

# **Botswana, Africa's Haven of Ethnic Peace and Harmony: Status and Future Prospects**

**Munya M. Mulinge**

## ***Abstract***

*This paper has the dual objectives to highlight some of the factors that account for the absence of ethnic tensions and conflict in Botswana since independence and to reflect on the future of ethnic relations in the country. It identifies factors such as the nature of ethnic relations during the colonial period, the nature of British indirect rule, the relatively even development across regions occupied by different ethnic groups, deliberate government efforts to create national as opposed to tribal consciousness and the institutions of chieftaincy as having contributed to harmonious ethnic relations. An examination of the current situation, however, points to emerging disintegrative ethnic consciousness. This is evident from three factors: 1) The political debates centred on ethnic representation in the House of Chiefs and the fairness of sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Constitution that are sweeping across the country; 2) the appointment of a Presidential Commission to review sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution, and 3) the focus the subject of ethnicity has received in the print media. It is concluded that Botswana is no longer safe from the ethnic strife, tensions and conflicts that have engulfed most other Africa countries, unless deliberate corrective measures are adopted by the state, drawing from other African countries to identify what works and what does not work.*

## **Introduction**

The term *ethnicity* refers to the consciousness of a feeling or an awareness of being a member of a distinctive ethnic group. The members of an ethnically conscious group conceive of themselves as having a distinct identity due to common historical origins (Maré, 1993; Kiyanga-Mulindwa, 1994: 1). They are characterized by a feeling of "we-ness" and display a "sense of peoplehood" and of the "corporate aspect" of sectarian affiliation (Horowitz 1985: 51). Ethnicity, broadly defined, is not new to Africa. It has been a persistent fact of life that predates the occupation of Africa by peoples of European descent. The continent is, in fact, the most varied and ethnically complex of all the world's continents. With the exception of Lesotho, Somalia and Swaziland, all African states, as we know them today, incorporate ethnically distinctive communities (United Nations, 1994) occupying different

regions within them. A state like Nigeria, for example, is home to as many as 250 distinct ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1991).

The onset of colonialism appears to have transformed the nature and magnitude of ethnic consciousness across most of Africa. Pre-colonial Africa was characterized by limited to local, small-scale inter-ethnic disputes and conflicts (Mair, 1977; Krymkowski and Hall, 1990) which rarely escalated into prolonged hatred, tensions and conflicts culminating in the kind of genocide witnessed by some nations since independence. However, the coming of colonial rule ushered in a new dawn in ethnic relations in which disintegrative ethnicity assumed prominence over positive ethnicity (Leys, 1975; Nkrumah, 1980; Munyae and Mulinge, 1999). As Nkrumah (1980: 59) asserts, tribes but not “tribalism” in the modern sense existed in Africa before imperialist penetration. But ‘tribalism arose from colonialism...’ As disintegrative ethnicity eclipsed its integrative counterpart, it set the stage for persistent ethnic tensions and conflicts even among groups that at one time co-existed peacefully.

This essay focuses on the question of ethnicity within the context of Botswana. Botswana is a landlocked semi-arid country boarded by Zambia to the North, Zimbabwe in the Northeast, South Africa in the South and East, and Namibia in the West. Although the country gained independence in 1966 as one of the poorest nations in the world, the discovery of diamonds in 1967, prudent economic management, financial discipline, good governance, peace and stability, and public sector development planning have seen Botswana achieve remarkable development (Good, 1994; Maipose and Somolekae, 1996; Maipose, 2003). The favorable economic growth has enabled the government to invest extensively in the social sector, thereby increasing accessibility of social services to the majority of its population (Mandlebe, 1997; Mpabanga, 1997). Although the government has taken initiatives to diversify the economy through manufacturing and other business enterprises, diamond mining remains the dominant economic activity, and the country continues to suffer from the absence of a viable private sector (Maipose, 2003). Thus, given the capital rather than labour intensive nature of the mining sector, the bulk of Botswana who are formally employed work for the public sector. However, the country’s population remains overwhelmingly rural, dependent mainly on cattle rearing and beef production for a livelihood, with large cattle barons

rather than small-scale holders dominating the sector.

Compared to most other Africa countries, Botswana presents a rather unique case with respect to ethnic relations. Like other African countries, the country comprises multiple ethnic groups. However, unlike most other African countries, where ethnicity has had disintegrative tendencies by creating conditions for competition and animosities between groups, until the late 1990s Botswana was characterized by integrative ethnicity in which ethnic groups co-existed as equals (Holm and Molutsi, 1992) and devoid of arrogance on the part of any particular group. Until then the country was 'free of divisive struggles that surround ethnically based politics' (Solway, 1994: 225) and enjoyed political stability and a relative peaceful co-existence between its different ethnic groups. Despite such uniqueness, little efforts have been made to identify the factors which are responsible for relative ethnic peace, and to analyze the future of ethnic relations in the country. This essay is a step in that direction. It advances the position that potential for ethnic animosities and resentment in Botswana remains real. Thus, it would be rather myopic to conclude that the ethnic unity and harmony that has characterized the country since independence is likely to prevail well into the distant future. While the country may have experienced a delay in the emergence of the socioeconomic and political conditions that have been responsible for soured ethnic relations in the rest of Africa, there are already indications that the wind of ethnic relations in Botswana is changing course.

### **Ethnic relations in Botswana**

Like most other African countries Botswana is an ethnically heterogeneous nation. However, the country presents a rather unique case with respect to the nature and extent of ethnicity in two ways. First, unlike in most other African countries Botswana is characterized by constitutionally grounded ethnic differentiation. The constitution of Botswana delineates eight "principal tribes" - namely, the Bangwato, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Bakgatla; Batawana, Barolong, Balete and Batlokwa - for the country. These were demarcated between 1899 and 1933 as the "principal tribes" through a Native Reserve Delimitation Commission. The Commission established "native reserves" in Bechuanaland that consolidated the subordination of non-Batswana ethnic

groups. In addition, the Commission marked the boundaries of seven native reserves plus the Barolong farms, with the rest of the country becoming "Crown Land" or "freehold land" (Schapera, 1943). Groups that were located outside the native reserves, e.g. in Kgalagadi, Ghanzi and Chobe, among others, were declared squatters on Crown land. At independence, Botswana's new constitution enshrined the eight Botswana groups occupying the native reserves. It retained the boundaries of the native reserves under the new label of "district". Because of this arrangement, chiefs of ethnic groups other than the eight major tribes continued to be marginalized. They were regarded as headmen or sub-chiefs without the right to represent their people (tribesmen) in the House of Chiefs (Molutsi, 1998).

