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# Evil: Genocide in the 21st Century

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# Evil: Genocide in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

## *A Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment*

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# Abstract

This paper will explore commonalities and processes that led to genocide in the twentieth century.  Information from four notable genocides will be used to determine the feasibility of genocide continuing unabated into the twenty first century.  Armenian, Holocaust, Cambodian and Rwandan genocides have similar qualities establishing a "recipe" for others to use as a template or as a predictor of the next genocide.  This thesis will use psychological theory, case studies and historical data to formulate reasons why individuals can be easily persuaded to take on the role as perpetrator.  Has the international community done enough to either prevent or identify potential genocides?  If not, where are the likely hotspots that genocide will prosper in the future?  The review concludes with this; without an international paradigm shift, genocide will flourish in the twenty first century.

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# Introduction

Genocide is the leading cause of preventable deaths in the twentieth and twenty first centuries, taking even more lives than war. From the Armenian genocide in 1915 to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the world is no more inclined to intervene to prevent future genocide today than it has been in the past 110 years. This thesis will explore the causes leading to genocide and give the reader a better understanding of the intricacies in the formation of genocide. Using professional insight, along with identifying patterns showing commonalities among the perpetrators and victims, it will become clear how genocide in the twenty first century will probably continue to occur.  Finally, we will see how societal markers may lead to the prediction of future genocidal acts (Blum 1). While wars are being fought with modern weapons against opposing military forces, genocide is being carried out against non-combatants by low tech weapons as guns, fire, rape, drowning and machetes.

Genocide tears at the very fabric of what is good and decent and it is incomprehensible that normal people can create such horrid violence on select groups or races of people on such a grand scale and justify it. It is estimated between 60 and 120 million men, women and children experienced the brutality of genocide in the twentieth century. These individuals were not combatants; however, they were being killed as an extension of war, even though they are not participants. A crime of unparalleled devastation to our fellow man gives the impression that pure evil could be lurking in each of us. To try and pinpoint reasons for genocide we must peer into the psychological, political and

fundamental reasons for the actions of so many to commit genocide. Will the

twenty first century be a continuation of the macabre, or can it be prevented?

There is a great deal of rhetoric for the need to stop genocide; however, the

international community has shown a lack of fortitude or clarity to intercede

militarily or continue to use peacekeeping forces.

On April 7, 2004 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi' Annan

established a Five Point Action Plan for the prevention of genocide. He

proclaimed, "We must first acknowledge our responsibility for not having done

more to prevent or stop the genocide.  We must never forget our collective failure

to protect at least 800,000 defenseless men, women and children who perished

in Rwanda 10 years ago" (Annan).  The United Nations had its beginnings in

1945 with a membership of 51 counties with the purpose of a commitment to

maintaining international peace.  Since this time the world has experienced at

least five major genocides;.

> As we attempt to learn the lessons of the genocide in Rwanda, two
> messages should be paramount. First, never forget. Second, never
> stop working to prevent genocide. Our thoughts go to the victims --
> the more than 800,000 innocent people who lost their lives with
> terrifying speed.  Our thoughts go to the survivors. Their resilience
> continues to inspire us. It is the responsibility of us all to support
> them in rebuilding their lives. How different it would have been, had
> we, the international community, and acted properly at the proper
> time. (Ki Moon)

The United Nations Convention on Genocide in 1948 was founded on the

principle of protecting the innocent from genocide, after the European Holocaust.

Failing to predict the genocide in Darfur in 2004 does not bode well for the United

Nations ability to prevent genocide in the twenty first century.  It is imperative that

organizations like the United Nations predict, prevent or respond to major crises in a timely manner to stop the unnecessary loss of innocent lives.

The genocide in Rwanda was the most well publicized genocide of the twentieth century, due mainly to technological advancements in media collection. Even so, 800,000 Rwandans lost their lives in a span of 100 days.  Ten years after the genocide, the United Nations formulated a ten step plan to stop future genocides (Annan).  The failure of the UN in its duty as an international entity to protect the people of Darfur is typical and symptomatic of the problems existing in the prevention of genocides in the twenty first century.  The fact is, the world stood by and watched a country disintegrate into absolute chaos and brutality with little to no international support.

While the international community may want to intercede, the geo-politics of genocide mean that we must be able to recognize and define it. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, mass murder, genocide, democide are becoming more horrific, brutal, and deadly if for no other reason but the sheer number of victims.

Improved and coordinated communications in the modern world could be a reason the perpetrators, such as the Hutus and sympathizers in Rwanda, become more efficient and expedient in dispatching their victims.  Wars in the modern age are being fought with a higher degree of technology, inflicting a larger number of casualties among combatants.

This review will define genocide, discuss the psychology of genocide, and concluded with a format for predicting genocide. If we do not predict and prevent, we will repeat these brutal acts in the future.

# Chapter One:   Genocide

**International Definition of Genocide**

The modern age brings new reasons and justifications for committing genocide.  Mass killing of civilians on ideological grounds "in the name of the people', whether ethnically driven (as against Armenians, Jews, Bosnian Muslims, Albanian Kosovars or Rwandan Tutsis) or class-driven (as in the Stalinist anti-kulak terror or Pol Pots' classicide') forms a crucial component of what makes modern political violence modern (Waller xii).

Genocide is not war, mass murder or ethnic cleansing.  The term genocide was first coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1943.  Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish legal scholar and refugee commented in his book, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,* genocide is "the co-ordinate and planned annihilation of a national, religious, or racial group by a variety of actions aimed at foundation essential to the survival of the group "(Lemkin 79).

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations took his idea a step further and adopted Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide.  Article II specifically defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic racial or religious group" causing them serious bodily or mental harm, creating conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, preventing births, or forcibly transferring children to another group" (Waller xi).

**Ethnic Cleansing**

Ethnic cleansing is sometimes used incorrectly as a synonym for

genocide.  Unlike genocide, it has no legal standing and its perpetrators have a

different agenda that can, and most likely will, lead to genocide (Blum 204).

Ethnic cleansing has been defined in this way:

> Ethnic cleansing falls below the horrible threshold of intention to
> exterminate when compared to the brutality experienced during the
> German orchestrated genocide.  Ethnic cleansers may take Hitler
> seriously without sharing his commitment to total elimination.
> Ethnic cleansing is far easier than the murder of an entire group,
> and serves most nationalist governments just as well. Nationalists
> who wish to build a nationally homogenous state need not kill all
> member of a minority population:  killing many to remove most is
> sufficient.  (Snyder 200)

The Bosnian War is the modern example of what is considered ethnic

cleansing.  The Bosnian War had its start when the Communist country of

Yugoslavia became divided by the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980.

Yugoslavia consisted of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia,

Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Yugoslavian President Tito was an expert at

maintaining a balance among the many ethnic regions. After his death in 1980,

the separate republics wrestled for control of the government and in 1991 and

1992 all of the republics declared independence and became sovereign states.

The Serbian and Croatian solution to the problem of separate states was to push

for ethnic nationalism. Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic appealed to all

Serbs in the republics to support his plan for a Greater Serbia.  Milosevic was

able to produce, "Fierce propaganda depicting Muslims as extreme

fundamentalists was causing many Serbs to support Milosevic's plan for ethnic

cleansing as a means of creating this Greater Serbia" (Bosnian).  Ethnic

cleansing of the Muslims expanded to include all who opposed the "Greater

Serbia." This period of ethnic cleansing resulted in over 230,000 deaths.

The term ethnic cleansing was first used by former Serbian President,

Slobodan Milosevic.  As leader of the Serbian Forces in the Bosnian War,

Milosevic explained his reasoning for the onslaught of murder and torture against

the Croats, Kosovan, Muslims and Albanian people.  He saw it as a way to stop

what he believed was ethnic cleansing by the Bosnians and Croats Armies

against the Serbian population.   Before the massacre in Srebrenica, Serbian

commanders had used the code word "*etnicko ciscernj*" meaning cleansing of the

region (Snyder 210).  Milosevic died in prison before the completion of his trial*.*

William Schabas, a professor of international law, differentiates ethnic cleansing

from genocide as, "One is intended to displace a population, the other to destroy

it.  The issue is one of intent and logically inconceivable that the two agendas

coexist.  Ethnic cleansing is a warning sign of genocide to come.  Genocide is

the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser" (Schabas 200).

Historically, ethnic cleansing was also a precursor to genocide in 1933

Germany (Schabas 1994).  The Nazi's initial policy was to coerce the Jews to

leave Germany.  The major stumbling block was the Jew's inability to find a

country that would take them in.  At this point the Nazi policy was ethnic

cleansing.  During this period Jews were persecuted, anti-Semitic laws were

passed, and surges of violence arose.  Later when the war with Russia began,

the Nazi policy shifted to annihilation of all Jews in Europe. The Jews were no

longer able to emigrate, even if another country would accept them.  This is when Nazi Germany's ethnic cleansing became genocide.  During the Eichmann trial, the Israeli District Court stated, "a doubt remains in our minds whether there was here that specific intention to exterminate', as required by the definition of genocide" (Schabas 200).

In the modern world, wars are being fought with a higher degree of technology, inflicting a larger number of casualties among combatants and civilians, "By the Second World War, military front and home front were scarcely divisible; this was not a popular war in the sense of the full involvement of the peoples of Europe in the fighting, and the suffering" (Kershaw 110).

Raphael Lemkin differentiates war from genocide as, "war is directed against sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians" (Lemkin 80). The four genocides in this thesis were conceived before but took place after a war had started.  The Turk's deep hatred for the Armenians began in the previous century; the actual genocide began at the same time as World War I. The German persecution of the Jews had its start in the early 1930's and the "Final Solution" began in 1941, two years after the start of World War II.  The Khmer Rouge gained their power after the Vietnam and Cambodian Civil War in 1975 and immediately initiated genocide.  In Rwanda, the Hutu government was battling the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army coming across the border in Burundi prior to the most recent genocide.

Modern age genocides can begin for a myriad of reasons, usually leading to war; however, there are common threads or patterns present in the genocides

of the twentieth century. "While there may be multiple motives for genocide, hating another's group is the perennial rallying point. That notion is particularly troubling since for most of us, the group is "we" and "we" are not about to give it up without a good fight" (Baum 3). Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, President of Genocide Watch: The International Alliance to End Genocide presented a briefing paper to the US State Department in 1996 on the genocidal processes including what he identified as the eight stages of genocide (Table 2) and how to prevent genocide during each stage (Stanton 3). Dr. Stanton concluded there were enough early signs of a coming genocide for the international community to stop the genocide in Rwanda. When it became clear the violent situation was worsening, the closing of many of the embassies removed the "eyes" of the international community and reduced the confirmation needed before any state's policy makers can take action. Table 1 summarizes the four prominent genocides in the twentieth century for this thesis while Table 2 lists the eight stages of Gregory Stanton's briefing to the UN. The stages are easily discernable and appear to be similar in their methodical planning, execution and end results.

