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Courtney B. Caudill
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"MISCHIEFS SO CLOSE TO EACH OTHER":
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE OHIO VALLEY SHAWNEES, 1730-1775

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by

Courtney B. Caudill

1992

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Courtney B. Caudill

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Approved, May 1992

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For Mom: Thanks, Easter Bunny.

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I also wish to thank Dr. James H. O'Donnell III of the Marietta College Department of History for encouraging (and enduring) my early study of ethnohistory.

Finally, I thank my mother, Kathy Caudill, for nearly a quarter-century of support (or has it been toleration?). It **did** matter whether Blue Jacket was a white man or a Shawnee, whether the United Remnant Band regained tribal lands, whether Nonhelema the Grenadier Squaw was as respected as any male chief. . . .

PREFACE

Popular history, when it has dealt with the Shawnees at all, has portrayed them as the most nomadic and warlike of the tribes of the Old Northwest. The reasons for these tendencies--if indeed the Shawnees displayed such tendencies--and any history that might explain them, have usually been overlooked in favor of shadowy legend, romanticized accounts, or even racist diatribe. More often, however, the story of the Shawnees has been the story of its greatest leader, Tecumseh, or of prominent figures such as Tenskwatawa the Shawnee Prophet (Tecumseh's brother, and, some say, the author of his downfall) and Blue Jacket (whose purported abandonment of his white birth family for life with the Shawnees is now being seriously questioned by scholars).

Even scholars have not delved too deeply into the greater external history of the Shawnees, choosing instead to deal with either a certain cultural aspect, a specific event (usually a battle or a war) involving the Shawnees, or, again, the life of an individual. In the 1930s, Erminie Wheeler Voegelin produced a significant body of work on general Shawnee culture based on fieldwork among the Shawnees in Oklahoma; Randolph C. Downes, at about the same time, produced Council Fires on the Upper Ohio, which included the Shawnees in the greater struggle for the Ohio Valley. Even Tecumseh's great-grandson, Thomas Wildcat Alford, only touched briefly on the history of the Shawnees, although he served as custodian of tribal records.

The question of Shawnee history beyond isolated events or specific locations is not a new question. As early as 1855, Henry Harvey made some attempt to address it; the result was History of the Shawnee

Indians from the Year 1681 to 1854 Inclusive. By 1881, Charles C. Royce, in American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal, made "An Inquiry into the Identity and History of The Shawnee Indians." But these were unusual--and still incomplete--treatments of Shawnee history. Then, in 1955, John Withhofs and William A. Hunter published in Ethnohistory an article entitled "The Seventeenth-Century Origins of the Shawnee." A new approach to Shawnee history had begun, and the question of a "full" pre-Revolutionary history of the Shawnees was raised.

Ethnohistory--the history of a nonliterate culture through the written records of another culture--is an ideal arena in which to approach the pre-Revolutionary history of the Shawnees. By using both French and English documents, both primary and secondary sources, a more complete picture can be drawn. And by looking at this picture, one may see a pattern emerging in regards to Shawnee history--a pattern which, for the most part, has been neglected by scholars.

As earlier scholars have suggested, it was undoubtedly the extensive migrations and exceptional fragmentation of the Shawnee tribe which caused the Shawnees to develop such complex and inconsistent relations with other Indian groups--and with the newcomers to the North American continent, the French and the English. The factors which contributed to the extensive removals and returns of the Shawnees to the Ohio Valley have been the subject of some discussion; the fact that the struggle for Shawnee loyalty--and lands--lay at the heart of any relations the tribe had with the English and the French has been less well documented, while the effects of both migration and struggle on these relations remain virtually unexplored. Within the

complexity of the tribe's external relations, a clear cycle of Shawnee migration and return to the Ohio Valley existed, a pattern which warrants further exploration in the context of Shawnee ethnohistory.

ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the external relations of the Ohio Valley Shawnees between the years 1730 and 1775. These years may be further divided into two distinct periods. The early period, from 1730 to the Seven Years' War, began with the return of large numbers of Shawnees to their Ohio homeland (after more than a century of nomadic existence) and drew to a close with the elimination of the French as a significant imperial power in North America. The later period, from 1763 to the coming of the American Revolution, began with the consequences and effects of the Seven Years' War (and, ultimately, the Proclamation of 1763) on Shawnee external affairs and ended with the unresolved situation in the Ohio Valley on the eve of the Revolution.

