

A Détente Over the Taiwan Strait? Japan's Policy Options*

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Ma Ying-jeou is now President of the Republic of China (ROC), and his ruling Nationalist Party (*Koumintang*, henceforth KMT) controls the ROC's legislature. Ma's inauguration in May 2008 marked a critical turning point. It helped defuse heightened politico-military tension with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which had built up during President Chen Shui-bian's preceding two terms (2000-2008).

Chen persistently ignored the cross-Strait status quo involving Taiwan's current *de facto* independence, a precarious regional equilibrium in the geo-strategic triangle of the United States, the PRC, and Japan; Japan plays an important role indirectly through the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chen challenged the status quo by taking radical measures, *inter alia*, to de-Sinicize the names of public monuments and organizations and to propose a national referendum on *de jure* independence. Chen got elected as President in 2000 since his pro-independence hard line coincided with rising Taiwanese identity vis-à-vis declining Chinese identity among the electorate. Thereafter, however, Chen's hard line significantly hindered the development of cross-Strait relations, and the economic well-being of the Taiwanese people stagnated. Taiwan's economic growth relies heavily on the rapidly growing mainland markets in in-

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vestment, production, and trade. Further exacerbated by Chen's corruption issues, his successor candidate of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) suffered from a bitter loss in the 2008 presidential election.

Apparently, the birth of the Ma administration evinced pragmatism of the Taiwanese people who preferred prosperity to *de jure* independence, at least at the time of the election. Ma's approach departs from Chen's pro-independence hard line that, from Ma's perspective, unnecessarily provoked the regime in Beijing to wage unflinching diplomatic battles against Taiwan's statehood. Ma's approach aims to achieve a *détente* between Taiwan and the mainland, emphasizing the need for Taiwan's growth and development through further economic engagement with the mainland economy.

This policy paper first analyzes Ma's rationale of *détente*, focusing on some of the major weaknesses of the current cross-strait *détente* in general and Taiwan's *de facto* independence in particular. The analysis looks at those conditions under which the *détente* most likely would collapse. That is, if Ma's approach made Taiwan too dependent on the mainland economy for its survival and prosperity to withstand Beijing's economic, political, and military pressures, Taiwan would be compelled to accede to unification on Beijing's terms. The paper examines some proposals to help Japanese policy makers cope with cross-strait relations after *détente*, identifying Japan's national interests in regard to Taiwan and analyzing constraints and limitations of Japan's Taiwan policy after 1945. Those who are interested in the evolving cross-strait relations in the United States, the PRC, the ROC, and elsewhere, would benefit from being acquainted with possible Japanese policy actions.

1. Ma's Rationale of *Détente*

In his inaugural address of May 20, 2008, President Ma confirmed the 1992 consensus reached between Beijing and Taipei and unequivocally rejects the

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de jure independence of a Republic of Taiwan. The consensus refers to recognition of “one China” with respective interpretations of the term, without determining whether “one China” means the ROC or the PRC. The President also confirmed his respect for the ROC’s constitution and committed to adhering to it rather than amending it to reflect the ROC’s effective control over only Taiwan and the other adjacent islands.⁽²⁾

President Ma’s inaugural address also stresses the need to maintain peace with the mainland as well as regional stability. He states that Taiwan has to be a “peace-maker” although it used to be a “trouble-maker” under Chen’s pro-independence hard line. Ma’s assertions agreed with PRC President Hu Jintao’s opening address to the Boao Forum on April 12, 2008. That is, they both believe that “reconciliation and truce in both cross-strait and international arenas” will be made possible by “building mutual trust, shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win solution.” For the initial concrete steps toward *détente*, Ma proposed “the normalization of economic and cultural relations” across the Taiwan Strait and then the cease of “vicious competition and the waste of resources” in the diplomatic battles both for and against Taiwan’s statehood.