Table 1: 20th Century Genocides

| Location & Time | Target Population | Aggressors | Est. Casualties | Prime Causes | Likelihood of Repetition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1912-1915 Turkey | Armenians | Ottoman Turkey | 1.5 Million | Religion Nationalism | High probability |

| 1933-1945<br><br>Nazi Germany & Occupied Europe | Jews, Gypsies, Critics; Non Aryan Political opponents Homosexuals Mentally Defective | Germans specifically Nazi | 6 million Jews and other ethnic groups with a total estimate of 20 million | Nationalism Retaliation | Low probability in Germany. Very Possible in the Middle East. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1975-1979<br><br>Cambodia (Khmer Rouge) | Perceived enemies of the state | "New People" Educated, Profession Foreign born Religious groups | 3.3 Million | Ideology of returning to an agrarian society. Political opponents | Medium probability |
| Rwanda 1994-1994 | Tutsi people | Hutu | 800,000 | Retaliation | High probability |

The first large scale genocide of the twentieth century began in 1912 when the Turkish government killed over 1.5 million Armenian Christians during a four year period.  The world view of the genocide in Armenia was the elimination of the Armenians because of their Christian heritage.  If this were the reason, why did Turkey tolerate the Armenians in their empire since the fourteenth century?

From the fourteenth century to the beginning of the Balkan War of 1912-1913, Turkey had amassed control of a large part of Europe's western regions. As many of the Balkan states were successfully gaining independence, the Ottoman Empire was weakening.  The Ottoman Empire losses were extensive. Through rebellion, independence and war, over 85% of its European conquest had been lost.

Table 2.  Eight Stages of Genocide and Prevention

| Stage | Explanation |
| --- | --- |
| 1.  Classification | All cultures have categories to distinguish people into "us and them" by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide. |
| 2. Symbolization | We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We name people "Jews" or "Gypsies", or distinguish them by colors or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups. Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily result in genocide unless they lead to the next stage, dehumanization. |
| 3. Dehumanization | One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. |
| 4. Organization | Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility (the Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal (Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants) or decentralized (terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are often trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings. |
| 5  Polarization | Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating and silencing the center. Moderates from the perpetrators' own group are most able to stop genocide, so are the first to be arrested and killed. |
| 6. Preparation | Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. Their property is expropriated. They are often segregated into ghettoes, deported into concentration camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and starved. |
| 7. Extermination | Begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called "genocide." It is "extermination" to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with militias to do the killing. Sometimes the genocide results in revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the |

| | |
|---|---|
| | downward whirlpool-like cycle of bilateral genocide (as in Burundi). |
| 8. Denial | It is the eighth stage that always follows genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile. There they remain with impunity, like Pol Pot or Idi Amin, unless they are captured and a tribunal is established to try them. |

In 1912 when the Armenians asked for reforms to achieve more autonomy, the memory of the rebellious Christian countries of the Balkans invoked rage against the Armenians. With the losses in the Balkan War fresh in their memories, many Turkish citizens rallied in the streets shouting, "Down with equality!", "The Balkan dogs are trampling on Islam." (Balakian 161). The Armenians became the enemy and were used as scapegoats for the empire's demise.

In Turkey, non-Muslim populations living in the Ottoman Empire held the status of infidel, living under the protection of the Muslim Turkish ruling order. At this point the classification stage of genocide began (Balakian xv). The new Turkish government began implementing plans to form a pure nationalistic Muslim state. The Armenians became a barrier to the Turkish plan. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the official name for the "Young Turks" began passing despotic laws to further the cause of nationalism, thus militarizing the government. A great number of Turks disliked the Armenians due to their

perception as being wealthy, particularly because they were of the minority and Christian in religion and culture. Few were wealthy but many were poor peasants who bore the brunt of this rage (Balakian 23).

The government of Turkey seized upon this rage and methodically ushered in a new nationalistic furor and "Turkification" of their youth. Paramilitary youth were issued rifles and ammunition in "defense of the fatherland" (Balakian 163). The wheels were now set into motion to unify the Muslim population against the alleged internal enemy, the Armenians.

On April 25, 1909, Adana, the last independent Armenian region, came under violent attack from overzealous Muslim Turks who looted and burned shops owned by the Armenians and Jewish communities. During the fray in Adana, Turkish soldiers stood by, and in some cases, assisted in the attacks and



mass murder. The national media declared that the Armenians were attacking Turkish forces, creating anger and fanning the flames of nationalism that sparked future attacks against the Armenians.

Figure 1  Armenian mass grave

The Turkish government used a systematic approach to rid Turkey of the Armenian problem. Men were evacuated from towns and executed, women raped repeatedly and some, as noted by investigative journalist Robert Fisk,

"were stuffed into caves and asphyxiated by brush fires as primitive gas chambers" (Balakian 176).

The new Turkish government began implementing plans to form a pure nationalistic Muslim state. The Armenians stood as a barrier to the Turkish plan. Just prior to the outbreak of War World I, Turkey forged a secret alliance with Germany to protect itself from Russia allowing many German troops to be stationed in Turkey, who eventually became witnesses to the Armenian Genocide. At the start of World War I the religious leader of the Ottoman Empire issued a proclamation of *jihad* against the Christians.

In 1915 the systematic extermination of the Armenian people began by targeting cultural and community leaders to weaken Armenian resolve, "The plan was to eliminate all Armenian writers, political activists, artists, teachers, and church and civic leaders." According to United States Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, killing squads, police, and soldiers, stripped, executed, mutilated or deported Armenians into the Syrian Desert to die of disease and starvation. Armenian men drafted into the Turkish Army were then disarmed and forced into labor battalions and summarily executed. A secret organization called the "Special Organization" was developed to protect Turkey from internal and external threats. State sponsored killing squads using convicts were established to expedite the Armenian liquidation and create an excuse for genocide deniability. The Turkish population and other Muslim groups plundered what the Armenians were forced to leave behind. When it was all said and done, the great majority of the Armenian population no longer existed (Balakian 154). To this

day, Turkey denies that the Armenian genocide ever occurred (Balakian 225). In 1984 the United States Congress tried to pass a resolution commemorating the Armenian genocide. Turkey threatened retaliation by, "closing military bases in Turkey and to terminate defense contracts with U.S. firms" (Balakian 387). The resolution was withdrawn and resubmitted as a bill in 1989, 2000 and 2007. On March 4, 2010, U.S. Congressman Gary Ackerman spoke at the House Foreign Affairs Committee on why a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide is imperative. "If you forget an injustice then it doesn't occur. If you forget something that was wrong you will no longer be able to tell right from wrong, because wrong then goes away" (Ackerman).

The Armenian genocide happened over 95 years ago, so why should we be concerned about the Armenian tragedy today? The answer lies in the events that have happened since. A terrible pattern of annihilation repeated itself time and time again in the twentieth century. The Armenian Genocide became the template which other genocides in the twentieth century came to mimic.

Hitler knew his decision to carry out the 'Final Solution" would be successful and that the world would not intervene or remember what happened to the Jewish population. As he states to his military staff, "Who still talks nowadays about the extermination of the Armenians"? In April 1945, exactly 30 years after the Armenian genocide, allied forces liberated the death camps of Nazi Germany.

Nazi Germany killed six million Jews and 14 million more from other groups over a thirteen year period ending in 1945. The public reason for the

Holocaust was the elimination of the Jewish people. This reasoning is too simplistic and hides the fact of Germany's goal of European dominance. At the end of World War I, a clause in the1919 Treaty of Versailles required Germany to pay $132 billion in German marks as reparations for instigating the war. This clause placed Germany on the road to hyperinflation, which nearly forced Germany into bankruptcy. The anger from the German people paying a so called "guilt clause" left the proud German people searching for a government to bring back Germany's economy and stature in the world (de Pommereau 2). The difficult life caused by the war and the embarrassment of the German society along with the political upheaval of the time, gave rise to a Nationalist Party (Nazi) along with its leader, Adolph Hitler, to fill a leadership void.

In his book, *Mein Kampf*, Hitler documented his revulsion toward the Jewish people and laid the blame on the Jews for all of the problems befalling Germany. On November 9, 1938 an arranged angry protest erupted over the killing of a low-level German diplomat at the German Embassy in Paris by a young Jew. This carnage is known as Night of Broken Glass (*Kristallnacht*). Throughout Germany, uncontested looting and burning resulted in over ninety-one Jewish deaths and over 8,000 Jewish businesses, shops, synagogues and apartments had been burned to the ground while the Nazi police and fireman stood by and sometimes participated. Over 20,000 Jews were taken into custody and 10,000 of them were sent to Buchenwald concentration camp (Rutherford 45-51).

Later that year, Jews were required to forfeit their property to the state, they were forbidden to go to cinemas, and Jews were only allowed to rent to Jews forming a "ghetto" like condition, placing most Jews in one section of the cities.  This evolution of increasing violence was in all probability, a preamble to the next step which includes mass killing or genocide.  The growing violence often expands to more groups than just the targeted one.  This expansion can take place over an extended period, with periods of calmness.  It is a central feature of intense group violence.

In 1939 Hitler formulated his plan to attack and invade Poland, along with the annexing of the German speaking countries of Austria and Czechoslovakia to expand Germany's heritage to the Germans under Non-German rule (Staub 379).  The annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and later the invasion of Poland, were met with little resistance from the international community because they did not want to provoke the Germans in to a world war.

Inaction by the international community's gave a free reign of terror for the Nazis to increase their aggression toward the Jewish people.  The Nazis considered their victims nothing more than "subhuman" placing them into a category that gives the victims no status as human beings, and killing them is not murder, it becomes "the


**Figure 2 Mass executions in Nazi occupied Ukraine**

slaughter of a lowly animal" (Lang 228). The extermination extended into occupied lands beyond that of the Jewish people to other minority ethnic groups, Poles, Russians and Gypsies.  Germany was setting up a utopian society based on the idea that the Aryan race was the only pure race and should be the only ones given status in the revitalized Germany.

