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Battlefield Archaeology: A Case Study

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BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY: A CASE STUDY

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Anthropology

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

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by

Patrick Paul Robblee

1995

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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Author

Approved, December 1995

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Marley R. Brown, III

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Norman Barka

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David Muraca

DEDICATION

For my wife, Judith

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a case study in the determination of the archaeological significance of a battlefield site. It presents a general discussion of battlefield archaeology, a discussion of archaeological significance, and a case study of the Battlefield at Williamsburg, a small Civil War battle fought on May 4-5, 1862. The remains of a Confederate defensive line consisting of 15 defensive structures were identified and mapped. The line was found to be significant as an example of a mid-nineteenth century defensive line. Furthermore, three other sections of the battlefield were identified that may yield archaeological resources relating to the battle. The thesis also makes recommendations for additional fieldwork on the battlefield.

BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY: A CASE STUDY

Figure 1. The Battle of Williamsburg (Leslie 1992).

Chapter 1:

Battlefield Archaeology

Monday, May 5th, 1862. Williamsburg, Virginia. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, has moved his command to the old colonial capital after abandoning Yorktown on May 3rd. The retreat was executed under threat of an impending siege by Union forces under General George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac. McClellan had been placing heavy siege guns along Johnston's Yorktown line for over a month after moving his army from Washington D.C. to the Virginia peninsula for a projected attack on Richmond, the Confederate capital. Fortunately for Johnston, McClellan's plan was to move all his guns into position before opening fire on the rebel line. When the siege seemed imminent, Johnston fled under cover of darkness hoping to move his command to the Richmond defenses before McClellan could catch him.

The retreat took McClellan by complete surprise. All his intelligence had reported that the rebels would stay and fight in Yorktown. He had not even considered the possibility of a retreat and it was over 12 hours after the discovery of the missing rebel army that he launched any infantry (General Joseph Hooker's division from the Third Corps and General William Smith's from the Fourth) in pursuit.

Despite the head start, however, Johnston was having difficulty moving his artillery and supply wagons due to soggy, muddy roads, a situation compounded by a heavy rain that began falling early on the morning of the 5th. Furthermore, Union cavalry under General George

Stoneman had reached the Confederate rear guard late on the afternoon of the 4th and skirmished briefly. Fearing the advance of Federal infantry behind the cavalry and the delays caused by mud, Johnston needed to buy some time. To his great fortune, Confederate General John B. Magruder, in command of the peninsula prior to his arrival, had fortified a three mile line of defense between the College and Queen's Creeks about two miles south-east of Williamsburg. The line consisted of a large earthen fort (Fort Magruder), 12 earthen redoubts, two earthen redans, rifle pits, and obstacles (see figure 2). Johnston ordered his Second Division, under General James Longstreet, to occupy the line and block the approach of the Union army--in military parlance, to fight a delaying action while the remainder of Johnston's army escaped to Richmond. The Fourth Division, under General D.H. Hill, spent the night of May 4th in Williamsburg and was available to Longstreet on the 5th as a reserve.

When Union General Joseph Hooker reached the Williamsburg defenses at dawn on May 5th, he deployed skirmishers to probe the line and placed his artillery on the only road leading to Fort Magruder. Longstreet responded by opening fire from his guns in Fort Magruder and the Battle for Williamsburg had begun (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; Sears 1992).

The study of war as cultural phenomena is a major theme in American anthropology. Indeed, two national symposia (Fried et. al. 1968; Haas 1990) and a number of sessions at the annual meetings of various anthropological associations have dealt exclusively with war. Addressing such issues as the origin of war, the role of war in complex societies, war as a tool of economic and political oppression, and the

Williamsburg Line

1 mi

0

Queens Creek

Capitol Site
West House

Palace Green

Market Square

C.H.

Duke of Gloucester

Magazine

Francis St.

Eastern
Lunatic Asylum

Bowden House

Bruton
Parish

Richmond Rd.

College
of W&M

Jamestown Rd.

Williamsburg

Cub Creek

□12

□13

□4

□11

Jones Pond

Whittaker House

□10

Fort Magruder

□8

5

3

□4

Tuttersa
Neck
Pond

Figure 2. The Williamsburg Defenses, May 1862 (Kettenburg 1980).

motivations for armed conflict, anthropologists have endeavored to expand our understanding of war as part of the total human experience.

Yet despite the many contributions from cultural anthropology, archaeologists have largely lagged behind in the study of war. While it is true that archaeologists have studied a variety of military sites such as fortifications and encampments, very little attention has been payed to the study of battlefields. At least one archaeologist has even suggested that archaeology has very little to contribute to the study of battles and wars (Noel Hume 1969). Several recent investigations, however, have shown otherwise. Barka (1976), Ferguson (1977), Gould (1983), Scott et. al. (1989), Fox (1993), and Geier and Winter (1994), for example, have all produced insightful reports based on their excavations at various historic battlefields. Furthermore, Sl. Vencl (1984) has developed a comprehensive body of theory for the study of battlefields through archaeology. As Fox notes, "Archaeology is a useful tool for studying battlefield sites, and much can be said about battles in particular and warfare in general (Fox 1993: 4)."

The purpose of this thesis is to present a case study for assessing the archaeological significance of Civil War battlefields. Such a study is necessary due to the relative lack of published information on battlefield archaeology in general and Civil War battlefields in particular. The problem is relevant given the many recent controversies in battlefield preservation, for example, at Brandy Station, Virginia and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Sipkoff 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). As more and more battlefield sites are threatened with development, it is increasingly necessary to define how archaeology can contribute to our understanding of war. Furthermore, a general discussion of battlefield significance begs the question, what role should archaeologists play in battlefield

preservation.

These are not simple questions. How we define battlefield significance will determine the level of archaeology, if any, undertaken at the site. Because of the size of many battlefields, the question of scale plays a major role in the definition of significance. Access to the battlefield in toto may not be unrestricted; this in itself may produce dilemma's in terms of the types of questions battlefield archaeologists may address. The ability to recognize patterns, for example, may be compromised if an insufficient area is tested. The public also plays a major role in how we determine significance. Battlefields frequently enjoy broad public support, particularly Civil War battlefields. Round tables and historic preservation societies may provide moral support and work as a lobby for preservation. They may also produce unscrupulous collectors and looters.

In the following chapters, I sort through these problems by way of a case study. The Battlefield at Williamsburg is an ideal example because it is partially destroyed, spread over a considerable area, shows evidence of looting, and enjoys public support in the form of a local Civil War Round Table and preservation committee. Broadly, I define the battlefield as a tactically significant, cultural landscape. Emphasis is placed on the spatial definition of battlefield features, including terrain, and a spatial analysis of recovered artifacts. Chapter Two begins with a general discussion of battlefield archaeology as a legitimate focus in the discipline, reviews pertinent literature, and highlights the potential of battlefield archaeology in particular as exemplified by Scott et. al. (1989) and Fox (1993) at the battlefield of the Little Big Horn. Chapter Three discusses the concept of significance in archaeology and how it applies to historic battle sites. Chapter Four describes the history of the Battle of

Williamsburg. Chapter Five describes the cultural resources remaining from the battle. And Finally, Chapter Six discusses the significance of those resources and offers recommendations for additional fieldwork and preservation/management options.

Chapter 2:

The Archaeology of Battles and Wars

A comprehensive introduction to battlefield archaeology requires an understanding of how archaeologists have defined and interpreted the evidence for war. The following chapter highlights theoretical and methodological contributions to the archaeology of war and describes the types of evidence used in its interpretation.

Archaeologists are able to interpret past human behavior, including warfare, on the basis of artifact pattern recognition. Behavior exhibits a certain degree of regularity, or patterning, because it is guided by cultural rules that define desirable behavior (Hodder 1977, 1993; Fagan 1991; South 1977). As Fagan notes:

> The concept of culture provides anthropological archaeologists with a means for explaining the products of human activity. When archaeologists study patterns of discard, or the tangible remains of the past, they see a patterned reflection of the culture that produced them, of the shared behavior of a group of...people. This patterning of archaeological finds is critical, for it reflects patterned behavior in the past (Fagan 1991: 38-39.

Archaeologists make inferences about the past on the basis of this relationship.

Like other aspects of human behavior, warfare is patterned because it is governed by a set of cultural rules that define how they are fought. According to Scott et. al., for example,:

> Battlefields may seem an unlikely place to look for human behavioral patterns, since they represent the most violent expressions of human behavior, but it is precisely for that reason that behavioral patterns are likely to be evident. Warfare has special rules by which it is practiced. Within our own culture (for example) this may be seen in the preparation and training given members of the military. This

training is given in order that those engaged in battle would perform their duties based on their training and respond to orders without dwelling on the consequences. That is patterned behavior (Scott et. al. 1989: 6).

It should be noted, however, that behavioral expectations in times of war are unique to individual cultures and not universal. These norms and expectations may vary from one culture to another. The Aztecs, for example, often waged war to obtain victims for religious sacrifice. The goal of battle was to capture rather than kill the enemy and it continued until enough victims were taken (Walsh and Sugiura 1991). As a result, we must never assume that our own understanding of war constitutes a model applicable to other cultures.

I should also note that the goal of archaeological research is not simply the identification of a particular pattern in the ground. If all an archaeologist can say about a particular battle site is that they have identified the "battlefield pattern," then they have not contributed anything significant to our understanding of the battle. The archaeology becomes nothing more than an exercise in curiosity. Rather, it is the job of the archaeologist to anticipate the patterns likely to emerge from a specified action (such as combat) and make inferences about the past on the basis of any deviation from those expectations. For example, if an infantry regiment fought according to standard military doctrine, then the artifact patterning should reflect that behavior (Scott et. al. 1989; Fox 1993).

It is possible to anticipate likely patterns on the basis of surviving documents and manuals that proscribe what at the time was seen as the most efficient means to execute military duty (see Sheppard 1972). At the time of the Civil War, for example, the United States Army and Navy had produced a variety of tactical manuals to govern military behavior, including combat action. We thus have a large body of documentary

evidence to reconstruct the behavioral rules of combat in historic times. As a result, we can predict the types of patterns one could expect from specific combat actions (Scott et. al. 1989; Fox 1993).

Military Sites Archaeology in North America

Battlefield archaeology falls under the purview of military sites archaeology, a discipline devoted to the study of sites associated with a variety of military activities. These sites include, for example, military encampments, field and permanent fortifications, shipwrecks, and battlefields. Battlefields may include other types of military sites, such as fortifications, but the defining feature of the battlefield is a site where combat took place.

Few battlefields have been studied by archaeologists with the goal of contributing to our understanding of the battle. Recent studies by Ferguson (1977), Scott et. al. (1989), and Fox (1993), however, have shown that archaeological investigations of battlefields can produce those results. Ferguson's (1977) study of Fort Watson, a British fort in South Carolina, for example, enabled him to determine the location of the American forces besieging the fort and the direction of their attack. Furthermore, Scott et. al (1989) and Fox (1993) have reconstructed the ebb and flow of the Battle of the Little Big Horn by interpreting artifact patterning in the recovery of spent armaments.

Military sites archaeologists have addressed a variety of other research topics on military sites. Some have sought to collect data to enable accurate reconstructions of military structures or to study engineering techniques. Excavations on the Yorktown Battlefield by Barka (1976), for example, identified communications and siege trenches

and compared the construction of various American and French redoubts on the battlefield. Elsewhere, Harrington's (1978) investigation of Fort Necessity revealed the location of the original fort and palisade. Other studies have focused on the identification of architectural detail in military structures. These studies have enhanced our understanding of the engineering principles that guided the construction of military structures. Babits (1991), for example, has studied architectural detail in Civil War defenses in Georgia and Beaudry (1983) has explored the construction of traverses and drainage systems at Fort McHenry.

Other archaeologists have focused on camp life and provisioning systems at military sites. Huey (1991), for example, has analyzed recovered assemblages from Fort Orange in upstate New York to interpret the daily life of the soldiers, traders, administrators, and Native Americans who lived or worked in the fort. Seidel (1990) has used recovered ceramic wares to assess status and living differences between officers and enlisted men at military posts during the American Revolution. Similarly, the study of food assemblages has enabled archaeologists to interpret social dynamics within military populations. Losey (1971), for example, has studied food refuse from Fort Enterprise in Canada to reconstruct social dynamics in the fort and Crass and Wallsmith (1992) have compared faunal assemblages with provisioning records to reconstruct supply and provisioning systems at Cantonment Burgwin in New Mexico. Munitions assemblages from Fort Filmore, New Mexico have also been used to reconstruct provisioning systems at that frontier outpost (Staski and Johnston 1992).

