt payments between the parties involved, Jacob Zuma was not convicted of any offense. Any opportunity for a conviction ended when the National Prosecutorial

¹⁶⁷ *New York Times* (New York), 10 May 1999.

¹⁶⁸ Kenneth R. Dombrowski, “South Africa After Apartheid,” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 3 (July 2006): 43-57.

¹⁶⁹ *New York Times* (New York), 2 September 2006.

¹⁷⁰ *The Star* (Johannesburg), 16 May 2006.

¹⁷¹ *Cape Times* (Cape Town), 21 June 2005.

Authority (NPA) dropped corruption charges on 6 April 2009, which followed Zuma's election as president of South Africa. The decision by the NPA to drop the charges against Zuma, in the words of former South African president F.W. de Klerk, raises "serious questions regarding the NPA's independence and whether all South Africans are still equally treated before the law."¹⁷²

Examples of crime and corruption in government between 1994 and 2004 were not limited to these two aforementioned incidences. In 2000, former cabinet minister Abe Williams was convicted of stealing 383,000 rand in donations and former ambassador Allan Boesek was convicted of stealing donor funds of an undisclosed amount.¹⁷³ Another instance of corruption centered on Tony Yengeni, who in 2003 was convicted of defrauding parliament by failing to disclose a 47% discount (worth R167 387) on a Mercedes-Benz ML 320 4x4 he bought in 1998.¹⁷⁴ The case of Yengeni is not unique as many cases of corruption stem from politician's desire to drive luxury cars, including the Mercedes-Benz brand.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, ANC leaders have been known to recklessly drive around Durban in luxury cars and constantly party at five-star hotels.¹⁷⁶ While these examples of corruption are troubling it is the cases of Bantu Holomisa and Jacob Zuma which are particularly disturbing cases due to their implication of prominent figures in South African politics. The inclusion of Jacob Zuma alone, clearly presents the extent to which crime and corruption was, and continues to be, embedded in South Africa's government. With this considered, to what extent did crime and corruption in government effect political

¹⁷² *The Star* (Johannesburg), 7 April 2009.

¹⁷³ *The Star* (Johannesburg), 21 March 2003.

¹⁷⁴ *The Mercury* (Durban), 20 March 2003.

¹⁷⁵ *The Mercury* (Durban), 20 March 2003.

¹⁷⁶ *Johannesburg Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 21 November 2006.

participation in South Africa? In order to answer this question, several indicators will be used including the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and the Global Integrity Index (GII). Lastly, survey data will be used to buttress these sources and provide additional insight into the problem of crime and corruption along with its impact on South Africa's political culture between 1994 and 2004.

The GCB is a public opinion survey that collects data by randomly surveying citizens of each country polled. Contrastingly, the CPI and GII collect information and opinions from carefully selected researchers and journalists within each country. Thus, by combining these sources it is possible to attain an accurate overview, which encompasses input from all societal and educational levels, of the role crime and corruption played in reducing political participation in South Africa.

Because understanding why there was a decline in political participation by the general populace in South Africa between 1994 and 2004 is the main focus of this thesis, the GCB will be presented first. Created by Transparency International (TI) as a supplement to the CPI, which TI created in 1995, the initial GCB was released in 2003. In this report, when 465 South African respondents were asked to approximate the degree corruption affected their political life, in other words political participation, troubling results were produced. Specifically, 304 (65.4%) South Africans said corruption in government very significantly affected their political life in South Africa.¹⁷⁷ Additionally, 106 (22.8%) said corruption somewhat significantly affected their political life, with only 55 (11.8%) noting that their political life was not significantly affected by

¹⁷⁷ Transparency International (TI), *the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer: A 2002 Pilot Survey of International Attitudes, Expectations, and Priorities on Corruption*, (London: Transparency International, 2003), 24.

corruption.¹⁷⁸ When 498 South Africans were asked the degree to which they believed corruption would increase or decrease in South Africa during the next three years, 180 (36.1%) said it would increase a lot, 73 (14.7%) said it would increase a little, and 67 (13.5%) said it would remain status quo.¹⁷⁹

Similar results were evident in the 2003 CPI. The CPI, which was developed by TI, released its first report in 1995. Beginning in 1995, the CPI index has calculated corruption in government by rating each nation on a scale from zero to ten, with zero standing as very corrupt and ten as highly clean. Included in the initial 1995 CPI, South Africa received a 5.62 score and was ranked 21st out of the 41 countries polled.¹⁸⁰ However, while South Africa's CPI minimally increased to 6.58 in 1996, it gradually followed a negative trend bottoming out at 4.4 in 2003, when it was ranked 48th out of the 133 countries polled.¹⁸¹ Presented in Figure 2 is South Africa's CPI from 1995 to 2004.