In 1941 Henrich Himler (SS) orders establishment of the Auschwitz, Birkenau concentration camps.  The first prisons were occupied by the Poles and then followed by Jews. The killings in the concentration camps began around January of 1942 until April 1945.  During this period Jews were gassed, shot, burned alive and experimented on by German scientist.  Germany also established the, *Einsatzgruppen* (SS paramilitary death squads) that were "mobile units sent into German occupied lands to specifically kill Jews. They numbered 3,000 and were organized into seven units.  They were, "led by the intellectual elite of the Nazi party.  Of the 25 leaders 15 bore the title of PhD, most of them doctors of jurisprudence or philosophy" (Einsatzgruppen).  In addition, killing squads, Police Battalions and the Security Service (SS), assisted the *Einsatzgruppen* in the murdering of Jews throughout Europe.  It has been estimated that over 6 million Jews and millions more of other ethnic origins were killed during this period. Genocide continues in Southeast Asia.

In 1975 the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia killed 1.7 million people or twenty percent of the population, over a four year period.  The public reason for the Cambodian genocide was the political philosophy of achieving a sovereign Cambodia not controlled by foreign interest.  Cambodia had little conflict until the

**Figure 3  Cambodian dead**

escalation of the war in Vietnam and the aerial bombing raids by the United States blurred the boundaries between Cambodia and Vietnam.  In 1970 in a bloodless coup, the Khmer Rouge Republic was formed with close ties to the United States.  Once the United States withdrew support from the Khmer Rouge Republic the communist contingent in Kampuchea became the dominant force and began a restructuring of the country's social system (Williams 449). Under the leadership of the dictator Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge wanted to "rid the country of those deemed not *borisot* (pure).  These included the educated; those "tainted" by anything of "heredity enemies, especially the Vietnam and other ethnic minorities (persons of Chinese, Thai, or Lao ancestry, as well as the Muslim" (Waller 169).  Pol Pot's goal and those of the new Khmer Rouge Republic was to return Cambodia to an agrarian society free of foreign intervention.

Identifying and classifying the enemies of the state required a targeted group.  The Khmer Rouge distinguished between," new people' –those who resided in the towns and cities and comprising foreign sympathizers, the intellectuals, teachers, middle class and members of the Khmer Republic- and "base people' those that had resided in the country-side during the 1970-75 conflict" (Williams 449) . The "new people" were forced to live in deplorable

conditions and forced labor.  The new regime was indiscriminate in their killings.

The first to be executed were those from the social class of intellects, teachers,

religious groups, ethnic minorities and former military and civilian leaders.  Many

people were just simply tortured and then eventually disappeared.

The next genocide occurred in Central Africa. In 1994 the Hutus in

Rwanda killed 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathizers in a 100 day period.  The

public reason for the Tutsi annihilation for the War in Rwanda was racial and

ethnic rivalry culminating with civil war.  Rwanda has a long history of racial

divide and violence.  Under Belgian colonist rule, the minority Tutsi ethnic group

was singled out to become the leaders by the Belgium authorities.  Even though

the Tutsis were the minority under the Germans and eventually the Belgium

colonization, they were placed into a position of authority to carry out the wishes

of the European powers.  The Belgians issued ethnic identification cards to the

Hutu, Tutsi's and the Twa (Batwa Pygmy) tribes, in essence developing a caste

system in Rwanda.  As part of the Arusha Accords in 1992 the identification

cards were to be eliminated and replaced with identification cards that were

never issued.  The identification cards were used by the Hutu to identify and kill

Tutsis.

The violent struggles in Rwanda initially began in 1955 to 1957, bringing

about the publication of the Hutu Manifesto declaring their right to govern

Rwanda which included The Hutu Ten Commandments calling for Hutu majority

rule.  The Hutu Manifesto demanded the end of Tutsi dominance and spread the

idea that Tutsis were not even Rwandans and only inhabited Rwanda in recent

memory. The Hutu saw the future of Rwanda as being Hutu- led and the Tutsi

saw it as maintaining Tutsi long tenured leadership and the belief by some, "that

the Hutu were by their very nature subservient" (Melvern 6).   According to

Melvern, "The United Nations also considered the problems in Rwanda a "racial

divide."  When the Hutu Manifesto was published, the UN sent a commission to

Rwanda and claimed there was little hope for the "reapproachment between the

races" and called upon the Belgians to emancipate the down-trodden Hutus

(Melvern 6).  In 1990 a magazine called the *Kangura* was established following

the Rwandan Patriotic Front attacked Rwanda (RPF) and in response to their

magazine *Kanguka* which meant "wake up".  In Kinyarwanda, the native

language of Rwanda, Kangura means "wake others up".



Photo © Corinne Dufka

**Figure 4 Rwandan orphans**

The magazine spread brutal hatred aimed at the Tutsi population and

introduced the Hutu Ten Commandments.  It continued to publish right up to the

start of the genocide.

Table 3.  Hutu Ten Commandments

1.     Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall be deemed a traitor:

-       Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman;

-       Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine;

-       Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée.

2.     Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified and conscientious in their role of woman, wife or mother. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!

3.     Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to their senses.

4.     Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsi are dishonest in their business dealings. They are only seeking their ethnic supremacy. "Time will tell." Shall be considered a traitor, any Hutu male:

-       who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis;

-       who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company;

-       who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi;

-       who grants business favors to Tutsis (granting of important licenses, bank loans, building plots, public tenders...) is a traitor.

5.     Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, military and security domain should, to a large extent, be entrusted to Hutus.

6.     In the education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be in the majority Hutu.

7.     The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That is the lesson we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier must marry a Tutsi woman.

8.     Hutus must cease having pity for the Tutsi.

9.     The Hutu male, wherever he may be, must be united, in solidarity and be concerned about the fate of their Hutu brothers;

-       The Hutu at home and abroad must constantly seek friends and allies for the Hutu Cause, beginning with our Bantu brothers;

-       They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda;

-       The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy.

10.  The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to Hutus at all levels. Every Hutu must propagate the present ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his Hutu brother for having read, disseminated and taught this ideology shall be deemed a traitor. (Thompson 279-281)

In 1959 thousands of people were killed when the Belgians began a power shift from Tutsi leadership to Hutu leadership.  The UN sent a fact finding mission to assess the situation and reported that racism abounded and bordered on "Nazism against the Tutsi minority" and the Rwandan government and the Belgians were to blame (Melvern 7).  In 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), composed of deported and fleeing Tutsis, attacked Rwanda from Uganda to end the totalitarianism under the rule of President Habyarimana.  The fear of this "internal" enemy gave the new Hutu government the method to round up suspected Tutsis "accomplices."  Prior to President Habyarimana's death, "Lists had already been prepared; educated Tutsis, prosperous Tutsis, and Tutsis who traveled abroad were among the first to be arrested" (Gourevitch 83).

 After the death of President Habyarimana in 1994 in a plane crash, any semblance of an organized government disappeared.  The radical Hutus began their planned and systematic annihilation of the moderate Hutus and anyone Tutsi.  The Hutu majority called upon all Hutus to eliminate the *inyenze* (cockroaches) along with a reward for participation as if were a contest (Bhavnani 656).  In the end 800,000 were slaughtered before the present uneasy peace.

# Chapter 2: Psychology of Genocide

**Perpetrators**

The common denominator in all genocides, and particularly the four being discussed, is the emergence of perpetrators. Their reasons may vary, but the end result is the same; they control events leading up to and including the formation and execution of genocide.  The answer lies in both the person and the situation.  A theoretical estimate of the percentage of authoritarians within a population is 15 to 20 percent (Baum 119). What kind of person becomes a perpetrator and why?  How does a leader of this perpetration wield so much control over a society that follows orders so obscene, they would take part in mass murder or a least help in the violence of genocide, whether by consent or by force.  There are many reasons attributed to one becoming a perpetrator. Social psychologist Ervin Staub suggests "to consider one's *orientation to authority* as a predisposition of ordinary people who become perpetrators" (Staub 75).

According to historian Michael Mann, a third of the Nazis had records of prewar extremist activity. These obedient servants had been nurtured in an environment of structure and a hierarchical society.  These dutiful perpetrators are historically accustomed to accepting orders and giving orders, depending on the status within the hierarchy.  Times of crisis, such as the death of moderate Rwandan President Habyarimana, can be the catalyst to push the predisposed perpetrators toward violence.  A crisis "can be very unsettling and disorienting for

individuals and may result in loss of group pride, an escalation of fear, frustration of needs and wants, confusion regarding personal identity and increase in prejudice" (Staub 1989 249).

The Turks dealing with loss of the Balkans created fear that another Christian group, much like the Balkan countries, would further destroy or erode the Turkish Empire. The Germans were dealing with the humiliation after World War I and the economic calamity it created. Khmer Rouge distain for foreign control of their country and the Rwandan Hutus perceived loss of power. These scenarios cause uncertainty, fear and stress. The upheaval creates a void of confidence in the current government and in leadership and a lack of pride in the disheartened population themselves and their culture. The void can and does become occupied by a leader who takes charge and rallies the people to a sense of national pride, which in turn brings the people together in a fervent nationalistic group. To accomplish this, a common enemy must be found, identified and labeled as a threat to the state and be found responsible for all of the problems besieging the country.

Daniel Goldhagen, an Associate of Harvard University's Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, produced three questions in his study of perpetrators during the Holocaust. Did the perpetrators of the Holocaust kill willingly? If so, what motivated them to kill and brutalize Jews? How was this motivation provoked? He began his study by evaluating three institutions of killing; work camps, police battalions and death marches. The actions of the

perpetrators chronicled deeds and highlighted their general voluntarism, enthusiasm, and cruelty in carrying out their assigned or self-appointed tasks.

The results of the study provided, indicate four perpetrator actions (Table 1) common among the perpetrators during the Holocaust (Goldhagen 376). Many of the German perpetrators methodically and enthusiastically carried out their orders to kill Jews, and in some cases took it upon themselves to kill Jews when they were not ordered to do so. "Each of the four types of action was an ordinary, typical, even a regularly occurring constituent feature of the perpetrators' treatment of Jews" (Goldhagen 376). In Table 4, the actions take into consideration whether a German acted by completing a mission or order and the actions taken was strictly on his or her own accord. Perpetrators carried out their orders blindly, with zeal, dedication and inventiveness. This study, particularly of police battalions, establishes the Germans' opportunities to extract themselves from killing operations rendering "following orders" a more complex psychological and motivational problem. The torture and suffering appears to be carried out by the captors for no other reason than pleasure. The immense suffering and torture in the work camps was ironic in that it was in direct conflict with the work camp's assigned purpose.

