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**Caught Between Nation and State:
An Analysis of Post-Cold War Military Intervention in Failed States**

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts


by

Christopher Liptak


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APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
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Approved, December 1997


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ABSTRACT

For most of the post-World War II era, U.S. strategy and military doctrine has been focused on a Westphalian notion of endemic conflict between nation-states. However, in the post-Cold War world, the use of the military instrument has, more often than not, been used to rectify problems internal to states.

Is the post-state level the arena where the U.S. will face its greatest military challenge in the coming decades? If so, then military leaders need to shift their analysis of nation-states to that of an internal perspective. In addition, if the military instrument of power is going to be the method of choice for dealing with state collapse, then political decision makers need to understand the capabilities and limitations of military force internal to states. This study seeks to address the effectiveness of military action in failed states by first, stepping backward and scrutinizing popular concepts of nation-states and sub-state linkages and then, analyzing recent military missions in failed states.

**Caught Between Nation and State:
An Analysis of Post-Cold War Military Intervention in Failed States**

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the number of sovereign states in the world has grown by a third and in the post-Cold War era the rate of creation of new “countries” has increased markedly. This new international order has deprived the formal rivals of either the capacity (the former Soviet Union) or the need (The United States) to uphold unpopular or ineffective regimes across the globe. This lessening of international pressure has afforded nations, ethnic groups and non-governmental entities the ability to pursue sovereignty unfettered by competing superpower demands. Unfortunately, the right of self-determination, supported by the international community, has been honored at the expense of the more practical aspects of long-term state survivability.¹ As regimes are increasingly left to their own devices to secure the conditions of their survival, many have shown that they are simply not up to the task. The result is a phenomenon becoming known as “failed-states” (states characterized by “civil strife, government breakdown and economic privation.”²) In the present era, the reduced specter of state versus state conflict has given rise to the use of the military instrument as the method of choice to be used to stabilize, and sometimes rectify, failed state problems. Military missions such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance, all grouped under the rubric “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), are military missions which are increasingly becoming the norm.

¹Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992/1993): 4.

²Ibid., 3.

In the United States, current strategy and military doctrine is dominated by a state versus state context or, in the military vernacular, war-fighting . However, day-to-day U.S. military entanglements are increasingly focused on problems internal to nation-states. Military operations in troubled states are a post-Cold War reality. This basis in fact requires that military and political decision makers understand failed-states. As General John Sheehan, former Commander in Chief of the United States Atlantic Command, succinctly explains: “I see a whole lot of Albanias’ in the future; ‘a whole lot of Haitis and Mogadishus.’”³ The rising number of troubled states with the potential of becoming failed states, and their impact on international stability, necessitates a better understanding of post-Cold War state dynamics. In addition, more effective political and military tools need to be formulated in order to address failed state crises. This study seeks to address the effectiveness of military action in failed states by first, stepping backwards and scrutinizing our concept of nation-states and sub-state linkages and then, analyzing recent military interventions in the failed states of Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Each case study will concentrate on an analysis of the state breakdown, the military missions formulated to address the breakdown, and lessons learned from those missions. A summary of the common trends in each case may be able to shed light on both the potential uses, and realistic limits, of the military instrument internal to failed states.

²Ibid., 3.

³George C. Wilson, “Deploy Less, Invest More, Sheehan Argues,” Navy Times: Marine Corps Edition, 7 April 1997, p.16.

FAILED STATE CRISES 1987-1997

<u>Year</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Military Mission</u>
1987	Liberia	Political Intervention
1990	Ethiopia	Humanitarian Intervention
1992	Somalia	Humanitarian Intervention (U.S.)
1993	Rwanda	Political Intervention (Belgium)
1994	Haiti	Political Intervention (U.S.)
1995	Bosnia	Political Intervention (NATO)
1997	Albania	Humanitarian Intervention (Italy)
1997	Zaire	Security Action (France)

(Table 1)

SECTION I

NATIONS, STATES AND STATE FAILURE

The collective American psychology regards the nation-state as a given and a basic frame of reference for understanding international politics. Government documents, academic journals, and the media typically address international issues at the state level. For Americans, and Westerners in general, the nation-state represents a constant in our established international equation. Nation-states have been, and remain, the primary actors on the international stage. But the reality of the post-Cold War international arena has undermined confidence in the viability of nation-states. In the past ten years, the viability of particular nation-states has been challenged in countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda, to name a few prominent examples. Much of this misunderstanding of the intrinsic weakness of states comes from the experience of the Cold War - 45 years during which the integrity of nation-states served as a fundamental principal of international order. The result was a tendency toward reductionism in thinking about international political affairs.

The term nation-state is used liberally in our societal discourse. To most Westerners, nation-state conjures up an image such as a France or Japan - a homogenous ethnic group under a single sovereign governmental entity. The fact is, while the term nation-state is colloquially used in most discourse, few understand its meaning. This problem may be endemic to our own language. As Haitian scholar Michel Trouillot points out, "unlike romance languages, in English the word nation is often treated as a

synonym of state."⁴ Thus, from a Western standpoint we not only have a conceptual problem but a language problem as well. What do the terms actually mean -- nation, state, country?

A nation refers to a social or cultural entity comprised of a group of people who share a common language, history, ethnic background, religion, or culture, or a combination of the above.⁵ Nations are homogenous populations of some type, not physical entities per se, but, more often than not inhabiting a contiguous physical space. A good representation of the concept is that of former Native American nations - Iroquois, Sioux, Comanche, etc. They were not organized political entities as much as they were a collection of people that shared a common cultural or ancestral lineage. Further, whichever combination of the above factors forms the basis for the sense of unity, a nation is a community of individuals that have developed a strong emotional bond or sentiment towards the larger group. It could be said the group has forged a common identity or a sense of "we-ness."⁶ This "we-ness" can be thought of as anthropological or embedded in the collective psychology of a group imprinting a culture upon it. As Senator Patrick Moynihan asserts: "The Nation is the 'highest' form of the ethnic group, denoting a subjective state of mind as regards to ancestry."⁷ Individuals tend to identify more with

⁴Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), 23.

⁵Wayne Davidson, "Actors to War and Conflict," War Conflict and Objectives, (Maxwell, Alabama: United States Air Force, Air War College Press, 1996): 2.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 4.

their nationality or ethnicity than their government, making nations and nationalism the most potent force in the international arena. Thus, nations should be thought of as powerful socio-cultural constructs⁸ or anthropological fields⁹ which give individuals in a population a collective identity.

