

# Installation/Performance

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The dialogue between artistic development work and philosophical aesthetics is a dialogue between very different partners. On the one hand, artistic development work seeks to open new windows of opportunity and show us something we have never seen before. On the other, philosophical aesthetics must insist that not everything that is new is art. Historically speaking, aesthetics has consistently sought to lay down rules for what is valid art – and these rules have been consistently broken by works possessing their own validity. Works that gave reflection the task of understanding the characteristic features of their own specific and unique nature, rather than assuming theoretical-philosophical support. In other words, theoretical reflection has consistently been challenged to change the current sets of rules in order to understand the new and the different; and we have consistently learnt things throughout history that only artistic experiment could teach us. But philosophical aesthetics has never surrendered its hesitant reservations, based on the experience that much that is new proves not to be art. And I believe that this is where its tradition and continued relevance can be found, which must still be considered when rules need to be changed even today.

The traditions of philosophical aesthetics certainly date back to Plato at least: in Plato we find a determined insistence that not everything is art. In fact, Plato seems to believe that

what we call art often contain a dangerous, misleading form of seduction which philosophical aesthetics was born to expose. And this insistence and doubt is worth remembering and understanding in a post-modern culture of images, challenged by spectacular acts of terror in which passenger planes are launched at skyscrapers, videos are broadcast showing hostages being decapitated, or child pornography is published on the internet.

We need critical reflection – and we need art and artistic development work to ensure that we do not fool ourselves into believing that we can lay down rules once and for all governing what constitutes valid artistic expression, thereby trapping ourselves in a Platonic state.

Umberto Eco understands the problem and its complexity very well, indicating in his *Poetics of the Open Work* that the rule-less, subjective and open

was noticed by classical writers, especially when they set themselves to consider the figurative arts. In the *Sophist* Plato observes that painters suggest proportions not by following some objective canon but by judging them in relation to the angle from which they are seen by the observer.<sup>1</sup>

Plato reflected a long time ago on open, experimental art, engaged in the creation of illusion and a pleasure to the eyes, so he can be included in Eco's attempt to establish a

form of poetics for the open work that unfolds and comes to life as it is perceived. However, as mentioned above, Eco is aware that the problem is complex, and that Plato was not immediately prepared to allow art and its experiments and illusions to determine the validity of such experiments without closer consideration. Eco points out that the attention paid to the ruleless, subjective, illusory and open was not regarded by Plato as a reason to change the rules he mastered. Instead, he saw all the more reason to insist on the things that rules could determine and maintain:

Yet it is equally certain that this awareness has led to a tendency to operate against the “openness” of the work, to favor its “closing out”.<sup>2</sup>

I shall return in a moment to Eco and his continuing historical outline of the dialogue between art and reflection, something which is far from irrelevant to his project and the point he tries to make. But first I should like to dwell on the reasoning contained in *The Sophist* in order to point out the forms of expression that Plato refuses to call art. Later in this article this will serve as a useful piece in the jigsaw of not only understanding why the Renaissance humanists – who invented and worshipped the illusory perspective which unfolded behind the surface of the screen to a presumed observer located in front of this surface – could also regard themselves justifiably as Platonists; but also understanding what kind of spatial awareness these Renaissance Platonists share with Plato. I hope this will enable me to indicate the areas in which artistic development work and philosophical-aesthetic reflection can utilise each other today in creating and exploring in a mutual, critically inspired dialogue.

As pointed out by Eco, in *The Sophist* we encounter a form of art known as *illusory art* which takes the observer into account and is content to mime a similarity between the objects it represents, without regard for the proportions of these objects. But this is not the only form of art dealt with in *The Sophist*. In fact the dialogue distinguishes between *illusory art* on the one hand, and *copying art* on the other, which “is made to reproduce the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth.”<sup>3</sup> In the dialogue *copying art* is actually presented first – after which there is a discussion of whether all forms of art do the same (representing the correct proportions of things). The answer to this question reveals that there is also a form of art that is

only an illusion, miming similarity, and that according to Plato this *illusory art* should be disdained because it does not observe objective rules about the similarity (*homeiosis*) between presentation and representation, or about concordance between objective rules. In addition, it is relevant for my argument to point out that the answer also reveals that the *illusory art* that Plato despises creates the illusion of space *in front of* or *on* a surface, and *not* (as seen in the subsequent Platonic Renaissance) *behind* the picture plane. In other words, I feel it is worth noting that Plato’s rejection of *illusory art* is due partly to the fact that perspective creating space behind the picture plane had still not been discovered in Antiquity; so the example of *illusory art* in *The Sophist* is a large surface which requires (out of consideration for the observer) manipulation of the proportions of the forms painted at the top and bottom *on* the surface. Or, as expressed in *The Sophist* in answer to the question of whether all art does not present *homeiosis*:

Not, as I should say, by those who have to model or paint colossal figures. Were they to reproduce their true proportions, the upper parts of the figures, you know, would appear too small, and the lower too large, as we have to view the first from a distance, but the others at close range.<sup>4</sup>

As indicated above, I will shortly return to the issue of why the difference – and similarity – between the art Plato rejects and the perspective of the Renaissance is significant.

Inspired by Eco’s further presentation of the history of the open work, and initially by his point that the early Christian medieval Platonists developed a theory of allegory

which posited the possibility of reading the Scriptures (and eventually poetry, figurative arts) not just in the literal sense but also in three other senses: the moral, the allegorical, and the anagogical<sup>5</sup>

it is tempting to consider whether Plato, too, can be read and understood in ways other than the literal. In other words, the question is whether the literal interpretation of Plato which I have just presented inspired by Eco can be supplemented by e.g. other less literal and more physically or bodily attentive interpretations. And the inspiration for such interpretations comes less from medieval allegory and more from forms of art that can be characterised as ancient

– but which have only attracted the attention of art history within the past 20–30 years. In other words, the question is whether installation and performance art can inspire us to less literal interpretations of Plato – whether attention to the installatory and the performative respectively, which in my opinion is effective but not thematised in the Platonic linguistic universe, and which has therefore rarely attracted the attention of more literal interpretations of Plato, can help us to understand that the space developed in the Renaissance in extension of Plato and medieval Platonists can be characterised as both Euclidian *and* installatory: the perspective system, after all, is an installation with a vanishing point, surface/mirror and a point of observation. And in this connection perhaps we can indicate how it is possible to approach other more performatively inspired spaces as we experience them in e.g. Mannerism, the Baroque, modernity and in our own era, and which have still only vaguely been satisfactorily thematised and reflected in and with the theory.

In her excellent summary entitled “I/Eye/Oculus: performance, installation and video”<sup>6</sup>, Kristine Stiles emphasises that recent performance and installation art has ancient roots in its focus partly on *kinesis* or movement instead of *stasis*, and partly on facticity, concretion or presentation instead of *mimesis* and representation. But she also points out that these art forms have never been either thematised or understood by the predominant form of philosophical aesthetics, which without reflection seems to assume that *stasis* and/or *mimesis* are criteria of true art. As indicated, we cannot accuse Plato of wishing to defend mimetic art – he seems to be primarily occupied by static, unchanging eternity, which the miming senses distort in critical fashion. But Aristotle understands art as *mimesis*. And in his influential *Poetics*, Aristotle inspires Alberti and the Renaissance, among others, to understand the space behind the picture plane as a stage on which stories (*storia*) of universal, ahistorical validity can be shown in a static, eternal present. The Renaissance space, of course, is an articulation of the eternal and unchanging – and the Renaissance city, also a stage, represents this eternity, too.

Inspired by Eco and his point that the early Christian medieval Platonists developed ways of understanding the Holy Scriptures that were not literal, it is possible to consider (as indicated above) what it means that we read Plato with

art instead of merely reading art with Plato, and thereby explore both the installatory and the performative in Plato’s writings. I do not pretend that this enables us to transcend the closed, limited and specific in Plato; but we do gain an understanding other than a literally Platonic understanding of how the dialogue between art and reflection has developed over time, and thus of how dialogue could work today, with specific focus on dialogue itself, on exchange and movement. Because as I will seek to show, dialogue is best (and best understood) if we acknowledge that philosophical aesthetics also has a compositional plane which bears reflection, the literal. That in other words it is in our attention to the compositional, and thus to what philosophical aesthetics learns from art, that we not only transcend the limitations that a simply literal interpretation of philosophy and art results in, but also establish the opportunity for continued, mutual inspiration between unequal parties. Between on the one hand art, which composes space and time, and on the other what Eco inspired by the medieval Platonists calls “the creative *logos*”<sup>7</sup>.