Table 4.  The perpetrator's actions

Ordered by Authority

|  | Yes | No |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Organized & "Structured" Cruelty | "Excesses" Such as Torture |
| No | Killing and Individual Killings | "Acts of Initiative" Such as Individually Initiated Killings |

Cruelty

The authoritarian reign of organized suffering was not only issued by the most senior officer; junior officers and non-commissioned officers organized their own men to torture Jews (Goldhagen 377).

**A Culture of Violence**

In a culture of violence there is usually a pattern of using aggression as a normal response to problem solving.  There also exists a belief of superiority and an aggressive nature toward a perceived threat.  Conversely, the major genocides of the twentieth century were all committed by or within states with a, "history of aggressive conflict and war. Cultures that glorify violence (e.g. military parades, heroic media) are at great risk for perpetuating many forms of violence" (Woolf 102).  A culture of violence arises in countries that use aggression as a

way to resolve differences or to eliminate a perceived threat with little consequence for their actions and the idea that their race, ethnicity or religion exhibits intolerance of diversity (Woolf 101).

The Turk's brutal wars of conquest and the ideology of authority over all non-Muslims by holding them in "infidel" status created an atmosphere of authority and paved the way for the Armenians to be slaughtered for no other reason than to eliminate those who were considered beneath them. You need to only look back at World War I for Germany's history of aggression and violence. Germany's perceived threat from the Jews gave the Germans all they needed to marginalize and then exterminates the Jews. This also holds true for Hutus with their record of indignation and lack of respect for the Tutsis dating back to their Belgian colonial period.

One thing appears to be a constant for the perpetrators and victims of the genocides in the twentieth century is the atmosphere of " aggression and violence that are so much a part of everyday life that they are often assumed to be the natural order of life" (Woolf 102). The United States' invasion of the sovereign state of Afghanistan, were a reaction to the attack on 9/11 on U.S. soil and the threat of more violence from Al Qaeda. The invasion of Iraq, without United Nations approval, was to eliminate a perceived threat of an attack from Iraq using weapons of mass destruction. The United States propensity for using violence to resolve conflict gives the international community's a view of the U. S. as a warrior nation. Germany, Turkey, Cambodia and Rwanda have a long-standing history of aggression and lack of cohesive diversity. Genocides of the

twentieth century have "a culture of cruelty buttressed by professional socialization, binding factors of the group, and the merger of role and person envelops perpetrators in a social context that encourages and rewards extraordinary evil" (Woolf 102).

**Authoritarian Personality**

While authority is necessary in a group society, too much obedience lends itself to blind loyalty, making an individual less apt to oppose those in higher authority and carry out their murder assignments. German Philosopher Theodor Adorno, working at the Frankfurt School of critical theory, developed what is called *The Authoritarian Personality*. His work at the Frankfurt school shows a connection between "those who disliked Jews tended to dislike other ethnic minority, racial and religious groups such as well (Mormon, Hispanics, African-Americans gays)" (Baum 118). Along with his colleagues, Adorno found a trend of prejudicial attitudes. They determined prejudiced people were, "children of dominating fathers and punitive mothers who engaged in unusually harsh child-rearing practices" (Waller 77).

To establish obedience, parents would use parental love as a device to create obedience by giving affection as a reward for good behavior. This dependency on the parents creates fear and as they grow older become more submissive to those with power (Waller 78). The results of Adorno and his colleague's study, was the identification of nine factors leading to an authoritarian personality resulting from a test called the Fascism or F-scale (Table 6). The F-

scale shows individuals who exhibit signs of a strong obedience toward authority and aggressive toward others held similar traits (Baum 118).

Adorno's first test subjects were selected from the student population at the University of California for specific reasons (Table 5). First, he was convinced that college students had an opinion and that all students understood the questions and the same responses had uniform implications.  He also chose them because, "college students form one group that is relatively quite homogeneous with respect to factors that might be expected to influence ideology" (Adorno 18).  Non-college subjects were selected who best represented a wide variation of the adult American.  The goal was to, "examine people who possessed in different degrees as many as possible of the sociological variables presumed to be relevant to the study-political, religious, occupational, income, and social group memberships" (Adorno 20).

Some groups were selected, such as veterans, service clubs, women's clubs, because of their struggles centering on societal discrimination.  Other groups were chosen for intensive study because, "they presented extreme manifestations of the personality variables deemed most crucial for the potentially antidemocratic individual' e.g., prison inmates, psychiatric patients" (Adorno 22).  Most of the subjects for the test came from the middle class. One group that was specifically excluded was ones with a majority of minorities.  It was not because, "the ideological trends in minority groups were considered not important; it was rather that their investigation involved special problems which lay outside the scope of the present" (Adorno 23).

Table 5.  Groups from Whom Questionnaires were collected

|  | # of Cases |
|---|---|
| *Form 78* (January to May, 1945) | |
| University of California | |
| Public Speaking Class Women | 140 |
| Public Speaking Class Men | 52 |
| Extension Psychology Class (adult women) | 40 |
| Professional Women (Public school teachers, social workers (SF area) | 63 |
| Total | 295 |
| | |
| *Form 60* (Summer, 1945) | |
| University of Oregon | |
| Student Women | 47 |
| University of California and Oregon Student Women | 54 |
| University of Oregon and California Student Men | 57 |
| Oregon Service club Men (Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary) | 68 |
| Oregon Service Club Men * | 60 |
| Total | 287 |
| | |
| A.  *Forms 45 and 40* November, 1945, to June, 1946) | |
| University of California Extension Testing Class (adult women) | 59 |
| Psychiatric Clinic Patients (men and women) ( Langley Porter Clinic          of the University of California) | 121 |
| San Quentin State Prison Inmates (men) | 110 |
| Total | 243 |
| | |
| B.  Both *Forms 45 and 40* | |
| Alameda School for Merchant marine Officers (men) | 343 |
| U.S. Employment Service Veterans (men) | 106 |
| Total | 449 |
| | |
| D.  *Form 40 Working-Class Women:* | |
| California Labor School | 19 |
| United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.) | 8 |
| Office Workers | 11 |
| Longshoremen & Warehousemen (I.L.W:U.) (new members) | 10 |
| Federal Housing Project Workers | 5 |
| Total | 53 |
| | |
| Working-Class Men: | |
| California Labor School | |
| United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.) | 12 |

Of the fourteen groups taking Form 40-65, the San Quentin Inmates obtained the highest mean score. This mean is significantly different form that of the next highest scoring group, the Working Class Men. Between the San Quentin group and the lowest scoring group of men the difference is very marked. In view of all that has been written concerning the close affinity of criminality and fascism, these results should not be surprising. The mean F score shows very little distinction between Working-class Men and Service Club Men. This "will come as a surprise only to those who have become accustomed to explaining all important differences in social attitudes on the basis of socioeconomic group membership, and who look to the working man as the main carrier of liberal ideas" (Adorno 268).

Adorno has reason to believe that the authoritarian structures with which we are concerned would be any less well developed in the working class than in other segments of the populations. For that matter the extremely high scoring San Quentin Inmates are a very large segment of the working class, and their outlook is depended upon their background as well as the reason they are in prison. The , "differences among the present groups of men depend more upon the factor of contact with liberal organizations and liberal thought than upon socioeconomic group membership" (Adorno 268).

Table 6.  Fascism or F-scale

| Conventionalism | Rigid adherences to conventional values |
|---|---|
| Submission | Uncritical attitude towards their own group's idealized moral authority |
| Aggression | Punishment for those who violate convention |
| Anti-Intraception | Intolerance of tender-mindedness |
| Superstition & Stereotypy | Rigid categories |
| Power and Toughness | Preoccupation with power and dominance, strength/weakness |
| Destruction and Cynicism | General hostility |
| Projectivity | Placing their sexual and aggressive impulses onto others |
| Sex | Preoccupation with sexuality and morals of others |

In 1981 Canadian Psychologist Bob Altemeyer developed a more accurate measurement to define authoritarianism.  He called this measurement Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale.  Using individuals scoring high on the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale he found many common attributes. The SDO person is usually the one that is the authoritarian leader, while the RWA is the follower of the SDO.  Altemeyer's results show that only three elements are truly common in the RWA's, conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression.  The study also revealed those who score high in these areas are the most discriminatory people in society (Altemeyer 1).

Right Wing Authoritarians seem to combine the worst elements of each kind of personality, being power-hungry, manipulative, lacking morals and lack of belief in equality.  They are usually very religious, ethnocentric and dogmatic, as right-wing authoritarians tend to be.  Right-wing authoritarians were highly likely to be prejudiced.  These "people are relatively submissive to those they consider

the established authorities, aggressive when they believe that authorities

sanction the aggression (Passini 52).  Social dominators intend to proceed with

relatively little moral restraint" (Altemeyer 4).

**Conventionalism**

Steven Baum, a noted Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the

University of New Mexico, attributes social conformity as a very significant

element of authoritarianism. For an authoritarian leader like Adolf Hitler, who did

not have an internal mechanism to differentiate right from wrong, social

conformity would be paramount for him to have others follow is leadership, as a

way to relieve undue anxiety.   Steve Baum writes, "Identity and feeling and

needs must be laid out and described in black-and-white terms.  Anything other

than traditional conventional and cognitively simple thinking creates even more

anxiety in a person with the most limited coping skills" (Baum 124-125).  To

remove this anxiety, "fascist thinking creates a certainty and hence a sense of

safety, security and pleasure in having all loose ends tied down, slowly but surely

its relentless quest for power and certainty destroys everything that stands in its

way and eventually its own life as well" (Charny 4).  In examining the

psychological makeup "of White supremacists like the Ku Klux Klan, many were

found to be fearful not of Blacks and Jews, but of the unknown" (Baum 124-125).

**Submission to Authority**

Perpetrators, who submit to authority, do so with passion and reverence.

They have a pattern of showing tendencies toward fundamental religious ideals

conservative in nature, and lend themselves to support tradition. This doesn't mean all perpetrators have to be are fundamentalist. The extreme sense of submission to a father-like figure may have evolved from living in an autocratic family where punishment was extreme and abusive. "Authority within the family generally translates to paternalistic family cultures. And such authority translates from cultural group to the culture at large" (Baum 126).