The extensive fragmentation of the Shawnee tribe resulted in tangled relations with the French, the English, "American" colonials, and other indigenous tribes and groups. Even contemporary observers found it difficult to establish the early history of the Shawnees and to trace their migration from and eventual return to their Ohio Valley homeland. However, it was this cycle of migration and return which affected the entire history of the Shawnees' external relations.

**"MISCHIEFS SO CLOSE TO EACH OTHER":
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE OHIO VALLEY SHAWNEES, 1730-1775**

WALKING THE PATHS

According to a Shawnee legend, the tribe once lived in the Wyoming Valley of the Susquehanna River. Some Shawnee mothers went out with their children to gather wild fruits. On the banks of the Susquehanna they met some women and children of the Delaware tribe who had also come to gather fruit. One of the Shawnee children caught a "fine, large grasshopper," and soon the Shawnee and Delaware children were quarreling over the insect. The mothers, too, joined the quarrel, and, when their menfolk found them, the quarrel between the Shawnees and the Delawares turned to war. Thus were the Shawnees compelled to become a wandering people.¹

Unfortunately, the legend of the "grasshopper war" cannot actually explain the extensive migrations of the "exceptionally fragmented" Algonquian tribe which came to be known as the Shawnee.² As John Upton Terrell wrote, "It is improbable that in either prehistoric or historic times any tribe moved, divided, and were reunited more than the Shawnee."³ Often these splits occurred along natural lines of differentiation within the tribe.

The Shawnee tribe was divided into five clans or divisions, which were patrilineal descent groups; each division had a specific traditional function within the tribe. The Chalahkawtha (Chalahgawtha, Chillicothe) and Thawegila (Thawikila, Hathawikila) divisions had charge

of political affairs; the principal chief of the nation came from one of these divisions. The Peckuwe (Pekowi, Pekowitha, Piqua, Pickaway) division was responsible for tribal ritual, whether in the maintenance of order or in matters spiritual; the Kispugo (Kispoko, Kispokotha, Kispogogi) division was responsible for the conduct of war and the training of warriors; the Maykujay (Mekoche, Mequache, Mequachake) division was responsible for health and medicine. Furthermore, there was a traditional system of unity among divisions: "the Tha-we-gi-la, the Pec-ku-we, and the Kispu-go . . . always had been closely related, while the Cha-lahkaw-tha and the May-ku-jay had always stood together," not only in the tribal councils, but along the trails as well.⁴ This fragmentation, along with their wandering ways, caused the Shawnees to have complex and inconsistent relations with other Indian groups--and with the newcomers to the North American continent, the French and the English.

The earliest French contacts placed the Shawnees (whom the French generally referred to as "Chaouanons" or "Chiouanons") in the upper Ohio Valley. As early as 1669, the Sulpician brother René de Bréhant de Galinée wrote of a group of Seneca Iroquois who reported that "this river [the Ohio] took its rise three days' journey from Seneca, that after a month's travel one came upon the Honniasontkeronons and the Chiouanons, and that after passing the latter, and a great cataract or waterfall that there is in this river [near present-day Louisville, Kentucky], one found the Outagame and the Iskousogos. . . ." ⁵ Galinée also received word from Louis Joliet that bordering the "Pottawattamies" (who lived in the region of Lake Michigan) was "the great river that led to the Shawanons."⁶ A year later, in 1670, the

Jesuit priest Jacques Marquette placed the "Chaouanons" east-southeast of the Illinois Indians (most likely the northern Peoria tribe of that group).⁷ In 1673, however, Marquette wrote that the Waboukigou (the Wabash, a stream which joins the Ohio in present Indiana) "flows from the East, where dwell the people called the Chaouanons in so great numbers that in one district there are as many as twenty-three villages and fifteen in another, quite near one another."⁸ The good father also noted of this people, "They are not at all warlike, and are the nations whom the Iroquois go so far to seek, and war against without any reason; and because these poor people cannot defend themselves, they allow themselves to be captured and taken like flocks of sheep; and innocent though they are, they nevertheless sometimes experience the barbarity of the Iroquois, who cruelly burn them."⁹

The "barbarity" of the Iroquois toward the "innocent" Shawnees was not limited to those incidents alluded to by Marquette. Before 1670, Nicolas Perrot encountered a group of Iroquois returning north "from a raid against the Chaouanons near Carolina, and had brought with them a captive from that tribe, whom they were going to burn."¹⁰ Nor were Iroquois aggressions directed solely against the Shawnees.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Indians of the Great Lakes region were involved in an extensive fur trade with the Europeans. The Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, and Seneca of northern New York, traded their pelts for Dutch goods at Fort Orange (present Albany); they continued to trade at the same location after the English conquered New Netherland in 1664 and renamed the colony New York. By the 1640s, however, the beaver population in Iroquois territory was "exhausted, or insufficient

for their needs. They went to war to obtain furs from . . . other nations trading with the French, and to harvest furs in the hunting grounds of neighboring tribes."¹¹

