

1992

"This Famous Island in the Virginia Sea": The Influence of the Irish Tudor and Stuart Plantation Experiences in the Evolution of American Colonial Theory and Practice

Meaghan Noelle Duff
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd>



Part of the [United States History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Duff, Meaghan Noelle, "This Famous Island in the Virginia Sea": The Influence of the Irish Tudor and Stuart Plantation Experiences in the Evolution of American Colonial Theory and Practice" (1992). *Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects*. Paper 1539625771.
<https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-kvrp-3b47>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

**"THIS FAMOUS ISLAND IN THE VIRGINIA SEA":
THE INFLUENCE OF IRISH TUDOR AND STUART PLANTATION EXPERIENCES
ON THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN COLONIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE**

**A THESIS
PRESENTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS**

**BY
MEAGHAN N. DUFF
MAY, 1992**

APPROVAL SHEET

THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS



MEAGHAN N. DUFF

APPROVED, MAY 1992



THADDEUS W. TATE



JAMES AXTELL



CHANDOS M. BROWN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
INTRODUCTION	2
CHAPTER I. "TO TRAVAILE & SEKE ABRODE WITH DANGER & COST EITHER HONOUR OR PROFITE"	6
CHAPTER II. "MEANES TO KEPE THIS ENTERPRISE FROM OVERTHROWE AND THE ENTERPRISERS FROM SHAME AND DISHONOUR"	17
CHAPTER III. "LIBERTINES OUT OF THE EYE OF THE MAGISTRATE"	38
CONCLUSION	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY	70
VITA	71

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. **Map of Tudor Plantations ca. 1603,**
in Steven G. Ellis' *Tudor Ireland* 8
2. **Map of the Munster seignories,**
in Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh's *The Munster Plantation* 28
3. **Conjectural View of Jamestown, Virginia, 1607,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 44
4. **Plan of Armagh and the Fort at Blackwater, Northern Ireland ca. 1601,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 46
5. **View of Fort Caroline, Florida, 1564,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 47
6. **Plan of Ralph Lane's Fort in Puerto Rico, 1585,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 48
7. **Conjectural Plan of Fort Raleigh, North Carolina, 1585,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 48
8. **Conjectural View of Fort Raleigh, North Carolina, 1585,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 48
9. **Map of the Ulster escheatment,**
in Gilbert Camblin's *The Town in Ulster* 54
10. **Plan of Londonderry, Northern Ireland ca. 1622,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 56
11. **Plan of Moneymore, Northern Ireland ca. 1622,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 57
12. **Plan of Ballykelly, Northern Ireland ca. 1622,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 58
13. **Conjectural View of Jamestown, Virginia, 1614,**
in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns* 60

**"THIS FAMOUS ISLAND IN THE VIRGINIA SEA":
THE INFLUENCE OF IRISH TUDOR AND STUART PLANTATION EXPERIENCES
ON THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN COLONIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE**

ABSTRACT

Colonial Ireland and colonial North America were not linked with one another simply because they shared the same stage in the drama of Elizabethan expansionism and its aftermath. Nor were they associated only because of a shared cast of characters or any similarities among the actors on either side of the Atlantic. To extend the theatrical metaphor, the relationship is significant because the enterprises were inextricably linked in the minds of the English directors.

A discussion of both the writings of contemporary theorists and the actions of actual Tudor and Stuart colonists demonstrates the impact of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Irish colonial experience on the evolution of English plantation theory and practice in North America. Each of the assumptions governing the Virginia enterprises--the expectations of adventurers, justifications for colonization of the land, planned administration, and image of the natives--were shaped in part by an Irish dress rehearsal. In addition, recent studies on the English plantations in Munster and Ulster demonstrate a striking similarity between the settlement practices, problems, and performance of colonies in Ireland and Virginia. Specifically, there were parallels in each colony's organization and sponsorship, distribution of land, construction of the physical environment, and treatment of the native and settler communities. This transference of plantation methodology from one enterprise to another illustrates the often underestimated influence of the early modern Irish colonial experience on the establishment and maintenance of an English colony in the Chesapeake.

**MEAGHAN N. DUFF
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA**

**"THIS FAMOUS ISLAND IN THE VIRGINIA SEA":
THE INFLUENCE OF IRISH TUDOR AND STUART PLANTATION EXPERIENCES
ON THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN COLONIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE**

INTRODUCTION

Although once described by Fynes Moryson as "This famous Island in the Virginia sea," Ireland did not represent a subordinate interest in the eyes of the English crown. The simultaneous seventeenth-century plantations of Munster, Ulster, and Virginia were competitive, not complementary enterprises. Latecomers to transatlantic colonization, the English were very familiar with the century-long involvement of the French, Spanish and Portuguese in the New World through travel literature collected by men such as the Richard Hakluyts (elder and younger). As one noted historian argues, in a sense the English's most original contribution in the exploitation of North America in the later sixteenth century was discussion not action.¹ Consequently, the seventeenth-century Virginia planners could choose from a variety of colonial models, many already described in published materials. Although they certainly hoped to emulate the financial success of the *conquistadores*, the practical experience gained in the forced plantation of Ireland most influenced the manner in which Virginia colonists imagined settlement of the American landscape. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir Francis Drake, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, the Earl of Southampton, Lord de la Warr, Lord George Carew, and Colonel Ralph Lane, each served in a military or

¹David Beers Quinn, *New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612* (New York: Arno Press and Hector Bye, Inc., 1979), vol. III, *English Plans for North America*, 1.

civil capacity in Ireland.² To understand fully how Irish colonialism influenced these individuals it is necessary to look past the contemporary promotional literature which might reveal what the investors, adventurers, and theorists wanted potential colonists to believe, rather than their actual expectations and intentions. Writings such as Sir Thomas Smith's correspondence (1565-1575), Richard Hakluyt's *Discourse of Western Planting* (1584), Thomas Harriot's *A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia* (1588), Edmund Spenser's *A View of the State of Ireland* (1596), and Francis Bacon's *Of Plantations* (1625) will each represent one facet or model of the transitional English approach to colonization in either Ireland or America.³

The relationship between the Irish and American colonial experiences has attracted the attention of numerous scholars in the twentieth century. While the great majority give it a mere mention in their histories, there are two notable exceptions. Much of the life's work of David Beers Quinn focused on English colonial activities throughout the Atlantic region, especially *The Voyaging and Colonising Enterprises of Sir*

²Howard Mumford Jones, *O Strange New World* (New York: The Viking Press, 1964), 173.

³David Beers Quinn, "Sir Thomas Smith (1513-1577) and the Beginnings of English Colonial Theory," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 89 (December 1945): 543-560. Richard Hakluyt, *Discourse of Western Planting*, in *New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612*, vol. III, *English Plans for North America*, ed. David Beers Quinn, (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 70-123. Thomas Harriot, *A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia* (1588), as reprinted by Hakluyt in 1589, in *The First Colonists: Documents on the Planting of the First Settlements in North America 1584-1590*, eds. David Beers Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, (*Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History*, 1982), 46-76. Edmund Spenser, *A View of the State of Ireland* (1596) in *The Works of Spenser, Campion, Hanmer, and Marlebyrrogh* Vol. 1. (Dublin: Hibernia Press, 1809), 1-266. *Of Plantations* (1625) *The Works of Francis Bacon*, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, vol. VI (New York: Garrett Press, Inc., 1870), 457-459.

Humphrey Gilbert (1940), *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (1966), *England and the Discovery of America, 1481-1620* (1973), as well as several important collections of edited documents.⁴ More recently, Irish historian Nicholas Canny has written of the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland in the wider context of European expansion.⁵ Canny particularly emphasizes the implications of English attitudes towards the Gaelic Irish for the treatment of the native and imported slave populations in North America. The work of these scholars demonstrates the remarkable advantages of taking a transatlantic approach to early modern colonial history. As Bernard Bailyn has pointed out, what is novel in this perspective is "the sense of large-scale systems of events operating over various areas. . . . Large-scale orbits developing through time have become visible, and within them patterns of filiation and derivation."⁶ Unfortunately, exploration of these Atlantic connections in colonial history are far too infrequent. Hugh Kearney attributes this fact to nationalist assumptions in both English and American historiography: "In

⁴David Beers Quinn, ed., *The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*, Vol. 1-2 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1940); *The Elizabethans and The Irish* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966); *England and the Discovery of America, 1481-1620* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973); *New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612*, Vol. I-V (New York: Arno Press and Hector Bye, Inc., 1979).

⁵Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," *William and Mary Quarterly* XXX 3 (October 1973): 575-598; *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World 1560-1800*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair, eds., *The Westward Enterprise: English activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America 1480-1650*, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978), 17-46.

⁶Bernard Bailyn, "Challenge of Modern Historiography," *American Historical Review* LXXXVII (1982): 13, quoted in Lois Green Carr, Philip D. Morgan and Jean B. Russo, *Colonial Chesapeake Society* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 17.

the world of historical research few have emulated the transoceanic approach of D.B. Quinn. Readers of the *English Historical Review* and the *William and Mary Quarterly* go their separate ways."⁷ It is the purpose of this essay to analyze the early colonial American experience in light of English plantation attempts in early modern Ireland. In Chapter one, a brief synopsis of all the colonial experiences provides a context for evaluating the various approaches to plantation in Ireland and America and their evolution over a period of sixty years. Thomas Smith's Ards Peninsula project first illustrated the theoretical and practical difficulties inherent in every colonization attempt, and one private adventurer's efforts to address them. The sixteenth-century Roanoke and Munster colonies, described in Chapter two, represent England's first concerted attempts to apply plantation theory to Great Britain's defensive and economic problems in the Atlantic region. Finally, Chapter three's discussion of the Jamestown and Ulster settlements explores the extensive theoretical and methodological interchange between America and Ireland in the early seventeenth century.

⁷Hugh Kearney, "The problem of perspective in the history of colonial America," in *The Westward Enterprise*, 290.

CHAPTER I

"TO TRAVAILE & SEKE ABRODE WITH DANGER & COST EITHER HONOUR OR PROFITE"

Although the English had occupied Ireland since Strongbow's twelfth-century invasion, government officials were barely familiar with either the landscape or its inhabitants by the mid-sixteenth century. In a telling statement to Lord Salisbury in 1609, Sir John Davies admitted that Ulster was "heretofore as unknown to the English here as the most inland part of Virginia as yet unknown to our English colony there."⁸ Although the Anglo-Normans once penetrated far into the island, there was gradual recovery of the Irish and hibernization (or degeneracy) of the Normans. By 1534 the reach of English authority was limited to the Old English residing in the Pale.⁹ Henry VIII attempted to remedy this situation by declaring Ireland a kingdom, enforcing his feudal relationships with the Old English lords, seizing and redistributing monastic lands, and instituting "surrender and regrant" policies among the Irish chieftains. He was moderately successful in strengthening English control over the Dublin government, but failed to extend any real authority over the Gaelic lordships.

During the reign of Edward VI, the English defended the Pale by extending their

⁸Davies to Salisbury, 24 August 1609 (H.M.C., *Salisbury MSS*, XXI, 121); quoted in Nicholas Canny, *Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established 1565-76* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1976), 1.