When religion "stops people from thinking about the larger questions, when it invokes infallibility and loyalty and avoids criticism, when it criticizes the followers for not believing enough, when it ask for full submission-then the cult is placed into religious culture and abuse occurs" (Baum 126). In some cases, religion has narrowed down choices for the follower to either right or wrong. This type of thinking in conjunction with selective information is a way to keep the culture closed-minded. In most groups, "ethnocentrism, xenophobia and a proclivity toward social dominance translate to fear and loathing of outsiders" (Baum 128). Before the genocide in Armenia started, Islamic fundamentalist separated the Christians from the Muslim population by classing them as "infidels" thus developing a fundamentalist closed minded society. The name, "Islam means *submission to Allah*. Submission to God and subjugation of nonbelievers are important components of that religion. One must submit and not question the religious law and practices which vary from Muslim nation to Muslim nation" (Baum 129).

**Obedience**

Obedience is required in a society to maintain order. When the obedience becomes blinded and is directed to a prejudiced authority, bad things can happen. In the 1960's Stanley Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University, conducted experiments to determine why individuals were obedient to a higher authority even though the orders they gave were counter to their moral values. While volunteering as a teacher they were given orders from the experimenter using remote feedback to administer shocks progressively for wrong answers to a learner (actor) who was located behind a wall. Using 40 volunteers, 26 followed the experimenter's orders and reached the maximum setting on the "shock" generator three times before the experimenter halted the test. Milgram was trying to find out if people would defy authority when the act of obedience was contrary to the teacher's moral belief. What he found after the experiment was a number of the volunteers appeared to remain calm while others showed signs of relief or regret, but nearly all complied (Milgram 33). While the results of the test noted the volunteers experienced stress "despite the fact that many protest to the experimenter, a substantial proportion continued to the last shock on the generator" (Milgram 5).

Again, using 40 subjects, Milgram altered the conditions of the experiment to bring the victim physically closer to the volunteer. He varied the experiment (2) only this time he used Voice-Feedback so the victim's vocal responses to the shocks could be heard by the volunteer. In experiment 3, he used Proximity conditions, placing the victim in the room with the volunteer. In experiment 4,

using Touch Proximity, the victim would still be in the room with the volunteer but they would only be shocked when the victim's hand rested on a shock plate. At 150 volts the victim refused to place their hand on the plate and the volunteer was directed to hold their hand down.  On a scale of 1 to 30, 30 being the most severe shock, Milgram found the following to be true:

Table 7.  Maximum Shocks Administered in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4

| Shock level | Experiment  1 | Experiment 2 | Experiment 3 | Experiment 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean maximum shock level | 27.0 | 24.53 | 20.80 | 17.88 |
| Percentage obedient subjects | 65% | 62.5% | 40.0% | 30.0% |

Looking at these results, the more removed from a subject the more likely the volunteer would follow the orders of the experimenters.  As the volunteer moves closer in proximity to the victim, obedience seems to wane.  The surprising element of these experiments is when the conditions require very close proximity, in the case of experiment 4, obedience drops significantly more than then did in experiments in experiments 1 and 2.  The most surprising and disappointing aspect is when the volunteer reached experiment 4, requiring a physical requirement to shock the victim, 30% continued to shock their victim, albeit at a lower shock level (Milgram 54).

Milgram altered the conditions by moving the experiment from the Yale lab to an austere location off campus to see if the new environment would reduce the acceptance level of obedience.  In this experiment (5) he used the Voice-

Feedback method like in experiment 2 with one difference (Milgram 55). He

would have the victim say,

> In the preliminary interview in front of the volunteer that he had,
> "When I was at the V.A. Westhaven Clinic Hospital, a few years
> ago, they detected a slight heart condition. Nothing serious, but are
> these shocks dangerous? The experimenter replies in a confident,
> somewhat dismissive tone that although the shocks may be painful,
> they cause no permanent tissue damage, then proceeds with the
> experimental routines. (Milgram 56)

These new guidelines would persist through experiments 5 through 11. In

experiment 6 he changed the type of people, taking in to consideration,

personality. Not using an experimenter who was a, "somewhat dry, hard,

technical-looking man. The victim in contrast was soft, avuncular, and

innocuous" (Milgram 58). In the next group of experiments he inverted the

personalities of the victim and experimenter. In experiment 7, the volunteer

would play the role more aligned with the experimenter.

Table 8. Maximum Shocks Administered in Experiments 5-11

| Verbal Designation & voltage level | Experiment 5 | Experiment 6 | Experiment 7 | Experiment 8 | Experiment 9 | Experiment 10 | Experiment 11 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean max shock level | 24.55 | 22.20 | 18.15 | 24.73 | 21.40 | 20.95 | 5.50 |
| Percentage obedient subjects | 65.0% | 50.0% | 20.5% | 65.0% | 40.0% | 47.5% | 2.5% |

The volunteers seemed to be more concerned about how they were doing in the eyes of the experimenter, making them more insensitive to the victim and, "lead us to believe that alterations in the relationship between subject and experimenter would have important consequences for obedience" (Milgram 59). An added twist to experiment 7 required the experimenter to leave the room and give his orders by telephone. The level of obedience was greatly reduced when the experimenter was located out of the area. He also noted that when the experimenter was not present, the volunteer would not increase the shock level as instructed. When the experimenter returned the volunteer would in most cases resume being obedient to the experimenters orders. Adherence to a, "destructive a command was in some degree dependent on the proximal relations between authority and subject, and any theory of obedience must take into account of this fact" (Milgram 62).

Unlike the previous experiments, experiment 8 consisted of 40 females. Women are considered less aggressive but more obedient; on previous test of obedience. The level of obedience shows women are no different than men in the experiment, with the exception of their level of struggle in shocking the victim. In experiment 9 the victim put a caveat on his contract to perform the experiment. His condition is that due to having a heart condition, the experiment will be halted upon his request. The experimenter begrudgingly agreed. When the experiment was conducted and the victim said to stop the majority brought up the contract condition, but 40% continued on with the shocks based on the experimenter's orders. Even with the contract condition of stopping when the victim said he

wanted to halt the experiment, and knowing that if he continued, the teacher,

they continued. "This is to be compared with the 20 subjects who continued to

obey in the relevant control, condition 6. There is some increment in

disobedience, but it could easily represent a chance variation" (Milgram 66).

To evaluate other variations, Milgram used Institutional Context in

evaluating his volunteers. Using the same parameters as the previous

experiments, Milgram moved the experiment to Bridgeport, a blue collar oriented

city, and advertised without using Yale as the source. The experiment was

conducted in an ascetic office building with minimal comforts. During the

interview process credibility of the company was a concern and the reasons for

the experiment. The experiment without the highly respected name of Yale

showed a slightly lower tension than those conducted at Yale (Milgram 68).

Experiment 10 gave the volunteer the authority to make the selection of

shock administered, on the assumption that who gives the command is

irrelevant. They were told they were allowed to use any level they desire,

including combinations of levels including the maximum level. Of the volunteers,

"Three subjects limited their shocks to the very lowest on the board, 28 went no

higher than the first indication of discomfort, and 38 did not go beyond the point

where the victim vehemently protested" (Milgram 72**).** So people are most likely

to obey if the orders are given "within some sort of institutional structure"

(Milgram 71) and are less likely to obey if they are the ones controlling the

situation and given the ability to choose punishment.

Based on the conclusions of the experiments, why people act to orders when alone indicates something about human nature. Why men shock at the highest level when directed to do so, "needs to be explained by the transformation of behavior that comes about through obedience to orders" (Milgram 72). At Nuremburg Rudolf Hess, Auschwitz camp commander, testified, "Adolf Eichmann "was not obsessed with the extermination of the Jew… but he was obsessed with 'orders" (Weinert 186). Though Milgram's experimenters gave the orders, the actual physical perpetrators are the volunteers giving the shock. Much like the average Hutu killing Tutsis, the Khmer Rouge soldiers slaughtering their own people, Muslims in Turkey eliminating Christians, the perpetrator doing the killing was more likely to kill due to obedience to orders. The axiom "I was just following orders" cannot release the individual from being the instrument from which the orders from the authorities' orders are carried but Milgram's experiments at least show us how it can occur.

> If the killers in Cambodia and Rwanda and Uganda emerged suddenly, as it were, like a massive tsunami that changes the face of the civilization it strikes, they just as suddenly dispersed, blending back into the societies from which they sprung. They, as doers of the nasty deeds, are the silent killers, the ones who truly are worse than Hitler-for they did not plan, did no envision, did not administer, did not question; they simply did with impunity. (Weinert 187)

This same principle could be applied to any member of the United States military. United States Federal law requires anyone who enlists or re-enlists into military service to take an enlistment oath. The oath of enlistment must be presided over by a commissioned officer.

Oath of Enlistment

"I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God." (Title 10, US Code 502- sec 502)

Military training regiments' mission is to teach soldiers how to respond to orders automatically with little or no hesitation. Criminal liability for obedience to orders is exempted from international law or by a country's military code unless the order is "manifestly illegal." Mark Osiel, Professor at The University of Iowa, College of Law writes, the law is "now generally understood to require that soldiers resolve all doubts about the legality of a superior's orders in favor of obedience. It therefore excuses compliance with an illegal order unless the illegality-as with flagrant atrocities-would be immediately obvious to anyone on its face" (Osiel 5).

Members of the United States Armed Services fall under the governance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ is criminal law applicable to all military members worldwide. Obedience to orders from a superior is tantamount to good order and discipline in the U.S. military. Failure to obey orders can carry severe penalties up to and including death if the failure to follow orders transpires during a time of war. The regulations in the UCMJ governing obedience to orders are;

UCMJ-SEC 892. ART. 92. FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER OR REGULATION

Any person subject to this chapter who--

(1) Violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;

(2) Having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by any member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or is derelict in the performance of his duties

UCMJ-SEC 893. ART. 93. CRUELTY AND MALTREATMENT

Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

If a soldier is given an order and fails to carry it out, Article 92 would apply. If he carries out an order later determined to be "manifestly illegal", then Article 93 would apply. This places a soldier in a combat situation, is ordered to do something while under duress, with degradation of their cognitive skills, the responsibility of determining if the order is legal. Military personnel are bound by law to follow the orders of their superiors and defend 'against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The Turks found the Armenians, the Germans the Jews, the Khmer Rouge the "new people" and the Hutus the Tutsis as their domestic enemies.

