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
Islamic Rhetoric in Pakistan: A Comparison at the National and Sub-national Levels

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from
The College of William and Mary


by

Ava Rosamund Chafin


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
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Islamic Rhetoric in Pakistan: A Comparison at the National and Sub-national
Levels

Ava Chafin

Abstract

This research examines the role that Islamic ideology plays in Pakistani politics at the national and sub-national levels. It seeks to understand how Islamic parties appeal to Islam to garner support. I pull from and contribute largely to the theoretical literature on nationalism and apply it specifically to my research question. I argue that political leaders rely on Islamic rhetoric more heavily at the national level to create a national identity. However, my research will also show that this phenomena is less prominent in sub-national politics. At the provincial level, political parties and party leaders are more likely to engage their constituents by using rhetoric that speaks to their ethnic identity and promises access to essential resources. To provide evidence for this argument, a corpus analysis was chosen to investigate news articles, interviews, and quotes from Islamic political leaders at the sub-national and national levels, specifically political leaders from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. The main result from this research is that Islamic rhetoric is used differently at the two levels. Thus, these results contribute to a better understanding of what motivates Islamic political parties in Pakistan and whether or not they are meaningfully distinct from other, more secular, political parties in Pakistan.

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Introduction

This thesis examines the role that Islamic ideology plays in Pakistani politics by analyzing how two political parties use Islamic rhetoric at both the national and sub-national levels. To provide a better understanding of how the two are connected in modern day Pakistan, I will provide a recent example. At the end of November, 2017 there were widespread protests in Pakistan calling for the current Law Minister, Zahid Hamid, to resign after suggesting amendments to the current blasphemy laws that would no longer require government officials to mention the Prophet Mohammed during oaths for office.¹ Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a Muslim preacher and founder of an Islamist political party, captured his party's reaction to this event by stating, "we will die to protect the honor of the prophet."² This event led to several weeks of protests against the government by a hardline cleric and resulted in the official resignation of Zahid Hamid.³ This illustrates how strong of a connection there is between Islam and the Government in Pakistan and why all Pakistani political parties appeal to Islam at the national level. However, this is only one example. To explain this connection further, one must examine Pakistan's beginnings as well as its history with colonialism. This situation also begs the questions: how and why has Islam stood the test of time? Is it because of Pakistan's ideological commitments or a calculated political strategy? It is important to understand these motivations,

¹ Sophia Saifi, Chieu Luu, and Susannah Cullinane, "As Street Tensions Simmer, Pakistani Law Minister Apologizes to Protesters," CNN, last modified November 29, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/asia/pakistan-protests-paramilitary/index.html>.

² "Thousands Of Islamic Protesters Block Islamabad Streets, Demand Minister's Removal," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, last modified November 11, 2017, <https://www.rferl.org/a/thousands-islamic-protesters-block-islamabad-streets-demand-minister-hamid-removal/28847788.html>.

³ Sophia Saifi, "Pakistan Law Minister Resigns; Blasphemy Protests Disperse," CNN, last modified November 27, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/asia/pakistan-law-minister-resigns/index.html>.

because it helps us examine how Pakistan creates its policies as well as discover the most powerful issues/interest groups that drive the Pakistani Government.

My thesis takes one aspect of the Pakistani political system, its construction of a national identity, and tries to break it apart to understand its complexities. Specifically, it builds on current literature on nationalism, ethnic groups, and provincialism. From there, it bridges the gap in the literature by analyzing how Islamic rhetoric is used differently at the national versus sub-national level. To accomplish this, I will first discuss relevant literature to provide context and to situate my research within the existing scholarship. From there, I will establish my argument that Islamic rhetoric is used to create a national identity in Pakistan, but does not effectively permeate into Pakistan's provinces. To make this claim, I will use both linguistic and political science methodology to collect data and analyze my results. Finally, I will discuss the implications of this research as well as areas for continued discussion.

Review of Scholarship

In this section, I will analyze literature focusing on the relationship between Islam and Pakistan's political system. Specifically, I will examine scholarship covering two categories: nationalism and Islamic parties. The first topic will be nationalism and the concept of a national identity. This will help to answer the major question of my thesis: why is there a difference between Islamic rhetoric at the national and sub-national levels? Scholarship on nationalism in this thesis includes: how a nation is defined, historical nationalism in Pakistan, and then finally ethnic nationalism. Islamic parties, the second topic in this section, are used as a case study in this thesis because of their self-purported commitment to Islam. Islamic party literature focuses on providing definitions for political Islam, Islamic party history, as well as arguments for how

Pakistan's Islamic political parties should be classified. From this literature, as well as my own data and analysis, this thesis will bridge the gap between the national and sub-national levels in Pakistan by providing comparative analysis that does not yet exist in the literature about how Islam is used differently by political parties at the two governmental levels.

Nationalism

Definitions

Ernest Gellner provides one of the first theoretical frameworks for understanding nationalism.⁴ The following passage from Gellner provides a definition of nationalism, which is relied on in this thesis:

Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative (i.e. consist of disqualifying marks from entry to privilege, without any positive similarity between those who share the disqualification and who are destined to form a new 'nation').⁵

Gellner provides more insight and argues that nationalism is not “natural”, or necessarily inherent in society.⁶ In this quote, Gellner details the idea of “negative nationalism.”⁷ Tudor expands on this concept by explaining that a “negative” national identity is one that is created out of opposition to something, instead of something more common among groups that comes from within them and their shared identity/history.⁸ I will use this idea of “negative nationalism” to measure the success of Pakistan's national identity today (whether or not the national identity permeates down to the sub-national level), and whether it is still defined negatively or not. To do this, I will compile evidence on the amount of Islamic rhetoric used by political leaders at the

⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 147-178.

⁵ Ibid, 168.

⁶ Ibid, 152.

⁷ Ibid, 168.

⁸ Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 94.

national and sub-national levels. This will illustrate how a national identity is implemented in Pakistan, as well as whether or not it extends into the provinces, which would be one measure of success.

While Gellner's quote detailed the "spirit" of nationalism, Anthony Smith provides more specific definitions and commentary on "nation" and "nationalism."⁹ For Smith, "a nation is a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common legal rights."¹⁰ While, he defines "nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of an existing or potential 'nation'."¹¹ These are important to note because Christophe Jaffrelot specifically applies Gellner's "spirit" of nationalism to the Pakistani context.¹² Jaffrelot argues that Pakistan is not a nation, because a nation cannot have multiple "nationalities" within it.¹³ Jaffrelot continues to discuss the different nationalities and ethnic groups within Pakistan, which creates room to argue that because there are distinct differences between Pakistan's provinces, these differences inherently create a divide between the national and sub-national levels in Pakistan.¹⁴ Thus, the Pakistani Government has to represent multiple ethnic groups with different languages, different interpretations of Islam, different cultural traditions, as well as minority groups who do not practice Islam.¹⁵ Because of these differences, national level politicians have to focus on how to create a sense of nationalism within the country, without a nation in place. Provincial

⁹ Anthony Smith, "The Origins of Nations," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 106-130.

¹⁰ Ibid, 107.

¹¹ Ibid, 108. For further discussion on nationalism, see Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42-55.

¹² Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New Delhi : London ; New York: Manohar; Centre de Sciences Humaines ; Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave, 2002), 10-11.

¹³ Ibid, 7-8. This idea is known as "two nation theory" and will be discussed later on in the paper, under theoretical framework.

¹⁴ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 16-32.

¹⁵ Ibid.

politicians, on the other hand, can instead focus on their specific ethnic demographics and relaying proper social services.

To understand how a national identity is formed, it is important to discuss the individual components of one. For author David Laitin, language is the most critical component of a national identity and is one of the easiest identifiers of a group.¹⁶ Jaffrelot applies this to the Pakistani case and argues that the Government had to turn “Islam” and “Urdu” into “symbols of dominion,” to create a national identity for Pakistan.¹⁷ In 1981, only 7.6% of citizens in Pakistan actually spoke Urdu.¹⁸ Tariq Rahman agrees with Jaffrelot and states, “it is Urdu that the ruling elites of Pakistan have supported and the ethnic nationalities have never accepted.”¹⁹ Therefore, just as Urdu is mainly used at the national level to unify the provinces, I argue that the same can be said for Islam.

The explanatory power of nationalism within the Pakistani context has been strongly debated. Saadia Toor argues that nationalism should not be used to explain the problems of Pakistan today.²⁰ While Toor’s argument may be correct, it does not allow for the idea that the power of nationalism may actually lie in understanding the differences between Pakistan and other nations, and even the differences within the country itself. These are not necessarily “problems” that Pakistan faces as Toor would define, but instead “differences” that are in part explained by nationalism and the creation of an identity in Pakistan. Maya Tudor explains one of

¹⁶ David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 22, <https://quod-lib-umich-edu.proxy.wm.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?cc=acls;c=acls;idno=heb32407.0001.001;node=heb32407.0001.001%3A4.1;rgn=div1;view=image;page=root;seq=36>.