¹⁷⁸ TI, *the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer*, 24.

¹⁷⁹ TI, *the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer*, 28.

¹⁸⁰ TI, *Corruption Perception Index*, (Berlin: TI, 1995), 5.

¹⁸¹ TI, *Corruption Perception Index*, (Berlin: TI, 2003), 4.




Figure 2: Corruption Perception Index of South Africa, 1995-2004

Source: Transparency International, *CPI* (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004), http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

Finally, the Global Integrity Index (GII) reinforces the fact that corruption in South Africa has had a negative impact on politics and political participation. Created by Global Integrity, a non-profit organization that seeks to evaluate and report on corruption in government worldwide, the GII combines ratings received from carefully selected researchers and journalists. Ratings range from 0 to 1; with 0 serving as poor and 1 as exceptional. In the 2004 Global Integrity Report, South Africa received exceptional scores for freedom of the media (.92), civil society organizations (1), and election monitoring agencies (.95).¹⁸² However, while the electoral process and electoral oversight committee (IEC) received admiral marks, among many other categories, its political party finances rating was abysmal, receiving a score of .06. Political party finances refer to the financial equality between political parties both large and

¹⁸² Global Integrity (GI), *Global Integrity Report: South Africa*, (Washington D.C.: GI, 2004), 2.

small, at both the national and local level. A poor rating in this category infers: 1) that there is no regulation on funds received by political parties nor is there a requirement to disclose donors and thus, 2) the procurement of finances is suspect and/or corrupt. Furthermore, the report stated that “the lack of regulation on private and foreign funding is one of the greater dangers to our [South Africa] democracy, both in terms of the integrity of political outcomes and in terms of levels of corruption.”¹⁸³ Thus, despite an overall GII rating of .81, the Global Integrity Report details a very unequal and corrupt component in South African politics.

Feedback from a survey I conducted indicates that the South African populace views crime and corruption in government as the primary concern regarding the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. This is clearly presented in Table 5, which contains a break down of 65 South Africans surveyed on the level of concern crime and corruption poses democracy.

Table 5: Concern over Crime and Corruption

<u>No Concern</u>	<u>Minor Concern</u>	<u>Moderate Concern</u>	<u>Major Concern</u>	<u>Immediate Concern</u>
2	3	5	14	41

As is evident in Table 5, 41 of the 65 South Africans surveyed, roughly 63%, believed that crime and corruption in government is an immediate concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. The concern South Africans have regarding crime and corruption is

¹⁸³ GI, *Global Integrity Report: South Africa*, 24.

magnified when immediate concern is combined with those who believe crime and corruption is a major concern. The sum, 55, is roughly 85% of the 65 South Africans polled. Regarding the South Africans who voted in 1994 but not in 2004, none expressed that crime and corruption itself was the reason for not voting. However, one respondent who did not vote in either election stated a lack of confidence in the practices of political officials. Specifically, the individual stated that “I wasn’t confident about the governing party and the competitors,” or in other words, South African politics. Thus, when the survey data and newspaper articles are combined with the GCB, CPI, and GII, it is apparent that crime and corruption in South Africa played the largest role in the decline of political participation between 1994 and 2004.

Economic Shortcomings

As discussed in Chapter Three, although South Africa’s economy improved between 1994 and 2004, it did not improve nearly to the extent necessary to curtail unemployment and widespread poverty. While direct foreign investment increased formal employment positions, the number of jobs created was overshadowed by population growth and an influx of immigrants from neighboring countries in southern Africa. Compounding this problem is the fact that the ANC failed to adequately provide and fund welfare programs necessary to affectively help impoverished South Africans. However, it is unclear as to: 1) the extent economic shortcomings contributed to declining political participation in South Africa and 2) the level of concern South Africans have regarding the economies role in the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. Figure 2 presents the results from 65 South Africans presented with these questions.