Finally, underwater archaeologists have explored a number of shipwrecks with military import. Broadwater et. al. (1983), for example, have identified several ships in the York River in Virginia scuttled by the

British prior to their surrender at Yorktown. Arnold et. al. (1992) have mapped and photographed the remains of the U.S.S. Monitor to study in detail the construction of that ship. In sum, military sites archaeologists have addressed a variety of research interests at military sites across North America.

Defining the Concept of War

The 1992 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary defines war as a "state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties (American Heritage Dictionary 1992)." Although this accurately describes the state of warfare as a violent confrontation between opposing parties, the definition is deficient in at least one respect. As McCauly (1992) notes, wars are both socially sanctioned and organized expressions of open conflict. As a result, wars are fought according to culturally specific rules that identify desirable and undesirable combat actions. This is an important dimension to the definition for it is these rules that result in patterned behavior.

The Origins and Antiquity of War

Due to the difficulty of interpreting evidence for war in the prehistoric record (see below), it is often assumed that war developed with civilization. This, however, is probably a reflection of the abundant historical evidence for warfare when compared to the prehistoric. According to Vencl:

> A possible objection that wars started to plague humankind only since the first occurrence of written sources may be easily refuted (1) by pointing out that such an assumption is flatly contradicted by uninterrupted development of archaeological evidence for, and frequency of, weapons,

fortifications, and other indications of warfare within the periods before and after the introduction of literacy; (2) by the fact that, in written records, the earliest wars are so sophisticated that some preceding development must have taken place; (3) by the observation that within individual areas of the world, the earliest written records come from such remote periods of time and from such different societies...that they constitute neither any coherent chronological horizon nor an identical development and cultural stage. Moreover, (4) at times, written sources report fights even among the barbarians, i.e., in a purely prehistoric milieu. And (5) ethnological evidence for wars in pristine societies is abundant (Vencl 1984: 119).

Just how far back the origins go, however, is open to interpretation. What is clear is that low population densities (as we might find in the Paleolithic) lower the probability of war because there is less opportunity for conflict over strategic resources. Vencl (1984) suggests that warfare could not develop until different societies came into direct competition for resources and he places this in the Mesolithic. During this period, for example, the transition to a warmer and wetter Holocene environment encouraged the rapid spread of woodland across Europe. As the biomass increased, so did the number of hunter groups vying for territory. As Vencl notes:

The existence of territories implied border regions.... Increased density of settlement and territorial life in fixed hunting grounds created substantial progress in cultural differentiation. Emergence of territorial cultural units created conditions for border disputes or disputes over food resources and over space (Vencl 1984: 121).

In addition, the physical evidence for Mesolithic warfare is substantial. Mesolithic cemeteries from Europe to North Africa have produced the remains of individuals who died of traumatic wounds. In many instances, projectile points were even sticking out of the bones. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that warfare at least dates to the Mesolithic (Vencl 1984).

The dawn of agriculture and patoralism in the Neolithic created ideal conditions for armed conflict. The accumulation of wealth in plant and animal stores set the stage for theft and plundering. Vencl has even suggested "...that the Neolithic discovery of harnessing the force of others, in particular of animal labor, constituted a model for the idea of a similar exploitation of human labor (Vencl 1984: 120)." He further notes the proliferation of fortifications throughout the Neolithic.

Carniero (1990) has suggested that the net effect of Neolithic warfare was dispersal. Because most disputes were the result of territorial conflict and access to resources, defeated populations were forced to migrate. As a result, they could maintain some degree of sovereignty despite their failure on the battlefield. As populations grew and competition for resources intensified, however, "warfare began leading to the subjugation of the losers by the winners, and to the seizure and incorporation of their territory as well (Carniero 1990: 191)." This led to the formation of chiefdoms and eventually the state (Carniero 1970, 1981, 1990).

Evidence

Historical archaeologists have a distinct advantage over their prehistoric colleagues due to their control of time and space through documentary analysis. Historical archaeologists may know in advance, for example, the location of the battle, the combatants, the types of weapons fired, the tactics combatants were likely to use, and background contextual information to guide and structure their research designs. In essence, the historical archeologist has some idea what s/he is looking for. In the total absence of documents, however, direct evidence for

warfare is often difficult to find. This is so because certain aspects of military behavior (especially prehistoric) do not appear in the archaeological record. According to Vencl:

> Difficulties in explaining the archaeological remains of warfare are an objective expression of the fact that (1) some important features do not enter archaeological contexts because of their non-material character (political and diplomatic negotiations, causes for war, etc.) or because of their perishable nature (like weapons of organic materials), or alternatively, for insufficient concentration in burial (in cases of battles). Archaeology is further characterized by (2) a limited capacity to distinguish phenomena following one after another in a short interval of time (e.g. troop transfers) and by the inability to synchronize spatially isolated phenomena (e.g., village and fortification fires). Difficulties of interpretation are brought about further by (3) the undoubted primitive and undifferentiated character of the earliest wars (Vencl 1984: 121-122).

As a result, it may be difficult to identify prehistoric battlefields.

There are, however, a number of types of evidence common to both prehistoric and historic battlefields. These include weapons, iconography, warrior's graves, bodily wounds, and fortifications (Vencl 1984). In addition, recent studies of historic military landscapes have produced unique insights into our understanding of the meaning and experience of battles and wars (Deetz 1990; Shackel 1994). The following sections briefly discuss each of these categories and provide examples were appropriate.

Weapons

Evidence for prehistoric weaponry is largely limited to inorganic remains such as stone tools. Vencl (1984) suggests that this has led to the underestimation of the importance of warfare in prehistoric societies. Some sites with exceptional preservation, however, have produced wood

javelins, spears, clubs, and maces, and bone implements. We also know from documentary sources that organic weapons remained a major component of military arsenals throughout classical antiquity. This suggests "..not only the possible distortion of our picture of the origin of weapons themselves[,] but also the doubtfulness of archaeological estimates of weapons in ages of metal (Vencl 1984: 125)." The fact that organic weapons do not preserve well in archaeological contexts is in no way proof that they did not exist.

There are also a number of types of weapons that may be outright impossible to detect in the archaeological record. These include unworked stone, all purpose tools (such as knives and axes), poisons, animals (such as war dogs), and fire (Vencl 1984).

As we move from the Neolithic into the Bronze and Iron Ages, however, the physical evidence for weaponry increases dramatically. Bronze or iron projectile points, spears, swords, and armor are found throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East (Fagan 1989; Oakeshot 1960). The Urnfield peoples of west Hungary (c. 1000 BC), for example, produced bronze shields, helmets, and a slashing sword that spread throughout Europe by 750 BC (Coles and Harding 1979). War chariots are known from Sumer by at least 3500 BC and rapidly spread to Egypt, Asia, and Europe in the next few millennia (Fagan 1989; Oakeshot 1960).

The history and development of historic weaponry is well documented. Lewis (1956), Newman (1942), and Sheppard (1972), for example, have all written extensively on the the development and history of explosive weapons. McKee and Mason (1975) have produced a detailed compendium of Civil War small arms and artillery projectiles to facilitate the identification of various types of nineteenth century rounds.

In recent years, historical archaeologists have applied modern firearms identification and ballistic analysis to small arm projectiles and cartridge cases recovered from archaeological sites. With the help of criminology experts from the Nebraska State Patrol, Scott et. al. (1989) and Fox (1993), for example, were able to identify specific cartridge case signatures on cases recovered from the Battle of the Little Big Horn in Montana. These signatures are produced on the case when the weapon is fired and are unique to individual weapons. This enabled them to identify which cartridges were fired from the same weapon. Connecting the proveniences of recovered cases, they were able to trace the movements of individual soldiers across the battlefield.

Iconography

Archaeologists frequently use iconography when interpreting the past. These sources, for example, may depict "artifacts in toto..., in functional contexts, or in action (Vencl 1984: 126)." The artistic representation of war not only provides evidence for its outright existence, but also on how the wars were fought. Recovered statuettes and painted ceramics from the Moche of Peru (c. 200 BC to 600 AD), for example, depict warriors with battle clubs and shields in addition to actual battle scenes. In addition, Fagan has interpreted Moche paintings of human sacrifice as plausible evidence for the execution of prisoners of war (Fagan 1989).

Iconographic source material from historic times not only include artistic representation but also photography. During the Civil War, for example, the armies of both the Union and Confederacy were accompanied by newspaper artists and professional photographers to

capture camp life and combat on paper and film. Photographs from this war, the first major war captured on film, provide archaeologists a unique window to glimpse the past. They may also have practical field applications. James Deetz, for example, used a Matthew Brady photograph of a Union pontoon bridge to locate the precise location of the bridge at Flowerdew Hundred. Using a large cypress tree in the photo as a starting point, Deetz was able to locate an identical tree on the banks of the river and geographically plot the exact location of the bridge (Deetz 1993).

As Vencl notes, however, there are several disadvantages to the use of iconography including "their (relative) scarcity and irregularity of spatio-temporal occurrence (Vencl 1984: 126)." In addition, iconographic sources may depict models, fashions, myths, or ideals (to glorify a warrior or king, for example) rather than actual historical events. Bazant ((1981) cited in Vencl 1984) has shown, for example, that war scenes on Athenian pots actually declined when Athens went to war. Even photographs are subject to the whims of the photographer whose allegiance may have been with one side or the other. Photographers may also have sought to over-dramatize or mythologize the events and people they captured on film.

Warriors' Graves

Warriors' graves constitute a third source of physical evidence because they often contain weapons or other military artifacts possessed by individual soldiers. The Anyang graves of the Shang dynasty in China (c. 3500 to 3100 BP), for example, have produced hordes of bows, arrows, knives, and other weapons. Archaeologists have even excavated the

remains of war chariots and the horses used to draw them (Kiernan and Fairbank 1974). Thus, warriors' graves have produced a great deal of the information we now know about ancient weaponry.

Grave sites, however, are not limited to the prehistoric. Excavations at a hospital cemetery for the 55th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry on Folly Island, South Carolina, for example, produced a variety of military artifacts including buttons, buckles, bits of clothing, regimental insignia, and others. Excavation of the 18 human burials in the cemetery enabled the archaeologists to reconstruct the sample's demographics and learn something of burial procedures at Union army hospitals (Smith 1993).

Despite their obvious importance, however, Vencl cautions that warriors' graves "always represent no more than a fraction of the number of warriors killed (Vencl 1984: 127)." In addition, the practice of placing grave goods in the tombs of dead soldiers was limited in time and space. We are also limited by the fact that artifacts deteriorate in the archaeological environment. As a result, it is not always possible to determine if the recovered artifacts represent even a small portion of the total buried assemblage. We must also recognize that the privilege of burying dead warriors may have been limited to the victors; defeated armies may not have had the option of collecting their dead from the battlefield (Vencl 1984).

This situation may be compounded by the fact that dead soldiers were often buried on the battlefield and later exhumed for reburial elsewhere, as in a national cemetery. The dead of the Seventh US Cavalry at the Little Big Horn, for example, were exhumed from shallow battlefield graves before reburial in a mass grave (Scott et. al. 1989; Fox 1993). At Folly Island, 16 of the burials were missing bones including

skulls; this led the archaeologists to conclude that the reburial parties were less than meticulous in their duties (Smith 1993).

Lethal Wounds

Bio-archaeological evidence in the form of cuts or gashes on recovered skeletons provide additional information on armed conflict including likely cause of death. Blakely and Mathews (1990), for example, have used skeletal remains to interpret acts of war between the Spanish and Native Americans in the American southeast. Like the other types of evidence, however, skeletal remains are limited in time and space. They suffer deterioration in the archaeological environment and do not reflect wounds to the flesh. Furthermore, the archaeologist must recognize that wounds may be inflicted by accident, as punishment, or part of a ritual and are not necessarily the result of an armed confrontation (Vencl 1984).

Skeletal evidence for disease, however, may also be interpreted as evidence of war. More than half the casualties in the Civil War, for example, were the result of contagious diseases spread in overcrowded camps and prisons rather than battlefield wounds (McPherson 1988). The archaeologist then must always be aware of the possibility that skeletal evidence for disease may be related to warfare.