⁹These were the Catholic descendants of the Anglo-Norman conquerors who lived in the four counties surrounding Dublin. They are distinct from the New English who planted Ireland during the Tudor and Stuart regimes.

influence to confiscated lands in Leix and Offaly, renamed Queen's County and King's County. Traditionally, escheated lands, or lands surrendered and seized from subjects in rebellion, belonged to the crown. Under the leadership of the Earl of Sussex, agricultural communities of New and Old English were established on the confiscated lands adjacent to fortified garrisons (Illustration 1). Although this military plantation ultimately foundered under Mary Tudor, it initiated the colonial settlement pattern for extending English control in hostile environments. The Leix-Offaly adventure also demonstrated to the crown the extremely high cost of controlled settlement, leading them to encourage private financial participation in colonial ventures. The 1560s saw the first sixteenth-century attempts to colonize Ireland beyond the Pale. Under the direction of the Lord Deputy, the highest English official in Ireland, New English planters tried to settle in northeast Ulster and southwest Munster. Several schemes for settling Ulster were proposed in the late 1560s but were each denied financial backing by Elizabeth. In 1571 Sir Thomas Smith sponsored an expedition to the Ards Peninsula. In Munster, vast but dispersed tracts of escheated land were granted between 1586 and 1598 to various private adventurers, such as Sir Richard Grenville and Sir Humphrey Gilbert. Similarly, corporate plantation of Ulster's lands, which were confiscated en masse in the wake of Elizabeth's war with the Gaelic-Irish chieftains, began in 1609 as James, sovereign in both England and Scotland, became increasingly enamored of the idea of large-scale colonization.

More restricted in vision and scale than their Irish counterparts, sixteenth-century English colonial efforts on the American coast depended primarily upon the



Illustration 1: Map of Tudor Plantations, with county boundaries at 1603, in Steven G. Ellis' *Tudor Ireland*

needs of Elizabethan privateers. Inadequate resources frustrated Sir Humphrey Gilbert's attempts to plant a colony in the New World between 1578 and 1583. From 1584 to 1590 Sir Walter Raleigh founded no less than three settlements at Roanoke in present-day North Carolina. Although sanctioned by the Queen, these small outputs relied almost exclusively on private sponsorship. War with the Spanish Armada caused Raleigh to abandon John White's 1587 colony, which consisted of 117 men, women, and children. While this "lost colony" may have endured well into the first decade of the seventeenth century, conclusive evidence of its survival does not exist. However, experience gained during Roanoke voyages influenced later North American expeditions. The 1607 Jamestown colony directly benefitted both from the knowledge of Virginia's topography, resources, and native inhabitants accumulated in Roanoke during the 1580s, and from the practical experience with sponsorship, recruitment, and hostile environments gained in Ireland during the Tudor plantations.

The private Irish adventures from 1566 to 1575 significantly influenced the development of American colonial theory. Although many of these projects eventually failed, they generated the first sustained discussion of both the theoretical and practical merits of English colonial settlement.¹⁰ The intentions and activities of Sir Thomas Smith, described in his private and official correspondence, epitomize this early generation's approach to plantation. Smith was a lifelong English civil servant, at one

¹⁰Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 545.

time a member of the Privy Council and Secretary of State.¹¹ In 1571 the crown granted him some 360,000 acres in Ards to be held as tenant of the earldom of Ulster "by one knight's fee, paying rent for all lands occupied by 29 September 1576 and losing title to those lands not occupied by 28 March 1579."¹² Thus, he was allowed to plant the said lands, collect rents, and regulate the Irish population as he saw fit as long as the colony remained vital and solvent. But Smith's initial expectations, administration of the colony, and use of a native labor force changed substantially in just a few years.

Desire for profit was the prime motivating force behind this (and all future) plantation schemes. However, Smith's views on colonization were most strongly influenced by Roman precedent. He felt that "England was as uncivil as Ireland until colonies of Romans brought their laws and orders, whose moulds no nation, not even the Italians and Romans, have more straitly and truly kept."¹³ Representing the new center of civilization, England had a mandate to export its culture to barbarous regions via colonization. Seeking to emulate his classical predecessors, Smith chose individual leadership based on military authority as the mechanism for establishing a civilized English settlement in Ireland. In a letter to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam he stated,

The truth is that I & my deputies be in dede Coloniae ductores, the distributors of land to english men in a forein countrey, And as they who so take land be Coloni, or Coloners, So we that do distribute it may be called coloniae ductores, or Colonells, a new name for an old doeng but

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 548.

¹³Smith to Fitzwilliam, 8 November 1572 (Carte MS 57, f.435), quoted in Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 546.

now by me a renewed thing.¹⁴

"Old" specifically indicated Roman, as Smith deliberately attempted to revive the classical military-colonial tradition, designating himself a modern-day colonel. He even obtained a commission enabling him to exercise martial law.¹⁵ By retaining direct control over minute operations, Smith sought to reserve all glory for himself and a few deputies, usually his relatives.

Smith believed the recruitment of capable adventurers to be the least of his plantation worries. Cheap land would draw scores of gentry, especially younger sons suffering under the constraints of primogeniture. He emphasized this fact in both his correspondence and his promotional literature-- a broadsheet, pamphlet, and map which were the first printed propaganda for any English colonial venture.¹⁶ In a letter to Sir Valentine Browne, Smith asserted, "There was never a better nor more profitable and honourable a voyage for young gentlemen and younger brethern to make, Find them self one year, and take land to them and their heirs ten times more than they can buy in England on the price and as good."¹⁷ Though he was able to recruit a significant number of colonists, especially discharged soldiers, preserving the military nature of the

¹⁴Smith to Fitzwilliam, 31 July 1574 (Carte MS 56, f.218), quoted in Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 547.

¹⁵Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 558.

¹⁶Ibid., 551.

¹⁷*Calendar of State Papers for 1583, & Add.*, 475, quoted in Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 552.

plantation,¹⁸ by April 1573 Smith bemoaned the shortage of able settlers. "Men be easier to be led from payne to ease, from labour to ydlenes, from adventuring to drinking and to lieng at home, then to travaile & seke abrode with danger & cost either honour or profite which they do not presently se."¹⁹ Smith intended to create an English civilization in the midst of Irish barbarity. However, he discovered that the gentry, those he believed most able to found a civil society, were the least prepared for the hard work involved in building an actual settlement. The Virginia colonists would have to relearn this valuable Irish lesson at Jamestown.

The Ards Peninsula project was to be financed by rents levied on eight or nine hundred private subscribers recruited to plant in Ireland. Although Smith was the first to apply the joint-stock corporate model to colonization,²⁰ he soon learned that such an arrangement was by nature precarious. It necessitated a sharing of power to which he was naturally adverse, and rendered the colony financially vulnerable if quick profits were not immediately realized. As he assured Thomas, his son and principal agent in the colony,

Touching those who require unreasonable things, you have made a good determination, methinks, and I would not have you swerve from it, lest others, who are contented with reason, should be offended, while he who demands more than reason will not be contented, and will ever ask more

¹⁸Nicholas Canny, "The permissive frontier: the problem of social control in English settlements in Ireland and Virginia 1550-1650," in K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair, eds. *Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America 1480-1650* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978), 18.

¹⁹Smith to Fitzwilliam, 13 April 1573 (Carte MS 56, f.49), quoted in Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 554.

²⁰Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 555.

and more, therefore let them go, as men unreasonable and unruly.²¹

The "unreasonable" were those adventurers demanding both a greater say in the administration of the colony and a return on their investments. Although both authoritarianism and corporatism created significant managerial problems for Smith (indeed contributed to the settlement's demise), as will be illustrated below, his example greatly influenced the future generation of planners. Colonial American theorists later concluded that some form of royal involvement, whether administrative or financial, was necessary for nascent colonies to succeed. Hence, they framed their arguments to secure support from the crown. Smith, on the other hand, was far more preoccupied with the task of building a colony. He did not attempt to win Elizabeth's favor by solving any long-term problems of the English government in either England or Ireland.

In planning the colony's physical structures he ordered the building of a fortress city. In instructions to his son he wrote:

For the first year there, and peradventure the second, ye shall do well to take one sure and convenient place to make a fort, as Byrso and Dido and Mons Aventunus to Romulus, and there to fortify yourself; and that being strong and provided to live and defend may master the country about, and so the country divided into villiages and parishes may make your first cottage or fort as big as any of the other was by long time and good governance.²²

Although the establishment of a walled garrison, like authoritarianism and corporatism,

²¹*Calendar of State Papers for 1583, & Add.*, 467-468, quoted in Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory, " 557.

²²*Ibid.*, 547.

was soon an inherent feature of many English plantations in both Ireland and America, not all of Smith's directives became standard.

After conquering the granted land and building a fort, the soldier-settlers were to use Irish laborers to cultivate the soil. Smith's petition to the crown read: "All Irishmen . . . which commonly be called churles, that will plow the grounde and beare no kind of weapon nor armoure, shalbe gentlye entertained and for their plowinge and laboure shalbe well rewarded with great provision that no iniurie be offered to them."²³ In the beginning, Smith praised the peaceable laborers he expected to work his lands. As he wrote to Lord Burghley, "He that is contented with his own and will live quiet, and much more he that will labour for his living shall be defended, cherished, yea, and enriched if he will."²⁴ As the colony failed, he reconsidered the viability of this position. After young Thomas was killed by the Irish servants in his household, Smith proposed separate societies. "My chief order is, that they shall offer no injury to eny Irish persone, nor take enything from them without payeng for it, but quietly build their howses, fortifie their towne, & plow their growndes, and be good neighbors."²⁵ Although Smith never actually promoted systematic annihilation of the Irish, New English planters were rethinking the theories governing their treatment of the native population.

Historically, the English believed that although the Gaelic system of government

²³Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 548.

²⁴*Calendar of State Papers for 1583, & Add, 468-470*, quoted in Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 553.

²⁵Quinn, "Smith and Colonial Theory," 553-554.

was corrupt, the Irish subjects were entirely redeemable if liberated from their chieftains' oppression.²⁶ This distinction collapsed in the second half of the sixteenth century as colonization schemes multiplied.²⁷ Essex's extirpation of the Irish natives in Ulster and Gilbert's in Munster illustrated this breakdown. According to observer Thomas Churchyard, Gilbert ordered

that the heddes of all those (of what sort soever thei were) which were killed in the daie, should be cutte of from their bodies and brought to the place where he incamped at night, and should there bee laied on the ground by eche side of the waie ledyng into his owne tente so that none could come into his tente for any cause but commonly he muste passe through a lane of heddes which he used *ad terrorem*, the dedde feelyng nothyng the more paines thereby: and yet did it bring greate terrour to the people when thei sawe the heddes of their dedde fathers, brothers, children, kinsfolke and freindes, lye on the grounde before their faces, as thei came to speake with the said collonell.²⁸

It was no coincidence that an increase in New English colonization paralleled more violent English-Irish relations. Irish historian Nicholas Canny states that "the Norman (Old English) lords were not known to have committed such atrocities in Ireland, and there is no evidence that systematic execution of noncombatants by martial law was practiced in any of the Tudor rebellions in England." He concludes that "Gilbert and Essex believed that in dealing with the native Irish population they were absolved from

²⁶Nicholas Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 30 (October 1973): 580.