Second, despite the existence of constitutionally legitimated ethnic differentiation, Botswana, unlike most other African countries, has experienced relative peace and harmony among its ethnic groups and the near total absence of disintegrative ethnicity since independence. While in most other African countries the existence of multiple ethnic groups has often been accompanied by ethnic tensions that have resulted in open hostility, conflict or murderous wars and even genocide, in Botswana ethnic consciousness and tensions have not been apparent. No conflict of the magnitude and devastating nature found in some other African countries has been witnessed here. The country has never experienced apparent tensions and conflict between groups, and has also been devoid of aggravating ethnic competition for political and socioeconomic resources. It is the competition for resources that has been responsible for discord between ethnic groups and for the entrenchment of practices such as the coalescing of political parties along ethnic lines and voting in ethnic blocks in other African countries (Wilson, 1995).

Ethnicity in politics in Botswana exists, but it is not as blatant as in some other African countries. That is, ethnicity is not the most important variable in Botswana's political process, as it has become in countries like Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, to name but a few. Although ethnicity plays a role in party membership, it is by no means the paramount factor. In Botswana political support along ethnic lines mainly exists in rural areas, where victory for political parties may be based more on ethnic constituencies than on other factors. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), for example, has dominated the politics of Botswana because of its ethnically grounded rural support.

Nevertheless, ethnic allegiance to political parties in Botswana is not driven by inherent ethnic competition for scarce national resources, like in other African countries. Across most of Africa, the primary purpose for people of similar ethnicity to join the same political party is to increase the group's chance of ascending the presidency and influencing national development policy decisions. For Botswana it would be more correct to argue that political parties have coalesced along a rural-urban dichotomy: The Botswana National Front [BNF] is mainly the party of the urban residents, whereas the Botswana Democratic Party [BDP] is the party of the (rural) masses; at least at the level of ordinary membership.

Referring specifically to voting patterns, Molutsi (1998:366-67) indicates that, "communities in Botswana have voted for local leaders based on ethnic identity rather than for national leaders and national issues." He argues that both minority tribes (such as the Bakalanga, Subia, Humbukushi, Yei Mabanderu and Basarawa) and majority Batswana tribes have all voted for ethnic leadership. What distinguishes the Botswana situation from other African countries is that here voting along ethnic lines has occurred for reasons different from those in other countries. In countries such as Kenya voting along ethnic lines by minority tribes has been driven by the desire to control the presidency and therefore the national agenda and resources. In Botswana, on the contrary, minority tribes have had to vote along ethnic lines because most of these groups found themselves residing in geographical territories occupied by one or another of the major ethnic groups (Molutsi, 1998). This type of arrangement is said to have led to the assimilation, subordination and subjugation of the majority groups. Furthermore, chiefs who represent tribal interests play a major role in influencing voting patterns in rural Botswana. Because of this, people are inclined to vote for the party their chief is sympathetic to. For instance, people vote for the BDP on account of its being the party of their chief, Sir Seretse Khama (Molutsi, 1998). It is on the strength of this fact that the BDP decided to co-opt and appoint to the position of Vice President Ian Khama, the first son of Sir Seretse Khama, just before the 1999 elections, with a view to strengthening party unity and improving its prospects for winning the elections. The move, aided by a split in the opposition, appears to have paid dividends, as the BDP regained much of the ground it had lost to the opposition BNF during the 1994 elections.

## Why the Harmonious Ethnic Relations in Botswana?

Logically, the establishment of native reserves and the consequent subordination of non-Tswana tribes by Tswana groups during the colonial period, and the existence of constitutionally legitimated ethnic inequalities after independence should have prepared the ground for ethnic tensions and conflict in Botswana. But it was not until towards the end of the 1990s that evidence of ethnic tension and competition began to surface in the country. This raises the question of what reasons may have caused this delay. There are several explanations that can be advanced to account for the relative ethnic 'unity', peace, and harmony that characterized Botswana since independence. These include historical factors such as the nature of ethnic relations during the colonial period and the nature of indirect rule employed by the British colonizers. In addition, economic factors, such as the relatively equal distribution and access to resources have had a role to play.

Historically, ethnic relations in Botswana were characterized by the assimilation, subordination and subjugation of minority by majority ethnic groups (Molutsi, 1998). Minority group such as Bakalanga, Subia, Humbukushi, Yei Mabanderu and Basarawa who found themselves sharing geographical territories with any of the majority groups (the Bangwato, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Bakgatla, Batawana, Barolong, Balete and Batlokwa) were presumed to have become the subjects of the host majority tribe. As such, they were considered to have forsaken their consciousness as distinctive ethnic groups and to have become assimilated to the majority group. Although one may question the authenticity of the assimilation argument, one is likely to be persuaded to believe that the absence of friction and conflict between minority and majority groups suggests that minority groups did not perceive themselves to be disadvantaged. That is, no master-slave situation existed and the level of differential treatment of minority by majority groups was minimal.

The historically grounded harmonious ethnic relations in Botswana were strengthened further by the system of indirect rule adopted by the British. The British had no economic interest in Bechuanaland. Their only goal was to maintain access to their territories in the North, especially the two Rhodesias. This reduced their physical presence in the country. Hence, unlike in other African countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe, Botswana escaped the ethnic

fragmentation and conflict associated with the British administrative practice of divide and rule. British colonialism also did not engineer and actively promote any paramount/favourite tribe in Botswana, as it did in its other colonies on the continent. Although some supremacy was created through the demarcation of native reserves from 1899 to 1933, as indicated earlier, this never assumed the social, economic and political undertones associated with ethnic domination in other British colonies.

Generally, as has been demonstrated by Vail (1996) and Wilmsen (1996), the source of ethnic tension and conflict is the unequal access to national resources among groups. Whenever ethnicity becomes the basis for the allocation of important societal resources such as power, economic development programs, political influence, and positions in the general labour market (Ungar, 1989; United Nations, 1994), it engenders rivalry, tension and conflict and, in extreme cases, even may result in armed struggle and even genocide. In Botswana, resource allocation did not constitute the basis for ethnic tension until very recently, because of three factors. First, the British never attached any economic value to Bechuanaland. As a result, they did not invest in the socioeconomic development of the country and the country attained independence without regional variations in development along ethnic lines that could constitute a basis for competition among groups. The overwhelmingly rural population depended mainly on agriculture for their livelihood (Botswana Government, 1991, 1997). The whole country was equally underdeveloped, access to education was limited and did not *deliberately* favor some tribes at the expense of others.