Our international system is based on the notion of competing states. States, by the generally accepted definition, refer to political-legal entities which exercise effective control over a distinct territory and population. States are discrete and separate from nations, although a single state may govern a single nation. According to Wayne Davidson, states possess four primary attributes: territorial integrity, population, legitimacy, and internal and external sovereignty.¹⁰ Of these attributes, the two critical features are legitimacy and internal sovereignty - legitimacy being the collective acceptance from the population that allows a state to govern and internal sovereignty the ability of a state to control its population. As Max Weber pointed out, States are organs of coercion. “[A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”¹¹ “States seek to ensure their survival.”¹² Thus, states achieve legitimacy and internal sovereignty before attending to other priorities. In order to maintain legitimacy and sovereignty, states utilize

⁸Davidson, “Actors to War and Conflict,” 4.

⁹Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992): 103.

¹⁰Davidson, 5.

¹¹Weber, Max, “Politics as A Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946): 78.

¹²Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1979): 91.

organizations such as those that wield political power (governing institutions), use force (militaries and police), and administer justice (laws and courts). National politics tends to be the realm of authority, of administration and of law.¹³ National and cultural identities can shape political institutions but states are still synthetic constructs institutionalized within populations. As organizational bodies, states can rise and fall, consolidate or fragment, or simply go out of business or fail, whereas nations rarely do. As the post-Cold War experience has reminded us, states are often unstable and ephemeral features in the international milieu. In the abstract, they are the accepted operational entities at work in the international system. However, individual states should not be thought of as constants. If the state system is enduring, the fate of particular states is far less secure. Nation states, however, are connected to more lasting (and perhaps more relevant) national forces through these fragile linkages.

Nation-states are what we most commonly think of when we refer to actors in the international arena. A nation-state is a state whose population is composed from a single nation of people. The population identifies the nation and the state as one and the same. It is conceptually, for many, “an ideal form of state, with all members of a particular nation having their own state.”¹⁴ States with a cultural homogeneity, such as Japan or the Scandinavian states best qualify as true nation states. Yet few scholars agree on a clear definition of the concept. For the most part, nation-states are a West-European notion, although few states in Western-Europe are true nation-states. Most states found in the

¹³Ibid., 113.

¹⁴Davidson, 7.

world today are multi-national states. Multi-national states are those states which govern a group of nationalities, cultures or ethnic groups. The more diverse the collection of nations or cultures under state control, the less of a common vision of governance will be present in the state and therefore the less stability. Additionally, since many multi-nation states are the products of great-power treaties, colonial agreements or elite manipulation, there may be little state legitimacy. Suffice it to say that the notion of a nation-state is often more of an ideal than a practical reality. Most states are multi-national within which nations compete for a common vision of state governance. It is generally the case that the more nationalities states control, the lower the level of identification with the state.

The two primary internal dynamics which shape states and determine their overall survivability are sovereignty and legitimacy. State sovereignty and legitimacy in populations and ethnic groups is managed through social linkages. Social linkages are established through the mobilization of social power. States form these linkages to control populations and, in some instances, the mobilization of social power can give form to states themselves. In essence, states can be vehicles in which dynamic social relations become institutionalized.¹⁵ In other instances, states, such as post-colonial states, can layer social power constructs over populations. Social power networks can be manifested in many forms; many of them are nationally or culturally dependent. For heuristic purposes, Michael Mann has simplified the notion of fields of social power into four interrelated groups - ideological power, economic power, military power and political

¹⁵Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Volume II, The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 52.

power.¹⁶ While not comprehensive, it is an analytical point of entry for dealing with an otherwise messy complex structure.¹⁷ The point to take away is that, as complex synthetic entities, countries must integrate a variety of social power networks - ideological, economic, military or political - in ways that are historically contingent and path-dependent or particular to each country's experience. If the social linkages connecting a state to a given nation or population fail, the state will lose its legitimacy and fail. State formation, in other words, is an unending process, with the possibility of failure never far over the horizon.

State stability is also affected by external pressures. As Kenneth Waltz has shown, bi-polar, or balance of power international systems, can be much more stable than multi-polar systems. In balance of power systems there is superpower management of crises within spheres of influence. In multi-polar systems, there is less management of the affairs of smaller states since there is no power to balance, per se. In multi-polar systems, nationalistic and ethnic forces within the boundaries of states can more easily challenge state legitimacy and sovereignty with little loss of territory or resources to competing states. In addition, in a multi-polar system with a single superpower, a situation where international stability is at a premium, the principle strategic concern of the superpower will be to maintain the international status quo and thus uphold a balance of power internal to states rather than external. These permissive international dynamics exacerbate internal forces which can have a correlative effect on state failure.

¹⁶Ibid., 7.

¹⁷Ibid., 10.

The current international environment is causing the erosion of the traditional foundations of the state - legitimacy and sovereignty. As Richard Rosecrance points out, "there is no doubt today that states' wherewithal and power has declined."¹⁸ States are still capable organizational entities, but in today's international environment, legitimacy -- the principal element of social power -- has declined. "Legitimacy is under attack from nationalism -- especially where political boundaries do not conform to national ones."¹⁹ "Sovereignty is under attack from international sources -- international economics, the spread of democracy, new ideologies."²⁰ The decline in state power has manifested itself on the international margins as a phenomenon becoming known as a "failed state." If a state loses legitimacy through mismanagement of governance, the economy or ideology, or loses sovereignty through nationalistic fragmentation, revolt or war, it can fail, or in essence, go out of business. The populations or nations that failed-states governed will continue to exist but the means of maintaining order (the governing and coercive organizations) will stop functioning and in some cases vanish. In many cases, police and military organizations exacerbate the failure by essentially becoming bandits, taking advantage of instability and disorder to maximize personal gain. In terms of state/nation relationships, the networks that Mann identified as the sources of social power -- ideological power, economic power military and political power -- become disassociated,

¹⁸Richard Rosecrance, "Trans-nationalism and the Nation-State," address presented at the symposium: "NATO at the Crossroads: Eyes on the Horizon," Norfolk, Virginia, 11-12 April 1997.

¹⁹Richard Haas, "The Impact of Global and Regional Forces on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship," remarks presented at the symposium: "NATO at the Crossroads: Eyes on the Horizon," Norfolk, Virginia, 11-12 April 1997.

²⁰Ibid.

and new organizations or groups compete with former sovereign authorities. Failed social linkages, especially economic and coercive, give rise to massive economic privation, resource crises, violence and anarchy. Such disorder can rapidly spread from the local to the regional level, with potential for international repercussions.