¹⁷ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 15-16.

¹⁸ Tariq Rahman, “Language and Politics in a Pakistan Province: The Sindhi Language Movement,” *Asian Survey* 35, no. 11 (1995): 1006, accessed April 15, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645724>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan* (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 2, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,shib&db=nlebk&AN=378673&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

these differences when she argues that the different trajectories of Pakistan and India can be explained in part by their differing national identities.²¹ My thesis adds to this scholarship by detailing how nationalism can explain the “differences” in the use of Islamic rhetoric by political leaders at the national and sub-national levels in Pakistan. Rhetoric is not a “problem,” but instead a bi-product of the type of nationalism created in Pakistan. Thus, the rest of this section will build on the importance of nationalism within the Pakistani context by examining Islamic nationalism during important points in Pakistan’s history, as well as exploring ethnic nationalism.

Nationalism and Pakistan’s History

In this section I outline “critical junctures” in Pakistan’s tumultuous history to detail important moments in shaping Pakistan’s national identity. Paul Pierson explains that “junctions are “critical” because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter.”²² I argue that the specific “junctions” that have impacted Pakistan’s national identity include: 1947 partition, Ayub Khan’s term, the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, and Zia al Haq’s Islamization in the wake of the 1971 war and partition of the country. These moments are turning points in Pakistan’s history, which determined and revised the concept of Pakistan’s national identity.

Partition

The first “critical juncture” for Pakistan’s national identity are the years directly leading to the 1947 partition of India into Pakistan and India. With the advent of a new country, there

²¹ Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan*, 86-99.

²² Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 135, <http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.wm.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzM5MDUxOV9fQU41?sid=e972f667-4dbc-4276-8cc7-e48688d674fd@sessionmgr4009&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1>.

was an opportunity to construct a new “Muslim” identity that could be separate from Hindus and the British. An important leader in creating this identity was Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was the leader of the Muslim League during partition.²³ The Muslim League was a political party formed to fight for the rights of the Muslim minority in Pakistan.²⁴

One of the most important years leading up to partition for the Muslim League was 1937. Authors Jalal and Tudor mark the 1937 provincial elections as a wake-up call for Jinnah, as the Muslim League was not able to establish a stronghold of support.²⁵ However, this defeat turned out to be fortuitous because it made the Muslim majority provinces look to Jinnah to preserve their autonomy.²⁶ The provinces saw that the Indian National Congress wanted to create a more centralized India post-independence, and feared that the Congress would be able to do so because of their recent electoral success.²⁷ Each province’s commitment to autonomy at all costs gives credence to the idea that the only identity shared among these provinces was their desire to be independent. Jinnah understood this and used it as a way to garner support for the Muslim League and their agenda.²⁸ Jinnah found success with this political strategy in the 1945/1946 elections when the Muslim League won significant Muslim seats in both the central and provincial legislatures.²⁹ But, the question remains, how was Jinnah going to be able to unite groups who fundamentally wanted to be independent? Jinnah was a not very religious and some categorize him as a “secular Muslim.”³⁰ However, Jalal explains that Jinnah was able to unite the

²³ Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 165.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 161.

²⁵ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 33-34; Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan*, 92-94.

²⁶ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*, 33-34.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 33.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 33-34.

²⁹ Barbara Daly Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, 212-213.

³⁰ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press,

provinces via political Islam when she states: “use of the communal factor was a political tactic, not an ideological commitment.”³¹ Jinnah used the idea that Islam was at risk to superficially unite these provinces, which is seen explicitly in the fact that the Muslim League started to use “Islamic slogans a year before independence”.³² However, once independence was achieved, the unity that a common loyalty to provincial autonomy brought was over. During the aftermath of partition, “the Muslim League had increasingly turned towards the discourse of “Islam” to quash dissent and to try to cobble together legitimacy for itself.”³³ This use of Islam has remained in Pakistan and this thesis will examine how the national Government relies on it to create a national identity.

Barbara and Thomas Metcalf also discuss specific details about the events leading up to partition and its aftermath.³⁴ One of their main arguments is that the British sped up independence and the partition of India in order for them to be able to shift their focus to their own reconstruction post World War II.³⁵ The two authors argue that because of this, post-colonial institutions could not be as easily set up.³⁶ In addition to the timing issue with partition, Barbara and Thomas Metcalf also explain that the struggle over Kashmir posed a major threat to post-independence stability for Pakistan and India.³⁷ Kashmir was a Muslim majority state with a Hindu ruler, and could have feasibly become a part of either India or Pakistan.³⁸ Kashmir is still a highly contested issue between Pakistan and India, and because of this conflict, the national

1996), 41,

<http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.wm.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzE2OTY1N19fQU41?sid=d2ebc900-1363-46c9-ade2-9d7ca23ad871@sessionmgr4009&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1>.

³¹ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*, 5.

³² Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan*, 98.

³³ Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*, 94.

³⁴ Barbara Daly Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 220.

³⁶ *Ibid*.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 224-225.

³⁸ *Ibid*.

identities of both countries are called into question.³⁹ For Pakistan, part of its identity is the fact that it is a “Muslim homeland”, but this identity becomes fragile when major portions of South Asian Muslims are not part of the country.⁴⁰ From the very beginning of Pakistan, the national level had to use Islam to create a sense of nationalism for the country, and this thesis will examine if this is still the case.

Ayub Khan

The next critical juncture came with Ayub Khan’s transition into power at the national level. It provides a salient example of how autonomy and differences between the provinces continuously plague Pakistan’s national unity. These differences became extremely apparent in 1954, when there was significant debate about whether or not there should be just one Pakistan, without provincial boundaries.⁴¹ The idea behind this change was that the deep sense of provincialism within Pakistan’s national story was a detriment to national integration.⁴² This created great instability within the country, so much so that general Ayub Khan was able to easily and successfully implement a coup for power.⁴³ Bloodshed and chaos ensued at the very idea of a loss of autonomy and because of this, we see that both provincialism and nationalism, which were a major part of the move for partition, were again at the forefront of debate in Pakistan in 1954.

Ayub Khan came to power with a “secular agenda,” and believed that he would be able to decrease the national Government’s reliance on Islam now that he was in power.⁴⁴ In 1962, Khan and his Government removed “Islamic Republic” from Pakistan’s official name in the

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*, 80.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid. 81.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 94.

constitution.⁴⁵ However, the regime received such harsh criticism that they changed it back to the previous constitution in the next year.⁴⁶ After Khan realized that this was not feasible at the national level, he turned to a platform of “religious modernism.”⁴⁷ In a move to consolidate power, Ayub Khan wanted to decrease Pakistan’s reliance on Islam and by proxy the influence of Islamic parties in Pakistan.⁴⁸ Ayub Khan shifted his agenda and instead used Islam to his advantage in Pakistan, so as long as his Government was able to control Islamic interpretation.⁴⁹ This shows a perfect example of secular leaders relying on Islam and not being able to pass up the political advantages that Islamic rhetoric can create.

Bengali Independence

East Pakistan’s fight for independence is the next critical juncture, which heavily influenced Pakistan’s national identity. East Pakistan was home to the Bengali ethnic group.⁵⁰ However, its inability to fit into the idea of Pakistani nationalism was true even before partition, as seen from the fact that Bengal was not even represented in the conception of Pakistan’s name, which stood for “Punjab, the Afghan region, Sindh, Baluchistan.”⁵¹ Before independence, it was not decided whether India would be divided into two or three separate states, or perhaps even more.⁵² One of these states was potentially going to be an independent Bengal because its leaders did not want to be marginalized by Punjab.⁵³ However, Bengal did not create its own state right after Pakistan’s independence; however, the issue of how to incorporate Bengal did make it very

⁴⁵ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 58.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*, 94.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 93-94.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 18.

⁵¹ Barbara Daly Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, 207

⁵² Ibid, 219.