Second, being one of the poorest nations in Africa at independence, land remained the dominant resource in Botswana. But the system of tenure allowed access to land for every adult Botswana. As such, land did not constitute a basis for ethnic competition. Ownership of land in Botswana takes three forms; freehold, tribal and state land. Tribal land refers to land which used to be held and administered by the chiefs of the various tribes prior to the passing of the Tribal Land Act of 1968 which transferred control and allocation of such lands to Land Boards. These are corporate bodies whose membership comprises of the chief (as ex officio) and representatives from the district council and central government. Citizens (i.e., nationals) can apply to the Land Board to be allocated land for residence, agriculture (often referred to

as the lands), for livestock rearing (termed cattle post) or for commercial purposes. Relative fairness has prevailed in the distribution of employment opportunities in that access to employment has mainly been based on merit rather than on ethnic affiliation.

Finally, Botswana has recorded impressive economic growth since the discovery and exploitation of valuable minerals, particularly diamonds (Botswana Government, 1991, 1997). This has created increasing revenue that has enabled the government to provide better services to the population. The efficiency in the provision of such services has been enhanced by the village system of rural settlement which concentrates rather than disperses populations geographically. While the overall level of poverty has been rising in Botswana and some regional variations in development are becoming evident, one may argue that, relative to most other African countries, there is some semblance of equality in the "village" distribution of national resources.

Persistent harmonious ethnic relations in Botswana could also be explained in terms of deliberate government efforts to create a unifying national consciousness. The postcolonial state has tried to suppress ethnic divisions by deliberately excluding ethnic identity from official records and especially national censuses. Unlike in most other African countries, where ethnic identity remains a major category in national censuses (Mulinge and Munyae, 2000), the Central Statistics Office in Botswana which oversees population enumeration, steers clear of gathering information that may reflect ethnic identities and languages, as a matter of government policy. In addition, ethnicity has never constituted a major category in official government documents such as national identity cards (*omangs*), passports and driver licenses. The state has also pursued an aggressive policy of Tswana assimilation through its official language and culture policy. In the interest of nation-building and national unity, Setswana and English are the only official languages in the country. Other languages can neither be spoken at official forums, nor be taught in schools (Holm and Molutsi, 1992, Molutsi, 1998). This approach is not unique to Botswana. It has been attempted in other African countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, but with limited success (Smith, 1981; Birch, 1989).



Finally, the institution of chieftaincy in Botswana has been considered to be one of the factors responsible for the ethnic peace that has existed up to the post-independence period. According to Holm (1996), this averted ethnic conflict by keeping ethnicity localized. Broadly construed this may be the case, but on closer scrutiny, there are indications that the nature of the chieftaincy institution in Botswana creates fertile ground for ethnic divisions by elevating the chiefs of the eight principal tribes to a status of supremacy while relegating those of the minority non-Tswana tribes to headmen and sub-chief status. Given that only chiefs from the eight major tribes sit in the House of Chiefs, minority tribes are denied direct representation by fellow tribesmen. In some parts of the country this has culminated in the emergence of what Solway (1994) referred to as 'politicized ethnicity.'

### **The future ethnic relations in Botswana**

Although no major ethnic rifts have occurred in Botswana since independence, the country is displaying signs of cultural and ethnic challenges comparable to those in many other African countries. These provide evidence that Botswana is beginning to travel the path followed by most African countries during the colonial period. A front-page article printed in the *Botswana Guardian* of October 6, 2000 entitled "Tribal Wars" best sums up the situation. In an attempt to answer the question as to whether Botswana is on the brink of a national meltdown, the article pointed out that:

Stress levels are rising as ethnic tensions hot up. Tribal rivalry is getting organized: the country's middle class is mobilizing around ethnic affiliations in the ongoing debate over the planned amendment to the Constitution to make it tribally neutral. Botswana's middle class national camaraderie - "the Old boys club" - is breaking down and tribal cabals are springing up in its place. At the University of Botswana, old friendships are being stretched to the limit by tribal rivalry. Yesterday's professional colleagues are today's tribal rivals. Old ethnic divisions in the country's business community are being fossilized, parastatal chiefs and senior government officials have also been dragged into the fray.

There are three key pointers to emerging ethnic tensions and competition in Botswana. These include the debates surrounding tribal representation in the House of Chiefs, the debates focusing on sections 77, 78, and 79 of the constitution, and the proliferation of media stories focusing on the subject. It is to a more detailed discussion of these that we now turn.

## **Debates about Representation in the House of Chiefs**

Political debates surrounding tribal representation in the House of Chiefs - the second house in Botswana's legislative structure - began in 1999. Tribes of the so-termed subject (or minority) groups were clamoring for recognition as distinctive entities and for representation in the House of Chiefs which plays mainly an advisory role in the country's politics. They called for the expansion of the House of Chiefs to incorporate chiefs from all tribes in the country. Minority tribes also desired their chiefs to be referred to as "paramount", like those of the constitutionally delineated eight major tribes. Political representatives from these groups elevated such demands to the national level forums by frequently raising them in the National Assembly and debating them in *Kgotla* (a public meeting or community council headed by the village chief in which community decisions are arrived at by consensus) and political gatherings. In addition, members of parliament and ordinary citizens from subject groups such as the Kalanga, Bakgalagadi and Bayeyi were demanding the recognition of their languages (vernaculars). They called for these to be used in national print and broadcast media and to be taught in schools where currently only Setswana is taught. Although the debates have since lost steam, the matters raised have not been resolved and are likely to surface again in the future.

### **Political debates centering around sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Constitution**

The second pointer to rising ethnic relations, temperatures in ethnic relations were the debates questioning the legality of sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Botswana constitution, which delineate eight principal tribes for the country, labelling them as discriminatory. These debates, manifesting a growing discontent with the constitutional status quo in Botswana, peaked in 1999. In recognition of the divisive potentials of these debates and of the rising ethnic temperatures in the country, the government appointed the Balopi Commission of Inquiry with the objective to solicit views from the public concerning the three sections, and to suggest a way forward.