On September 25, 2008, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a *Foreign Policy Report* to the legislature, which elucidated Ma’s cross-Strait policy in terms of “flexible diplomacy” characterized by “diplomatic truce” and “proactive diplomacy.”⁽³⁾ The primary aim of “flexible diplomacy” is minimizing Chinese threat, amassing Taipei’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Beijing, and expanding Taipei’s ability to maneuver internationally amid Beijing’s all-out diplomatic offensives. The *Report* presumes that Taipei’s commitment to the 1992 consensus will form the solid foundation of cross-Strait *détente*, focusing on improving Taipei’s relations with Beijing by discussing their common interests and fostering mutual trust. Under this cross-Strait “diplomatic truce,” Beijing should at least suspend its unflinching diplomatic battles against Taipei

and free it from endlessly bleeding its limited resources to aid diplomacy for merely retaining its current diplomatic allies. These resources then could be used “to strengthen relations with [Taipei’s] diplomatic allies”, and to “upgrade the level of contact with many countries in each region and integrate [Taiwan] into the Asia-Pacific regional economy.” The “diplomatic truce” also should end Taipei’s diplomatic isolation, opening to opportunities to participate in functional and specialized international organizations.

In sum, Ma’s “flexible diplomacy” is based on the strong optimism that Beijing would accept cross-Strait *détente* as a win-win game of mutual growth and prosperity, as far as Taipei withdraws the pro-independence hard line. Then, it is crucial to examine whether such optimism is tenable nor not.

2. The Pitfalls of *Détente*

In order to ascertain Beijing’s real motive in pursuit of cross-Strait *détente*, it is critical to analyze not only Beijing’s immediate need of rapprochement but also its expected power structural transformation. Beijing seems to have supported the Ma administration and the ruling KMT, as demonstrated by Hu’s speech at the Boao Forum. Indeed, its failure to do so would most likely turn Taiwanese public opinion against *détente* and then bring back to power the opposition DPP that would adopt a more tenacious pro-independence position. Thus Beijing is compelled to reciprocate Taipei’s *détente* initiatives, at least as long as Ma and the KMT continue in power. In turn, Beijing will be restrained from resorting to armed attack or imposing an economic blockade of Taiwan, unless, of course, Taipei provokes Beijing, for instance, by abruptly switching to *de jure* independence.

Beijing’s need to reciprocate does not necessarily mean, however, that its top leaders are firmly committed to *détente*. While Taipei has already begun to take unilateral initiatives toward *détente*, Beijing has discretion over its

response to Taipei, in regard to the scope and the levels of reciprocation: which issue-areas to select and to which extent to implement. Accordingly, Beijing may try to minimize the substance of *détente* and then tip the cross-Strait balance of power in its favor. Taipei then would face an increasing military threat and deepening economic dependency on the mainland's markets. Thus, Taiwan's future depends on whether to secure reciprocity in light of specific terms and conditions of *détente*.

Importance here is a lesson learned from the failed U.S.-Soviet *détente* in the 1970s to which Washington and Moscow agreed without sharing common understanding of what it entailed. Washington saw *détente* as necessary for global international relations and then the peaceful coexistence of Western capitalism and Eastern Socialism/Communism. Moscow, however, considered *détente* as applying to only its European front. As a result, Moscow continued aggressive military intervention in the rest of the world, centered on Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Central America, since under its conception of "*détente*," Washington was largely unprepared to counter Soviet military offensives. Consequently, in the 1980s, Washington responded with an even harder line against the Soviets.

It therefore is critical to determine Beijing's real motive because it could take advantage of the current cross-Strait *détente* to gain a decisive, and irreversible, superiority in all areas.

In the military sphere, Beijing has not at all decelerated its defense spending, arms buildup, training, and deployment of forces directed at Taiwan, even during this cross-Strait *détente*. For more than two decades, Beijing has maintained that its offensive posture is justified in deterring Taiwan's *de jure* independence or preparing for possible cross-Strait contingencies if it did declare independence. Yet, the justification is no longer tenable, because both Ma and the KMT are firmly committed to maintenance of the cross-Strait status quo that denies the *de jure* independence. In addition, Taiwan's arms buildup and

modernization have stalled, owing to the slowdown of arms imports from the United States, essential to maintaining its military balance over Taiwan Strait. Beijing's continuing arms buildup, therefore, indicates either its disregard of *détente* or the inability of its civilian leadership to control its resource-hungry military, thereby upsetting the cross-Strait balance of military power as the indispensable foundation of *détente*.