Attention to the composition of Plato’s texts, or to be more accurate his dialogues, reveals immediately that what is involved is carefully composed performance or dramatic art, which Plato himself (for instance in the dialogue entitled *Ion*) does not fail to condemn as seduction. And throughout Plato’s works we encounter a diligent and precise use of images and metaphors to explain that only the literal, unambiguous concept is in contact with the truth. In fact Plato does not seem able to explain or show us the truth – not just the truth about the lies of images, but truth itself – without using images and metaphors. The famous cave picture from *The Republic VI* is both a metaphor and a carefully described installation. There is fire, objects that are moved and illuminated by the fire, a number of observers, a wall, and the shadows of the objects on the wall. Plato, of course, wishes to use this installation to show us once again that we cannot trust our senses; as such the literal meaning of the cave picture is clear and in accordance with *The Sophist’s* rejection of *illusory art*. But there is no doubt that what inspired the early Christian Platonists was the installatory *and* the performative in Plato’s presentation of the truth: the idea that we should move out of the cave and up into the light to reach the truth inspired the medieval analogical understanding of truth which Eco, as quoted

above, mentions among the non-literal interpretations of the Holy Scriptures of the era. The anagogical, of course, subsequently became very important for the composition of scholastic books and Gothic cathedrals – both of which were designed and composed by Platonists.

In my view it is also clear that the subsequent Renaissance (using the perspective construction) so to speak repeats and develops Plato's cave installation: observers see and objects are seen, which once again means that the truth depends on images and the positions of the observers and is *not* independent of the relational or relative, which Plato literally condemns. In extension of Plato and medieval Platonists' movement into space, towards the light, in the Renaissance it becomes urgent to master space and use visual art – once again by using the presentations of visual art – to show the path leading to the three-dimensional harmonious extent that subsequent work on construction and urban planning assumed, as if it was an essential truth about reality.

With this three-dimensional space, founded on proportionality, but independent of any size or scale, we are very close to the spatial awareness that the Renaissance shared with Antiquity, although spatial awareness in Antiquity still only related to the proportions of individual objects and not to an idea of what objects constituted as a single entity. As indicated above, in Antiquity people had still not discovered a perspective capable of gathering and coordinating the spatiality of objects in and with a single common space *behind* the picture plane. In Antiquity spatiality was portrayed *on* the surface, and owing to the fact that these portrayals had their fixed point in the spatiality of individual objects up and down respectively (cf. *The Sophist* above), both the objects and the common space which thus arose between them were distorted. And in fact it is also worth pointing out the difference between the space of Antiquity and the Renaissance, thereby underlining that it was thanks to the experiments of art that culture achieved a dialogue with new rules, new opportunities, which art alone could show us. Or expressed another way: it should be emphasised that it is only in accordance with Plato's and the Renaissance Platonists' view that the truth is unique and unchanging that the difference between Antiquity and the Renaissance is concealed; and (like both Plato and the Renaissance Platonists) we forget that it was thanks to special work with images and via the experiments of art (the ability to present

space *behind* and not *on* the surface) that the existence of a harmoniously proportioned, rectangular space could be outlined for a stationary observer in front of the picture who was allowed for in the composition. And in the Renaissance this extended, three-dimensional space in harmonious *stasis* was soon the subject of particular interest, as if it were identical with the essence of the world in which the space was installed. It is true that Alberti wrote a treatise both on visual art and on architecture, and there is no doubt that Alberti understands the essentially artistic nature of perspective. In fact he was the first one to use language to describe Brunelleschi's perspective installation. But it is worth pointing out that perspective does not occur in Alberti's subsequent treatise on architecture. This treatise contains only directions, explaining how to work in accordance with the extended three-dimensional space that perspective had revealed at all stages from buildings to cities. And the key concept for the aesthetic judgement is proportions. Space was identical with geometry.

