

## Assessing the Prevalence of Extreme Middle-Eastern Ideologies among Some New Immigrants to Canada

Wagdy Loza<sup>1</sup>, Stella Bhawanie<sup>2</sup>, David Nussbaum<sup>3,4</sup>, & Artur Maximenco<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Queen's University, Kingston, Canada

<sup>2</sup>Fielding Graduate University, Santa Barbara, United States of America

<sup>3</sup>University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

<sup>4</sup>Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences, Whitby, Canada

Correspondence: Wagdy Loza, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, K7M 6S6, Canada. Tel: 1-613-634-0227.  
E-mail: [wml1@sympatico.ca](mailto:wml1@sympatico.ca)

Received: May 16, 2013 Accepted: June 13, 2013 Available online: June 29, 2013

doi:10.11114/ijsss.v1i2.166

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v1i2.166>

### Abstract

The goal of this research was to investigate whether new immigrants from the extended Middle-Eastern countries differ from each other on issues related to extreme Middle-Eastern religious beliefs based on their religious identification. The Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ARTS; Loza, 2007a), a scale designed to assess extreme religious beliefs originating from the Middle-East, was administered to a sample of 91 participants who had recently immigrated to Canada from Pakistan. The sample was comprised of Muslims (the majority of the participants) and a small number of Christians from the same background. Due to the small number of the Christian participants, Christian responses from previous studies were included in the present comparisons. Results indicated significant differences between the religious groups and were consistent with previously obtained results. Current results also support the use of ARTS as a reliable and valid measure to help with risk assessment for beliefs supporting violence.

**Keywords:** assessing, radicalizations, extreme middle-eastern ideologies, immigrants to Canada

### 1. Introduction

Coverage of extremist political, social views and associated terrorism originating in the Middle-East has been a stable diet in the media for several years. Middle-Eastern terrorism rests upon many factors but the most potent, and we argue, paradoxically a neglected factor is the extreme belief ideologies that play a central role in radicalizing the population into believing these ideologies and in rare cases manifesting them in terrorist acts (see Loza, 2007b for a review of these factors and ideologies).

Middle-Eastern scholars have opined that the prevalence of religious thinking and ideologies in Middle-Eastern countries is paving the way toward more extremism and terrorism and is an essential stage toward building the terrorist mind (El-Bana, 2008; Yaseen, 2007a). In the same vein, it is reported that extreme religious ideologies play a central role in radicalizing young Muslims globally, recruiting and indoctrinating them into the terrorist ideology, and eventually asking them to commit terrorist acts (Ibrahim, 1980, 1988; Isam, 2006; Schwind, 2005). In fact, extreme belief ideologies are both associated with, and reliably precede violent acts perpetrated by Middle-Eastern terrorists (Pipes, 2008) and the idea that present day terrorism is the result of the prevalence of ideologies that look down upon others and consider them infidels (Shbekshy, 2004). As a result of these ideologies being widely taught, negative attitudes against non-Muslim culture are apparent in Muslim countries (Littman, 2005; Manji, 2003; Sayyed, 2005) and appear to be spreading into segments of Muslim populations that did not previously adhere to these extremist views.

There are concerns that the extreme Middle-Eastern religious ideologies are prevalent and growing among the Muslim communities in Europe (Bawer, 2006; Wicker, 2007; Yaseen, 2007b) and other western countries. Unfortunately, the prevalence of these ideologies may have contributed to the home grown terrorism in the western countries. Examples of these influences are the bombings in Madrid and London; the murder of Van

Gogh in the Netherlands; the many attempted attacks against EU countries since 2001; the many thwarted attempts in Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands; the 9/11 airplane crashes in New York; the 2009 killing of 13; and wounding of 32 USA army servicemen in Texas (Ibrahim, 2012; Lorenzo, 2007; Silke, 2008; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Wicker, 2007). Examples of the prevalence of the extreme ideologies among first or second generation Middle-Eastern emigrants are drawn from several sources. First, from the testimonies of the offenders, terrorists themselves during their interrogations, and court proceedings that are later published in police reports or news papers. Second, from surveys like that conducted in Great Britain. These surveys showed that the British Muslims reported their primary identity as being Muslims (rather than reporting their dominant identity as British); held more positive views toward jihad and martyrdom than their fellow citizens (Ansari et al., 2006); 13% of British Muslims believed that the persons who bombed the London subway system in July 2005 were Martyrs for Islam, and 49% believed that the U.S. military actions in Iraq were an attack against Islam (Wicker, 2007). Third, research results that indicated the prevalence of Middle-Eastern extremist ideologies among samples were from western countries (Loza, 2010a; Loza, 2010b; Loza, El-Fatah, Prinsloo, Hesslink, & Seidler, 2011).

