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Latin America during the Cold War: The Role of U.S. Soft Power

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Latin America during the Cold War: The Role of U.S. Soft Power

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from
The College of William and Mary

by

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Chapter One

Introduction

The year was 1915, and the bloodshed and destruction of World War I consumed international attention. As the Allied and Central powers clashed throughout Europe, other countries looked on to determine if they were willing to provide aid and support, and to which side. Each of the warring coalitions realized the importance of strong international allies, and sought to obtain backing from great powers still on the sidelines. The United States, with its vast economic resources, was highly desired as an ally by both Britain and Germany. Each country did its best to win the support of the American people and their leaders, both acknowledging that the United States could not be forced to take sides. Instead, each opponent sought to “wine and dine” Washington, hoping to win U.S. support (Nye, 2004).

Both countries deployed propaganda campaigns to create a favorable view of themselves in U.S. public opinion. The German campaign was a failure. Germany inundated the United States with a deluge of strong messages, in both words and images, that extolled the virtues of the Central powers and glorified the German empire. The approach backfired. Americans were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of messages and startled by their forcefulness. The people became wary of Berlin’s intentions, and support for the German war effort did not increase (Nye, 2004).

Britain learned its lesson from the failed German attempt. Its propaganda campaign was far more subtle, portraying the British people and leadership as having an air of “dignity, elegance, and affability” (Nye, 2004, 100). This understated approach

engendered a more appealing image of Britain than the German campaign suggested of Germany. In addition, the British focused first on U.S. elites rather than attempting to win the support of the entire American public. This approach yielded the desired result: the United States viewed the British cause more favorably and provided financial support to London as well as moral support to the British cause as a whole. According to Nye, “the sheer radiation of aristocratic distinction [in the British propaganda campaigns] was enough to warm the cockles of many a staunch...heart, and to invoke enthusiasm for [Britain]” (2004, 100).

The propaganda campaigns of WWI are examples of the use of soft power. While soft power as a term is a rather recent addition to the international relations lexicon, the concept is not new (McClellan, 1963; Thompson, 1979; Roxborough, O'Brien, & Roddick, 1977). Soft power encompasses a variety of foreign policy tools that are alternatives to carrot or stick approaches like military force, economic sanctions, and bribes, and can fulfill a variety of goals. It can be used when other tools of foreign policy are impracticable, and it can have results that are just as dramatic as, for example, a military invasion.¹

This thesis addresses the question of whether or not the United States used soft power as a foreign policy tool using case studies of U.S. interventions in Latin America during the Cold War. In so doing, it sheds light on the larger question of whether soft power has historically been used at all. It also seeks to go beneath the surface of the term

¹ Nye also argues that soft power may be the cheapest or more effective option even when hard power tactics can be employed as well (2004).

and explain how soft power can be used to describe diverse scenarios and to achieve different goals.²

Past Research and Definitions

Joseph Nye, Jr. coined the concept of “soft power” in the late 1980s, and since then the literature on the topic has expanded significantly. Soft power researchers have sought to define and clearly operationalize the term, refute critics who claim soft power is not a commonly used or important tool of statecraft, and differentiate soft power from hard power (2004; 2011).³ Colloquially defined, soft power is “anything other than hard power.” Indeed, it is easier to explain what soft power is if we first explain what it is not. Hard power, according to Thomas Schelling, has two components: brute force and coercion (1966, 65).

Brute force is the explicit display of superior military or economic strength to force a target country to take a certain action or cease some behavior (Schelling, 1966, 67). Examples include bombing raids, predator drones, and the deployment of ground troops to a target country. Coercion is the threat of punishment or the promise of reward. This manipulation can take the form of either carrots or sticks. State A may, for instance, tell State B that State A will launch airstrikes or impose economic sanctions if State B does not comply with State A’s wishes (i.e., a stick). Alternatively, State A may promise to lift existing sanctions or cease military operations on State B if State B complies with

² It is not, however, concerned with whether attempts to use soft power were effective or not. The focus is purely on whether it was used at all.

³ Scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Niall Ferguson, and others have argued against Nye and his supporters, claiming that soft power does not exist and/or is not relevant for policymakers (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007).

State A's wishes (i.e., a carrot). Bribes or the promise of foreign aid also fit into the "carrot" category (Schelling, 1966, 69).

Soft power, on the other hand, uses the principles of attraction to entice another actor to follow your lead (Nye, 2004). A target exhibits the effects of a soft power influence attempt when it changes its public opinion, elite attitudes, or policies because it wants to emulate another state, among possible other changes.⁴ Soft power tactics include propaganda campaigns and proclaiming support for certain policies or leaders (Nye, 2004; Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007; Parmar & Cox, 2010).

While there is considerable research on soft power as a theoretical concept or idea, there are two holes in the literature (Nye, 2004; Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007; Parmar & Cox, 2010; Ruland, Hanf, & Manske, 2006). One is a lack of systematic empirical analyses of cases in which soft power has been deployed. There is very little evidence beyond anecdotal claims that states have actually used soft power as a foreign policy tool. In addition, soft power is too often used as a blanket term, applied casually and imprecisely to cover any non-hard power policy tool. The literature would benefit from a definition that differentiates between instances of soft power use and takes into account the fact that not all non-hard power operations are examples of soft power. This categorization would make the term more precise and more useful for describing circumstances in the real policy world. This thesis addresses both of these issues.

⁴ The three examples of the effects of soft power use explained in this paragraph are included because they were the three goals of soft power use discovered in my previous work with this topic.

Summary of Theory

I argue that states have in fact used soft power as a foreign policy tool, and demonstrate this assertion using three case studies of Latin American countries during the Cold War: Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. I examine instances in which the U.S. government sought to use soft power tools in each of these cases and demonstrate that such instances qualify as soft power, thus showing the use of soft power policy instruments during the Cold War.

To address the second gap in the literature, the lack of a nuanced definition, I test a new typology, based on my previous work with this topic, which categorizes instances of soft power use by the goals that Washington sought to achieve, the components of which were compiled during my previous work with this topic. To accomplish this task, I determine what goals the United States pursued in each of the three case studies and match them to my typology. For example, in the case of Guatemala, I show how the United States developed and ran three separate types of propaganda campaigns to decrease support for the communist-leaning Salvador Allende administration, with the goal of changing the public opinion of both the Guatemalan people and the army.

Thus, this thesis conducts the first systematic analysis of soft power use, increasing confidence in the usefulness of soft power as a concept. This study paves the way for other researchers to study soft power empirically in different regions and time periods. Further, it proposes a new typology of soft power that will clarify the term and allow it to be used more accurately in the literature. In short, this thesis breaks new conceptual and empirical ground in the study of soft power.

Conclusions

I find that the United States used soft power during the Cold War in Latin America, specifically in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. Specifically, in Chile, I demonstrate that the United States used soft power to attempt to change public opinion in three separate instances. The methods used in this case were propaganda campaigns and endorsement of U.S.-approved policies.

In Guatemala, the United States sought to change public opinion and elite issue attitudes using three different types of propaganda campaigns. First, Washington orchestrated a series of pamphlet drops over the capital city. Second, the CIA created its own radio station to broadcast anti-government messages to the population. Third, the United States supported student groups in Guatemala that were already opposed to the government and dictated parts of their propaganda campaigns.

Finally, in Brazil, the United States used its soft power resources to encourage the anti-government efforts of the Brazilian Congress, the armed forces, labor and student groups, churches, and elements of the business sector before and during the military coup that deposed the regime of João Goulart. Although the CIA case file concerning this conflict has not yet been declassified, there is enough information available to conclude that the United States did use soft power to affect the outcome of the coup. These influence attempts were all efforts to change public opinion or elite issue attitudes.

In terms of the typology, this thesis concludes that the goals that the United States used in these countries during the Cold War fit into two of the three categories gleaned from my earlier research: to change public opinion or to change attitudes of the leadership on a certain issue. In the theory chapter, I will discuss my hypothesis that soft

power can also be used to accomplish the goal of changing policy and provide evidence for why this may still be the case, despite the lack of evidence in this thesis.

Contributions

The conclusions described above are important contributions to the soft power literature for two reasons. First, they provide evidence that soft power is in fact a policy option that states choose in attempts to achieve their international policy goals. As discussed above, there has long been a debate in the literature over whether or not soft power exists and/or is useful for study. While the numerous theoretical discussions of soft power are essential for defining and operationalizing how the term might play a role in international affairs, empirical evidence of the concept at work is necessary to move the research program forward and lay these doubts to rest.

Second, the proposed typology allows scholars to differentiate among types of soft power. Despite the wealth of study on its operationalization, soft power is often defined too broadly. The literature would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of soft power—one that differentiates between the different goals it is used to achieve. In determining that states can and do use soft power to change public opinion and shift attitudes on specific issues, this thesis provides insight into how different soft power tools have been used to accomplish different goals. The question of which soft power tools can be used to address which goals, while not the subject of this thesis, is an interesting and valuable question. My typology will aid research on this topic because policymakers will

make better informed decisions about the use of soft power by knowing which soft power tools have been used in the past to accomplish which goals.⁵

The evidence provided in this thesis can be used by scholars to argue that the use of soft power was an integral part of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. As is shown in the case study chapters, Washington used a variety of tactics, both hard and soft, to achieve its goals in Latin America. If soft power tactics are removed from the equation, the United States would have had far fewer options at its disposal. Some goals could not be reached using hard power tactics, such as changing the public opinion of Chile to increase support for a certain presidential candidate while maintaining free and fair democratic elections. The United States would not have been able to address this and other goals without the use of soft power tactics.

While the subject of this thesis is how the United States used soft power in Latin America during the Cold War, the conclusions it draws are likely generalizable to other regions, time periods, and actors. First, there is no reason to assume that soft power is a tool deployed only by the United States. The Soviet Union also used propaganda campaigns during the Cold War to keep their allies close and to denounce U.S. doctrine. In addition, soft power tools were likely not unique to the Cold War period. While Nye argues that the United States has placed less emphasis on soft power since the end of the Cold War, there has been a resurgence of the use of these tactics during America's most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (2004; Parmar and Cox, 2010). Furthermore, the goals outlined in the typology are goals that any state or nonstate actor may have as they

⁵ Note that the three categories of the typology were created during my previous research on soft power during the Cold War in Latin America. This thesis seeks to verify that these three categories are appropriate to apply in this context and determine if there are additional categories that should be added to the typology.

consider their foreign policy agenda. They are also not restricted to a particular time period or region, meaning that scholars can apply the proposed typology to other geographic or temporal contexts that are of interest to them.

Research Design

I conducted my analysis in the following way. First, I heavily researched the concept of soft power to discern the holes in the literature. Second, I formed my research questions based on this research. Third, I selected my three case studies and catalogued U.S. intervention attempts in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. Fourth and finally, I determined which influence attempts were examples of soft power use and determined which of the three goals from my typology (if any) the attempts sought to achieve.

Roadmap

This thesis has a total of six chapters. The next chapter provides an in-depth literature review of soft power research and the gaps which persist. It also describes my theory in greater detail, identifies its contributions to the literature, and explains the research design I will use to glean information from my case study chapters.

I next present three cases studies of Latin American countries during the Cold War: Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. Each chapter begins by introducing the case and providing a brief history of the situation there during the Cold War, focusing on U.S. intervention attempts. Each then continues with brief explanations of the major hard power influence attempts by the United States present in the case. Third, each chapter provides a thorough discussion of the soft power influence attempts by the United States,

concluding with explanations of the goals each attempt tried to accomplish. This provides evidence for the proposed typology. The final chapter is the conclusion, tying together the insights gathered from the case studies.

Chapter Two

Soft Power and U.S- Latin American Relations in the Cold War

The concept of power is frequently understood in militaristic and economic terms – guns and tanks, trade embargos and tariffs. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II and the napalm of Vietnam come quickly to mind. But there is another type of tool available to states seeking to gain control over others that may be just as prevalent and potent, if not as readily apparent. This tool, called soft power, was in action during World War II when European teenagers behind the Iron Curtain turned on Radio Free Europe and listened to American music and news and during the Cold War when the United States disseminated anti-Communist propaganda amongst its allies (Nye, 2004).⁶ Understanding the uses and goals of soft power helps explain when and why these tactics are chosen in place of hard ones, and provides a clearer picture of U.S. foreign policy.

Power is one of the central concepts of international relations theory, and the main distinction made in the literature is between hard and soft power. Hard power includes the subcategories of brute force and coercion, which covers the use and threat of force as well as the promise of rewards. Soft power, on the other hand, is associated with less obvious tactics like propaganda campaigns and international business initiatives. Hard power focuses on forcing or persuading an opponent to comply with your wishes, while soft power uses principles of attraction – such as building positive relationships and

⁶ Statements such as this should not be interpreted to mean that there is a wealth of empirical evidence on the subject. As will be explained later, the current literature on soft power contains only anecdotal evidence that soft power may exist outside in practice.

cultivating respect – to entice your opponent to want what you want (Nye, 2004). Soft power is the subtle side of politics – getting results by making your state’s culture and policies attractive to others.⁷

This thesis advances the literature on soft power in two ways. First, while soft power has been widely discussed in a theoretical context, there has been little empirical work done to show how, or even if, it has been used in specific instances. I address this problem by observing whether and how the United States used soft power in three specific case studies in Latin America during the Cold War, namely U.S. intervention in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. Second, soft power is usually too broadly defined and would benefit from a narrower, more nuanced classification system. This thesis proposes a typology of instances of soft power use based on the goals it set out to achieve. This typology is important to the development of the soft power literature because it differentiates between instances of soft power use, which will make the term more useful for describing foreign policy tactics.

By addressing whether and how the United States used soft power during the Cold War in Latin America, this thesis also contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy in the region. The literature suggests the use of soft power during this time, but there is little conclusive evidence on the subject. This thesis takes the first step toward explaining how soft power played a role in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War period.

This chapter has three sections. The first will define soft power and review the current literature, arguing that there is at present little empirical evidence for the use of

⁷ The terms will be defined more fully in the next subsection, entitled “Soft Power.”

soft power. The second will discuss the need for a new typology of soft power use and explain how this thesis will further the soft power literature. The third will present the research design used to test the argument that states use soft power and test the goals-based typology of soft power uncovered in my earlier work on this topic. It will also discuss how soft power will be operationalized for the purposes of this study.

Soft Power

The term soft power is a relatively new one, developed in the late 1980s by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Introducing the idea in his book *Bound to Lead*, Nye took issue with the widely-held view that the United States was falling from a position of primacy (Lockwood, 1983; Thompson, 1981). Nye argued that there was no cause for alarm because the United States was still the world's strongest nation not only militarily and economically, but also on a new third dimension that he dubbed "soft power" (Nye, 2004, 56).

Nye asserts that the nature of global power has changed over time. While in the past it was possible for countries to use "command and coercion"—that is, "hard power"—to get their way in international affairs, over the past several decades there has been an increased emphasis placed on getting others to want what you want, or soft power (Nye, 2004). Power in one area does not necessarily translate into power in another, and a nation that is long on military might may be short on the resources necessary to wield soft power. Thus, it is no longer common to hear statesmen such as John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War during World War II scoff, "'World opinion?' I don't believe in world opinion. The only thing that matters is power" (Nye,

2004). Leaders now realize that the ability to move hearts and minds is just as much a part of power as the ability to move armies and bank accounts.

According to Thomas Schelling, hard power can take one of two forms: brute force or coercion. Brute force is generally easily recognizable as hard power. It includes military tactics, economic sanctions, and other methods by which one state displays a clear superiority over another. In terms of coercion, Schelling makes the distinction between coercive diplomacy and coercive attempts. He defines coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war that involves building up military force and threatening to use it if the target does not respond appropriately. In contrast, coercive attempts include elements like bribery: methods of gaining leverage over a target using positive inducements rather than force or the threat thereof (Schelling, 1966). Neither of these examples are instances of soft power use because each comes with either an explicit or implied threat or promise. Soft power attempts contain neither of these elements.

Soft power differs from hard power in several key ways.⁸ First, it is a far more subtle approach (Nye, 2004). Rather than dangling a carrot or waving a stick in front of international actors, soft power calls for a less pointed tactic that aims to turn the tide of opinion. It is a method of agenda setting whereby a state sets an example and adopts policies that other countries then seek to follow – not because of threats or bribes but simply because they respect the state that set the rules and want to emulate them. It relies

⁸ Soft power is not to be confused with influence or persuasion, however. Influence, the ability to produce effects on the behavior of others, can work through hard power sources like military force or economic sanctions. Persuasion, the ability to reason with others to change views and/or behavior, is not a broad enough term to cover all the aspects of soft power. It lacks the attractiveness element, the charisma of sorts that a leader or nation must cultivate to draw in other actors, and focuses too heavily on a logical appeal. Soft power is the international relations version of having a magnetic personality (Mearsheimer, 2001). In addition, soft power capacity is not dependent on hard power capacity. Nye uses the example of the Pope and the Vatican, which has few hard power resources but still fairly extensive political clout (Nye, 2004).

on a state's ability to shape preferences and shift the course of international events through what amounts to the use of seduction. For example, in Iran today satellite radio is raising support for western ideals and policy initiatives (Nye, 2011). Finally, soft power carries a more positive public relations connotation than hard power because the state whose policy has been changed has done so voluntarily (Nye, 2003; Nye, 2004).

It is important here to note the difference between building soft power and using it as a foreign policy tool. Some actions, such as exchange students traveling overseas, U.S. businesses making a positive impression as they expand to other countries, and the use of foreign policy initiatives that endear one country to another are all examples of building soft power. Using soft power involves deploying the resources that have already been built up to accomplish a goal through, for example, propaganda campaigns and endorsement of foreign policies and leaders. This thesis is concerned with the second aspect of soft power. The literature has done a good job of detailing where soft power comes from and how stockpiles of it develop, but this thesis moves to the second step. By showing how soft power is actually used, and the goals it can be used to achieve, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to the literature.