Rome was not recreated according to Alberti's directions as requested, and in general the ideal city of the Renaissance did not pass the planning stage. But on the threshold of what we now call Manierism – and thus on the threshold of the renewed task of understanding the expressions of art, a task which is still ongoing (just think of the still unsatisfactory, post-modernist reception of Michelangelo) – Rafael managed during the so-called High Renaissance in *The School of Athens* (1509–11) to unite Plato and Aristotle in a single space behind the surface, which can be characterised as a perspective of a raised elevation of Bramante's design for the Church of St. Peter, subsequently changed radically by Michelangelo. And it did make a difference although we still seem to have difficulty in understanding Manierism. Even Robert Venturi's often excellent interpretations of Manierism, which are in close dialogue with his own artistic development work, are unsatisfactory, deficient.<sup>8</sup>

We must not delve too deeply into art history here. However, it is important for my argument to point out that the Renaissance shared with Plato the idea that the world is basically Euclidian and identical with the geometry by which it is measured and proportioned. This meant that like Plato the Renaissance was forgetting what we remember if we are aware that the perspective installation, and thereby all of it (the observer's position, the surface/mirror and the space

portrayed behind the surface), is the precondition *and* limitation of this space. The Renaissance installation is in the world – not the other way round. And every artist since Rafael and the High Renaissance seems to have known that as far as perspective is concerned anamorphosis (distortion) is the rule, whereas the ‘correct’ observer position (and thus the perspectivistic illusion) is the exception. And that the rectangular, harmonious space is an abstraction that we only experience approximately and thanks to abstraction from our senses. As pointed out by Michel Foucault in his Manet lecture<sup>9</sup>, very few artists in the centuries after the Renaissance were interested in revealing this knowledge, which is why they explore and develop the ability to portray what we see on a surface so objectively or seductively that we simply forget to consider our own observer’s position. And even though it is true that art (and a great deal of fantastic, innovative art) has been created in and with this ambition, I believe (as indicated in my introduction) that Plato’s scepticism with regard to illusory art and the merely pretentious is still relevant – even though such scepticism should be connected these days with explicit understanding of the installatory, the performative and the compositional, which reflection has always learned about from art.

It should be added that Eco underlines the importance of Baroque architecture, which with its

search for kinetic excitement and illusory effect leads to a situation where the plastic mass in the Baroque work of art never allows a privileged, definitive, frontal view; rather, it induces the spectator to shift his position continuously in order to see the work in constantly new aspects, as if it were in a state of perpetual transformation.<sup>10</sup>

But also that he underlines that in the spiritual life of the Baroque there is *no* awareness of what we (retrospectively, with our attention directed at the dialogue between the work and the observer) know the art and the architecture of the epoch were on the track of. Eco:

In fact, it would be rash to interpret Baroque poetics as a conscious theory of the “open work”.<sup>11</sup>

In the Manet lecture mentioned above, Foucault points out that Edouard Manet inaugurated modern art because in his painting Manet works with and alienates the observer’s position – and in the picture alienates and works with the

actual flatness and framework of paintings – thereby giving us an understanding partly of the fact that what we see in a painting is not a mirror image of the world in which we find ourselves as observers; and partly of the fact that art and its installations *are* in a world we do not know in its essence, and which is far more complex than we have believed until now<sup>12</sup>. In his famous painting *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (1881–82), Manet shows us that the person in the mirror behind the picture plane (behind the barmaid in the middle distance) *cannot* be a mirror image of the observer in front of the surface of the painting; and according to Foucault this is not a proposal that we should give up on art or give up our work with and reflection on the complexity which art shows us. On the contrary: it is once again via art that we gain the opportunity to deal with our prejudices – and once again it is art that shows us opportunities we must grasp (but carefully, and without persuading ourselves that the change means we must now throw everything else overboard). Even though we learn that space is not the same as either perspectivistic illusion or Euclidian geometry, it is still true that geometry and the proportional can be a single clarifying factor in the exploration and creation of space. But geometry and attention to proportions are now only a corrective element, because we can no longer fool ourselves into believing that space and the things we are searching for and creating can be comprised or contained by a well-proportioned geometry.<sup>13</sup>

Ever since Manet – and ever since the scientific progress we can attribute to Einstein, Bohr and others – we no longer accept that space and the things we are searching for and creating can be comprised or contained by the proportional. We no longer share the idea of the Renaissance that space is Euclidian, but can *among many other things* avail ourselves of Euclid in working with a complexity that *among many other things* includes awareness of the observer – something which the Renaissance forgot but Manet remembered. I add *among many other things* to underline that we are no longer content to vary the truth with the observer that Manet once again drew our attention to. As in installation art, in architecture we wish to create a great number of observer positions, a great number of movement options, many different relations. To paraphrase Gilles Deleuze’s modern, retrospective Baroque ideas, we could say that we are interested not so much in varying the truth in accordance with

a subject as in establishing the preconditions allowing the truth of variations to reveal itself to the subject as fields of opportunity<sup>14</sup>. And it seems to me that this ambition is congenial to Eco's poetics for the open work.