²⁷However, when confronted with massive forced plantation in Ireland, the Old English, recognizing the eclipse of their political power, continued to argue that Gaelic leaders should be persuaded to adopt English ways, not massacred.

²⁸Thomas Churchyard, quoted in Canny, *Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland*, 122.

all normal ethical restraints."²⁹ The explanation for this change in behavior stems largely from the cultural beliefs of the New English colonists. In the English mind, civilization could exist independent of Christianity, as in the Orient or East Indies, but Christianity required civility. In order to treat Gaelic Ireland as a colony, planners had to believe it was uncivilized and therefore unchristian. As radical Protestants, the New English disdained Old English Catholicism. By comparison, the Gaelic-Irish Catholicism they encountered in Munster and Ulster looked like paganism. Once viewed as pagans, the Irish could logically be reclassified as uncivilized barbarians.³⁰ Unfamiliar Gaelic customs (the wearing of mantles, for example) and agricultural practices such as transhumance,³¹ which planters encountered upon arrival, easily reinforced this characterization. In little more than a decade, Smith's generation of theorists moved from a belief in the social inferiority of the Irish to a belief in their anthropological inferiority.³² By the time the English reached Jamestown, their concept of barbarity had crystallized; they were experienced at subjugating native cultures.

²⁹Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization," 583.

³⁰Ibid., 586.

³¹Transhumance is the seasonal movement of livestock and especially sheep between mountain and lowland pastures either under the care of herders or in company with the owners.

³²Canny, *Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland*, 131.

CHAPTER II

"MEANES TO KEPE THIS ENTERPRISE FROM OVERTHROWE AND THE ENTERPRISERS FROM SHAME AND DISHONOUR"

By the final quarter of the sixteenth century, colonial planners, witnessing the early efforts at plantation in Ireland, could identify several of the problems inherent in colonization. After the demise of Smith's colony in Ards, they could also suggest several necessary components for the construction of a successful settlement. Although private or corporate sponsorship was financially appealing to the crown, execution of large-scale plantations necessitated royal participation. Also, the theorists believed that difficulties in governing the native and settler populations required authoritarian measures, predisposing later colonies to military-style settlement. Finally, as the Ards project demonstrated, some less well-known planners were beginning to see the commercial value of overseas colonies. Unfortunately, Elizabethan society was still fundamentally uncertain about the role of trade in the English economy.³³ As a result, privateering, rather than mercantilism, drove early American colonization. Richard Hakluyt's prescriptive writings on the English plantation of North America and Walter Raleigh's actual settlement attempts on the Outer Banks recognize these Irish lessons.

In 1583 Richard Hakluyt the younger, a minor official in the English administration, was sent to France to collect information on North America. In his

³³Carole Shammas, "English commercial development and American colonization 1560-1620," in *The Westward Enterprise*, 162.

1584 report to Queen Elizabeth, entitled "A particuler discourse" and subsequently referred to as *Discourse of Western Planting*, Hakluyt summarized his views on English colonization in the New World. The document is striking in both its scope and content. Never intended for publication, the treatise conveys the urgency felt in some circles regarding plantation. (At this time England was nearly a century behind the continental powers in exploitation of the Americas.) Most important, Hakluyt carefully detailed a "meanes to kepe this enterprise from overthrowe and the enterprisers from shame and dishonour."³⁴ In other words, he described, more carefully than any previous theorist, how to construct a colony without repeating the Irish debacles.

Well versed in foreign affairs, Hakluyt framed his arguments in favor of colonization to secure royal participation. Assuming that plantation would be on a grand scale, he continually emphasized the mercantile potential of America. The New World would supply England with goods she was currently purchasing from other nations. "The soyle yeldeth and may be made to yelde all the severall commodities of Europe, and of all kingdoms domynions and Territories that England tradeth withe, that by trade of marchandize cometh into this Realme."³⁵ Western planting would not, however, inflame other European powers or endanger English shipping. "The passage cutteth not nere the trade of any Prince, nor nere any of their contries or Territories and is a safe passage, and not easie to be annoyed by Prince or potentate

³⁴Hakluyt, *Discourse of Western Planting*, 72.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 118.

whatsoever."³⁶ Hakluyt stated that the English could plant North America without provoking outright Spanish retaliation while simultaneously bringing "kinge Phillippe from his highe Throne and make him equall to the Princes his neighbours."³⁷

Ironically, he later argues that the large merchant ships needed for a transatlantic trade could combat piracy and augment the royal navy in times of war. As he wrote,

the marchant will not for profitts sake use it but by shippes of great burden, so as this Realme shall have by that meane shippes of greate burden and of greate strengthe for the defence of this Realme, and for the defence of that new seate, as need shall require, and withall greate increase of perfecte seamen, which kinde of men are neither nourished in fewe daies nor in fewe yeres.³⁸

It is unclear in this instance whether the "new seate" would need immediate defending from attacks by other imperial countries or the native American population.

Regardless, colonization would provide an antidote for England's perceived high unemployment and overpopulation. It would do so, he reasoned,

By makinge of shippes and by preparinge of things for the same: By makinge of Cables and Cordage, by plantinge of vine and olive trees, and by making of wyne and oyle, by husbandrie and by thousandes off things there to be don, infinite numbers of the english nation may be sett on worke to the unburdenynge of the Realme with many that nowe lyve chardgeable to the state at home.³⁹

Thus, Hakluyt pictured the western frontier as a training ground for seamen and skilled laborers of the mother country. In the Age of Elizabeth and Francis Drake, great

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., 87.

³⁸Ibid., 119.

³⁹Ibid.

privateering ventures constituted much of the official foreign policy of England. Consequently, Hakluyt described American colonies which could serve as way-stations for English ships in their open sea war with Spanish cargo vessels. With the exception of the production of naval stores and timber, he saw the New World as a place to cultivate only exotic crops, probably because it enjoyed latitudes parallel to those of the Mediterranean. This imagined feature of North American agriculture was certainly attractive to English markets eager for commodities as delicate as wine and oil. Unlike Smith, Hakluyt felt that royal backing of future colonial enterprises was essential. Consequently, his arguments were designed to secure Elizabeth's support.

Hakluyt clearly stated his formula for successful and profitable settlement. First and foremost, in the all-out contest of late sixteenth-century colonization, he recommended speedy planting upon discovery. "For in all newe discoveries it is the chefest thinge that may be don at the begynnyng to fortifie and people the Contrie."⁴⁰ Establishment of armed forts on large navigable rivers would enable the settlement to "kepe the naturall people of the Contrye in obedience and good order,"⁴¹ defend themselves from attack, or flee. While the *Discourse* spent comparatively little time considering native relations, Hakluyt did expect the colonists to defray early plantation costs by trading immediately with the Indians, following the French model: "We are induced by late plaine examples of the Frenche, that have traficqued in those partes with great profit, to beleve that upon our plantinge wee shall as yt were defraye as well

⁴⁰Ibid., 101.

⁴¹Ibid., 100.

the first chardges as the chardges followinge by the commodities in trafficque that wee shall receave by passinge into the Inland by River."⁴² If the natives would not cooperate, "then wee are to devise of our selves howe wee may otherwise at the firste countervaile our chardges and become great gayners will or nill the naturall inhabitantes of those Regions."⁴³ In this tract Hakluyt never suggested the need, or described a way, to extirpate the Indians. Familiar with the continental powers' activities in the New World, he argued "that the Spaniardes have exercised moste outragious and more then Turkishe cruelties in all the west Indies, whereby they are every where there become moste odious unto them, whoo woulde joyne with us or any other moste willinglye to shake of their moste intollerable yoke."⁴⁴ Either the natives would voluntarily join with the English, or the newcomers would play Indian rivalries against one another, following a Spanish example. If attacked, the colonists could "ronne upon the Rivers with our shippes, pynnesses, Barkes and boates and enter into league with the petite princes their neighbours that have always lightly warres one with an other, and so entringe league nowe with the one, and then with the other wee shall purchase our owne safetie and make ourselves Lordes of the whole."⁴⁵ If Hakluyt's arguments concerning the natives seem to conflict with the ideas put forth by Smith, or appear illogical and contradictory in their own right, they should. There was

⁴²Ibid., 103.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., 92.

⁴⁵Ibid., 100.

tremendous confusion surrounding the image of the North American Indian in the English mind. One view expected the Indians to be receptive of English colonization, seeing them as unenlightened but friendly. Another view witnessed the Spanish experience and thought the natives hostile barbarians to be conquered and enslaved. Gary B. Nash argues that this duality stemmed from the England's desire to build trading networks in the New World and her recognition of the danger involved.⁴⁶ This was only partly true, however. As the Irish experience illustrated, the English were transferring to the American Indian their stereotype of the "wild" Irishman, a willing laborer and barbarous pagan.

At the end of the *Discourse* Hakluyt listed the supplies and the types of colonists needed in North America. Skilled labor, everyone from Arrowheadmakers to Waxechandlers, was of paramount importance. Hakluyt even supported the transportation of beggars and merchant debtors to North America because he felt they had good reason to work hard.⁴⁷ Primarily a commercial venture, the westward enterprise he described emphasized the establishment of mercantile society over civil society. Interestingly, one of Hakluyt's final prescriptions was to include travel literature among in cargo heading west. "That the books of the discoveries of the West Indies and the conquestes of the same be also caried to kepe men occupied from worse cogitations, and to raise their myndes to courage and highe enterprizes and to make

⁴⁶Gary B. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind," *William and Mary Quarterly* XXIX (April 1972): 205.

⁴⁷Hakluyt, 123.

them lesse careles for the better shonnyng of the common daungers in suche cases arisinge."⁴⁸ This may be attributed in part to the fascinations of the author. Hakluyt published several large collections of travel narratives from around the globe including *Divers voyages* (1582), *Principall navigations* (1589), and *Principal navigations* (1600). However, it also demonstrated the great value New World theorists placed on the lessons of past colonial enterprises.

Principall navigations chronicled the Sir Walter Raleigh's Roanoke voyages, a six-year attempt to plant an English colony in North America. On March 25, 1584, Elizabeth granted Raleigh the patent for American colonization south of Newfoundland. This monopoly enabled Raleigh to establish a privateering base in the New World from which to raid Spanish shipping. Ultimately, this purpose of the settlement determined the nature of its organization, the type of colonist recruited, and early relations with the Indians. Many of the fatal errors made by Smith in Ireland barely a decade earlier were repeated by Raleigh in Roanoke.