Soft power has three sources: (1) a society's cultural values, as expressed through the way they conduct their domestic and international political affairs; (2) its political values; and (3) the decisions statesmen make and objectives they pursue in foreign policy. World leaders are starting to pay more attention to the elusive concept of "world opinion" that hinges on the soft power sources, meaning a state's reputation and standing in the international community (Nye, 2011).

Nye defines culture as “the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society” (2004, 89). The climate is right for gains in soft power when the values are universally accepted and supported by a state’s public, and when the government enacts policies that reflect these values (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011). These shared values create a sense of a common viewpoint among domestic citizens that is key to fostering soft power abroad. When citizens of the international community are able to clearly identify a common cultural identity emanating from a state, they began to associate the entire state with that identity. Indeed, one need look no further than the global spread of McDonald’s or Coca-Cola to see how one society’s cultural “values” can pervade another to great effect. Neither the U.S. government nor the private sector forced other countries to incorporate these American businesses into their cultures, but it is hard to deny that they have often been warmly embraced (Nye, 2011). In addition, the cultural element of soft power extends beyond the commercial sector. Every American traveling, living, and working abroad is an ambassador of sorts for American culture and values. U.S. exchange students have the opportunity to spread knowledge about their state, and, for better or for worse, to help others form opinions of America and Americans (Nye, 2003; Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011).

Some scholars claim that soft power is defined only in the cultural sense just described (Wight, 1994). Nye goes further, arguing that government actions both domestically and internationally are two other sources of soft power (2004; 2011).

The influence of domestic government actions is sometime difficult to spot, because it must follow a convoluted path in order to have an effect. Virtually any law a state has on its books can be a source of soft power, provided other countries care about

it. Members of the international community may either approve or disapprove of the actions the government has taken, and their view of the state the government represents may change as a result. There are few domestic policies that are controversial enough to cause international debate, but some notable exceptions include gay rights and abortion laws, capital punishment and gun control (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011). Nye cites U.S. laws permitting capital punishment and poor gun control as examples of policies that are currently stunting the growth of American soft power in Europe (2004).

Actions in the international community also cause other countries to sit up and take notice. The United States' decision to invade Iraq in 2003, for instance, was the subject of intense debate, especially among European governments, because the United States' actions were going to have a profound effect on the way these other countries conducted international affairs. In those countries which supported the U.S.'s actions, U.S. soft power resources increased. Conversely, in countries which did not support the U.S.'s actions, U.S. soft power resources were reduced (Nye, 2011). In general, international actions are more likely than domestic ones to contribute to the decline or improvement of soft power resources because they are more likely to be noticed by and affect the international community.

The Iraq War is the most recent example of the use of this soft power source, but certainly not the first. The Vietnam War was also tremendously unpopular, both at home and abroad, and led to a sharp decrease in U.S. soft power. In this case, soft power rebounded after the dust settled and memories of the conflict started to fade. According to Nye, overseas publics are generally able to distinguish the American people from American policies. Even so, there is a growing rumble of discontent regarding U.S.

influence in foreign countries, whether cultural, economic, or militaristic (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011).

There is an additional disagreement in the literature over how soft power should be defined. The core of the disagreement stems from whether or not to include diplomacy as an element of soft power. Nye and others argue that diplomacy is often nothing more than coercion by another name, making it a hard power tool (Nye, 2004; Parmar & Cox, 2010). Others cite diplomacy as the quintessential soft power tool, distinct from military force (Wight, 1994; Waltz, 2008). The latter belief likely stems from the popular belief that diplomacy is the “nice” way that states get what they want in international politics, when in reality there is nothing that says diplomacy has to be (or even often is) polite. In reality, diplomacy often involves bargaining and negotiations, encouraging another state to do what you want because you have threatened them with repercussions if they do not (Schelling, 1966). While no shots might ever be fired and no bombs ever dropped, this is not a soft power tool because it does not rely on the principles of attraction. Instead, it uses intimidation and fear, two tactics that run contrary to soft power logic (Schelling, 1966).

It is important to note that institutions and organizations other than a state’s government can possess soft power. The Pope and the Vatican, as well as other non-state actors like OPEC, the United Nations, and even terrorist groups can cultivate and deploy soft power (Nye, 2004). It is for this reason that governments must make sure that the policies they enact reinforce their message rather than undermine it. World opinion can be quite changeable, and a government whose ideology is supported by its practices will be better able to weather an unfavorable turn of the tide. Leaders must make sure they are

the loudest sound in the cacophony of voices clamoring for attention (Nye, 2003; Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011).

Soft power may be more difficult to build up than hard power because many of its sources are beyond governmental control. For example, cultural values have been entrenched long before the current regime came to power and will almost certainly outlast it. Further, soft power is also much slower to create. Because soft power deals primarily with larger issues of global identity and the degree of respect for a state in the international community, it cannot be quickly conjured as a quick fix for whatever current international crisis a state is facing (Nye, 2004). In terms of deployment, changing public opinion takes time, and changing the entire identity of a state takes even longer. Soft power should therefore not be expected to make large, sweeping changes to a state's policies overnight, in the way an atomic bomb might. Soft power can also either produce a favorable climate for a certain type of policy or make the policy itself (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011). Soft power is by definition not coercive, and relies on the target state's respect of the state using the soft power to effect change in the target state. Because of this fact, soft power should not be expected to be swiftly created to swift changes to policy or attitudes. In addition, the groundwork must be laid slowly, making soft power a poor choice for resolving crises requiring immediate action (Nye, 2004; Mearsheimer, 2001).⁹

In terms of international relations theory, soft power aligns well with constructivism, although Nye himself was a neoliberalist (2011). The constructivist framework suggests that international politics is conducted primarily through a

⁹ This poses a challenge for soft power detection, but not an insurmountable one. We can still see how soft power is developing in a given case, even if we cannot yet see the finished product.

continuous, fluid process of interaction between actors. The key variable is ideas rather than material factors, and it is their exchange, as well as the sharing and building of interests and identities, that shapes policy decisions (Wight, 1994; Mearsheimer, 2001). Soft power fits easily into this framework since it addresses the cultural variables that realism ignores.

Furthermore, soft power is an integral part of the constructivist framework because of the variables that interest a constructivist scholar. He or she analyzes IR theory and practice by determining what each actor desires, fears, identifies with, and avoids, then looks for relationships between and across categories. It is a more nuanced field of study, with more facets and possible avenues for explanation than the cut-and-dried realist paradigm that considers solely hard power variables (Wight, 1994; Art & Waltz, 2004). The topics of propaganda, public opinion, and the use of language and rhetoric, all elements of soft power thinking, lend themselves to study under the constructivist paradigm. This is not to say that constructivism ignores the influences of military and economic processes in the course of international events, but rather that it believes there are other aspects of the equation that add richness (Wight, 1994; Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007).

Not all academics agree with Nye that soft power is useful or that it even exists as a foreign policy tool. Many realists have derided the usefulness of soft power as a concept because they believe that nations respond purely to military and economic threats, not cultural influence (Mearsheimer, 2001; Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007; Wight, 1994; Thompson, 1981; Turner & Ullman, 1972). Also, some authors contend that soft power is difficult to distinguish from other forms of power because it can often

appear very similar to threats to use hard power (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007; Mearsheimer, 2001). As an example, Janice Bially Mattern cites George W. Bush's famous phrase, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," spoken before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, as a use of soft power (Ruland, Hanf, & Manske, 2006). Other scholars, however, have asserted that this phrase was only an implied threat to use military or economic force against those who end up "against us" (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007; Mearsheimer, 2001).

In the realist paradigm, there are only two types of power: military and economic. Realists may concede that there are variables that affect the international system besides military and economic power, but they do not believe that they play enough of a role to warrant serious attention (Mearsheimer, 2001; Wight, 1994; Waltz, 2008). Furthermore, some realists believe that trying to analyze power in terms of variables like respect and admiration rather than material ones like military and economic potential is problematic because soft power resources are harder to quantify. Attempting to conceptualize power in this way may cause international conflicts to escalate out of control because it becomes difficult for leaders to determine the goals of other actors (Turner & Ullman, 1972; Wight, 1994). In addition, in the realist worldview states are competitive and self-interested, which leads to a certain basic level of suspicion of all other states. A realist would then find it totally illogical for any one state to aspire to be like another because it admired the other's culture, values, or any other subjective variable (Art & Waltz, 2004; Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007).

Admittedly, military and soft power can operate simultaneously. While military force is generally considered to be one of the defining criteria for hard power, it can also

contribute to soft power resources (Art & Waltz, 2004). One need look no further than Stalin or Hitler to leaders who cultivated a persona of invincibility to attract followers.¹⁰ Power, or the appearance of it, is an extremely seductive quality, and many people will find themselves inexorably drawn to a strong leader or state (Mearsheimer, 2001). Paradoxically, one of the key ways to cultivate this image of control and strength is to actually possess a large quantity of hard power, whether militarily, economically, or both. In this way hard power can contribute greatly to the growth and maintenance of soft power resources (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007). In the international arena, this fact seems to indicate that countries with larger stores of hard power should have higher levels of soft power as well, or at least be better equipped to earn it. In these situations the line between hard and soft power is blurred.¹¹

These criticisms miss critical elements of the definition of soft power. First, hard power cannot be the only force at work in international relations because it overlooks many tools used by states to achieve their aims. For example, stability operations, or winning the hearts and minds of the general population, have been part of U.S. military tactics throughout its history (Chapman, 2009). Soldiers need to be equally adept at defeating the enemy (hard power) and cultivating a positive image in the eyes of civilians (soft power) to ensure cooperation from them in the future. This public relations management ensures that soft power resources are not decimated when a military operation is conducted. Second, adding soft variables to the power equation does not

¹⁰ The psychological term “Stockholm syndrome” is also relevant here as it identifies people who have been kidnapped and end up identifying and sympathizing with their captors (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007).

¹¹ This does not mean that we cannot distinguish the terms conceptually or empirically. It only shows that we must be careful in our observations and know where to draw the line. Subsequent chapters will deal with the relationship between hard and soft power use.

increase uncertainty, but rather does the opposite. Taking into account how states view each other provides valuable information that may change the order of one state's foreign policy preferences. For instance, a state may try to determine whether it is in its best interest to intervene in a conflict between two other states where it has a vested interest in seeing one side win. While it may have the military superiority to facilitate the desired outcome, if it cares about its reputation in the eyes of the losing state it may think twice before taking action.

So far, the literature on soft power has made great strides in terms of the operationalization of the term. Nye and others have distinguished soft power from hard power and identified a number of policy tactics that could fall under the soft power umbrella, such as propaganda campaigns and official statements asserting the view of the government. They have speculated on how soft power might theoretically be used in foreign policy. While this groundwork was necessary to advance the field in its early stages, empirical evidence is conspicuously absent. The next step is to look for evidence of soft power in real world policy situations. Currently, much of the evidence in the literature is anecdotal, meaning that there have been no rigorous empirical studies that attempt to catalogue how soft power has been used throughout history. Rectifying this gap is the next step in advancing the soft power literature, as well as making it relevant for policymakers and academics alike.

Advancing the Literature on Soft Power

The first problem that this thesis attempts to address is that of the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating that states have used soft power tactics to achieve their

goals in the soft power literature. Through a thorough analysis of three cases, this thesis will begin to make headway in this area. The first task will be to show that soft power is, in fact, a tool that has been used in the past to accomplish foreign policy goals.

The second problem is that despite the wealth of study on its operationalization, soft power is often defined too broadly. The literature would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of soft power—one that differentiates between the different goals it is used to achieve. Thus, after establishing that states have used soft power, this thesis categorizes the instances of soft power use in terms of a typology of aims developed in my earlier research on this topic. This typology will be explained in the next section.

The literature on soft power does highlight differences in the origins of soft power—that is, whether it is cultural, domestic, or international. But a typology based on differences in goals has two advantages over one based on sources: First, it can help determine when governments will employ soft power tactics and which ones they will use. Second, it will enable future scholars to identify the conditions under which soft power is most useful. That is, for what goals do leaders most often deploy soft power and which goals can soft power most effectively achieve?

Future research may also find that different soft power tactics are better suited to each goal. For instance, starting a propaganda campaign geared toward influencing Guatemalan indigenous tribes would be more likely to change public opinion in that community than the attitudes of Guatemala's non-indigenous elite. In addition, some tactics can be used to further more than one goal, depending on the situation. For example, a clear and consistent propaganda campaign in Lebanon decrying regulations that require women to prove education at the elementary level before they can vote could

change both that particular policy as well as the overall national attitude toward women's rights.

From my previous research on the deployment of soft power, I have tentatively concluded that states can seek to do one of three things with their soft power resources. They can attempt to change: (1) the attitude of the general public of a state (change public opinion), (2) elite attitudes on an issue (such as women's rights), and/or (3) a specific policy (enact or repeal a certain law). But this may not be an exhaustive list of the goals soft power can be used to achieve. One of the goals of this research is to test the existing categories typology, adding or subtracting goals based on the three cases explored.

Each soft power attempt will likely try to fulfill at least one goal, and sometimes several. Which goals are pertinent in a given scenario will depend on the long-term agenda of the government exercising the soft power and will differ from situation to situation. It is therefore imperative for states to clearly define their goal(s) as well as gauge the values and ideals of their opponent before choosing which tactic(s) to pursue. Because of these facts, choice of goal may also be determined by the amount and type of stores of soft power available to a state. For instance, a state without a means for reaching another state's general population but with a way to reach its leaders will find it difficult to accomplish the goal of public opinion change since this requires access to more than just the government. They might, however, be able to change a specific policy if they can persuade the relevant members of the leadership to make a change. In this way the type and amount of soft power dictate the goals even as the goals dictate the type and amount of soft power.

Research Design

As identified several times above, there are two major gaps in the literature on soft power, namely a lack of empirical analysis and a failure to explore differences between instances of soft power use. This thesis will attempt to address these problems by first showing that soft power was indeed a tool used by states in the past to accomplish foreign policy goals. After instances of soft power use have been identified, I will then determine the goals that the governments were trying to achieve. In so doing, the thesis will test the typology of aims described above, demonstrating that soft power is not a one-dimensional tool and can be used to achieve a variety of goals.

Case Selection

This thesis examines three case studies of Latin American countries in which the United States may have exercised their soft power resources during the Cold War: Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. These cases were chosen for several reasons. First, scholars have identified some cases when soft power might have been used by the United States—especially in Europe—although the evidence is purely anecdotal. But there has been limited speculation about the use of soft power in Cold War-era Latin America. In his book *Negotiating Paradise*, Dennis Merrill asserts that this particular angle of study is new and innovative (2009).¹²

Second, these cases likely provide a good cross-section of the different ways soft power policy can be used. The United States entered each of these countries with

¹² Part of the reason for this state of affairs is that the soft power research program is rather young, and social scientists and historians alike are just beginning to scratch the surface of how the concept has been applied throughout history (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007).

different sets of goals and used different strategies in order to pursue them. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that a wide range of soft power tools was used as part of these strategies.

Third, these are “most likely” cases—making for a good test of the soft power argument. The United States was more likely to use soft power during the Cold War in Latin America than in many other times and places throughout its history because this was a time period and region in which the United States was very concerned about its security. The United States was very worried about the spread of the communist threat during the Cold War era, and particularly key to its strategy was protecting areas with close proximity to U.S. borders. While this reason could be interpreted to mean that we would expect to find evidence of hard power and not soft, it more generally highlights the expectation that we would find more instances of influence attempts of all varieties than in other regions and time periods. Therefore, we expect that we will find evidence of both hard and soft power.

More specifically, the United States was likely to use soft power in Latin America during the Cold War because Latin America is physically very close to the United States. Washington thought it imperative to build and maintain a strong sphere of influence in the region during the uncertain Cold War years (McClellan, 1963; Kagan, 1996). Since the Soviet Union already had control over Cuba, U.S. leaders sought to contain the Communist threat and isolate it on that island. If the United States could encourage other Latin American states to trust and admire Washington more than the Moscow, the Soviet Union would be limited in its ability to launch an attack on the United States from nearby (Kagan, 1996). This is important because it shows that the United States had a definitive

primary goal during the Cold War era: national defense. As will be shown in the case study chapters, Washington was often willing to use any means necessary to achieve this end.¹³

The Cold War is also the ideal time period in which to search for evidence of soft power because of the unique nature of the conflict. The Cold War world was a bipolar one, with states forced to choose between supporting either the United States or the Soviet Union, without much room for neutrality in between (Heller, 2006; Crandall, 2008; Thompson, 1981). Tensions were high across the globe as both the United States and Soviet Union possessed the ability to inflict severe damage on the other, and the threat of nuclear war loomed large, threatening disaster if everyone did not toe the line. Due to the ideological nature of the conflict, with the two sides competing in terms of political and economic systems, I believed that soft power would be more likely used than hard power due to its ability to change opinions and belief structures.

Finally, these three cases were chosen because they represent countries in which the United States has a long history of involvement. Undoubtedly, not all of these instances of U.S. involvement will indicate soft power use. For instance, in Chile, the U.S. played a role in the 1973 coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende, which was an example of hard power (Grandin, 2004). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that more instances U.S. involvement provides more chances for soft power tactics to be employed.

¹³ The criticism could be made that while hard power could not be used in a direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, it could be and was used on the periphery (such as Latin America). In response, I am not suggesting that there will be no soft power uncovered in the cases – in fact, I am certain that there will be quite a lot of it. There will also likely be instances of soft power as well, due to the increased number of U.S. influence attempts in Latin America during the Cold War.

In sum, the goal of the case studies will be to carefully analyze the different instances of U.S. involvement in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil during the Cold War to determine whether soft power was used. I will also classify these instances of soft power use in terms of the goal(s) Washington tried to achieve. This will test and enhance my aims-based typology and ensure that it is generalizable to other regions and time periods as well.

Operationalizing Soft Power

In order to conduct the case studies, it is important to operationalize soft power clearly so we will know when it is in use. I will take a few moments to describe hard power in detail in order to show what soft power is not, then move into a discussion of what soft power is, present and discard several possible operationalizations of soft power, and finally explain how we will operationalize it for the purposes of this study.