In the political sphere, despite the seminal importance of the 1992 consensus, the Ma administration and the ruling KMT do not explicitly subscribe to "one China, respective interpretations," thereby failing to reject the Beijing's claim that "one China" means Taiwan is part of the PRC. On May 28, 2008, KMT President Wu Poh-hsiung met Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman and PRC President, Hu Jin-tao, in Beijing. Although both referred to "one China," Wu failed to obtain Hu's confirmation on the meaning of "one China, respective interpretations."⁽⁴⁾ Also during the meeting, Wu addressed Hu Jin-tao as President Hu but referred to Ma Ying-jeou as Mr. Ma.⁽⁵⁾ Finally, Wu was unsuccessful to secure Hu's commitment to Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization (WHO). Hu was willing only to discuss the WHO issue.⁽⁶⁾ The Ma administration and the ruling KMT could not but submit themselves to their unequal relationship with Beijing. This submissive stance was clear in Ma's interview on August 26, 2008, citing the cross-Strait relationship only as between two administrative regions and not as an inter-state relationship. This admission contrasts with the "special state-to-state relations" and the "one country on each side" of the former ROC Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, respectively.⁽⁷⁾ Moreover, Beijing so far has shown no significant sign of committing to Taipei's interpretation of *détente*. Faced with the imminent danger of a swine flu pandemic, Beijing decided to tolerate Taipei's observer status in WHO's 2009 general assembly but not its formal WHO membership in WHO. Because the observer status requires annual renewal,⁽⁸⁾ it does not mean a permanent right to attend the meeting.

In the economic and social spheres, the Ma administration was quick to implement a series of economic engagement measures, such as starting direct charter flights to the mainland on weekends, the arrival of mainland tourists, deregulating Taiwanese investment in the mainland, and promoting mainlanders' investment in Taiwan. These measures will surely bring about Taiwan's integration with the mainland, which is already Taiwan's largest market. Certainly, closer integration will develop dense supply-chain networks through investment and production in the mainland, and consequently increase Taiwan's dependency and vulnerability vis-à-vis the mainland. As of 2008, the last year of the Chen administration, the mainland was already the Taiwan's largest trading partner (\$132.5 billion) and the largest investment recipient (\$150–200 billion), while some five million Taiwanese visited the mainland in the year. As of April 2009, one million Taiwanese, 4.4% of the total population, reside in the mainland.⁽⁹⁾ In addition, closer relations will strengthen the pro-Beijing forces in Taiwan, particularly among the KMT political and economic elites. They will be inclined to choose unification on Beijing's terms in a social-political progression similar to the run-up process of Hong Kong's reversion to the mainland.⁽¹⁰⁾ Such integration could benefit both Taiwan and the mainland through a win-win game of development and prosperity, but over time, the mainland will inevitably become dominant economically amid increasing Taiwan's dependence on and vulnerability to the mainland. The cost of breaking this interdependent relationship, therefore, would be much higher for Taipei than for Beijing. And when their relationship progresses to the point that Taiwan cannot live and prosper without the mainland, Taipei will have to capitulate to Beijing's terms of unification.⁽¹¹⁾

Since the inception of Ma's "flexible diplomacy," cross-Strait interaction has rapidly grown economically and socially, but with few military and/or political achievements. The state of affairs hints at, or perhaps attests to, Beijing's only lightly veiled intent to take advantage of the *détente* to create the necessary

military and economic conditions for cross-Strait unification on its own terms.

3. Japan's Taiwan Policy

Over time, this current cross-Strait *détente* will have a highly corrosive effect on Taiwan's *de facto* independence and the regional status quo, even though it has significantly reduced the uncertainty inherent in the spiral of provocation, miscalculation, armed conflict, and escalation. That is, the current stability does not necessarily promise long-term peace. Although in response to this *détente*, Japan has taken a wait-and-see approach, it must begin to recalibrate its cross-Strait policy in order to defend its national interests.