**Ethnocentrism**

The technical name for ethnocentrism "is a view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Each group, "nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders" (Waller 154). Children as young as six or seven already have identified a strong penchant for their own ethnic group. Experimenters," have noted the concept of "us and them" carry positive emotional significance that is activated automatically

and unconsciously" (Rutherford 191). When identified with a group people have an easier time exaggerating difference between the group they belong to and other "different groups" (Waller 155). Ethnocentrism is the adaptation universal adaptation and the second is xenophobia.

**Xenophobia**

Ethnocentrism changes into xenophobia, which is the hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers or of their politics or culture. This fear leads to people of like attitudes to form groups for protection, which in turn, exacerbates the phobia. It can even be said that in forming bonds we deepen fissures. Defining, "what the in-group is also requires defining what it is not. We are what we are because they are not what we are (Waller 155). On a much larger societal level, governments, propaganda and militaries can easily summon and heighten our capacities for ethnocentrism and xenophobia.

At the extreme, "these capacities may even translate into a genocidal imperative as they are used to forge in-group solidarity and undermine the normal inhibitions against killing out-group strangers" (Waller 156). Matt Ridley "argues that humans have evolved natures with a host of social instincts. On the positive side, these social instincts equip us "with predispositions to learn how to cooperate, to discriminate the trustworthy from the treacherous" (Ridley 155). The negative is that the social predispositions can cause ethnocentric distrust and can be the basis for an atmosphere of association with one's own group and hostility toward other groups.

Anthropologist Michael Ghiglieri Writes: "xenophobia and ethnocentrism are not just essential ingredients to war. Because they instinctively tell men precisely whom to bond with, versus whom to fight against, they are the most dangerously manipulative facets of war psychology that promote genocide. Indeed, genocide itself has become a potent force in human evolution" (Ghiglieri 211).

To sum it up we have an instinctive propensity to reach out to what we are acquainted with and view those that are not the same as dangerous, and in all probability to be avoided. "More than two hundred social psychological experiments have confirmed the intimate connection between familiarity and fondness" (Waller 156). This general inclination is the basis for the behavioral expressions of ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Ethnic clashes "have to some degree become a basic feature in many modern societies. Behind any conflict, you are sure to find racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia or a related intolerance" (Waller 156*).*

**Desire for Social Dominance**

One of the most powerful motivating forces in animals is the desire for social dominance. This desire, leading to differences in rank and status, can be defined as the set of sustained aggressive-submissive relations among a group of animals. These relations form a hierarchical structure, commonly called dominance. Other times, however, our evolved desire for social dominance means that we have an inclination to respond to certain kinds of situations aggressively, even violently, to get our way. Violence works as a means of

getting some contested resource by increasing the cost of that resource to another individual. Moreover, once an organism gets past initial inhibitions against aggressive and violent behavior, such behavior rapidly escalates and increases over time and seems, in part, to become self-reinforcing.

In short, aggression and violence often result from our desire for social dominance (Waller 158). This desire for social dominance is, "Perhaps driven by primal forces of herd protection, all groups are constitutionally ethnocentric, xenophobic, and prone to social dominance. No matter what the size or shape of the group, all group members remain perpetually threatened and stand vigilant pending attacks from outsiders" (Baum 38).

As long as people feed into their social group identity, as long as they believe they represent their group in the world, as long as they remain unable to distinguish between personal and social identities then ethnocentrism and xenophobia continues. "Little did I know, "says former Nazi Bruno Manz, "that collective pride was a narcotic for the mentally homeless" (Baum 222). Michael Ignatieff, analyzing the Serbian conflict, states "When people think of themselves as patriots' first, individuals second, they have embarked on a path of ethical abdication" (Baum 222).

**De-individuation**

De-individualism is the loss of a person's sense of individuality and refers to a, "state of relative anonymity in which a person cannot be identified as a particular individual, but only as a group member" (Waller 216). The concept includes a loss of individual identify with less emphasis on individual norms and

replaced by social norms associated with a definite group norm. These are, "conditions that confer anonymity and increase the likelihood of extraordinary evil as people partially lose awareness of themselves as individuals and cease to evaluate their own actions thoughtfully" (Waller 216). When having to face hardship alone, some find security and sympathy from organization like church, addiction support groups and to dangerous hate groups. Group dynamics can exacerbate an individual's ideas whether they are positive or negative (Waller 218). In groups, "people do many things they would never do alone, for instance decision - making goes awry as social forces take over logic, " group think"" and confirmation bias, and create errors such as those that occurred in the Watergate scandal" (Baum 38).

Robert I. Watson Jr., a Harvard anthropologist, theorized that groups that changed their appearance before going to war by wearing mask, shaving their heads or painting their face would be more aggressive against their victims- more likely to kill, torture, or mutilate them- than would groups that did not change their appearance (Waller 217). The results of his research clearly reveal an important connection between the process of de-individuation and aggression in war. Of those cultures that were reported to go through de-individuating process before entering into battle, 80 percent were coded as extremely aggressive in warfare. In a similar manner social psychologist, Brian Mullen, content-analyzed newspaper accounts of sixty lynching's committed in the United States between 1899 and 1946 and found there was greater cruelty and ferocity in killing their victims when they were in a mob (Waller 217).

De-individuation is especially relevant to incidents of mass killing and genocide where the perpetrators are members of a military or paramilitary organization; all clad in like uniforms and appear less identifiable. De-individuation does not require a person to belong to an organization to be a factor in the act of committing atrocities. Hiding in a crowd, "disguised or masked, or covered by darkness can confer de-individuation even on those who are not state functionaries acting under orders" (Waller 217). History shows de-individuation does not have to be a significant reason for the commission of an atrocity. "In Bosnia and Rwanda, for instance, many of the atrocities were inflicted on neighbors by other neighbors, and even by one's own close relatives" (Waller 217).

As a social animal, people generally want to be liked and to fit in with others in a group. Military units teach teamwork, bonding and reliance on one another so when in a combat situation each person in the unit can rely on the other to have their back. Military organization espouses unit cohesion. "Bonds soldiers formed with one another in military and paramilitary organizations are often stronger than the bonds they will form with anyone else at any other point in their lifetimes. Among people who are bonded together so intensely, there is a powerful dynamic of conformity to peer pressure" (Waller 218). Christopher Browning, in his book, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* wrote the majority of men in Police Battalion 101 carried out their orders to kill Jews, regardless of their feelings, trepidation or repugnance. The men knew that if they did not complete their task, the others in the unit could

perceive them as not being totally committed to the unit, thus alienating them from their support group.  Whether a solder wanted to kill or not, someone had to complete the mission and carry out the executions, further causing resentment toward the non-conforming individual.  Browning writes, " Those who did not shoot, risked isolation, rejection, an ostracism a very uncomfortable prospect within the framework of a tight—knit unit stationed abroad among a hostile population, so that the individual had virtually nowhere else to turn for support and social contact" (Waller 218-219).

**Bystanders**

A bystander is generally one who is present but refrains from involvement.   The percentage of bystanders within a population may be between 50 and 65 percent.  They are primarily concerned for safety and abide by the laws of their nation, attend houses of worship and protect their families. Because they are the largest group in a population, they have the most potential to make a difference and do well:

> Bystanders often respond to events on the basis of a history of relationships they have had with the parties involved.  They, refrain from assessing and making decisions on the basis of actual events, moral principles and human suffering.   They either do not exercise prudence or good judgment, which the ancient Greeks regarded an essential element of morality. (Staub 185)

In genocide, bystanders can be intimidated easily and switch from one side to another while remaining unattached.  While genocide is going on around them, bystanders continue to maintain a level of routine to create a sense of normalcy.  In any culture the majority of people will go along with the group.

They will think, "If everyone else does it, it must be okay." Nobody likes to go against the grain and be an outsider or concerned by the threat of what they would do to you or your family (Baum 161). Some bystander nations became rescuer nations when groups, such as the Jews, were exported to them by individual rescuers to be used as safety zones. During the Armenian genocide, the US and Europe became external bystanders by refusing to pressure Turkey to cease the murdering of the Armenians.

In Rwanda, the French interventions in 1990 were supposed to prevent more deaths. In actuality, they transformed from a rescuer nation to a bystander nation, if not a perpetrator, by continuing to help the Hutu government militarily knowing the Hutus were slaughtering the Tutsis. Bystanders often respond to events on the basis of a history of relationships. The friendship between President Mitterrand of France and the President Habyarimana of Rwanda could have possibly clouded the judgment of France's decision to pick sides. As for responses from other international communities, the US and the UN resisted calling the violence genocide so the genocide convention would not be convened and generate a push for a response to the calamity unfolding.

To remain a bystander nation, the US went as far as to resist and slowed down a vote in the Security Council on sending back peacekeepers to Rwanda, even though US troops were not required. The US refused to provide equipment, but insisted on leasing it to the UN. The US and the UN haggled over the amount to be paid for the equipment while every day many thousands of people were killed (Staub 186). Traits of a bystander include conformity, passive or active in

nature, and lack the ability to think of others as individuals rather than group members. With a change in the social situation, "bystanders can easily become perpetrators, particularly if it increases their standing in the group or strengthens social bonds" (DeZalia 356).

**Rescuers**

According Baum, rescuers usually make up between ten and twenty percent of the population. To discern between helping and rescuing you must know the intent of the rescuer. Some perpetrators helped, but they do not rescue because their intention is not to save the victim, but for them to benefit from the gesture. "In terms of our divisions, the motivations follow accordingly. While perpetrators are concerned with "what's in it for me?" or "What would those in authority say? Bystanders are concerned with "what would the neighbors say"? By contrast, rescuers can be defined by an internal motivation expressed what I say" (Baum 182).

In the Holocaust the exact number of altruistic rescuers is not really known. Yad Vashem, the Israeli organization that honors those who risked their lives for saving Jews, gives estimates which are considered very low (20,000 acknowledged rescuers out of a general European population of 750 million). Many scholars believe the number is much higher (Baum 182). Rescuer traits include individualism, individuality and autonomy. They also have a more humanistic personality (DeZalia 356).

Rescuer nations amount to a small number. Denmark and Bulgaria made rescue legendary. Nation such as Italy and Hungary prior to 1943 and 1944

refused to deport Jews to Germany. Bulgaria's entire 50,000 member Jewish

community was spared the Holocaust. Theirs was the only Jewish community to

survive intact in Nazi Europe (Baum 205).