The status of ethnic relations in Botswana became evident from the spectrum of individuals who chose to express their opinions publicly. Broadly speaking,

the debates pitted Tswana-speaking tribes against non-Tswana speaking groups, with the former rooting for the status quo and the later agitating for change. Participants included senior government officials, parastatal heads, academics, prominent business personalities and political party activists. Those supporting the status quo subscribed to the view that there is nothing amiss with the Botswana constitution. They argued that the constitution of Botswana does not discriminate, and those who harboured such ideas had misconceptions. According to them the eight major tribes had an acquired right to their status. On the other side of the debate, those who were opposed to sections 77, 78 and 79 of the constitution saw them as discriminatory, because they deliberately excluded the names of non-Tswana tribes in favour of the eight listed Tswana groups. They maintained that this constituted the basis for persistent discrimination against the rights of those groups to land and administration. For this reason, they called for an amendment to the constitution to treat all tribes in the country equally and to guarantee that all ethnic groups are represented in the House of Chiefs. According to those agitating for change, rectifying the constitution would eliminate the "false supremacy" that the constitutionally legitimated majority ethnic groups enjoyed since independence. This, in turn, would further national unity by creating a cohesive, democratic and tolerant nation amidst diversity.

The findings of the commission reiterated the concern that the three sections were discriminatory and recommended that they should be scrapped from the constitution (Republic of Botswana, 2000). As a result, a Bill on Chieftaincy was drafted by way of scrapping sections 77, 78, and 79. However, despite the president's initial support of the Bill and the recommendations of the commission, political pressure forced him to shift his stance and promise his supporters that the proposed constitutional change was not going to be implemented. As a result, no substantive steps have been taken in the direction of implementing the recommendations of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry, despite the government having accepted its report in 2000.

### **Print Media Evidence**

The third indicator of rising ethnic tension in Botswana is the frequency of media stories focusing on the subject. Since 1999, there has been an upsurge of accusations and counter-accusations on the subject of ethnic belonging in

Botswana in the print media. Newspapers such as *The Botswana Gazette*, *The Sun*, *The Botswana Guardian*, *Mmegi/The Reporter*, and *Mmegi Monitor* all were replete with news items focusing on ethnic relations in Botswana. In our view, the persistent appearance of the topic of ethnicity in the print media was an indication that ethnic relations in Botswana were assuming the status of a major social issue meriting the attention of the public. Even the government-controlled newspaper, *The Daily News*, which is distributed freely to citizens, was not left out in the rush to profile the ethnicity debate.

At the general level the print media have carried numerous calls on Botswana to put national interests before tribal interests. A letter titled "Remember Rwanda and Burundi" appeared in the *Botswana Guardian* of October 26, 2001, stating that, "whether you call it tribalism, ethnicity or cultural divisions, it is all the same. They all are like cancer that can spread very fast and destroy its host very quickly. Right thinking people of our society should strive to root out all signs and symptoms of tribalism before it becomes acute and fully blown... everybody who loves peace in this country must by all means avoid casual talk about issues of tribalism." The letter concluded by challenging the view that some people rely on ethnicity to access employment, arguing that employment and progression in the country were based on merit and capability rather than on ethnic background. Similar sentiments were mirrored in an article, specifically targeting sections 77, 78 and 79 of the constitution, published in *The Midweek Sun* of May 5, 2002 (p.7). The article cautioned to "put the country before your selfish tribal interests" and called for individuals to "swallow your shallow tribal pride and accept that our society is not treating all people equally."

The bulk of the print media evidence, however, focused on the open discontent over the ethnic factor in Botswana's labour market, with article after article dwelling on the ethnic composition of the workforce in the public service, the parastatal sector, and in the private sector, culminating with the conclusion that all sectors are dominated by a particular ethnic group. For instance, in an open letter published in the *Mmegi Monitor* newspaper of July 11, 2000 (p. 16) by a concerned citizen the Bakalanga were accused of being Zimbabweans who were using their tribal identity to monopolize economic opportunities and public service jobs, and of being hungry for power, compared to 'real' Botswana. The author of the letter gave the examples of corporations such as

Debswana Diamond Mining Company, Botswana Development Corporations, and other unnamed private companies to demonstrate that the Bakalanga dominated the labour market.

A closely related article appeared in the *Botswana Guardian* of July 15, 2002 (p.3) in which an irate employee at Supreme Furnitures, a subsidiary of the Profurn group which operates the retail chains of Supreme, Barnetts, and Protea Furnitures, accused the management of corruption, tribalism, and favouritism. The author complained that 90 percent of all senior officers in the northern region are Bakalanga, a scenario he concluded had resulted in the employment of more Bakalanga than any other tribe. *The Voice* edition of July 27, 2002 (pp. 1-2) added its voice to the debate by carrying another story pointing to the ethnic contestation in the labour market. In an article with the headline caption, "Bakalanga Accused of Corruption and Nepotism", the author dismissed Bakalanga rhetoric of marginalization as meant to conceal the fact that they dominate and possess elite status in various spheres of life in Botswana. More specifically, the author singles out the ethnic composition of the public service, utilizing the judiciary as a case study to drive his point home. According to him, of 15 Batswana judges 13 are Bakalanga; the other two are from the 8 principal tribes demarcated in the constitution. In lieu of this the author concludes that:

The Bakalanga are well placed in positions of power and influence. Such positions allow them to dictate pace of change and infuse their ideas at the national level. They have access to strategic information, which they are using to entrench their ethnic kind in the social and economic spheres of the country. It is the Bakalanga who are marginalizing other ethnic groups, not the other way round.

The accusations labelled against the Bakalanga tribe have not gone unanswered. For instance, a member of the Society for the Promotion of the Ikalanga Language (SPIL) writing in the *Botswana Gazette* of August 10, 2002 (p.4) pointed out that some people were simply jealous of the Bakalanga because they are more hard working, and that some tribal bigots who believe that they are superior on account of the constitutional provision that the Bakalanga have been subjected to cannot stomach the fact that the Bakalanga are the most qualified citizens.

As an indicator of the gravity of the ethnic question in the labour market in Botswana the media has also been replete with a chain of articles calling upon Batswana to guard against the divisive tendencies of ethnically inspired bad mouthing. Most of the articles in this category called for better education that guaranteed that benefits trickled down to all. One such article appeared in *The Botswana Guardian* of September 7, 2001 (p.11), emphasizing the importance of education in labour market attainments. Its author argues that the Bakalanga took to education like ducks to water, while other ethnic groups were not particularly enthusiastic about education. He concluded that it was education that was responsible for Bakalanga dominance in the various spheres of life in Botswana. These views are supported by Werbner (2002) who points out that many senior and capable civil servants in Botswana are from the Kalanga community because that community heavily agitated for and invested in schools during the colonial period. A similar article was printed in *The Voice* of September 7, 2001 (p. 9) in which the author argued that "instead of demonizing and bashing the Bakalanga we should be making concerted attempts to learn from them ... ethnicity has the potential to undermine national unity."