In response to the Iroquois threat, the Shawnees fled the Ohio Valley, with different bands heading in different directions. In March 1683, Robert René Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, had completed "the Fort of St. Louis" on the southern bank of the Illinois River, known as Le Rocher (or "Starved Rock"); in the winter of that same year, Henri Tonty, La Salle's faithful lieutenant, reported that "300 lodges . . . [of] Illinois and Miamis and Chaouanons" had been established around the fort.¹² These Shawnees apparently remained with La Salle until 1688. Then, despite traditional friendships, their relations with the Illinois became so strained that when the Twightwees (Miamis) withdrew from Fort St. Louis in 1688, the Shawnees "found it expedient to withdraw the following year" and join kinsmen on the Cumberland River in Tennessee.¹³

Other Shawnees also moved into the Southeast. By 1680 one group reached as far south as the Savannah River (opposite present Augusta, Georgia), which bore a version of the tribe's name; these Shawnees evicted the Westo tribe and "for a time established themselves as a dominant tribe in the area."¹⁴ For approximately a decade the Carolinians regularly furnished the Savannah Shawnees and neighboring nations with arms, encouraged them to raid against the Cherokees, purchased any prisoners taken on these raids, and sold these captured Cherokees in Charles Town for transportation to the West Indies as slaves. In 1693 a delegation of some twenty Lower Cherokee headmen arrived in the provincial capital of South Carolina and asked Governor

Thomas Smith to do something about the Shawnees and the slave trade. Smith responded that he could do nothing about prisoners already purchased, but he did agree to discourage further raids. The Commons House of Assembly was apparently more willing to run the risk of war than to reduce the supply of slaves: they pointed out that the Shawnees were not legally required by the government to keep their war parties away from the Cherokees, and then passed a resolution supporting the Shawnees.¹⁵ The Lower Cherokees, not pleased with this resolution, took matters into their own hands and drove the Shawnees from the banks of the Savannah, although several bands of stragglers continued to hover on the fringes of Cherokee and Creek territory.¹⁶

The Iroquois had not forgotten the Shawnees, nor their protectors at Fort St. Louis, the French. At a conference held in 1684 by the French at Cuyahoga (present Cleveland, Ohio), the Five Nations cited as one reason for their aggression against the Twightwees (Miamis), that this tribe had brought the "Satanas"--the Shawnees--into the Ohio country and armed them to aid in the struggle against the Iroquois. By August 1692, however, the commander-in-chief of New York, Major Ingoldsby, received word that "Sattaras Indians, late in war with the Five Nations, had come, numbering 100 warriors, as far as the Delaware river, to negotiate a peace with the New York Indians."¹⁷

Such a peace was of great interest to the English of New York: the Iroquois--staunch English allies--could then concentrate their efforts against the French, "while a war with the more distant Shawanoes 'much diverted and hindered them in their efforts against Canada.'"¹⁸ Under orders of the Council of New York, Captain Arent Schuyler conveyed two wampum belts to these "Showannes" (and some Senecas, led

by Malisit, who had traveled amongst them for nine years) and then saw the group safely to New York City. When word of this reached the Iroquois, they informed Governor Fletcher (through the mayor of Albany) that a treaty between the Shawnees and the colony could not be made without their consent and their presence. After a series of interviews in August and September 1692, Fletcher told the Shawnees that they must first make peace with the Iroquois, and then he would extend to them the same protection that he had extended to the Five Nations. A conference was held with the Iroquois in July 1693, and the Iroquois seemed amenable to a treaty: "'We are glad that the Shawanoes, who were our enemies, have made their application to you last fall for protection, and that you sent them hither (to Albany) to make peace with us.'"¹⁹

The cessation of hostilities with the Iroquois drew Shawnees eastward. In 1692 the Munsees (the northern division of the Delaware tribe) persuaded a group of Shawnees (most likely of the Pekowi division) who had been living under French protection at Fort St. Louis to come to the upper Delaware River.²⁰ (A Mahican-Munsee hunting party evidently escorted this group from the Ohio country, thus establishing a long-standing relationship of respect between the "younger brother" Shawnees and their "elder brother" Delawares.)²¹ This group, consisting of seventy-two men and one hundred women and children, along with Martin Chartier, a French trader who was married to a Shawnee woman, reached the mouth of the Susquehanna in the summer of that year.²² The Maryland Council, concerned that Chartier might be a "'spie, or party concerned with them [the French at Fort St. Louis] in designs of mischief,'" ordered the French trader to be held prisoner, then, two and a half

months later, ordered his release.²³ Chartier remained with the Shawnees, who had settled a village named Pequea (now Lancaster, Pennsylvania), and became well known as an Indian trader.