Fortifications

Fortifications (earthworks, forts, abatises, ramparts, obstacles, etc.) collectively form a fifth class of physical evidence and probably the most common in the study of war. Traditionally, archaeologists have

dealt with fortifications as defensive structures. As Vencl notes, however:

> Textual references since classical antiquity bear out...that fortified camps as refugees for troops on the march were erected in the course of military operations and transfers. Alternatively, ground fortifications on hilltops could have been put up in haste by retreating troops or troops confronted with an enemy superior in numbers. For this reason, a certain segment of...fortifications could be assumed to have had tactical significance (Vencl 1984: 128).

That most fortifications were designed for defensive purposes is not in doubt. However, this should never be assumed. Even those built strictly for the defense could effectively function in offensive operations by impeding the enemy's advance, providing protection to engaged troops, or used as a staging area.

Fortifications, however, are limited in time and space. Impromptu or mobile fortifications (such as wagons or sandbags) may leave no trace in the archaeological record. In addition, fortifications may have had several occupations by different combatants (indeed, they may change hands in the same battle) thus obliterating or mixing the evidence from different occupations (Vencl 1984).

Landscapes

The study of historic landscapes is a fairly new sub-discipline in historical archaeology. Landscape interpretation, however, can provide a great deal of information on spatial patterning, land use, and ideology. Deetz has defined landscape as "the total terrestrial context in which archaeological study is pursued" and cultural landscape as "that part of the terrain which is modified according to a set of cultural plans (Deetz 1990: 2)." Battlefields fall in the purview of cultural landscape because

they were modified by the military operations that took place in the field. Natural terrain features on the battlefield must also be considered part of the cultural landscape even if they were not modified by direct human action. This is so because terrain features such as hilltops or valleys may have had tactical significance. A river, for example, may limit avenues of approach or obstruct attacking or retreating forces.

Battlefields are particularly amenable to landscape analysis because of the emphasis on space. Unlike other types of archaeological sites such as homelots, battlefields witnessed intense occupation spread across space in a relatively short span of time. Given the short duration of the occupation, well developed stratigraphy is unlikely. Rather, it is the horizontal and not the vertical dimension that is most important to the analysis. In their study of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, for example, Scott et. al. (1989) and Fox (1993) traced the ebb and flow of the battle by conducting a spatial analysis of the recovered artifacts. Understanding the cultural landscape then is the key to interpreting the past.

Historical Archaeology and the Study of War

Historical archaeologists are in a unique position to study battles and wars due to their access to documents which provide background and contextual information. Unlike historians, who rely solely on documents, or prehistorians, who rely solely on material culture, historical archaeologists have two bodies of data from which to interpret the past. Furthermore, historical archeologists frequently have the advantage of knowing where historic battles were fought. This gives them the opportunity to test for patterning on the battlefield itself. The

combination of documentary and archaeological resources, should enable the archaeologist to:

> identify specific relationships between certain kinds of behavior under the stress of war and the characteristic material by-products of that behavior in their final (archaeological) context of discard (Gould 1983: 134).

Documentary analysis is a major component of this type of research in the construction of context. Beaudry et. al. (1991), for example, argue that context is fundamental to our understanding of the past because it provides the background to our perception of meaning. Context, they suggest:

> ...is where meaning is located and constituted and provides the key to its interpretation. Recovery of meaning is predicated on recovery of context because context not only frames meaning by tying it to actual situations and events, but it is inextricably bound up with meaning. The existence of a context implies the presence of meanings functioning within it, and conversely, meanings cannot exist in the absence of context (Beaudry et. al. 1991: 160).

In other words, in order to recover meaning in the archaeological record, one must situate it in a cultural context that can only be derived from documentary research.

To this end, Scott et. al. (1989) and Fox (1993) have developed a model for testing artifact patterning on historic battlefields called the stability/disintegration model. The model assumes that if you can predict the type or types of deployment formations an effective combat unit is likely to use (derived from combat and other military manuals), you should be able to determine if the unit deployed tactically on the basis of the material culture (particularly armaments) left behind. The model was tested at the Battle of the Little Big Horn in Montana with spectacular results.

On June 25th, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer

led a force of 225 cavalrymen against an estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Native Americans (mostly Sioux and Cheyenne) on the banks of the Little Big Horn River. All 225, including Custer, were killed in action. As a result there has been some confusion and much controversy over what actually happened on the battlefield. Some historians have argued that Custer and his men fought a desperate battle to the very end making a gallant last stand despite the odds in men. Others have argued that they panicked in the face of the odds resulting in a breakdown in command and the loss of their effectiveness as a fighting combat unit. Using the archaeological evidence as a data base, Scott and Fox attempted to model troop positions and movement during the course of the battle by mapping recovered cartridge cases, bullets, and battlefield markers which reportedly marked the exact spot where each soldier fell. What they found was that Custer initially deployed tactically but his men began running off in erratic directions and to undefensible positions, some even climbing into a depression. Had they fought effectively, all deployments would have been tactical (as in skirmish lines) and all movement as a unit to defensible positions. This confirmed a breakdown in command and suggested the rapid spread of panic throughout the unit (Scott et. al. 1989; Fox 1993).

Conclusions

Because war is a unique aspect of the total human experience, it deserves the attention of archaeology. As Fox notes:

> War, though hardly a credit to humanity, is a distinctly human enterprise. Combat behavior is, from the archaeological perspective, no more and no less susceptible to analyses than any other form of human endeavor. Battlefields, the theatres for war, represent the sites at which armed adversaries engaged in combat. Armaments--

weapons and equipment--are the implements of war and few
battles have been fought without them (Fox 1993: 5).

Archaeology thus provides a unique opportunity to explore war through
the material culture it leaves behind.

In this chapter, I have discussed some of the methodologies and
types of evidence archaeologists use to interpret war. Although I have
divided them into seven different categories (weapons, iconography,
warriors' graves, lethal wounds, fortifications, landscapes, and
documentation), they are all mutually dependent and inter-related. Any
assessment of a battlefield should consider all the evidence in toto. Any
contradictions or gaps in the record--if we have wounds and graves, for
example, but no weapons--should be explored and explained. Finally,
battlefield archaeologists must emphasize the spatial dimension in their
analyses. The reconstruction of the cultural landscape is a crucial
element in determining what we can learn from an archaeology of the
battlefield.

Chapter 3:

Significance:

Within three weeks of the Battle of Gettysburg, efforts to preserve the battlefield as a symbol of valor and victory began in earnest. The National Cemetery, conceived as a tribute to the Union dead, was completed in less than a year from the conclusion of the battle. But apart from a memorial cemetery, "some people wanted the battlefield itself to serve as a permanent memorial to the heroism of the Union troops and the righteousness of their cause (Linenthal 1991: 89)." The battlefield was recognized at once as a powerful symbol to a nation struggling to maintain its existence and define its identity.

As the above example suggests, battlefields frequently enjoy broad support as significant historic and cultural sites. Indeed, they are often elevated to the status of symbols to express cultural or political sentiments. By the 1880's, for example, Gettysburg was transformed into a symbol of reconciliation, based on the restoration of white rule in the south, as part of a national movement to heal the wounds of war. The question of slavery was conveniently forgotten and African-Americans were excluded from participation in the symbol. At other times, Gettysburg has been likened to a symbol of state's rights, the valor of the American soldier, and even world peace (Linenthal 1991).

The power of battlefields as symbols has led historian David Linenthal (1991) to describe them as America's holy ground. He notes, for example, the frequency with which battlefields are described in religious terms. An 1886 Gettysburg guidebook, for example, described

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the battlefield as "consecrated" ground and likened it to Calvary, the site of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ in Christian tradition (Linenthal 1991: 4). Such imagery highlights the ideals of sacrifice and duty expected from men in arms in service of the nation.

Battlefields also function as symbols of veneration to the modern state. As Silberman notes:

> Across a modern landscape of carefully excavated and preserved tourist attractions, pride in ones nation, as well as the hidden takens-for-granted of modern society--concepts of ethnicity, gender, work, identity, and efficiency--are made to seem timeless and therefore inevitable. It is little wonder then that the modern nation's archaeological and historical shrines are most often those that reflect technological progress, cultural dominance, or battlefield victories--the basic aspirations of the modern state (Silberman (1993: 1-2).

The battlefield is the ideal symbol because it embodies each of these aspirations simultaneously. Victory symbolizes cultural dominance over a vanquished foe and technology typically plays a role in the outcome of battle. The battlefield, as the site of an historic event, recalls the sacrifice of a nation's forbears and therefore legitimates dominant ideologies. Clearly, battlefields play an integral role in shaping the patriotic rhetoric of a nation.

Yet the symbolic meanings of battlefields are often contested by marginalized peoples who attach a different significance to the battle. In the 1970's, for example, representatives of the American Indian Movement (AIM), staged a direct challenge to the popular myth of George Custer as an American patriot and the savior of the west. Led by Russel Means, AIM held protests at the Little Big Horn and placed their own memorial on the battlefield. The battlefield provided an ideal symbolic setting to point out contradictions in dominant ideologies and to argue for a different interpretation of history. As Linenthal notes:

> ...battlefields are civil spaces where Americans of various ideological persuasions come, not always reverently, to

compete for the ownership of powerful national stories and
to argue about the nature of heroism, the meaning of war,
the efficacy of martial sacrifice, and the significance of
preserving the patriotic landscape of the nation (Linenthal
1991:1).

Yet despite their obvious historical and cultural significance,
archaeologists have largely failed to define the archaeological
significance of battlefields. The remainder of this chapter discusses the
concept of significance in archaeology and its implications for
archaeology on the battlefield.

Significance

Archaeological significance is most often defined in terms of the
eligibility criteria for nomination to the National Register of Historic
Places. The Historic Site Preservation Act of 1966 defines as significant
those sites...

(1) that are associated with events that have made a
significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history;
or

(2) that are associated with the lives of persons significant
in our past; or

(3) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type,
period, method of construction, or that represent the work
of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that
represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose
components may lack individual distinction; or

(4) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, important
information in prehistory or history (quoted in Schiffer and
Gumerman 1977).

This legal definition, and its enabling legislation, virtually created the
field of cultural resource management in archaeology. It is not, however,
the only definition.

As Schiffer and Gumerman (1977) note, archaeological significance may be defined by a variety of criteria that may or may not overlap with the legal definition. Sites capable of producing the data to answer specific research questions, for example, possess scientific significance; sites associated with or important to a particular ethnic group possess ethnic significance; and sites useful in the education of the public or that promote local economy through tourism possess public significance (Schiffer and Gumerman 1977). Furthermore, the determination of significance may be made at the national, state, or local level (King et. al. 1977). A battlefield such as Williamsburg, for example, may possess significance for local or regional history, but not to the nation at large.

Marley Brown has suggested that significance be determined on the basis of potential information loss. If we are likely to loose information by not excavating a site (or by extension not preserving it), then it possess significance (Deetz 1993). In sum, the definition of significance may be based on a variety of broad perspectives and different criteria.

Despite the diversity, however, archaeologists have generally agreed that significant sites must possess integrity regardless of any other criteria applied to the site. The National Register criteria, for example, stipulate that:

> the quality of significance...is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects...that possess *integrity* of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association (36 CFR 60.0, quoted in King et. al. 1977: 97; emphasis added).

This appears fairly straightforward on the surface. A site with integrity possesses spatial and associational contexts that have not been compromised. Yet in practice, the concept of integrity is just as broad as the other significance criteria.

As King et. al. note, "the integrity criterion has meaning only as it interacts with the more specific criteria upon which the significance of the property is judged (King et, al. 1977: 97)." They suggest that the definition of integrity is inexplicably tied to the specific research questions an archaeologist asks of a property. By way of example, they argue that an Early Woodland scatter of stone tools and flakes, thoroughly mixed by plowing, has integrity despite the mixing if the research questions focus on "local stone working techniques" or "patterns of regional trade." In these instances, detailed contextual information is not required to complete the study (King et. al.1977).