⁵³ Ibid.

difficult to create a national identity that included a province disconnected from the rest. One such difficulty was that there were sharp inequalities between West and East Pakistan from the beginning. One example is that Jinnah refused to make the national language of Pakistan Bengali.⁵⁴ Even though “Bengalis constituted a majority of the Pakistani population,” they were continuously marginalized and exploited from the beginning.⁵⁵ Another example of this stems from economic discrimination, specifically when East Pakistani exports and trade earnings were taken and used in West Pakistan to create a more modern and industrialized West Pakistan.⁵⁶ Even foreign aid was mainly dispersed for development projects in West Pakistan.⁵⁷ Persistent inequality started a “move from linguistic regionalism to nationalism” in Bengal.⁵⁸ This cry for Bengali nationalism was used in 1969 by the Student Action Committee, which was formed in East Pakistan and called for many reforms, most notably complete provincial autonomy.⁵⁹ This student group started the battle for Bengali independence and galvanized the East Pakistani Awami League, which is a political party that formed to fight for Bengali equality and autonomy.⁶⁰ In an effort to extinguish these riots and opposition, the national Government actually arrested Awami Leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), for “conspiring with India to undermine the unity of Pakistan.”⁶¹ In West Pakistan, the Awami League was seen as “a corrosive cultural influence that diluted the glue of Islam holding Pakistan together.”⁶² This battle between parties, provinces, and national identities continued into the 1970 elections, where

⁵⁴ Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2013), 6-7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpm44>.

⁵⁵ Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*, 18.

⁵⁶ Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh*, 7.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 20.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 20-21.

⁶¹ Ibid, 22.

⁶² Ibid, 52.

the Awami League won the majority of seats.⁶³ This electoral victory as well as the subsequent events started the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.⁶⁴ This war and the subsequent independence of Bangladesh represent the deep loyalty to provincial autonomy that characterizes the provinces of Pakistan. East Pakistan was able to actually succeed in its move for independence, but we see similar movements in Sindh and Baluchistan, which will be examined in the ethnic nationalism section.⁶⁵ These moves for independence show that autonomy and Islam are two threads that are woven throughout Pakistan's history without exception, and the war for Bangladesh's independence provides a salient example of this commitment to autonomy.

Zia-al-Haq's Islamization

The fourth and final critical juncture occurred in 1977, when General Zia-al-Haq led a military coup to displace Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP (People's Party of Pakistan) administration.⁶⁶ Saadia Toor explains that this coup "had no legitimacy, and no real base of support" and therefore Zia-al-Haq had to use "Islam to legitimate authoritarianism."⁶⁷ There is a history of using Islam as a political tool in Pakistan, from Ayub Khan to Zia-al-Haq, however these two leaders used Islam very differently. Khan wanted to modernize Islam, while Zia-al-Haq called for a more traditional implementation.⁶⁸ Even though these two leaders used Islam very differently, Islam has always been evoked at the national level to reduce the "arbitrariness" of national rule. However, Zia-al-Haq's use of Islam actually resulted in an "increased

⁶³ Ibid, 34-39.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Christopher O. Hurst, "Pakistan's Ethnic Divide," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 19, no. 2 (April 1996): 189, accessed March 29, 2018, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,shib&db=mth&AN=9607010982&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

⁶⁶ Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*, 117.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 126, 131.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 131-132.

centralization of power, which inflamed the national question.”⁶⁹ Yet again, Islam is not enough to blind people of the national Government’s encroachment of their autonomy. This time, the citizens of Sindh, a province in Pakistan, created uproar against Zia-al-Haq.⁷⁰ Sindhis felt particularly called to oppose Zia-al-Haq because Bhutto was actually from Sindh.⁷¹ Therefore the Sindhis took issue both with Zia-al-Haq’s coup as well as his increased support of the opposing ethnic group in the province, the Muhajirs.⁷² This is an example of yet another province in Pakistan taking issue with the central Government and taking up arms to defend its autonomy. This illustrates how pervasive autonomy is in Pakistan.

Ethnic Nationalism

In this section, I will provide a background on the ethnic groups in Pakistan as well as examine literature that shows how important ethnic nationalism is in Pakistan’s provinces. From there, I will be able to argue why ethnic nationalism has made it difficult for Pakistan to adopt a central national identity. At partition, Pakistan was home to the Bengali, “the Baluchs, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Punjabis, Muhajirs.”⁷³ Bengal was not unique in its commitment to its language and culture nor its quest for self-determination. Just like the Bengali, the Baluch and Sindhi ethnic groups in Pakistan have also fought for autonomy and wanted independence, as seen specifically with the impetus for “Sindhu Desh,” which is a movement for a “completely autonomous Sindhi homeland”.⁷⁴ This section will provide information on each ethnic group and explain how ethnic nationalism has always been a part of Pakistani history, even before partition.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 138.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Christopher O. Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 179.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 189.

The Baluch ethnicity makes up the smallest population in Pakistan and has remained pastoral and tribal in make-up.⁷⁵ The Baluch have fiercely maintained their language as a main aspect of their culture and it is “one of the oldest living languages.”⁷⁶ The Baluch have been able to do this, even though their territory has been fractured by the “British, Iranian, and Pakistani regimes,” at various points throughout history.⁷⁷ This shows how the Baluch and their fight for Baluchistan and their cultural heritage, pre-dates the formation of Pakistan. However, more specifically in 1973-1977, they actually fought against the Pakistani government and formed an insurgency.⁷⁸ The fact that the Baluch people make up the smallest population in Pakistan, yet still rose up to fight for autonomy and their cultural heritage shows how salient ethnic nationalism is in Pakistan. The Sindhis are most similar to the Baluch, not necessarily in tradition, but in terms of their fight against central authority, and more specifically against Punjabi take-over.⁷⁹ The Pashtuns are also an ethno-national group whose geographic homeland is divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁸⁰ However, they have not used as much violence against the national Government as the Sindhis or Baluch.⁸¹

The Muhajirs are another ethnic group from the Sindh province, but are different from the Sindhis, the original inhabitants of Pakistan’s Sindh province.⁸² The Muhajirs are Muslim immigrants and their descendants who came from India at partition and who were often better educated and more skilled than Sindhis, resulting in tensions between Sindhis and Muhajirs.⁸³

⁷⁵ Ibid, 183.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 184

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 189.

⁸⁰ Selig Harrison, “Ethnicity and the Political Stalemate in Pakistan,” in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 284.

⁸¹ Christopher O. Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 186-187.

⁸² Ibid, 190-191.

⁸³ Ibid, 190-192.

The Punjabis are another ethnic group, who with the Muhajirs have at various periods throughout Pakistan's history made up the majority of the national Government bureaucracy.⁸⁴ This is in part because the "British viewed Punjabis as the ethnicity that showed the most promise in the region."⁸⁵ Christopher Hurst explains this further by detailing how the British believed that the Punjabis would be able to adapt to the British style of leadership and assimilate more quickly.⁸⁶ This then led to the Punjabis being picked to play a major role in the colonial army, which allowed Punjabis to dominate other groups after partition because they had been taught the skills necessary to implement national institutions.⁸⁷ Because of this, there was a "Punjabization of Pakistan" that set forth a competition between Punjab and the other provinces, as well as created a national government and identity that only really encompassed one province in Pakistan.⁸⁸ With such distinct ethnic groups in Pakistan, the obstacles with trying to create a national identity that unites all of them are clear. These provinces focus their energy on maintaining their cultural heritages, dealing with ethnic conflict, as well as fighting for autonomy. Therefore, it makes sense that their politicians who campaign at the provincial level would also tailor their campaigns and rhetoric to ethnic nationalism, instead of only "central" nationalism, i.e. Islam. Ayesha Jalal explains the obstacles that the national Government faces in creating a national identity when she states: "there has been a distinct sharpening of tensions in Pakistan's remaining provinces where linguistic and cultural identities are fusing with political and economic grievances to short circuit the melting mechanisms of state-sponsored programmes of Islamization in effect since the late 1970's."⁸⁹ These provinces already have their ethnicity and

⁸⁴ Ibid, 181-182.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 182.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 182-183.

⁸⁸ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 16-18.

⁸⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, 187.

cultural heritage as an identity and therefore do not need Islamic rhetoric to create a national identity. In fact, they fight against the formation of a national identity because it means increased centralization of the state and decreased autonomy. My thesis builds off of this literature and shows that these ethnic divides are still present and therefore still dictate how political representatives speak to their constituents.