The Pekowi with Chartier were not the only Shawnees who settled among the Delawares and the Susquehannocks in the Pennsylvania region. Another band of Shawnees, apparently coming directly from the Ohio country, was brought into eastern Pennsylvania by Aernout (or Arnold) Viele in 1694; yet another group arrived about 1697 on the lower Susquehanna near the mouth of Pequea Creek, where they were sponsored by the Conestogas.²⁴ And small bands from the Savannah River settlements slowly made their way north as more Shawnees were assured that the Iroquois regarded the war between the two tribes at an end.²⁵

In a petition of May 1, 1700, Conodahto, "king" of the Conestogas, and Mecalloua, "king" of the Shawnees, complained to William Penn that during the fall of 1699, three white men had forced them to hand over four strange Indians who had taken refuge with them and whom the white men claimed as their property. The chiefs had found "one Woman with her Son to be nearly related to the King of the Naked Indians [the Miamis]," and they intended "to return her and her Child safe to her relations, hoping thereby to settle a lasting Peace with the said Naked Indians, which might have been of great importance to the petitioners as well as the Inhabitation of this Government, they being a powerful Nation and hath often molested these petitioners as well in their towns at Susquehanna as in their hunting quarters, these Petitioners being the Frontier Inhabitants of this Government." But they had been frightened by the white men's threats of violence and surrendered the refugees. Furthermore, they had not planted corn in the spring, but

"continued in a moving posture in fear of being cutt off." Having heard of Penn's "love, good will, and favour towards . . . as well Indians as Christians," they asked the governor to accept them under his protection as true friends.²⁶

Obviously Penn's reply pleased the Conestogas and the Shawnee, for they met with him several more times to renew their covenants or treaties--and, in October 1701, to say good-bye. As a further sign of their high regard for this man, six chiefs of the "Sasquehannah and Shavanah Indians" provided Penn with a testimonial to be delivered to the King of England, acknowledging him as "their good friend and brother" and praising his fair and generous treatment of the Indians.²⁷

Despite the mediation of the colonial government, the Shawnees in Pennsylvania, as well as their Delaware, Conoy, and Conestoga neighbors, were clearly under Iroquois domination. In 1697 Captain John Tillman reported that "Shevanoo [Shawnee] Indians being about thirty men beside women & children live within four miles of Caristauga [the town of Conestoga on the Susquehanna] lower downe & submit themselves & pay tribute to the Susquehannocks & Senecas."²⁸ The making of treaties with Maryland in 1700 and with William Penn in 1701 by the Pekowi Shawnee sachem Wapaththa (Opessa) threatened the dominant position of the Iroquois, and they made every attempt to keep the Shawnees in line. In 1711 the Five Nations forced Wapaththa to step down as chief of the Pekowis and appointed in his stead the Oneida chief Carondawana to govern the Shawnees.²⁹

Colonial authorities found it more convenient to deal with the Shawnees and other western tribes through the Iroquois, who, as James Logan wrote in 1731, "have absolute authority as well over the Shawanese

as all our Indians, that by their means the Shawanese may not only be kept firm to the English [Pennsylvania] Interest, but likewise be induced to remove from Allegheney nearer to the English Settlement."³⁰ The Shawnees and the Delawares undoubtedly saw the situation in a different light. They ignored agreements forced upon them by Iroquois conquest or military threat whenever possible, which prompted Major Robert Rogers of New Hampshire (later the famous ranger during the Seven Years' War) to write, "The Delawares and Shawnees are remarked for their deceit and perfidy, paying little or no regard to their word and most solemn engagements."³¹

Also having a profound effect on the external relations of the Shawnees was the growing struggle for the Ohio Valley. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had officially ended the Anglo-French hostilities of Queen Anne's War, begun in 1702; more important in the game of empire, the treaty had, by its fifteenth article, supposedly settled the dispute over British and French boundaries in the western territories of North America:

The subjects of France, inhabiting Canada, shall hereafter give no hindrance or molestation to the Five Nations or Cantons of Indians subject to the dominion of Great Britain, nor to the other natives of America, who are friends of the same. In like manner the subjects of Great Britain shall behave themselves peacefully to the Americans, who are subjects or friends to France, and on both sides they shall enjoy full liberty on account of trade, as also the natives of those countries shall with the same liberty resort as they please to trade with the British or French colonies for promoting trade on the one or the other,

without any molestation or hindrance either on the part of the British subjects or the French but it is to be exactly and distinctly settled by commissaries, who are and who ought to be accounted the subjects and friends of Britain and of France.³²

Certainly this treaty left a great deal open to interpretation. But it was actually the "Beaver Wars" of the Iroquois which had provided the basis for both English and French official claims to the Ohio country. "In the English version," according to one scholar, "the Iroquois, after their conquest of the Ohio country, submitted their lands to the British crown in 1701 and were by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 acknowledged as under British dominion. The French at the same time claimed the country on the ground that 'La Salle took possession of it when it was inhabited by the Cha8oinons [Shawnees], against whom the Iroquois made war incessantly, and who have always been our friends.'"³³

Whether or not the Shawnees had always been the friends of the French, their relations with the English--and the Iroquois--were increasingly strained. In October 1722 Pennsylvania's governor Sir William Keith informed the Shawnee, Conestogas, Delawares, and Conoys of a treaty made by Virginia's governor Alexander Spotswood with the Iroquois on behalf of ten other tribes in Pennsylvania, a treaty which reinforced an earlier agreement between Keith and Spotswood. This treaty provided that "if any of the Five Nations [or their 'Northern Indian' subjects] shall pass the said Boundaries [the 'Southern Branch of Patowmeck' and the 'great ridge of Mountains' between Pennsylvania and Virginia] . . . they shall be treated as publick Enemies and be put to Death, or transported into other Countries beyond the Seas."

The treaty further specified that the Shawnees were to return through the Conestogas any runaway black slaves they harbored.³⁴

Still more oppressive to the Shawnees than Iroquois arrogance was the pressure of white settlers. The Shawnees had been disturbed at their Pequea Creek village as early as 1710 or 1711 by Swiss Mennonite immigrants. They removed farther upstream on the Susquehanna, but by 1728 they had surrendered their lands to white settlers and gone off to the west again, at about the same time a skirmish broke out between white settlers and Shawnees in the Lehigh area.³⁵ In that same year, the Shawnee chief Kakowatchiky led his own people and some Munsees from Pechoquealin near the Delaware Water Gap to the Wyoming Valley on the North Branch of the Susquehanna in order to avoid further clashes with settlers.³⁶ Between the arrogance of the Iroquois and the encroachment of white settlers, the Shawnees simply found that Pennsylvania no longer made a comfortable home.

CHAPTER I

BUILDING THE WEGIWA: FROM THE 1730S TO THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

After about 1724, most eastern Pennsylvania Indians began a westward migration to the Allegheny and Ohio Valleys: what had once been hunting grounds now became homelands as white settlements expanded. Patrick Gordon, who had replaced Keith as governor, sent messages to the Five Nations and the Delawares, inquiring why the Shawnees had suddenly left the upper Delaware River; he received no real response.¹ On November 19, 1731, Gordon notified Peter Chartier, *métis* son of the trader Martin Chartier and current leader of the western Pennsylvania Shawnees, that (under orders of Governor Gordon and the Council) Jonathan Wright, Tobias Hendricks, and Samuel Blunston were "now Going over Susquehana, To Lay out a Tract of Land between Conegogwainet and the Shaawna Creeks five or six miles back from the River, In order to Accomodate the Shaawna Indians . . . To Defend them from Incroachments . . . That Those woods may Remain free to the Indians for Planting and Hunting."² Then, on December 4, Governor Gordon sent a message to the Shawnee chiefs at Allegheny (and to the Delawares) asking them to return east, or to at least come for a meeting.³