Like himself, the two men Raleigh selected to establish and govern his colony, Sir Richard Grenville and Colonel Ralph Lane, gained their practical military experience on Irish battlefields. As illustrated in Ards, soldier-settlers, especially those primarily interested in looking for precious metals among neighboring Indian tribes and on board Spanish ships, were of little use in building a lasting society. Thomas Harriot revealed that some of the colonists returned from Roanoke "for their misdemeanour and ill dealing in the countrey" had been "there woorthily punished." He believed that "the

⁴⁸Ibid.

cause of their ignoraunce was . . . that after golde and silver was not so soone found, as it was by them looked for, had litle or no care of any other thing but to pamper thier bellies, or of that many which had litle understanding, lesse discretion, and more tongue then was needfull or requisite."⁴⁹ The Roanoke leadership also discovered, as had Smith in Ireland, that colonists of high social rank could be quite troublesome:

Some also were of a nice bringing up, only in cities or townes, or such as never (as I may say) had seene the world before. Because there were not to be found any English cities, nor such faire houses, nor at their owne wish any of their old accustomed daintie food, nor any soft beds of downe or feathers, the countrey was to them miserable.⁵⁰

It is apparent that Lane employed the strictest methods in controlling the settler population. He even went so far as to include a jail in the small settlement's design.⁵¹ And by all indication, the colonel was proud of his colony's authoritarian regimen. In reminiscences of the 1585 expedition Lane wrote,

...bearinge the seconde place vnder Sir Richard Grinvile, where hauinge beine permitted by him to sett downe a discipline which was severely executed first at sea, and then afterwarde by me in lyke sorte continued at lande, neither at sea nor at lande we loste by sicknes aboute fowre persons of eight score.⁵²

As Lane's attitude indicates, in the eyes of Elizabethan adventurers, colonial success was tied to strong leadership and discipline. In Ireland, the royal administration typically

⁴⁹Thomas Harriot, *A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia*, in Quinn, *The First Colonists*, 48.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 49.

⁵¹Karen Kupperman, *Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony* (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 37.

⁵²Ralph Lane, "Reminiscences of the 1585 Expedition," in David Beers Quinn, ed., *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590* (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1955), 228.

blamed a lack of social control for the gradual assimilation of English settlers into Gaelic society.⁵³ It is therefore not surprising that when an astonishingly high death rate later devastated the Jamestown settlement, it was partially attributed to the mismanagement of colonial governors. Leaders in Ireland and America were expected to maintain authority and received wide latitude in the disciplinary measures they employed.

Lane's treatment of the Algonquian Indians reflected the confused approach of the English to New World natives. Although the historical record is not silent on Anglo-Indian interaction at Roanoke, the major sources, Harriot and Lane, tell somewhat conflicting stories. It appears that by the end of Lane's tenure, relations with the natives had deteriorated. While Lane recounts elaborate tales of negotiation and conspiracy, attack and retaliation,⁵⁴ according to Harriot, "some of our companie towards the ende of the yeare, shewed themselues too fierce, in slaying some of the people, in some townes, vpon causes that on our part, might easily enough haue bene borne withall: yet notwithstanding because it was on their part iustly deserued."⁵⁵ Harriot seems to imply that the English mishandled Indian relations, and that Lane misrepresented native behavior as a conspiracy, either unintentionally or purposefully. Lane may simply have been following the advice of Hakluyt that by "entringe league nowe with the one, and then with the other wee shall purchase our owne safetie and

⁵³Canny, *The Westward Enterprise*, 23.

⁵⁴Lane, in Quinn, *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590*, 275-288.

⁵⁵Harriot, in Quinn, *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590*, 381.

make ourselves Lordes of the whole." Or he could have zealously used the experience he gained suppressing the natives in Ireland. Probably he tried both methods. In the 1580s the English were still unsure how to manage indigenous populations, especially in North America.

After losing both reinforcement ships and supplies from Francis Drake in a hurricane, Lane's colony abandoned Roanoke in mid-June 1586, returning to England. John White returned the following spring with three ships and 115 settlers to recolonize the area. Significantly, White brought families, not soldier-settlers. This plantation was not intended to aid English privateers but to become agriculturally self-sufficient and to supply English markets with American products.⁵⁶ When White sailed to England for supplies in August, however, full-scale war with the Spanish fleet prevented his return to America until 1590. He found the Roanoke settlement deserted and never located the colonists he left behind. Interestingly, John White went to settle in Munster as a planter, at Newtown, Kilmore, County Cork, after 1591.⁵⁷

Seventeenth-century planners learned much about the American landscape and its inhabitants from the writings of Harriot and the drawings of White, published in Theodore de Bry's *America* in 1590.⁵⁸ As a result of the Roanoke experience, the Jamestown colony paid greater attention to the geographic location of the settlement and initially attempted plantation on a larger scale, realizing that small colonies were too

⁵⁶Kupperman, *Roanoke*, 107.

⁵⁷Quinn, *The First Colonists*, XXV.

⁵⁸Quinn, *England and the Discovery of America*, 418.

precarious. White's settlement also demonstrated the benefits of using families, rather than soldiers, as settlers. But Roanoke was not the only sixteenth-century English colony to inform the Jamestown settlement. Development of a large plantation in Ireland, nearly contemporary with the Roanoke voyages, also influenced subsequent American colonization.

In the wake of the Desmond rebellion, which lasted from 1579 to 1583, the English crown confiscated scattered tracts of depopulated land in Ireland's southwestern province of Munster. Elizabeth and her administrators, determined to prevent the return of the old order, approved the first large-scale plantation of the island. Sir Francis Walsingham, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Christopher Hatton, and William Cecil, Lord Burghley (Francis Bacon's uncle), each played a leading role in designing the plantation scheme.⁵⁹ The widely scattered escheatments were divided in seignories of 12,000, 8,000, 6,000, and 4,000 acres and granted to English undertakers for settlement (Illustration 2).⁶⁰ Unlike Thomas Smith's expedition to the Ards Peninsula in the 1570s, the Munster plantation, which began in 1584, was not organized under a joint-stock corporation. Instead, each individual undertaker provided his own capital and recruited his own tenantry. This greatly limited the flexibility of the developing colony. Whereas a company with rich non-participatory members might have used a central

⁵⁹Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland 1583-1641* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 39.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 30.




Illustration 2: Map of the Munster seignories, in Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh's *The Munster Plantation*

fund to benefit the needs of the entire plantation, as it was, investment varied widely from region to region.⁶¹ The surveying of granted lands by the various undertakers was often protracted. Quinn suggests that many hopeful settlers arriving in Munster in the mid-1580s expected to find surveyed land ready for cultivation. Disillusioned by what they encountered, many potential tenants returned to England. Quinn speculates that "one of the ports to which they could well have come was Portsmouth and we might think that perhaps from among them were recruited men and women who had turned from Munster to North America."⁶² (Like the Munster plantation, White's Roanoke colony used families, not soldiers, as settlers.) The Irish and North American enterprises were competitive, not complementary, ventures.

Regardless of the practical problem of obtaining colonists, the intention was to settle each seignory with ninety-one households, including the grantee and his family. As an inducement to plant, the undertakers were not charged full rent and could export goods without paying custom duties for seven years. In addition to holding the undertakers individually responsible for the proper defense of their lands, the patents prescribed precisely the kind tenant to be planted on each seignory: six freeholders receiving 300 acres each, six farmers with 400 acres each, forty-two copyholders receiving 100 acres each, and thirty-six undertenants receiving anywhere from 10 to 50 acres.⁶³

⁶¹Ibid., 120.

⁶²David Beers Quinn, *Set Fair for Roanoke: Voyages and Colonies, 1584-1606* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 257.

⁶³Ibid., 31.

Even more interesting, however, were the ethnic requirements for settling granted lands. According to the 1586 plantation articles, all the initial planters had to be English born. Nevertheless, a poorly worded amendment to the articles allowed the tenants and purchasers of granted lands to be of Old English descent.

None of the English people to be there planted shall make any estate to any of the mere Irish not descended of an English name and ancestor...That the heads of every family shall be born of English parents, and the female inheritable to any the same lands shall marry with none but with persons of English parents or with such as descend of the first patentees. And that none of the mere Irish as aforesaid shall be maintained or permitted in any family there.⁶⁴

Though prohibited from leaseholding, the Irish usually settled illegally upon the land as tenants and laborers, unmolested by the government. Removal of the Irish from the landscape remained a fiction.

One special problem of the Munster plantation concerned the insecurity of land titles. How much of the Earl's confiscated lands actually belonged to him and how much belonged to freeholders? And what exactly constituted ownership under the Irish system? Disputes surrounding the Desmond escheatment pitted the natives against the newcomers, with the Irish chieftains frequently emerging victorious. Rough estimates indicate that by 1611 approximately one-third of the planted lands were returned to the local inhabitants.⁶⁵

Notably absent from the Munster scheme were building requirements for the grantees. The crown maintained its interest in constructing fortified towns for the

⁶⁴Ibid., 34.

⁶⁵Ibid., 106.

defense of the settlement, probably structures along the model proposed by Smith. However, Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh argues that the planners omitted this mandate from the articles so as not to overburden the undertakers.⁶⁶ Besides, each seignory of the confiscated lands usually contained several castles, garrisons, or other existing fortified domestic buildings. Few New English planters constructed new dwellings during the early stages of the settlement.⁶⁷ This is not to say that large-scale building failed to accompany English plantation in Munster, simply that it occurred after 1600.

Throughout the sixteenth century, Elizabethan planters wrestled with the problem of managing the native Irish population. As we have seen, the English saw everything Gaelic as culturally inferior, and were quite capable of extirpating the natives if necessary. While plantations were intended to establish civility in the midst of barbarity, Irish history demonstrated the danger of English hibernicization. Thus, the planners perceived Irish culture as directly threatening English survival. Indeed, even when the Irish made concessions, such as adopting the English language, it was seen as a simple device to manipulate and exploit the settler community.⁶⁸ Regardless of the fears of the planners, segregation of settlers from the native population did not occur in colonial Ireland. All social levels regularly interacted before 1641.⁶⁹

⁶⁶Ibid., 38.

⁶⁷Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, "The English Presence in Early Seventeenth Century Munster," in *Natives and Newcomers: Essays on the Making of Irish Colonial Society 1534-1641*, ed. Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie, (Irish Academic Press, 1986), 181.

⁶⁸Nicholas Canny, *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World 1560-1800* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 40.

⁶⁹Ibid.

The unsuitable nature of the colonists migrating to Ireland also exacerbated the problem of plantation discipline. Although little is actually known about the new tenants in Ireland,⁷⁰ it may be assumed from the defensive requirements placed on the undertakers that discharged soldiers formed a significant portion of the settlement. Unwilling to work, generally insubordinate, and prone to desertion, these soldiers were not interested in building a civil society. Most were single men, and they were likely to assimilate into Irish society through marriage, even though it was legally prohibited.⁷¹ Some of the anti-Irish propaganda was probably intended to discourage soldier-settler interaction with the natives. Aware of the less-than-ideal colonists a frontier plantation attracted, the English planters expected the right to use martial law to maintain social control. Smith claimed this right in Ards, as did Lane in Roanoke, and the New English in Munster.

In spite of the undertakers' efforts, a native uprising disrupted the first plantation of Munster in 1598. The scattered settlement pattern aided the rebels. Sir George Carew, arriving in Ireland in 1600, led crown forces in the bloody recapturing of seized plantation lands. Anxious to secure these lands, the government encouraged, but did not enforce, the re-establishment of the colony. Gradually, the plantation revived and continued to grow steadily until the island-wide rebellion in 1641. However, the 1609 founding of an Ulster plantation in the north diverted royal attention from a second plantation in Munster.

