

LOCK, STOCK AND ICEBERGS: A HISTORY OF CANADA'S ARCTIC MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY. By ADAM LAJEUNESSE. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-7748-3109-3. xv + 404 p., maps, b&w illus., notes, bib., index. Softbound. Cdn\$34.95; US\$37.95.

Lock, Stock and Icebergs sets a new standard for Canadian Arctic policy studies. Not everyone in this country will agree with or be pleased by what the author has to say. But every one of us who is interested in the Arctic stands to gain by coming to terms with his take on a theme that's in danger of becoming stale. And if somehow a good number of us were to become critically aware of the information, perspectives, and insights that are on offer here, the quality of Canadian public debate about the Arctic would improve, perhaps greatly. All along, the rigour and ease displayed by Adam Lajeunesse in delving into the governmental side of Canadian Arctic policy-making are a challenge to those who would do the same.

Lajeunesse's study is a detailed history of the evolution of Canadian policy-making and policy for the governance of the Arctic waters that we regarded as our own during the century from the transfer of authority from Great Britain in 1880 to the Canada-U.S. Arctic Cooperation Agreement of 1988. It is also a history of managed Canada-U.S. disagreement as experienced and handled by the Canadian side.

Lock, Stock and Icebergs reports great consistency and gradual (but nevertheless substantial) success in the Canadian effort to gain U.S. acquiescence in and assent to Canadian rights to exercise jurisdiction, and therefore a measure of control, over foreign commercial and other private navigation in and about the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. The story told of U.S. naval operations in those same waters is something else. Given a century of constancy in Canada's overall approach to its Arctic waters and in the absence of any substantial change in Canada's outward behaviour on Arctic maritime issues since 1988, the account presented here is very apropos today.

The narrative is constructed around three themes. They are examined together to yield an integrated assessment of Arctic sovereignty policy development as it took place. The first theme concerns just what lands and waters Canada would claim sovereignty over in a frontier region of incrementally (and then, with World War II and the Cold War, rapidly) increasing activity and interest for a perennial group of southern Canadian policy makers residing in Ottawa. In the course of many decades, priority came to be given to the maritime over the terrestrial in their thinking about a claim, and to the concept not of a Canadian Arctic sector, but of historic internal waters delimited by straight baselines drawn from headland to headland around the Archipelago. With skill and ingenuity that are well depicted here, Canadian policy makers saw to it that there was no challenge when the claim was at last made in 1985.

Lajeunesse's second theme is the evolution of a basis for the Canadian claim in international law and in the

international affairs of the day. The issue here was, and still is, the creation of facts and arguments that would convince the world to treat Canada's Arctic waters as internal, and not, as urged by the United States and most other maritime nations, as an international strait with rights of transit passage by foreign vessels, both state and private, as specified by the Law of the Sea. Canada's unilateral declaration of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, made in 1970 without effective international opposition, stands out in the account given here, only to be dwarfed by the brilliant diplomatic achievement of driving the negotiation of Article 234 of the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and its recognition of the right of coastal states to regulate commercial and other private navigation in ice-covered waters. As occurred with the specification of Canada's claim of sovereignty, the goal of step-by-step or "fibre by fibre" success in gaining international acceptance was pursued with impressive creativity and is rightly praised in the book.

Adroit as Canadian policy makers were in articulating and advancing a sovereignty claim in the face of U.S. and wider international opposition, something had to be granted to the United States. This brings us to the third theme of the book: What was Canada prepared to do, physically as well as diplomatically, to further its Arctic maritime sovereignty? Having already touched on some of the diplomatic process, this reviewer needs to turn to the physical issues and question not Lajeunesse's findings, but what he makes of them.

The book's preface opens with the assertion that for more than 100 years the Canadian government's public stance on the Arctic has differed from the "more pragmatic" approach taken in its dealings with U.S. officials in private. For Lajeunesse, anything else would have been "truly shocking." For me, what's somewhat shocking and no real surprise is the continuous practice of a democratic government in being more open and accommodating with its principal adversary than it is in its reports to its own people on an issue of proven concern to them.

In their striving for sovereignty, Canadian policy makers have done more than achieve substantial advances in our ability to control foreign private entry into and activity in the Archipelago. As I read Lajeunesse, they have also found it necessary and indeed desirable to allow the U.S. Navy to operate in Canada's many northwest-southeast and east-west Arctic waterways as though they were governed by the international straits regime, as the United States has insisted. Accompanied by references to notification, concurrence, and permission elsewhere in the book, the evidence of de facto U.S. freedom of naval action is laid out most clearly in chapter 10, which deals with previously classified U.S. submarine activity in transiting and exploring these waterways, as well as helping Canada to establish submarine sensing capabilities at choke points in the Archipelago.

The problem here is not the underwater activities of the United States in Canada. In my opinion, they have been allowable both as allied naval security operations and for

their contribution to U.S. readiness to endorse a growing measure of sovereign Canadian control over foreign private navigation in Canadian waters. It is that the Canadian government acted without also revealing and explaining, choosing to remain unaccountable to an uninformed public. For this is a public that's historically prone to explode in true-north outrage on learning of U.S. activity in the Arctic Archipelago, in outrage that's been promoted by politicians who should know better.

As I write these words, the luxury U.S. cruise ship *Crystal Serenity* is preparing to take the Northwest Passage from Anchorage to New York in August and September with more than 1000 passengers, 600 crew, and a hull that's thin and not strengthened to resist ice. *Serenity's* voyage is therefore being very closely monitored and controlled by Transport Canada, in conjunction with other Canadian government departments, U.S. agencies, and the Government of Nunavut, together with hunter and trapper associations in small Inuit communities along the route. I expect the voyage could well be a success and the first of a series of extravagant cruise-ship transits. But *Serenity* also acts as early surrogate for a U.S. aircraft carrier and accompanying strike force of high-value, thin-skinned ships, as well as attack submarines, all in a convoy needing to make a rapid inter-ocean transfer of naval assets between the Pacific and the North Atlantic in a U.S.-Russia clash over one or more of the Baltic states, or in a crisis with China over Taiwan. If the *Crystal Serenity* can do it, so can an entire carrier-based strike force when the conditions are right and the necessity arises.

Canadians need to become capable of intelligent conversation about such things before they happen. Indigenous peoples, Inuit foremost, need to be made part of a conversation that Lajeunesse inadvertently shows to have been conducted almost entirely without them. The office-holding politicians and the officials of Canada need to ease up on the information control. They also need to stop simultaneously feeding and fearing live Canadian opinion on Arctic sovereignty, when what we should be talking about is cooperative stewardship and security. Those of us in the attentive public need to factor the findings of *Lock, Stock and Icebergs* into new consensual knowledge that helps us all to shape, as well as understand, what's in store for the Arctic Archipelago in the fast-moving 21st century.

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