In August 1732, deputies of the Six Nations (the Tuscaroras having

joined the Iroquois Confederacy about 1715), in response to an invitation issued through the Cayuga chief Shikellamy, held a treaty with the Proprietary Thomas Penn (son of William Penn), Governor Gordon, and the Provincial Council. The meetings dealt mainly with French activities west of the mountains and with Pennsylvania's hope that the Iroquois would be able to convince the Shawnees and Delawares to return to the Susquehanna Valley.⁴ The Six Nations "were told that as they were the Chiefs of all the Northern Indians in these parts, and the Shawanese had been under their protection, they should oblige them to return"; the Iroquois, not being so assured of their authority, replied that Pennsylvania should "joyn with them in calling back the Shawanese, which they conceive they can do by preventing our [Pennsylvania] Indian Traders from going to Ohio, for while the Indians are supplied at that place with such Goods as they want, they will be the more unwilling to remove."⁵

In a meeting which lasted from September 30 to October 5, 1732, "the Shawanese Chiefs" Opakethwa and Opakeita (and Peter Chartier, who served as an interpreter) met with the Provincial Council in Philadelphia. The Pennsylvanians had received "some advices . . . that the Shawanese Indians at Allegheny had once or twice at Montreal, to visit the French Governor; that some Messages and Presents had passed between them, and that it was to be apprehended the French were Endeavouring to gain them over to their Interest."⁶ Governor Gordon inquired of the Shawnees the reason they had "gone so far back as Allegheny"; the chiefs replied "that having lost him [their 'King' had died 'at Patowneck'], they Knew not what to do; that they then took their Wives and Children and went over the Mountains, (meaning

Allegheny,) to live."⁷ Gordon warned them that "our Traders might leave off carrying out Goods to such a distance, and they well knew the French could not supply them with Goods, either so valuable in their Kind, or at such cheap rates"; the Shawnees replied "that they were sensible of this, but they had horses of their own, and could bring down their Skins to the Trader, or to this town, if there were occasion."⁸ They then reaffirmed "that the place where they are now Settled Suits them much better than to live nearer; that they thought they did a Service to this Province, in getting Skins for it in a place so far remote; that they can live much better there than they possibly can anywhere on Sasquehannah; that they are pleased however with the Land laid out for them."⁹ Finally, they professed continuing friendship toward the English but showed no desire to ever return to the Susquehannah Valley.

In 1734 the Provincial Council received a letter dated May 1 from Nechikonner (also known as Nuckegunnah or Nucheconna) and other Shawnees living on the Allegheny, responding to Pennsylvania's incessant requests that the Shawnees return to the Susquehanna Valley. Nechikonner and the others evaded the issue of removal, however, by stating, "As for the belt of Wampum [to open official talks on Shawnee removal] you sent by the 5 Nations, we have not yet had, though so often mentioned."¹⁰ Instead they complained about certain traders who came amongst them and abused them, and they requested that these men be "kept particularly" from trading amongst the Shawnees. They then endorsed several traders whom "we desire may have Licence to come and trade with us, as also Peter Cheartier [sic], who we reckon one of us, and he is welcome to come as long as he pleases." They also

petitioned that "no trader abovementioned may be allowed to bring more than 30 Gallons of Rum, twice in a year and no more," for excessive indulgence in rum was beginning to take ill effects on the Shawnee people.¹¹ (This restriction did not apply to Chartier, who was the half-Shawnee co-leader of this group: he was to be permitted to bring as much rum as he wanted.)

On October 15, 1734, the Seneca chief Hetaquantagechty reported to the Proprietaries (John and Thomas Penn), Governor Gordon, and the Provincial Council concerning the Six Nations envoys who had been sent to "prevail with the Shawanese to leave Ohio or Allegheney and return towards Sasquehannah."¹² The messengers had been told by the Shawnee chiefs "that they would remove further to the Northward, towards the French Country"; furthermore, these Shawnee chiefs had sent a belt of wampum to the Delawares, "intimating to them that as they, the Shawanese, were to seek out a new Country for themselves, they should be glad to have the Delawares with them."¹³

The situation grew more intense by the autumn of that year, for Hetaquantagechty returned to Philadelphia (along with Shikellamy) to tell of the Iroquois chiefs who had gone to confer with the Shawnees on the Allegheny River. On September 10, Hetaquantagechty reported that these Six Nations chiefs "had delivered them [six wampum belts] to the Shawanese there, and had been very pressing with them to return towards Sasquehannah, assuring them that the Six Nations would take them under their Wings and protect them," but the Shawnees "had entirely refused to leave that place, which they said was more commodious for them."¹⁴ They did, however, accept the belts in a gesture of continued friendship. Hetaquantagechty also added that "one Tribe [division

or clan] of those Shawanese had never behaved themselves as they ought; they seemed not to have good Designs; the Six Nations were not satisfied with them."¹⁵ He then affirmed the validity of this dissatisfaction:

. . . a great man of the Tsananadowas [Senecas] named Sagohandechty, who lived on Allegheny, went with the other Chiefs of the Six Nations, to prevail with the Shawanese to return; that he was the Speaker, and pressed them so closely that they took a great Dislike to him, and some Months after the other Chiefs were returned, they [the aforementioned division] seized on him a[nd] murdered him cruelly.¹⁶

He also specified that this group of Shawnees was not Pekowi from Pennsylvania, but "is called Shaweygira [Thawikila], and consists of about thirty young Men, ten old Men, and several Women and Children; that it is supposed they are now returned to the place from whence they first came, which is below Carolina."¹⁷ The Six Nations also suggested "whether as that tribe of the Shawanese has fled to the Southward, it might not be proper to write to the Governour of Virginia [William Gooch, who took office in 1727], who is a warlike man, to acquaint him with what they have already done, and what Mischief they may still doe if they are not cut off."¹⁸ Evidently the Pennsylvania authorities never acted upon this suggestion.

In early August 1737, James Logan, President of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, received a letter from Governor George Clarke of New York. This letter revealed, through Clarke's private conversation with two Mohawk sachems, that

the Shawanese Indians of Sasquehannah River . . . having heard that the Cayoogoes and Sinnakas had lately sold to our

[Pennsylvania] Proprietors the Lands whereon those Shawanese live, they had sent a Belt of Wampum to the french Indians settled at Tuchsaghroudie [the region near Detroit], desiring Leave to live among them, who had consented to their Request, and assured them that they with a Number of french would on the first Notice of their March meet them with Provisions and conduct them to their Country.¹⁹

Thus was the Anglo-French struggle for Shawnee allegiance renewed.

On August 10, 1737, James Logan

laid before the Board a Message to our Proprietor from the Chiefs of the Shawanese at Allegheny, accompanied with a String of Wampum, which being read is in Substance, that they are strongly solicited by the French, whom they call their Fathers, to return to them; that every year they send those Indians some Powder, Lead, and Tobacco, to enable them to withstand their Enemies, the Southern Indians, by whom they have often suffered, and were last year attacked in one of their towns; that they are gott so far back that they can go no further without falling into their Enemies' hands or going over to the French. . . .²⁰

Logan and the Council then resolved that "all possible Means ought to be used to prevent their Defection and to keep them attached to the British Interest."²¹

Keeping the Shawnees "attached to the British Interest" would be more difficult than the Council believed. By this time the westward (trans-Allegheny) migration of the Shawnees had begun in earnest. Its first stirrings had begun as early as the 1720s, due to a variety of factors: depletion of game, sales of Shawnee land by the Iroquois

(and the Delawares), confrontations with white settlers, friction with the Iroquois, and a favorable response by the French to Shawnee overtures of renewed association. The Ohio country was particularly attractive to the migrant Shawnees because it was closer to the French, because it was rich in game and fertile fields for corn--and because it was virtually uninhabited, thanks to the Beaver Wars (from the 1640s to 1700) of the Iroquois. By 1731 about 1,200 Shawnees were living at the headwaters of the Ohio River; others dwelt on the Juniata and the Susquehanna Rivers, and several villages were scattered throughout the Wyoming Valley. The Thawikila who had murdered Sagohandechty had fled down the Ohio River and, in all likelihood, subsequently established the settlement at the mouth of the Scioto River which was later called Lower Shawnee Town.²² (The establishment of Lower Shawnee Town drew together "segments of the Shawnee divisions that had been scattered since the period of the Iroquois Wars [1641-1701]."²³ The Shawnees had come home.

During this period of Shawnee migration, traders in the Ohio Valley reported that "some years since," a Frenchman named "Cavilier" had appeared among the Shawnees, "sent as 'twas believed from the Governor of Montreal." On his return to Montreal, "Cavilier" took several Shawnee chiefs, who later returned to Allegania "highly pleased." In the spring of 1731, the same "Cavilier" returned, bringing, amongst others, an interpreter and a gunsmith "to work for them [the Shawnees] gratis." Pennsylvania Council Secretary James Logan "'represented how destructive this Attempt of the French, if attended with success, may prove to the English Interest on this Continent, and how deeply in its consequences it may affect this Province.'"²⁴

Maintaining the English influence on the Shawnees was vitally important to "the English Interest on this Continent," since the Shawnees were seen as particularly susceptible to French intrigues. Since efforts to persuade the Shawnees to return to the Susquehanna Valley remained fruitless, the colonial governments attempted to closely support and regulate their representatives among the Indians, the traders who supplied the new western villages with vast amounts of British manufactured goods--and liquor.