⁷⁰Canny, *The Westward Enterprise*, 23.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 23-24.

The poet Edmund Spenser was more a social critic than an Elizabethan colonial theorist or adventurer. However, he did receive a land grant of over 3,000 acres in the late sixteenth-century Munster colonization scheme,⁷² buying the right to call himself a planter. *A View of the State of Ireland*, which he wrote in 1596, was primarily a commentary on the baseness of Irish society and the Irish people. But more than this, it was a treatise on the methods for transmitting English social practices and values to culturally inferior populations. In Spenser's writing we see a synthesis of the ideas espoused by Smith and Hakluyt.

Written as a dialogue between Eudoxus and Irenaeus, the *View* played once again with the Roman colonial metaphor. Like Smith, Spenser believed that "the English were, at first, as stoute and warlike a people as ever the Irish, and yet you see are now brought unto that civility, that no nation in the world excelleth them in all goodly coversation, and all the studies of knowledge and humanitie."⁷³ Now the center of civilization with all the rights and responsibilities of ancient Rome, England could export civility. Specifically, he recognized three categories of Irish "evil" that needed correction. First, traditional Gaelic law, or Brehon law, was naturally antithetical to civility. "It is a rule of right unwritten, but delivered by tradition from one to another, in which oftentimes there appeareth great shew of equity, in determining the right betweene party and party, but in many things repugning quite both to Gods law, and

⁷²MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 291.

⁷³Spenser, *View*, 17-18.

mans."⁷⁴ Spenser seemed to believe that the situation in Ireland had degenerated over time and that things were not always this desperate. Reinforcing this notion was Spenser's recognition of the string of incomplete and failed conquests in Ireland since the twelfth century and the continuous hibernicization of the Old English.

Second, Spenser believed that Gaelic customs--such as pasturage (transhumance), manner of dress (wearing mantles), and a strong bardic tradition--typified barbarous behavior. While the English fundamentally misunderstood the basis of Irish social institutions and cultural traditions, these perceptions are important, for they alone shaped Spenser's opinions on plantation.

Finally, Spenser believed that the Irish had no real understanding of religion, regardless of what they purported. "They be all Papists by their profession, but in the same so blindly and brutishly informed, (for the most part) that not one amongst a hundred knoweth any ground of religion, or any article of his faith."⁷⁵ In one sense, he became a mouthpiece for the New English theories of Irish cultural inferiority and paganism. Yet the synthesis of these ideas was distinctly Spenser's own.

He proposed to correct Irish abuses not by "lawes and ordinances" but rather "by the sword; for all these evils must first be cut away by a strong hand, before any good can bee planted, like as the corrupt braunches and unwholesome boughs are first to bee pruned, and the foule mosse cleansed and scraped away, before the tree can bring forth

⁷⁴Ibid., 7.

⁷⁵Ibid., 137.

any good fruite."⁷⁶ Only after scraping Ireland clean, or extirpating significant proportions of the Gaelic population and its leadership, could England build a new society. Echoing the wisdom of Hakluyt, Spenser promoted royal leadership of English colonial adventurers. "By the sword I mean the royall power of the Prince, which ought to stretch it selfe forth in the chieftest strength to redressing and cutting off those evils, which I before blamed, and not of the people which are evill."⁷⁷ He argued that it was useless to give barbarians legal status and attempt to persuade them to adopt civil ways.⁷⁸ "For Lawes ought to be fashioned unto the manners and condition of the people to whom they are meant, and not to be imposed upon them according to the simple rule of right, for then (as I said) in stead of good they may work ill, and pervert iustice to extreame iniustice."⁷⁹ Since building a legal system on the manners and conditions of the people was obviously not possible in uncivilized Ireland, "sithence wee cannot now apply lawes fit to the people, as in the first institutions of common-wealths it ought to bee, we will apply the people, and fit them unto the lawes, as it most conveniently may bee."⁸⁰ Calling for the total suppression of the Irish race, Spenser easily and methodically denied legal existence to a people recognized as royal subjects of

⁷⁶Ibid., 152.

⁷⁷Ibid., 153.

⁷⁸This was most likely an indictment of the Old English position on the reformation of Gaelic Ireland. It further demonstrated the ascendance of New English authority in Ireland and the eclipse of Old English political power.

⁷⁹Spenser, *View*, 17.

⁸⁰Ibid., 222-223.

the kingdom of Ireland since 1541.

The implications of this argument for North American Indians were tremendous. Spencer believed that a barbarous, pagan, or uncivilized (read unchristian) people can *never* be peacefully integrated into English society. They must be forcibly subjugated and then regulated by English law. Spencer was certainly on the radical fringe in suggesting virtual extirpation of the native population. However, his extremist ideas were not inconsistent with the behavior of Essex and Gilbert during the Tudor rebellions in Ireland, or with the later actions of colonists after the 1622 Indian rising in Virginia.

In the *View*, Spenser detailed his proposal for the complete, simultaneous plantation of Ireland. For example, he wrote, "moreover at every of these forts, I would have the seate of a towne layde forth and encompassed, in the which I would wish that there should inhabitants of all sortes, as merchants, artificers, and husbandmen, bee placed, to whom there should charters and fraunchises be graunted to incorporate them."⁸¹ However, not a planner himself, Spenser merely repeated the now-standard methods for colonization in a rebellious or hostile environment, including confiscation of lands, private sponsorship, diversity of labor, and construction of garrisoned towns. Implicit in his discourse was an approval of the plantations scheme currently in progress in Munster.

By the close of the sixteenth century, English colonial experimentation in Ireland and America revealed several shared trends and problems. Adventurers were now trying to found agriculture-based plantations. Feeling threatened after disastrous

⁸¹Ibid., 202.

encounters with the natives, the English employed similar language in stereotyping "wild" Irishmen and Indian "savages." Colonial planners nominally attempted to segregate settler and native populations, while theories governing the subjugation and reformation of indigenous cultures prospered. As Smith and Hakluyt had indicated, the type of settler recruited was of paramount importance. And finally, sponsors began to see the precarious nature of private and corporate colonies, and the advantages of royal participation. The Jamestown and Ulster settlements were the final stages of early English colonial experimentation in the Atlantic. The development of these colonies was not a linear methodological progression from previous Irish and American plantations, however. Rather, the transference of settlement techniques from one region to another continued through the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

CHAPTER III

"LIBERTINES OUT OF THE EYE OF THE MAGISTRATE"

By the time the Virginia settlers reached the shores of Cape Henry in April 1607, colonial planners in England could celebrate a half century of failed plantation attempts in Ireland and America. Once the English theoretically justified the imperial colonization of lands populated by culturally inferior peoples, they clung to the traditional plantation methods initially outlined by the Richard Hakluyts more than two decades earlier. Not until the disastrous first years at Jamestown did New World adventurers take to heart lessons learned from both the early Irish colonization efforts and the experiments at Roanoke.

Historian Carole Shammas argues that the first part of the seventeenth century witnessed the commercializing of English colonization, as England (like other western European nations) began to integrate New World economies with those of the mother country.⁸² She believes that with the appreciation of three factors in the early 1600s, "the term 'colony' came to imply a highly market-oriented overseas settlement": first, the profitability of a world-wide carrying trade; second, the variety and volume of goods consumers would learn to need; and third, the link between commerce and national power.⁸³ Shammas correctly connects this large-scale merchant sponsorship of colonies

⁸²Shammas, "English commercial development and American colonization 1560-1620," in *The Westward Enterprise*, 151-174.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 174.

in North America with the shift from Elizabethan to Jacobean-style plantation. Her argument is not limited to the New World, however. The first example of a commercially-oriented English colony was Thomas Smith's plantation in Ireland. The increasingly successful Jamestown and Ulster plantations, which followed the Ards project, demonstrate in both America and Ireland the transition in English colonial methodology from reliance on closed agrarian societies to integrated commercial communities.

Unlike the Munster plantation, a joint-stock company organized and sponsored the Jamestown colony. In 1606, the Virginia Company of London received a patent from King James to colonize southern Virginia. He appointed two councils to oversee the enterprise, one in England and one in the colony. The Council of Virginia elected its own president to supervise operations. In 1609, the king granted a revised charter, relinquishing control over the plantation's government. Subsequently, the Council in England appointed a governor to administer the colony with the non-binding advice of the councilors in Virginia. The basic plan remained the same under both charters (although the plantation's organization was far more authoritarian under the second charter). The adventurers intended indentured colonists in Virginia to work together on behalf of the Company's investors at whatever might bring the greatest profit. This was in sharp contrast to the Munster enterprise in which the undertakers and tenants worked individually for personal gain. Ideally, the Virginia colony would supply England with the materials she currently purchased from foreign markets. The adventurers' pre-plantation arrangements closely followed the younger Richard

Hakluyt's advice on the colonization of foreign lands described in his *Discourse of Western Planting*. Initially, the organization of the Virginia enterprise looked much more like Smith's expedition to the Ards Peninsula than the Munster plantation. Both Jamestown and Ards were intended as concentrated settlements oriented towards commercial activities. The Munster seignories, on the other hand, were erected on widely scattered escheatments and primarily agrarian in nature. Gradually, however, the Virginia colony came to look like the individualized, dispersed settlements in Munster.

The horror stories of Jamestown's first decades are well known and need not be retold here. Not one of the English plantations in Ireland experienced any comparable destruction of human life, either native or settler. Indeed, the unprecedented mortality rate in early seventeenth-century Virginia is the prime distinguishing factor between English colonization attempts in Ireland and America. News of Jamestown's heavy death toll in England forced the Company to adopt more liberal land policies in order to attract settlers. Thus, the Company developed a new program of land distribution to aid recruitment. Any colonist who arrived before the spring of 1616 received one hundred acres at the end of their indenture. Investors got an extra one hundred acres for every share they owned in the Company. Those arriving after 1616, or paying the transportation fee of another, received a fifty-acre grant known as a "headright."⁸⁴ As in Munster, this land was nominally free from taxation except for the "quitrent" of one

⁸⁴Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery-American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), 94.

shilling a year for each fifty acres granted. Later, in order to offset taxation, the Company began granting land in sizable portions to government officers and those who would organize large-scale settlements. Sir Edward Sandys encouraged the founding of subcorporations, known as "particular plantations," to hasten settlement. Investors received one hundred acres per share of stock in the company plus an additional fifty acres for each tenant recruited. Eventually, these particular plantations formed small communities within the larger colony.⁸⁵ The size of the grants in the colony are most important. The Virginia governor received 3,000 acres and 100 tenants, the treasurer and marshal each received 1,500 acres with 50 tenants, while the vice admiral received 300 acres and 12 tenants.⁸⁶ Such large grants illustrated the increased dispersion of planters along the rivers feeding the Chesapeake Bay.