Taiwan is of vital strategic importance to Japan's national security. Because of the island's location on Japan's major south-bound sea-lanes of communications, allowing the PRC to take control of them is simply not acceptable for Japan. This means that Japan needs to secure the freedom of navigation on both sides of Taiwan, not necessarily the *de jure* independence of a Republic of Taiwan. But Taiwan also is Japan's fourth largest trading partners, after the PRC, the United States, and South Korea. Therefore, Taiwan's continued prosperity as a democracy and a free-market economy is indispensable to Japanese economic and commercial interests. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, an independent Taiwan is Japan's best interests.

For practical reasons, the Japanese government has consistently taken a noncommittal position on Taiwan's status under international law. From 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire, but Japan gave up its sovereign rights to the island in accordance with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Since then, the official Japanese government position has been to say nothing about who possesses Taiwan. Moreover, it cannot support one country's claim to the island while denying another's. Supporting any country's claim is surely in contravention of the obligations under the Peace

Treaty. Because the Treaty does not stipulate which country should have the sovereign rights to Taiwan, its status remains unsettled and can be determined unequivocally only by a second peace conference. The 1972 joint communiqué between Japan and the PRC stipulates that Japan fully “understands” and “respects” the PRC’s sovereign claim to Taiwan; in turn, Japan has never “recognized” that Taiwan is part of the PRC’s territory.

Japan’s strategic interests regarding Taiwan and its official international legal position on the island diverge. To sidestep the issue, Japan has taken two approaches to cross-Strait relations. The first is for Japan to stay out of the conflict as much as possible and, at most, to provide logistical and intelligence support for any U.S. military operation: buck-passing. The second is for Japan to openly support the United States against the PRC: balancing power.

The first “buck-passing” approach is better because Tokyo then can avoid the issue and can benefit from the cross-Strait status quo which ensures the freedom of navigation in the area around Taiwan and free trade with it. Nonetheless, this approach makes sense only if the United States is willing as well as capable to use its military power to maintain the status quo. Over the last decade in which U.S. hegemony has gradually experienced relative decline, however, this assumption has become less sure, and now increasingly less sure because the ongoing financial and economic crisis and the quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan have severely weakened the hegemony. As a result, Washington is expected to become less and less inclined to intervene in support of Taiwan.

The second “balancing power” approach carries a significant risk for Japan because it could lead to military confrontation with the PRC. Even so, Japan’s defense policy has slowly but steadily shifted in this direction. Currently, Japanese policy contains elements of both approaches, but the second approach is taking precedence. In the first approach, Japan would give the United States logistical and intelligence support only from Japanese territory. In contrast,

the second approach would include such support also from the high seas and the air space over them, as long as Japanese forces were not deployed to a combat zone or Japan's support did not become integral part of a U.S. military operation. In 1996, the United States and Japan drew up the bilateral Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, and in 1999, Japan enacted the law ensuring Japan's peace and security in situations in areas surrounding Japan, which authorizes Tokyo to take military action in accordance with the second approach.

The North Korea crisis in 1990s was the impetus for the Guidelines, but both Japanese policy makers and the informed public recognize that the PRC is now a principal target of the Guidelines, although Tokyo has never admitted so explicitly. In addition, "the areas surrounding Japan" is a situational, not a geographical, concept. Yet, the Guidelines will be easily applied to a cross-Strait contingency. In February 2005, Japan advanced toward the second approach by concluding a joint communiqué with the United States that openly regards Taiwan as a common security concern. For its part, Tokyo agreed to give logistical and intelligence supports to U.S. forces in case of a Taiwan contingency, but it ruled out any combat missions. In fact, Director-General of Japan's Ministry of Defense Bureau of Defense Policy, Takamizawa Nobushige, announced at a meeting of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on March 13, 2008, that a Taiwan contingency would be treated as an area-surrounding-Japan situation.⁽¹²⁾

As long as the cross-Strait status quo holds, Japan's Taiwan policy will be reasonably stable, needing only minor adjustments between the first and second approaches. But if the *détente* should collapse, Japan will have to rethink its policy. Next, the following will discuss about some ideas and policy measures in regard to preparing for or preventing the worst case scenario.