One may also cite other newspaper articles, such as *The Gazette*, October 10, 2001 (p.11), *Mmegi Monitor*, September 19, 2001 (p. 4), and *The Botswana Guardian*, April 12, 2002 (p.14), to illustrate the upsurge of the ethnicity question in Botswana. In addition, the changing tide in ethnic relations in Botswana has been documented by the few academic studies that are available. For instance, Nyamnjuh (2002:6) pointed to the existence of "growing importance of identity politics and more exclusionary ideas of nationality and citizenship, as minority claims for greater cultural recognition and plurality are countered by majoritarian efforts to maintain the status quo of an inherited colonial hierarchy of ethnic groups" in the country.

### **What the future holds: The role of poverty**

The driving question for this essay is what the future holds regarding ethnic relations in Botswana. The ethnic discrimination identified by the various debates that have raged since 1999 is an indicator that Botswana is entering a

phase in her socioeconomic and political development that is likely to be characterized by heightened ethnic consciousness. There is an increasing likelihood that the stratification war in Botswana is slowly but surely shifting its locus more and more from the gender issue to the ethnic question. Since discrimination is a threat to fundamental societal values such as equality of opportunity and merit-based advancement, it might be expected that a natural tension would arise in the interpretation of interactions involving advantaged and disadvantaged group members in Botswana. While advantaged group members may be careful to avoid the appearance of condoning discrimination and as well as to vehemently deny any charges of impropriety, members of the disadvantaged groups might be prone to interpret ambiguous interactions as potentially discriminatory.

Dwindling socioeconomic resources and an emerging socioeconomic trend engulfing particularly the ruling elite and the upper and middle class members of the society point to future heightened ethnic tensions and competition in Botswana. Diminishing socioeconomic resources manifests itself in a number of ways, including high poverty rates, rising unemployment rates and limited educational places, especially in tertiary institutions. These conditions create an environment that increases ethnic competition and elevates the potential for tension, hatred/hostility and even conflict to greater heights. While merit and need may, in principle, continue to be the basis for the allocation of the dwindling socioeconomic resources and opportunities, ethnicity is likely to become an additional credential necessary for one to access certain resources such as employment and tertiary educational and training institutions.

As far as the overall socio-economic situation is concerned, Botswana currently is characterized by "poverty in the midst of plenty". The poverty rate is high with a large proportion of the population living below the poverty datum line (PDL) (see e.g. Good, 1992; Jefferis, 1997). No current data on the extent of poverty in Botswana are available but a study conducted by the Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA) in 1997 showed that 47 percent of Botswana (or 38 percent of all households) were living below the poverty threshold of Botswana Pula 100 (approximately 30 US dollars) per person per month in 1993/94. Of these, 30 percent were classified as "very poor". Based on the Central Intelligence Agency (2008) World Factbook, in 2003 the proportion of the population living below the poverty

line stood at 30.3 percent. Poverty levels in Botswana vary across the country, with remote rural areas having the highest incidences. For instance, South West, Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, and the Western parts of Kweneng and Southern districts had the highest poverty rates in 1993/94; 71 percent of its population was classified as people living below the PDL (Siphambe, 2003). Like in most developing countries, poverty in Botswana has a gender dimension: Female-headed households are more likely to be poor than their male-headed counterparts. This poverty manifests itself through lack of adequate shelter or clothing, high mortality and morbidity, poor educational achievement, malnutrition, dependency, lack of social and economic mobility, and vulnerability to adverse events outside the control of the poor (World Bank, 2001). In Remote Area Dweller (RAD) settlements, the major indicators of poverty are widespread, as are symptoms of apathy, dependency and alcoholism.

There are a number of perceived causes of poverty in Botswana. Topping the list is the lack of cash income and the skewed distribution of incomes and productive assets (BIDPA, 1997; United Nations, 2002; Siphambe, 2003). Direct benefits from mining, the dominant economic sector, have tended to accrue only to those in formal employment, and those with the specialist skills needed in the mining industry and other parts of the formal sector. Poverty in Botswana is also rooted in the country's adverse physical conditions and narrow economic base (United Nations, 2002). The harsh climate makes it difficult for especially rural populations to engage in agricultural activities that could bring them income. And the narrow economic base (read over-reliance on mining), is mainly responsible for the high levels of unemployment in the country. Whereas minerals accounted for the bulk of Botswana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), mining is not labour intensive and provides only 3.5 percent of formal employment (BIDPA, 1997; United Nations, 2002; Siphambe, 2003). The situation is worsened by the weak informal sector with low levels of self-employment. Other factors exacerbating poverty in Botswana include weakening of traditional support systems (e.g., loaning of animals, pooling of resources, share cropping, communal production, and the decline of the traditional extended family system); continuing movement of people from rural to urban areas in search of non-existent jobs; and the growing burden of HIV/AIDS, which has put intolerable strain on families who are already struggling to cope (United Nations, 2002).



To address the problem of poverty in Botswana, the government has experimented with a variety of policies and programmes. These have included agricultural entrepreneurship programmes [e.g., the Arable Land Development Policy (ALDEP) and the Accelerated Rain-fed Arable Programme (ARAP)]; financial assistance programmes [e.g., Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), the Small Medium and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs), and, most recently, the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA)]; as well as social protection programmes (e.g., destitution allowance, and food baskets). Whereas agricultural entrepreneurship programmes aimed to assist or subsidize resource-poor farmers with farm implements in order to encourage food security and raise income, financial assistance programmes have been designed to offer grants to citizens that would assist them to set up or expand private businesses in order to create more employment through diversification of the economy, away from mining and beef industries (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1995; <http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/botswana/social.htm>; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1998). On the other hand, social protection programmes are geared toward assisting vulnerable (destitute) persons in the community to meet their daily needs. The government of Botswana has also tried in a number of ways to eradicate poverty through diversification of the economy away from mining and beef industries, which it has made a top priority for some years now. This approach is based on the idea that for any national poverty alleviation strategy to be successful it must operate within a macro-economic framework that ensures stability and sustained economic growth (United Nations, 2002). The policy aims to boost employment and at the same time to reduce the country's risk of depending too heavily on a single commodity (i.e., diamonds). Despite the wide spectrum of government policies and programmes, the level of poverty in Botswana remains high.