Holland's Antirevolutionary Church and Germanys Confessing Church,

Italy's Assisi villages and France's Le Mazet, Fay-sur-Lignon, Tence,

Chabannes, La Suchere, Montbuzat, and the Protestant enclave of Le chanbon-

surLignon. These religious institutions were responsible for saving many Jewish

lives.

> At Le Chambon the entire village became a haven for Jews fleeing
> from the Nazis and their French collaborators. The Chambonnais
> hid Jews in their homes, sometimes as long as four years, provided
> them with forged ID and ration cards and helped them to safety in
> Switzerland. With their history of Huguenot persecution as a
> religious minority in Catholic France, empathy for Jews as the
> people of the Old Testament, and the powerful leadership and
> example of their pastor and his wife, they helped to save lives.
> (Baum 205)

Consistent with all other rescuers, the Chambonnais rejected any labeling

of their behavior as heroic. They said: "Things had to be done and we

happened to be there to do them. It was the most natural thing in the world to

help these people" (Baum 205). Thus, the no-victims in genocide are composed

of a complex mix of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers driven by personality

and circumstance.

# Chapter 3:  21<sup>st</sup> Century Potential Genocides

The world has experienced its first genocide in the first three years of the

twentieth first century.  The Darfur region in Sudan experienced an enormous

loss of life when more than 70,000 civilians were killed beginning in February of

2003.  The Arab militias attacked and killed civilians from the black African tribes

located in Darfur.  The biggest issue facing the international community at the

time was whether or not to classify it as genocide.  In July 2004, "the United

States Congress passed a resolution labeling Darfur genocide.  Then, in early

September, Secretary of State Colin Powell also used the term, and President

George W. Bush followed suit in a speech to the United Nations" (Straus 123).

The United Nations Security Council sent 674 lightly armed African

Peacekeepers to the Darfur region with a population of six million people. The

genocide in Darfur is the beginning of a much larger pogrom to follow.  The

potential for genocides in the future extend to Chechnya, Sudan and Nigeria.

**Chechnya**

The history of hostilities between Russia and Chechnya goes back many

centuries. In 1944 Stalin accused the Chechens of working with the Germans

and deported many of them to Central Asia and Siberia as was their standard

policy of eliminating an enemy.  Russia would deport its inhabitants, and because

of a surplus of population, resettle the vacant area with ethnic Russians.  Stalin's

policy was reversed in 1956, and the Chechens began to return to their

homeland, causing violent disputes between the Russians who had resettled in

Chechnya and the returning Chechens.   In 1991, with the unraveling of the

Soviet Union, Chechnya declared independence from Russian domination, which

led to war from 1994 to 1996.  The new Chechen government was weak, and

many areas of Chechnya fell under the control of Islamic militants.  In 1999 the

Islamic extremist behind an uprising in neighboring Dagestan, provoked a

Russian invasion, igniting war (Fredholm 317).  The war in Chechnya has given

the Russians a stronger presence militarily in the Caucasus, as well as a political

point to rally Russian public opinion.  The popular support of "the war in

Chechnya has reached levels of over 60 percent  Moscow has used the war to

successfully tighten the level of security throughout the Federation, as well as to

strike against criminal activities through an increased level of law enforcement

activity" (Fredholm 318).

The first fighting began in what is now called the "battle for Grozny."

Russian military forces initiated an all-out attack on the city.  When this failed, the

Russians began an air assault that caused many civilian casualties.  The

bombing was so intense it "has been calculated that an average of over 4000

blasts were recorded per hour during the most intensive fighting.  This compared

to Sarajevo were the highest rate recorded was 800" (Cornell 88).  After Grozny

fell to the Russians the barbaric nature of the incursion began to surface.

Documented reports show systematic torture of prisoners in Russian "filtration

camps" and all men aged 15 to 60 were removed and sent to camps in Mozdok,

North Ossetia.  The village of Samashki in April of 1995 was bombed heavily and

300 Russian troops entered the village "shooting indiscriminately and throwing

grenades into basements; civilians were tortured and executed" (Cornell 90). The killings were unfolding while the world watched. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Helsinki Watch group documented the destruction and the gross human rights violations against the civilian population by Russian troops.

Reactions by the international community were quite reserved. Because Chechnya was not recognized as an independent country by most in the international community, the situation was looked at as a Russian internal matter. The only organization taking a stance against the Russian atrocities was the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It went so far as to "urge the Council of Europe to refuse Russian membership, and moreover appealed to the United States to freeze a $6.8 billion IMF loan to Russia, deploring the bleak reaction to the 'enormous' crimes committed by the Russian military" (Cornell 94). Stalin's use of deportation and Putin's use of the Russian military to remove or vanquish a segment of their non-Russian citizens equates to genocide. The Chechnya people have never accepted Russian domination since they were conquered in the nineteenth century and probably never will. The relative peace in Chechnya is fragile; only because of military garrisoning, can Russia maintain control of its Chechen citizens. The history between Russia and its renegade republic, and the brutality of its citizens leaves the question on what form of genocide the Russians employ next against the Chechens.

**Sudan**

Sudan has experienced civil war since 1956, when it gained its independence from British rule. Sudan is located in Northwest Africa, between Egypt and Uganda, with the Red Sea to the north. Sudan is the largest country in Africa. It is roughly the same size as the East Coast of the United States extending to the Mississippi River. The ethnic population of Sudan is Arab/Muslim north and black African/Christian and animist south. The official religion is Islam, indigenous beliefs, and southern Sudan is Christian. Even though they are in Africa, they identify themselves more as Arab and Muslim. They are more aligned with the Middle East than Africa, even though their culture and Islamic practices are a mix of African culture and belief systems. The civil war is pitting the North against the South, and as of late the conflict has been centered on the regions of Darfur. The official languages are Arabic and English, along with many tribal languages. The 30 million people located in the northern region are Arab speaking Muslims where most of the urban areas are located. The southern region has a population of around 8 million and a predominantly rural, subsistence economy.

Since 1955, the people of Sudan have experienced numerous wars and rebellion resulting in major destruction and economic despair. The conflict has severely affected the population of the South, resulting in over 2 million deaths and more than 4 million people displaced between 1983 and 2005 (Hirsch 2). The Southern Sudanese practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although Christian missionaries have converted some. The South also contains many

tribal groups and many more languages than are used in the north. The Dinka--
whose population is estimated at more than 1 million--is the largest of the many
black African tribes in Sudan.

In 1958 continuing into the 1980's, Sudan fell under the leadership
of many military rulers, most pursuing the path toward path of Arabization and
Islamicization including the southern regions of Sudan. In 1979, Colonel Gaafar
Muhammad Nimeiri gave partial autonomy to the southern Sudan, and with their
help he was able to stop two rebellion attempts by Darfur and Kordofan who
were looking for the same autonomy as southern Sudan. Nimeiri, in 1983
reversed his earlier ruling abolishing the Southern region's autonomy and made
Arabic the official language, replacing English. Nimeiri incorporated Islamic law
into the penal code including the non-Muslim in the north and the south (US
Department of State).

In July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the southern rebels agreed to
self-determination and the role of state and religion (Hirsh 3). At the same time,
another revolt began to take shape in the Darfur region. The war began with two
dissident Sudan liberation Movement/Army SLM/A and Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM). Both groups were fighting for the agricultural farmers "to
restructure the country into a New Sudan that would be free from any
discrimination due to race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender" (Deng 158). The
Sudanese Government supported local militias consisting of Black Arab herders
(Janjaweed) with weapons and support from the Sudan Armed Forces which

resulted in the deaths of over two hundred thousand and many millions displaced.

On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and an SLM/A faction signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  Soon after the peace agreements, violence increased from groups who were not part of the DPA.  The peace in Sudan is at best fragile. The fighting has been reduced, but the conditions remain the same. Darfur's SLM/A rebels continue to fight for autonomy as well as the southern regions that still are economically inferior to the northern regions.  The religious dispute between the Arab Muslim population and the southern regions, Christian population continues to divide the country on a more spiritual level.

**Federal Republic of Nigeria**

The history of Nigeria is steeped in tradition of British rule beginning in 1885.  In the nineteenth century, Britain expanded its trade into the Nigeria interior.  This expanded trade led to formation of the Royal Niger Company.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the Royal Niger Company fell under the control of the British Empire, and in 1914 the area was consolidated and renamed the "Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria."

Under British rule the territory was managed as two independent regions. The northern region whose leaders were given partial self-government rule and were able to, "maintain their "religion-based" structure under an indirect regulation arrangement with colonial authorities" (US State).  The southern region was required to have a more direct rule from the United Kingdom.  The southern regions progressed faster, educationally, socially, culturally and

politically. After World War II, Nigeria became more resentful of foreign domination resulting in Nigeria emerging from the war more nationalistic and demanded independence resulting in a British legislative constitution "moving Nigeria toward representative self-government" (US State).

Nigeria is a country of over 250 ethnic groups with many mixtures of languages, customs, and historical backgrounds. It is a country with the largest population in West Africa, but only about 25 percent live in urban areas. The "largest and most influential ethnic group in the northern region, covering over two-thirds of the country, is the Hausa-Fulani, most of whom are Muslim. Other major ethnic groups residing in the northern regions are the Nupe, Tiv, and Kanuri. The Yoruba people are predominant in the southwest" (US State). About half of the Yorubas are Christian and half Muslim. Of the Christian population, Catholicism is predominant among the Igbo, who represent the largest ethnic population in the southeast.

Nigeria's official language is English and due to the wide variety of different ethnic or tribal languages most use a second language of Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, and Kanuri depending on location within the country. Religious differences and location of each ethnic group, while bringing diversity to Nigeria, is also responsible for the power struggle and fractures the implementation of their nationalistic desires.

Nigeria claimed complete independence from the British in 1960. The country was divided into "three distinct regions, (northern, western, and eastern) under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary form of government" (US

State). Later in 1963, the Midwest region was created and Nigeria established itself as a new federal republic, forming a new constitution. Over the next forty years, Nigeria experienced many hostile and violent military and civilian coups. Whereas the leadership had its roots determined how the issues of ethnicity would be handled. After the first military takeover in 1966, the country was divided into twelve states. Each state wanted their doctrines to be honored and to become part of the constitution. This led to civil wars and the deaths of thousands.