Islamic Political Parties

This section outlines the characteristics of Islamic parties in Pakistan, as well as provides an understanding of why and how they use Islam to achieve their political agenda. Haroon Ullah provides an organizational framework to understand the complexities of Islamic political parties.⁹⁰ He notes, “while all Islamic confessional parties agree that Islamic tenets should inform governance, they vary tremendously in how strictly they interpret religious laws and how significant they believe the government’s role in enforcing those laws should be.”⁹¹ From this, he creates his own categories of Islamic political parties in Pakistan along what he calls the “sharia-secularism continuum”.⁹² This spectrum divides the broad category of Islamic parties into two more distinct ones: Islamist and Muslim Democratic.⁹³ The key distinction between the two lies in the level of commitment they have to implementing Islamic law and moral philosophy into the public sphere.⁹⁴ While Muslim Democratic Parties do believe that Islam should inform some policy, Ullah explains that their main commitment is to economic and political issues.⁹⁵ On the other hand, Islamist parties have “religious ideological commitments to state adoption of

⁹⁰ Haroon K. Ullah, *Vying for Allah’s Vote : Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 10, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,shib&db=nlebk&AN=686809&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 10-11.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 48.

sharia.”⁹⁶ Ullah gets rid of the oversimplification and misunderstanding of religious parties in Pakistan by breaking them into groups and explaining how they are not all the same and do not practice or campaign under the same tenets.⁹⁷

Ullah’s division of Islamic parties makes it necessary to study at least one party from each category: Islamist and Muslim Democratic.⁹⁸ For this thesis, I chose the Jammat-e-Islami (JI), an Islamist party, and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N), a Muslim Democratic party.⁹⁹ I will examine their political candidate’s rhetoric at both the national and provincial levels. The PML-N, with a stronghold in the Punjab, is also one of the only Islamic parties that has reached national recognition and according to Ullah is the “largest and most successful”.¹⁰⁰ The JI first campaigned in the Punjab province in 1951 and therefore has a strong tie to the province.¹⁰¹ Because Islamic parties purport to have this commitment to Islamic ideology, it is necessary to examine their use of Islamic rhetoric at the national and sub-national levels first. If we see a distinction between the two levels with these parties, then it will be easier to make the case that this difference also exists for more secular parties in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The above literature provides both the historical and institutional context for understanding how Islam has been used at the national level to try and create a unified identity for the country. At the sub-national level, the themes of provincialism and ethnic conflict found in this literature help explain the differences between provinces as well as the differences

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 10.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 63, 78.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 63 - 64.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 82.

between the two levels. Building on this background literature, my thesis will add another difference, which is how the two levels use Islamic rhetoric.

Theoretical Framework

This section outlines the theoretical framework that my thesis builds on. Theories focusing specifically on Pakistan as well as broader theories on competition for votes and political representation also provide background. To understand the motivating factors behind these parties, we have to first understand what it means and what it takes to be successful in the political arena. These theories will then give meaning and interpretation to the results and evidence that I have collected, which will be outlined later in this thesis.

Two-Nation Theory

Many authors use two-nation theory to explain why Jinnah argued for a separate Pakistani nation.¹⁰² Jaffrelot explains that Jinnah actually created the idea of “two-nation theory” and provides the following explanation:

The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures [...] To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.¹⁰³

This theory established a precedent for claiming independence if religious distinctions and “social customs” were significant.¹⁰⁴ This theory was also used to explain the events that lead up to the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, where East Pakistan claimed that it was too distinct

¹⁰² See Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, 223; Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 11-15.

¹⁰³ Muhammad Jinnah, quoted in Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New Delhi : London ; New York: Manohar; Centre de Sciences Humaines ; Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave, 2002), 12.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

from West Pakistan, and was not being represented properly.¹⁰⁵ This called into question whether or not Jinnah was actually correct in using two-nation theory to argue for a separate Muslim homeland, because ultimately the Pakistan envisioned at partition, one including Bengal, failed. The commonalities that Jinnah espoused were not salient enough to keep Pakistan together. From there, Pakistan either has to redefine its founding or create a new national identity centered around issues that all modern day Pakistanis have in common. However, if this does not happen then two-nation theory could be used to make the claim that because each province has its own ethnic national identity, then they should become their own independent country. There are practical reasons that this has not happened since the 1971 war, one of them being that the other provinces do not have the support of India or another major power to help them.¹⁰⁶ Thus, this thesis will build on two-nation theory and discuss its relevance to today's political and ethnic climate in Pakistan.

Political Institutionalization Theory

Political institutionalization theory provides a framework to judge the institutionalization of Islamic parties in Pakistan and if they do or do not use Islamic ideology to increase that institutionalization to become more “successful” parties. Samuel Huntington defines institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”¹⁰⁷ He makes the case that in order for organizations, for example political parties, to become fully entrenched in the political system, they must have the following criteria: “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.”¹⁰⁸ Shmuel Eisenstadt provides a different

¹⁰⁵ “Two-Nation Theory Again,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 6, no. 13 (1971): 690, accessed March 29, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4381773>.

¹⁰⁶ Christopher O. Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 185.

¹⁰⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

set of criteria for successful institutionalization and instead argues that having a charismatic leader that is able to attract many social groups is most important.¹⁰⁹ If party leaders are able to attract a wide array of followers, then they will also be able to extract unique resources from them which will make them more apt to compete against already established parties.¹¹⁰ Regardless of which criteria are used, it is useful to be able to judge and categorize the institutionalization of the political systems and parties in Pakistan. This theory serves to provide a model to understand how organizations can become part of the legacy that is the political system in a country, and ultimately identifies what makes organizations able to stand the test of time.¹¹¹ Huntington goes further with this institutionalization theory by describing the rural-urban gap within politics. He states “one major test of the institutionalization of a party and the adaptability of its leadership is the willingness of the latter to make the concessions necessary to win the support of the countryside”.¹¹² This test of institutionalization theory makes it clear that blind loyalty to ideology is actually seen as a hindrance to party success in the eyes of institutionalization theorists. Parties must be able to create alliances and compromises to remain relevant and in control of the political system. Huntington also stresses the importance of the countryside citizens in maintaining political stability for those in power, which is key to understanding why major national parties may or may not reach out to smaller regional or religious parties, such as Islamic ones, to ensure votes and their own stability.¹¹³ This provides a

¹⁰⁹ S. N Eisenstadt, “Institutionalization and Change,” *American Sociological Review* 29, no. 2 (1964): 237, accessed April 15, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2092126>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ For further discussion on institutionalization, see Richard Sinnott and E.E. Davis. “Political Mobilization, Political Institutionalization and the Maintenance of Ethnic Conflict,” *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 4, no. 4 (October 1981), accessed April 15, 2018, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.wm.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=0a3b980c-d791-4157-b717-495750417d8a%40sessionmgr101&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBIPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRIPWVob3N0LWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=10448120&db=sih>.

¹¹² Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 434.

¹¹³ Ibid.

framework to analyze the relationship between national and sub-national/religious parties in Pakistan and how each one might use ideology differently, knowing that a reciprocal relationship is necessary for survival.

Political Ideology Theory

This section outlines why understanding a party's ideology is important in understanding how a party was formed, its overall institutionalization and success in its respective political system. Alan Ware writes that party ideology changes are not significant, but when they do happen they are "prompted, primarily, by competition for votes."¹¹⁴ The first part of his theory is important to note because it means that party ideology is not as pliable as some theorists perceive it to be, and instead it takes a party's goal of institutionalization and success to supersede its originating ideology. Ware also states that "the need to compete for votes can result in parties that had rather different origins coming to resemble each other."¹¹⁵ These two ideas seem at odds with one another, but they do provide an important distinction for the overall framework for analysis in this thesis. That is the idea that ideology creates the foundation for a party and is important at the origin, but ultimately changes as "competition for votes" and other external aspects of a party's environment take precedence.¹¹⁶

Scholars Erikson and Romero also agree with Ware that over time, parties start to adopt similar stances on key political issues, thus shifting their ideology to make room for public opinion.¹¹⁷ Erikson and Romero create a "general model of candidate equilibrium", which quantifies "optimal candidate positions" that politicians can take on central ideological

¹¹⁴ Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Robert S. Erikson, and David W. Romero, "Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of the Vote," *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 4 (1990): 1122, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1963255>.

questions.¹¹⁸ Knowing theoretically that this position exists, gives merit to the idea that parties can change their ideology to a more medium position and be better able to compete for votes. Even if parties are never able to achieve the exact “optimal position”, it may still be worth it for parties to try. Thus, it is important to include party ideology and vote competition theory into the framework for this thesis. If these theories supposedly apply to all political parties, then parties should act and use the same methodology to campaign and attract voters at both levels of government. However, if this is not the case, and rhetoric is different at the two levels, then something else, like nationalism, is more likely to dictate the difference. Relating this theory to the Pakistani case, we would expect to see that Islamic parties over time lose their loyalty to an ideology to more effectively compete for votes at both the national and sub-national levels. However, I argue that this only happens at the sub-national level, where ethnic issues are more salient and because Islam is still needed at the national level to create a national identity.