Table 6: Concern over Economic Shortcomings

<u>No Concern</u>	<u>Minor Concern</u>	<u>Moderate Concern</u>	<u>Major Concern</u>	<u>Immediate Concern</u>
5	5	19	24	12

As displayed in Figure 2, 36.9% of the South Africans polled believed that economic shortcomings are a major concern for the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. Additionally, 55.4% of those polled believed that economic shortcomings were either an immediate or major concern for the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. Contrastingly, only 15.4% of those polled believed that economic shortcomings are of little or no concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. These statistics clearly indicate that the majority of South Africans believe economic shortcomings are a concern for the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.

Regarding the role economic shortcomings played in the decline of political participation in South Africa, several survey participants provided insightful comments. For instance, one participant stated that the failure to vote in 2004, despite voting in 1994, was because the participant “moved to UK to find work.” Another participant stated that he or she “was living in SA in 1994 and felt passionate about contributing to the right outcome.” Lastly, one respondent noted a “lack of progress in black empowerment” which refers to the failure of government to bridge the financial gap between races. From these statements it is obvious that these South Africans were not politically active because they were either forced to find employment outside of South Africa and thus have less of a vested interest in South Africa’s political situation, or are dissatisfied with the economic progress of black South Africans. Specifically, the second quote

notes feeling passionate in the past tense, which suggests that the passionate feeling no longer exists. Thus, for some South Africans who were forced to find employment outside of South Africa or are displeased with economic progress, economic shortcomings played a role in their lack of political participation in South Africa.

Lack of Nationalism

A main theme that has remained constant in South African society since the arrival of Europeans is the lack of unity between classes, and more notably, races. As presented in Chapter Two, South African society has a longstanding history of being fragmented; whether between the British and Boers, upper-class parties like the UP or the ANC-in its early years-and both parties lower-class constituents, or between black and white, African and European. The complexity of this racial and class history made it all the more important that, for the successful and long-term stability of democracy and mass political participation, a shared national identity emerged in South African society. One step taken by the government to increase the likelihood of this happening was the through the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was a commission that invited participants from both sides in the struggle over apartheid to openly testify about their involvement, whether as perpetrators, as victims, or in many cases both. It was hoped that by airing past atrocities the tensions embedded in South African society would be lessened so that the unification of the populace could occur.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ André de Toit, "Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenström, Gandhi, and the TRC," *Journal of South African Studies* 31, no. 2 (June 2005): 437.

Perpetrators who testified before the TRC were not promised amnesty simply because of his or her admittance to criminal actions; amnesty was conditional. Victims who testified gave up the right to pursue legal actions; the TRC decided what reparations would be awarded, if any. However, some critics argued that by focusing on attaining testimonies from specific individuals the TRC limited participation in the hearings to political activists and former apartheid agents, not society as a whole.¹⁸⁵ Another criticism of the TRC centered on its position as an independent commission-separate from the government-which rendered it unable to directly prosecute noted perpetrators and provide the justice many South Africans wanted. Thus, although the TRC was successful in airing many past human rights violations, it was unable to prosecute former perpetrators, provide the justice necessary to heal past wounds, and set the stage necessary to unify South African society.

Resultantly, in a speech given on 28 November 2006, Executive Director of the Human Sciences Research Council on Social Cohesion and Identity Research for South Africa Xolela Mangcu, stressed South Africa remains, to its detriment, racially divided. Specifically, he believed that South Africans allied along racial lines instead based on politics and ideology. Arguing that the ANC is responsible for the lack of unification due to its adherence to only its black constituency, Mangcu called for the ANC to “invite the broader public to be part of its family” and embrace “the irreducible plurality of all societies.”¹⁸⁶ One example that suggested South Africa continued to be racially divided-with the ANC only assisting its black constituents-was when the premier of Gauteng visited a mixed-race township called Eldorado Park in 2003.

¹⁸⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, “Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC),” *Diacritics* 32, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 34.