The terms nation, state and nation-state are simple concepts with complicated real-world dynamics. In order to understand states and nations each must be viewed as a distinct entity, one synthetic, one anthropological, but with a history that is entwined. Nations, states and their stability is directly affected by the international environment and their internal makeup. In this era, state power no longer conveniently rests on a measure of weapons and technology, it rests on a more elusive social base. In a permissive international environment that does little to discourage nationalism and other social forces or shore up the vital bases of state power -- legitimacy and sovereignty -- states fail. Failed states can give rise to problems of an international scale such as economic privation, refugee crises, and genocide. If the key problem is not power, but its opposite - the weakness that follows from a lack of social power -- what is the purpose and role of military power forces in rebuilding state power? Rather than assume these questions in abstract, I will look at three actual cases in which military power was used to address humanitarian world order concerns in a context of weak or absent state legitimacy. In the conclusion I will generalize the effectiveness of military power in a failed state from the lessons learned in each of the cases.

SECTION II

U.N./U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

Thus far it has been observed that the current international environment is characterized by an increased tendency toward state failure. In this section we will concern ourselves with the use of military power in failed states. If military means are to be the method of choice for dealing with failed states, then strengths and weakness of the military instrument in these environments must be carefully analyzed. The ideal way to approach the subject is through an analysis of recent military actions in troubled states. U.S. and coalition military operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia shed important light on problems in failed states that can, and cannot, be solved by military means. The cases are typical of states in crisis, and in each case, military power was used with varying degrees of success.

Each case will be examined using an analytical model to: (1) assess the dynamics of each (failing) state and define the nature of the breakdown; and (2) determine the conditions affecting the success of military missions formulated to ameliorate the crisis. The lessons learned from each case will be amalgamated into a list of tenets which can reasonably be used to frame the use of military power in failed states. It is important to point out that the debate in this exercise is not centered on the political rationale for engagement into failed states. Suffice it to say that major powers can, and do, use military force to stabilize troubled states for a wide variety of reasons. It is the effectiveness of military engagement, once the political decision has been made to intervene, that we seek to investigate.

Dynamics of the Somalian Crisis

The Somali nation is composed of a culturally, linguistically, and religiously similar people divided among six distinct clans or tribes and scattered sparsely over a harsh, dry land.²¹ There is a weak national identity in the population due to the clan system identifying with a common ancestor. Three-fifths of the 7.7 million population is made up of regional nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists and herders,²² making geographical clan identification the strongest cultural force in the nation. Unlike Western states, only ten percent of the population, mostly elites, live in the few urban centers. Most of this small urban population lives in the capital, Mogadishu. These urban areas, and their mixed elite populations, tend to be marginalized as national centers of gravity due to nomadic detachment and regional clan dynamics. The clans are the basic unit of society, serving social, political and economic functions.²³

Somalia's history as a state is little different than many other former European colonies in Asia and Africa following World War II. Somalia was formed in 1960 by combining the former Italian and British colonies in the horn of Africa. It began as an idealistic Muslim republic founded by Somalian colonial bureaucratic elites. Somalia's departure from pluralistic state development came after a rocky nine years; in July 1969 a coup d'etat ousted the semi-democratic government and Major General Mahammad Siad

²¹Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Somalia: A Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993): 94.

²²*Ibid.*, xiv.

²³*Ibid.*, 85.

Barre assumed control of the country. Barre established a Muslim-Marxist republic and governed through a Supreme Revolutionary Council. Barre courted the Soviet Union and established Somalia as a Soviet client state for military and economic assistance. In addition, he used Marxism to try and build a nation-state identity by attacking the Somali clan system through rhetoric, education, and law. He established a homegrown scientific socialism which attacked tribalism, not class, in order to build government legitimacy among the clans. Unfortunately, the Barre plan only served to undermine what he was trying to accomplish. The abolition of political parties and the prohibition of political opposition made the clan system the only outlet for political activity.²⁴ Barre's practice of openly favoring the lineages and families of his own clan and distributing rewards and government offices to them disproportionately further undermining public support.²⁵ The result was the continued undermining of the legitimacy of Barre's state by an intensive identification with sectarian clans. In the final years of Barre's rule (1985-1990) the severe reduction of Soviet aid and "the multiplicity of political rivalries among the country's numerous clans seriously jeopardized Somalia's continued existence as a unified state."²⁶

The Somalian state collapsed in January of 1991 when repressed non-Barre clans militarily mobilized and forcefully deposed Barre. When Barre fled, the government that he had filled with family members, the armed forces led by clans he favored, and the

²⁴Ibid., 163.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

bureaucracy staffed by favorites, disintegrated. Not only had Barre's repressive policies undermined the government's legitimacy, but when rival clans mobilized, he lost the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the essential condition of any government's existence. Barre's flight caused a governmental vacuum.²⁷ The clans that advanced into Mogadishu had no vision of national governance. Within six months of Barre's abdication and the collapse of his government, the rival clans which had taken Mogadishu began fighting amongst themselves. "The result was disintegration of government, civil society, and essential services by September of 1991."²⁸ Media accounts of the situation in Somalia during this time frequently used the term "anarchy" to describe the political conditions. The Somalian state had failed.

Somalia received international attention in 1992 when, in addition to state collapse, massive drought struck the interior of the country. Since government services had ceased to function, and internal security had disintegrated, the bulk of the population -- the nomadic pastoral peoples of the interior -- suffered massive privation and starvation. Kenneth Allard of the U.S. National Defense University described the famine as one of "Biblical proportions: more than *one-half million* Somalis had perished of starvation and at least a million more were threatened."²⁹ There were no political or social mechanisms to stem the crisis. The situation in urban areas was little better; clan warlords and former

²⁷Ahmed I. Samatar, "The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in Somalia," in The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994): 120.

²⁸Metz, Somalia: A Country Study : xxx.

²⁹Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995): 13.

military officers exploited the growing refugee populations and humanitarian aid workers brought in to ameliorate the crisis. “Somalia had become a geographical expression rather than a country -- but whatever it was called the scale of human suffering there had captured the attention of the international community.”³⁰

Application of Military Power in Somalia

The scale of state failure in Somalia was total. Layered on top of complete government collapse was a multi-factional civil war and a catastrophic humanitarian disaster. Superpower interests -- humanitarian (ending the famine) and leadership (bringing together an international stabilization force) -- meant that not only did food aid need to get to the starving populace, but security and stability needed to be established. In the U.S., it was determined by the Bush administration that the American military was the only U.S. organization that could bring the requisite scale, organization, structure, logistical expertise and security to the anarchy that was Somalia.