A little later in Eco's text he mentions two significant, text-based examples of art operating with an understanding that text is tissue – in other words, that the subject has the chance with the tissue of a text to work with the truth of variation that transcends what the author can maintain from a single viewpoint or observer position. One of these examples is Mallarmé's *Livre*, which (as pointed out by Eco) probably has ambitions reminiscent of those of late scholastics, but which unlike

the closed, single conception in a work by a medieval artist, [which] reflected the conception of the cosmos as a hierarchy of fixed, preordained orders (...) obviously suggests the universe as it is conceived by modern, non-Euclidean geometries.<sup>15</sup>

The work, with which Mallarmé worked in a cultural circle that also comprised Manet, was never completed; but it is emphasised by Eco because in his *Livre*, consisting of a finite number of interchangeable sheets of paper, Mallarmé wished to understand and show us how a limited number of structural, moveable elements could make an astronomical number of combinations possible. This was by no means a homage to the arbitrary and rule-less, but an attempt to liberate language from the centred and centring viewpoint and allow it to work in a field of many different viewpoints.

Mallarmé's attempt did not succeed – he had to give up on his work. But he shared this ambition to create texts that draw on language as a material, a tissue capable of binding something which is highly varied into a single composition, with James Joyce and *Ulysses*, which is also emphasised by Eco:

The "Wandering Rocks" chapter in *Ulysses* amounts to a tiny universe that can be viewed from different perspectives: the last residue of Aristotelian categories has now disappeared. (...) Joyce has practised a great deal of technical inventiveness to introduce us to the elements of his story in such a way that it enables us to find our own paths: I doubt very much whether a human memory is able to satisfy all the demands made by *Ulysses* on a first reading. And when we read it again, we can start from any point at all, as if we were faced with something solid and fixed like a city which really

exists in space, and which we can enter from any direction we please. While writing his book, Joyce said that he was working on all its various parts at the same time.<sup>16</sup>

What seems to interest Eco in these open, text-based works – and what I have noticed in particular – is the opportunity to connect their authors/readers in a dialogue with a polycentric, multifaceted truth, the truth of variation. In extension of this, the ambition will be to create texts that enter into dialogue with artistic development work by developing (in parallel, so to speak) opportunities to think, understand and assess what development work wishes to show in its material as compositional opportunities. And this research ambition: the wish to work in language with conscious awareness of e.g. the installatory, performative and compositional as an opportunity to process space in and with the tissue of text, which can *remember* more than the human memory, is reminiscent of the relationship between art and science which Eco emphasises as a special feature of our times, characterised by

*structural homologies* [which] need not commit us to assembling a rigorous parallelism. (...) Thus, the concepts of "openness" and dynamism may recall the terminology of quantum physics: indeterminacy and discontinuity. But at the same time they also exemplify a number of situations in Einsteinian physics.<sup>17</sup>

The field of potential cooperation between artistic development work and philosophical aesthetics, which I have attempted to identify under the influence of Eco, is a field in which the resources of cautious philosophical aesthetics are still relevant; although its history (and art) should by now have taught it that cooperation has always required that it should *preferably* allow reflection to work in and with the tissue of the text in order to reflectively understand and assess the potentials of art installations, *rather than* leading the text on towards a single literal conclusion which it already possessed in advance. Nonetheless, authors today know that even though the point of a text is contained and varied in its tissue and does not need to occur in the form of a conclusion towards the end, a text like any other work should on the one hand be judged on its precision, its understanding of differences and of the fact that things matter, and on the other constitute a delimited field marked by a concluding full-stop.