It is important to investigate the prevalence of extreme Middle-Eastern belief ideologies among new immigrants from the Middle-Eastern countries because many of the immigrants to western countries come from the broader areas of the Middle-East. The goal of this study was to contribute to such investigation. It is important to be aware of the belief systems of the new immigrants to western countries from the Middle-East because the majority of terrorist acts that the world has witnessed in the last few years have been linked to extremist ideologies, beliefs, and attitudes that originated from the Middle-East.

To complete this research, we compared the responses of recently arrived immigrants from Pakistan to Canada on the Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ARTS; Loza, 2007). We compared the responses of Pakistani Muslim participants with those of their Christian fellow counterparts. Due to the small number of Christian participants in the current sample, we compared the responses of the Pakistani Muslim participants to responses from previous research of Christians, others belonging to non-Abrahamic religions (i.e., not Judaism, Christianity or Islam), and Atheists.

We hypothesized that participants of different faiths would differ in their responses on the ATRS, with participants of the Muslim faith scoring significantly higher on the ATRS than Atheists or participants of Other Religions. This hypothesis is based on the results of research of one of the paper's authors and the reported prevalence of extreme Middle-Eastern religious views in Canada and around the world (Loza, 2010a; Loza, 2010b; Loza et al., 2011; Littman, 2005; Manji, 2003; Sayyed, 2005).

## 2. Methods

### 2.1 Participants

Involved in this study were 91 participants, recently emigrated from Pakistan to Canada. Participants were residing in the Greater Toronto area (see Table 1 for a summary of demographic characteristics of participants.)

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of participants

Demographics	Pakistani Christians (n= 8)		Pakistani Muslims (n = 83)		Christians from other countries (n=401)		Other Religions and Atheists (n = 231)	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Age	45.38	4.07	37.99	8.48	35.75	12.29	35.63	12.51
	<u>Freq (%)</u>		<u>Freq (%)</u>		<u>Freq (%)</u>		<u>Freq (%)</u>	
<u>Sex</u>								
M	37.50		45.78		44.19		48.68	
F	62.50		54.22		55.81		51.32	
<u>Marital Status</u>								
Single	100.00		12.05		5.93		32.02	
Married/divorced			87.95		90.07		67.98	
<u>Race</u>								
Asian	100.00		100.00					
Cac, afr, asi, mix.	8.79		91.21		100.00		100.00	

Education

< Secondary	00.00	00.00	5.05	31.86
Secondary	00.00	15.66	10.86	12.83
College	50.00	74.70	40.91	26.11
Higher education	50.00	9.64	43.18	29.21

Occupation

Unemployed	00.00	00.00	13.20	44.98
Students	00.00	04.82	07.11	2.18
Non-professionals	50.00	86.75	55.07	35.37
Professionals	50.00	08.43	24.62	17.47

*2.2 Measures*

The Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ATRS; Loza, 2007; formally the Belief Diversity Scale, BDS; Loza, 2007) is a theoretically driven, empirically validated, self-report instrument, constructed to cover the areas in the literature that are commonly reported to be indicative of or related to religious extreme beliefs (Loza, 2007). The ATRS is a 33-item scale with six content subscales, a total scale score, and a validity scale. The first subscale, Attitudes towards Israel, reflects negative attitudes towards Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered to be one of the main sources of grievances that have been promoted and manipulated by extremists (Ameen, 1993; Mockaitis, 2007). The second subscale, Political views, measures the important political views that are advocated by Middle-Eastern extremists (e.g., opposing secular laws and governments, advocating for the implementation of the Sharia [Islamic] law; Ibrahim, 1988; Mockaitis, 2007). The third subscale, Attitudes towards women, assesses the individual's attitudes toward women. These current, extreme attitudes are considered repressive from a Western perspective (Kanany-Minesot, 1995). The fourth subscale, Attitudes towards Western culture, measures negative attitudes toward Western culture. Middle-Eastern extremists have been vocal in their rejection of Western culture (Mazarr, 2007; Mockaitis, 2007; Tanveer, 2005), claiming that Western civilization is corrupt (McCauley, 2002) and that the West is trying to undermine their religion (Orbach, 2001). Extremists generally emphasize the prevalent negative attitude in the Muslim countries toward non-Muslim culture (Littman, 2005; Manji, 2003; Mockaitis, 2007; Sayyed, 2005). The fifth subscale, Religiosity, assesses the respondent's commitment to his or her religion. Extremists rely on religion to advocate for their cause and to recruit new pools of extremists (Hafez, 2003; Ibrahim, 1988; Isam, 2006; Lotfi et al., 1993; Mazarr, 2007; Mockaitis, 2007; Sageman, 2004; Schwind, 2005). The sixth subscale, Condoning fighting, measures views that condone fighting and promote acts of violence as a means for the revival of religion, with the goal of destroying non-believers and achieving one world under the Islamic religion (Sageman, 2004; Schwind, 2005). A final, seventh subscale, is a validity scale that indicates whether participants misunderstood the items, answered carelessly, or deliberately attempted to conceal their true answers. The total scale score consists of answers to items included in the subscales. Items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree). Higher scores indicate more extreme beliefs. The stages of development of the ARTS and results demonstrating the reliability and validity of the ARTS have been previously documented (Loza, 2010a; Loza, 2010b; Loza et al., 2011).