Given the broad variety in all possible definitions of significance, any battlefield could potentially be ruled significant. Battles, for example, are often associated with important historic persons, relevant to broad patterns of history, and enjoy public support. Consider, for example, the number of battlefields preserved at the state and national levels. Even small skirmish sites are frequently relevant to local history. The key question in determining a specific battlefield's archaeological significance, however, hinges on the concept of integrity. How one defines integrity with respect to the research questions asked of a battle site will determine the interpretation of significance.

Battlefields have largely been overlooked by archaeologists for several reasons. They are routinely dismissed as archaeological sites because the behavioral activity that took place on the site occurred in a short span of time. Archaeologists typically deal with sites, such as homelots or encampments, that are occupied for considerably longer periods of time. As a result, it is assumed that no meaningful stratigraphy could be produced on the site. Furthermore, it is often argued that looting activity by relic hunters has destroyed any

associational context among artifacts that may or may not have existed in the first place. Excavation then becomes an exercise in curiosity and battlefields have no significance outside the fact that a battle once took place. As Noel Hume notes:

> Little can usefully be said about battlefield sites. If one side had time to dig in, we may be left with the remains of fortifications...; if not, the site will have little to distinguish it, except perhaps some graves and a scatter of hardware that can best be salvaged by using a metal detector. There can be no meaningful stratigraphy (as far as the battle is concerned), and the salvage of relics becomes the be all and end all (Noel Hume 1975: 188).

In sum, battlefields cannot be studied productively because they lack integrity.

This is certainly a fair statement if one evaluates battlefields in the same way as other types of archaeological sites, such as domestic occupations or long term military encampments. Battlefields, however, are a unique site type. The short duration of battle activity provides the archaeologist the rare opportunity to interpret past behavior in a short span of time. Whereas other types of site are occupied for years or decades, a battlefield provides the archaeologist a tight date range for the site (Barka, personal communication 1995). Furthermore, research designs that only emphasize the recovery of artifacts are inadequate. When battlefield sites are conceptualized as nothing more than depositories of military hardware, as Noel Hume (1975) suggests, then no meaningful patterning of finds can be expected to exist. But when the battlefield is conceptualized as a cultural landscape, a clearer picture of contextual relationships begins to emerge .

As Deetz (1990) notes, of the three archaeological dimensions-- space, time, and form--space has not always been given its due. He suggests at least two reasons for why this is so. On the one hand, space

is neglected "where there is no visible sign of human activity" such as a house or fortification. The key word is *visible* for landscapes are often used or modified in subtle ways. With respect to battlefields, one might pay particular attention to terrain features. Valleys, hilltops, fields, and other geographic features are tactically significant attributes of the battlefield. Indeed, the decision to fight a battle at a given time and place is often based on terrain. The fighting on the first day of Gettysburg, for example, was tactically designed to enable the Union army time to occupy the high ground to the south of town (McPherson 1988).

On the other hand, the neglect of landscape is the result of scale. Landscapes can be enormous and as Deetz notes, "they lack the specific locational focus of the more usual archaeological features (Deetz 1990: 2)." The 1942 German-Russian front during World War II, for example, stretched from Finland to the Black Sea. Such immense military landscapes are difficult to comprehend let alone study archaeologically. To be sure, most battlefields were not quite so monstrous; but the notion of scale does beg the question: how do we define battlefield landscapes. Do battlefields include, for example, areas occupied by troops on line but not actually engaged or troops in reserve. This is not simply a trivial question for how we define the battlefield landscape has direct implications for our definitions of integrity and significance.

Webster defines the battlefield as "a place where a battle is fought (Merriam-Webster dictionary 1974)." Though straightforward and simple, this is an inadequate definition for the archaeologist for the reasons discussed above. When the battlefield is conceptualized as a distinct locational entity where combat took place, then the recovery of battle-related artifacts becomes the focus of the research. Rather, the

battlefield must be recognized as a tactically significant, cultural landscape. How and where armies draw their lines of battle is just as important as the battle (read fighting) itself. Reconstructing the battle landscape, with emphasis on modified or unmodified terrain features, impromptu or permanent fortifications, and the definition of avenues of approach is just as significant as the recovery of artifacts.

Landscape analyses acquire more meaning when combined with the results of artifact recovery. Scott et. al. (1989) and Fox (1993), for example, were able to isolate fighting positions and plot troop movement across the Little Big Horn Battlefield by defining artifact patterning through space, i.e., across the landscape. Recovered shell casings and bullets were piece plotted enabling them to trace the ebb and flow of the battle. Furthermore, they included an analysis of terrain features in their interpretations again reinforcing the importance of terrain in military operations.

These studies are relevant in at least two ways. On the one hand, they define the battlefield as a cultural landscape; space is the key factor in the analysis. On the other hand, they demonstrate that artifact patterning may exist on a battlefield. Recall that one of the major arguments against archaeology on the battlefield is that artifacts will be low in number and probably disturbed. As these results suggest, this should never again be assumed.

The definition of integrity then must include space as a key variable and recognize the battlefield as a cultural landscape. Research designs that over-emphasize the recovery of artifacts or material culture studies are inadequate to the task. The battlefield, regardless of its size, must be conceptualized as a whole. This is particularly relevant for cultural resource management projects that are limited in scope by

contract. Evaluations of integrity, and by extension significance, must take into account those sections of the battlefield outside the project area. Should patterns fail to emerge, one must ask if this is so because the patterning does not exist or because an insufficient area has been tested. If the possibility exists that more meaningful results could be obtained by testing a larger area, then the area tested should not be ruled insignificant.

It is here suggested that the most productive way to approach an archaeology of the battlefield, is to divide it into manageable study units, called episodes, that correspond to various battle events (Fox 1993). Each episode includes that part of the total battle landscape related to an event such as the building of fortifications or a particular skirmish. All episodes must be understood as a part of the whole and related to the battlefield in toto. Episodes may overlap, a fortification may be occupied during a skirmish for example, but each episode is unique to the particular event with which it corresponds. This provides the archaeologist a means to sort through various battle events without losing track of the whole.

Furthermore, the concept of the episode allows the archaeologist to evaluate integrity and significance in smaller units. While the integrity of one episode may be compromised by development or some other disturbance, evidence of other episodes may remain intact. This in no way eases the problem of moving beyond the immediate project area, but it allows the archaeologist to think in conceptual increments: one may assess, for example, how the immediate project area relates to the episode or episodes of which it is part, and then how those episodes relate to the battlefield as a whole.

This moves us to the question of methodology. If the goal of the

project is to understand the battlefield as a cultural landscape, then the archaeologist must maximize the collection of spatial data. Shovel testing is an inadequate recovery strategy because it does not produce the detailed spatial data needed to reconstruct battle events. Rather, battlefields must be swept with metal detectors and recovered artifacts piece plotted in order to identify spatial patterning in the finds. This is not to reject sampling strategies outright; rather, the sampling should be based on a metal detector survey rather than shovel testing alone. The archaeologist will then be in a better position to evaluate a battle site's integrity and significance. Failure to incorporate an adequate research design may lead to an improper determination of insignificant.

Finally, the archaeologist must recognize public interest in the site. Because battlefields enjoy broad public support, round tables or other historic societies often have preservation goals. The archaeologist may use the support of these institutions or other interested citizenry to bolster determinations of significance. In return, these groups may benefit from archaeology in their preservation efforts. Describing an historic property as a significant archaeological site in addition to an historical and/or cultural site, may assist in their preservationist goals. The archaeologist must be wary, however, of unscrupulous looters associated with these groups. If honorable individuals can be identified, they should be encouraged to identify looter's in the membership. Furthermore, groups can be educated on the detriments of this type of site destruction.

To summarize, the significance of battle sites should always be based on an understanding of the battlefield as a cultural landscape. Emphasis must be placed on a detailed description and spatial analysis of battle features, including terrain features, to make interpretations

meaningful. Evaluations of integrity must be based on adequate recovery strategies. The concept of the episode provides the archaeologist a means of dividing the total landscape into manageable, but related parts. Finally, the archaeologist must recognize that the public may also have an interest in the site.

Chapter 4:

The Battle for Williamsburg

After discovering the rebel retreat from Yorktown, McClellan ordered his cavalry under General George Stoneman and four batteries in pursuit. Stoneman, who was promised infantry support from General Hooker should he make contact, managed to catch the Confederate rear guard just outside the Williamsburg defenses on the evening of May 4th. He engaged Confederate pickets eight miles out of Yorktown and the Fourth Virginia Cavalry (see Appendix A, Units Engaged at Williamsburg) under Lieutenant W.C. Wickman two miles further. A Union battery under Philip St. George Cooke (J.E.B. Stuart's father-in-law), however, forced Wickman to retreat. At this point the Confederate defenses were still empty, the bulk of the army having already passed Williamsburg, and a race ensued to take the forts. General Johnston, commanding from Williamsburg, ordered a brigade under General Paul J. Semmes to occupy Fort Magruder and Semmes beat Cooke to the prize. Semmes was soon joined by a second brigade under General Lafayette McClaws who took command of the operation. McClaws ordered one gun each into the redoubts on his right (Redoubts 1 through 5) and a brigade under J.B. Kershaw to secure his left flank. After brief skirmishing in front of Redoubts 7 and 8, however, Stoneman ordered a withdrawal when his infantry support failed to materialize (see figure 3).

General Hooker, and a second division under General William F. Smith, were having difficulty moving their own troops and artillery across the soggy, muddy roads and coping with obstacles left in the wake

Figure 3. The Williamsburg Line, May 4th, 1862 (Kettenburg 1980).

of the Confederate army. In addition, both divisions were tied up in a traffic jam when they crossed the same roads. In the end, Smith approached Williamsburg from the Union right (Yorktown Road) and Hooker from the left (Hampton Road). Neither division, however, was able to reach Stoneman during daylight hours (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).

Smith finally arrived at the defenses around nightfall along with General Edwin V. Sumner, the Second Corps Commander, ordered to take charge of the operation by General McClellan. Sumner ordered Smith's division to advance but the units became tangled in thick underbrush and lost direction in the dark. By eight o'clock, in total darkness and rain, the advance was stopped. Sumner himself got lost in the woods on a mission to reconnoiter the rebel works. In the meantime, General Hooker made camp on the Hampton Road some three miles southeast of Williamsburg .

During the night, Johnston ordered Longstreet to replace McClaws in the defenses. Longstreet placed his second brigade under Richard A. Anderson and his fifth under Roger A. Pryor into the fortified line. Johnston ordered his three remaining corps, under Generals Magruder, G.W. Smith, and Daniel H. Hill, to continue the march to Richmond. Due to delays, however, Hill was forced to spend the night in Williamsburg (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; Longstreet 1960).

Hooker resumed the march early on the morning of May 5th and had reached Fort Magruder by 5:30. Longstreet was waiting. When the approaching Union column was first detected, Anderson deployed the Fourth South Carolina as skirmishers to counter the threat. In response, Hooker ordered the First Massachusetts to the left of Hampton road, and the Second New Hampshire to the right, and drove the rebels

back to the fortified position. He then placed a battery on the Hampton Road and opened a barrage on Fort Magruder. Rebel guns responded from the fort and Redoubt 5 as sharpshooters aimed at Union cannoneers (see figure 4).

By eight o'clock, Hooker began extending his line to the right hoping to link up with Sumner who he believed was forming a Union center in front of Fort Magruder. The Eleventh Massachusetts, Twenty-Sixth Pennsylvania, and Fifth New Jersey were extended to the right of the Second New Hampshire. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth New Jersey were then deployed to the left of the First Massachusetts to secure the flank. They were met by the Nineteenth Mississippi, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Alabama, and Fourteenth Louisiana (under the consolidated command of Cadmus M. Wilcox) attacking the extended Union line just south east of Redoubts 3, 4, and 5 (see figure 5). Hooker then sent the Seventy-Second New York to relieve the First Massachusetts who were nearly out of ammunition (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).

By eleven o'clock, neither side had gained a decisive advantage despite over five hours of hard fighting. Hooker sent frequent requests to Sumner for reinforcements and urged the Third Corps' Third Division, under General Philip Kearny, now moving up the Hampton Road and toward the battle, to hurry along. Longstreet, in the meantime, ordered Anderson to bring the brigades of Wilcox and General Ambrose P. Hill into line of battle. Hill had been waiting in reserve on the road between Williamsburg and Fort Magruder when he received the order to advance. He organized the Seventh, Eleventh, Seventeenth, and First Virginia Regiments behind Redoubts 2, 3, and 4 and advanced to the right of Wilcox for a renewed attack. Hill was supported in the rear by a brigade of Virginians under General George Pickett. As the new Confederate line

Figure 4. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 7 AM (Kettenburg1980).