¹⁸⁶ *Cape Times* (Cape Town), 30 November 2006.

The citizens of Eldorado Park inquired as to why several years of electric debt accumulated by citizens of Soweto, a black township, had been written off, while the same accordant had not been provided to them despite Eldorado Park being in the same financial situation as Soweto. Specifically, the mixed-race citizens of Eldorado Park “wanted to know whether the government, now run by black people, was practicing reverse racism” and felt like “there is no place for them in the New South Africa.”¹⁸⁷

Reinforcing these comments, another newspaper article detailed that South Africans decisions and responses “continue to be clouded by the colours we support” and not “the general good of all the people”¹⁸⁸ The date these statements were made reflect that racial division continued to persist in South Africa for the duration of the period between 1994 and 2004, and at least up until 2006 there was a lack of a shared national identity. The extent that a lack of shared national identity is of concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa is presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Concern over Lack of Shared National Identity

<u>No Concern</u>	<u>Minor Concern</u>	<u>Moderate Concern</u>	<u>Major Concern</u>	<u>Immediate Concern</u>
6	16	15	20	8

¹⁸⁷ *New York Times* (New York), 27 July 2003.

¹⁸⁸ *Cape Argus* (Cape Town), 9 October 2006.

In contrast to the other areas of concern analyzed in this thesis (ANC dominance, crime and corruption in government, and economic shortcomings), lack of a shared national identity ironically produced an even distribution that follows a bell curve centering on moderate concern. This is ironic because the only prompt that produced a bell curve regards a topic that stresses the disunity prevalent in South Africa. While the highest number of South Africans (20) chose major concern, this grouping was balanced by those South Africans who selected minor concern (16) which received the second highest number of votes. Additionally, South Africans who selected immediate concern (8) were balanced by those who selected no concern (6). Furthermore, none of the South Africans surveyed who voted in 1994 but not in 2004 noted a lack of a shared national identity as their reason for not being politically active. Thus, regarding lack of a shared national identity as a cause for the reduction in political participation-and the deterioration of the once politically active South African political culture-results from the survey vary and are thus inconclusive.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Between 1994 and 2004 the political culture in South Africa saw a steady decline in political participation as satisfaction with the South African government deteriorated causing widespread disillusionment. This is evident not only via the decline in voter turnout recorded by the IEC but by the numerous statements given by South Africans attesting to why the given individual did not vote in 2004 despite voting in 1994. As was noted, there were numerous troubling developments that explain the decline in political participation. Unemployment significantly increased in South Africa between 1994 and 2004 because work programs were not developed and implemented. In turn, poverty increased as welfare spending was cut due to the adherence of the ANC to procedural democracy, a decision aimed at attracting direct foreign investment while limiting fiscal spending. Together, these economic developments widened the gap between the marginalized-unemployed proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the percentage of South Africans infected with HIV/AIDS increased as well, due to flawed educational programs including Sarafina II, and the varying standards of healthcare provided to South Africans based on class and race.

Amidst these developments several decisions made political participation in South Africa difficult for those opposed to the ANC. This includes the unification of civic associations under Sanco; the funding of liberal NGO's to speak out against social democracy while advocating procedural democracy; and the legalization of floor crossing despite overwhelming public opposition. Lastly, South Africans were made aware of numerous instances of crime and corruption committed by politicians in high-ranking positions. Newspaper articles pointed out time and again the fact that many politicians embezzled money or accepted bribes during a time

when unemployment and poverty was increasing in South Africa. However, discerning what factor is most responsible for the decline in political participation was difficult as each is troubling in its own right. The survey I conducted sought to provide some insight and produced conclusive results.

As presented in Chapter Four, the South African populace believes that crime and corruption in government is the main reason there was a decline in political participation between 1994 and 2004. The surveys also clearly show that crime and corruption in government is of most concern to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa. Closely following crime and corruption in government was ANC dominance, which continued between 1994 and 2004 due to Sanco, liberal NGO's, and floor crossing. However, it can be inferred that crime and corruption of a government dominated by one-party, the ANC, allows these two categories to be combined. Indeed, the reason crime and corruption is a separate category is the fact that other parties occupied positions in government; although the likelihood that a member from a smaller party would risk losing his or her position by participating in crime or corruption, amidst the eyes of oversight committees dominated by members of the ANC, is limited.