Unlike in Ireland, land once occupied in Virginia was seldom returned to the Chesapeake natives. Although the abundance of land in Virginia rendered property titles reasonably secure, the dissolution of the Virginia Company in 1624 jeopardized the legal status of titles on certain properties, especially a number of the particular plantations, such as Martin's Hundred.⁸⁷ On January 20, 1625, after the transfer of power from the Corporation to the crown, Governor Sir Francis Wyatt stopped issuing land patents until legal doubts could be resolved.⁸⁸ There was some fear that Virginia

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., 97.

⁸⁷Ivor Noel Hume, *Martin's Hundred* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 66-67.

⁸⁸Jon Kukla, *Political Institutions in Virginia, 1619-1660* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 68.

would be remodeled after Ireland, with planters treated as tenants. According to Jon Kukla, "the presense of Lords Chic[h]ester, Carew, and Grandison on the Mandeville Commission, which had been established on 15 July 1624 'for settling a Government in Virginia,' suggested that Irish policies might be adapted to Virginia under royal rule."⁸⁹ Although such a plan was never implemented, Virginia land titles remained uncertain until Wyatt, bearing royal instructions, confirmed the patents in 1639.⁹⁰

Information concerning the nature and origins of buildings constructed at Jamestown is sketchy. By the seventeenth century, fortified garrisons were standard features of colonial outposts. In use by the English since the Leix-Offaly experiment, they were recommended by both Smith and Hakluyt. Consequently, it is not surprising that as the first order of business after planting the Council called for all hands to assist in constructing community buildings.

It Were Necessary that all Your Carpenters and Other such like Workmen about building Do first build Your Storehouse and those Other Rooms of Publick and necessary Use before any house be set up for any private person and though the Workman may belong to any private persons yet Let them all Work together first for the Company and then for private men.⁹¹

They also prescribed a traditional rectangular shape for the garrison: "And Seeing order is at the same price with Confusion it shall be adviceably done to Set your houses Even and by a line that You[r] Streets may have a Good breadth & be carried Square

⁸⁹Kukla, 69. Lord Chichester was Lord Deputy in Ireland from 1604 to 1615. Lord Grandison was Lord Deputy in Ireland from 1616-1622.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 96-97.

⁹¹Philip L. Barbour, ed., *The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606-1609*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1969), I, 53.

about your market place."⁹² The planters seemed to disregard this instruction.

Captain George Percy, a leader in the colony who assisted in building the fort, described it as "triangle-wise, having three bulwarkes at every corner like a half-moon, and four or five pieces of artillery mounted in them."⁹³ According to another contemporary, the fort, erected

on the North side of the River, is cast almost into the forme of a Triangle, and so Pallizadoed. The south side next the River (howbein extended in a line, or Curtaine six score foote more in length, then the other two, by reason the advantage of the ground doth so require) contains one hundred and forty yeards: the West and East sides a hundred onely.⁹⁴

Covering approximately half an acre, the garrison contained the colony's market as well as individual accommodations. "To every side, a proportioned distance from the Pallisado, is a settled street of houses, that runs along, so each line of the Angle hath his streete. In the middest is a market place, a Store house, and a Corps du guard, as likewise a pretty Chappell."⁹⁵ Without a surviving plan, historians relied on these literary descriptions to construct a conjectural view of the Jamestown Fort (Illustration 3). Now submerged under water, the site cannot be excavated.⁹⁶

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³George Percy, *Observations Gathered out of "A Discourse of the Plantation of the Southern Colony in Virginia by the English, 1606"* David Beers Quinn, ed. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967), 22.

⁹⁴William Strachey, quoted in John W. Repts, *Tidewater Towns: City Planning in Colonial Virginia and Maryland* (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1972), 38.

⁹⁵Strachey, quoted in Cary Carson, "Settlement Patterns and Vernacular Architecture in Seventeenth-Century Tidewater Virginia" (Masters' Thesis, University of Delaware, 1969), 47.

⁹⁶Allen Mardis, Jr., "Visions of James Fort," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 97 4 (October 1989): 498.




Illustration 3: **Conjectural View of Jamestown, Virginia, 1607, in John W. Reps'**
Tidewater Towns

There are several possible explanations for the unusual shape of the fort. Since the mid-sixteenth century, the English built walled garrisons in the Irish countryside as bases from which to control the native population. A 1601 plan of Armagh in Northern Ireland showed a fort called Blackwater that strongly resembled the Jamestown structure (Illustration 4). Like the Virginia fort, this enclosure was a modified triangle with bastioned corners. Architectural historian John Reps believes that it is conceivable that this Irish fortification served as a model for the stockaded James Fort.⁹⁷

Latecomers to colonization, the English could also follow European models of settlement fortifications in the New World. The Spanish constructed a triangular fort in St. Augustine which Sir Francis Drake certainly observed during his attack on the colony. The French Huguenots built a triangular palisade on the Florida coast in the summer of 1564 (Illustration 5). Hakluyt obtained the drawings of Fort Caroline in 1588 and they were published in 1591.⁹⁸ Each fort could have served as a model for the English at Jamestown.

Although Jamestown's shape was unusual from an English standpoint, the colonists were not completely adverse to building irregularly shaped structures, as Ralph Lane's forts in Puerto Rico and Roanoke Island demonstrated (Illustrations 6,7, and 8). Though not discovered in the excavation, the small size of Fort Raleigh suggested the situation of a town nearby, as later occurred in Jamestown.⁹⁹ One last possibility, the

⁹⁷Reps, 12.

⁹⁸Ibid., 36.

⁹⁹Ibid., 27.



Illustration 4: Plan of Armagh and the Fort at Blackwater, Northern Ireland ca. 1601, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*







Illustration 5: View of Fort Caroline, Florida, 1564, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*



*Conjectural Plan of Fort Raleigh,
North Carolina, in 1585*



Plan of Ralph Lane's Fort in Puerto Rico: 1585



Conjectural View of Fort Raleigh, North Carolina, in 1585

Illustration 6: Plan of Ralph Lane's Fort in Puerto Rico, 1585, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*

Illustration 7: Conjectural Plan of Fort Raleigh, North Carolina, 1585, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*

Illustration 8: Conjectural View of Fort Raleigh, North Carolina, 1585, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*

triangular shape may have been used simply because it was an easy way to enclosed a defensive space quickly and economically.

While the origins of the shape of James Fort remain uncertain, the structure's purpose was clear. A highly charged atmosphere characterized Anglo-Indian relations in the early decades of plantation. Although usually dependent on the natives for food, the English frequently attacked, tortured, and slaughtered their benefactors. One example of the colonists' behavior sufficiently illustrates the point. At Kecoughtan, Sir Thomas Gates, a recent arrival in the colony and part of the new leadership instituted after the second charter, enticed the Indians with music and dancing only to fall upon them, "putt fyve to the sworde wounded many others some of them beinge after fownde in the woods with Sutche extreordinary Lardge and mortall wownds that itt seemed strange they Cold flye so far."¹⁰⁰ Historians have advanced a variety of reasons for the colonists' behavior, including fear and laziness, diffusion of authority, mismanagement of the colony, the communal organization of labor, and the character of the immigrants.¹⁰¹ While these explanations are all at least partially correct, the experience in Ireland also influenced English actions in Virginia. The importance of this behavioral pattern is often overlooked by modern scholars.

Many of Virginia's leaders, such as Gates and Sir Thomas Dale, were fresh from Irish battlefields. Like Gilbert, Essex, and Lane a generation before, they were

¹⁰⁰George Percy, "A Trewe Relacyon of the Procedeinges and Occurrentes of Momente," *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, III (1922), 270.

¹⁰¹Morgan, 78-91.

accustomed to using lethal force to control the native population and martial law to control their followers. As in Ireland, the American adventurers expected the right to use military discipline to control the settlers. Technically, the 1609 charter, like the commissions of the leadership, permitted the exercise of martial law only "in cases of Rebellion and Mutenie." However, these same documents also invited colonial governors to use the extraordinary powers more broadly.¹⁰² As De La Warr's instructions read,

We holde yt requisite that yor Lo[rdshi]p in causes of Civill Justice proceede rather as a Counsellor then as a Judge that is to saie rather upon the right and equitie of the thinge in damaunde then upon the nicenes and letter of the lawe, which perplexeth in this tender body rather then dispatcheth Causes. Soe that a Sumary and arbitrary way of Justice [will be] mingled with discreet formes of Magistracy as shall in your discretion seeme aptest for your Lo[rdshi]p to exercise in that place.¹⁰³

Given the hostile environment, background of the leaders, and nature of the settlers, the institution of permanent martial law seemed inevitable. The most famous example of the Company's attempt to regulate colonial behavior was the drafting of the *Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall* in 1611. In addition to proscribing certain activities, the code forbade settler interaction with the Indians. The new leadership obviously disapproved of Captain John Smith's relations with the natives, his willingness to adopt their battle tactics and to send his men to live in their camps (summer of 1609), for

¹⁰²Rutman, Darrett Bruce, *The Old Dominion* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1964), 16-17.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 17.

example.¹⁰⁴ The frequency with which men attempted to flee to the Indians certainly conjured up memories of English hibernization in Ireland. This threatened the basic survival of the colony. Thus, under the *Lawes*, degeneracy, known in America as "going native," was punishable by death.

In the 1610s and 1620s, when Virginians fanned out along the rivers to grow tobacco, social control became almost impossible. The settlers "planted dispersedlie in small families, far from neighbours . . . covetous of large possessions (larger than 100 tymes their number were able to cultivate) . . . like libertines out of the eye of the magistrate."¹⁰⁵ As in Ireland, the natives staged a massive uprising to drive out their oppressors. On March 22, 1622, the Powhatans rose in rebellion, killing 347 of the 1,240 colonists.¹⁰⁶ Predictably, the scattered settlement pattern of the colonial Chesapeake contributed largely to the plantation's losses.

Some historians believe that the English, following the Irish example, used rebellion as a excuse for exterminating the Indians and seizing their lands.¹⁰⁷ When instructed to obey the rules of justice in dealing with the natives, the governor and his council replied, "wee hold nothingse injuste, that may tend to their ruine."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴James Axtell, *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 201 and 203.

¹⁰⁵George Sandys, quoted in Canny, *The Westward Enterprise*, 40.

¹⁰⁶Axtell, 215.

¹⁰⁷Bernard W. Sheehan, *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 175-177.

¹⁰⁸Morgan, 100.

J. Frederick Fausz argues instead that this situation was quite reversed. Whereas administrators in London could quickly and easily change their opinions about the Indians upon hearing of the rising, the same was not true for Virginia colonists. According to Fausz, those settlers nearest the rebellion launched limited, not lethal raids on Indian cornfields, not the Powhatans themselves. In addition, they strengthened their commercial relationships with other neighboring Indians.¹⁰⁹ While the importance of these interethnic trading alliances should not be disregarded, even Fausz admits that the "innovative experiments in intercultural cooperation succeeded only in promoting the intense competition that aborted the beaver boom and ultimately encouraged what they initially deferred-- the emergence of a mature English tobacco coast inimical to Indian trappers, colonial traders, and beavers alike."¹¹⁰ Eventually, Virginians successfully established the separate societies only dreamed about in Ireland.