Closely related to high rate of poverty is the high unemployment rate. A 1987 International Labour Organization (ILO) put the unemployment rate in Botswana in 1984/5 at 25.3 percent. A comparable rate of 23.8 percent was recorded by the 2002/2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the Central Statistics Office (2004:14). These figures show that in a period of about 20 years the unemployment level in Botswana remained almost unchanged with only a 1.5 percent drop from 1984 to 2003. Young people, including those with college diplomas and University degrees, are the most affected by the unemployment problem. With the exception of the

technical and professional areas such engineering, medicine, accounting and law, most areas of employment are now saturated. The public service, which is the dominant employer of school, college and university graduates, cannot offer jobs to the majority of job seekers. Even the teaching profession - the major consumer of graduates in the humanities is getting clogged up. As pointed out earlier, Botswana is experiencing a shortage in educational places, particularly in tertiary institutions such as colleges and university.

The competition for resources in Botswana is likely to be aggravated by an emerging socioeconomic trend that is engulfing particularly the ruling elite and the upper and middle class members of the society. Evidently, these groups are now embracing the second phase of capitalist development at the individual level, that is, they are moving beyond the satisfaction of basic needs to embrace the pride inherent in the personal accumulation of resources. For example, many no longer just desire to own a home in town and one in the rural village of origin, but seek to possess other homes and productive assets such as land to be judged successful. This creates a quest for private accumulation resulting in an artificial shortage in major resources that increases the chances for ethnic-based competition. With specific reference to land, the policy that a Motswana can apply for and be allocated land anywhere in the country is beginning to raise ethnic tensions in villages adjacent to urban centres. The situation in the Mogoditshane and Tlokweng villages, which border Gaborone, the capital city, is illustrative. As the concept of sub-urbanisation gets entrenched, more and more members of the tribes originally occupying these villages are finding themselves landless as the urban elite - in many cases not originating from that area - scramble to acquire plots at the periphery.

Whatever path Botswana chooses to take, ethnicity is going to be a major feature in the social, economic, and political fabric of the society in the years ahead. As a matter of fact, the situation profiled by Glickman (1992: 22) with respect to the African continent as a whole is beginning to take shape in Botswana, particularly as resources dwindle. Glickman argues that in Africa, when it pertains to issues of political, social, and economic concerns, there tends to be an overriding loyalty to group interest vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, i.e. people generally advance the interests of their own ethnic group rather than those of the nation. According to Glickman (1992), employment is one area where ethnic interests take precedence over national solidarity. Nevertheless, one cannot argue with certainty that Botswana will join the ranks of other African countries which are characterized by unending ethnic tensions and conflicts. However, the problem can neither be wished away nor swept under the rug. Ethnicity is likely to occupy a prominent role in group

dynamics in the future.

There are three major lessons that we can learn from the Botswana case. First, that ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to ethnic tensions and conflict. Botswana is a multiple ethnicity country which has experienced ethnic peace and harmony until the late 1990s. Second, the Botswana case refutes the view espoused by some African political leaders - such as Daniel Arap Moi, a former president of Kenya, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda - that hatred-laden ethnicity in postcolonial Africa is the offshoot of multiparty democracy. Those who espouse this view have argued that democratization tends to promote opportunities for the expansion of ethnic conflict, because having more than one ethnic group demands pulling in different directions, thereby leading to conflict. More often than not, political parties are essentially ethnic coalitions that do not reflect a national outlook, and thus electoral mobilization breeds ethnic divisions and political instability. Botswana however, has been a multiparty democracy since independence. The country never rushed to change its constitution to introduce a one-party state as it happened in most other African countries which were spared from the military coups that swept through the continent in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, it was not until the late 1990s that evidence of ethnic resentment began to emerge in Botswana.

Third and most importantly, the Botswana case underlines that it is the scramble for scarce resources which is the major basis of ethnic tensions, competition, and conflict. The emergence of ethnic badmouthing in the late 1990s was clearly a function of dwindling resources and especially of scarce employment opportunities. This is evident from the media debates which overwhelmingly focused on the labour market. Indeed, in light of this fact one may argue that while ethnic-based political parties remain an indisputable fact of the political terrain in Africa, it is not the mere existence of multiple ethnic groups in a nation state that is directly responsible for the formation of the same (Munyae and Mulinge 1999). Rather, it is the fear of economic and consequently political and social domination of a group or several groups by another group or a coalition of other groups that is mainly to blame for the existence of ethnic political parties. The postcolonial African state has perfected the use of ethnicity in the allocation of scarce resources such as government jobs and educational opportunities. As such, tribal parties are an attempt by the various ethnic groups to wrestle power from dominant groups and open the resource gates to their members. Unfortunately, the rebirth of multiparty democracy in most countries in the 1990s occurred in an environment that was already highly charged with disintegrative ethnic sentiments characterized by repressed rivalry over resource allocation.

## Conclusion and the way forward

Lessons from the rest of Africa tend to suggest that once it is deeply rooted, disintegrative ethnicity - like corruption - is hard to eradicate. For Botswana to escape the destructive and counterproductive ethnic tensions and conflict that have rocked many African countries since independence, the political leadership must adopt a more progressive and open approach toward disintegrative ethnicity. The tendency thus far has been for the top level political echelon to adopt a "strategy of denial" in dealing with what is potentially an explosive problem. For instance, the country's president has previously dismissed ethnicity as something that was being peddled by academics (see *Mmegi, The Reporter*, August 4, 2002: 2). According to him, Batswana lived together harmoniously, but some elites wanted to use ethnicity to their own advantage. This is a common approach to the ethnic question across most of Africa: Nearly everywhere political leaders denounce the existence of tribalism in their country because ethnicity is destructive to their ideals of national unity.

Across Africa, attempts to build cohesive nations devoid of ethnic tensions and animosities have varied widely. One commonly utilized method has been the search for a common lingua franca or a national language to replace multiple local languages (Birch, 1989). For instance, in Kenya and Tanzania Kiswahili was declared a national language, while in Botswana Setswana assumed a similar status. Such languages have, nevertheless, failed to excite a fully-fledged mass sentiment towards unity among dispersed and culturally heterogeneous populations (Smith, 1981), as most ethnic groups have been able to retain their distinctive linguistic and cultural identities even after being schooled in the chosen national language. Another approach to the ethnicity problem has been state control of the mass media, accompanied by the spread of propaganda by the state and censorship of what the press could disseminate to the public (Birch, 1989). Some countries (such as Kenya) have also experimented with outlawing tribal welfare associations, arguing that these perpetuated unhealthy ethnic consciousness, while others tried the constitutional banning of multiple political parties to create single party states, arguing that such parties tended to coalesce along ethnic lines, thereby solidifying rather than weakening ethnic competition and fragmentation (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984). Unfortunately, these measures have failed to produce the desired results in virtually all cases.