*2.3 Procedure*

Participants were informally approached in a mall outside of a mosque in Toronto. They were asked if they are willing to participate in a research project about their beliefs. They were assured anonymity and advised not to identify themselves in any form. However, they were asked to indicate their place of birth, age, gender, race, religion, marital status, educational level, and occupation. They were also advised that they were free to decline participation at any time. Only a few participants declined participation. Since the majority of respondents have recently emigrated from Pakistan to Canada, respondents emigrating from other countries were not included in this study. The majority of the participants were Muslims and there was a small number of Christians from the same background. Muslims and Christian responses were compared to each other. Due to the small number of the Pakistani Christians, the Pakistani Muslim responses were compared to responses of participants of Other Religions from other countries. The responses of the participants from other countries were obtained from the data collected from previous studies (Loza, 2010a; Loza, 2010b; Loza, et al., 2011).

### 3. Results

In terms of psychometric properties, the range of Coefficient Alphas (CA) for the ATRS subscales was .77 to .89 (see Table 2, column 4). The Attitudes towards women subscale, however, had a CA of .43. All items correlated strongly and significantly with their respective subscales (see Table 2, column 5). The correlations between ATRS subscale scores and the total score ranged from .67 to .93 (see Table 2, column 6). The correlations among the subscales ranged from .31 to .84 (see Table 3). The comparisons of mean scores among the ATRS scores of Muslim and Christian participants from Pakistan are shown in Table 4. Muslims scored higher than the Christians on all subscales and the total scale. All comparisons were statistically significant. The comparisons of the mean ATRS scores among Pakistani Muslims, Christians, and participants of Other Religions and Atheists are shown in Table 5. Results indicated that the Muslim participants always scored higher and were significantly different from Christians and participants of Other Religions and Atheists group on all subscales and the total scale.

Table 2. Psychometric Properties of the Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ATRS) - n=91

ATRS Subscales (number of items)	Sample Means	Sample SDs	Coefficient Alpha	Ranges of Item-to-Subscale Correlations	Total /subscale correlations and Confidence Intervals r (95% CI)
Attitude towards Israel(4)	7.58	1.90	.79	.73 - .85*	0.67 (.54 - .77)
Politics views (5)	13.25	2.18	.77	.63 - .81*	0.80 (.71 - .86)
Attitudes toward women(5)	12.07	1.68	.43	.33 - .82*	0.77 (.67 - .84)
Attitude towards western culture (5)	11.52	2.40	.82	.63 - .87*	0.90 (.85 - .93)
Religiosity (6)	17.01	3.32	.88	.71 - .86*	0.90 (.85 - .93)
Condoning fighting(8)	20.69	4.20	.89	.69 - .86*	0.93 (.90 - .95)
Total ATRS	82.12	13.45			

\* $p < .0001$ .

Table 3. Correlations Among ATRS Scale and Subscales for the Pakistani Study

	Israel	Politics views	Women	Western Culture	Religiosity	Fighting
Israel	-					
Politics views	.31*	-				
Women	.71*	.45*	-			
Western Culture	.64*	.64*	.78*	-		
Religiosity	.39*	.81*	.53*	.76*	-	
Fighting	.57*	.71*	.65*	.78*	.84*	-
Total ATRS	.67*	.80*	.77*	.90*	.90*	.93*

\* $p < .0001$ .