Throughout the sixteenth century, Ulster remained more distinctively Gaelic than any other province in Ireland. Although technically subjects of the English monarch, the region's principal Irish families, the O'Neills of Tyrone, the O'Donnells of Donegal, the Maguires of Fermanagh, and the Scottish Macdonnells, constantly vied with each

¹⁰⁹J. Frederick Fausz, "The Invasion of Virginia: Indians, Colonialism, and the Conquest of Cant: A Review Essay on Anglo-Indian Relations in the Chesapeake," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 95 2 (April 1987): 149.

¹¹⁰J. Frederick Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds: Anglo-Indian Interest Groups and the Development of the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake," in Lois Green Carr, Philip D. Morgan and Jean B. Russo, *Colonial Chesapeake Society* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1988), 47-98.

other for power and influence. In attempting to stabilize the situation and institute its own authority, the Dublin administration played the Gaelic rivals against one another. The Elizabethans' war with the Irish chieftains ended in 1603 with the death of the Queen and the defeat and submission of O'Neill and O'Donnell. The 1607 "Flight of the Earls" to Europe resulted in the extralegal confiscation of the six counties of Armagh, Cavan, Coleraine, Donegal, Fermanagh, and Tyrone (Illustration 9). James I, sovereign in both England and Scotland, supported plans for the plantation of Ulster as a way to solve simultaneously many of England's domestic problems. A settlement would stabilize the most uncontrollable part of Ireland, serve as an inexpensive source of land for grants to royal soldiers and administrators, and reduce England's population surplus. An official scheme for plantation emerged by 1608.¹¹¹

The plan for settling Ulster demonstrated that the English had finally learned from the plantation experiences in southern Ireland and North America. This time they used a combination of private sponsorship and public administration to organize the colony. The scheme evolved under the direction of King James and his leading ministers, the Lord Deputy, the Attorney-General, and the Chief Justice. There were three classes of grantees: English and Scottish undertakers, servitors (English crown servants in the kingdom of Ireland), and Irish freeholders.¹¹² An important example of the transference of methodology from America to Ireland occurred in 1610 when a

¹¹¹Philip S. Robinson, *The Plantation of Ulster: British Settlement in an Irish Landscape, 1600-1670* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984), 1-8.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 60-63.




Illustration 9: Map of the Ulster escheatment, in Gilbert Camblin's *The Town in Ulster*

group of London merchants founded "The Society of the Governor and Assistants, London, of the New Plantation in Ulster, within the Realm of Ireland," a joint-stock corporation modeled on the Virginia Company of London.¹¹³ Later known simply as the Irish Society, the Company developed the towns of Derry and Coleraine in Ulster. Shown in Illustration 10 is a plan of Londonderry in 1622, as it was envisioned in 1611.¹¹⁴

The Irish lands intended for plantation consisted of 162,500 acres granted to English and Scottish undertakers and 38,520 acres granted to individual London companies, such as the Drapers and Fishmongers. Each undertaker received a "proportion" of land between 1,000 and 3,000 acres. Within three years they had to plant twenty-four men, representing ten families, for every 1,000 acres granted. As in other colonies, the adventurers initially enjoyed freedom from both rents and tariffs.¹¹⁵

The building requirements in Ulster, more extensive than in any previous plantation, were based on the erection of defensive structures called "bawns." Derived from the Irish word *badhun*, meaning cattle fort, the English bawn was a walled courtyard usually constructed of stone, but sometimes of brick, clay, timber, or wattle and daub. It was designed to protect the undertaker, his family, and his property in

¹¹³Ibid., 80.

¹¹⁴Reps, 15.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 63.




Illustration 10: Plan of Londonderry, Northern Ireland ca. 1622, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*

the event of native attack.¹¹⁶ The "Plan for Plantation" required, within three years, grantees of 2,000 acres to erect a stone house and bawn; 1,500 acres, a stone or brick house and bawn; 1,000 acres, a bawn.¹¹⁷ Sir Thomas Phillips' sketches of the bawns built by the Drapers at Moneymore and the Fishmongers at Ballykelly are two good examples of the types of fortifications envisioned by the English (Illustrations 11 and 12). The fortified Ulster houses could be either freestanding, as with the Fishmongers' bawn, or part of a wall surrounding the courtyard, as with the Drapers' bawn. In his recent article, Robert St. George attached great significance to the planters' use of bawn-type fortifications. "From an English point of view, a strategy of concentric-household and linear-town defense was also necessary because the Irish were 'uncivilized' savages...bent on dethroning the Stuart king."¹¹⁸ Perhaps the Virginia planters, when confronted with the Chesapeake's "uncivilized savages," used the 1601 Irish fort at Blackwater as a model and built a linear town adjacent to the bawn-like defensive structure of James Fort (Illustration 13).

The "Plan of Plantation" gave formal legal status and limited freeholding rights to Irish farmers, and initially many Irish natives, unlike their American counterparts, were willing to work for the newcomers. Assimilation occurred gradually. The constant shortage of British tenants in the seventeenth century made the native farmer indispensable. Economic necessity forced the New English in Ulster to make yet another

¹¹⁶Robert Blair St. George, "Bawns and Beliefs: Architecture, Commerce, and Conversion in Early New England," *Winterthur Portfolio* XXV (1990): 242.

¹¹⁷Robinson, 63.

¹¹⁸St. George, 259.




Illustration 13: Conjectural View of Jamestown, Virginia, 1614, in John W. Reps' *Tidewater Towns*

cultural distinction, this time between the Irish worker and the "kerne in the woods."

The following excerpt is from the Ironmongers' Company records in 1615:

There are yett Irish out in rebellion in thier wooddes and some tymes light upon passengers and Robb them and somtymes light into the houses and doo many villanyes, the last weeke they tooke an Irish man as he was keeping cattell in the woodes upon the Mercers proporcon, and hanged him wth a with in a tree, and tis thought for no other cause but that his Mr being an Irishman had conformed himself and came too the Church.¹¹⁹

Under this new classification system, the undertakers could disparage traditional Irish customs and still profit from native labor. This binary view of the Irish natives paralleled the English beliefs about the American Indians.¹²⁰ Contemporary Gaelic poetry suggested that some segments of Irish society accepted the New English cultural distinctions, but reached opposite conclusions. For example, the messages of one poet's story was that the Irish gentry were failing to perform their traditional duties as cultural gatekeepers.¹²¹ As the competition for labor increased, the local peasant's dependency on his Irish overlord decreased, threatening the Gaelic social order. Although the Irish tenantry initially had the most to gain from the plantation, both their opportunity to own land and their social status gradually eroded up to the general rebellion in 1641.¹²²

Contemporaries regarded both the Munster and Virginia colonies as almost

¹¹⁹Robinson, 189.

¹²⁰This comparison is especially useful during the period of trading partnerships between the settlers and their non-Powhatan neighbors.

¹²¹Nicholas P. Canny, *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World 1560-1800* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 44.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 190.

complete failures in their first twenty years of settlement. They saw Ulster as more successful, not because of the plantation itself (1610-1625), but because of the massive influx of British migrants over the seventeenth century. The tables below list the population statistics for each plantation. Although they do not explain how and why the colonies grew, they do indicate the general strength of each settlement.

MUNSTER¹²³

YEAR	EST. ENGLISH POPULATION
1598	4,000
1611	5,000
1622	14,000
1641	22,000

Although the Munster plantation grew steadily in the years between the 1598 and 1641 rebellions, the scale of immigration to southern Ireland never equalled the massive migration of English and Scottish settlers to Ulster.

VIRGINIA¹²⁴

YEAR	EST. ENGLISH POPULATION
1622	1,240
1625	1,300
1629	2,600
1632	3,200
1634	5,200
1640	8,100

¹²³MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 118.

¹²⁴Morgan, 404.

Extremely high mortality rates plagued the Virginia colony's early decades. After the 1622 rising, which destroyed more than a quarter of the English population, the plantation increased gradually, mostly through immigration and not natural increase.

ULSTER¹²⁵

YEAR	EST. BRITISH POPULATION
1622	25,000-35,000
YEAR	EST. BRITISH MALE POPULATION
1611	971-1,290
1613	1,991-2,238
1619	6,102-6,323
1622	5,942-6,402
1630	6,555-6,589

Population comparisons of the Ulster plantation with the other colonies are more difficult because the available statistics usually referred only to the male population. As early as 1622, however, Ulster was far larger than either the Virginia or Munster settlements. As in the New World, early population growth stemmed from migration, not natural increase.

There seems to be a rough correlation in the grant sizes at both the top and bottom of the social ladder. Undertakers of full seignories (12,000 acres) in Munster had approximately 3,600 acres at their disposal after distributing the required number of freeholds. Virginia's governor, the highest official in the colony, received 3,000 acres, while the treasurer and marshal each got 1,500 acres. In Ulster, the proportions

¹²⁵Robinson, 106-107, 223.

ranged from 3,000 to 1,000 acres. The average grant size per tenant, on the other hand, appeared to be between 50 and 100 acres of land. The Munster undertaker could grant his seventy-eight undertenants between 10 and 100 acres. In Virginia, a headright equalled fifty acres, and in Ulster ten families were to be settled on every 1,000 acres of land. It must be emphasized that these were theoretical land distributions, not indications of actual settlement patterns. However, the comparisons do indicate some correlation in land ownership of the highest and lowest members of each colony.

The fundamental question surrounding the Irish plantation experience's impact on early American colonization concerns the struggle between inheritance and environment. In other words, to what extent was persistence of culture the dominant factor governing settler behavior in the Chesapeake? Through the first quarter of the seventeenth century, shared colonial problems and similar plantation methodologies make Irish-American comparisons highly instructive. After 1625, however, economic and demographic factors unique to each region drove change. Demands of the tobacco cash crop most influenced subsequent social organization in Virginia. In Ulster, the massive internal natural migration¹²⁶ of Scots into the region after completion of the official plantation largely determined the character of northern Ireland. In addition, factors such as distance from London and limits on the availability of land affected colonial development differently. Unlike in Ireland, the size of the native population in the Chesapeake decreased over time. Finally, the Cromwellian Settlement of the 1650s

¹²⁶Karl S. Bottigheimer, "Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Westward Enterprise 1536-1660," *The Westward Enterprise*, 57.

was shaped largely by domestic and European considerations, not colonial patterns in the Atlantic.

CONCLUSION

Even more than Spenser's *View*, Francis Bacon's brief essay *Of Plantations*, published in 1625, is an excellent example of the convergence of the once disparate elements of plantation theory in the minds of Englishmen. Written after the founding of both the Jamestown and Ulster colonies in the seventeenth century, the treatise summarized the practical lessons learned over the last sixty years. It also neatly summarizes the main themes of this essay.

Bacon began with *Coloniae eminent inter antiqua et heroica opera*, "plantations are amongst ancient, primitive, and heroical works."¹²⁷ Although he invoked the Roman analogy, Bacon did not go beyond a mere mention of the classical roots of English colonialism. More sure of themselves after an apprenticeship in Ireland, English planters dropped the Roman precedent argument. While Thomas Smith's justifications were still valid, they were no longer necessary. Concerning the administration of a colony, Bacon cautioned against the expectation of a "hasty drawing of profit in the first years," for "planting of countries is like planting of woods," it takes time.¹²⁸ Like Hakluyt, he stressed the importance of colonial self-sufficiency in the growing of food to defray plantation costs, downplayed the hope of discovering precious

¹²⁷Bacon, 457.