Figure 5. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 9 AM (Kettenburg
1980).

pushed forward, Hooker fell back (see figure 6). After ordering the Seventieth New York forward to relieve the Seventy-Second New York and New Jersey brigades, Hooker threw his last remaining reserve, the Seventy-Third and Seventy-Forth New York, into line and shifted the Eleventh Massachusetts to the Union left to relieve the Second New York. The Sixth Pennsylvania was also directed to shift left but never received the order. This left a small gap in the Union line and the rebels were quick to capitalize. South Carolina troops from Redoubt 6 charged the gap and captured four Union guns in the process (see figure 7).

The rebels, however, were having difficulties of their own. As ammunition ran thin, Longstreet was forced to call for reinforcements. D.H. Hill was recalled from Williamsburg and two of his regiments, the Second Florida and Second Mississippi, deployed in line. Confusion reigned on the battlefield. The thunder of artillery and musketry made communication difficult while smoke and rain limited visibility and hampered mobility. Before the rebels could organize an effective attack on the Union gap, Hooker stabilized his line and neither side could gain the advantage. All Hooker's requests to Sumner for reinforcements were ignored despite the fact that Smith's division was not engaged. Fearing an attack on the Union center, Sumner refused to weaken his own line to support Hooker. Without the reinforcements, Hooker could only continue to fight to a draw (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).

By one o'clock p.m., however, John J. Peck's brigade from the First Division of the Fourth Corps reached Hooker along the Yorktown Road and deployed the One Hundred-Second Pennsylvania to the right and Fifty-Fifth and Sixty-Second New York to the left. Intending to provide Hooker some relief by drawing rebel troops from the engaged Confederate line, Peck only drew the attention of South Carolina troops from Fort

Figure 6. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 11 AM (Kettenburg 1980).

Figure 7. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 1 PM (Kettenburg 1980).

Magruder. After a strong counter-attack, Peck was forced to strengthen his own line with the Ninety-Third Pennsylvania and Hooker continued to fight without relief or reinforcement (see figure 7).

By three o'clock, the Union line again showed signs of fatigue. Ammunition ran low and Hooker had no additional reserve to move into line. When the Seventieth New York finally exhausted its ammunition, they were forced to retreat. Only the timely arrival of General Kearny enabled Hooker to maintain the line. Kearny deployed the Second and Fifth Michigan and Thirty-Seventh New York of the Third Brigade to the left of Hampton Road and the Thirty-Eighth and Fortieth New York of the Second Brigade to the right. He then ordered the Michigan regiments forward and watched as they pushed the rebels back to their approximate starting point and recaptured the lost guns (see figure 8). Hooker and Longstreet would occupy these positions for the remainder of the battle (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).

Elsewhere on the Union left, attempts by Union cavalry to out-flank the rebel defenses met with little success. The Third Pennsylvania Cavalry managed to push as far as Redoubt 1 and cavalry under William H. Emory tentatively advanced up a road that led to the Confederate rear. No advantage came of the maneuvers, however, due to the lack of infantry support (Kettenburg 1980).

As action on the Union left ground to a halt, it was just beginning on the right. Throughout the day, escaped slaves and contrabands entering Union lines provided intelligence that suggested Confederate redoubts on the Union right were unoccupied. Additional reconnaissance proved that Redoubt 14, just across a road over the Cub Creek Dam, was indeed unoccupied. In response, Sumner ordered General Winfield Hancock from Smith's division with five infantry

Figure 8. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 3 PM (Kettenburg 1980).

regiments (the Fifth Wisconsin, Forty-Ninth Pennsylvania, Thirty-Third New York, and Sixth and Seventh Maine) and a New York battery to occupy the redoubt. Hancock approached with caution, leery of the intelligence, and crossed the Cub Creek Dam road in assault formation. Finding the redoubt empty, he also discovered that the Confederates had failed to occupy Redoubt 11. From there he could see clearly to Fort Magruder. He then called for reinforcements in preparation for an assault on the Confederate left flank. All that arrived, however, were four guns who opened on Fort Magruder and drew the attention of the rebel line. Confederate Colonel Micah Jenkins, in command of Fort Magruder, reinforced Redoubts 9 and 10 with the Sixth South Carolina and Hancock refused to engage without reinforcements (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; Sears 1988; Tucker 1960).

By two o'clock, Hancock was again requesting the men he believed necessary to destroy the Confederate flank. Instead, Sumner ordered him back to Redoubt 14. Recognizing the strategic importance of the position, however, Hancock refused to comply and dispatched yet another request for reinforcements along with a description of his position. Sumner only repeated his original order. Undaunted, Hancock held Redoubt 11 and continued sending staff officers to Sumner's headquarters to argue his case.

In the meantime, the Confederate's continued to strengthen their position. General D.H. Hill, who heard the initial volley of artillery fire, was given permission by Longstreet to attack. Hill deployed his First Brigade under General Jubal Early who marched the Twenty-Fourth and Thirty-Eighth Virginia, and Twenty-Third and Fifth North Carolina through some woods in the general direction of the Union position. Neither Hill nor Early had bothered to get any intelligence on the Union

position and were ignorant of its exact location and strength. To make matters worse, they were traveling through thick woods in the pouring rain. The formation lost its integrity, the units were separated, and communication broke down (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; Tucker 1960).

By five o'clock, Hancock had no new word from Sumner and grudgingly decided to withdraw to Redoubt 14. Just as the Union regiments began quitting their position, however, Early emerged from the woods with the Twenty-Fourth Virginia and charged. The Fifth Wisconsin immediately responded with fire as Hancock moved the brigade back to the crest of the redoubt. The Fifth North Carolina also emerged from the woods and, mistaking the Union withdrawal to Redoubt 14 as a retreat rather than a redeployment, also charged. Hancock formed a second line to repel the attack. The fire was murderous and the Confederates were forced to retreat when Hancock ordered a countercharge. The Twenty-Fourth Virginia, who had already suffered heavy casualties, escaped back into the woods. The Fifth North Carolina, however, were not quite so lucky. They had charged too far from the safety of the woods to make a timely retreat and had to cross back over an open field to reach the safety of the woods. Union volleys took three-fourths their total number. The Twenty-Third North Carolina and the Thirty-Eighth Virginia never made it to the field to support or participate in the attack. Hancock refused to press the retreat, however, as he still lacked reinforcements. The battle took just over twenty minutes (see figure 9) (OR, XI, Pt. 1; Tucker 1960).

Fighting came to a complete halt with nightfall and the rebels withdrew from the field to continue their march to Richmond. Union casualties amounted to 2,283, the majority sustained by Hooker, and the

Figure 9. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 5 PM (Kettenburg 1980).

Confederates lost 1,560, over one-third in the charge on Hancock (see figure 10). McClellan proclaimed a Union victory because they were left in position of the field and occupied Williamsburg. The Army of Northern Virginia, however, despite abandoning the battlefield, had accomplished their sole strategic objective: to fight long enough to enable the rest of their army to continue the march to Richmond. Furthermore, once the Confederate chain of command had decided to abandon the peninsula altogether, the strategic importance of Williamsburg was nil. McClellan was left in possession of a town Johnston was leaving anyway. Given the strategic success, victory seems to belong to the Confederate army (Kettenburg 1980; Sears 1988).

A Comparison of Union and Confederate Casualties

Figure 10. A comparison of Union and Confederate casualties (after Kettenburg 1980).

Chapter 5:

Assessing the Battlefield at Williamsburg

The Williamsburg battlefield makes an interesting case study in battlefield archaeology for several reasons. Unlike major Civil War battlefields, such as Gettysburg and Antietam, the Williamsburg Battlefield has not been preserved and large sections have been destroyed by development. Furthermore, ownership of the battlefield is divided among home owners, businesses, a museum, the National Park Service, and York County; this raises critical questions regarding the coordination of intact resources and the often touchy issue of property rights. Real estate divisions and sub-divisions infrequently take unprotected historic resources into consideration. This is particularly problematic for the Williamsburg battlefield because it stretches across three different communities: Williamsburg, James City County, and York County.

There has also been a great deal of looting at sites associated with the battlefield. Several of the extant redoubts are pocketed with looter's pits and show other signs of disturbance. This type of activity is exceeding difficult to control on unprotected sites. Land owners may be indifferent to relic hunting on their property or not even realize such activity is taking place. Furthermore, Civil War relic collectors are typically very knowledgeable about battlefields and know exactly where to look for military artifacts.

Williamsburg is also home to an active Civil War Round Table with a particular interest in the battlefield. The Round Table has recently

erected a monument to the battlefield and various members have created the Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee to monitor construction activity on intact portions of the battlefield and to organize a campaign to acquire the battlefield for preservation. The committee was delighted to discover an archaeologist interested in the battlefield largely because they had never considered it as an archaeological site.

All these factors merge when struggling with interpretations of significance. The fieldwork for the project consisted of isolating intact sections of the battlefield that may contain archaeological resources. Although no sub-surface testing or metal detector surveys were conducted, the goal was to define those areas that have the *potential* of producing those resources, including artifacts, architectural remains, or significant topographical features. This information not only begins to organize the archaeological resource database, but should also prove useful in future Resource Protection Planning (RP3) for Williamsburg, York County, and James City County (see Brown and Bragdon 1986) and the preservation efforts of the Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee.

Episodes

The Williamsburg battlefield may be divided into four major episodes including the construction of the defensive line by Magruder, the Stoneman engagement, the Hooker engagement, and the Hancock engagement (see figure 11). Each episode may then be sub-divided for finer degrees of analysis. The construction of each individual redoubt, for example, constitutes a sub-episode of the larger defensive line. The three main engagements may also be divided according to skirmishes

A Summary of Battle Episodes

15 known defensive structures built in a three mile line of defense between the College and Queens Creeks	**Construction of the defensive line**

The Stoneman engagement	Union cavalry engage Confederate infantry outside Redoubts 7 and 8 on May 4, 1862

Union and Confederate forces engage outside Redoubts 2, 3, 4, 5, and Fort 6 on May 5, 1862	**The Hooker engagement**

The Hancock engagement	Union infantry occupy redoubts 14 and 11 and repulse a Confederate counter-attack on May 5, 1862

Figure 11. A summary of battle episodes.

between the various divisions, brigades, and regiments engaged in the battle. The episode concept enables the researcher to divide the battlefield into manageable study units when searching for intact portions of the battlefield. The division of the fortifications is the simplest and most logical division because they are relatively easy to define through space. The concept is particularly useful, however, when applied to the engagements. Battlefields witnessed intense and often confusing violent behavior. Each army moved and parried off the other trying to achieve the decisive advantage. The concept of the episode allows the archaeologist to divide that behavior and the material culture it left behind into increasingly smaller study units. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the potential archaeological resources associated with each episode.

The Defensive Line

The location of 15 known defensive structures, in various states of preservation, are recorded on the Virginia Department of Historic Resource's site survey (see figure 12 and Appendix B). These sites were rudimentally surveyed in the early 1970's. Fieldwork for this project consisted of reinspecting the sites to assess the potential of archaeological resources and to update the state's files. All structures were photographed and mapped in plan where feasible.

Redoubt 1

Redoubt 1 (44JC56), a remarkably preserved, five sided fort that anchored the Confederate right, is located on a knoll just north of

Figure 12. Topographic map showing location of recorded battlefield sites (USGS 7.5 Minute Series Topographic Map, Williamsburg Quadrangle).

Tutter's Neck Pond and owned by the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation. The redoubt commanded a small road (Quarterpath Road) running north along the pond that led to the Confederate rear. It consists of a large earthen parapet surrounded by a moat, and includes a well preserved collapsed magazine and two earthen gun platforms (see figure 13). The platforms face to the south of the structure to guard the flank of the line. The moat was destroyed on the western side of the fort probably as a result of modern improvements to the road.

Small looter pits across the body of the redoubt attest to the relic hunting that has taken place on the site. Because it played a small role in the actual battle, however, it is unlikely that any surviving artifacts relate directly to the engagement. Rather, the significance of the site lies in its remarkable state of preservation. The magazine and gun platforms are in excellent condition as are the parapets and moat.