As explained above, hard power has two components: brute force and coercion. Brute force includes overt displays of military and/or economic superior strength. On the military side, this definition covers all instances in which State A attacks State B (either preemptively or in response to a real threat) with military force with the intent to either effect change or preserve the status quo (Schelling, 1966). For example, State A may choose to initiate the use of military force against State B because State B has deployed several units of their army and they are marching toward State A. State A uses force to repel State B and return the international system to its previous state. This example shows a state responding to a real threat with the intent to preserve the status quo. Had State B not deployed their army but instead started performing military exercises and

demonstrations with increased intensity and/or frequency, State A's actions would have been considered a preemptive strike, again with the intent to preserve the status quo.

Finally, suppose State D is a rising power that decides it is in its best interest to challenge State C, the regional hegemon. State D deploys its army against State C. This is an example of military power being used to change the status quo.

Coercion occurs when a state threatens future punishment or promises a reward to shape the behavior of its target. Coercion can take the form of either a carrot or a stick, that is, a bribe or a threat (Schelling, 1966). For instance, State A may promise to reward State B by supporting them militarily and remaining on peaceful terms with them as long as State B does not display aggression toward State A. This provides an incentive for State B to not challenge State A. Should State B decide that it is not in its best interest to uphold this agreement, however, State A will not provide the promised reward. In terms of threats, suppose State B militarily challenges State C, a small state that is an ally of State A. State A demands that State B cease and desist, and threatens to use military force against State B should its wishes not be heeded. Provided that State A's threat is credible, this should cause State B to stop harassing State C. Should State B not stop, State A will use military force against State B as they had threatened to do.

Soft power, on the other hand, involves enticing the target to want what you want them to want, evidenced by an unforced change in attitude or policy (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011). There are no threats or bribes involved, as these are the domain of coercion. Soft power is at work when one state either changes policy or maintains the status quo because they want to please or follow the guidelines set out by another state, although they are not being forced to do so. To encourage State B to change its stance on the role

of women in government, for example, State A must make itself very attractive to State B. It must make State B strongly desire to be like State A, at least in matters pertaining to the issue at hand. State A will do this by making its culture and/or policies appear useful or beneficial to State B. The method through which this is achieved will be determined by what State B values and/or seeks. Once State B admires State A and holds it in high esteem, State A can begin to encourage State B to make policy changes. The emphasis is on the word *encourage*, however. Should State A become frustrated with State B and attempt to speed up the process by incentivizing behavior, the action has become hard power. The moment a threat or a bribe is presented, the tool has shifted from a soft to a hard one.

I will now discuss two possible operationalization options for soft power use, ultimately discarding each in favor of a third, which I will then detail.

First, soft power can be exercised by either proactive or permissive means. Perhaps we should claim we have found evidence of soft power when we see either a proactive or permissive influence attempt. This means that a government may exercise soft power by setting forth a specific policy or by simply not prohibiting the exercise of soft power by another group (Nye, 2011). For instance, a government might initiate an official propaganda campaign, drawn up by government advisors and distributed in another state by a special task force that the government appoints. Or, as was the case in Cuba, a government can allow American radio programs to be broadcast in another state. The United States had the ability to stop this from happening but allowed it to continue in order to keep some measure of communication open with the Cuban population. By permitting a source of soft power to continue to operate, Washington continued to have

influence in Cuba even after cutting off trade (Crandall, 2008).¹⁴ This is not a useful typology for our cases for the same reason as the first: it is far too general, and could apply to all influence attempts.

Second, I assert that Nye's typology of soft power sources is useful in general but not the proper operationalization for this study. While it is helpful in many circumstances to know from what source a certain policy tool comes or by what authority an actor possesses it, knowing this information in our case does nothing but provide interesting information. Part of my contribution to the soft power literature is looking at the concept from an action-oriented perspective, advancing it from the theory sphere into the policy one. Therefore, I require an operationalization that will allow me to distinguish soft power by its ends rather than its sources, and reject the idea that I have found evidence of soft power when an influence attempt pursues one or more of the above goals.

For my operationalization, I will be looking for one of two criteria that will indicate that soft power is in fact in use. First, I will look at the content of the messages employed in the influence attempts. If these messages tell the target to perform an action or support a cause because doing so is in line with U.S. values or will make the target like the United States, this will be considered an example of soft power use. Sample language for this criterion would be, "Support XXX because doing so is in line with the policies and goals of the United States of America," or "supporting XXX will further the values of democracy, freedom, and equality in your nation." The values listed in the second example quote would have been understood to be synonymous with the United States during the Cold War era (Franco, 2002). This was because the Cold War was typically

¹⁴ This thesis finds evidence of only proactive soft power attempts. This does not mean that permissive attempts do not occur.

framed as having two distinct sides, the communists of the Soviet Union and the non-communists of the United States. In the Western hemisphere, each side was depicted as displaying a unique set of values that were in conflict with the values of the other side, with the United States having the values listed in the example quote (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Peter Scoblic writes that it was this “understanding of the Cold War as a struggle between good and evil” and an “uncompromising stand against the Soviets” that framed U.S. foreign policy and rhetoric during this period (2008). Further, Jonathan Nashel argues that “[a]n ‘us’ versus ‘them’ attitude permeated almost all of Washington’s actions during [the Cold War],” setting up a “pro-freedom” culture of communication that espoused a “rhetoric of democracy” (2005, 161; 69; 116). Through this taking of sides, the United States became synonymous with the values enumerated above.

The second criterion is implicit. If I can produce evidence that the United States had reason to believe that its soft policy influence attempts would be successful due to a prior relationship that the United States had cultivated with the target country, even without explicit references to the United States or its policies, I will consider that influence attempt to be an example of soft power use. The United States has a history of largely positive relations with Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, and this did not happen by chance (Franco, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2010). The United States worked to cultivate a positive image for itself in each of our case study countries prior to the Cold War, enabling to make the claim the United States was justified in believing its words would be heard and its preferences taken into account.¹⁵

¹⁵ The “prior relationship” referenced in this paragraph is one that has been built on either hard or soft power. As explained above, there is a difference between creating and deploying soft power resources. The United States worked to cultivate positive relationships, and therefore soft power resources, with Latin

As Martha Cottam demonstrates in her book *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America*, the United States used several hard power methods to develop a close relationship with various Latin American countries. Through “economic aid programs...[and] military aid and assistance programs,” the United States ingratiated itself to Latin American countries prior to the Cold War (1994, 4). She goes on to assert that this aid made many Latin American countries dependent on and favorably disposed to the United States. Other authors provide specific examples. For instance, President “Kennedy saw the Peace Corps as part of an information campaign to counter the perceptions of ‘Yankee imperialism,’ create a positive image of the United States in the Third World, and serve the broader anti-communist strategy” (Hodge & Nolan, 2007, 287). Finally, Jeffrey Taffet summarizes the idea concisely by stating that “[t]hough there is a moral component to economic aid programs...one of their central attractions is the power they give policymakers over other governments” (2007, 4). By building a “satisfying relationship and a deeper level of cooperation” between the United States and Latin American countries, U.S. foreign aid created a positive image of the United States in the eyes of Latin American governments (Taffet, 2007, 4).

In the Chile case we will come across a soft power influence attempt where the target is the United States domestic public and the international community at large. I assert that the United States had reason to believe that its opinion would be heard and heeded by both of these audiences. First, the United States possessed a high degree of domestic legitimacy during the Cold War. According to Joseph Nye, Philip Zelikow, and David King, “[c]ommon defense is a public good, and willingness to sacrifice is higher in

American countries through cultural and political means, enabling the deployment of soft power during the Cold War.

wartime. The cold war was the glue that held public opinion together” (1997, 15). In short, the U.S. public was more willing to support and listen to their government during the Cold War due to the presence of a formidable security threat. Second, the United States possessed significant international legitimacy during this period. As Robert Kagan writes,

Throughout the Cold War, the legitimacy of U.S. power and of U.S. global leadership was largely taken for granted, and not just by Americans. The vast majority of Europeans, although they sometimes chafed under U.S. dominance and often questioned U.S. actions in Vietnam, Latin America, and elsewhere, nevertheless accepted U.S. leadership as both necessary and desirable. (2004)

This shows that international publics, at least the major players in Europe, would have listened to U.S. perspectives and accepted U.S. guidance in a variety of areas during the Cold War.

In each case, then, we look for instances in which the United States stated its preferences or policy, expressed its approval or disapproval without making a threat or offering a bribe, or made a suggestion to a foreign government, used this through either proactive or permissive means, and fulfilled one or both of the above criteria. There are many instances of power use in the three case study countries. The first task will therefore be to identify as many as possible, then define whether they are examples of hard or soft power. After this has been accomplished, I will look at the soft power cases and determine what the goal of the United States was in each case. This will allow me to strengthen and refine the typology introduced above, adding and subtracting elements

based on the data collected. From this I will be able to create a complete typology of how the United States used soft power in Latin America during the Cold War.

This chapter has presented an overview of the soft power literature, identified its shortcomings, and laid out a plan to address them. The next chapter will deal with the first case of Cold War Chile, and will examine whether soft power was used by the United States as a foreign policy tool. In the process the goals typology will be expanded and modified until it provides a complete analysis of the goals soft power can be used to achieve.

Chapter Three

Case Study One: Chile

During the Cold War, Latin America was a chessboard on which the United States and the Soviet Union vied for supremacy. To Washington, Chile was a vulnerable and valuable pawn that must be protected at all costs. The United States kept a watchful eye on the political system and intervened in Chilean affairs numerous times to ensure that the country would not fall into the wrong hands.

Most of the intervention attempts are examples of hard power. A smaller number, such as support for pro-U.S. policies and administrations, pro-U.S. propaganda operations directed at the Chilean public, pro-Pinochet propaganda campaigns directed at U.S. and international publics are examples of soft power attempts. But often, hard and soft power tactics were used together to achieve U.S. goals, such as during the 1973 coup that deposed the Allende administration.

This chapter will provide a brief overview of U.S. interventions in Latin America. I will first identify and briefly explain the various hard power attempts, then more fully develop the cases of soft power use. This will show the contrast between hard and soft power influence attempts. In addition, I will classify the soft power attempts in terms of the typology of goals.

U.S. Influence Attempts in Chile during the Cold War

There is a common perception of the United States throughout Latin America today that associates U.S. interventions and foreign policy initiatives are with propping

up oppressive authoritarian regimes, not encouraging democracy (Bethell, 1993; Falcoff, 1989). This perception seems to contradict the conventional wisdom within the United States, which suggests that Washington seeks to promote democracy worldwide. Part of this disconnect stems from the Cold War era, when the United States often pushed democratization and other policy objectives aside in order to combat the communist threat (Bethell, 1993; Kagan, 1996). Washington viewed communism as such a profound menace to the American way of life that U.S. leaders were willing to support authoritarian regimes in Latin America as long as they were not communist (Kagan, 1996). This was evident in U.S.-Chile relations during the Cold War.

We begin our story in the late 1950s. President Jorge Alessandri took office in 1958 and governed until 1964. During this time, the United States was very concerned with the spread of communism because of the Cuban Revolution. Washington sought an ally in the Chilean government and encouraged the implementation of reforms in Chile to strengthen U.S. influence there (Falcoff, 1989; Roxborough et al, 1977). For example, the United States endorsed Alessandri's laissez-faire economic policies, which represented a sharp departure from the heavy government regulation of earlier regimes. The reforms were hailed as the best way to address the country's inflation woes, but also caused the Chilean market to be flooded with U.S.-made goods as tariffs steadily decreased (Kagan, 1996).

Democracy began to erode during the Alessandri administration, partly due to popular backlash against its policies, and the United States lost confidence in the willingness and ability of the conservatives to support U.S. policies and goals. In 1962,

the United States chose to support the Christian Democratic Party's candidate in the 1964 election, Eduardo Frei (Roxborough et al, 1977).¹⁶

During the Frei campaign of 1964, the United States actively pursued covert operations in Chile, mainly through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Kagan, 1996). The use of covert operations was not a new foreign policy initiative, but the intensity with which these particular operations were conducted reflected the increased concerns about Latin American security as well as a turn in the American intelligence community toward more subversive methods of influence. Through posters, radio spots, television advertisements, and pamphlet distribution, the United States was able to turn the tide of public opinion away from Allende. In addition, the United States contributed approximately \$20 million to the campaign and sent about 100 advisors to counsel and assist him. Frei defeated Allende with 56.1% of the popular vote to Allende's 38.9% (Kagan, 1996).¹⁷

Allende again appeared on the presidential ballot in 1970, near the end of Frei's six-year term, and again the United States sought to block him using means similar to the 1964 contest.¹⁸ This time, however, Allende managed to narrowly defeat his U.S.-backed National Party candidate Jorge Alessandri, taking 36.6% of the popular vote to Alessandri's 35.3% (Kagan, 1996).¹⁹ Allende's victory is largely attributed to efficient, targeted efforts by the KGB to sway public opinion.

¹⁶ The United States could not support Alessandri for another term because Chilean election law forbids presidents to serve two consecutive terms.

¹⁷ Julio Durán of the center-right Democratic Front took 4.99% (Kagan, 1996).

¹⁸ Chilean election law permits former presidents to seek unlimited reelection, as long as the terms are nonconsecutive.

¹⁹ Radomiro Tomic of the Christian Democratic Party won 29.09% of the vote (Kagan, 1996).

U.S. President Richard Nixon became alarmed and voiced his concern that Chile “could become another Cuba” if Allende was permitted to enact his policies (Kornbluh, 2004, “Kissinger”; Kornbluh, 2008). The United States sponsored numerous failed covert operations in an attempt to keep Allende from actually assuming office, centered on fostering fighting within his United Party and urging the Chilean Congress not to confirm him. In a declassified White House audio tape from March 23, 1972, Nixon informed press secretary Ron Zeigler that he had ordered the CIA to “do anything short of a Dominican-type action” to keep Allende from taking office (Nixon, 1972).²⁰ Other records indicate that Nixon called for the CIA to “prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat him” during the fall of 1970, and that the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, was deliberately excluded from these conversations so the operations could be conducted in secret (Nixon, 1970).

The primary casual factors for the 1973 coup, which put Augusto Pinochet and his junta in power, were not related to U.S. intervention. The biggest culprit was a dramatic increase in domestic polarization. There was a decrease in the number of moderates in the Chilean electorate, and the extreme left and right began to show their willingness to employ more extreme methods of regime change. The United States played a role in the planning and execution of the coup (Kornbluh, 2008).

After the coup, the United States helped to gather the far-flung factions of Pinochet’s followers together and consolidate their support. The CIA helped create the first economic plan established by the military junta, aided the production of a text known as the “white book” that provided justification for the coup, and funded a

²⁰ The President was referring to the 1965-66 U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic during the Bosch administration (Kagan, 1996).

campaign to bolster the reputation of the new regime in the eyes of the international community (Kornbluh, 2009). The Nixon and Ford administrations also provided economic aid and worked to refinance Chilean debt in the Paris Club (Kornbluh, 2008).

U.S. Uses of Hard Power in Chile

Most of the influence attempts in Chile during the Cold War were examples of hard power use. This section will briefly address several of these attempts and explain why they constitute exercises of hard power, in order to provide a contrast for the soft power attempts that will be discussed afterward.

The Frei Campaign, 1964

The \$20 million the United States contributed to the Frei campaign is an example of hard power use, specifically positive inducements (Lowenthal, 1991). The United States only gave the money to Frei because he was a more U.S.-friendly alternative to Allende, and would have removed it had he suddenly adopted a different campaign platform. The United States did not attempt to change Frei's platform but instead gave him valuable funding to encourage him to continue his campaign.

Next, the United States sent approximately 100 individuals, referred to in the literature as "operators," "workers," and simply "people" (Kornbluh, 1998; Kagan, 1996; Lowenthal, 1991). There is little information available concerning the role these individuals played in the Frei campaign, but there is evidence that at least some worked as consultants and advisors, guiding Frei's staff and counseling him on campaign best practices (Kornbluh, 1998). The expertise and advice these individuals provided to the

campaign was critical to the eventual success of the Frei administration, but they worked on a conditional basis. If the campaign began to espouse viewpoints with which the United States did not agree, these individuals would be called back (Kornbluh, 1998). This threat was expressed to the Frei administration when the advisors were first offered. Senior campaign officials were told that the United States was providing this assistance because it supported Frei's democratic, capitalist platform, but that the assistance would be removed if the campaign's message changed. This situation is another example of positive inducements since the assistance these individuals provided was contingent on the actions of the Frei campaign.

The Allende Confirmation Process, 1971

The Nixon administration used two approaches to keep Allende out of power. Track I, a State Department campaign to undermine Chilean officials and discourage them from confirming Allende, was an example of coercive hard power. The United States used a combination of promises and threats to negotiate with top congressional officials and party leaders to convince them to vote against Allende. The United States used a two-pronged approach during this period. Track I used the State Department to negotiate with key government officials responsible for Allende's confirmation (Kornbluh, 2009). CIA documents reveal that the goal was to convince the Chilean Congress through threats to their current jobs and future success of their parties that Allende should not be confirmed and to appoint the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, instead (Kornbluh, 2009). The plan stipulated that Alessandri would resign shortly thereafter, forcing a new election and permitting Frei to run against Allende again, with U.S.

backing. Track I was abandoned because Alessandri was not willing to undermine Chilean democracy (Kornbluh, 1998; Kornbluh, 2009).

Track II was a CIA operation designed to identify and support Chilean military officers who would be willing to support or help carry out a coup. Nixon authorized \$10 million to fund this initiative. Declassified CIA documents reveal that Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA's director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessine, offered economic support, military advice, and promises of U.S. backing in the media (Kornbluh, 2008).