4. Risk Management Options for Japan's Taiwan Policy

Preserving the cross-Strait status quo until Taiwan and a fully democratized PRC are peacefully united is paramount, owing to the Strait's geo-strategic importance to Japan's national security. The alliance between Japan and the United States is premised on Japan's giving up its strategic independence and relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But if the alliance fails to ensure peace and security in the Strait, Tokyo will no longer rely on the alliance and either restore its strategic independence for survival or submit to rapidly growing PRC's military power in the area. Whichever its choice, Japan will become a wild card, upsetting the San Francisco Peace Treaty system as the Asia-Pacific part of the Yalta regime. Although it is intriguing to speculate these various scenarios, they are beyond the scope of this paper.

More practical is preserving the cross-Strait status quo by Tokyo using specific policy measure to head off or minimize any risks to *détente*. These measures not only must compensate for Taipei's naïve, hasty, and imbalanced concessions in pursuit of the cross-Strait *détente*, but also must supplement and even complement U.S. military power so that Washington remains willing and capable to intervene if necessary. Tokyo will no longer be able to settle in an approach premised on full U.S. hegemony (or the "buck-passing" approach), but instead must increasingly tilt toward reinforcing the United State's power in the region (or the "balancing power" approach).

First, Tokyo must accelerate its formal and informal policy discussions with Taipei and Washington, with the aim of preserving the cross-Strait status quo. Discussions by Japanese, Taiwanese, and American policy researchers and academics are particularly important, since neither Tokyo nor Washington has formal diplomatic channel with Taipei. Such discussion should center on persuading Beijing to agree to slow its rapid buildup of arms and to cease try-

ing to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. Tokyo must reach a common understanding with Washington, and then both must press Taipei to stop making unilateral concession without concrete reciprocation by Beijing. In addition, to preclude any uncertainty about cross-Strait relations, Taipei must remain committed to the 1992 consensus.

Second, Tokyo must strengthen its involvement with the Taiwanese economy so as to limit Taiwan's economic dependence on and vulnerability to the mainland. Japan's support will help halt Taiwan's downward spiral of unilateral concessions and deepening dependence. Tokyo also must expand its trade with Taiwan and encourage Washington to conclude its proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Taipei. If Japan's economic engagement is successful, it will exert a significant countervailing effect on the mainland's sway over Taiwan. For example, Tokyo's and Taipei's recent decision to have their major microchip firms form a strategic alliance during the ongoing global economic crisis may further integrate Taiwan into Japan's regional supply-chain networks of investment, production and trade. Such networks could coexist with a U.S.-Taiwan FTA in context of the evolving webs of regional economic integration.⁽¹³⁾

Third, in cooperation with Washington, Tokyo has to persuade Taipei, through informal policy discussion, to follow through on its pending arms imports agreements from the United State, in order to counterbalance Beijing's extensive arms buildup, which already has had a serious destabilizing effect on the cross-Strait status quo. In addition, along with Washington, Tokyo must welcome Taipei's efforts to modernize and professionalize its military, including the proposed abolition of conscription, and encourage Taipei to expend the contrived funds for armed imports. Both Tokyo and Washington need to prompt Taipei to enhance qualitatively, if not quantitatively, its defense capability.

Fourth, Tokyo must strengthen its military power in the areas surrounding

Japan in general and its south-bound sea-lanes of communication in particular. Japan also must accelerate the modernization of its maritime and air capabilities. Its priorities should move from the earlier Cold War emphasis on the northern front, in Hokkaido, to the western and southern fronts, in Kyushu and Okinawa. Funds for mechanized ground forces will need to be reallocated accordingly.

Tokyo is now moving in this direction. For instance, its Air Self-Defense Force (SDF) is planning to acquire next generation tactical air superiority fighters to replace the current F-15 aircraft. The Maritime SDF (MSDF) has recently commissioned the first *de facto* helicopter carrier, after having built three large flush-deck landing ships equipped with limited amphibious assault capability.⁽¹⁴⁾ A second helicopter carrier is scheduled to commission in 2011, and a third being considered is a VSTOL carrier.⁽¹⁵⁾ All these will augment the SDF's military power, which has been improved gradually but substantially through cumulative investment over the decades in major platforms, weapon system, and defense infrastructures as related to AEGIS vessels, AWACS aircraft, air-borne refueling aircraft, and a missile defense system.⁽¹⁶⁾