The application of military power in Somalia had three distinct phases [see (Table 2)]: U.N. Operations Somalia I -- *UNOSOM I (Operation Provide Relief)*, U.S. Operation *Restore Hope*, and U.N Operations Somalia II -- *UNOSOM II. Provide Relief* was the bounded international effort under U.N. Security Council Resolution 751. Its mission was to provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate the end of hostilities. *Provide Relief* is more of a typical humanitarian operation. During *Provide Relief*,

³⁰Ibid.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>U.N. Resolution</u>
UNOSOM I (Provide Relief)	August - December 1992	UNSCR #751
Restore Hope	December 1992 - May 1993	UNSCR #794
UNOSOM II	May 1993 - March 1994	UNSCR #814

Courtesy: National Defense University
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

(Table 2)

humanitarian aid was delivered to the region but the security situation deteriorated.

Restore Hope and *UNOSOM II* better addressed the new challenges of military operations in failed states. Each mission had to grapple with the nature of state failure in Somalia -- the failure of governing and political institutions -- and the success of each mission depended on how it approached the remaining political framework.

The U.S. military mission for operation *Restore Hope* as defined by the Bush administration to the U.S. Central Command was to:

[C]onduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing relief under U.N. auspices.³¹

Militarily the mission was straightforward. It gave the U.S. military the leeway to use force to provide necessary security and stability in key areas. The only flaw was the miscalculation of military involvement in the political structure in order to accomplish the security mission. The nature of state failure in Somalia left it with no government, no political or coercive institutions, no social order. When 28,000 armed U.S. troops appeared in the region they, in essence, became the state. The seemingly simple task of maintaining security took on a different dimension in the anarchy that was Somalia. The *U.S. Army Forces Somalia, After Action Summary* captures the difficult dimension of providing security in a failed state:

In order to get military forces out of the security business, local security forces must function once again. In order to establish these security forces some type of local council or "government" must exist. Therefore our forces

³¹Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations*, 16.

were very closely tied to assisting in the establishment of local councils and facilitating the establishment of local council's police forces.³²

Clarity of mission and purpose was essential in order to keep the U.S. military in Somalia from being drawn into the political struggle in the failed country. *Restore Hope* managed to keep a fairly clear differentiation between the military and political tasks to be accomplished in Somalia. In turn, by most accounts, the U.S. military operation was deemed as generally successful in halting the fighting and increasing the amount of humanitarian aid that reached the population in the rural areas of the country.³³ Thus, the U.S. approach of sidestepping the political framework and limiting military missions and tasks to those suited to military forces helped control some of the anarchy in the former Somalia.

The post-U.S. United Nations mission labeled *UNOSOM II* fell into the pitfall of trying to rebuild the governing framework with military forces, which, as Kenneth Allard points out, is "an exercise akin to nation-building."³⁴ The immediate difference between the U.S. and U.N. operation was mission scope. The key differences are evident in U.N. Security Council Resolution #814 where:

- The Council mandated the first ever U.N.-directed peacekeeping operation under the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the Charter, including the requirement for *UNOSOM II* to disarm the Somali clans.
- It explicitly endorsed the objective of rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of a member state.

³²Department of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division, After Action Summary, (Fort Drum, New York: Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, 1993): 49.

³³Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 186.

³⁴Allard, 18.

- It called for the building of a secure environment throughout the country, including the northern region that had declared its independence.³⁵

The U.N. mission in Somalia was labeled as a peacekeeping mission, but it was in fact a far broader effort. The missions of disarmament and political rehabilitation greatly complicated the achievable military missions of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. These missions violated the canon of neutrality which is the centerpiece of a peacekeeping strategy.³⁶ In addition, the “absence of government authority not only means that there are no viable structures on which to build a peace settlement, but the actors who participate in the negotiations are less defined.”³⁷ Predictably, as U.N. forces became involved in the political dynamic of the warring clans, violent action toward peacekeeping forces increased. Peacekeepers, especially from major powers such as the U.S. and Italy, were seen as Western foreign invaders.³⁸ This politicization of the peacekeeping forces compromised the basic missions of providing humanitarian assistance and security to the Somali population and resulted, after significant violence, in the reduction of great power support for the mission.

Military Lessons Learned

Post-mission analysis and After Action Reviews showed that the U.S. operation with its limited humanitarian and security objectives achieved relative success achieving

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Diehl, 188.

³⁷Ibid., 189.

³⁸Allard, 189.

tasks to stabilize the environment. The U.S. mission was clear, achievable and within the scope of military forces. Still, even with a clear military mission, U.S. Army After Action reviews highlighted the problem of U.S. military forces becoming immersed in political problems -- the true nature of state failure in Somalia. The lack of a political solution and the application of political instruments against the anarchy in Somalia (e.g. a coherent plan amongst civilian agencies) meant that U.S. military solutions would be topical at best.

In contrast, the U.N mission with its capacious use of military force for a political mission was less successful. The U.N. overestimated the ability of a peacekeeping military force to reestablish institutions and disarm warring factions. In defining the limits of military action in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, Kenneth Allard describes those “bright lines” where the limits of military force are being reached: “One of them involves the use of military forces for nation-building, a mission for which our forces should not be primarily responsible. While military forces may well set the stage for such action, the real responsibility for nation-building must be carried out by the civilian agencies of the government.”³⁹ Also, in reference to the U.N. mission of disarming the warring factions: “If the disarmament of the population becomes an objective, then there should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed to combat.”⁴⁰

A comparison between the two operations highlights the success of the U.S. mission which was more in concert with the militarily achievable facets of state breakdown

³⁹Ibid., 90.

⁴⁰Ibid.

in Somalia. The primary task at hand for military forces was the stopping the famine and mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. mission addressed this problem while sidestepping the Somalian political framework. The U.N mission addressed the political problem head on, but failed to take into account the fact that military forces would have little effect in altering the fundamental absence of government legitimacy. By trying to reconstruct, with limited military forces, a popular base of support for a national state in Somalia, the U.N. mission was doomed to failure. The irony is that the U.N. and its member nations were encouraged by the initial U.S. success in Somalia but failed to realize that those successes were due to limited application of military power, not due to the overwhelming capability of military action.

Another important pattern to be considered, as we shall see in the other case studies, is the phased structure of military operations in Somalia (Table 2 - *UNOSOM I* through *UNOSOM II*.) The operational phases I and II (*UNOSOM I* and *Restore Hope*) were more successful than phase III (*UNOSOM II*). This lack of success in phase III can be partly attributed to the political dynamic of the *UNOSOM II* mission, but this phased trend also highlights the difficulty of transitioning from immediate, topical military problems to stickier political ones. As seen in the distinct phases and missions, military forces can be vital in ending violent social conflict and humanitarian disasters, but successful exit from a failed state will require an effective longer-term political solution in concert with the nature of state failure. Unfortunately the attempted U.N. political solution and accompanying military mission married the wrong tools to the right task.