## Notes

1. Umberto Eco, "The Poetics of the Open Work", in *The Open Work*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1989, p. 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Plato, "The Sophist", in A.E. Taylor (tr.) *Plato: The Sophist & The Statesman*, p. 122 (235d).
4. Ibid.
5. Op. cit., *ibid.*
6. Kristine Stiles, "I/Eye/Oculus: performance, installation and video", in Gill Perry and Paul Wood (ed.), *Themes in Contemporary Art*, London 2004.
7. Op. cit., p. 6.
8. In *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (1966), Robert Venturi managed to introduce Manierism to contemporary architectural debate; and he did so by presenting his own architecture and following art historians (Nicolaus Pevsner, Werner Hager and others) around the mid-20th century who had finally started to take a more nuanced view of architectural history – particularly Heinrich Wölfflin, who had distinguished between Renaissance and Baroque architecture but who had not observed the special features of 16th-century Italian architecture, including that of Michelangelo and Palladio. Venturi was important for post-modernism, but he himself was probably never attracted by post-modernism as a trend. There was nothing unsatisfactory in this. But it was unsatisfactory when in 2004 he and his wife Denise Scott Brown in the book *Architecture as Signs and Systems – For a Mannerist Time* once again presented (primarily) their own architecture – this time as an expression of a broader spirit of the time which regards "Architecture as sign rather than space", as stated in the heading of the introductory chapter of the book, which again draws parallels to the 16th century in Michelangelo and others. As mentioned above, in 1966 the issue was "Complexity and Contradiction": not either/or but both/and. Venturi was experimental, and found parallels in other experimental forms of architecture. In 2004 the issue is "Sign rather than Space" – now we have to choose in advance, as if the experiments are subject to rules which prefer to ignore space. This framework may be sufficient to present Venturi's later works, but it is quite simply unsatisfactory in charting the vital features of Michelangelo's architectural oeuvre!
9. This was a lecture given by Michel Foucault in Tunis in 1971, recently published on the basis of tape transcripts in Michel Foucault, *La peinture de Manet*, Paris 2004.
10. Op. cit., p. 7.
11. Ibid.
12. In his Manet lecture, Foucault said: "Since the 15th century, since quattrocento, it was a tradition in Western painting to seek to forget, to mask and avoid the fact that paintings were deposited on or written in a particular fragment of space: this space might be a wall for a fresco, a wooden panel or canvas, or even a piece of paper; to seek to forget that paintings were founded on more or less rectangular and two-dimensional surfaces; and to replace this material space in which paintings were grounded by a represented space which in a way denied the space in which the painter painted. And it is in this way that painting since quattrocento has tried to represent the three dimensions while being grounded on a plane in two dimensions. (...) What Manet has done (and this is certainly one aspect of the important modifications Manet has contributed to Western painting) is to make material properties, qualities or limitations reveal themselves once again within whatever is represented in a painting, and which paintings had previously sought to delete or mask in some way or other." Michel Foucault, op. cit., p. 22–23.
13. In 2003 Philip Boudon republished *Sur l'espace architectural*. When this book was originally published in 1971, it described the basis of what was known as *Architecturology*: a theory about the conception of architecture which has since generated a wide range of research publications, but which has still had little influence on Scandinavian architectural research. The decisive feature of Boudon's theory is the importance of scale in the understanding of architecture. In republishing *Sur l'espace architectural*, Boudon wrote a new preface in which he underlines that a theory of the creation of architecture cannot allow a proportional, geometric space to form its framework. On the other hand, frequently unreflected but assumed geometric space has constituted an epistemological barrier to the understanding of the spaces that architecture creates today. Consequently, the proportional must not be assumed as the first thing, something which scale will subsequently adjust. Instead, the understanding of scale – or scales – must be the first aspect of the theory, which proportional considerations may subsequently define in greater detail. In this connection I believe it is relevant to point out that the understanding of scales, of the concrete formats of art and architecture which interest Foucault and Boudon – and which art since the quattrocento and until Manet sought to conceal – is also the controlling feature of David Summer's re-interpretation of art history, as presented in the impressive and inspiring *Real Spaces* in 2003.
14. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Le pli, Leibniz et le baroque*, Paris 1988, which points out on page 27, for instance: "It is true that perspectivism in Leibniz as well as Nietzsche (...) is a form of relativism, but not relativism as it is generally understood. What is involved is not a variation of the truth in accordance with a subject, but the conditions under which the truth of variation appears to the subject".
15. Op. cit., p. 13 (...) 14.
16. Ibid. p. 10. The first part of the quotation is taken from the English translation, the second part from the Danish: Umberto Eco, "Det åbne værks poetik", in Jørgen Dehs (ed.), *Æstetiske teorier*, p. 109. While the Danish version is a translation of *Opera aperta* 2.ed, where Eco has added the latter part of the quotation the English version is a translation of the almost identical 1.ed..
17. Ibid. p. 18.