The CIA was authorized to arrange the kidnapping of particularly troublesome officers. For example, the CIA backed an attempted kidnapping on October 22, 1970, of René Schneider Chereau, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army. The attempt failed and Schneider was shot multiple times, dying in the hospital several days later. In 2001, when Schneider's family filed a lawsuit accusing Kissinger of arranging the murder, CIA documents were produced that revealed that while the CIA had been supportive of a kidnapping attempt, Schneider's death had been entirely accidental (Kornbluh, 2008). Further documents revealed that Kissinger had declared the October 22 attempt "hopeless" and had attempted to call it off, but Chilean General Roberto Viaux proceeded without U.S. support (Kornbluh, 2009).

Track II was an example of hard power use. The CIA located individuals who were discontented with the Allende regime and promised them support and protection if they agreed to plot to overthrow it (Kornbluh, 2008). If the target turned out to be a strong Allende supporter or worse, a whistleblower, the United States might instead choose to plot against that particular official to remove him as a threat (Kornbluh, 2009). In the case of René Schneider Chereau, for example, the CIA supported the kidnapping of

an officer it felt posed a danger to coup preparations. While the CIA ultimately called off the kidnapping and urged the Chileans not to follow through, the fact remains that the CIA was willing to take decisive action to remove threats to the coup plot (Kornbluh, 2008). Therefore, it was in the best interest of Chilean military officials to respond positively to U.S. direction related to coup support.

The 1973 Coup

CIA documents and White House transcripts confirm that the Nixon administration condoned and supported the 1973 coup with military advice and funding (Kornbluh, 2004, "Nixon"; Kornbluh, 2006; Kornbluh, 2008). CIA documents from the years preceding the coup call for the CIA to be prepared to take "whatever means necessary" to keep Salvador Allende from taking power.

In addition, there is evidence that the United States received multiple intelligence reports of coup plots between 1970 and 1973. A 1975 congressional inquiry stated that Washington was made aware of the plot, successfully penetrated the group in charge, and established regular contact with its leader (Kornbluh, 2008). Finally, transcripts of a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on September 16, 1973, reveal that Nixon questioned Kissinger as to whether the United States' "hand" in the coup would become apparent, seeking to remove himself from the media backlash surrounding the incident. Kissinger was forced to admit that "we helped them" and that U.S. operatives had worked to make conditions as favorable as possible for a coup attempt (Kissinger, 1973).

U.S. participation in the 1973 coup was an example of hard power. The United States knew and supported the idea of a coup against the Allende administration. While

the extent to which the United States actually participated in the coup is unclear, Nixon's conversations with Kissinger after the event make clear that the coup was not entirely devoid of U.S. intervention (Kissinger, 1973). The United States extended its Track II approach throughout the Allende administration, continuing to seek out those officials who would be receptive to a coup attempt. The Nixon administration received many intelligence briefings on the plot and maintained contact with the leadership of the plot's organizing group (Kissinger, 1973; Kornbluh, 2008). These details indicate that the United States was using its hard power resources to achieve its goals, rewarding and supporting cooperative officials and punishing uncooperative ones.

The Pinochet Regime, 1973-1989

The United States agreed to back the Pinochet regime as long as they continued to oppose communist ideology (Lowenthal, 1991). This is a critical point because it illustrates how the United States was willing to support a nondemocratic government as long as it remained aligned with U.S. ideals. The Pinochet regime committed a number of human rights violations, but the United States chose to overlook them for years, downplaying them in statements to domestic and international publics as long as the regime continued to oppose communism (Falcoff, 1989; Lowenthal, 1991).

The Carter administration changed this, imposing a number of sanctions on the Pinochet regime. For Carter, the final straw came when Chile failed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Letelier-Moffitt assassinations (Kornbluh, 2009; Kornbluh, 1998). He enforced a series of military, economic, and diplomatic sanctions, all of which were examples of hard power use. These hard power punishments were a

direct response to the incident and helped shape how the American public felt about the regime.

U.S. Uses of Soft Power in Chile

While most U.S. influence attempts in Chile during the Cold War were examples of hard power, there were three instances of soft power: support of the Alessandri administration from 1958-1964, support for Eduardo Frei in the 1964 election, and both support for and condemnation of the Pinochet regime. This section will discuss them in detail, including the goals Washington sought to achieve in each case.

The Alessandri Administration, 1958-1964

Alessandri's laissez-faire economic policies were not popular among the working class, and his administration became increasingly dependent on the United States for its financial resources. According to Julio Faundez, the United States banking industry and Treasury Department (along with the IMF and ICA) gave approximately \$130 million to Alessandri (1988). In addition, the United States kept a watchful eye on the communist-leaning left, which was gaining electoral support every year, and Washington supplied as much as 13 percent of its foreign military aid to the region to the Chilean government during the Alessandri years to guard against leftist influence (Stallings, 1978).

While these aspects represent exercises of hard power because they involved the United States providing positive inducements to the Chilean government, Washington also provided support of a different nature. Concerned about the slim margin by which Alessandri had won the election, only 3.3% over Salvador Allende, U.S. Ambassador to

Chile Walter Howe encouraged the U.S. government to provide nonmonetary support to “the non-communist parties of the Chilean center and left” (Gustafson, 2007, 23-24). In 1960, President Eisenhower acted on this advice by visiting Santiago and meeting with President Alessandri. According to the statement released after the meeting, the two “discussed the collaboration of Chile and the United States of America in international organizations with a view to the realization of the common principles which guide the foreign policy of both countries” (Eisenhower, 1961, 263). There is no evidence that particular types or instances of support were discussed, simply that Eisenhower showed U.S. solidarity with the Chilean government and expressed American commitment to improving the economic situation.

Eisenhower’s signal of support to the Alessandri administration is an example of the use of soft power. The United States did not promise Alessandri money or other positive inducements or threaten to punish his administration if he did not improve the economic situation in Chile (Kornbluh, 2008; Bethell, 1993).²¹ Washington simply indicated that it supported Alessandri’s proposed policies for Chilean economic revitalization and was willing to offer assistance. This influence attempt fits our second operationalization criterion. As discussed in Chapter Two, the United States had reason to believe that its support of a policy or administration in Chile would cause support for the policy to increase within Chile. However, U.S. support did not have the desired effect. The Chilean public showed their displeasure with their low wages, caused by the

²¹ It is essential to note the distinction between the two elements of support for the Alessandri administration. The United States did provide economic support to the administration, which is an example of a hard power influence attempt. The soft power aspect comes into play when we consider Eisenhower’s show of support for Alessandri’s policies, which was a symbolic “vote of confidence” for the administration (Bethell, 1993).

reduction in trade barriers, by failing to elect Alessandri's supporters in the 1961 congressional elections (Kornbluh, 2009).

During the same visit to Chile, President Eisenhower used more explicit, values-based language that fulfills our first criterion. At a dinner hosted in his honor by Alessandri several days before their meeting, Eisenhower proposed a toast to his Chilean counterpart, saying, "[s]ince you treasure freedom, independence, and human dignity as much as we...my colleagues and I are...seeking ways to strengthen the friendship and the fruitful cooperation of our two countries" (Eisenhower, 1961, 70-71). The values of freedom, independence, and human dignity are in line with those described in Chapter Two as being associated with the United States, fulfilling our first soft power criterion.

This is an example of soft power use in an attempt to change public opinion. As stated above, the 1958 election was quite close, and the United States was concerned that the Alessandri administration did not have enough support to carry out its policies. Even more concerning was the idea that, in the words of Ambassador Howe, "the political pendulum has swung as far as it is likely to go, and...the return swing is likely to be evidenced in...the presidential election of 1964" (Gustafson, 2007, 23). The United States sought to grant legitimacy to the Alessandri administration and show the Chilean people that Washington both supported and was willing to assist with economic reform. The hope was that this would increase support not only for the Alessandri regime but for right-leaning politics in general, leading to a more definitive conservative victory in 1964 (Kornbluh, 2009).²²

²² As an aside, the United States was able to capitalize on the Alessandri policies to secure an important role in the Chilean economy. Alessandri's policies caused the United States to become one of Chile's

The Frei Campaign, 1964

The United States was wary of Frei's opponent in the 1964 election, Salvador Allende, because he was openly sympathetic toward the Cuban government and had publicly denounced the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Concerned that the unpopularity of Alessandri's policies would cause Chileans to vote for Salvador Allende, the United States increased its economic aid to Chile still further, totaling 15.3 percent of all aid to Latin America in 1964 (Lowenthal, 1991). In addition to the funding and campaign workers discussed above, the United States began an intense pro-Frei propaganda campaign designed to align Frei with American ideals (Kagan, 1996; Lowenthal, 1991).

This propaganda campaign, initiated by the CIA, was the most obvious example of soft power use in Chile during the Cold War period. The CIA used every method of communication available – radio, television, posters, and pamphlets – to equate Frei with American ideals of democracy and capitalism and Allende with communism and socialism (Kagan, 1996; Lowenthal, 1991). For example, the United States essentially took over *El Mercurio*, a prominent Chilean newspaper, and used it to the public to vote for Frei because he stood for social and political rights like freedom of speech and honest elections (Kagan, 1996). According to Morris Morley and Steven Smith, CIA-sponsored propaganda during this period “played an important role in influencing popular consciousness by formulating [a Frei presidency] in a manner advantageous to U.S. policy goals” and hinted that a “breakdown of order” and an epidemic of “labor indiscipline” would break out in the country under Allende (Kourvetaris, 1980, 393). While the United States was not explicitly mentioned in these articles, the Chilean people

foremost trading partners, and the Chilean economy became very dependent on that of the United States (Bethell, 1993).

had been conditioned to associate the United States with competence, order, and success, as explained in Chapter Two. They understood the implication that an Allende administration would counteract these ideals.

This influence attempt was aimed at the Chilean people, not the administration. Since the president would be decided democratically, any ultimately successful influence attempt would have to be aimed at the voters themselves. The United States could give Frei the tools he needed to run the most effective campaign possible, but this was for naught if public opinion could not be swayed. To this end, the CIA sought to make Frei, who represented U.S. values and desires, the more attractive candidate (Lowenthal, 1991; Kagan, 1996). The campaign was a soft power attempt because the CIA did not use threats, promises, or brute force to change public opinion but rather tried to persuade the public that Frei was the better candidate because he stood opposed to “godless, atheist communism” and promised to “redistribute income and reshape the...economy” in a way that would enable Chile’s economy to move along the path becoming successful like the United States (Zezima, 2001).

The propaganda campaign used during the election of 1964 was an example of a soft power attempt that sought to alter public opinion since it was aimed at building support for Alessandri and decreasing support for Allende among the voting public. It was not aimed at those already in power or at those seeking power. It did not seek to change attitudes about a specific issue or alter a policy. Rather, it sought to make Alessandri the more attractive candidate to the Chilean people, diverting some of Allende’s followers.

The Pinochet Regime, 1973-1989

The United States was instrumental in consolidating the various cells of Pinochet's military dictatorship and bringing them together to function as a cohesive unit (Kornbluh, 1998; Falcoff, 1989). The United States helped craft a new economic plan and offered direction to the government while proclaiming at home and abroad that while the new regime was not perfect, it was far and away an improvement over Allende (Kornbluh, 1998). The U.S. stamp of approval was crucial in shifting international opinion on the issue, especially since the media in both the United States and Chile took the side of Allende (Kornbluh, 2009). While President Nixon never formally spoke out on the incident, the latter part of his presidency being consumed by allegations concerning the Watergate incident, Gerald Ford did offer his support for the Pinochet regime (Kornbluh, 2008; Kornbluh, 1998). In a 1974 news conference, Ford stated that the coup was "in the best interest of the people in Chile" (1974). He went on to explain that Washington's work to support "opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press and to...preserve opposition political parties" was an effort to "protect national security" in the face of the damage Salvador Allende sought to do to each of these aspects of democracy (Ford, 1974).²³ Henry Kissinger downplayed the human rights violations of the Pinochet regime, stating that "[the] worst crime of this government is that it's pro-American" (Dept. of State, 1974, 35). Although this particular statement was uttered in a private meeting with his regional staff, it illustrates the type of line the Ford administration fed to the American press in the early years of the regime.

²³ It is interesting to note that at this particular conference Ford denied U.S. involvement in the 1973 coup, bluntly stating, "[t]he facts are we had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup itself" (Ford, 1974).

According to Roger Burbach, “the U.S. press...for years largely ignored or downplayed...the Pinochet’s regime’s savage repression” (n.d.). This was in line with the media’s general “decision to support or ignore repressive U.S. operations in Latin America throughout the Cold War period” (Burbach, n.d.).

As the 1976 election drew closer, there was a shift in the way the U.S. Congress viewed U.S. involvement in Chile. Members began to place a higher emphasis on supplying humanitarian aid to Chilean citizens rather than offering purely economic aid to the regime. In 1976 Congress cancelled military aid and scaled back economic assistance until the Chilean government took steps to solve the human rights issues plaguing the country (Kornbluh, 1998). In remarks to reporters following a 1977 meeting with Pinochet, Carter stated that the meeting went “very well” and that the two leaders “had a good discussion about matters that are important between us” (Carter, 1977). He went on to say that “we had a very frank discussion about this serious problem [human rights violations]. I think...President Pinochet...recognize[s] that the reputation of [Chile] has been very poor in the field of human rights” (Carter, 1977). These statements show that human rights were inching toward the top of the agenda in U.S.-Chilean relations.

U.S. involvement in Chile was a key point of contention between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter in the debates leading up to the 1976 U.S. Presidential election. Despite downplaying the problem in the remarks cited above, Carter denounced Ford’s support of the Pinochet regime, claiming that it displayed a complete disregard for moral values (Kornbluh, 2004, “Pinochet”). In an October 1976 presidential debate, Carter attacked Ford’s position on the issue, saying “[e]very time Mr. Ford speaks from a position of

secrecy--in negotiations and secret treaties that have been pursued and achieved, in supporting dictatorships, in ignoring human rights--we are weak and the rest of the world knows it” (Ford/Carter, 1976). This dramatic change, along with the shift toward a greater focus on humanitarian issues among the American public led to a formal apology from the Carter administration for U.S. actions in Chile during the Allende years (Kornbluh, 2004, “Pinochet”; Kornbluh, 2009).

Despite this outward display of support for the Pinochet regime, the Carter administration was deeply concerned with human rights issues. This concern led to several disagreements with Pinochet over his inaction on Chilean human rights troubles (Kornbluh, 1998). Near the end of his term, Carter applied various military, economic, and diplomatic sanctions to the Pinochet regime for failing to investigate the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Chilean politician and activist Orlando Letelier and his American assistant Ronni Moffitt on in Washington, D.C., September 21, 1976 (Kornbluh, 2009). Letelier and Moffitt had fled from the Pinochet regime and taken refuge in the United States. The Pinochet administration’s failure to investigate their deaths greatly decreased U.S. popular support for the Pinochet regime (Kornbluh, 1998; Kornbluh, 2009).

The tables turned yet again in 1981, when Ronald Reagan took office. He lifted all the sanctions imposed by Carter because he saw Chile as an important ally in the global fight to contain communism (Kornbluh, 2008). This marked a shift back toward the way the Nixon and Ford administrations had viewed the military dictatorship – as long as they remained anti-communist, they would have the support of the United States.

Reagan again overlooked the regime's refusal to permit a transition to a democratic government and its human rights violations, asserting that Chile was an "authoritarian" regime, meaning that its society was not developed enough to handle democracy, instead of a "totalitarian" one, in which the society has the means to support a democratic government but it is denied (Kornbluh, 1998). Using these concepts, Reagan argued that to force the Pinochet regime to shift to democracy and make changes to human rights practices would be catastrophic because it would open the way for a communist government to take power.

Reagan adopted a policy of "silent diplomacy" through which his administration exerted its influence on the Pinochet regime by secret negotiations (Kornbluh, 1998). The Pinochet regime, however, understood silent diplomacy as a free pass for repression and continued to perpetuate human rights violations. They did not attempt to make even the surface changes that would give the illusion of progress. Reagan perceived this as Pinochet taking advantage of his goodwill and tensions increased between the United States and Chile (Kornbluh, 1998; Kornbluh, 2009).

By 1984, the United States abandoned silent diplomacy (Kornbluh, 2008). Containing communism was still the top priority, but human rights concerns were again near the top of the agenda for Chilean-U.S. relations. The decision to do place greater emphasis on social concerns was also influenced by the increased democratization of other states in the region. Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina were all moving toward a more democratic style of governance, increasing the pressure on Chile to follow suit (Kornbluh, 2009). The United States thus chose to apply more pressure to the Pinochet

regime, encouraging Chilean leaders more strongly to move to a democratic system of governance.

The Reagan administration had been calling for an abrupt transition to democracy, urging the Pinochet regime to step down as soon as possible due to the severity of its human rights abuses, but changed its approach in light of emerging concerns over the economic and political havoc this move might cause. After an October 1988 plebiscite in which the Chilean people spoke out against the Pinochet regime with an overwhelming “No” when asked if they wanted the regime to stay in power, the United States began to encourage a gradual “re-democratization” designed to prepare the government and the people for a democratic election in 1989 (Kornbluh, 2009). Official U.S. support for the Pinochet regime dropped sharply, and Washington began funding potential leftist candidates in order to ensure that the elections would be free and fair and would result in a regime change (Kornbluh, 2008).

The United States sought to change the mindset of its own citizens – who had been trained to support the Pinochet regime – and the international community, to whom Washington had defended Pinochet, in order to place pressure on the regime to change its tactics (Kornbluh, 2009). To do this, Washington changed its media and official messages. President Reagan painted the Chilean people as “yearning for democracy” in his remarks at a World Affairs Council luncheon in 1988 (1988). In an interview several years prior, he stated that “[t]here can be no doubt about the strong support of the United States for Chile’s peaceful transition to democracy” (Reagan, 1986). The U.S. government condemned the Pinochet regime to the international community in several ways as well (Kornbluh, 2008; Kornbluh, 2009). According to a 1988 *LA Times* article,

the United States chose to abstain from votes on international bank loans to Chile, citing the human rights violations. In addition, the U.S. voted in favor of U.N. legislation condemning Chile for its human rights abuses, the first time it had done so. These and other similar measures sent a clear message to the international community that the United States was not pleased with the Pinochet regime (Lowenthal, 1988). The author of the article, Abraham Lowenthal, states that “[the] Reagan Administration...deserves to be praised for its more constructive and realistic stance in Chile” (1988). While Lowenthal acknowledges that the “initial approach...was not so positive,” the Reagan administration had since demonstrated its willingness to be “aligned in Chile with the democratic opposition,” which Lowenthal felt was a step in the right direction (1988).