Measuring effectiveness of a particular military operation in a failed state centers on the concept of stabilization of the environment. Stabilization is the consistent theme in U.S. military doctrine on peace operations and operations other than war.⁴¹ Stabilization in an anarchic situation can have many facets but can only be successfully accomplished by identifying and applying force to destabilizing forces. In a failed state this would mean applying political, military, and economic instruments of power against forces exacerbating state failure. Each instrument of power has a limited range of available tools to bring to bear in a certain situation. In Somalia, government breakdown due to friction between sub-national clan rivalries, compounded by famine, defined the nature of the failed state and resulting anarchy. As was evident in the U.S. and U.N. missions, applying military force to solve problems within the scope of military forces -- staying the famine -- were successful, while applying military force to rectify political problems -- reestablish government institutions or sort out clan rivalries -- were unsuccessful. As this case has shown, military power is an inappropriate tool for building social power, but is an indispensable tool for establishing the environment within which political measures can be successful.

⁴¹United States Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. (Norfolk, Virginia: OC Inc. 1997): 1-9.

SECTION III

U.S./U.N. INTERVENTION IN HAITI

The tortured past of the Haitian nation gives great insight into the failure of the Haitian state in the twentieth century. The Republic of Haiti, formerly Saint-Domingue -- the richest, most coveted colony in the French colonial empire⁴² -- contains a population of more than 5 million descendants of former African slaves. The theme of Haitian history and culture is one of exploitation. Even though the nation rebelled against French colonial rule in 1791 becoming the world's first black republic, "[t]he slaveholding system had established the efficacy of violence and coercion in controlling others, and the racial prejudice inherent in the colonial system survived."⁴³ The exploitive French colonial system left a nation divided between a black peasant class (noirs) and a light skinned elite (blancs) who wield a disproportionate share of the political and economic power.⁴⁴ In addition, the country's legacy of slavery and French colonization left a cultural imprint of which members of the Haitian upper class cherished Franco-Haitian culture because French language and manners separated them from the masses they wished to rule.⁴⁵ This divided national existence consistently undermined the mechanisms and institutions of a functional civil society. Consequently, Haitian history is replete with class-based and race-

⁴²Richard A. Haggerty, ed. Dominican Republic and Haiti: country studies. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991): 206.

⁴³Ibid., 203.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., 241.

based turmoil and struggle; a dysfunctional nation trapped in an exploitive political mechanism.

Haiti's troubled political history mirrors its exploitationist colonial roots. Haitian political development was continually arrested due to foreign influence and internal corruption. After throwing off the brutal yoke of the French colonial administration, early governments were manipulated and overthrown by outside powers such as Spain, Britain, Germany and the United States, in addition to continued meddling by France. Further, the division between elites and peasants exacerbated problems in state development as competing economic priorities -- elites insisting that peasants produce commodities for the world market and peasants who wished to be left alone to grow foodstuffs⁴⁶ -- tore at the notions of a representative political system. Elites continually backed charismatic leaders that maintained the social and economic status quo which peasants periodically displaced through rebellion and violence. This chaotic and personalistic nature of Haitian political culture provided fertile ground for a succession of despots, strongmen, and dictators.⁴⁷ The trend continued throughout the twentieth century until the Duvalier dictatorship was broken in 1986 and a fledgling representative government established. While the democratically elected government was the first step in functional state development, the lack of developed democratic institutions undermined the future of a democratic Haitian state. The republican state, due to colonial legacy, foreign influence, and class/race conflict, never developed the political and social linkages needed to attach the state to the

⁴⁶Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti. (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1994): 74.

⁴⁷Haggerty, 203.

nation. As Haitian historian Michel Trouillot argues, Haiti was the epitome of a “State Against Nation,” never functioning on a social-political level.

In September of 1991, the Haitian state failed when the progressive fledgling government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed by an elite backed coup. The economic elite of Haiti feared that their wealth and privileges would be taken away by the Aristide government. Seeking protection from this threat of expropriation, they sponsored a conservative military coup. The U.S. press defined the coup as repressive, thus defining the perception of right and wrong to the U.S. public and U.S. policy makers. The United States, along with the Organization of American States, responded to the coup by imposing an international trade embargo.⁴⁸ Government exploitation coupled with the trade embargo caused massive privation among the peasant population and gave rise to a refugee crisis in which “30,000 Haitians fled across the border to the Dominican Republic, while 40,000 others boarded rickety boats and tried to sail to Miami.”⁴⁹ The military government had no way to respond to this situation other than to give up power. The state of Haiti had failed its people for the fifth time this century and, as per Haitian history, it would take either internal violence or outside intervention to return stability to the island.

Application of Military Power in Haiti

The realization that Haiti, with the Cedras military regime in place, would become

⁴⁸Louis Ortmayer and Joanna Flinn, “Hamstrung Over Haiti: Returning the Refugees.” Pew Case Studies in International Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, 1994: 1.

⁴⁹Ibid.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>U.N. Resolution</u>
Uphold Democracy	Sept. 1994 - January 1995	UNSCR #940
MNF - Haiti	January - March 1995	UNSCR #940
UNMIH	March 1995 - January 1998	UNSCR#940

Courtesy: United States Atlantic Command
Operation Uphold Democracy:
US Forces in Haiti

(Table 3)

a long-term human rights dilemma for the United States made military solutions an increasing strategic necessity. Yet, due to experience in Somalia, it was realized that a military solution would be topical and not rectify the intractable problems of the failed state. From this vantage, the National Security Council established an interagency working group (IWG) that “brought together representatives from all government agencies involved in the planning and policy development process for Haiti.”⁵⁰ This forum allowed coordinated political-military planning and had members from Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury as well as from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.⁵¹ Unfortunately, the working group never arrived at a coordinated, objective driven political-military policy,⁵² but its creation marked an important realization -- that while the military could achieve the goal of establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment, in essence, assuming the monopoly on the use of force and stabilizing the environment, civilian agencies could formulate programs and policy to address the longer term solutions needed to reconstruct the state. Thus, even though the interagency process for Haiti did not arrive a complete political solution prior to the application of military force, the post--Somalia awareness that political solution was required at all was an important benchmark.

The military mission in Haiti, like in Somalia, can be divided into three distinct phases: *Operation Uphold Democracy* -- the initial U.S. military intervention in Haiti,

⁵⁰United States Atlantic Command, Commander-in-Chief. Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti (Norfolk, Virginia: O.C. Inc., 1997): 6.

⁵¹Ibid., 7.

⁵²Ibid., 8.