A more realistic approach to the ethnicity question in Botswana should be one anchored in the acknowledgement, as opposed to denial, on the part of the state and community leaders, that ethnic consciousness is becoming a major factor in socio-economic and political processes of the Tswana society, and

that new strategies are necessary to keep it under control. To effectively address the problem of surging ethnic consciousness, Botswana must draw from the experiences of other African countries and from its own history to avoid making the same mistakes that have been responsible for the intensification of ethnic competition. The country can draw valuable lessons from the experiences of other countries such as Kenya and Nigeria which are bedevilled by ethnic competition and animosities, and from a re-examination of past strategies utilized internally to foster national cohesion. For instance, rising ethnic consciousness in the country suggests that previous approaches which emphasized using language to create a unified nation no longer offer a lasting solution to the problem. They could also indicate that the harmonious ethnic relations that Botswana has enjoyed in the past are due to factors other than such deliberate steps.

A thorough and clear understanding of the different factors that are responsible for the surging ethnic consciousness in Botswana is central to devising appropriate intervention strategies. For such an understanding to be attained, it is imperative that people talk to each other and decisions are made through debate and compromise. In particular, since ethnic consciousness is at its formative stages, the state should dialogue more directly with the aggrieved parties to understand the basis for their concerns, and to articulate its stance with respect to the resolution of the situation. Through dialogue and collective decision making suspicions and resistance emanating from state decisions could be eliminated. Botswana appeared to have embraced the path of dialogue when the state allowed debate about sections 77, 78, and 79 of the constitution to flourish, culminating in the appointment of the Balopi Commission to collect public views and make appropriate recommendations. The commission was testimony to the state's willingness to listen to its people. However, subsequent decisions by the state to shelve, rather than implement, the recommendations of the Balopi Commission, could be construed to be a pointer to the state's support of the view that some tribes are more important than others, which ultimately undermines public confidence in the state's commitment to dialogue and collective decision-making. By not implementing the recommendations of the commission, Botswana joined the ranks of other African countries which have treated commissions of enquiry as instruments for cover up and/or suppression of socio-politically charged issues.

In addition, considering whose interests may be served through intervention is important. This is particularly so in light of the fact that Botswana has legislated ethnicity by demarcating eight principal tribes in its constitution through sections 77, 78, and 79. Since the legitimacy of these sections has previously been questioned (a situation that led to the Balopi Commission),

state intervention that appears tilted toward the eight principal tribes would amount to crushing some groups while lifting those the state considers to be important. This is more likely to aggravate rather than ameliorate the situation by rousing suspicion and creating further disenchantment among 'minority' tribes. Where it is necessary for interventions to be targeted at specific ethnic groups, the state must explain meticulously the rationale behind its actions and involve the leadership from other groups, especially those which are likely to treat the initiative with suspicion.

The state in Botswana should not pay lip service to, or play political correctness with, interventions to curb rising ethnic consciousness. This is a mistake that many other African countries have committed in the past with disastrous results. The continent is replete with governments that have preached loudly against ethnic-based discriminations, while at the same time presiding over the entrenchment of ethnicity as a major factor in public service appointments and the distribution of national resources for socio-economic development. Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki offers classic examples. Rather than to follow such a route, the state in Botswana should ensure that intervention is based on a long-term commitment to the attainment and preservation of ethnic cohesion. This should prevail regardless of the party or the individuals wielding political power at any particular time. Unfortunately, the experience with the Balopi commission, which categorically recommended the repealing of sections 77, 78, and 79 from the constitution, points to a state that is bent on paying lip service to and/or playing political correctness with the ethnicity question.

In order to diffuse ethnic tensions and possible conflict in Botswana it is also important for the state to address culturally based perceptions. This is consistent with Fisher's (1998) position that the mindsets or cultural lenses with which the disputing parties - as well as the interveners - view the subject are crucial to understanding and responding to their concerns. For instance, rather than to adopt a blanket approach to rising ethnic consciousness, the state must address separately the push by some ethnic pressure groups like the Society for the Promotion of the Ikalanga Language (SPIL) for the recognition of their culture. This could occur through activities such as the teaching of native languages. In the same vein, the more politically motivated concerns about the institutionalization of ethnicity through sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Botswana constitution and concerns related to the more equitable distribution of resources, particularly employment opportunities, must be addressed separately, based on merit. Finally, to check rising ethnic consciousness in Botswana, the state should create greater values that unite rather than divide the people. The development of a national language, though important, does not offer the ultimate answer in this regard. A constitutional order that ensures

that resources are equitably distributed in the country would be far more important. Given the rising unemployment, there is a need to guarantee that appointments to public office are done on technical cognisance of merit and equity, and that previous attempts by the state to distribute the proceeds from Botswana's natural resources evenly are improved. In a similar vein, the recommendations of the Balopi Commission that sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution be repealed should be implemented without further delay to restore public confidence that the state does not consider any ethnic groups in the country to be more privileged than others.