This series of changes is an example of soft power use. During the Nixon through Reagan administrations, both the American public and the international community were asked to change their opinion on the Pinochet regime multiple times, with little other than the word of the U.S. government on which to base their views. As shown above, government rhetoric from the early years of the Pinochet regime downplays the human rights problems in Chile and encourages support of the regime. In contrast, rhetoric from the late 1980s sings a completely different tune. It calls attention to the severity of the human rights violations taking place under the regime’s nose and implies that Pinochet’s ignorance of the problem meant that he had drifted away from U.S. values and no longer deserved Washington’s support. That the U.S. government was able to manipulate public opinion multiple times in this way speaks volumes about the soft power resources they possessed. A country whose culture, economic and military strength, and overall success were so attractive that it could accomplish this feat is rich in soft power resources. Again,

the United States did not use threats, bribes, or force to achieve these goals (Kornbluh, 2008; Kornbluh, 2009). This ability was important because it offered the opportunity to increase international pressure on Chile to change its ways.

This soft power example fits our second criterion. The United States had reason to believe that its domestic public and the international community would treat the United States as a reliable source of information on the events in Chile and would trust Washington's judgment on the Pinochet regime. Again, I direct you to Chapter Two to read the full explanation of why this would have been the case.

This manipulation of both domestic and international views of the Pinochet regime is an example of soft power used to change public opinion. Washington knew that the support of both its public and the international community would be crucial for putting pressure on the regime, and was able to successfully garner a least a modest level of support for its repeated policy changes toward Chile. This is an example of public opinion change because the target audiences were whole countries of people rather than individuals. In addition, this does not represent an attempt to change elite attitudes or policies, again because the focus is so broad. Washington sought to completely alter the mindsets of their target audiences, to change their gut reaction when they thought about the Pinochet regime.

Conclusion

The United States used soft power during the Cold War in Latin America in three instances to attempt to change public opinion. The most interesting point to take away from this chapter is that the United States often used both hard and soft power in

combination to address a situation. This illustrates that hard and soft power are not contradictory phenomena but complementary ones. They can be used in conjunction with one another to address a wider array of problems and reach more types of goals. In the next three chapters, I will devote a section to exploring this relationship in greater detail.

The next chapter looks at a second case study, that of Guatemala. Like Chile, Guatemala experienced a U.S.-backed coup that did much to shape the way in which the political culture developed. However, soft power served in more of a supporting role in the Guatemalan case than in Chile.

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Chapter Four

Case Study Two: Guatemala

The most significant event in Guatemala during the Cold War was the U.S.-initiated 1954 coup that overthrew the Jacobo Árbenz Guzman administration (Gordon, n.d.; Grandin, 2004). This chapter will discuss the events surrounding the coup and the coup itself in terms of soft power usage and the types of goals the United States set out to achieve.

This chapter has four sections. I will provide a brief history of Guatemala during the Cold War period, focusing on U.S. influence attempts; briefly identify and discuss the hard power influence attempts; provide a more detailed analysis of the soft power attempts; and discuss how soft power appears primarily in a supporting role in this case. I will describe three soft power influence attempts in this chapter, each of which is a different type of propaganda campaign: pamphlet drops, radio broadcasts, and support of student groups within Guatemala.

U.S.-Guatemalan Relations in the Cold War

The United States was relatively uninvolved in Guatemalan affairs during the early years of the Cold War (Grandin, 2004; Doyle and Franzblau, 2009). By 1954, however, the United States had assumed an important role in the country due to its dislike and distrust of democratically elected president Jacobo Árbenz. Árbenz, elected in 1950, who raised many red flags for Washington in terms of both his policy and his rhetoric.

Guatemala had long suffered under the oppressive and anti-American military dictatorships of Jorge Ubico and Federico Ponce Vaides in the 1930s and 1940s. Árbenz was one of the key military officials who rebelled against the Ponce regime in 1944. On October 19, 1944, Árbenz and his followers attacked the National Palace in what came to be known as the “October Revolution” (Grandin, 2004; Costello, 1997). Ponce fled into exile, and Árbenz and his followers took control of the government. Although they formed a military junta, the members promised that democratic elections would be held within the year (Grandin, 2004).

They followed through on their promise, and in 1944 Juan José Arévalo won the election for the leftist Revolutionary Action Party (PAR). The elections are generally accepted to have been free and fair, and Arévalo took 85 percent of the popular vote (Doyle and Franzblau, 2009). Arévalo instituted a number of reforms, including minimum wage laws, labor reforms, extending the right to vote to all but illiterate women, and improving the educational system.

Although his reforms were generally moderate, the United States was largely skeptical of the Arévalo administration. Washington believed that his administration was corrupt, inefficient, and sympathetic to communism, and took issue with the fact that his reforms mainly benefitted the upper middle class, widening the income gap between this group and the agricultural laborers living in poverty (Grandin, 2004; Costello, 1997). There were as many as 25 coup attempts during the Arévalo administration, most of which were planned and executed by wealthy conservative military leaders.

There is evidence that the United States was aware of at least several of these coup attempts as they were being planned, but there is little indication that Washington

played a large role in their planning or execution. CIA intelligence reports indicate that the United States received rumors of potential coups throughout the early 1940s, but there is no evidence that Washington took any action to either aid or discourage the efforts (CIA, 1966, "Death"). This tacit approval of coup efforts does not represent an influence attempt so we cannot categorize it further.

Tensions were high within the Arévalo administration. In 1949, for example, Chief of Staff Francisco Javier Arana mysteriously died in a gunfight in Guatemala City in 1949 (Grandin, 2004; Karabell, 1999; USAID, 1966). Some scholars suspect that either Arévalo (who did not trust Arana) or Árbenz (who saw him as the candidate to beat in the 1950 presidential election) arranged for the Arana killing to take place (Karabell, 1999; Doyle and Franzblau, 2009). The result was a botched revolt against the Arévalo administration, ultimately quelled by Árbenz, and a dearth of opponents to Árbenz in the 1950 election (Karabell, 1999).

Árbenz won the 1950 contest, garnering over three times the number of votes won by his competitor Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes of the National Democratic Reconciliation Party (Costello, 1997) Fuentes called for a recount, citing election fraud, but scholars have since shown that while fraud may have played a role in the election, it was not the reason that Árbenz ultimately won (Karabell, 1999; Doyle and Franzblau, 2009). The U.S. State Department was not pleased with the election of Árbenz, and claimed that Arana "has always represented [the] only positive conservative element in [the] Arévalo administration" (Costello, 1997). They claimed that his death and the election of Árbenz would lead to a resurgence of leftist power and influence and signaled a vulnerability to

Communist control (Gordon, n.d.). To combat this, the United States set plans in motion for a coup in 1954.

The U.S.-backed forces of Colonel Castillo Armas, approximately 400 strong, invaded Guatemala from Honduras and El Salvador from five entry points in the evening of June 18, 1954 (Grandin, 2004). This multi-pronged approach was designed to make the rebellion forces seem stronger and larger than they actually were. The rebels failed in their attempt to enter the capital city and overthrow the government, but were successful in getting the Guatemalan army to surrender, largely due to rumors that U.S. military forces were mobilizing as well. The chaos following the army's surrender caused Árbenz to resign on June 27 (Doyle and Franzblau, 2009; Grandin, 2004).

International condemnation of the coup was severe, with accusations that U.S. actions violated the U.N. charter and destabilized Guatemala's fledgling democracy (Karabell, 1999; Grandin, 2004). In an attempt to convince its detractors that the actions taken were necessary and beneficial, Washington began another covert operation, known as Operation PBHISTORY. The goal of PBHISTORY was to gather and catalogue private documents from the Árbenz administration and demonstrate that there were definite ties between Guatemala and the Soviet Union. The operation was a failure. Despite gathering over 150,000 pages of documents, the CIA found very little evidence that Árbenz was a puppet of the Soviet Union. In fact, Washington discovered that the land reforms and other so-called "communist behaviors" were not at all tied to the Soviet Union and were initiated independent of Soviet assistance or control (CIA, 1966, "Interrogation;" USAID, 1966).

After Árbenz resigned, the United States continued to play a large role in Guatemalan affairs. The aftermath of the coup was chaotic and confusing, with five different military juntas attempting to claim power in the 11 days following Árbenz's resignation (Grandin, 2004). It was difficult to persuade the entire Guatemalan military to switch their allegiance to Armas. Although most soldiers did not support Árbenz due to his controversial land reform policies that had forcibly seized private lands from those who had many acres and redistributed them among those who had few, those who had benefitted from the policy remained loyal. Armas eventually took power at the end of the 11 days of turmoil, but proved to be terribly inept at the job and ushered in an era of corruption and conflict not seen since the revolution of 1944 (USAID, 1966; CIA, 1966, "Death").

The United States steered clear of Guatemalan politics as the dust from the coup settled. Evidence of U.S. involvement in Guatemalan affairs is scarce until the 1960s. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson began to suspect that the Guatemala had fallen under the influence of Cuba and was again operating as a communist puppet state (Grandin, 2004). He tasked his CIA director, William Raborn, with finding evidence to support this belief so that Johnson could send private military contractors into Guatemala to eradicate the threat. However, Raborn was unable to find evidence to confirm Johnson's suspicion (USAID, 1966).

Guatemala was embroiled in a bloody civil war at this time between the government, leftist insurgents, and right-wing paramilitary groups. The United States publically declared its support of the government and Cuba did the same for the insurgents, causing Johnson to worry that if the insurgents gained control of the country,

Guatemala would become a communist state (Grandin, 2004). The CIA would go on to play an important role in the civil war that began in the 1960s and continued into the late 1990s, supporting Guatemalan military detachments that would later be accused of committing a number of serious human rights atrocities.

Hard Power Influence Attempts

Most of the U.S. influence attempts used during this time were hard power attempts. In this section I will briefly describe several examples: Operation PBFORTUNE, Operation WASHTUB, Operation PBSUCCESS (the coup itself) and U.S. involvement in the Guatemalan civil war after the coup.

Operation PBFORTUNE

In 1951, the CIA drafted a contingency plan for the removal of Árbenz and the potential communist threat he posed. Codenamed PBFORTUNE, the plan called for the assassination of approximately 58 Guatemalans known or suspected to possess communist sympathies. It also included working with leaders in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic to keep tabs on and ensure the return of “top flight communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in the event of a successful anti-Communist coup” should these individuals flee the country (DIA, 1995). The plan was abandoned in October 1952 when it became clear that it was no longer a secret (Dept. of State, 1967).

Operation PBFORTUNE was an attempted use of hard power because the United States conspired to overthrow a democratically elected, though anti-American,

government and forcibly set up another in its place. U.S. values such as democracy and freedom were tossed around as reasons for the operation, and CIA documents indicate that it was undertaken because the Árbenz administration was not in line with U.S. beliefs, but because the government used force it does not qualify as soft power (Dept. of State, 1967).

Operation WASHTUB

In 1954, the United States launched Operation WASHTUB, a plan to demonstrate that the Árbenz administration was in league with communist groups in other countries. The aim was to plant a cache of Soviet weaponry in Nicaragua and claim that that the Árbenz administration was responsible. In February 1954, the CIA carried out the plan, hiring a group of Nicaraguan fisherman to “discover” the weapons cache. President Anastasio Somoza Garcia of Nicaragua was also involved in the deception and held a press conference after the cache was uncovered. He announced that his administration had photographed a Soviet submarine that he claimed was delivering the weapons, but that no prints of the photos were available. This revelation was received with skepticism and the story did not have the desired effect of turning the international community against the Árbenz regime (CIA, 1967; Dept. of State, 1967).

As it happened, evidence of Guatemala’s ties to the Soviet Union surfaced without U.S. intervention. In May 1954, an arsenal of Czechoslovak weapons arrived in Guatemala on the *Alfhem*, a Swedish ship whose manifest had been altered to disguise its cargo. Although the weapons themselves were barely serviceable World War II-era German weapons, the United States perceived this shipment as proof that the Árbenz

administration was working with the Soviet government (Dept. of State, 1967). This may have been exaggerated, however, as the CIA was only able to unearth two other instances of Guatemalan-Soviet contact during the Árbenz administration. The first was an incident in which a Soviet diplomat attempted to facilitate a deal trading agricultural machinery for bananas. The deal ultimately fell through because refrigerated ships were not available. The second was a series of payments from a Moscow bookstore to the Guatemala Communist Party, totaling just \$22.95 (CIA, 1967).

Operation WASHTUB was intended to show that the Guatemalan government was accepting assistance from the Soviet Union by staging a weapons transfer. This was a hard power influence attempt because the United States tried to force the hand of the Guatemalan people and encourage them to support the coup efforts by providing irrefutable proof that the Árbenz administration was in league with the Soviet Union. An argument could be made that on the surface this is a soft power influence attempt because the goal was to persuade the Guatemalan people to support the coup. This argument is weak, however, because neither of our operationalization criteria apply in this instance. The first criteria does not apply because there was no mention of the United States or its values in the rhetoric surrounding the incident, and the second does not because Washington did not make it known that it had played a role in the incident (CIA, 1967). This situation arose because to acknowledge U.S. involvement would be to acknowledge that the weapons cache was a hoax, thereby defeating the purpose of the operation. Perhaps this influence attempts belongs in another category, one that contains attempts that do not use blatant force but do not fit our definition of soft power. For our purposes, however, it is closer to a hard power attempt due to the absence of soft power criteria and

also because of the fact that the attempt was designed to coerce the Guatemalan people to support the coup through deception.

Operation PBSUCCESS

The Árbenz administration was well aware that the United States was scrutinizing them very carefully, and tensions between the two countries continued to escalate between during the years immediately following Operation PBFORTUNE. The United States began work on a new covert operation, dubbed Operation PBSUCCESS, which sought to topple the Árbenz administration. The United States first gathered a group of approximately 400 fighters into the ad-hoc “Liberation Army,” armed them with U.S. weaponry, and trained them in guerilla tactics. The commander of this revolutionary force was exiled Guatemalan army officer Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, and Washington instructed him to prepare for overthrow of the Árbenz administration and the installation of a military junta. The operation was kept secret from the U.S. public, and reports of actions in Guatemala stated only that a “revolution” was taking place in the country (Dept. of State, 1967).

On June 18, 1954, Armas’s forces crossed the border from El Salvador and Honduras. They were told to avoid direct contact with the Guatemalan military if possible and instead to create panic among the general population. They hoped to imply that a large force was sweeping down upon Guatemala from all sides, in the hope of creating the impression of impossible odds and encouraging the military and Guatemalan public to join with the rebel forces (Dept. of State, 1967).

The coup failed to achieve the United States' goals, at least right away. It took several days for the rebels to reach their objectives (military and civilian targets throughout Guatemala) which undermined the notion that the rebels were a large, unstoppable force. A small detachment of the Guatemalan army defeated 122 rebels at Zacapa, leaving only 28 survivors (USAID, 1966). Shortly thereafter, 170 rebels were stopped at Puerto Barrios. By the end of the first few days of the operation, Armas had suffered the loss of three out of his five units.

Árbenz was not concerned about the remnants of the makeshift rebel army, and gave orders to allow them to penetrate into the heart of Guatemala without interference. He feared that crushing the rebellion too quickly would give the United States a pretext to take overt military action against his administration. Rumors of U.S. Marines landing in Honduras, in preparation for an attack on Guatemala, were rampant and Árbenz feared that the military might soon turn against him and strike a deal with Armas. His fears were confirmed when an entire garrison of the Guatemalan army surrendered to Armas's forces. Árbenz assembled his cabinet and announced his resignation (Dept. of State, 1967; CIA, 1967). The coup achieved its desired result, but not in the intended manner.

As with Chilean coup discussed in the previous chapter, the United States used its economic and military power to arm and train a revolutionary force designed to take over a democratically elected government. This is a classic example of hard power. Although the economic and military power were used as part of a covert operation, they were clear examples of one country using its superior might to force regime change.

Post-Coup Years

Despite Raborn's failure to unearth any concrete evidence that Guatemala was colluding with the Soviets, the CIA began to train Guatemala's police and military forces in 1967 to give them an edge in the Guatemalan Civil War, bloody thirty-six year conflict between the Guatemalan army and leftist rebels who opposed the military's usurpation civil government institutions. The civil war lasted from 1960 to 1996, and the government was blamed for numerous human rights violations and acts of genocide during that time (Dept. of State, 1967). It was later discovered, however, that the United States played a much larger role in these atrocities than was believed at the time (DIA, 1995).

In the late 1990s, information concerning U.S. covert interventions in Guatemalan affairs came to light. Beginning in 1954, covert CIA agents worked inside a Guatemala military detachment to orchestrate and support the assassination of thousands of Guatemalan citizens. The group, known as G-2, was implicated in numerous political crimes and assassinations over the years, but its association with and support by the CIA was unknown until recently (CIA, 1967).

Several members of G-2 came forward in the late 1990s revealed the extent of U.S. involvement in the atrocities. Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez stated that CIA agents travelled to Guatemala and other Central American countries fairly regularly and trained G-2 leaders in "contra-subversion tactics," "how to maintain factors of power," and how to "fortify democracy" (Nairn, 1995). At least three G-2 chiefs received paychecks from the CIA, and according to George Hooker, U.S. DIA chief in Guatemala from 1985-1989,

“It would be embarrassing if you ever had a roll call of everybody in [the] Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA paycheck” (Nairn, 1995).

This is another example of hard power, because the United States used its military and economic might to support the G-2 and its endeavors. The United States made no attempts to persuade or appeal to the powers of attraction felt by the Guatemalan people. Instead, Washington supported the G-2 with resources and expertise so that they could more effectively employ force to achieve their goals in Guatemala.