Multi-National Force Haiti (MNF Haiti) -- a U.S. led multi-national coalition set up after a secure environment was established, and the United Nations Mission Haiti (UNMIH) which took over from MNF Haiti after a stable and secure environment was established. The initial U.S. military mission dictated by the Clinton administration to the Commander of the United States Atlantic Command via the U.S. Joint Staff, was to:

[U]se military force in Haiti to establish a safe and secure environment that would permit the re-establishment of the legitimate government of President Aristide. Other tasks were to neutralize the Haitian Army (FAd'H) and to protect American citizens.⁵³

The challenge of the military mission was that, even though it was limited in scope -- *establish a safe and secure environment and neutralize the Haitian Army* -- it still displaced the, albeit dysfunctional, military government in Port au Prince. This meant that the U.S. military became the de facto government until Aristide was returned to power and new government were institutions created. To keep the mission from creeping into a nation building program in Haiti, initial goals of military commanders after displacing the Haitian military regime were to immediately "establish civil-military operations"⁵⁴ to reorganize those government institutions which the military could effect -- the army and police. In addition, in order to limit military involvement to attainable objectives, defined end states were dictated for turn-over to the Multi-National/United Nations Force (dependent on threat) at either 30, 45 or 180 days. The limiting of the military mission to those aspects of security and stability that military forces could provide, and the definition

⁵³Ibid., 2.

⁵⁴Ibid.

of end states for military operations in the failed state, made U.S. military operations in Haiti less tractable than those in Somalia. U.S. military intervention in Haiti had a clearer conception of the need for a civilian solutions to political problems and gave rise to a more successful employment of military power in the failed Haitian state.

The mission of the U.S. led Multi-National Force differed little from that of the original U.S. Joint Task Forces involved in the initial intervention. The U.S. formulated mission dictated a continuation of the safe and secure environment in Haiti as well as the facilitation of the return of the legitimate government to Haiti and the professionalization of Haitian public security forces. It was also charged with transitioning government services from the military to the government of Haiti.⁵⁵ The mission of the multi-national force is unique in that the MNF was challenged with returning authority and institutions back to the legitimate government. Aside from police forces, there was no charter for institution building in Haiti. The military objective was viewed as creating a stable environment for Haitian institutions to resuming functioning,⁵⁶ not to take over functions from Haitian institutions. The U.N mission in Haiti continued in this vein, more than likely due to the legacy of initial U.S. command of both the MNF and U.N mission. Thus, unlike Somalia, as the military mission in Haiti transition from U.S. to MNF to U.N., the mission remained relatively constant. This resulted in a relatively successful military program in maintaining a stable and secure environment in Haiti as the democratically Haitian government of President Aristide reestablished itself.

⁵⁵ United States Atlantic Command, Commander-in-Chief. Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After Action Report (JAAR) (Norfolk, Virginia: U.S. Atlantic Command, 1995): 23.

⁵⁶United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti : 19.

Military Lessons Learned

Unlike Somalia, the nature of state failure in Haiti was less anarchy and government breakdown than dysfunction. In terms of a U.S. Army war college study, Haiti was a “Predatory state,”⁵⁷ one in which the state abused its legitimate use of force. The most important lesson from the intervention in Haiti was the realization that in order to address the state dysfunction, a coordinated political-military solution to the crisis needed to be defined prior to intervention. The interagency effort, a first for engagement in a failed state, was one of the most significant changes in policy formulation during this type of crisis. Even though the interagency process did not produce an effective political plan to deal with state failure in Haiti, the fact that an interagency effort was attempted proved that policymakers were becoming aware of the limitations of strictly limited military solutions. The closing comment of the U.S. Atlantic Command synopsis on mission planning and execution in Haiti acknowledged this change:

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY for the first time integrated political, military, and economic planning through an IWG [interagency working group] that developed a plan to assist Haiti. Although this was the first step, it fell short of its goal and highlighted the need for an interagency structure based on accountability of all the participants and a formal process to ensure the execution of planning efforts for the successful attainment of US goals and objectives.⁵⁸

The application of military power, regardless of the environment, must be led by political power. Clausewitz’s maxim that military force is “the continuation of state policy with

⁵⁷Max Manwaring, “The Challenge of Haiti’s Future,” Strategic Studies Institute Special Report, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army War College Press, 1997): 3.

⁵⁸United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: 61.

other means”⁵⁹ still holds true. A clear political strategy must always lead the application of military power. The interagency effort is essential in focusing instruments of power to be used against the anarchy and to formulate a longer-term political plan. As seen in Haiti, the military can stabilize the environment (for a time actually become the state), provide security, open lines of communication and facilitate the distribution of resources, but the long-term stability of the new government, the economy and social institutions were outside of the scope of the military’s capabilities and ultimately remained the responsibility of other U.S. government organizations and the United Nations.⁶⁰

The success of the military mission in Haiti can be directly attributed to the clear and specific nature of the mission and objectives and their correlation to the nature of state failure in Haiti. As concluded in the United States Atlantic Command overview of the Operations in Haiti: “A clearly defined mission with attainable objectives and an exit strategy is critical.”⁶¹ In other words, the military mission in Haiti, through U.S., MNF and U.N. control remained a measurable, achievable concept with formulated for military forces. The mission did not force military forces to take sides between rival factions, rebuild state institutions (with the exception of law enforcement), or administer justice. The military mission was carefully crafted so that the military instrument did not, in the long-term, become the state -- a difficult task since the nature of state failure in Haiti was the abuse of the legitimate use of force. Planners compensated for the displacement of

⁵⁹Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984): 81.

⁶⁰United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: 19.

⁶¹Ibid., 60.

Haitian civil authority by U.S. military authority by programming in the phasing out of U.S. only operations and the phasing in of multi-national troops. A Haitian government in exile ready to reassume power also helped formulate a less intractable military end-state.

Integrated attempts to formulate a political solution and a definable military mission all contributed to the initial success of the U.S. intervention in Haiti. However, the lack of an adequate long-term political and economic plan for Haiti has dimmed the prospects for the republic's stability. Haiti presents an excellent example of why a long-term political plan is imperative prior to military engagement. Like in Somalia, the three phases of the Haitian operation from *Restore Democracy* to UNMIH demonstrate that military forces can quickly establish order and temporarily provide some services, a longer-term political solution is needed to insure the elements which caused the dissolution of the state are placated and refocused on establishing domestic order.