Participation Theory

The previous section on party ideology makes it necessary to understand voter behavior and what makes certain voter participation more likely than others, because this will dictate the “optimal candidate positions”.¹¹⁹ This is the case because it is important to know whom these parties are competing for and what influences these voters. Sidney Verba defines participation as “the process by which citizens influence or control those who make major decisions affecting them”.¹²⁰ He then makes this definition more specific and identifies the factors that predict participation, which include: “resources”, “motivations”, and other external factors in a voter’s

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 1104-1105.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Sidney Verba, “Democratic Participation,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 373 (1967): 54, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1037353>.

environment.¹²¹ This theory about the overall power that voters have within a political system suggests that when combined with voter competition and party ideology theory, parties are controlled by the participants within a political system and not by party leadership. The next question, then, is whether or not participation changes at the national-versus sub-national levels, as well as if the actions that national level candidates need to be competitive are the same as those for sub-national level candidates. Verba starts to answer this question by theorizing, “participation is not limited to any particular government level.”¹²² He notes that the real difference between the types of participation is the extent to which these candidates and officials are available and open to their constituents as well as the amount of decision-making power they have.¹²³ This establishes that theoretically there will be differences in participation between the two levels, which correspond to how close or far the candidates are from voters. I will apply this theory to Pakistan then, because each province is home to ethnically diverse constituents with differences in geography, wealth, ethnic conflict, and access to resources. Therefore, their political leaders will use rhetoric that specifically applies to those groups in order to effectively compete for votes.

Argument

Based on the above literature on nationalism and ethnic groups in Pakistan, I argue that at the national level, there is a reliance on Islamic rhetoric to create a national identity for the country. I use Gellner’s notion of “negative” nationalism to show how provincial unity before partition could not be maintained after.¹²⁴ Tudor expands on this idea and writes that the Muslim

¹²¹ Ibid, 62.

¹²² Ibid, 56.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, 168.

League's basis for nationalism was negative in the sense that it was defined "in opposition to the colonial regime."¹²⁵ Jinnah and the Muslim League united the provinces together based on a common fear of increased centralization that the Congress was trying to establish after independence.¹²⁶ Therefore, once partition happened and the provinces were not under colonial or Congress control anymore, the Muslim League's negative nationalism was no longer sufficient. There was a hole left that had to be filled to try and create one cohesive nation. This was not the case for India, because the Congress had established a "programmatically nationalism" that was based on common "economic and social principles," and not just anti-colonialism sentiment.¹²⁷ Therefore, because negative nationalism is not as salient and could not be continued post-independence, the Pakistani national Government had to try and overcome the continued provincialism in Pakistan to create a national identity. I argue that one way the national level does this is through an extensive use of Islamic rhetoric when speaking to its citizens.¹²⁸ In addition, I argue that Islamic rhetoric is not used as extensively at the sub-national level. Instead, politicians use secular rhetoric regarding provincial issues when speaking to their constituents. From this, I believe that the ethnic conflicts and distinct national identities in these provinces will instead make up most of the rhetoric used by provincial leaders, because they want to appeal to voters and compete for votes.¹²⁹

In summary, my arguments are:

A1: To to create a national identity, the Pakistani central Government must rely on the use of Islamic rhetoric

¹²⁵ Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan*, 207.

¹²⁶ Barbara Daly Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, 216.

¹²⁷ Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan*, 5.

¹²⁸ See Figure 1 for causal diagram.

¹²⁹ See figure 2 for causal diagram.

A2: At the sub-national level, Islamic ideology is not as important because of the strength of ethnic nationalism

Figure 1: Causal Diagram for A1





Figure 2: Causal Diagram for A2



Methodology and Case Selection

Case Selection Process-Provinces

This section will outline the criteria I used to pick which provinces in Pakistan would be the focus for my thesis. Today there are four provinces in Pakistan: Sindh, the North West Frontier Province (or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Balochistan, Punjab.¹³⁰ Azad Kashmir is also a region in Pakistan, but is a “semi-autonomous” state and therefore will not be looked at in this study.¹³¹ To narrow down the research involved, it was necessary to pick two provinces in Pakistan, which would be the focus for my evidence. I chose Punjab because of the “Punjabization” that occurred post-partition in Pakistan and because its citizens make up most of the Government workforce.¹³² Because of this connection between the national level and Punjab, if there is a difference in the use of Islamic rhetoric by political leaders at the two levels, then I will be able to make a significant conclusion and apply that to the other provinces as well. I also chose Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to contrast Punjab with a province and ethnic group that does not make up a significant portion of the Government or army, but still has a comparable population.¹³³ Below are tables showing provincial population numbers from the 2017 census as well as the results from the 2013 general election to the national and provincial assemblies.

¹³⁰ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 16-32.

¹³¹ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in the Crossfire* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 183.

¹³² Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 16-18.

¹³³ Christopher O. Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 186-187.

Table 1. Provincial Population Statistics from the 2017 Census¹³⁴

Administrative Unit	Total Population
Pakistan	207, 774, 520
Punjab	110, 012, 442
Sindh	47, 886, 051
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	30, 523, 371
Balochistan	12, 344, 408

¹³⁴ “132 Million in 1998, Pakistan’s Population Now Reaches 207.7 Million: Census Report,” ARY News, last modified August 26, 2017, <https://arynews.tv/en/pakistan-population-reaches-207-7-million-census/>.

Table 2. 2013 General Election Results¹³⁵

Party	National	Provincial			
		Punjab	KP	Sindh	Balochistan
PML-N	184	295	17	6	17
PPP	42	6	4	89	0
PTI	30	26	46	4	0
MQM	23	0	0	48	0
JUI-F	13	1	16	0	8
PML-F	5	0	0	10	0
JI	4	1	8	0	0
PkMAP	3	0	0	0	14
NPP	3	0	0	2	0
PML-Q	2	8	0	1	6
ANP	1	0	4	0	1
BNP	1	0	0	0	2
QWP-S	1	0	10	0	0
NP	1	0	0	0	10

Case Selection Process-Political Parties

The case selection process for the political parties was based off of Haroon Ullah's classification of parties in Pakistan.¹³⁶ Therefore, the parties chosen had to be classified as an

¹³⁵ "The 2013 National and Provincial Assembly Elections in Pakistan," National Democratic Institute, 2013, 30-43, <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI-ANFREL-Pakistan-EOM-Final-Report.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Haroon K. Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan*, 10.

Islamic party by Ullah and also have deep historical roots in each of the provinces and at the national level. I thought it would be useful to conduct my analysis using parties mentioned by Haroon Ullah in order to be consistent with existing research examining Islamic ideology in Pakistan.¹³⁷ There are also two main types of Islamic parties that Ullah identifies, which are Muslim Democratic and Islamist. Because of this, I chose to pick one of each: PML-N and JI.¹³⁸ As seen from table 2., both of these parties have provincial strongholds. However, because their strongholds are different from one another, I will be able to compare their rhetoric, regardless of whatever provincial ties they may have to the region.

Corpus Analysis Methodology

To provide evidence for my arguments, I will use both critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus analysis to examine primary texts from Islamic political parties in Pakistan.¹³⁹ Authors, Samaie and Malmir used these two techniques to analyze the media's use of the terms Islam and Muslim.¹⁴⁰ They define the methodology as “a textually oriented interdisciplinary approach to the study of social problems which have a semiotic and discursive dimension.”¹⁴¹ In addition, Paul Baker wrote a seminal work on this methodology where he explains that a corpus analysis is a quantitative and electronic way to study discourse.¹⁴² One of the first steps in this type of analysis is to create corpora, which Baker defines as “large bodies of naturally occurring

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 63, 78.

¹³⁹ I found the methodology and an application of CDA and corpus analysis in both Lucas Leblanc, “Understanding Secession: An Analysis of the 2012-2014 Debates on Independence in Scotland and Catalonia,” Undergraduate Honors Theses, College of William and Mary, 2015, <https://publish.wm.edu/honorstheses/208> and Rebecca Willis, “Taming the Climate? Corpus Analysis of Politicians’ Speech on Climate Change,” *Environmental Politics* 26, no. 2 (2017): 212-231, accessed December 3, 2017, doi:10.1080/09644016.2016.1274504.

¹⁴⁰ Mahmoud Samaie and Bahareh Malmir, “US News Media Portrayal of Islam and Muslims: A Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 49, no. 14 (December 6, 2017): 1351–66, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2017.1281789>.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 1353.

¹⁴² Paul Baker, *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis* (London; New York: Continuum, 2006), 1.

language data stored on computers.”¹⁴³ Baker establishes one issue with this type of analysis, which is that online corpora get rid of the context that regular textual analysis provides.¹⁴⁴ However, Baker also states that this issue can be minimized if a researcher actually compiles the corpus themselves, which is what I have done for my research.¹⁴⁵ This is the best methodology for me to use because it decreases the amount of bias that usually comes from researchers cherry-picking texts to analyze.¹⁴⁶ In addition to a corpus analysis, I will also conduct a close textual analysis on select documents later in this thesis. I do this to try and capture some of the context that Baker emphasizes is so important to fully understanding a topic.¹⁴⁷

To apply this methodology and begin the first steps of compiling my corpus, I first had to choose a type of linguistic software to manage it. I chose Sketch Engine after understanding the differences between the many types of software available.¹⁴⁸ Via Sketch Engine, I was able to extract 820 different news articles from the online Pakistani newspaper, Dawn.¹⁴⁹ Just like Samaie and Malmir, I chose to not narrow my search on Dawn by typing in specific search terms, in order to not create a bias in the documents that Sketch Engine was able to extract.¹⁵⁰ I chose Dawn to be the source for the news articles mainly because it is one of the only English newspapers in Pakistan and has been around for the longest period of time.¹⁵¹ This does present an unavoidable bias in that the audiences that a fully English newspaper caters to are different

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 25.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 10-12.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 25.