Table 4. Comparison of Means (SDs) Among Christians and Muslims Pakistani on ATRS

ATRS Subscale	Muslims (n = 83) M (SD)	Christians (n = 8) M (SD)	F value (df= 1, 89)
Attitudes towards Israel	7.84 (1.78)	4.88 (.64)	7.75*
Politics views	13.30 (2.28)	12.75 (.46)	24.33***
Attitudes toward women	12.20 (1.69)	10.63 (.74)	5.14***
Attitudes towards western culture	11.75 (2.38)	9.13 (.83)	8.15*
Religiosity	17.19 (3.41)	15.13 (.99)	11.86**
Condoning fighting	21.10 (4.17)	16.50 (1.20)	12.18**
Total ATRS	83.39 (13.40)	69.00 (2.88)	21.66***

Note. \* $p < .01$ , \*\* $p < .001$ , \*\*\* $p < .0001$ .

Table 5. Comparison of Means (*SDs*) Among Religious Groups Muslim Pakistani vs. Sample on ATRS

ATRS Subscale	Pakistani Muslims ( <i>n</i> = 83)	Christians from other countries (401)	Other Religions and Atheists ( <i>n</i> = 231)	<i>F</i> value ( <i>df</i> =2, 712)
Attitudes towards Israel	7.84 (1.78) <sup>a</sup>	6.66 (2.18) <sup>b</sup>	5.22 (2.49) <sup>c</sup>	39.74*
Politics views	13.30 (2.28) <sup>a</sup>	10.46 (3.75) <sup>b</sup>	9.32 (4.09) <sup>c</sup>	34.64*
Attitudes toward women	12.20 (1.69) <sup>a</sup>	9.95(2.07) <sup>c</sup>	2.60 (5.00) <sup>b</sup>	35.71*
Attitudes towards western culture	11.75 (2.38) <sup>a</sup>	10.24 (2.85) <sup>b</sup>	11.33 (3.30) <sup>c</sup>	11.21*
Religiosity	17.19 (3.41) <sup>a</sup>	13.87(4.79) <sup>b</sup>	12.07 (5.29) <sup>c</sup>	35.18*
Condoning fighting	21.10 (4.17) <sup>a</sup>	15.71(5.47) <sup>b</sup>	15.71(6.41) <sup>c</sup>	33.17*
Total ATRS	83.39 (13.40) <sup>a</sup>	66.89(17.73) <sup>b</sup>	63.55 (19.21) <sup>c</sup>	38.93*

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly, at probability indicated, by post hoc Scheffé's paired comparisons.

\**p* < .0001.

#### 4. Discussion

The goal of this research was to investigate whether new Muslim immigrants to Canada coming from the extended Middle-Eastern countries differ from their Christian countrymen and countrywomen, Christians from other countries, and participants of other religious backgrounds from other countries on issues related to Middle-Eastern based extreme religious beliefs. We hypothesized that participants of different faiths would differ in their responses to the ATRS, with participants of the Muslim faith scoring significantly higher on the ATRS than Christians and participants of Other Religions and Atheists.

Consistent with results of previous studies (Ahmed, Audu, & Loza, *in press*; Loza, 2010a; Loza, 2010b; Loza et al., 2011), the reliability of the ATRS was demonstrated by adequate CA for the subscales, strong correlations between items of each subscale and their respective subscales, and strong correlations between the total ATRS score and the ATRS subscale scores. The discriminant validity of the ATRS was demonstrated by the predicted differences among the scores of participants of Muslims and participants from other religious backgrounds, with Muslim participants scoring significantly higher than Christians, and participants from Other Religions and Atheists.

Like some other western countries, Canada has been welcoming immigrants from the extended Middle-Eastern countries. Assessing the prevalence of Extreme Middle-Eastern Ideologies among new Immigrants to Canada, as one of the western countries, is important for understanding and dealing with individuals who may have extremist ideologies in western societies. The data collected from this study may be instrumental for policy and decision makers in considering the cultural beliefs and practices for these communities.

This study is important because it provides further validation of a measure that could be used to assess Middle-Eastern religious extremist beliefs. To our knowledge, we are not aware of any other scales designed specifically to measure extreme Middle-Eastern ideologies.