Soft Power Influence Attempts

There are several instances when the United States used soft power to influence events in Guatemala during the Cold War. Indeed, Washington used three different propaganda campaigns to encourage both the Guatemalan general public and the Guatemalan army to shift support away from the Árbenz and toward the Armas rebellion (USAID, 1966; CIA, 1966, “Interrogation;” CIA, 1966, “Death”). The propaganda campaigns conducted by the United States in Guatemala during this time were even more intense than the ones that would be used in Chile several decades later. The CIA made use of posters, pamphlet drops, radio broadcasts, and student groups within Guatemalan in order to convince the general public and the army that the Árbenz administration should be ousted (USAID, 1966).

Pamphlet Drops

In 1954, the United States organized pamphlet drops over the capital city of Guatemala City. Castillo Armas’s warplanes flew low over the city, dumping hundreds of

leaflets targeted at members of the Guatemalan military. These pamphlets contained messages such as: “Struggle against Communist atheism, Communist interventions, Communist oppression...Struggle with your patriotic brothers! Struggle with Castillo Armas!” They were designed to persuade the Guatemalan military to side with Armas and the United States (Dept. of State, 1967). According to Zachary Karabell, the pamphlets had their roots in “U.S. corporate advertising; selling the message of capitalism was not so different from selling its products” (1999, 41). Designed to “undermine the loyalty of the military to Árbenz,” the pamphlets portrayed Árbenz as a communist supporter while simultaneously presenting a “positive synthesis” of the rebellion’s beliefs, setting the two in direct opposition (Karabell, 1999, 134; 41).

The pamphlets were mainly intended to connect with the soldiers, urging them to literally “struggle” against the communism espoused by the Árbenz administration. The public, on the other hand, would have understood these sentiments in a more figurative sense, indicating a psychological struggle. While the Guatemalan public would likely have interpreted the use of the word “struggle” to indicate a metaphorical crusade for American values, the Guatemalan army would have read them much more literally (Grandin, 2004; Karabell, 1999; USAID, 1966). They likely would have perceived the “struggle” as a call to turn against their leader. Through this operation the United States was able to use one propaganda campaign to reach two audiences: the Guatemalan public and the army. As Thomas Jeremy Gunn writes,

From its inception, PBSUCCESS was based on one premise: only the Guatemalan army could overthrow Árbenz. Psychological warfare would be the CIA’s main

weapon to convince the Guatemalan officers that their security and well-being were at stake, and thus prod them toward treason. (2009, 142)

The same words were interpreted slightly differently by the two groups but with the same net result: decreasing support for the Árbenz administration.

This campaign was not hard power because its purpose was not to intimidate nor bribe the Guatemalan army. The messages encouraged and exhorted and never threatened or coerced. There were no explicit threats to soldiers who remained loyal to Árbenz or promises of wealth or glory if they aligned with Armas instead. It is also unlikely that there was an implied threat that, for example, soldiers who refused to join with Armas would be overrun because of the size and strength of the Guatemalan army and the relative weakness of Armas's forces (Grandin, 2004; Dept. of State, 1984). While these statements do not on their own categorize the attempts as soft power, they do rule out hard power as a classification option.

This influence attempt is an example of soft power because of the content of the propaganda. The message was that siding with Armas was siding with the United States and standing against communism and the Soviet Union. The pamphlets called on the "freedom-loving" members of Guatemalan society to "purge their government of its communist element" (Lucas, 1999, 226). Statements like this one made an explicit contrast between traditionally American ideals like freedom and democracy and communism. Because of statements like these, we have evidence of our first soft power criterion.

This influence attempt was an example of soft power being used to change public opinion and elite attitudes because of its dual audience: the general public of Guatemala

and the army. The United States sought to convince the members of the military that they should no longer support Árbenz because his values were inferior to those of Armas. The Guatemalan army was a major player in Guatemalan politics, to the point where Árbenz's legitimacy was nearly entirely based in the support of the armed forces, and we therefore consider this an attempt to change elite attitudes (DIA, 1979). However, the Guatemalan public was also a target, so we can say that this influence attempt served a dual purpose. This attempt was not an attempt to change policy since there was no attempt to implement or alter a specific law.

Radio Broadcasts

Beginning in 1953, the United States used radio to change public opinion of the Árbenz administration. The radio had played an influential role in the Iran conflict of 1953, and Washington was eager to deploy it again. Although few Guatemalans could afford a radio, the scarcity of this medium actually worked in the United States' favor because it was seen as an authoritative news source. The content of radio broadcasts were widely held to be credible (USAID, 1966; Dept. of State, 1967).

The United States created its own radio station called *La Vox de la Liberacion* (The Voice of the Liberation) that played a mix of popular music, comedy programs, and anti-government propaganda. The station was located in neighboring Nicaragua, but broadcasts hinted that it was located "deep in the jungle" of Guatemala (Dept. of State, 1967).

The propaganda messages had two intended audiences: the public and the military. The United States realized that source of Árbenz's control over the Guatemalan

people lay in his influence over the military, and the military's subsequent influence over the public (Dept. of State, 1967). The goal was to convince the military that they were outmatched through exaggerations of the revolution's size and strength while convincing the general public that the Armas rebellion was well-funded, well-trained, and would be successful against the Guatemalan army should a confrontation arise (Dept. of State, 1967; CIA, 1967). Declassified documents related to the broadcasts state that "[t]he army is a primary target of the propaganda. The 'Military Decalogue,' a statement of military values, is referred to several times in the effort to persuade the military to take action against the communists" (Dept. of State, n.d., 1-2).

Content of the broadcasts followed a repeated pattern. According to declassified transcripts of the broadcasts, the broadcasts proclaimed that "[c]ommunism is the great evil. It is anti-God, anti-religion, anti-fatherland. President Árbenz is depicted not [just] as a communist but as a writing instrument of the Kremlin who has sold the country out to international communism...." (Dept. of State, n.d., 1). Recurring segments covered "the virtues of the liberation movement's cause, the evils of communism and the treason committed by Guatemalan leaders" as well as "political commentary generally attacking communism" and declared that "[e]very Guatemalan should have as symbols in his struggle against communism, God, Country, and Liberty; as aspirations Justice, Truth, and Work (Dept. of State, n.d., 5; 16).

The content of the broadcast contained language similar to the pamphlets in that they equated Armas with U.S. ideals of democracy and capitalism and asserted that Árbenz would lead the country backward into oppression and recession. For example, one broadcast contained the following message: "The government of Jacobo Árbenz,

impelled by the communist party, aims for total control of the economy” (Dept. of State, n.d, 17). Another implored, “Guatemalan, if you love God, if you love your fatherland, if you defend your freedom, fight against communism” (Dept. of State, n.d., 20). The purpose was to equate Armas and his followers with values and ideals that the Guatemalan people would have desired for themselves (Dept. of State, 1967). Again, as described in Chapter Two, the Guatemalan people would have understood the insinuation behind these statements. Repression and economic hardship would have been linked to communism and the Soviet Union, while the United States represented the reverse (Grandin, 2004).

Although the soldiers would have heard the same content that as the general public, there was an added appeal embedded in it for them. The United States frequently called on the “men of action” in Guatemala to cast off their old allegiances and support Armas (Dept. of State, 1967). The phrase “men of action” would have been perceived by the Guatemalan military as being aimed directly at them. They would have heard the call to align with Armas in a much more literal way than their civilian counterparts (Dept. of State, 1967; Grandin, 2004). The goal was to present the opposition as a passionate, united front that stood for the values of democracy and freedom that would carry Guatemala into the future. By manipulating the national spirit and loyalty to country of the soldiers by calling on them to be “Guatemalan...patriots, not...traitors” the United States believed they would be able to sway key military officials to their side (Dept. of State, 1967).

There were few if any explicit mentions of the United States in this campaign, but the values that were espoused would have been synonymous with the United States,

especially in a Cold War world. During the Cold War, policies and views were either in line with the United States or with the Soviet Union, and there was not much middle ground. As explained in Chapter Two, the United States was synonymous with the values of democracy, capitalism, freedom, and equality, and the Soviet Union was seen as representing communism, socialism, and authoritarianism. The United States had successfully communicated this message due to its geographic proximity and long history of involvement with various Latin American governments (Dept. of State, 1966, “Request;” CIA, 1968). The United States was able to set itself up as the positive alternative to the Soviet Union: democratic, economically successful, and free.

The radio broadcasts during the coup period were instances of soft power use for two reasons. First, the messages contained references to American values and ideals and encouraged the Guatemalan people accept and support Armas because he stood for these values. Second, the United States had reason to believe, due to its long history of close relationships with many Latin American countries, that any message that espoused American ideals would be more readily received and accepted. This satisfies both our criteria for soft power use.²⁴

The United States could not use threats in this situation because doing so might have aroused a spirit of nationalism in the Guatemalan military and compelled them to stand steadfastly by their leader, which ruled out hard power attempts. The United States also realized that Armas’s forces, although well-trained and well-armed, were outnumbered by the vast Guatemalan army. They could not hope to achieve success in a

²⁴ As always, the rationale for these assertions can be found in Chapter Two.

direct conflict, and the odds would have been made even worse if the army felt threatened or cornered (Karabell, 1999; Grandin, 2004; Costello, 1997).

The overall goal of the propaganda campaigns was to change the type of values and ideals that the Guatemalan people supported, espoused, and wanted to see in their government. That is, this was not an attempt to change policy but rather an attempt to shift public opinion. The second goal of the radio propaganda broadcasts was to shift the allegiance of the Guatemalan military away from Árbenz (USAID, 1966; Dept. of State, 1967). The United States understood that the support of the Guatemalan military was essential to the success of the operation, and that the way to garner that support was through a direct appeal to their values. This belief classifies the attempt as an effort to change elite attitudes. Hence, we have another example of an attempt with two goals – changing elite attitudes and public opinion.

Student Groups

From 1953 to 1954 the United States also worked with groups, mainly students, within Guatemala as part of its propaganda campaign to further convince the Guatemalan public to turn against the Árbenz administration. CIA operatives stationed in Florida gave direct instructions to the National Student Association to write weekly newsletters condemning the administration and calling for citizens and soldiers alike to support the rebellion. The students also painted the number “32” on walls and sides of buses across the country to symbolize Article 32 of the Guatemalan constitution, which forbids the participation of foreign political parties-- like Soviet communist parties--in the electoral process (Dept. of State, 1984; DIA, 1979). As time passed, the students grew even more

innovative, attaching stickers reading “a communist lives here” to the front doors of the homes of known Árbenz supporters and distributing fake death notices for Árbenz and his cabinet members to the local media (DIA, 1979).²⁵

Their actions garnered extensive media attention and had such a profound negative effect on support for the Árbenz regime that Árbenz was forced to take action. He arrested members of the opposition, threatened media outlets, and limited the right to assemble. In so doing, Árbenz played right into the hands of his opponents by demonstrating the anti-freedom tendencies of which the United States accused him (DIA, 1979).

The United States was directly involved with these operations, instructing the student groups in the content of the propaganda. Leaving the distribution of the messages up to the students themselves, the CIA drafted content “designed to...intensify anti-Communist, anti-government sentiment and create a disposition to act” (Cullather, 1999, 66). This method allowed the United States to keep a low profile while still spreading its message.

This is not an example of hard power because the United States did not use threats or bribes against the Guatemalan public, its target in this operation. Through the student groups, the United States attempted to instead surround the Guatemalan people with information that linked the Árbenz administration to the Soviet Union and instill in them the idea that regime supported ideals that were not in line with U.S. values. Student groups “[shook] the Árbenz regime and heartened the opposition” throughout the coup

²⁵ While this particular element of the campaign could be seen as a hard power attempt, I argue that it is a soft power one. The goal was not to threaten members of the administration but to make the Guatemalan public believe that the fight against the administration would be successful because the leadership was dead.

period, to “denounce Árbenz as a dangerous leftist” (Cullather, 1999, 73; Appy, 2000, 200). This influence attempt was an example of soft power use because of the content of the messages. The United States used values-based messaging, as outlined above, to set U.S. values and the Árbenz administration in direct opposition to each other.

This is an example of soft power being used to change public opinion, namely that of the Guatemalan public at large. The propaganda produced by the student groups was not targeted toward a specific audience but was designed to persuade as many members of the Guatemalan population as possible to support the rebellion. This was not an attempt to change issue attitudes since the goal was an overall ideology change that would keep communist-leaning regimes out of power in the future as well. This was also not an example of an attempt to change policy because forcibly overthrowing the government is not suitable as a regular method of regime change. Washington simply sought to increase general public support for the rebellion.

Soft Power in a Supporting Role

U.S. involvement in Guatemala began with the coup in 1954 and continued for many years afterward. The CIA played a large role in Guatemalan affairs throughout the Guatemalan Civil War, working with domestic groups within Guatemala to put down the opposition. Over the three decades of involvement, we find three examples when Washington sought to use soft power. The United States orchestrated two propaganda campaigns--pamphlet drops and radio broadcasts--to change public opinion in three different instances and targeting two different groups, namely the general public and the Guatemalan army.

In this case, the United States relied on hard power more than soft power. This does not mean, however, that soft power was unnecessary or not useful. The United States used soft power to enhance the effects of soft power and increase the likelihood that hard influence attempts would be effective. While analyses of success are beyond the scope of this thesis, we have reason to believe that the United States felt that a mixed approach would produce a greater chance of success than hard power alone. This assumption is based on the fact that the United States was able to rely on its history of positive relations with Guatemala to believe that soft power attempts would be effective.

The United States used radio broadcasts to encourage Guatemalan soldiers to support Armas instead of Árbenz. The United States understood that it could not face the full Guatemalan military head-on and needed to instead persuade as many soldiers as possible that the side of the revolutionaries was the right one. In other words, soft power was needed first, to set up the hard power to be more successful. Armas and his followers would likely not have been able to achieve even the limited successes that they did had soft power not paved the way. The propaganda campaign caused the Guatemalan army to be less sure of itself, not because they doubted their military might but because they began to doubt the “rightness” of the cause for which they fought (Dept. of State, 1967). I posit that without the soft power influence of the propaganda campaign to grease the wheels, this would have been a much more difficult task to achieve.

A potential critique of this observation would be to say that it is either not necessary or useful to separate the hard and soft power elements of these influence attempts. This critique can be answered by returning to our second criterion for the presence of soft power. In the incidents described in this chapter, the United States had

reason to believe that the inclusion of soft power in a mixed approach would increase the chances that their hard power influence attempts would succeed, due to the relationship that the United States had cultivated with Guatemala. Because of this belief, it is not only logical but necessary to analyze the two types of influence attempts separately. Rather than rely on the hard power attempts alone, Washington chose to incorporate soft power attempts as well in order to increase their chance of success.²⁶

Conclusion

The United States used soft power to pave the way for hard power attempts several times during the coup period in Guatemala. Washington was primarily concerned with shifting public opinion to support General Castillo Armas with regard to the 1954 coup attempt and sought to accomplish this goal with pamphlet drops, radio broadcasts, and by cooperating with student groups. While the use of hard power, such as the coup, may have been successful without the simultaneous use of soft power, the United States had reason to believe that the combination of the two would be stronger than either by itself because the United States and the values it espoused were seen as positive alternatives to communism and, therefore, the Árbenz administration. The Guatemalan case study is an example of how soft power can support and increase the effects of hard power influence attempts.

We now turn to our third and final case, that of Brazil. The United States again supported a successful coup attempt in Brazil, and again used a mixed approach that combined hard and soft power elements in order to do so. The interesting twist in this

²⁶ Further discussion of this relationship can be found in Chapter Six, Conclusion.

case is that the United States eventually did not need to use its hard power resources because the coup succeeded more quickly than anticipated. We will examine the implications of this development in greater detail in the next chapter.

Chapter Five

Case Study Three: Brazil

A survey of Cold War influence attempts by the United States usually highlights the Chile and Guatemala coups discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter takes up the third “textbook” example of U.S. intervention: the 1964 coup in Brazil that resulted in the downfall of the João Goulart administration (“U.S. Role,” 2004; Pike, 2011; Welch, 1995). As in the Guatemala case, we find that soft power in this situation often played a supporting role to hard power. The United States again supported a coup attempt through hard power means, but also used four soft power campaigns to pave the way.

This chapter has four sections. In the first, I provide a brief history of U.S.-Brazilian relations during the Cold War period, focusing on Washington’s influence attempts. In the second section, I identify and describe several hard power influence attempts evident in this case, and in the third section I describe the soft power influence attempts. Finally, in the fourth section I discuss how soft power served in a supporting role to hard power in this case.

U.S.-Brazilian Relations during the Cold War

The decades leading up to the 1964 coup were tumultuous for the Brazilian leadership. Two-time president and champion of populist politics Getúlio Vargas committed suicide in despair over what he felt was an inevitable coup in 1956, and populism and the path to democracy began to crumble (Fitch, 1979). Juscelino Kubitscek assumed the presidency in 1956 following the death of Vargas. In an attempt to make

good on his campaign promise of “fifty years of progress in five” he turned to foreign investment to boost the Brazilian economy. He gave generous incentives in terms of low taxes and land donation to foreign companies who were willing to invest in his country. This policy undercut domestic producers and severely decreased their growth potential (Fitch, 1979; Markoff and Duncan Baretta, 1990).

The 1960 election was won by Jânio Quadros, a member of the Christian Democratic Party. João Goulart was selected as his vice president, although Goulart belonged to the Brazilian Labour Party. Quadros remained in office for only seven months before resigning, and some historians suspect that this was an attempt at a self-coup designed to put Goulart in power (Grindle, 1981; Hilton, 1981; Skidmore, 1988). Goulart was the natural choice for a successor, but political leaders both within and outside of Brazil were concerned about what would happen if he were allowed to take office (Grindle, 1981; Haines, 1989).