¹⁴⁸ Adam Kilgarriff, and Iztok Kosem, “Corpus Tools for Lexicographers,” in *Electronic Lexicography*, ed. Sylviane Granger and Magali Paquot, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31-55.

¹⁴⁹ Dawn, accessed March 29, 2018. <https://www.dawn.com/>.

¹⁵⁰ Mahmoud Samaie and Bahareh Malmir, “US News Media Portrayal of Islam and Muslims: A Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis,” 1355.

¹⁵¹ “Dawn Joins Asia News Network,” *The Daily Star*, last modified November 29, 2011, <http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-212146>.

than that of a paper in Urdu. However, this bias could not be avoided due to my inability to read Urdu or find reliable translations.

From the corpus compilation, Sketch Engine was able to create a list of the most frequent words found in all the documents that are associated with either “ideological” or “secular” rhetoric.¹⁵² This created a dictionary of terms that I could then use to perform a traditional, more qualitative textual analysis. I used the most commonly associated words to distinguish between the types of rhetoric that the specific leaders within the parties and provinces of my area of research were trying to invoke.

To choose the specific leaders to use in my textual analysis, I went to each party’s or provincial Government’s website and determined their leaders in the specific provinces in my case study area.¹⁵³ I then did a broad search for articles in Dawn and pulled the most recent articles that each leader had been mentioned in and created separate corpora for each individual. Next, Sketch Engine created a simple word list for all of the articles mentioning that leader and determined which words were used most often.¹⁵⁴ I performed a close textual analysis of one of the national leaders, Nawaz Sharif, speeches as well as on one central document. The central document for my research is an article written by Asif Luqman Qazi published by the Brookings Institute.¹⁵⁵ It is one of the only interviews done in English with an Islamic party leader where

¹⁵² “Sketch Engine: Language Corpus Management and Query System,” Sketch Engine, accessed March 29, 2018. <https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/>.

¹⁵³ “Our Chief Ministers,” Punjab Portal, accessed March 29, 2018. https://www.punjab.gov.pk/Our_Chief_Ministers; “Government,” Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, accessed March 29, 2018. <http://kp.gov.pk/page/government>; “Provincial Leadership,” Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, accessed March 29, 2018. https://jamaat.org/en/provincial_leadership.php.

¹⁵⁴ “Sketch Engine: Language Corpus Management and Query System,” Sketch Engine.

¹⁵⁵ Asif L. Qazi, “How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words,” Brookings, last modified April 25, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-islamize-an-islamic-republic-jamaat-e-islami-in-its-own-words/>.

they explicitly talk about their view of the party and use of Islamic ideology.¹⁵⁶ An obvious bias exists from the fact that the leader is speaking in English and to a Western audience; however, it still provides a good idea of how these parties hope to be portrayed internationally.

Analysis

Corpus Dictionary

To properly distinguish and give meaning to the words found in the Dawn documents, I had to establish two sub-categories within the corpus dictionary that I created. These sub-categories and the terms within them will create the un-biased dictionary of words that will then be later used to analyze the specific articles and documents on the leaders of the parties at the different levels.

Sub-Category 1: Ideological

The first sub-category that the dictionary is divided into is *ideological* terms. I chose this sub-category because it identifies which other terms are most often associated with ideological rhetoric, and from there I will be able to quantitatively understand how many “ideological” terms a specific article or text uses in comparison to more “secular” terms. This will allow me to establish the overall “theme” of the documents, and compare the use of ideological rhetoric at the national and sub-national levels. The central words in this sub-category were “Islam” and “ideology,” and I chose these words because Islam captures the religiosity of the ideology that I am trying to examine and the term “ideology” itself shows what types of ideology are most used by party leaders and in the news/media. From there, I wanted to capture the closely associated

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

(“collocates”) of the terms in the Dawn corpus.¹⁵⁷ Baker explains that “the phenomena of certain words frequently occurring next to each other is collocation.”¹⁵⁸ The top 15 collocates are listed below in Table 3.

Here I will comment on important “themes” that came out of the frequency list in table 3. One interesting point of analysis is that “extremist” and “violent” are the most frequent collocates for both Islam and ideology. This has serious implications that even in Pakistan, Islam and terrorist/extremist organizations are connected with a specific religion and therefore behavior. This begs the question: how could the international system be expected to understand the subtlety between terrorists organizations and Islamic political parties given the conflation of the terms within Pakistan itself? The other major “theme” of the ideological words is that of Islamic teachings/way of life. Words like “tenet,” “principle” and “creed” are associated with how Islam should be taught as well as practiced. This is interesting because I would expect more explicit references to Allah and other symbols of Islam because those tend to be more universal rhetorical items that could be evoked to stir up Islamic nationalist sentiment and pride. Collocates of “ideology” are in fact more secular than I would have expected with “religious” and “creed” being the only words that could reasonably constitute Islamic rhetoric. Because of this, I will focus more on the collocates of “Islam” when I am examining other works and corpora for Islamic rhetoric.

¹⁵⁷ Dawn, accessed March 29, 2018. <https://www.dawn.com/>. Specific articles were not picked out from Dawn for this step, but instead Dawn was used as a database for news articles, which were then collated into one corpora in Sketch Engine.

¹⁵⁸ Paul Baker, *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis*, 96.

Table 3. “Ideological” sub-category¹⁵⁹

Rank	Collocates of Islam	Rank	Collocates of Ideology
1	Extremist	1	Extremist
2	Teach	2	Violent
3	Pervade	3	National
4	Muslims	4	Religious
5	Idealism	5	Creed
6	Principle	6	Pakistan
7	Ideologue	7	Custodian
8	Tenet	8	Council
9	Interpretation	9	
10	Cause	10	
11	Spirit	11	
12	Son	12	
13	Conversion	13	
14	Hold	14	
15	Service	15	

Sub-Category 2: “Secular”

The second category of words in the dictionary will be “secular” and include terms that are collocates of the terms “political” and “government.” I chose this sub-category to provide a comparison between words/terms that were ideological in nature versus those that were not, but still held some political meaning. I chose “political” and “government” to represent these because of their representation of Pakistan’s political system, separated from the Islamic ideological aspect. The top 15 collocates for “political” and “government” are captured in Table 4.

In comparison with the “ideological” and “secular” frequency tables, there are significantly more “secular” words within the Dawn corpus. Islam plays a major role in Pakistani history and nationalism, but in terms of media, culture, and entertainment, I argue that

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

Islam is not a significant aspect. What is also interesting in table 4. is that “religious” comes up as a collocate for “political.” This verifies the overlap of religion and politics in Pakistan.

Finally, both provincial and federal or national levels of governments are represented in the frequency list below, showing that both levels of politics matter greatly in terms of news coverage and therefore, it makes sense to examine both levels and their use of Islamic rhetoric.

Table 4. “Secular” sub-category¹⁶⁰

Rank	Collocates of Political	Rank	Collocates of Government
1	Party	1	Federal
2	Leader	2	Provincial
3	Social	3	Punjab
4	System	4	PML-N
5	Elite	5	Official
6	Religious	6	Elect
7	Economic	7	Civilian
8	Crisis	8	Afghan
9	Career	9	Sindh
10	Leadership	10	Successive
11	Situation	11	Next
12	Analyst	12	British
13	Mainstream	13	PPP
14	Current	14	New
15	Prisoner	15	Department

Critical Discourse and Corpus Analysis of Central Document

The central document for this thesis was the Brookings Institute publication of Asif Qazi’s essay, “Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words”.¹⁶¹ As seen in Table 5, only two words out of the first 15 most frequent words were actually ideological in nature.¹⁶² Throughout the document, Qazi does make specific references to Jinnah, the founding of Pakistan, and the

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Asif L. Qazi, “How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words.”