With the discovery of oil in 1970, Nigeria became more industrial and less dependent on its agrarian history, leaving a large number of the population economically depressed. After many years of military rule, civilian leadership and a democratic government reemerged in May 1999 and began the arduous task of rebuilding a country crumbling around them. Even with strict authoritarian rule, many "incidents of ethno-religious and community conflicts, which derived from distorted use of oil revenue wealth, flaws in the 1999 constitution, and longstanding disputes over the distribution of land and other resources" (US State).

The ethno-religious violence is being carried forth into the twenty first century. In March of 2010, over 500 Christians, "mostly women and children near the city of Jos, long a center of tensions between Christians and Muslim were killed. The dead were Christians and members of an ethnic group that had been feuding with the Hausa-Fulani. The assailants were identified as Muslim herders who on , "early Sunday morning, the attackers set upon the villagers with

machetes, killing women and children in their homes and ensnaring the men who tried to flee in fishnets and animal traps, then massacring them, according to a Nigerian rights group whose investigators went to the area" (Nossiter 1).

Nigeria is infested with militias having one of two objectives. Some such as the (Duduwa Peoples Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Egbesu direct their attacks toward the government of Nigeria and any ethnic group loyal to the government of Nigeria. The other group's violence is directed at any ethnic group or community they consider their enemy. Nigeria's militia problems began in the 1990's, "when military rule became more repressive and intolerant on the one hand, and blatantly partisan and corrupt on the other. Under military rule, the state became and instrument for executing an ethnic agenda" (Ikelegbe 507). Political weakness and ethnic pluralism has created an environment in Nigeria ripe for genocide. Without external resources and a commitment from the Nigerian government to stop the policy of inclusion and exclusion in government to produce disadvantage groups, violence toward its civilians will only increase (Ikelegbe 493).

**United Nations Role**

The United Nations had little success since its inception, and under the current structure will have little effect in the twentieth first century. The bureaucracy in the United Nations is detrimental to the rapid reaction to a genocidal crisis. Under current guidelines, the UN Security Council determines if a new peacekeeping operation is needed and when and how to deploy new

peacekeeping troops.  Before any peacekeeping force is constructed, the United

Nations has developed eight steps that must be completed before a

peacekeeping force can be established (un.org).

 Step one is the initial consultation as, "conflict develops, worsens, or

approaches resolution; the UN is frequently involved in a number of consultations

to determine the best response by the international community. The UN will then

dispatch a technical field assessment mission "(United Nations).  The technical, "

assessment mission analyzes and assesses the overall security, political,

military, humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground, and its

implications for a possible operation" (United Nations).

Step two, As soon as security conditions permit, an assessment team is

dispatched. The assessment team mission is to, " analyzes and assesses the

overall security, political, military, humanitarian and human rights situation on the

ground, and its implications for a possible operation" (United Nations).  The

results are sent to the UN for review by the UN Secretary-General and the

Security Council.

Step three, if a peacekeeping requirement is needed; the Security Council

adopts a resolution.  The Security Council resolution, "sets out the operation's

mandate and size, and details the tasks it will be responsible for performing. The

budget and resources is then subject to General Assembly approval" (United

Nations).

Step four, appointment of senior officials-The Secretary-General normally

appoints a Head of Mission (usually a Special Representative) to direct the

peacekeeping operation. The Head of Mission reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters. The Secretary-General also appoints a peacekeeping operation's Force Commander and Police Commissioner, and senior civilian staff. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are then responsible for staffing the civilian components of a peacekeeping operation.

Step five is the planning and deployment phase. This involves, "the planning for the political, military, operational and support (i.e., logistics and administration) aspects of the peacekeeping operation. The planning phase usually involves the establishment of a Headquarters-based joint working group or integrated mission task force, with participation of all relevant UN departments, funds and programs" (United Nations).

Step six is the deployment of an operation proceeds then as quickly as possible, taking into account the security and political conditions on the ground. It often starts with an advance team to establish mission headquarters and leads to a gradual build-up to encompass all components and regions, as required by the mandate (United Nations).

Step seven, since the UN has no standing army or police force of its own, and Member States are asked to contribute military and police personnel required for each operation. Peacekeepers wear their countries' uniform and are identified as UN Peacekeepers only by a UN blue helmet or beret and a badge.

Step eight, the peacekeepers report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General and will then provide regular reports to the Security Council

on the implementation of the mission mandate. The Security Council reviews these reports and briefings, and renews and adjusts the mission mandate, as required, until the missions is completed or closed.

The Rwandan Genocide was carried out by the Hutu's in less than 100 days. The United Nations administrative nightmare rendered them impotent in their ability to react to the genocide. If the UN wants to prevent genocide in the twenty first century, genocide needs to be identified in a more efficient and timely manner.

To exacerbate the United Nations diminished capacity to assist, it is currently operating fourteen peacekeeping operations around the world with the assistance of over 114 countries participating. Since 1948 the UN peacekeeping units have been deployed to hot spots around the world.

Table 9. Current United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

| Location | Date | Uniformed Personnel | Civilian Personnel | Fatalities | Budget 7/2010-6/2011 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western Sahara | 1991 | 231 | 283 | 15 | $60,038,500 |
| Haiti | 2004 | 12,055 | 1,933 | 160 | $853,827,400 |
| Darfur | 2004 | 23,055 | 4,334 | 81 | $1,808,127,500 |
| Syria | 1974 | 1,045 | 144 | 43 | $47,806,900 |
| Cyprus | 1964 | 980 | 153 | 180 | $58,156,300 |
| Lebanon | 1978 | 11,766 | 996 | 291 | $518,710,200 |
| Kosovo | 1999 | 16 | 398 | 54 | $47,874,400 |
| Liberia | 2003 | 9,402 | 5,641 | 154 | $524,052,800 |
| Timor-Leste | 2006 | 1463 | 1,427 | 10 | $206,311,600 |
| India-Pakistan | 1949 | 44 | 72 | 11 | $16,146,000 |
| Middle East | 1948 | 152 | 215 | 50 | $60,704,800 |
| Democratic Republic of | 2010 | 19,136 | 4,332 | 10 | $1,369,000,000 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the Congo | | | | | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2004 | 9,062 | 1,383 | 72 | $485,078,200 |
| Sudan | 2005 | 10,456 | 4,278 | 59 | $1,008,026,300 |

An example of the long term commitments required when peacekeeping forces are committed; the Middle East Peacekeeping force has been assigned to their current operations for over 60 years. Though the contingent is small, they have incurred 152 UN personnel deaths.  The current operating budget for the UN Peacekeeping forces from July 2010 to Jun 2001 is $7.83 billion dollars (United Nations).  As tensions increase in the Middle East and Africa and the potential for long term assistance, more troops and money is not a practical solution.

# Conclusion

In conclusion, genocide will continue to exist and proliferate in the twenty first century.  Genocide, as evidenced by the previous century, cannot logically be eradicated or totally prevented.  This is not to say the international community should not continue to try or at least reduce the effects and the tremendous loss of life as a result of genocide.  The question then becomes why hasn't the international community been able to prevent, identify (in a timely manner) or intercede to stop the genocides of the twentieth and the beginning of the twentieth first century?  The problem lies in the international communities' inability to agree on what constitutes genocide and the appropriate reaction to the threat.

During the genocide in Rwanda few wanted to recognize the mass killings of Tutsis as genocide.  The year before the United States had the experience of losing peacekeeping forces in Somalia, resulting in Presidential Decision Directive 25, which limits the United States commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, with the exception of genocide.  Also, U.S. military forces remain under the control of the United States President limiting the command and control of any UN Peacekeeping force.  Other member nations have many restrictions or caveats as well.  If members of the United Nations can restrict the locations, control, responsibility, authority and training of the United Nations forces from their respective country, the UN forces will be inefficient and ineffective.

With little legal grounds to enforce international Law to combat genocide, the UN can only react after the fact. Progress has been made in bringing the high ranking perpetrators to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The numbers are small and unless arresting authority is expanded, many perpetrators will escape conviction. The United Nations should establish a commission of experts to refine the UN arsenal of sanctions. United States Presidential Directive 25 does not support any form of a military for the United Nations. The only option, besides sending in peacekeepers to an area of concern, is to implement trade sanctions against the country in question. The problem with sanctions is they currently do more harm to the people (victims) than the government. This coupled with genocidal organizations like Al Qaeda, where there are no borders thus eliminating sanctions as the obligatory punishment. The heart of global governance must be prevention in advance of destructive violence. The ICC is an important step in that direction. Unfortunately the ICC has already met strong resistance by great powers; some of the strongest and most vocal opponents are countries known for an intensive official Human Rights dialogue, such as the US and France.

The Holocaust has become the standard by which all genocides are measured. With the rise of Muslim extremism, state sanctioned genocide has now become religious based genocide and the traditional peacekeeping operations need to change with this new threat. The current method of evaluating genocides is after the fact studies first established with the documenting of the Holocaust (Savage).

The study of historical genocide has many limitations. It cannot predict, only offer explanations from hindsight for why genocide has occurred. It is accurate to say genocide has never been prevented in either the twentieth or the first part of the twenty first century, and the present capabilities do not render a positive outlook for prevention. Prevention indicates genocide can be stopped before it starts. In reality, genocide cannot be prevented until it is already underway. Prevention, beginning in the seventh stage (Extermination Stage) of Dr. Stanton's Eight Stages of Genocide is seven steps too late (Savage). The focus of stopping genocide will require expediency in decision making, rapid deployment of troops and full UN member support. The United Nations multilayered system from fact finding to implementation of troops has been too cumbersome due to politics and legal wrangling to be of any good.

If genocide is to be stopped, the United Nations must take the lead role and set a guideline on the lowest threshold of what constitutes genocide and act immediately. The General Assembly in consultation with the UN Secretary-General should be given the ultimate authority on deciding when and where genocide is occurring and the level of force they will require and authorize to use in stopping the genocide.

The time has come for the United Nations to have a supervised rapid deployment, self-contained force that can be to any location within a 48 hour period. These units need to be strategically located near designated hot spots and all member countries should be required to assign a military specialty unit whose sole training purpose is to support all UN directed mandates. The largest

issue for these units will be the logistical support needed to maintain their mission (Savage).

      The peacekeeping orders in Bosnia and Rwanda constituted nothing more than observing with little authority for the on-scene commander to intervene in the killing.  To send a lightly armed force, such as the Belgian contingent, to a situation like Rwanda, is a recipe for disaster.  The international community has a moral responsibility to protect the innocent.  With a paradigm shift away from talking about prevention and more a call to action the opportunities for genocide will diminish.

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