This redoubt, along with number two, is fortunate to be owned by Colonial Williamsburg. Development on the site is unlikely and the Foundation has a capable staff to administer the site. When a small portion of the moat and parapet on the western side of the fort were damaged by Virginia Power Company vehicles (a power line runs across the redoubt), Colonial Williamsburg responded by reseeding the damaged area and covering it with straw. Furthermore, the Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee has opened channels with the Foundation to assist in the monitoring of the site.

Redoubt 2

Redoubt 2 (44JC57), a rectangular fortification about half a kilometer due northeast of Redoubt 1, also sits astride the Quarterpath

Redoubt 1

depression

elevated
gun emplacement

- Parapet
- Possible collapsed magazine
- Moat
- Quarterpath Park

0   30m

Redoubt 2

disturbed area

- Parapet
- Collapsed magazine
- Gun platform (probably bastions)
- Raised line
- Moat
- Slight depression (possible bomb proof)

0   15m

Redoubt 3

- Parapet
- Collapsed magazine
- Gun platforms
- Modern gazebo
- Moat

x benches

0   15m

Redoubt 4

- Parapet
- Moat

0   15m

Figure 13: Plan of Redoubts 1, 2, 3, and 4, clockwise, from top left.

Road and is owned by Colonial Williamsburg. Like Redoubt 1, it is remarkably well preserved. The fort was occupied by Longstreet during the battle and played a key role in the fighting. Elements of General A.P. Hill's brigade used the redoubt as a staging area during the Hooker engagement. Although the site has been heavily looted, it is possible that sub-surface artifacts relating to the battle remain intact in the fort.

The moat and parapet are well preserved on three sides of the redoubt (see figure 13). Three of the corners (southeast, southwest, and northwest) slope into triangles suggesting the possibility the fort was bastioned. In addition, a slight depression approximately two meters wide and running north-south through the body of the fort suggests the presence of a bomb proof.

Redoubt 3

This square fortification (44JC58) is approximately three quarters intact and owned by the Fort Magruder Inn, a hotel and convention center on Route 60. The east parapet and moat were probably destroyed during the construction of the complex (see figure 13). The remainder, however, is preserved as a small park complete with benches and a gazebo for inn guests. The fort is relatively clear of overgrowth (with the exception of the moat) and guests are free to walk through the redoubt and on the parapet. The interior has been partially landscaped to accommodate the park and ground lights have been installed for use at night.

The redoubt was occupied by artillery and elements of Cadmus Wilcox's and A.P. Hill's brigades and used as a staging area during the fighting. It is unlikely, however, that artifacts relating to the battle

survive in or around the fort due to the construction of the hotel, the park, and a trailer park immediately to the east of the redoubt. Although the intact remains have been preserved as a park and augmented with interpretive signs, the flow of people through the fort and especially on the parapets is potentially threatening to its continued preservation. At the very least, the inn should should take measures to keep individuals off the parapets to lessen the impact of erosion.

The use of the fort as a public attraction does, however, speak directly to the issue of public significance. Indeed, the decision to preserve even a portion of the fort suggests the importance of the battle to local history. The inn is named for General John Magruder and is decorated with portraits and paintings of Civil War figures and battles. A display in the lobby showcases the Battle of Williamsburg and includes military artifacts (such as buttons and bullets) probably recovered during construction. The military theme also distinguishes the inn from its competitors in the Williamsburg area. Unfortunately, however, it typifies the problems associated with this type of preservation. The construction and landscaping on the property have destroyed part of the fortification, the artifacts in the lobby display were undoubtedly recovered unscientifically, and the gift shop sells buttons and bullets looted from Civil War sites.

Redoubt 4

Only a small portion of this redoubt (44JC59) remains intact along the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad tracks just west of the James Terrace development (see figure 13). The remaining bit of parapet is fairly well

preserved and augmented with interpretive signs (see figure 14).

Redoubt 5

Redoubt 5 (44JC60), located in the James Terrace development in Williamsburg, is completely destroyed. Only the general location of the fortification is known. It is possible that at least part of the moat survives cut in the sub-soil beneath the development.

Fort 6 (Fort Magruder)

Fort Magruder (44YO47 and recorded as Fort 6) sat astride the two main roads leading from Yorktown to Williamsburg and was the center of the Confederate line. In his official report on the battle, General McClellan described the fort as:

> a large work in the center with a bastioned front.... The parapet ...is about six feet high and nine feet thick, the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about 600 yards (OR XI, Pt. 1).

All that remains today, however, is a small portion of the fort (see figure 15) owned and preserved by the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC). The parapet is in fairly good condition, though heavily overgrown, but the moat is completely filed in. The UDC maintain a small monument on the site (see figure 16) and hold a yearly memorial service on the anniversary of the battle. Because the fort sits in the midst of a heavily developed suburb, it is unlikely that any battle related artifacts remain in undisturbed contexts. However, undeveloped lots in the general vicinity of Fort Magruder may contain intact portions of the moat that could assist in reconstructing its original dimensions.

Figure 14: Photograph of historic marker at Redoubt 4.

Figure 15: Plan of Fort Magruder, Fort 8, and Redoubts 10 and 11, clockwise, from top left.

Figure 16: Photograph of memorial at Fort Magruder.

Redoubt 7

Redoubt 7 (44YO49), located in the York Terrace residential development, is completely destroyed.

Fort 8

Fort 8 (44YO50), a chevron redan, sits in a heavily wooded area roughly one-half mile north-east of the York Terrace development and just off Interstate 64 in York County. The fort is remarkably well preserved with a platform to mount one gun, a collapsed magazine, a parapet, and a moat (see figure 15). The redan faces to the north-east and is protected on the flanks by Redoubts 7 and 9. It was attacked by Union cavalry in the Stoneman engagement and was occupied by Confederate forces during the battle. The site has been heavily looted and it is doubtful that many battle related artifacts remain in the fortification.

Redoubt 9

This redoubt (44YO51) is completely destroyed and believed to be located under Interstate 64.

Redoubt 10

This square fortification (44YO52), located on a chicken farm roughly one-half mile north of the York Terrace development, is approximately one-quarter intact (see figure 15). The remainder was

destroyed by a residential development just north of the farm. It is currently in a terrible state of preservation. The moat is completely filled in and the parapet has suffered heavily from erosion. No interior features such as a magazine or gun platform are visible on the surface. Furthermore, the site has been heavily looted by relic hunters.

Redoubt 11

This square fortification (44YO53) is located on the Colonial National Parkway in York County and owned in part by the National Park Service (see figure 15). The redoubt is completely intact with a well preserved parapet and moat but heavily overgrown. Several large fallen trees have left small craters on the walls of the parapet and the interior of the fort. The overgrowth is so heavy on the interior it is virtually impossible to detect interior features such as a magazine. Additionally, the site has been disturbed by looters. The fort was occupied by Hancock on his move to the Confederate left.

Redoubt 12

This roughly square fortification (44YO42) is located in the New Quarter Park in York County. Only three sides of the redoubt remain intact (see figure 17). It is possible the forth side was destroyed by the construction of a softball field adjacent to this side of the fort. However, Redoubt 13, just north of Redoubt 12, could have protected the rear of the fort suggesting the possibility it was left open ended. If Redoubt 12 had a fourth side, it is probable the cut for the moat remains intact under the softball field. Otherwise, the fort is remarkably well

Figure 17: Plan of Redoubt 12, redan, and Redoubt 14, clockwise, from top left.

preserved with two gun platforms, a large parapet, and a moat. There is no visible magazine in the interior of the redoubt. The fort was not occupied during the battle.

Redoubt 13

This redoubt (44YO37) is completely destroyed and believed to be located under a volleyball court in the New Quarter Park in York County. It is possible the cut for the moat remains intact in the sub-soil. The redoubt was not occupied during the battle.

Redan

In addition to Redoubts 12 and 13, a small earthen redan (44YO40) also sits in the New Quarter Park in York County (see figure 17). The fortification is unique to the Williamsburg defenses because it has an embrasure cut through the center of the parapet rather than a gun platform. The embrasure would enable a gun to clear the parapet without the necessity of a platform. The redan faces to the south-east on a direct line with the Cub Creek Dam just in front of Redoubt 14. Unfortunately for the Confederate Army, the redan was left unoccupied during the battle and Hancock crossed a road over the dam to take Redoubt 14. The site is remarkably well preserved but has been disturbed by looters.

Redoubt 14

Redoubt 14 (44YO54) was the first fort occupied by Hancock in his

move to the Confederate left. Owned by the Department of the Interior, this diamond shaped fortification (see figure 17) is just north of the Jones Mill Pond and off the Colonial National Parkway. It is in excellent condition with a well preserved collapsed magazine. The magazine is particularly interesting because it appears to be in two compartments although it is possible one of the two is the result of a tree fall. A small road leading from the redoubt to the pond may also relate to the fortification. The site has been heavily looted but the area around and between this fort and Redoubt 11 is undeveloped and probably contains resources relating to the Hancock engagement.

The Stoneman Engagement

The majority of the Stoneman engagement was fought immediately to the front of Fort Magruder and Redoubts 7 and 8. The general vicinity of Fort Magruder is fairly well developed with residential structures and small businesses (see figure 12). It is doubtful any meaningful patterning of finds would result from a survey of the remaining undeveloped lots. It is also highly likely the area has been disturbed by looters. Immediately west of Redoubts 7 and 8, however, the land is largely undeveloped and may contain cultural resources related to the engagement.

In addition, the terrain of this section of the battlefield, and in particular around Redoubt 8, is typical of that encountered by the soldiers across the entire line. The area is characterized by a number ofdeep ravines cut by small streams and protruding draws. The high ground furnished an ideal setting for the observation of approaching enemy columns and the ravines provided cover and concealment.

Furthermore, the rough terrain would have made it exceedingly difficult for attacking forces to coordinate and execute attacks.

The Hooker Engagement

The vast majority of this section of the battlefield, and indeed the entire Union left flank, has been disturbed or destroyed by development. The area immediately west of Redoubts 3, 4, and 5, and Fort Magruder, for example, have suffered residential, commercial, highway, and railroad development. Although it is possible that some battle related artifacts remain in the small pockets of undeveloped area within this part of the battlefield, it is doubtful any meaningful patterning of finds still exist.

A small portion of the Union left, however, may still remain intact. The area immediately southwest of Redoubt 2 is undeveloped and was occupied by the tail ends of the Confederate and Union lines. Topographically, the area is cut by several seasonal streams that drain into Tutter's Neck Pond. The terrain is fairly rough (see figure 12) and characterized by a succession of spurs and a large ravine that fill the small valley. The land is now heavily wooded and aside from a few utility roads and a small pumping station, uninhabited.

This part of the battlefield may include the remains of three sub-episodes within the larger engagement. These include the 11 am engagement between the 28th, 19th, and 18th Virginia, 14th Louisiana, 8th and 10th Alabama, and the 8th New Jersey (see figure 6); the 1 pm engagement between the 14th Louisiana, 8th Alabama, 11th Virginia, 10th Virginia, 10th Alabama, and the 70th New York (see figure 7); and the 3 pm engagement between the 8th and 18th Virginia and the 37th

New York (see figure 8). Each of these sub-episodes were fought approximately .5 miles due west of Redoubt 2. Because they were all fought on the same ground, however, it may not be possible to distinguish among the three sub-episodes on the basis of artifact patterning. It is theoretically possible to sort regiments according to the type of bullet fired (the 8th New Jersey and 70th New York, for example, are known to have carried M-1855 or M-1861 .58 caliber rifle muskets (Coates and Thomas 1990)); given the variety in arms and armaments in use during the war, however, this may not be feasible. Rather, it is hoped that if artifacts do remain in undisturbed contexts, gross patterns may emerge to distinguish the tail ends of the two lines.

The Hancock Engagement

The Hancock engagement was fought entirely on the Union right immediately east of Redoubt 11. Some residential development has taken place in the immediate area. However, the majority remains as undeveloped woodland and may contain cultural resources relating to the battle, particularly along the Colonial National Parkway (see figure 12). The parkway also preserves a significant topographic feature associated with Early's charge on Hancock. The men of the 24th Virginia and 5th North Carolina Regiments charged along a low, sloping crest where Hancock had positioned his men. The crest is still visible in the undergrowth along the parkway.