¹⁶² Ibid.

importance of Islamic ideology in shaping the nature of government and life in Pakistan.¹⁶³ Qazi's reference to Jinnah is specifically calling on Pakistan's history and how it necessitated the creation of parties like the JI to remain true to the ideal society that Jinnah envisioned. Qazi refutes the idea that Jinnah was as secular as many scholars make him out to be and he provides evidence to support his statement.¹⁶⁴ Qazi's article on the JI shows a distinct pattern; he talks about JI's religious ideology in terms of the past, and focuses on more political and secular goals for the future of JI.¹⁶⁵ Specifically, he cites that the JI is in full support of the implementation of the constitution and highlights a current debate in the JI party, which is whether or not the party needs to split and have a solely political wing that is focused on winning elections.¹⁶⁶ This is an important change in JI ideology, and Qazi makes clear that this change is due to a desire to more effectively compete for votes and gain more political traction.¹⁶⁷ Overall, Qazi's discussion validates the idea that the JI does focus on Islamic ideology in its platform, but ultimately wants to be distinguished from extremist groups and become a fully political party that overtime will inevitably have to change its adherence to Islamic ideology to achieve greater success.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Table 5. Frequency of words in “Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words”¹⁶⁸

Rank	Word	Frequency	Percentage
1	Pakistan	61	0.194267516
2	Islam (ic)**	58	0.184713376
3	Political*	38	0.121019108
4	Muslim*	21	0.066878981
5	Constitution*	20	0.063694268
6	Parties*	17	0.054140127
7	Organization*	17	0.054140127
8	Elections*	13	0.041401274
9	Social*	12	0.038216561
10	Bangladesh*	10	0.031847134
11	Faith**	10	0.031847134
12	Jinnah	10	0.031847134
13	Government*	10	0.031847134
14	Members*	9	0.02866242
15	Structure*	8	0.025477707
Total		314	1

*Denotes that the word is classified as “secular”
** Denotes that the word is classified as “ideological”

Evidence for AI

To reiterate, my first hypothesis was that at the national level, the consensus within the literature is accurate in describing Islam as a political tool used by Islamic parties to create a national identity. To test this hypothesis, I had to first choose which leader at the national level would be most beneficial for my study. I first decided that a representative from the PML-N party would be most apt because up until 2017, Nawaz Sharif had been Prime Minister of Pakistan since 2013 and was the leader of the PML-N party.¹⁶⁹ This is helpful not only because Sharif belongs to one of my case study parties, but also because he has given relatively recent speeches that appear in English. Once I had my representative chosen, I went to the Prime

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ “Former Prime Minister’s,” Prime Minister’s Office, accessed March 29, 2018. http://pmo.gov.pk/former_pms.php.

Minister’s official website and looked at all of the transcripts of speeches they had from the beginning of Sharif’s term.¹⁷⁰ I built a corpus from these, which included 151 speeches and messages from 2013-2017.¹⁷¹ To not bias the selection, I did not look at the speeches before selecting them, except to make sure they were in English. The only speeches from the website not used in the corpora were those in Urdu. Table 6 displays the raw results from the word list that Sketch Engine created from my corpora.¹⁷² These results will be used later to perform comparative analysis with the sub-national level.

Table 6. Word List from Nawaz Sharif of PML-N¹⁷³

Ideological	Frequency	Secular	Frequency
Allah	58	Economic	261
Islamic	48	Development	257
Religious	44	Government	232
Religion	39	Country	216
Islam	28	National	175
Faith	28	Security	164
God	16	International	145
Eid	16	Government	126
Blessed	15	Investment	98
Blessings	8	Trade	91
Holy	8	Political	88
Prayers	7	Economy	88
Religions	7	Education	73
Grace	6	Infrastructure	73
Bless	5	Policy	72
Total	333 (13.4%)		2,159 (86.7%)

¹⁷⁰ “Prime Minister’s Speeches,” Prime Minister’s Office, accessed March 29, 2018.

http://pmo.gov.pk/pm_speeches.php.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² “Sketch Engine: Language Corpus Management and Query System,” Sketch Engine.

¹⁷³ “Prime Minister’s Speeches,” Prime Minister’s Office.

Close Textual Analysis for A1

From the 151 documents used to create the corpora that resulted in the data shown in Table 6, I chose to conduct a textual analysis on one of Nawaz's speeches. The one I chose was a speech given directly to his citizens on Pakistan's Independence in August 2013.¹⁷⁴ I chose this document because it was one of the only ones in which Sharif is directly speaking to his constituents, the rest are mainly focused on Sharif's speeches to the international community, and, more specifically most are concerned with business and finance.¹⁷⁵

In Sharif's address to Pakistan on Independence Day, "God" is used five times which accounts for a significant amount of the times that "God" is used in all 151 documents in the corpus. Sharif focuses on the founders of Pakistan in this speech, but also reminds his citizens that all of it was due to God's generosity.¹⁷⁶ The two instances in which Sharif relies on Islamic rhetoric are the times that he thanks and attributes Pakistan's prosperity to God, and at the very end when he says "Insha'Allah."¹⁷⁷ Nowhere within the speech does Sharif talk about the necessity of maintaining Pakistan's deep religious routes or the validity of intertwining the Government with Islam.¹⁷⁸ Because of the context provided by this speech, it becomes apparent that at least in this speech, Sharif was superficially evoking the terms "God" and "Allah" to hark on the national identity that tries to bind the citizens of Pakistan together.

Evidence for A2

To collect the necessary evidence to test my second hypothesis, which is whether or not Islamic rhetoric is used significantly at the sub-national levels, I decided to examine rhetoric

¹⁷⁴ Nawaz Sharif, "Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's Address on Independence Day of Pakistan," Prime Minister's Office, last modified August 14, 2013, http://pmo.gov.pk/pm_speech_details.php?speech_id=1.

¹⁷⁵ "Prime Minister's Speeches," Prime Minister's Office.

¹⁷⁶ Nawaz Sharif, "Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's Address on Independence Day of Pakistan."

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

from specific representatives from each party and from each province. My methodology for choosing each leader was mainly dependent on their role within the provincial government, specifically chief minister or governor. The JI did not have representatives at the chief minister or governor levels within these provinces and therefore I went to the JI's website to understand who their party's leaders were within these provinces.¹⁷⁹ For the PML-N representatives, I found that in both provinces the PML-N holds the position of either chief minister or governor, which are the top leadership positions in the provinces.¹⁸⁰ Once these representatives were chosen, I standardized the process for acquiring documents written about their speeches or statements to the public. First, I conducted a general search for their name in Dawn.com.¹⁸¹ From there, I went through all the documents found in the website and pasted relevant passages into Sketch Engine.¹⁸² Relevant passages were those that either detailed words or sentiments spoken by the leaders or included direct quotes from the representatives themselves. All documents were from within the last decade and a total of 112 were found. Once these corpora were constructed, Sketch Engine created word lists for each representative.¹⁸³ From those word lists, I categorized relevant words into my two sub-categories (Ideological or Secular) and counted the number of times each word was used by the representative. From there, I calculated percentages for how much of the most frequent words were either ideological or secular rhetoric. Table 7 listed below summarizes the information about the representatives and the corpora built for each one.

¹⁷⁹ "Provincial Leadership," Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, accessed March 29, 2018. https://jamaat.org/en/provincial_leadership.php.

¹⁸⁰ "Our Chief Ministers," Punjab Portal, accessed March 29, 2018.

https://www.punjab.gov.pk/Our_Chief_Ministers; "Government," Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, accessed March 29, 2018. <http://kp.gov.pk/page/government>; "Iqbal Zafar Jhagra," Senate of Pakistan, accessed April 18, 2018. <http://www.senate.gov.pk/en/profile.php?uid=835>; "Nawaz Sharif's Brother Shahbaz Sharif Becomes Interim Chief of Ruling PML-N," *Business Standard*, last modified February 27, 2018, http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/nawaz-sharif-s-brother-shahbaz-sharif-becomes-interim-chief-of-ruling-pml-n-118022700624_1.html.

¹⁸¹ Dawn, accessed March 29, 2018. <https://www.dawn.com/>.

¹⁸² "Sketch Engine: Language Corpus Management and Query System," Sketch Engine.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

Following that table, tables 8-11 display the results from the word lists created by Sketch Engine.¹⁸⁴

Table 7. Representative Corpora Information

Representative	Party	Province	Position	Number of Documents
Mian Maqsood	JI	Punjab	Party Amir	18
Shehbaz Sharif	PML-N	Punjab	Chief Minister	18
Mushtaq Ahmad Khan	JI	KPK	Party Amir and Senator	39
Iqbal Zafar Jhagra	PML-N	KPK	Governor	37

Table 8. Word List for KPK PML-N Representative: Iqbal Zafar Jhagra¹⁸⁵

Ideological	Frequency	Secular	Frequency
	0	Government	41
		People	33
		Education	31
		Nation	26
		Development	22
		Party	14
		Political	14
		University	14
		Peace	14
		Tribal	13
		Terrorism	12
		Province	12
		Security	9
		Educational	9
		Afghanistan	9
Total	0 (0%)		273 (100%)

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Dawn, accessed March 29, 2018. <https://www.dawn.com/>. For each party leader, Dawn was used as a database to find articles and quotes regarding their rhetoric. Specific documents were not used, but instead they formed corpora to then be linguistically analyzed by Sketch Engine.