Economic shortcomings had an impact on political participation as well, due to many South Africans leaving the country to work abroad. While these individuals continued to live part-time in South Africa, their exposure to other countries lessened the vested interest they had in South Africa. Furthermore, the failure to properly address unemployment and poverty undoubtedly played a major role in the decline of political participation between 1994 and 2004. The one factor that was inconclusive was the role the lack of a shared national identity played in lessening political participation and the concern it is to the long-term stability of democracy. What is conclusive is that South Africa continued to be drastically unequal and at the end of the

first decade of democracy had become one of the most unequal countries in the world. Thus, while some accomplishments were made between 1994 and 2004, they were overshadowed by the numerous failures that arose during this period. Indeed, countless South Africans explained that in some ways life was far worse in 2004 than it was in 1994; higher levels of unemployment and poverty overwhelming points to these sentiments being valid.

APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL



University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board
Office of Research & Commercialization
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501
Orlando, Florida 32826-3246
Telephone: 407-823-2901, 407-882-2012 or 407-882-2276
www.research.ucf.edu/compliance/irb.html

Notice of Exempt Review Status

From: **UCF Institutional Review Board**
FWA00000351, Exp. 10/8/11, IRB00001138

To: **Andrew E. Kinsell**

Date: **December 23, 2008**

IRB Number: **SBE-08-05947**

Study Title: **Post Apartheid Political Culture in South Africa, 1994-2004**

Dear Researcher:

Your research protocol was reviewed by the IRB Chair on 12/22/2008. Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.101, your study has been determined to be **minimal risk for human subjects and exempt** from 45 CFR 46 federal regulations and further IRB review or renewal unless you later wish to add the use of identifiers or change the protocol procedures in a way that might increase risk to participants. Before making any changes to your study, call the IRB office to discuss the changes. **A change which incorporates the use of identifiers may mean the study is no longer exempt, thus requiring the submission of a new application to change the classification to expedited if the risk is still minimal.** Please submit the Termination/Final Report form when the study has been completed. All forms may be completed and submitted online at <https://iris.research.ucf.edu>.

The category for which exempt status has been determined for this protocol is as follows:

2. Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey or interview procedures, or the observation of public behavior, so long as confidentiality is maintained.
 - (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that the subject cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subject, **and/or**
 - (ii) Subject's responses, if known outside the research would not reasonably place the subject at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subject's financial standing or employability or reputation.

A **waiver of documentation of consent** has been approved for all subjects. Participants do not have to sign a consent form, but the IRB requires that you give participants a copy of the IRB-approved consent form, letter, information sheet, or statement of voluntary consent at the top of the survey.

All data, which may include signed consent form documents, must be retained in a locked file cabinet for a minimum of three years (six if HIPAA applies) past the completion of this research. Any links to the identification of participants should be maintained on a password-protected computer if electronic information is used. Additional requirements may be imposed by your funding agency, your department, or other entities. Access to data is limited to authorized individuals listed as key study personnel.

On behalf of Tracy Dietz, Ph.D., UCF IRB Chair, this letter is signed by:

Signature applied by Joanne Muratori on 12/23/2008 09:18:12 AM EST

IRB Coordinator

APPENDIX B: SURVEY

Survey of the South African post apartheid political culture from 1994-2004

The goal of the below survey is to:

1) Get an understanding of the South African publics' perception of government and its progress, or lack thereof, between 1994 and 2004.

2) To determine what the South Africa public believes to be the number one concern to the stability of democracy in South Africa.

It is being conducted by a graduate student attending the University of Central Florida, located in the United States of America. No personal information, other than your age, is desired. Thank you for your participation.

(Circle which applies)

- | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-------|-----|
| 1. Age | 33-49 | 50-65 | 66< |
| 2. Did you vote in the 1994 election? | Y | N | |
| 3. Did you vote in the 2004 election? | Y | N | |

4. If you voted during the 1994 election but not in the 2004 elections please explain why, in the space provided below, you did not vote in 2004.