The general consensus among his opponents, both in Brazil and the United States, was that Goulart was far too radical to serve as president. His politics fell far to the left on the political spectrum, he held militantly nationalist views and was willing to enact policies to match, and, perhaps most alarmingly, he was willing to develop closer ties with communist nations (Haines, 1993). The concern was that Goulart would destroy the steps toward democracy that presidents before him had worked so hard to take. Even worse, his opponents feared he would align Brazil with the Soviet Union and communist ideologies. It was widely believed by both U.S. officials and Brazilian opposition party leaders that the communist political ideology would spell disaster for human rights,

economic growth, and the development of democracy in Latin America—and Brazil was no exception (Black, 1977; Grindle, 1981).

When Quadros resigned on August 25, 1961, Goulart, his vice president, was on a state visit to China. According to the election rules, Goulart should have assumed the role of president immediately (Pike, 2011, Grindle, 1981). As he was abroad, however, his opponents had several days to formulate a plan to keep Goulart from taking office. On August 29, a group of military and political leaders appeared before the Brazilian congress to declare that allowing Goulart to take control of the government would put Brazil on the path to civil war (Grindle, 1981). Congress vetoed the motion, but a compromise was reached that turned Brazil into a parliamentary democracy: Goulart would be permitted to assume the title of president, but would serve as head of state with only limited powers. A new prime minister, Tancredo Neves, was appointed the head of government (Haines, 1993; Grindle, 1981).

On January 6, 1963, Goulart ordered a referendum to change the system back to a presidential democracy, which passed by a large margin (Grindle, 1981). Goulart now assumed the full responsibilities of his role in a poor political and economic climate. The economic situation was especially troublesome, and Goulart struggled to acquire foreign investment and slow domestic inflation (Grindle, 1981; Black, 1977). The currency was kept afloat by stimulus packages from the International Monetary Fund, but public outcry over Goulart's mishandling of the crisis hurt his popularity and credibility (Black, 1977). In foreign policy, however, the fears of his critics were not realized. He refused to align himself with either the United States or the Soviet Union, and spoke out against both the Bay of Pigs invasion and Fidel Castro's policies.

The military and Goulart were often at odds, and tensions reached a high point in early 1964. On March 25, almost 2,000 sailors in the Brazilian Navy marched on Rio de Janeiro, demanding better living conditions in exchange for supporting the rest of Goulart's reform program. Silvio Mota, Minister of the Navy, sent a group of marines to Rio de Janeiro to break up the protest and arrest the leadership. Instead, Rear Admiral Cândido Aragão refused to arrest the sailors, and the marines ended up joining the demonstration (Markoff and Duncan Baretta, 1990; Haines, 1993).

In response, Goulart took the side of the protestors and prohibited repression of the protest, also firing Mota as Minister of the Navy. The Minister of Labor, Amauri Silva, was able to negotiate a compromise the next day, and the sailors left the assembly area peacefully. Upon returning to their unit, they were immediately charged with mutiny (Markoff and Duncan Baretta, 1990). Goulart, however, then pardoned the sailors. This created a serious rift with the military, which turned into one of the defining factors in the run up to the coup (Markoff and Duncan Baretta, 1990; Welch, 1995).

The Sailors' Revolt was the last wave in a rising tide of discontent with the Goulart administration. Both pro- and anti-Goulart forces were convinced that a coup was going to take place but were not certain of the timing. For example, as early as October 1963, Leonal Brizola, Goulart's brother-in-law and political ally, had organized groups of eleven people, fittingly called "Groups of Eleven," who would work to support Goulart's reforms in peacetime but would be turned into militias to defend his presidency if needed (Welch, 1995). For the opposition, Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, chief

of staff of the army, issued a letter to his top generals ten days before the coup to warn them of the dangers of a communist regime (Black, 1977).²⁷

Washington was displeased with Goulart's policies and became convinced that he would begin to align with the Soviet Union if something was not done. The United States stockpiled weapons arsenals at home and on Brazilian shores. In a military maneuver known as Operation Brother Sam, Washington also deployed U.S. troops and ships to just off Brazil's shores, ready to intervene in a coup attempt (CIA, 1964, "Plans;" CIA, 1964, "Intelligence"). The CIA also took on a significant role in the situation, channeling funding to anti-government rallies and demonstrations throughout Brazil (Johnson, 1964; Gordon, 1964, "Rio"). In addition, Washington worked to increase domestic support for the coup effort through communications with businesses, church groups, congress, the military, and student and labor groups (Fitch, 1979; Welch, 1995).

The coup began on March 31, when General Olímpio Mourão Filho, commander of the 4th Military Region, instructed his troops to move from their headquarters in Minas Gerais toward Rio de Janeiro (Skidmore, 1988). The former army chief of staff thought this decision both premature and ill-advised and tried several times to stop Mourão's advance (Fitch, 1979). General Amaury Kruel, one of the other key leaders of the plot, called President Goulart several times, each time demanding that Goulart renounce the left-wing elements of his administration, specifically his Chief of Staff and Minister of Justice. Goulart refused repeatedly (Skidmore, 1988).

²⁷ Although Goulart did not officially align himself with either the Soviet Union or the United States, examples like this one show how his opponents attempted to paint him as a communist threat through the power of suggestion.

In the afternoon of April 1, Goulart departed Rio de Janeiro for Brasília to attempt to stop the coup. The last loyal elements of his army were overwhelmed as Goulart traveled or shortly after his arrival (Skidmore, 1988). Upon entering Brasília, the president was dismayed to find that he lacked both political and military backing. In addition to losing the remnants of his army to the rebellion forces, he discovered that the Senate president, Auro Moura Andrade, was speaking out in support of the coup and encouraging other members of Congress to do the same. Goulart gathered his family in Brasília and then fled the city. Shortly after his departure, Auro Moura Andrade declared that the position of president of Brazil was now “vacant” (Skidmore, 1988).

As April 2 dawned, Auro Moura de Andrade and the president of the Supreme Federal Tribunal appointed Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, the speaker of the house, as president. The move may have in fact been unconstitutional as Goulart was still in the country (Hilton, 1981). He had fled to Porto Alegre with the last remaining loyal detachment of his military, the 3rd Army. Here he considered possible resistance measures and eventually decided to leave the country for Uruguay after learning that the coup leaders were headed to Porto Alegre and that he risked arrest if he remained in Brazil (Welch, 1995). Mazzilli remained the interim president while the coup leaders vied for power. Eventually, General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco was elected by the national congress (Fitch, 1979).

Hard Power Influence Attempts

In this section, I will discuss the hard power influence attempts by the United States during the coup period. These are Operation Brother Sam, which was a stockpiling

of weapons and supplies and a deployment of U.S. troops to Brazil, and covert CIA operations that focused on funding pro-coup rallies.

Operation Brother Sam

The United States was deeply interested in the development of the coup and declassified documents show that Lincoln Gordon and Colonel Vernon A. Walters (U.S. Ambassador and Military Attaché to Brazil, respectively) provided near constant updates to President Lyndon B. Johnson during the months leading up to and following the coup (CIA, 1964, "Intelligence"). Reports show that the United States predicted a full civil war, which was seen as promising for U.S. interests because internal instability would conceal any U.S. involvement (CIA, 1964, "Plans").

Faced with the appealing prospect of removing a potentially leftist regime in Latin America, Johnson authorized the placement of so-called "logistical materials" along the Brazilian coast (Johnson, 1964). These materials consisted of ammunition, fuel, and food and health supplies, prepared in advance of a possible deployment of U.S. troops to the mainland. Johnson also ordered the deployment of a Navy fleet, complete with an aircraft carrier, to provide further support to the coup effort. In addition, he ordered the preparation of approximately 110 tons of ammunition and poisonous gas in New Jersey. These supplies were to be ready for a potential airlift to Campinas, a city located just inland from Rio de Janeiro that served as a base for rebel operations (Kornbluh, 2004, "Brazil"). Finally, Johnson deployed two guided missile destroyers and four standard destroyers under the cover of a military exercise (Kornbluh, 2004, "Brazil;" Johnson, 1964).

Operation Brother Sam was a clear example of a hard power influence attempt. The United States stockpiled a large amount of weapons and ammunition and deployed troops and equipment with the goal of using its superior military force to aid coup efforts. One might question here whether a preparation for the use of force is an influence attempt if the target is not aware that it has occurred. That is, the influence attempt occurs only when Goulart is made aware that the weapons and troops have arrived. However, even though Goulart was not aware of what was happening the United States was still able to influence the conflict with its covert supply chain. Washington's support gave the coup leaders the confidence they needed to continue with full-scale preparations for the operation. Knowing that the United States stood ready to lend aid should the leaders overstretch themselves and attempt an operation that was beyond their means made the coup possible (Gordon, 1964, "Rio").

CIA Involvement

In addition to the overt displays of military force described above, the CIA was also involved in a number of covert operations in Brazil. Declassified telegraphs between Gordon and Johnson reveal that the administration authorized support for rebel rallies due to the fact that "a clear majority of [the Brazilian] Congress mistrusts Goulart's purposes and scorns his evident incompetence," and the Washington was hopeful that it could drum up popular support for the rebel cause as well (Gordon, 1964, "Rio," 5). These rallies were staged by student, church, and business groups in an attempt to raise awareness of the communist tendencies of the Goulart administration and to increase support for both the coup leaders and the ideals for which they stood. The United States

funded these rallies to help them gain national media attention and promised to defend the participants should the Goulart administration react violently (Johnson, 1964; Gordon, 1964, “Rio”).

This assistance is a hard power influence attempt because the United States provided positive inducements for the leaders of the rallying groups in the form of financial support, which would have been taken away if the attendees had suddenly changed their message and stopped supporting U.S. ideals. The rallies would have had difficulty reaching their target audience without the U.S. funding because they would not have been able to attract the attention of the media. So it follows that they had a vested interest in listening to the United States and acting as the Johnson administration wanted (Hilton, 1981; Grindle, 1981).

Soft Power Influence Attempts

This section describes the attempts by the Johnson administration to use soft power to overthrow the Goulart administration. They are covert operations designed to influence members of the Brazilian Congress, the armed forces, labor and student groups, churches, and the business sector.

Declassified documents concerning U.S. actions leading up to the coup indicate that President Johnson was very concerned about the possible failure of the coup attempt (CIA, 1964, “Plotters;” CIA, 1964, “Meeting”). On March 31, 1964, Johnson told his aides “I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do,” to ensure that the coup efforts had the greatest chance of success (Johnson, 1964). A declassified audio recording of President Johnson receiving a phone

briefing at his ranch in Texas further illustrates his position. Johnson states, “I’d put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity...on making sure the coup went forward....We can’t take this one. I’d get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little” (Kornbluh, 2004, “Brazil”).

To accomplish his goals, President Johnson authorized the CIA to engage in covert “psychological operations” designed to turn the tide of public opinion in Brazil (Kornbluh, 2004, “Brazil”). Telegrams from Lincoln Gordon indicate that these “complementary measures” were designed to provide “encouragement democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, and business” (Gordon, 1964, “Rio”, 11). Below I address each attempt at “encouragement” in turn.

Congress

Washington sent CIA operatives to the Brazilian congress to communicate support for the coup effort (CIA, 1964, “Intelligence”). The Johnson administration was against speaking out publicly in favor of the coup, because the rebellion was a surprisingly unpopular effort, both in Brazil and abroad (Skidmore, 1988). The coup was unpopular because it was organized and executed largely by the military, and the general population did not feel connected to the effort (Skidmore, 1988; Grindle, 1988). Because of this, the United States was concerned that if the Brazilian public became aware that the United States supported the coup effort, Washington’s ability to use its soft power in the future might decrease. The United States understood that support from the general public

was necessary in order for the coup to be successful, a detail largely passed over by the military leaders in charge (Skidmore, 1988).

To garner support, the Johnson administration visited key members of the Brazilian Congress with whom the United States had already built a relationship (CIA, 1964, "Intelligence"). The CIA was instructed to reassure these leaders that the United States supported the coup effort because of the communist leanings of the Goulart administration (Gordon, 1964, "Ambassador"). Lyndon Johnson knew that in order for the coup to have the desired long-term effect of improving the Brazilian political situation, congress had to be ready to swiftly step in to ensure a smooth transition. This could only occur if members of congress supported the coup effort. According to declassified CIA documents, Gordon recommended "a sufficiently clear indication of United States government concern to reassure the large numbers of democrats in [the Brazilian Congress] that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution [in Brazil]" (Gordon, 1964, "Ambassador", 2). The United States quickly acted on his concerns, starting "informal contacts with friendly Brazilians" in Congress almost immediately after Gordon's telegram was received in March 1964 ("Ambassador," 3).

This influence attempt is not an example of a hard power because there were no threats or promises made to the members of congress. At no time did the CIA either state or hint to the members that if they chose not to support the coup effort that the United States would either cease to provide them with support or threaten them with any type of force. In addition, there were no promises made of protection, military aid, economic assistance, or other positive inducements if congress did lend its support to the coup. Remember here that the United States did not want the general public to know about the

hard power resources it was willing and able to provide if necessary. This information was kept hidden from congress as well (CIA, 1964, "Intelligence;" Dept. of State, 1964). This attempt fits our second criterion for the presence of soft power. As explained further in Chapter Two, the United States felt confident that a Brazilian audience would respond favorably to U.S. political suggestions because of the military and economic aid Washington had provided to Brazil and other Latin American countries in prior years (Hilton, 1981).

A possible critique of my argument is that the United States had been steadily losing favor with the Brazilian government over a policy disconnect, because of which the United States refused to provide the Brazilian government with the aid it requested. This would seem to render moot the point that the United States had confidence in its "special relationship" with Brazil and trusted in the positive image it maintained there. I answer that the anger in Brazil at this time was directed nearly entirely toward the government, and even though the United States was losing favor in both official and unofficial capacities, at the time of the coup it would still have been seen as the lesser of the two evils.

This influence attempt is an example of the United States using soft power to change elite issue attitudes. In this case, the elites in question were members of the Brazilian congress. The United States targeted the decision makers of the Brazilian political system, the ones who would be in charge of naming a successor to Goulart if and when the coup was successful. Because this attempt targeted a highly influential subset of the Brazilian population, it is an example of an attempt to change public opinion. This

attempt is also not an example of an attempt to change policy because there were no laws in question to be made, repealed, or altered.

Armed Forces

Although the military was the main architect of the coup, only a few generals were involved in the planning at the beginning. The United States understood that in order for the coup to be successful, it needed to gain the support of a larger percentage of the armed forces (CIA, 1964, "Meeting"). CIA operatives contacted leaders of the army's main regional units, with the goal of encouraging "Brazil's usually fractious military leaders [to band] together and [organize] a coup" (Henry, 2004, 4). The generals were reassured that the United States supported the coup effort since it was an attempt to overthrow a leader with communist leanings, and encouraged them to do the same. Washington sought to convince the army that "there is a real and present danger to democracy and freedom in Brazil which could carry this enormous nation into the Communist camp," and to encourage them to take action against it (Gordon, 1964, "Rio," 12).

As was the case with Chile and Guatemala, the United States had worked hard to cultivate a positive image for itself and its values in Brazil prior to the Cold War period, especially with regard to the army (Welch, 1995; Smith, 2010). For example, during the Franklin Roosevelt administration, Washington provided military and economic assistance to the Brazilian government as a gesture of goodwill toward the Getúlio Vargas administration. Shawn Smallman states that "Vargas was pleased with the United States' ...support" and "wanted to ally with the United States to fight communism and to

gain financial support for liberal development” (2002, 75; 145) This development and others like it enabled Washington to take the stance that the Goulart administration could not be allowed to remain in power because it stood for ideals and values that were not in line with those espoused by the United States, and therefore those that would enable Brazil to move forward in the long run (Welch, 1995; Markoff and Duncan Baretta, 1990).²⁸ This influence attempt therefore fulfills our second criterion as well. It may well fulfill the first as well, based on references to democracy and freedom in documents outlining the actions to be taken, but there is limited detailed information available at this time.²⁹

This influence attempt was not hard power because there were no threats or promises made toward the generals. The CIA operatives who communicated with the military leadership simply stated U.S. support for the coup efforts and relied on the relationship the United States had built with Brazil during the pre-Cold War years to do the rest (CIA, 1964, “Meeting”). As noted above, there is some evidence that these operatives may have used a values-based rhetoric that pitted freedom and capitalism against oppression and communism, but there is not enough information available at this time to draw that conclusion.

One could argue here that the military would have known that the United States was in the process of stockpiling weapons for use should the coup fail and that the United States could use the weapons against them if they declined to participate. However, the United States was very careful to let only a few key officials know about the weapons

²⁸ Full discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter Two.

²⁹ This is due to the fact that the CIA case file from the Brazilian coup period has not yet been declassified. Information in this chapter is drawn from selected declassified documents and third party sources.

stockpile, namely those who had planned the coup from the beginning, and instructed them to keep the plan secret (CIA, 1964, "Meeting"). Thus, the targets of this influence attempt would not have known about the military resources that the United States had assembled.

This was an example of soft power being used to change elite issue attitudes, namely the attitudes of select Brazilian army officials toward the coup effort. It is not an example of an attempt to change public opinion because the United States carefully selected its targets to have the maximum amount of influence over coup participation. For example, the CIA only contacted two-star generals who were in charge of one of Brazil's six military command zones (CIA, 1964, "Meeting"). There would then have been a trickle-down effect as these generals gave orders to their subordinates, who gave orders to theirs, and so on. This was also not an example of an attempt to change policy because there were no laws or legal proceedings involved in this situation.

Labor and Student Groups

The United States worked with student and labor groups who opposed the Goulart regime, even if they did not explicitly support the coup effort (CIA, 1964, "Plans"). The CIA sought to "teach Brazilians how to manage labor relations in order to maintain productivity, promote stability, and keep out communist agitators," and noted that this was the perfect opportunity for student groups "to assert their personality in world affairs" (Welch, 1995, 1; Blum, 1995). Washington noted that "[t]he moment is particularly favorable for the putting forward of the American point of view" in Brazil,

and sought to encourage a “firm anticommunist policy” that included support of the coup effort (Welch, 1995, 2; Jentleson, Paterson, and Rizopoulos, 1997, 175).