Table 9. Word List for Punjab PML-N Representative: Shehbaz Sharif¹⁸⁶

Ideological	Frequency	Secular	Frequency
		Government	17
		Country	15
		Electricity	12
		Party	10
		Provincial	8
		Education	8
		Corruption	7
		Province	5
		National	5
		International	5
		Terrorism	5
		Policies	5
		Federal	5
Total	0 (0%)		107 (100%)

Table 10. Word List for KPK JI Representative: Mushtaq Ahmad Khan¹⁸⁷

Ideological	Frequency	Secular	Frequency
Islamic	6	Government	69
		Provincial	47
		Party	37
		Federal	26
		Province	15
		Elections	15
		Tribal	15
		Corruption	14
		Parties	13
		Alliance	12
		Country	11
		Party's	11
		System	10
		Political	10
		Youth	6
Total	6 (1.89%)		311 (98.11%)

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

Table 11. Word List for Punjab JI representative: Mian Maqsood¹⁸⁸

Ideological	Frequency	Secular	Frequency
		Government	17
		Provincial	6
		Youth	5
		Party	5
		Youths	7
Total	0 (0%)		40 (100%)

Conclusion

Comparison

In this section, I will reflect and compare the data from tables 6-11. There are four significant themes from this data: “international”, “economic”, “corruption”, and “youth.” The use of the term “international” by the above representatives is interesting because it is only included in Nawaz and Shehbaz Sharif’s frequency lists. Shehbaz Sharif is Nawaz’s Sharif’s brother and is currently acting as the head of the PML-N, while his brother had to resign as prime minister after the Panama Papers leak.¹⁸⁹ It makes sense that Nawaz Sharif referenced or addressed the international community while he was prime minister, because of his status as a national level representative. What is more unique is Shehbaz Sharif’s use of the term, because none of the other provincial leaders, even within the same party, made a similar reference, or at least not as frequently. This validates the literature previously mentioned about the large numbers of Punjabis that work in the Government as well as the “Punjabization” of Pakistan that happened after partition.¹⁹⁰ The fact that this similarity exists makes sense with how linked Punjab and the national Government are. However, it does raise the question: why is Islamic rhetoric so different between the national level and Punjab, especially given that the two

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ “Nawaz Sharif’s Brother Shahbaz Sharif Becomes Interim Chief of Ruling PML-N,” *Business Standard*.

¹⁹⁰ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 16-18.

representatives are brothers and from the same party? This is where my argument fills the gap in the literature, and explains that the reason for this has to do with the national level and its use of Islamic rhetoric to create a national identity, which is not required of the provincial level.

The second theme has to do with the economy and is important because Nawaz Sharif only uses it at the national level. The first word in Nawaz Sharif's frequency list was "economic", whereas "government" was first for all four of the provincial leaders, regardless of province or party. Nawaz Sharif also uses the terms "trade" and "investment", which also fall into this theme. On the other side, the third theme is "corruption", which is more heavily used by the provincial leaders versus Nawaz Sharif. These differences in terminology and rhetoric illustrate which issues these leaders assess as being the most important for their constituents or other audiences, such as the international community. This is important to note because even though Nawaz Sharif speaks to the international and business communities, he still also heavily relies on Islamic rhetoric in a way that is very different from the provincial levels use of Islamic rhetoric.

The final theme is "youth." This theme is unique because only the JI representatives use it. This is a clear similarity in party rhetoric that does not depend on which province the candidate is from. Asif Luqman Qazi, whose essay I reviewed earlier, actually outlines the JI's plan for attracting more youth into the party.¹⁹¹ He mentions this when he talks about how the party is experimenting with trying to relax its membership to be able to appeal to a wider group of people, and specifically states that the party is focusing on its social media platforms to reach out to the youth in Pakistan.¹⁹² It is interesting to see the direct correlation between what a leader

¹⁹¹ Asif L. Qazi, "How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words."

¹⁹² Ibid.

of the JI is saying that the party is trying to do and then find evidence that they are actually in fact focusing on that party-wide with the specific use of rhetoric.

Results

My first argument was that Islamic rhetoric would be evoked more at the national level in the form of a political tool than at the sub-national level. 89.5% of the most frequent rhetoric in all of the speeches was secular, while 10.5% was ideological. However, of that ideological rhetoric, 98.2% of it came from Nawaz Sharif. Thus, leaving the sub-national level accounting for only 1.8% of the ideological rhetoric used in the total 263 documents collected. Therefore, I conclude that my first argument contributes to the literature on Islamic parties in Pakistan by quantifying the gap in ideological rhetoric between the two levels. The close textual analysis results also fit into the theoretical framework of my thesis, as they showed how different types of nationalism at the national and sub-national levels necessitate different uses of rhetoric. Those more nuanced ideas and use of rhetoric can only be captured and parsed with close textual analysis because it involves context as well as interpretation. From reading the documents, it was clear to see where and why Islamic rhetoric came up, depending on which issues the leaders were talking about; thereby showing how political Islam is used as a tool for creating a national identity at the national level.

From the results of my thesis, it seems clear that theory on the competition for votes contributes to the sub-national level results where parties start to become uniform so they can stimulate voter participation and electoral success by relying on ethnic nationalism. However, this is different at the national level where the candidates have to try and unite many groups of people, often without much of an identity rooted in either culture or language. However, an important note to make is that ideological rhetoric at any of the levels was not as prevalent as I expected. I believe there is a tendency to conflate Islam and Pakistan as being mutually

exclusive; however, just as Islamic parties are not all the same, Pakistan is much more than its religion and its political leaders illuminate that point. These results also show that my second hypothesis was accurate in the sense that Islamic rhetoric was not used as heavily at the sub-national level. However, there were some interesting findings about the use of Islam between parties as well as across provinces, specifically that the JI was slightly more ideological in its rhetoric in comparison to both of the PML-N representatives.

Counter-Arguments

Critical arguments against my hypothesis and results come from potential case selection bias. There is a valid argument for including all four provinces into this case study as well as other political parties. This would be useful in testing the robustness of my argument and confirming that ideological rhetoric is also used more at the national level in comparison to the Sindh and Balochistan provinces. While this expansion would increase the accuracy of my thesis, I do not believe it currently limits the results or conclusions of my work. KP and Punjab again account for a significant amount of the population and therefore ethnic groups within Pakistan. The JI and PML-N are well known political parties in Pakistan, regardless of the amount of success they garner. I believe that both parts of these case selections are a good starting point for research into how Islam is used differently at the two levels, but agree that a more inclusive study could be done to determine more nuance within the results.

The Western bias within this thesis should also be acknowledged. The newspaper outlets and think tanks chosen for this study are both geared towards a Western audience because they are published in English. Therefore, there could be differences in the type of rhetoric used in Urdu versus that used in English.

Further Research

I have identified at least two areas for further research on this topic. One potential question has to do with how Islamic rhetoric has changed over time in Pakistan. Now that the relationship between Islamic rhetoric and the two levels has been identified, it would be interesting to test this theory across time, specifically during the historical periods mentioned in the literature review of this thesis. The other question addresses Jaffrelot's argument regarding whether or not Pakistan's "nationalism" is centered on Islam or anti-India sentiment.¹⁹³ Using the same corpus methodology, these two types of rhetoric could be pulled from the speeches and articles to see how prevalent they are within the discourse.

Concluding Thoughts

From the rhetoric and news samples collected, it is clear to see that Islam is conflated either with Pakistan as a whole or extremism. My thesis builds off of the literature that is trying to dig deep into the complexities of Pakistan and Islam to dispel these broad generalizations.¹⁹⁴ I use scholarship on nationalism to explain the differences in rhetoric at the national and sub-national levels in Pakistan, while also recognizing that nationalism is not the sole cause for any one facet of Pakistani complexity. By combining linguistic methodology with political science analysis, I was able to parse through text and provide conclusions. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state, a key actor in the fight against terrorism, as well as an ally to both the United States and China. For these reasons, it is important to understand the motivations behind Pakistan's political

¹⁹³ Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*, 38.

¹⁹⁴ Some of this literature includes: Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*; Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan*; Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?*; Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*; Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*; Haroon K. Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote : Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan*.

actions and rhetoric in order to reduce the confluences that already exist. Most research has focused on either Islam at the national level or ethnic conflict at the sub-national level, and my thesis was able to bridge the two and explore the links between Islamic nationalism and ethnic nationalism in Pakistan.

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