SECTION IV

U.N./NATO INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Since the treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, the ethnic cocktail that made up the state of Yugoslavia was always inherently unstable. Not only were there competing ethnic groups under a single state, but there was a volatile religious and cultural dynamic as well. In addition, the division of Yugoslavia into distinct republics, or semi-states doomed its success. From the 1940s through the 1980s, the coalition Yugoslavian government, with its separate republics, functioned under the Cold War fear of Soviet intervention. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the international order that held together the Yugoslav state began to unravel.⁶² “Normal political conflicts over economic resources between central and regional governments and over the economic and political reforms of the debt-repayment package became constitutional conflicts and crises of state itself.”⁶³ Slovenes and Croats, objecting to the Serb-dominated communist government in Belgrade, wanted to begin Western-style democratic reforms and market economies. Both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia in order to align with the Western powers. After brief and bloody fighting, the federal government in Belgrade let ethnic Slovenia and Croatia go.

⁶²Woodward, Susan L., Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995): 16.

⁶³Ibid., 15.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic at the crossroads of each cultural and religious group, did not go as peacefully as Slovenia and Croatia. When Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from the disintegrating Yugoslavian state, the republic immediately split along ethnic lines. The population, which consisted of an urban elite Muslim majority numbering 44 percent, a working class Orthodox Christian Serbian segment of 33 percent and a Catholic Croation western population in the order of 17 percent,⁶⁴ went their separate ways. However, “[e]thnic differences, even substantial differences, do not set a society inexorably toward a path of war.”⁶⁵ Resource competition, weak state institutions, and lack of vision of governance all tore at the political fabric of the Bosnia state. When the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo failed to establish a vision of governance that would satisfy all of the ethnic groups in the region, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, it lost legitimacy and war broke out in the province. Much of the violence stemmed from the Bosnian Serbs' desire to establish a Serbian state from the patchwork of Serbian land that dotted Bosnia. But there were other dynamics at play as well -- rich and poor, urban and rural, elites and non-elites. As the fighting escalated, political institutions collapsed, military and police organizations demobilized and took up arms with competing groups, and social institutions broke down. The Muslim-led government lost legitimacy among the non-Muslim population. Bosnia-Herzegovina ceased to be able to manage its population and was racked by violence and internal war.

⁶⁴United States Department of Defense, Bosnia Country Handbook (DOD-1540-16-96). (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995): 2-4.

⁶⁵Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: 18.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>U.N. Resolution</u>
UN Protection Force I	January 1992 - March 1993	UNSCR #743
UN Protection Force II (NATO Air Support)	March 1993 - Dec. 1995	UNSCR #743
NATO IFOR	Dec. 1995 - Dec. 1996	UNSCR #1031

(Table 4)

Application of Military Power in Bosnia

The application of military power in Yugoslavia began under the auspices of the U.N. Protection Force which was designed to separate warring factions in Croatia and Serbia. The mission migrated to the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it was quickly overwhelmed and, in fact, became a liability when NATO began airstrikes to protect safe areas. When NATO finally put forces on the ground it was under the U.S. brokered Dayton Peace Accords which divided Bosnia into two separate entities under one state. A 60,000 man NATO force formed around a core of 20,000 U.S. troops would be the military instrument used to bring order to the failed state. The Dayton Peace Agreements, while not presenting a completely satisfactory political solution, presented a political framework upon which a peaceful military entry could be accomplished. Lessons learned in Somalia and Haiti -- to have a clear political vision and end-state before committing military forces -- were beginning to have an effect on military operations in failed states. The NATO military mission in Bosnia is by far one of the clearest and most specific of the three studied thus far. The mission of NATO intervention force (IFOR), as dictated by the NATO Security Council, was broken down as follows:

[M]onitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. UNSCR 1031 provides the mandate for a one-year IFOR mission as described in the agreement. The North Atlantic Council has authorized IFOR for this period. The military tasks include:

- Ensuring self defense and freedom of movement.
- Supervising selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the parties.
- Monitoring and--if needed--enforcing the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, and the establishment of Zones of Separation.

- Assuming control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes.
- Establishing Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to the Peace Agreement.
- Assisting with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR.⁶⁶

As seen before, the key components of a successful mission were built into the IFOR charter. Namely, (1) the mission was based around supporting the political framework of the Dayton Accords, (2) it was achievable -- it married military capabilities with military tasks, (3) it was objective driven -- it established six primary, measurable military objectives that were to be the focus of the effort, (4) lastly, it was limited in scope and time - it did not try to rebuild the Bosnian state and only supported the political agreement for a period of one year. These components have helped prevent the mission creep that was seen in Somalia and, to some extent, Haiti.

The jury is still out on the overall success of the IFOR mission. NATO forces are still engaged in Bosnia under the new NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) arrangement. It is uncertain whether Bosnia will come apart again when NATO military forces leave in the near future. Still, the intervention in Bosnia has been, by far, the most effective of the three case studies analyzed. At this point, all timetables for disarmament have been scrupulously honored and specific goals have been met. As journalists Laura Silber and Allan Little chronicle: "The results were tangible. Within the first two months, the warring sides met the deadline to pull back from the zones of separation. After more than four years of war, tens of thousands of people killed, and more than two million made

⁶⁶United States Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: The Role of IFOR in the Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996): 1.

homeless, there was no more shelling, no more fighting.”⁶⁷ Thus, in terms of mission accomplishment, IFOR was more successful than operations in Somalia, and to a limited degree, Haiti. IFOR did not get into the intractable position of trying to reestablish political institutions in Bosnia, nor was it required to economically rehabilitate the former state. The tangible military objectives of order, freedom of movement and the withdrawal of factions proved to be what was needed in order to bring a small window of stability to the troubled landscape. This stability has created an environment of basic security within which development of the political and economic solutions which are the real keys to long term peace in the region.

Military Lessons Learned

Thus far U.S. political and military engagement in Bosnia can be considered a success. With the exception of the humanitarian crisis, Somalia seems no better off than when the U.S. became involved in 1992. And Haiti, while a military success, seems to be sinking back into economic ruin. When compared to the situation in Bosnia three years ago, there appears to be much progress. This success can be attributed to the element of stability that the NATO military force has brought to the region. But as we have seen, stability brought by intervening military forces can be fleeting.

Through each case study, the development of a political solution for the failed state crisis proved to be a key factor in the overall success of the entire mission, both political and military. As we have seen there was no political framework and little clarity

⁶⁷Laura Silber and Alan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997): 377-8.

over the desired end state in Somalia, thus the lack of direction and failure of the mission in Mogadishu. In Haiti, a political solution was attempted but never got much farther than the planning stage, thus the continued political and economic problems in Haiti. In Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, for all of their uncertainty, have provided a framework from which to build a semblance of stability and peace. Hence, at least from a surface perspective, the Dayton framework was critical in ensuring the success of the military component of the mission.