For each of the following questions, regarding each aspect rate the effectiveness of the South African government from 1994-2004 on a scale from (1) poor to (5) good, with (2) unsatisfactory, (3) fair but needs improvement, and (4) satisfactory.

- | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5. Economic performance | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. Employment/labor/job creation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. Reconciliation of society | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Educational system improvements | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. Healthcare system improvements | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

For each of the following questions, rate the degree to which each prompt is a concern regarding the long term stability of democracy on a scale from: (1) no concern, (2) minor concern, (3) moderate concern, (4) major concern and (5) immediate concern.

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10. Lack of a shared national identity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. Dominance of ANC in government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Crime and corruption in government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13. Economic shortcomings/failures | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT



Informed Consent

Researchers at the University of Central Florida (UCF) study many topics. To do this we need the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. You are being invited to take part in a research study which will include about 200 people. You can ask questions about the research. You can read this form, and if interested, can agree to take part in the survey right now. You have been asked to take part in this research study because you are at least 33 years old and are a citizen of South Africa citizen of South Africa which ensures that you were both old enough and eligible to vote during the first democratic election in 1994.

The person doing this research is Andrew Kinsell of the UCF Department of History. Because the researcher is a master's student, Dr. Ezekiel Walker, a UCF faculty supervisor in the Department of history, is guiding him.

Study title: Post Apartheid Political Culture in South Africa, 1994-2004

Purpose of the research study: The purpose of this survey is to attain an understanding of how the South African public perceives the progress, or lack thereof, in South Africa between 1994 and 2004. Furthermore, it will also attempt to garner what South Africans, as a whole, believe to be the primary concern facing the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.

What you will be asked to do in the study: Answer a thirteen question survey that asks participants to rate on a scale from 1 to 5;

- 1) The progress or lack thereof, made in South Africa for each prompt between 1994 and 2004.
- 2) The concern each prompt poses to the long-term stability of democracy in South Africa.

Voluntary participation: You should take part in this study only because you want to. There is no penalty for not taking part, and you will not lose any benefits. You have the

right to stop at any time. Just tell the researcher or a member of the research team that you want to stop.

Location: Surveys will be handed out in public settings to individuals interested in completing the survey.

Time required: The survey should only take a few minutes to complete as it is only thirteen questions long and asks you to rate each prompt on a scale from 1 to 5.

Audio or video taping: This study does not include any audio or video taping.

Risks: Since there are not any personal questions contained in the survey there are not any expected risks for taking part in this study.

Benefits: There are no direct or immediate benefits to you for taking part in this study. However, long term the survey data will hopefully improve the international understanding of South Africa between 1994 and 2004 along with the challenges that face the long term stability of democracy in South Africa.

Compensation or payment: There is no compensation or other payment to you for taking part in this study.

Anonymous research: This study is anonymous and no personal information other than your age is required.

Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: Andrew Kinsell, Graduate Student, History Program, College of Arts and Humanities, (239) 823-4563 or Dr. Ezekiel Walker, Faculty Supervisor, Department of History at (407) 823-1024 or by email at ewalker@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu.

IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

How to return this consent form to the researcher: By completing this survey, you give me permission to report your responses anonymously in the final manuscript to be submitted to my faculty supervisor as part of my course work.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Andreasson, Stefan. 2006. The African National Congress and its Critics: 'Predator Liberalism' Black Empowerment and Intra-Alliance Tensions in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Democratization* 13, no. 2: 303-322.
- Bauer, Gretchen, and Scott D. Taylor. 2005. *Politics in Southern Africa*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Beck, Roger. 2000. *The history of South Africa*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
- Butler, Anthony. 2004. *Contemporary South Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Crais, Clifton C. 1992. *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davenport, T.R.H., and Christopher Saunders. 2000. *South Africa: A Modern History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Dombroski, Kenneth R. 2006. South Africa After Apartheid. *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 3: 43-57.
- Ensor, Paula. 2004. Contesting Discourses in Higher Education Curriculum Restructuring in South Africa. *Higher Education* 48, no. 3: 339-359.
- Etherington, Norman. 2001. *The Great Trek: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854*. London: Longman Publishers, 2001.
- Fynn, Henry F. 1950. *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*. Pietermaritzburg, ZA: Shuter and Shooter.
- Glaser, Daryl. 2001. *Politics and Society in South Africa*. London: Sage Publications.
- Hearn, Julie. 2000. Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa. *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 5: 815-830.
- _____. 2001. The 'Uses and Abuses' of Civil Society in South Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 87: 43-53.
- Hendricks, Fred. 2003. *Fault-Lines in South African Democracy: Continuing Crises of Inequality and Injustice*. Uppsala, ZA: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

- Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality. 1998. *Report prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality*.
- Johnston, Alexander. 1999. The 1999 Election and South Africa's Postapartheid Political Culture. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 27, no. 2: 17-23.
- Keegan, Timothy. 1996. *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.
- Kunnie, Julian. 2000. *Is Apartheid Really Dead: Pan-Africanist Working Class Cultural Critical Perspectives*. Oxford: Westview Press.
- Kuper, Leo. 1957. *Passive Resistance in South Africa*. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.
- de Kiewiet, C.W. 1937. *The Imperial Factor in South Africa*. London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd.
- Laband, John. 2005. *The Transvaal Rebellion*. Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman Publishers.
- Lester, Alan. 1996. *From Colonization to Democracy: A New Historical Geography of South Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Mabokela, Reitumetse Obakeng, and Kimberly Lenease King, eds. 2001. *Apartheid No More: Case Studies of Southern African Universities in the Process of Transformation*. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC). *Diacritics* 32, no. 4: 33-59.
- Mattes, Robert. 2002. South Africa: Democracy Without the People. *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1: 22-36.
- Maylam, Paul. 2001. *South Africa's Racial Past: The history and historiography of racism, segregation, and apartheid*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- McKinley, Dale T. 1997. *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle*. London: Pluto Press.
- Meli, Francis. 1989. *South Africa Belongs to Us*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Merwe, P.J. 1995. *The Migrant Farmer in the History of the Cape Colony 1657-1842*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

- Morris, Donald. 1965. *The Washing of the Spears*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Nattrass, Nicoli, and Jeremy Seekings. 2005. *Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Nutting, Anthony. 1970. *Scramble for Africa: The Great Trek to the Boer War*. London: Constable & Company Ltd.
- Posel, Deborah. *The making of Apartheid 1948-1961*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ridgeway, J. West. 1907. The Future of the Transvaal. *Journal of the Royal African Society* 6, no. 22: 154-162.
- Robinson, Ronald, ed. 1988. *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shaw, William. 1972. *The journal of William Shaw*. Cape Town, ZA: A. A. Balkema.
- Shepherd, R. H. W. 1955. The South African Bantu Education Act. *African Affairs* 54, no. 215: 138-142.
- Terreblanche, Sampie. 2002. *History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002*. Pietermaritzburg, ZA: University of Natal Press.
- Thomas, Scott. 1996. *The Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign relations of the ANC since 1960*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- de Toit, André. 2005. Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenström, Gandhi, and the TRC. *Journal of South African Studies* 31, no. 2: 419-448.
- United Nations. 1976. Special Committee against Apartheid. *Special Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid on "The Soweto massacre and its aftermath"*.
- _____. 1984. Special Committee against Apartheid. *Appeal by the Special Committee against Apartheid to the cities of the world*.
- _____. 1984. World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa. *Declaration adopted by the World Conference on Sanction against Racist South Africa*.
- UNAIDS. 2008. *2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic*.
- UNDP. 1995. *Human Development Report 1995: Gender and Human Development*.
- _____. 1997. *Human Development Report 1997: Human Development to Eradicate Poverty*.

- _____. 1998. *HIV/AIDS & Human Development: South Africa*.
- _____. 1999. *Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face*.
- _____. 2000. *South Africa: Transformation for Human Development*.
- _____. 2003. *South Africa: the Challenge of Sustainable Development*.
- _____. 2004. *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*.
- WHO. 1996. *The World Health Report 1996: Fighting Disease, Fostering Development*.
- _____. 2007. *The World Health Report 2007-A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century*.
- World Bank. 2003. *2003 World Development Indicators*.
- Zuern, Elke. 2002. Fighting for Democracy: Popular Organizations and Postapartheid Government in South Africa. *African Studies Review* 45, no. 1: 77-102.