Summary

To summarize briefly, of the 15 original defensive structures, six

are intact, six are partially intact, and three are destroyed. Three of those structures (Redoubts 2,10, and Fort Magruder) have suffered severely from the effects of erosion. In addition, undeveloped lots within each of the battle episodes may contain cultural resources relating to the battle and have preserved several significant topographic features. These features include the ravines contained in the Stoneman and Hooker episodes and the crest in the Hancock episode.

Chapter 6:

Conclusions and Recommendations

The previous chapters have outlined the theoretical and methodological background of battlefield archaeology, discussed the concept of significance in archaeology, described the history of the Battle of Williamsburg, and discussed the extant cultural resources remaining from the battle. This final chapter argues for the significance of those sites and makes recommendations for additional fieldwork and preservation/management options.

Significance

The cultural resources remaining from the Battle of Williamsburg possess archaeological significance at the local state, and national level. Six of the defensive structures are completely intact, six are partially intact, and only three are destroyed (see figure 18). Several of the fortifications are significant as individual structures given their remarkable state of preservation and the famous historic persons who occupied them. Redoubt 14, for example, was occupied by General Hancock who was commended by General McClellan for his actions on the Confederate left and would become a major player in the rest of the war. Furthermore, the leading Union element to take the redoubt was led by a young lieutenant by the name of George Armstrong Custer (Kettenburg 1980).

In toto, however, the Williamsburg defenses are significant as an

75

A Comparison of Intact to Destroyed Fortifications

A Comparison of intact to destroyed fortifications

- Intact
- Partially Intact
- Destroyed

Figure 18: A comparison of intact to destroyed fortifications.

example of a Civil War era defensive line. While it is true that some of the structures have been destroyed by development, the line roughly possesses integrity of setting, location, and feeling. A comparison of the individual redoubts and forts not only with one another but also with other defensive lines may enlighten our understanding of mid-nineteenth century defensive operations. Special attention should focus on the relationship of the orientation of the forts to the region's topography or how the spatial relationships between the forts contribute to the battlefield landscape. Such comparisons may be made to other Virginia engagements or to those throughout the country.

Finally, the Williamsburg line is particularly significant at the local level. Williamsburg is a small southern city with a rich cultural tradition dating to the early seventeenth century. It was home of the second colonial capital after Jamestown and selected as the site of the College of William and Mary. The creation of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation museum has helped to preserve that heritage. That two Civil War armies marched through the town and fought a battle is equally significant. To ignore the cultural resources of that event while preserving, studying, and excavating those of the colonial era is to belittle the history of the city through time. Furthermore, the local public has a particular interest in the fort sites. The Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee in conjunction with the local Civil War Round Table are currently working to preserve and protect the defensive line. This speaks directly to the question of public significance.

In addition to the fortifications, several significant topographic features are preserved on the battlefield. These include the ravines associated with the Stoneman and Hooker episodes and the crest associated with the Hancock episode. In conjunction, these features

form part of the cultural landscape that defined the battlefield.

It is not yet possible to determine if any cultural resources from the Stoneman, Hooker or, Hancock episodes remain intact because these areas have not been archaeologically tested. If such resources do remain intact, it may then be possible to identify artifact patterning in the finds.

Archaeological Recommendations

Several recommendations are made for additional archaeological fieldwork. First, phase 2 tests of the undisturbed portions of the Stoneman, Hooker, and Hancock episodes would permit a sound determination of their significance and assess the need for any additional work. Second, the extant fortifications should be mapped in far greater detail. Although the plans presented in this thesis are a step in the right direction, the parapets, moats, and other internal features should all be mapped in profile and in detailed plan and photographed. Aerial photographs would be a satisfying supplement to the overall plans. Finally, phase 2 tests of Redoubts 1 and 2 to locate the rifle pits outside the fortifications would enable a more accurate reconstruction of how they looked in 1862.

Preservation/Management Options

Justification to protect and manage historic landscape resources is based on a belief that these places educate and stimulate the kind of creative reflections that are good for the people and critical for the nation. It is unfortunate that we are a nation of historic and geographic illiterates (Lamme) 1989: 191-192).

Several options for preserving and managing the Williamsburg

Battlefield are available to local government and other interested constituencies. These parties include not only the governments of Williamsburg, James City County, and York County, but also Colonial Williamsburg, the National Park Service, The Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee, The United Daughters of the Confederacy, and private landowners.

The Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee is currently spearheading efforts to preserve the battlefield by lobbying against development on the extant cultural resources. They are working to interest national preservation societies, such as the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites, in purchasing battlefield sites. Additionally, they are working to coordinate and educate the other concerned parties to preserve the battlefield. The long term goal is to create a Civil War park in Williamsburg (King, personal communication 1995).

Currently, five of the extant redoubts are owned by parties with preservation interests. Redoubts 1 and 2 are owned by Colonial Williamsburg, Fort Magruder is owned by the United Daughters of the Confederacy, and Redoubt 14 and part of Redoubt 11 are owned by the National Park Service. For the time being, these structures may be considered preserved and unthreatened by development. Additionally, the National Park Service owns a portion of the total area encompassing the Hancock engagement. All other portions of the battlefield, however, are in private or city or county ownership and are currently unprotected. Although Redoubt 12 and a redan are located in a York County public park, the county does not have the resources to staff the park and are considering leasing the land for the development of a golf course (King, personal communication 1995).

The city of Williamsburg is currently considering a plan to establish an archaeological district to protect threatened sites. Such a district could potentially include sites associated with the battle. If adopted, the plan would insure that archaeological assessments of these sites be made prior to any development. It would not, however, include sites outside the district or insure that they are preserved (Brown, personal communication 1995). While certainly a step in the right direction, a comprehensive plan would have to include James City and York Counties to cover the entire battlefield.

Other options available for preserving the battlefield may include new zoning restrictions (such as a Historic District Zoning Ordinance), the establishment of easements, voluntary preservation or stewardship programs, updating the RP3 plan for Williamsburg, York County, and James City County with greater emphasis on Civil War resources, and creating a general implementation plan for the preservation of these sites (Lichtenberger 1995). Additionally, funds and technical assistance for the preservation of historic resources are available from the state through the Certified Local Government Program (CLG). Williamsburg became a CLG in 1994; James City and York Counties could consider applying for CLG status and use at least a portion of any funds received for the preservation of battlefield sites. Finally, National Register status could be considered for these sites.

At this time, it is not feasible to reccomend a specific comprehensive plan. The Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee is still working to coordinate all involved parties and exploring different preservation options. Such a plan should soon be forthcoming from this organization.

Conclusions

In conclusion, several significant sites remain intact from the Battle of Williamsburg. The line of fortifications is most significant as an example of a mid-nineteenth century defensive line. They also enjoy broad public support. Other sections of the battlefield may contain intact cultural resources but these have yet to be explored. This thesis has sought to identify potentially significant sites and begin to organize the archaeological database. Recommendations for additional fieldwork consist of mapping and photographing the fortifications in far greater detail and conducting phase 2 tests of unexplored areas. Furthermore, a comprehensive plan for managing these sites is necessary to insure their continued preservation. Such a plan should build off of the work already begun by the Williamsburg Line Preservation Committee and consider all available options.

APPENDIX A:

UNITS ENGAGED AT WILLIAMSBURG

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILLIAMSBURG, VA.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES.

Major-General George B. McClellan. Brigadier-General Edwin V. Sumner, second in command.

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Brigadier-General Samuel P. Heintzelman.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Joseph Hooker.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cuvier Grover: 1st Mass., Col. Robert Cowdin; 11th Mass., Col. William Blaisdell; 2d N. H., Col. Gilman Marston; 26th Pa., Col. William F. Small (w), Major Casper M. Berry. Brigade loss: k, 33; w, 186; m, 34 = 253. *Second Brigade,* Col. Nelson Taylor: 70th N. Y., Col. William Dwight, Jr. (w c), Major Thomas Holt; 72d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Israel Moses; 73d N. Y.,Col. William R. Brewster; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Burtis. Brigade loss: k, 191; w, 349; m, 232 = 772. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Francis E. Patterson: 5th N. J., Col. Samuel H. Starr; 6th N. J., Lieut.-Col. John P. Van Leer (k), Maj. George C. Burling; 7th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Ezra A. Carman (w), Maj. Francis Price, Jr.; 8th N. J., Col. Adolphus J. Johnson (w), Maj. Peter H. Ryerson (k). Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 353; m, 64 = 526. *Artillery,* Maj. Charles S. Wainwright: D, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn; 4th N. Y., Capt. James E. Smith; 6th N. Y., Capt. Walter M. Bramhall; H, 1st U. S., Capt. Charles H. Webber. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 20 = 24.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Philip Kearny. Staff loss: k, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles D. Jameson: 87th N. Y., Col. Stephen A. Dodge; 57th Pa., Col. Charles T. Campbell; 63d Pa., Col. Alexander Hays; 105th Pa., Col. Amor A. McKnight. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney: 3d Me., Col. Henry G. Staples; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N. Y., Col. J. H. Hobart Ward: 40th N. Y., Col. Edward J. Riley. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 92; m, 10 = 118. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 2d Mich., Col. Orlando M. Poe; 3d Mich., Col. Stephen G. Champlin; 5th Mich., Col. Henry D. Terry; 37th N. Y., Col. Samuel B. Hayman. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 223; m, 7 = 299. *Artillery,* Capt. James Thompson: B, 1st N. J., Capt. John E. Beam; E, 1st R. I., Capt. George E. Randolph; G, 2d U. S., Capt. James Thompson.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Brigadier-General Erasmus D. Keyes.

Cavalry : 5th U. S., Major Joseph H. Whittlesey.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Darius N. Couch.

First Brigade, Col. Julius W. Adams: 65th N. Y. (1st U. S. Chasseurs), Lieut.-Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N. Y. (1st Long Island), Lieut.-Col. Nelson Cross; 23d Pa., Col. Thomas H. Neill; 31st Pa., Col. David H. Williams; 61st Pa., Col. Oliver H. Rippey. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. John J. Peck: 55th N. Y., Col. P. Regis de Trobriand; 62d N. Y., Col. John L. Riker; 93d Pa., Col. James M. McCarter; 98th Pa., Col. John F. Ballier; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 82; m, 24 = 124. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.: 7th Mass., Col. David A. Russell; 10th Mass., Col. Henry

S. Briggs; 2d R. I., Col. Frank Wheaton. Brigade loss (7th Mass.): k, 1; w, 2 = 3. *Artillery,* Maj. Robert M. West: C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy; D, 1st Pa., Capt. Edward H. Flood: E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore Miller; H, 1st Pa., Capt. James Brady.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen.William F. Smith.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock (also in temporary command of Davidson's Third Brigade): 6th Me., Col. Hiram Burnham; 43d N. Y., Col. Francis L. Vinton; 49th Pa., Col. William H. Irwin; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 76; m, 1 = 85. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks: 2d Vt., Col. Henry Whiting; 3d Vt., Col. Breed N. Hyde; 4th Vt., Col. Edwin H. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. Lewis A. Grant; 6th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord. Brigade loss: w, 2. *Third Brigade* (temporarily under Hancock's command): 7th Me., Col. Edwin C. Mason; 33d N. Y., Col. Robert F. Taylor; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 76th N. Y., Col. James B. McKean. Brigade loss (33d N. Y.): w, 10. *Artillery,* Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres: 1st N. Y., Lieut. Andrew Cowan; 3d N. Y., Capt. Thaddeus P Mott; E, 1st N. Y., Capt. Charles C. Wheeler; F, 5th U. S., Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Silas Casey.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry M. Naglee: 11th Me., Col. John C. Caldwell; 56th N. Y., Col. Charles H. Van Wyck; 100th N. Y., Col. James M. Brown; 52d Pa., Col. John C. Dodge, Jr.; 104th Pa., Col. W. W. H. Davis. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. William H. Keim: 96th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles O. Gray; 85th Pa., Col. Joshua B. Howell; 101st Pa., Col. Joseph H. Wilson; 103d Pa., Maj. Audley W. Gazzam. Brigade loss (103d Pa.): w, 2. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Innis N. Palmer: 81st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Jacob J. De Forest; 85th N. Y., Col. Jonathan S. Belknap; 92d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 93d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin C. Butler; 98th N. Y., Col. William Dutton. *Artillery,* Col. Guilford D. Bailey: 7th N. Y., Capt. Peter C. Regan; 8th N. Y., Capt. Butler Fitch; A, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas H. Bates; H, 1st N. Y., Capt. Joseph Spratt.