There are practical implications of using the ATRS, the most important one being the assistance it can provide in identifying individuals with extreme Middle-Eastern ideologies or individuals who have beliefs supporting Middle-Eastern ideology-related violence. In fact, currently available data enables us to establish norms, cut off scores, and percentile tables that will help in predicting respondents as low, moderate, or high in terms of their potential for extreme acts according to the ATRS. Also, the ATRS could be used to guide and inform policies related to the prevention of these violent acts or responses to terrorist threats and violence. The ATRS has several advantages. First, because the ATRS is a self-report scale, it ensures maximal objectivity by avoiding possible misinterpretation of participants' responses, and reduces the possibility of assessor biases, which is important in this sensitive area of assessment. Second, the ATRS is more convenient and economical to use as a screening tool than utilizing lengthy interviews. Participants simply provide numeric responses indicating agreement or disagreement with the items, and the scale usually takes only a few minutes to complete. Scoring the test is straightforward, as the basic interpretation requires minimal professional involvement. A third advantage of the ATRS is the large proportion of dynamic statements that could be used to measure the effect of any changes over time, following exposure to contrary information, or intervention. The fourth advantage is that the ATRS could be used to identify those at risk for escalation to terrorism and could potentially be used as part of individualized intervention programs. For example, extreme erroneous thoughts indicated by the endorsement of particular statements could be addressed during rehabilitative interventions.

Some of the limitations of the present study are similar to previously reported limitations in studies completed on the ATRS. First, caution has to be exercised when reporting the results of such research due to the sensitive nature of the research area. Second, the sample included a small number of Christian participants from Pakistan. However, this was compensated for by comparing the results obtained from the Pakistani Muslims with data already available in one of the co-authors' database. Third, because participants were volunteers who were recruited based on their religious identification, this was not a random sample of the population. A fourth limitation is the lack of other measures available to further assess the concurrent or external validity of the ATRS. Additionally, because we assured participants of their anonymity, we are not able to use their scores and responses for future predictive studies (i.e., to assess whether high scores on the ATRS will predict acts of aggression motivated by extreme beliefs, which could include terrorist acts), as we cannot identify participants for follow-up studies. Predictive studies are also very difficult to conduct when the target behavior has a very low base rate (e.g., extremism-motivated violence), which is a limitation of many predictive studies.

In spite of the limitations of this research, the results are encouraging, considering the enormous task of designing a scale that could reliably measure Middle-Eastern extreme beliefs. Future research should focus on further validating the ATRS with groups of known ranges of Middle-Eastern extremist views, in different cultures, countries, and settings.

### Acknowledgements

We wish to express our appreciation to the participants who were involved in this study. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of any institution.

### References

- Ahmed, A. G., Audu, M. D., & Loza, W. (*in press*). The prevalence of extreme Middle-Eastern ideologies among some Nigerians.
- Ameen, H. A. (1993). *El-Mowagha: Gzoor El-Erhab [The Confrontation: Roots of Terrorism; pp. 10-18]*. Cairo, Egypt: Egyptian Organization for Publishing Books.
- Ansari, H., Cinnirella, M., Rogers, M. B., Loewenthal, K. M., & Lewis, C. A. (2006). Perceptions of martyrdom and terrorism amongst British Muslims. In M. B. Rogers, C. A. Lewis, K. M. Loewenthal, M. Cinnirella, R. Amlot & H. Ansari. (Eds.), Proceedings of the British Psychological Society seminar series aspects of terrorism and martyrdom, eCommunity: *International Journal of Mental Health & Addiction*.
- Bawer, B. (2006). *While Europe slept: how radical Islam is destroying the west from within*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- El-Bana, R (2008, July 27). Lemaza tadahour al-Muslemoon? [Why Muslims deteriorated?]. *Al-Ahram Newspaper*.
- Hafez, M. M. (2003). *Why Muslims rebel: Repression and resistance in the Islamic world*. Boulder, CO: Lynnes Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Ibrahim, R. (2012). A Disturbing Event: The American Conservative Union Embraces an Islamist. *Frontpage Mag*. Retrieved from <http://frontpagemag.com/2012/raymond-ibrahim/a-disturbing-event-the-american-conservative-union-embraces-an-islamist>
- Ibrahim, S. E. (1980). Anatomy of Egypt's militant Islamic groups: Methodological note and preliminary findings. *International Journal of Middle East studies*, 12(4), 423-453. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800031238>
- Ibrahim, S. E. (1988). Egypt's Islamic activism in the 1980s. *Third World Quarterly*, 10(2), 632-657.
- Isam, S. E. (2006, April 24). *Karitat Iktrak El-Ikwan Wa-El-Irhabieen Lil El-Taleem El-Masry [How the terrorist's brothers invaded the Egyptian educational system]*. Cairo, Egypt: Rose-El-Yossef.
- Kanany-Minesot, G. H. (1995). The Saudi-Islamic invasion to Egypt: A blind apostasy from civilization and a multi-violation of human rights. *The Copts: Christians of Egypt*, 22, 23. Jersey City, NY: The American, Canadian, Australian, and European Coptic Associations.
- Littman, D. G. (2005, February-March). A culture of hate based on jihad and martyrdom: Saudi Arabian and Egyptian schoolbooks today. *Midstream*, 51(2). Retrieved from [www.midstreamthf.com](http://www.midstreamthf.com)
- Littman, D. G. (2005, June 21). *Jihad and martyrdom as taught in Saudi Arabian and Egyptian schools*. Retrieved from <http://www.iheu.org/node/1543>