Of three military operations analyzed in this paper, the IFOR mission in Bosnia was, by far, the most detailed and specific concerning the application of military force in troubled states. Much of this success can most likely be attributed to the involvement of a significant number of U.S. forces and the collective lessons learned from previous engagements in failed states. The IFOR mission was centered on ensuring the success of the political framework by providing those aspects of security and stability that a military force could offer. While the verdict is not in on the overall success of political engagement in Bosnia, the military aspect of the mission must be considered a substantial success.

Military success in Bosnia stems from the fact that a broader political framework was worked out in before the decision was made to commit NATO military forces on the ground. Policy makers and military planners appear to be learning some lessons from the recent spate of engagement abroad. In Bosnia, this was translated into the formulation of a long-term political framework -- the Dayton accords -- upon which an achievable, objective driven military mission could be formed. Many may not like the political

solution arrived at in Dayton, but a political solution will always be required prior to the engagement of a military forces in order to define what they are supposed to accomplish.

SECTION V

SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER IN FAILED STATES

When global interests dictate engagement in troubled states, the lesson of previous engagements are invaluable. As the Atlantic Command review of Operation *Uphold Democracy* succinctly points out: “Lessons learned in Grenada and Panama had a significant influence on the resulting [Haiti] plans.”⁶⁸ Understanding the capabilities and limitations of military force in military operations other than war are fundamental when engaging in operations in failed states. The three recent case studies highlighted the benefits and pitfalls of military operations other than war in an anarchic failed state environment. From these case studies there are several lessons which resonate through the entire set. These lessons can be summed up in five tenets for military engagement in failed states.

Five Tenets of Military Operations in Failed States

I. Approach the situation outside of a nation-state framework

Despite the prevailing conception, the viability of particular states is not to be taken as a given. Nation-states are fragile frameworks of socio-political linkages and institutions that provide varying degrees of order and stability over a given populace. It has been evident in the post-Cold War era, when the international system loosens, history “returns” and states falter, break and come apart. Understanding the nations, tribes and ethnicities that underlie most states is the challenge of the post-Cold War policy maker

⁶⁸United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti : 2.

and military planner. When states come apart the institutions and trappings of the state fall with it. From a political-military standpoint, it is often useless to try to solve a failed state crisis through the institutions of the former regime. The frame of reference needs to be refocused to that of the population and its anthropological underpinnings such as national, ethnic, and tribal identities. By reducing the frame of reference below the level of the state, a definitive, neutral political and military solution can be applied.

II. Engage under a clear political plan

A political solutions to problems in a failed state must take precedence over military engagement. While military engagement in failed states can bring quick order and stability, political plans to transition the region to a certain, stable end-state must take priority. Long-term stabilization and institution building requires a political blueprint. As was seen in Haiti, even with an interagency working group, there was no clear conception of, or arrangement for, a desired political end state. This made the transition of military authority to that of other governmental agencies and to local civil authority less than clear, the upshot being the continued engagement, albeit limited, of U.S. military forces to this day. As in Bosnia, political solutions such as Dayton, even if limited, provide the foundation upon which successful military missions are built. Without a political framework, military engagement will only be topical and not provide any long term corrections to the anarchy of a failed state.

III. Focus military missions on tasks relevant to military forces

Military missions must focus on those tasks that can be accomplished by military units. Providing security, opening lines of communication and rebuilding minor parts of a

county's infrastructure are examples of missions that are achievable by military forces.

Rebuilding governmental institutions, whether entire governments as in Somalia, or police forces as in Haiti are not appropriate military missions; military units lack the training and the expertise to accomplish these types of programs. Nation-building type missions are better suited to other governmental or non-governmental agencies and should be ruled out as military functions during mission development. Military units can accomplish much, especially when instruments of order and coercion are needed, but, as seen in Somalia, the improper, or inadequate, application of military force can have negative effect on the problem at hand.

IV. Establish concrete military objectives

The primacy of the objective is the core doctrinal tenet of the United States military. It is the center piece of the United States Department of Defense Doctrine for Joint Operations where it states: "a clearly defined and obtainable objective is critical when the United States is involved in military operations other than war."⁶⁹ Mission driven objectives should be specific, measurable and achievable. They should be limited in scope and limited in time. Of the case studies analyzed, missions that did not have clear objectives, such as UNOSOM II, suffered from a lack of focus and overall accomplishment. When the objectives were detailed, measurable and limited in scope and time, such as in Bosnia, there was a higher level of mission accomplishment and overall mission success. The definition of clear mission objectives in any military operation is fundamental to mission success. In the anarchic environment of a failed state, where the

⁶⁹Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995): V-2.

military threats are less certain and the political tasks more complicated, clear objectives are a necessity.

V. Stabilization of the environment for a broader purpose

In the anarchy of a failed state, the primary task of an outside military organization will always be providing for some type of stability so that broader political and economic reforms can be enacted. As stated in the United States Joint Warfighting Center Handbook for Peace Operations: "Principally, peace operations are designed to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed."⁷⁰ As we have seen, missions areas which directly address stabilizing the environment -- famine relief in Somalia, disarmament in Haiti, and separating warring parties in Bosnia -- are the most successful. Thus, the military commander in a failed state environment must never lose sight of the primary goal of providing stability so that broader political and economic plans may be accomplished.

Post-Cold War Truisms

The above tenets can provide a broad frame of reference when entering into planning for operations in failed state. A sixth tenet could easily be to plan for a transition to multi-national, or United Nations authority. In each case study, the use of coalitions, be they United Nations, multi-national, or NATO forces, have always led and followed unilateral engagement in a failed state. As shown by the case studies, phased mission

⁷⁰United States Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations: 1-7.

approaches are the operational reality. Post-Cold War, unilateral operations, especially peace operations, are rare. Planning for coalition operations, or the transition to coalition operations, should always be a consideration when establishing a political-military framework for a failed state.

Military operations in the anarchic environment of a failed state will always be accompanied by the “friction” and “fog of war” so aptly described by Clausewitz. Military operations other than war place unique demands on military forces -- demands not normally associated with traditional warfighting roles. In an article on joint doctrine and Post-Cold War Military Intervention, Steven Drago explains that “it is evident that long-term political goals can be extremely difficult to translate into well-defined and readily attainable military objectives. . . the challenge is to select appropriate military actions to support political ends.”⁷¹ Viewing the problems in a failed state outside of a nation-state framework, developing political solutions and end states, articulating military missions and planning for coalition operations are a few of the key necessities prior to the engagement of military forces. The formulation of the critical military component of missions and objectives can only be built on the firm foundations of the desired political solution. An up-front political solution for a failed state is the only way for a military force not to become caught between nation and state.

⁷¹Steven R. Drago, “Joint Doctrine and Post-Cold War Military Intervention.” Joint Force Quarterly, number 14 (Winter 1996-97): 108.

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