ADVANCE-GUARD, Brig.-Gen. George Stoneman. Brig.-Gen. P. St. George Cooke and William H. Emory, brigade commanders.

Cavalry : 8th Ill., Col. John F. Farnsworth; McClellan (Ill.) Dragoons, Maj. Charles W. Barker; 3d Pa., Col. William W. Averell: 1st U. S., Lieut.-Col. William N. Grier; 6th U. S., Maj. Lawrence Williams. *Artillery,* Lieut.-Col. William Hays: B and L, 2d U. S., Capt. James M. Robertson; M, 2d U. S., Capt. Henry Benson; C, 3d U. S., Capt. Horatio G. Gibson; K, 3d U. S., Capt. John C. Tidball. Advance-guard loss (mostly on May 4th): k, 15; w, 33; m, 1 = 49.

The total loss of the Union army (May 4th and 5th) was 468 killed, 1442 wounded, and 373 captured or missing = 2283.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

General Joseph E. Johnston. Major-General James Longstreet in immediate command on the field.

SECOND DIVISION (Longstreet's).

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill: 1st Va., Col. Louis B. Williams (w), Maj. William H. Palmer (w); 7th Va., Col. James L. Kemper; 11th Va., Col. Samuel Garland (w); 17th Va., Col. M. D. Corse. Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 245; m, 14 = 326. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson (in command on the right), Col. Micah Jenkins: 4th S C. (Battalion), Maj. C. S. Mattison; 5th S. C., Col. John R. R. Giles; 6th S. C., Col. John Bratton; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, Col. Micah Jenkins, Lieut.-Col. Joseph Walker; La. Foot Rifles.

Capt. McG. Goodwyn : Fauquier (Va.) Artillery, Capt. Robert M. Stribling; Williamsburg (Va.) Artillery, (2 guns), Capt. William R. Garrett; Richmond (Va.), Howitzers (2 guns), Capt. Edward S. McCarthy. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 75; m, 6 = 91. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. George E. Pickett: 8th Va., Lieut.-Col. Norbourne Berkeley; 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. Henry A. Carrington; 19th Va., Col. John B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. Robert C. Allen; Va. Battery, Capt. James Dearing. Brigade loss : k, 26; w, 138; m, 26 = 190. *Fourth Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 9th Ala., Col. Samuel

Henry: 10th Ala., Col. John J. Woodward; 19th Miss., Col. Christopher H. Mott (k), Lieut.-Col. L. Q. C. Lamar. Brigade loss: k and w. 231. *Fifth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Roger A. Pryor: 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Thomas E. Irby (k); 14th Ala., Maj. O. K. McLemore; 14th La., Col. R. W. Jones; 32d Va. (detachment); Richmond (Va.) Fayette Artillery. Lieut. W. I. Clopton. Brigade loss: k, w, and m. 214. *Colston's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Colston: 13th N. C., Col. Alfred M. Scales; 14th N. C., Col. P. W. Roberts; 3d Va., Col. Joseph Mayo. Brigade loss not separately reported. Donaldsonville (La.) Battery (3 guns), Lieut. Lestang Fortier.

FOURTH DIVISION, Major-Gen. Daniel H. Hill (in command on the left).

Early's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early (w), Col. D. K. McRae: 5th N. C., Col. D. K. McRae; 23d N. C., Col. John F. Hoke. Maj. Daniel H. Christie; 24th Va., Col. William R. Terry (w), Major Richard L. Maury; 38th Va., Lieut.-Col. Powhatan B. Whittle. Brigade loss (except 5th N. C., not reported): k, 30; w,

106; m. 70 = 206. *Rodes's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes: 5th Ala., Col. C. C. Pegues; 6th Ala., Col. John B. Gordon; 12th Ala., Col. R. T. Jones; 12th Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor. *Rains's Brigade*. Brig.-Gen. G. J. Rains: 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal; 6th Ga., Col. A. H. Colquitt; 23d Ga., Col. Thos. Hutcherson. *Featherston's Brigade*. Brig.-Gen. W. S. Featherston: 27th Ga., Col. Levi B. Smith; 28th Ga., Col. T. J. Warthen; 4th N. C., Col. George B. Anderson; 49th Va., Col. William Smith. *Unattached*: 2d Fla., Col. George T. Ward (k); 2d Miss. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. John G. Taylor. Unattached loss: k, 9; w, 61; m, 11 = 81.

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart: 3d Va., Col. Thomas F. Goode; 4th Va., Maj. William H. Payne (w), Capt. R. E. Utterback; Jeff Davis Legion, Lieut.-Col. William T. Martin; Wise Legion, Col. J. Lucius Davis; Stuart Horse Artillery, Captain John Pelham. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 3 = 4.

The total loss of the Confederate Army was 288 killed, 975 wounded, and 297 captured or missing = 1560.

From:

Anonymous,
n.d   Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (2): 200-201.

APPENDIX B:

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HISTORIC RESOURCES SITE INVENTORY FORMS

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 1   SITE NUMBER: 44JC 56

STUDY UNITS: XII   XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18   EASTING 350480   NORTHING 4124200

OWNER/ADDRESS: Colonial Williamsburg, Inc.
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS: : Earl C.& David Hasting, 169 Dennis Dr., Wmsbg- 229-724
SURVEYED BY: Edward Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: On a knoll north of Tutter's Neck Dam

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
500' s to Tutter's Neck Pond

DIMENSION OF SITE: 100 x 100' as mapped.

DESCRIPTION: This redoubt anchored the right of the Confederate line on
Tutters Neck Pond and commanded a road to Williamsburg and the Confederate
rear.   See VHLC Survey 47-47.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None

SPECIMENS REPORTED: None

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: "Lee's Lieuts" by D.S. Freeman. "Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies" (Series I, Part III, Vol. XI, and Series I,
Part I, Vol. XI). "From Manassas to Appomattox" James Longstreet. "Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War" Vol. 2. "Narrative of Military Operations" by
J. E. Johnston.

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS: None made

PHOTO: None   MAP: Appended
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 2   SITE NUMBER: 44JC 57

STUDY UNITS: XII   XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 350790 NORTHING 4124680

OWNER/ADDRESS: Colonial Williamsburg
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: 3/4 mile SW of James Terrace

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
1200' E to unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck Pond

DIMENSION OF SITE: 200 x 200' as mapped.

DESCRIPTION: This redoubt, along with numbers 3,4,and 5 was occupied by
elements of Longstreets Division during the night of May 4-5, 1862 in the
face of arrival of strong Union forces east of these positions. See
VHLC Survey 47-48.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None

SPECIMENS REPORTED: None

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS: None made

PHOTO: None   MAP: Appended
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 3   SITE NUMBER: 44JC 58

STUDY UNITS: XII   XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18   EASTING 351000   NORTHING 4125180

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Edge of trailer park at city limits.

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
1000' SE to unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck Pond

DIMENSION OF SITE: 200 x 200' as mapped

DESCRIPTION: Square fortification. Very well preserved, but threatened
by prime location for development. Historical events about as described
for Redoubt 2 (44JC57). See VHLC Survey 47-49.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None

SPECIMENS REPORTED: None

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS: None made

PHOTO: None   MAP: Appended
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 4   SITE NUMBER: 44JC 59

STUDY UNITS: XII   XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 351310 NORTHING 4125170

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Route 60 W of James Terrace

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
700' SW to unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck Pond

DIMENSION OF SITE: Unknown

DESCRIPTION: Only a fragmentary corner of this fortification remains on
the northern edge of C&O RR tracks. Historical events about as described
for Redoubt 2 (44JC57). See VHLC Survey 47-50.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None

SPECIMENS REPORTED: None

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS: None made

PHOTO: None   MAP: None
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 5   SITE NUMBER: 44JC 60

STUDY UNITS: XII   XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 351880 NORTHING 4125170

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: James Terrace

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
1000' S To unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck Pond.

DIMENSION OF SITE: 600 x 600' as mapped.

DESCRIPTION: General area of this destroyed fortification. Historical
events about as described for Redoubt 2 (44JC57). See VHLC Survey 47-51.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None

SPECIMENS REPORTED: None

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS: None made

PHOTO: None   MAP: None
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 6   SITE NUMBER: 44YO 47

STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 352250 NORTHING 4125270

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: By a church in suburbia.

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: The small remnant of this large fortification marked and
preserved by U.D.C. This very large & strong fortification was the ctr of
the Confederate defensive line and sat astride the 2 primary rds. to Rich-
mond via the Peninsula. See VHLC Survey 47-52.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56. See Abbott 1862 map and Hope 1862

CONDITION: Fenced off and overgrown.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 7   SITE NUMBER: 44YO 49

STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 353010 NORTHING 4125310

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS:

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: This redoubt, like Fort 8, played a key part on the battle.
On the afternoon of May 4, 1862 it was attacked by elements of the Union
cavalry advanced guard under Gen. Phillip St. George Cooke. See VHLC
Survey 99-38.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 6   SITE NUMBER: 44YO 50

STUDY UNITS: XVII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 353220 NORTHING 4125760

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Rte. 64

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: Chevron-shaped fortification. Historical events about as
described for Redoubt 7 (44Y049). See VHLC Survey 99-39.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort ? 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SITE NUMBER: 44YO 5?

STUDY UNITS:　XII　XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18　EASTING 353100　NORTHING 4126100

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Rte. 64, believed to be the location of this
destroyed fortification.

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: See VHLC Survey 99-40.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44 JC56

CONDITION:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO:　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff　　　　　　　　DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 10   SITE NUMBER: 44JC56

STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 352740 NORTHING 4126220

OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS:

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: On the afternoon of May 5, 1862, this redoubt (along with
number 7, 8, and 9) was manned by South Carolina troops under Confederate
Col. Jenkins. This was one of the redoubts attacked by Hancock in the
afternoon. See VHLC Survey 99-41.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: 44JC56

CONDITION:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 2 Dec. 1977

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 11   SITE NUMBER: 44JC 9?

STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthworks
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 333470 NORTHING 4127040

OWNER ADDRESS: U.S. Dept. of Interior
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Very well preserved square fort. Fine location for
preservation and presentation to public, just south of the Colonial
Parkway, although one edge of the fortification seems to be owned by the
Park Service.

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: After penetrating an unoccupied section of the Confederate
line in the morning of May 5, 1862, Gen. W.S. Hancock advanced his forces
to the area in and around this redoubt. See VHLC Survey 99-42.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56

CONDITION:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 5 Dec. 1977

NAME OF SITE: Unnamed   SITE NUMBER: 44YO

STUDY UNITS: XI: XIII   XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Civil War redoubt
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 354290 NORTHING 4128450

OWNER/ADDRESS: York County
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: VRCA
DATE: 1977

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: County owned park (New Quarter Park).

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION:

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: New Quarter Park report.

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: None known   MAP: None known
RECORDED BY: McCartney/Hazzard   DATE: Sept. 1983

NAME OF SITE: Unnamed　　　　　　　　　　　　SITE NUMBER: 44YO 40

STUDY UNITS:　XII　XIII　XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Civil War gun emplacement
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18　EASTING 354540　NORTHING 4128230

OWNER/ADDRESS:　York County
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: VRCA
DATE: 1977

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: County owned park (New Quarter Park).

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION:

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: New Quarter Park report.

CONDITION: Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS:　None made

PHOTO: None known　　　　　　　　　　　MAP: None known
RECORDED BY: McCartney/Hazzard　　　　　DATE: Sept. 1983

SITE SURVEY FORM

NAME OF SITE: Fort 14   SITE NUMBER: 14

STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthworks
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic, Civil War

MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 354200 NORTHING 4127340

OWNER/ADDRESS: U.S. Dept. of Interior
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell
DATE: 1971

GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: This well preserved diamond-shaped fort is now being
readied for opening to the public, largely as the result of the interest
of Earl C. Hastings, and son.

NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):

DIMENSION OF SITE:

DESCRIPTION: A key work in the Confederate line which guarded a second
bridge to Williamsburg over Cut Dam Creek. See VHLC Survey 99-45.

SPECIMENS COLLECTED:

SPECIMENS REPORTED:

OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
                             .

CONDITION:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff   DATE: 5 Dec. 1977

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