## References

- Birch, A. H. (1989). *Nationalism and National Integration*. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.
- Botswana Government. (2000). *Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana*. Gaborone: Government Printers
- \_\_\_\_\_. (1997). *National Development Plan 8; 1997/98 - 2002/03*. Gaborone: Government Printers
- \_\_\_\_\_. (1991). *National Development Plan 7; 1991/92 - 1996/97*. Gaborone: Government Printers
- Botswana Institute of Policy Analysis (BIDPA). (1997). *A Study of Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Botswana*. Gaborone: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
- Central Intelligence Agency. (2008). *The World Fact Book: Botswana Economy 2008. Botswana*. Available: [http://www.theodora.com/wfbccurrent/botswana/botswana\\_economy.html](http://www.theodora.com/wfbccurrent/botswana/botswana_economy.html). Accessed on February 11, 2009
- Central Statistics Office. (2004). *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2002/03*. Gaborone: Government Printer
- Fisher, G. (1998) *The Mindsets Factor in Ethnic Conflict: A cross-cultural Agenda*. London: Intercultural Press, Inc.
- Glickman, H. (1995). *Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa*. Atlanta, GA: The African Studies Association Press
- Good, K. (1994). "Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: A Best Case Example", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32 (3)
- \_\_\_\_\_. (1992). "Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30 (1): 69-95
- Hólm, J. D. (1996). "Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana." In L. Diamond, J. J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*. London: Lynne Rienner
- Holm, J. D. and Molutsi, P. P. (1992). "State-Society Relations in Botswana: Beginning Liberalization." In G. Hyden and M. Bratton (eds.), *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. (pp. 75 - 95)
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- International Labour Office. (1987). *The Unemployment Challenge in Botswana: Prospects for Employment Generation through Diversification of the Economy Volume 1*. Lusaka-Zambia: ILO.
- Jefferis, K. (1997). "Poverty in Botswana." In D. Nteta, J. Hermans and P. Jeskova (eds.), *Poverty and Plenty: The Botswana Experience*. Gaborone: The Botswana Society. Pp. 33 - 60

- Kiyanga-Mulindwa, D. (1994). "Culture and Ethnicity in Social, Political and Economic Development in Botswana." In S. Brothers J. Hermans and D. Nteta (eds.). *Botswana in the 21st Century*. Gaborone: Botswana Society
- Krymkowski, D. H. and Hall, R. L. (1990). "The African Development Dilemma Revisited: Theoretical and empirical exploration", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13, (3): 315-344
- Leys, C. (1975). *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neocolonialism, 1964-1971*. London: Heineman
- Maipose, G. S. (2003). "Economic Development and the Role of the State in Botswana", *DPMN Bulletin*, 10 (2).
- Maipose, G. S., and G. M. Somolekae. (1996). *Managing a transition from aid dependence: The Botswana case study*. Policy Working Paper. Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium (AERC).
- Mair, L. (1977). *African Kingdoms*. London: Oxford University Press
- Mandlebe, W. (1997) "Trends in Real Wages and Labour Productivity in Botswana." In J. Salkin, D. Mpabanga, D. Cowan, J. Selwe and M. Wright (eds), *Aspects of the Botswana Economy: Selected Papers*. Gaborone: Lentswe la Lesedi, pp 435-446
- Maré, G. (1993). *Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa*. London: Cambridge University Press
- Mazrui, A. A. and Tidy, M. (1984). *Nationalism and New States in Africa From About 1935 to the Present*. New Hampshire: Heinemann educational Books Ltd.
- Ministry of Commerce and Industry. (1998). *Government Paper No.1 of 1999: Policy on Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises in Botswana*. Gaborone: Government Printer
- Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. (1995). *Financial Assistance Policy (FAP): Medium and Large Scale FAP Pamphlet (3rd Revision 1995)*. Gaborone: Government Printer
- Molutsi, P. P. (1998). "Elections and Electoral Experience in Botswana." In W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (eds.) *Botswana: Politics and Society*. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Publishers (pp. 363 - 377)
- Mpabanga, D. (1997). "Constraints to Industrial Development." In J. Salkin, D. Mpabanga, D. Cowan, J. Selwe and M. Wright (eds), *Aspects of the Botswana Economy: Selected Papers*. Gaborone: Lentswe la Lesedi, pp 369-388
- Mulinge, M. M and Munyae, M. M. (2000). "The Ethnicisation of the State and the Crisis of Development: The Kenyan Experience" *Journal of Cultural Studies*, 2 (1): 141-159
- Munyae M. M. and Mulinge M. M. (1999). "The Centrality of a Historical Perspective to the Analysis of Modern Social Problems in sub-Saharan Africa: A tale from Two Case Studies", *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 14 (2): 51-70
- Nkrumah, K. (1980). *Class Struggle in Africa*. London: Panaf Books Ltd
- Nyamnjoh, F.B. (2002). "Local Attitudes towards Citizenship and Foreigners in Botswana: An Appraisal of Recent Press Stories". *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28 (4): 755-775
- Oşaghae, E. E. (1991). "Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria", *African Affairs*, 90 (354): 235-258
- Schapera, I. (1943). *Native Land Tenure in Bechuanaland Protectorate*, Alice: Lovedale.
- Siphambe, H. K. 2003. "Dimensions and Measures to Reduce Poverty in Botswana." *Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, Volume 17 (2)
- Smith, A. D. (1981). *The Ethnic Revival*. London: Cambridge University Press
- Solway, J. S. (1994). "From Shame to Pride: Politicized Ethnicity in the Kalahari, Botswana", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 28: 254-274
- United Nations. (2002). *Botswana Country Profile*. Available: [www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natinfo/wssd/botswana.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natinfo/wssd/botswana.pdf) [Accessed: October 22, 2007]
- United Nations. (1994). *World Social Situation in the 1990s*. New York: United Nations
- Ungar, S. J. (1989) *Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent*. New York:



Simon and Schuster

- Vail, L. (1996). "Ethnicity in Southern African History." In E. N. Wilmsen and P. McAllister (eds.), *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World Power*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 52-68
- Werbner, R. (2002). "Cosmopolitan Ethnicity; Entrepreneurship and the Nation: Minority Elites in Botswana". *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28 (4): 731-753
- Wilmsen, E. N. (1996). "Premises of Power and Politics." In E. N. Wilmsen and P. McAllister (eds.), *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World Power*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 1 – 23
- Wilson, F. (1995). *Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism*. London: Frank Cass.
- World Bank. (2001). *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty*. Oxford University Press, New York

### **Newspaper Article**

- Mmegi Monitor September 19 2001. Gaborone: Botswana.
- Mmegi Monitor July 11, 2000. Gaborone: Botswana
- Mmegi Monitor September 26 2000. Gaborone: Botswana.
- Mmegi/The Reporter, August 4, 2002. Gaborone: Botswana
- Mmegi/The Reporter, October 29, 2000. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Gazette, August 10, 2002. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Gazette, October 10, 2001. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Guardian, July 15, 2002. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Guardian, April 12, 2002. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Guardian, October 26, 2001. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Guardian, September 7, 2001. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Botswana Guardian, October 6, 2000. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Midweek Sun, May 5, 2002. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Voice, July 27, 2002. Gaborone: Botswana
- The Voice, September 7, 2001. Gaborone: Botswana

### **Web Sites**

[www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natinfo/wssd/botswana.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natinfo/wssd/botswana.pdf)

<http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natinfo/countr/botswana/social.htm>