This was an example of soft power use because it fulfills our second criteria. As above, the United States had reason to believe that its opposition to the Goulart administration and suggestion that labor and student groups support the coup effort would be heeded. In addition, the absence of threats, bribes, force, and positive inducements indicates that this was not a hard power attempt. Johnson instead relied on the relationship the United States had cultivated with Brazil in the past to encourage the groups to sit up and take notice.

This is an example of soft power being used with the intent to change public opinion. The public in this case was the membership of certain student and labor groups. This was not an attempt to alter elite issue attitudes because the United States sought the support of the broader Brazilian population, hoping that the opinion change would persist and apply to future administrations. This persistent change would ensure a communist-leaning president would never be elected again. In addition, this is not an example of an attempt to change policy because there were no laws or statutes being considered.

Church Groups

There is little concrete evidence that this influence attempt was carried out, but the CIA did make plans to communicate with certain church groups, who were sympathetic to the coup (CIA, 1964, “Intelligence;” Kornbluh, 2004, “Brazil”). The church in Brazil was an important political force during this time, and leaders and their congregations occasionally took stands on political causes about which they held strong

opinions. The United States had a plan in place to encourage these groups to reach out to others in their congregations and communities to elicit their support the coup effort (Kornbluh, 2004, “Brazil”). Washington believed that there “was [a] need for...religion to be a force to combat communism. Communism was aided in lands where religious practices had diminished” and also that “organized religion was the grave enemy of communism for it promoted moral and spiritual values against which the Soviet ideology had no response acceptable to the people” (Gribble, 2003, 2). To accomplish this, Washington “consider[ed] the Catholic Church as an interest group,” and encouraged the church to “become a key advocate of social justice, human rights, and democratic reform” (Manuel, Reardon, and Wilcox, 2006, 4; 152).

This plan satisfies our second criteria for the presence of soft power. While the United States had no explicit involvement in the Brazilian Catholic church in the years leading up to the Cold War, both groups shared a set of common values. Both sides proclaimed as their “principal concern” the “advance in Communism and its growth” and sought to create a “secure atmosphere of freedom” in Brazil (Gribble, 2003, 5). The Brazilian Catholic church was highly politicized and therefore likely to take action on political issues. The United States was able to capitalize on the church’s crusade for “religion and freedom and decency” to demonstrate to the church that its values were in line with those of the United States (Gribble, 2003, 6).³⁰ These shared values created a link between the two actors that encouraged the church to become even more politically active than it had been.

³⁰ While there may be evidence that our first criterion is satisfied as well, I am not comfortable making such a claim due to the limited data available on the content of communications between Washington and the church. I focus instead on how a set of shared goals caused the two groups to look favorably on each other and work to

Further, this attempt was not hard power due to the lack of force. The United States planned neither to threaten the church groups nor promise them anything but simply to validate their beliefs, affirm them as an indispensable part of the coup effort, and encourage them to share their anti-communist beliefs with others.

This is an example of soft power being used to change public opinion, with the target being church-going Brazilians and those who looked to the church for political guidance. Although the United States targeted specific elements of the church, specifically several respected and trusted bishops, Washington believed that these groups would be able to reach large segments of the Guatemalan Christian population due to their prominence and influence. This attempt was not one to change elite attitudes because it was aimed at the general population, nor were there any attempts to change policy or laws, preventing it from being an example of a change in policy.

Business

The United States also worked with the Brazilian business sector, particularly the telecommunications industry. Johnson was concerned that Goulart would nationalize the Brazilian telephone system, called Telebrás, which was owned by an American company (Skidmore, 1988). The United States encouraged businesses in the telecommunications and other sectors to support the coup because “[Brazil] needed [the coup] in order to free itself of a corrupt government which may be about to sell...out to international communism” (Chomsky, 1987, 217).

This influence attempt is an example of soft power because it fulfills our second criterion. The United States used the groundwork it had laid in previous years, having

expressed “a deep institutional interest in Brazil,” especially in the business sector (Crandall, 2011, 88). While Washington was often accused of a “blind focus on the Communist threat,” its desire to expand its economic influence in Latin America ensured that an emphasis on Brazil’s “drive for economic development” was always near the top of the agenda (Crandall, 2011, 89). The positive view of the United States that the shared goal of economic development created ensured that Brazilian corporations would listen to the United States’ message (Skidmore, 1988). The United States had reason to believe that the companies would be more likely to accept the message because it came from the United States, an ally and friend (Fitch, 1979).

This influence attempt is an example of soft power being used to change public opinion rather than elite issue attitudes because businesses in Brazil were generally not very involved politically. According to Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph, “Brazilian business groups have remained independent of corporatist ties to the state” (2010, 448).³¹ Therefore, this influence attempt was not an effort to change elite issue attitudes because most business leaders were not key political actors, at least not on the order of the army or government officials. It was also not an example of a policy change since there were no laws associated with the coup effort.

Soft Power in a Supporting Role

Soft power served in a supporting role to hard power for the United States in Brazil. Washington intended to use its vast military resources to support the coup effort with force (hard power) while the soft power attempts discussed above were meant to

³¹ This is not to say that businesses had disorganized lobbying efforts or were uninvolved in politics, but Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph state they were not as influential as other actors (2010).

ease the road and increase the likelihood that the hard power influence attempts would be effective. In reality, the coup proceeded much more quickly than the Johnson administration anticipated, and U.S. military support was not needed. Because of this development, only the soft power attempts were actually deployed.

This turn of events may suggest that soft power was so effective in this case that it rendered hard power unnecessary. Based on the evidence presented in this thesis alone, however, we do not have enough information to make this claim. Perhaps, for instance, soft power was also unnecessary, and domestic support for the coup effort was high enough on its own to ensure its success without U.S. intervention of either kind. This line of thinking would be an interesting topic for future research.

Conclusion

The CIA's operational file on the coup period in Brazil remains classified, making it difficult to locate evidence related to the soft power attempts discussed above. However, there is sufficient available information about the intent of the U.S. government when they instituted the policies described above. And the declassified documents to which we do have access reveal that soft power was indeed used in Brazil during the 1964 coup period.

The United States used soft power resources to encourage multiple sectors of the Brazilian population to support the coup: congress, the armed forces, labor and student groups, churches, and business. All of these "encouragement attempts" were designed to change public opinion or issue attitudes, either of the Brazilian population at large or a

subset thereof. In addition, soft power in this case was used to back up and reinforce hard power influence attempts—so successfully that hard power was rendered unnecessary.

In the final chapter, I will summarize the information presented in this study and explain how it has contributed to the academic and policy spheres. Specifically, I will review the research question and the gap in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill, summarize the arguments and findings made in the case study chapters, synthesize my findings across cases, explore how this thesis contributes to academic and policy discussions of soft power, and consider the next steps of a research program.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

This thesis has observed and catalogued instances of U.S. soft power use in Latin America during the Cold War. It summarized the relevant literature, proposed a new aims-based typology of soft power influence attempts, and finally explored three case studies of Latin American countries during the Cold War: Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil. In this chapter, I will restate the question this thesis has tried to answer, review what scholars have already said about the topic and why there remains a gap in the literature, summarize the arguments and findings detailed in the case study chapters, synthesize conclusions across cases, assert the relevance for this study for academic and policy debates on soft power and related topics, and speculate on the next steps this research program might take.

Research Question and Previous Research

This thesis sought to address the question of whether or not the United States used soft power as a foreign policy tactic in Latin America during the Cold War. Further, if in fact soft power was used in this context, this thesis tested a typology of goals that would assist in the more precise usage of soft power as a term.

The first question requires an answer because the current literature on the subject of soft power is highly theoretical. While many books have been devoted to discussions of how soft power could or should be used as a foreign policy tool, there is a near total

absence of empirical evidence that it has actually been employed. In other words, the term has been often operationalized but seldom applied.

Due to this gap in the literature, an opportunity exists for a new research program. This program would proceed through careful consideration of country case studies throughout history, examining influence attempts by one actor on another and determining which attempts were examples of soft power. I proposed to begin this process through the analysis of three countries in Latin America during the Cold War, focusing on U.S. influence attempts in those countries.

The second inadequacy in the literature concerns the manner in which soft power influence attempts are discussed. The term “soft power” is too often used as a blanket designation to cover all influence attempts that are “not hard power.” This leads to a tendency to conceive of all soft power influence attempts as similar to one another, when in fact they can be used to address a number of different goals. In other words, not all soft power influence attempts are created equal, and the literature often fails to recognize that fact. Despite the wealth of study on its operationalization, soft power is often defined too broadly. The literature would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of soft power—one that differentiates between the different goals it is used to achieve.

To address this problem, I proposed a typology of soft power influence attempts based on the goals each sought to address. This is a more useful typology than Nye’s categorization by sources because it is more applicable to the type of empirical analysis I conducted. Based on an exploratory study I conducted in 2011 on U.S. soft power influence attempts in Latin America during the Cold War, I proposed in my theory chapter (Chapter Two) that the United States could use soft power to address the goals of

changing public opinion, changing elite attitudes about a certain issue, and/or changing policy. I did not suggest that this was a complete list of possible goals, but rather a framework upon which I might construct a more comprehensive typology based on the soft power influence attempts uncovered in this thesis.

Summary of Argument

In order to locate soft power influence attempts within the many interventions by the United States in Latin America during this time period, I first needed a clear method of defining when an attempt was in fact an example of soft power. In order to accomplish this task, I operationalized a soft power influence attempt as one that fulfills at least one of two criteria: (1) the content of the message must either refer explicitly to the United States in a positive light, or to values that represent or are associated with the United States, or (2) Washington must have reason to believe that the target country would be more willing to listen to and accept the wishes of the United States because of a close relationship between the two countries that existed prior to the Cold War.

I proposed this operationalization because I felt that previous attempts to create one were inadequate for my purposes. I discussed and ultimately rejected the options of defining soft power in terms of its passivity or proactivity or its sources, due to the failure of each to capture the essence of soft power or apply to my empirical analysis.

In terms of a new typology, I proposed to test and build one based on the goals that soft power influence attempts can be used to achieve. As described above, this typology is more applicable to the type of empirical analysis I conducted because it is results-focused rather than source- or means-focused.

Summary of Findings

I studied U.S. influence attempts in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil in order to determine which were examples of soft power and which were not. I also considered the goals each attempt set out to achieve.

In Chile, I demonstrated that the United States used soft power to attempt to change public opinion in three separate instances. The methodology used in this case was propaganda campaigns and endorsement of U.S.-approved policies.

In Guatemala, the United States sought to change public opinion and elite issue attitudes using three different types of propaganda campaigns. First, Washington orchestrated a series of pamphlet drops over the capital city. Second, the CIA created its own radio station to broadcast anti-government messages to the population. Third, the United States supported student groups in Guatemala that were already opposed to the government and dictated parts of their propaganda campaigns.

Finally, in Brazil, the United States used its soft power resources to encourage the anti-government efforts of the Brazilian Congress, the armed forces, labor and student groups, churches, and elements of the business sector before and during the military coup that deposed the regime of João Goulart. Although the CIA case file concerning this conflict has not yet been declassified, there is enough information available to conclude that the United States did use soft power to affect the outcome of the coup. These influence attempts were all efforts to change public opinion or elite issue attitudes.

In terms of my typology, this thesis concludes that the goals that the United States pursued in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil during the Cold War fit into two of my three original categories: changing public opinion or changing attitudes of the leadership on a

certain issue. In the next section I will discuss why the shrinkage of my typology throughout the course of this thesis from three to two may have occurred and suggest methods for overcoming this difficulty in future research.

Synthesizing Findings

In analyzing my results across cases, two primary findings emerge. First, soft power often serves in a supporting role to hard power, or at least works in tandem with it. Second, the typology I proposed to test in Chapter Two (based on my 2011 study) shrinks throughout the course of this thesis. I will address each finding in turn.

First, in all three cases covered in this study the United States used a mixed hard and soft power attempt to pursue their goals. Each case deals with a coup scenario in which the United States played a hard power role, backed by several soft power influence attempts.³² The presence of a coup in each case in which the United States participated in a hard power capacity nearly guaranteed that soft power and hard power would have to work together, if soft power was present at all. I am therefore not surprised at this finding, and suggest that to overcome it in the future a wider variety of cases be selected, focusing on achieving a wide array of influence attempts between the cases.

While the 2011 typology had three categories (changing public opinion, changing elite issue attitudes, and changing policy), this thesis finds evidence of only the first two. This was a surprising finding due to my expectation that the typology would grow throughout the course of the study. Based on these results, I remain unconvinced that I have created a typology that encompasses all the possible goals that soft power could be

³² In Chapter Five I addressed the critique that it is not useful to separate hard and soft power attempts from one another since one could argue that they comprise one attempt.

used to achieve. I am also unwilling to claim that since I did not find evidence of policy change in this thesis that I should discard that element as a possible part of the typology.³³ I discovered evidence of the goal of policy change in my 2011 study of the Goulart administration in Brazil, but upon further analysis I believe that the soft power attempts in that case are in fact examples of attempts to change public policy. I am unwilling to remove this element from the typology however, until more data can be gathered from other countries.

Implications for Soft Power Literature

This thesis benefits the soft power literature in two ways. First, it provides one of the first systematic empirical case study analyses of soft power. While the soft power literature is rich in theoretical scholarship, it lacks in empirical analysis. This thesis examined a finite time period and region in a systematic manner, assessing how the United States used its soft power resources. While this research is only the first in the series of many analyses that must be conducted in order for the soft power literature to truly advance, it represents a meaningful step forward in expanding empirical inquiry.

Second, this thesis introduces a new typology for understanding and categorizing soft power influence attempts. The typology of goals offers a fresh perspective on cataloguing and differentiating between soft power influence attempts because it sheds light on why states choose to apply soft power resources, beyond the mundane and obvious answer that states employ the resources that they have. Considering the goals

³³ I discovered evidence of the goal of policy change in my previous research of the Goulart administration in Brazil, but upon further analysis I believe that the soft power attempts in that case are in fact examples of attempts to change public opinion and elite issue attitudes only.

that soft power can be used to achieve is important because it leads directly to a discussion of what soft power can and cannot do. This thesis uncovered evidence of two out of three previously discovered possibilities, but there are likely several more. That my typology is likely only a partial list does not concern me, however, because conceiving of soft power in terms of the framework of this typology allows scholars to think beyond where soft power comes from and to begin to consider what it can do. This shift from thinking about soft power in terms of its effects rather than its causes is a crucial step in moving the literature from a theoretical standpoint to a more empirical one. More goals will be added to the typology as the research program progresses.

Extensions of the Research

This thesis has perhaps raised more questions than it has answered. In assessing U.S. soft power influence attempts in three Latin American cases, it logically raises questions about other regions, time periods, and actors. I see no reason why the strategy used in this thesis would not uncover examples of soft power use in other instances for three reasons. First, while I selected Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil as three cases where evidence of soft power would be most likely to be found, I see nothing about these cases that suggests they are extreme or special, or that the results gleaned from them cannot be generalized to other cases. An argument could be made that the presence of a coup attempt in each case sets these three apart from others, but I assert that this does not affect whether or not soft power is present, only the likelihood of intervention attempts in general. As we have seen from these three cases, soft power can exist in tandem with hard power but can also function on its own. Therefore, one potential area of expansion is

extending the case study analysis to other Latin American countries, or to other continents. This will lead to questions about how soft power tactics and goals might change depending on the political and cultural elements present in each new case.

Second and third, I have no reason to believe that the United States only used soft power during the Cold War, or that the United States is the only power that has ever used soft power. In fact, there is evidence that the United States has used soft power tactics from the Revolutionary War (Wilmer, 2002; Bradley, 1999) to the Iraq War (Brewer, 2009; Altheide, 2006). In addition, during my study of U.S. propaganda campaigns in Guatemala, I uncover evidence of pro-Soviet poster campaigns that directly opposed U.S. and rebellion efforts (Evans, 1955). Therefore, two avenues for extending the research begun in this thesis involve considering other time periods or actors. These lines of inquiry will then lead to questions about how tactics and goals have changed over time.

As previously mentioned, the goals typology needs to be fleshed out and added to as more information becomes available from further case studies. This research track will develop alongside those already described, as more case studies yield more and more diverse types of soft power intervention attempts. Creating a comprehensive typology is important because doing so will permit researchers to compare and contrast cases – and soft power influence attempts within cases – in terms of the goals pursued in each instance. This in turn will provide information on how often specific soft power tactics are used to accomplish certain goals.

Finally, while questions of efficacy were not addressed in this thesis, answering them is important for furthering the literature as well. After all, if soft power tactics are not effective, they should be removed from the menu of policy options a state consults in

making foreign policy decisions. It may turn out that some tactics are more effective than others, or more effective at achieving certain goals. These are also useful pieces of information to know as researchers attempt to determine the full range of possibilities for soft power use.

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

On its own, this thesis suggests that U.S. policymakers should continue to employ soft power influence attempts as part of their foreign policy decisions. Although no specific conclusions about the efficacy of soft power can be drawn from this study alone, a quick glance over the evidence provided seems to suggest that at the very least the addition of soft power resources does not make things worse. In some situations, especially when combined with hard power, soft power may in fact increase the chance that a state will achieve the desired outcome. This is yet another potential avenue for future study: does soft power increase the efficacy of hard power? Alternatively, is soft power more effective when combined with hard power or when used as an independent tool?

Next Steps for Research Program

As explained in the Extensions of the Research section above, the next step in the research program is to extend the case study analysis to cover more soft power influence attempts. This can be achieved in a variety of ways: considering other targets, other time periods, or other users are all plausible options for how to proceed. I recommend that

researchers remain focused on the Cold War at first, expanding to other targets and actors within that period since the Cold War era has proven to be fruitful so far.

Summation

This thesis has started the process of shifting the soft power literature from a purely theoretical standpoint to a more empirical one. In addition, it has proposed a new typology that encourages researchers to think in terms of the intentions of actual soft power attempts rather than the sources of soft power resources which might never be used. While there is still much work to be done on the practical uses of soft power, this research has taken the first steps in a new and exciting direction for the literature.

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