- Lorenzo, V. (2007). The Hofstad Group: The new face of terrorist networks in Europe. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(7), 579-592. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701385933>
- Lotfi, S. H., Ali, M., & Kamel, G. (1993). *El-Mowagha: Tadbeek El-Sharia El-Eslamiah Been El-Haqiqa Wa-Shiaraat El-Fitnah [The confrontation: Applying the Islamic Sharia between truth and rhetoric of splitting among Muslims]*. Cairo, Egypt: Egyptian Organization of Publishing Books.
- Loza, W. (2007). *The Belief Diversity Scale*. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Loza, W. (2007a). *The Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale: A measure of Middle-Eastern extremism*. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Loza, W. (2007b). The psychology of extremism and terrorism: A Middle-Eastern perspective. *Journal of Aggression & Violent Behavior*, 12(2), 141-155. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2006.09.001>
- Loza, W. (2010a). The prevalence of Middle-Eastern extreme ideologies among some Canadians. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 26(7), 1388-1400. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260510369133>
- Loza, W. (2010b). The prevalence of Middle-Eastern extremist ideologies among some Canadian offenders. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 25(5), 919-928. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260509336966>
- Loza, W., El-Fatah, Y., Prinsloo, J., Hesslink, A., & Seidler, K. (2011). The prevalence of extreme Middle-Eastern ideologies around the world. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 26(3), 523-538. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260510363417>
- Manji, I. (2003). *The trouble with Islam: A wake-up call for honesty and change* (1st ed.). Toronto, ON: Random House Canada.
- Mazarr, M. (2007). *Unmodern men in the modern world: Radical Islam, terrorism, and the war on modernity*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- McCauley, C. (2002). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: Theoretical understandings and perspectives (psychological dimension to war and peace; vol. 3, pp. 3-29)*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Mockaitis, T. R. (2007). *The "new" terrorism: Myths and reality*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Orbach, B. (2001). Usama Bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida: Origins and doctrines. *Middle-East Review of International Affairs*, 5(4), 54-68.
- Pipes, D. (2008). *Closing and/or countering radical Islamic media*. Conference talk given at International Conference 2008 of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sayyed, T. (2005, December 2). *A Muslim in a Jewish land*. Retrieved from <http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009251.php>
- Schwind, R. L. (2005). The London bombings hatred in Islam civil society and the Umma. *Islam review*. Retrieved from <http://www.islamreview.com/articles/hatredinislam.shtml>
- Shbekshy, H. (2004, December 1). Erhab bil-reda'a [terrorism by nursing]. *El-Arabia net*. Retrieved from <http://www.alarabyia.net/views/2004/12/01/8390.html>
- Silber, M. & Bhatt, A. (2007). *Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat*. New York, NY: The New York Police Department.
- Silke, A. (2008). Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological process of Jihad radicalization. *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(1), 99-123. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477370807084226>
- Tanveer, A. (2005). The Muslim "marginal man". *Policy*, 21(1), 35-41.
- Wicker, C. (2007). *International lessons learned and recommendations for combating domestic Islamic terrorism*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks.
- Yaseen, E. (2007a, September 20). Al tatarof el-ideology wa makater el hokoma el denia [The extreme ideology and problems of the religious government]. *Al-Ahram Newspaper*.
- Yaseen, E. (2007b, September 28). Dawla dinia or islam dimokrati? [Religious country or Democratic Islam?]. *Al-Ahram Newspaper*.