¹²⁸Bacon, 457.

minerals, and emphasized instead the natural wealth of the environment.

In a country of plantation, first look about what kind of victual the country yeilds of itself to hand. . . . Then consider what victuals or esculent things there are, which grow speedily, and within the year. . . . But moil not too much under ground; for the hope of mines is very uncertain and useth to make the planters lazy in other things.¹²⁹

Speaking specifically of Virginia Bacon mentioned growing cash crops, especially tobacco. "Consider likewise what commodities the soil where the plantation is doth naturally yield, that they may some way help to defray the charge of the plantation, (so it be not, as was said, to the untimely prejudice of the main business,) as it hath fared with tobacco in Virginia."¹³⁰ Bacon disagreed with Hakluyt on one key issue. The former favored a moderate number of undertakers of noble birth, rather than merchants who "look ever to the present gain."¹³¹ It appears from his cautions against massive cash crop cultivation and merchant sponsorship that Bacon failed to recognize the seventeenth-century shift to commercialized colonization.

With respect to government, he wrote, "let it be in the hands of one, assisted with some counsel; and let them have commission to exercise martial laws." By the second quarter of the seventeenth century, all colonial governors expected to use martial law to regulate their newly founded plantations. This was the norm, not the exception, standardizing Thomas Smith's concept of authoritarian military settlement as the primary method of social organization and control in nascent colonies. Both Bacon and

¹²⁹Ibid., 457, 458.

¹³⁰Ibid., 458.

¹³¹Ibid., 459.

Hakluyt agreed on the importance of a diversified labor force. "The people wherewith you plant ought to be gardners, ploughmen, labourers, smiths, carpenters, joiners, fishermen, fowlers, with some few apothecaries, surgeons, cooks, and bakers."¹³²

Challenging conventional wisdom, Bacon favored all male settlements in the beginning.

When the plantation grows to strength, then it is time to plant with women as well as with men; that the plantation may spread into generations, and not be ever pieced from without. It is the sinfulest thing in the world to forsake or destitute a plantation once in forwardness; for besides the dishonour, it is the guiltiness of blood of many commiserable persons.¹³³

This last statement was probably in response to Raleigh's abandonment of White's Roanoke colony.

Although opposed to extirpation, Bacon gave little consideration to the displacement of native populations and their potentially violent reaction. He simply instructed planters that "if you plant where savages are, do not only entertain them with trifles and gingles; but use them justly and graciously, with sufficient guard nevertheless; and do not win their favour by helping them invade their enemies."¹³⁴ "Use them justly" could indicate that Bacon saw the natives as a compensated labor force like the one described by Smith early in the Ards venture. Or he might have viewed them simply as trading partners, as Hakluyt originally intended the Indians in the New World. Finally, Bacon may have envisioned a culturally inferior and subjugated working class like Spenser suggested for all of Ireland. This last model is

¹³²Ibid., 457.

¹³³Ibid., 459.

¹³⁴Bacon, 459.

unlikely, however. In *Of Plantations* Bacon stepped back from the harsh rhetoric employed by Spenser in the *View of the State of Ireland*. Most likely, Bacon accepted the indigenous people's gradual disappearance from the increasingly English American landscape.

Bacon favored "plantation in a pure soil; that is, where people are not displanted to the end to plant in others. For else it is rather an extirpation than a plantation."¹³⁵ Although he knew that Virginia was not exactly pure soil, this was probably an indication of his preference for New World rather than Irish colonization. As Bacon recognized, Ireland was still part of the Old World, "the second island of the ocean Atlantic," not merely an "Island in the Virginia Sea."¹³⁶

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Francis Bacon, *The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, vol. IV (London, 1868), 123.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andrews, J.H. *Plantation Acres: An Historical Study of the Irish Land Surveyor and His Maps*. Tyrone: Ulster Historical Foundation, 1985.
- Andrews, K.R., N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair, eds. *The Westward Enterprise: English activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America 1480-1650*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978.
- Axtell, James. *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Bacon, Francis. *Letters and Life of Francis Bacon*. Edited by James Spedding. Vol. IV. London, 1868.
- _____. *The Works of Francis Bacon*. Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. Vol. VI. "Of Plantations (1625)." New York: Garrett Press, Inc., 1870.
- Barbour, Philip L., ed. *The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606-1609*. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for The Hakluyt Society, 1969.
- Brady, Ciaran, and Raymond Gillespie, eds. *Natives and Newcomers: Essays on the Making of Irish Colonial Society 1534-1641*. Irish Academic Press, 1986.
- Camblin, Gilbert. *The Town in Ulster*. Belfast: Wm. Mullan & Son, Limited, 1951.
- Canny, Nicholas P. "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America." *William and Mary Quarterly* XXX 3 (October 1973): 575-598.
- _____. *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-1576*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1976.
- _____. "Protestants, planters and apartheid in early modern Ireland." *Irish Historical Studies* XXV 98 (1986): 105-115.

- _____. *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World 1560-1800*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
- Carr, Lois Green, Philip D. Morgan and Jean B. Russo. *Colonial Chesapeake Society*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1988.
- Carson, Cary. "Settlement Patterns and Vernacular Architecture in Seventeenth-Century Tidewater Virginia." Masters' Thesis, University of Delaware, 1969.
- Craven, Wesley Frank. *Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1932.
- _____. *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century 1607-1689*. Louisiana State University Press, 1949.
- _____. *White, Red, and Black: The Seventeenth-Century Virginian*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971.
- Culliford, S.G. *William Strachey, 1572-1621*. Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1965.
- Diamond, Sigmund. "From Organization to Society: Virginia in the Seventeenth Century." *The American Journal of Sociology* LXIII 5 (March 1958): 457-475.
- _____, ed. *The Creation of Society in the New World*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company for the Berkeley Series in American History, 1963.
- Doherty, J.E. and D.J. Hickey. *A Chronology of Irish History Since 1500*. Maryland: Barnes & Noble Books, 1990.
- Ellis, Steven G. *Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community, and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603*. New York: Longman Inc., 1985.
- Fausz, J. Frederick. "Patterns of Settlement in the James River Basin, 1607-1642." Masters' Thesis, College of William and Mary, 1971.
- _____. "The Powhatan Uprising of 1622: A Historical Study of Ethnocentrism and Cultural Conflict." Ph.d. Dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1977.
- _____. "The Invasion of Virginia: Indians, Colonialism, and the Conquest of Cant: A Review Essay on Anglo-Indian Relations in the Chesapeake." *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 95 2 (April 1987): 133-156.

- Forman, Henry Chandlee. *Jamestown and St. Mary's: Buried Cities of Romance*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1938.
- Garvan, Anthony N.B. *Architecture and Town Planning in Colonial Connecticut*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.
- Gillespie, Raymond, *Colonial Ulster: The Settlement of East Ulster 1600-1641*. Cork: Cork University Press, 1985.
- Greene, Jack P. and J.R. Pole. *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.
- Hume, Ivor Noel. *Martin's Hundred*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982.
- Jones, Howard Mumford. *O Strange New World*. New York: The Viking Press, 1964.
- Kukla, Jon. "Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in Pre-Restoration Virginia." *American Historical Review* 90 2 (April 1985): 275-298.
- _____. *Political Institutions in Virginia, 1619-1660*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989.
- Kupperman, Karen Ordahl. *Settling with the Indians: The Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580-1640*. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980.
- _____. *Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony*. New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984.
- _____. *Captain John Smith*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
- Lemay, J.A. Leo. *The American Dream of Captain John Smith*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1991.
- MacCarthy-Morrogh, Michael. *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland 1583-1641*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Mardis, Allen, Jr. "Visions of James Fort." *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 97 4 (October 1989): 498.

- Merrell, James H. "Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians." *William and Mary Quarterly* XLVI 1 (January 1989): 94-119.
- Moody, T.W., F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne, eds. *A New History of Ireland. Vol. 3, Early Modern Ireland, 1534-1691.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
- Morgan, Edmund S. *American Slavery-American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975.
- Nash, Gary B. "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind." *William and Mary Quarterly* XXIX 2 (April 1972): 197-230.
- Percy, George. "A Trewe Relacyon of the Procedeinges and Occurrentes of Momente," *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, III (1922): 270.
- Phillips, Sir Thomas. *Londonderry and the London Companies 1609-1629.* Belfast: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928.
- Quinn, David Beers, ed. *The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert.* Vol. 1-2. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1940.
- _____. "Sir Thomas Smith (1513-1577) and the Beginnings of English Colonial Theory." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 89 (December 1945): 543-560.
- _____, ed. *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590.* London: The Hakluyt Society, 1955.
- _____. *The Elizabethans and The Irish.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- _____. "The Munster Plantation: Problems and Opportunities." *Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society* LXXI (1966): 19-40.
- _____, ed. *George Percy: Observations Gathered out of "A Discourse of the Plantation of the Southern Colony in Virginia by the English, 1606".* Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities, 1967.
- _____. *England and the Discovery of America, 1481-1620.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973.
- _____, ed. *The Hakluyt Handbook.* Vol. 1-2. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1974.

- _____, ed. *New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612*. Vol. III and V. New York: Arno Press and Hector Bye, Inc., 1979.
- _____, and Alison M. Quinn. *The First Colonists: Documents on the Planting of the First English Settlements in North America, 1584-1590*. Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History, 1982.
- _____. *Set Fair for Roanoke: Voyages and Colonies, 1584-1606*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
- Reps, John W. *Tidewater Towns: City Planning in Colonial Virginia and Maryland*. Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1972.
- Robinson, Philip S. *The Plantation of Ulster: British Settlement in an Irish Landscape, 1600-1670*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984.
- Rountree, Helen C. *Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through Four Centuries*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1990.
- Rukeyser, Muriel. *The Traces of Thomas Hariot*. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Rutman, Darrett Bruce. *The Old Dominion*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1964.
- _____. *A Militant New World 1607-1640*. New York: Arno Press, 1979.
- St. George, Robert Blair. "Bawns and Beliefs: Architecture, Commerce, and Conversion in Early New England." *Winterthur Portfolio* XXV (1990): 241-282.
- Sheehan, Bernard W. *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Shirley, John W. *Thomas Harriot: A Biography*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
- Spencer, Edmund. *A View of the State of Ireland (1596) in The Works of Spenser, Campion, Hanmer, and Marlebyrrogh* Vol. 1. Dublin: Hibernia Press, 1809.
- Silver, Timothy. *A New Face on the Countryside: Indians, colonists, and slaves in South Atlantic forests, 1500-1800*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

VITA

MEAGHAN NOELLE DUFF

Born in Maryland, December 21, 1969. Graduated from First Colonial High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia, June 1987. Attended Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland, from September 1990 to May 1991. Received a bachelor's degree in History from the University of Virginia, August 1991. Entered the College of William and Mary as a graduate assistant in the Department of History, August 1991.