Fifth, Tokyo might have to take more drastic measures to supplement and even complement U.S. military power if Beijing accelerates aggressive arms buildup and if Washington becomes less willing to intervene in case of a Taiwan contingency. In this case, Japan's MSDF could double the size of its submarine fleet by extending the duration of each sub's service from fifteen to thirty years, which is the major navies' standard. Tokyo has long halved the life cycle simply to maintain its submarine-building capability. The new subs are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) capability, reinforcing the inclusion of the SDF's sole semi-strategic capability in the calculation, particularly by Beijing, of the region's balance of power. Tokyo might even consider the addition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. It also could build a few medium-sized aircraft carriers for fixed-wing airplanes for carrier battle

groups, particularly if Beijing built a blue-water navy that included carrier battle groups. Most likely, Tokyo will follow a prudent and reactive approach aimed to prevent regional arms race. But if Japan were faced with an overwhelming threat, it would be compelled to act quickly and decisively.

Sixth, Tokyo must conclude a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, in the event that Washington should be unwilling to intervene on behalf of Taiwan. Washington has concluded similar agreements individually with Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Netherlands, which give Washington control over its nuclear weapons stored in these countries in peacetime through Permissive Action Links (PALs) but hand over control of the weapons to each party to the agreements in wartime.⁽¹⁷⁾ A similar arrangement between Japan and the United States would give Tokyo a limited yet effective nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing.⁽¹⁸⁾

The preceding six options are step-by-step policy measures for Tokyo to consider implementing in response to the threat it faces. The worst case scenario, which currently is improbable but still is possible, is Washington's losing its hegemony and subsequently withdrawing from the region's security, thus forcing Tokyo to revert to being strategically independent. These six options, however, mesh with the worst-case scenario, because the sequential implementation of the options will be essential to meet it.

[Notes]

- (1) <http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105499687>.
- (2) This refers to the fiction that the ROC has jurisdiction over all the territories inherited from the Qing Dynasty, which includes not only the PRC's territory but also Outer Mongolia, Tuva, and other areas adjoining today's Myanmar and India, with its capital still in Nanjing, a major city on the mainland. Only twenty-three countries in the world recognize this claim and maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC.
- (3) <<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=33802&ctNode=1027>>

&mp=6>.

- (4) “Hu Jintao Meets KMT Chairman Wu Poh-Hsuing,” *Xinhua*, May 28, 2008 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/28/content_8269806.htm>; Kichinosuke Ihara, “Seven Months of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration,” *Kaigai Jijo—Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 2009, p. 9.
- (5) Jimmy Chuang, “DPP Condemns Wu’s Comments,” *The Taipei Times*, May 28, 2008 <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/05/28/2003413164>>.
- (6) “Taiwan and China in ‘Special Relationship’: Ma,” *The China Post*, September 4, 2008 <<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm>>.
- (7) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_state-to-state_relations>; and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Country_on_Each_Side>.
- (8) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 30, 2009.
- (9) *Nikkei Shimbun*, May 4, 2009.
- (10) U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Taiwan* <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm>, accessed on May 7, 2009>.
- (11) DPP President Tsai Ing-wen made a similar observation. See, *Sankei Shimbun*, April 10, 2008.
- (12) *Sankei Shimbun*, March 13, 2008 <<http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/080313/plc0803131934007-n1.htm>>.
- (13) *Nikkei Shimbun*, April 15, 2009, the evening edition.
- (14) <[http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%81%B2%E3%82%85%E3%81%86%E3%81%8C_\(%E8%AD%B7%E8%A1%9B%E8%89%A6\)](http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%81%B2%E3%82%85%E3%81%86%E3%81%8C_(%E8%AD%B7%E8%A1%9B%E8%89%A6))>.
- (15) <<http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%81%8A%E3%81%8A%E3%81%99%E3%81%BF%E5%9E%8B%E8%BC%B8%E9%80%81%E8%89%A6>>.
- (16) *Sentaku*, May 2009, p. 99.
- (17) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing>.
- (18) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permissive_Action_Link>.