The Shawnees had grown concerned about the "ill Consequances" of the liquor trade in their villages. Finally, in March 1738, Nuckegunnah, Lapechkewe (son of Opessa), and Coycacolenne sent this message to the Pennsylvania Proprietor and the Council: "we held a Council together to Leve of[f] Drinking of Rum for the Space of four years, and we all in Janeral agreed two itt takeing it into Consideration the ill Consequances that attend itt and what Disturbance itt makes." (This action was motivated by an incident in which two Mingoes, or Ohio Iroquois, were killed because of "Rum's baneful influence.") To insure that this agreement would be enforced, the Shawnees staved all kegs of rum in their villages and promised to do the same to any that might be brought in later. They then requested that no Pennsylvania trader bring liquor into Shawnee villages; the same firm message was conveyed to the French, the Six Nations, and the Delawares and Shawnees who remained on the Susquehanna.²⁵

That the Shawnees were still dealing with the French troubled the British. On July 30, 1739, Governor Thomas of Pennsylvania told the Shawnees, "[A]s the King of England was in Friendship with the French King, they ought to be civil to the French; but if the two Kings

should go to War, they are bound by Treaty to assist us." He then convinced the Shawnees to sign a new treaty "of the same Substance with that made with their Father William Penn," a treaty which stated, "[T]he said nation of the Shawonese under their King Wopaththaw alias Opessa . . . will not by any Motives or perswasions be induced to join with any Nation whatsoever who shall be in Enmity with the Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain in any Acts of Hostility against them."²⁶

But "Acts of Hostility" could be provoked by those other than enemies of the Crown of Great Britain. In the winter of 1742, an Iroquois war party on its way south to attack the Catawbas became embroiled in a skirmish with Virginia frontiersmen; several Indians and Virginians were killed. The following January, ten Iroquois en route to the Six Nations Council to complain of the attack stopped at the Shawnee town on the West Branch of the Susquehanna, opposite the Great Island (present Lock Haven). After these Iroquois told their story of mistreatment and attack by the Virginians, some Shawnees took umbrage with all "white People." Thomas McKee, who had a store near the town, told these Shawnees that the Pennsylvanians could not be blamed "for what the People of another Province may imprudently do."²⁷

Governor Thomas and the Provincial Council quickly realized that Iroquois hostility towards Virginia would endanger Pennsylvania: under the guise of loyalty to the Six Nations, the Shawnees might well begin to raid along the frontiers, which could in turn bring retaliation by frontiersmen against **any** Indians and thus lead to a general Indian war. In hopes of preventing such a series of events, they dispatched Conrad Weiser to Shamokin to assure the Six Nations and other Indians there that "Pennsylvania would be faithful to its treaties with them

as long as they, too, were faithful; and to express Pennsylvania's regret for the trouble in Virginia and its hope that matters could be settled amicably. Pennsylvania would be glad to serve as mediator." Partway to Shamokin, Weiser came upon a small party of Shawnees (led by Missemediqueety, or Big Hominy), who were scouting to discover what Pennsylvania was doing in the matter. Despite their initial unfriendliness, when Weiser told them he had been sent by Thomas to speak to the Indians about the "unhappy incident" in Virginia, they accompanied him to Shamokin.²⁸

While at Shamokin, Weiser learned from the Shawnees of the Wyoming Valley that the Shawnees at the Great Island, supposedly under order of Kakowatchiky, were to "open the Trader [McKee's] Store and divide the Goods amongst themselves which they did accordingly." Shikellamy, the Cayuga chief, "sent his Son to the Great Island to get the Goods returned since Cayhkawaychykees the Shawono Chief never gave such order as Shikellimy was credibly informed." Upon receiving this intelligence, Weiser sent Kakowatchiky a fine matchcoat, reaffirming friendship and hoping the chief would "never do nor suffer any of his People to do an injury to the said Chain of Friendship and always observe the good counsel of the Six Nations and the Governor of Pennsylvania."²⁹

After a second journey to Shamokin in April 1743, Weiser returned to the Council with wampum (delivered by Shikellamy and Sachsidowa) and messages from "Nocheconna" and "Cachawatsiky" regarding Pennsylvania's mediation of the Virginia affair. Nuckegunnah, saying he "[could] do nothing, [he was] but weak, and [did not] so much as intend Mischief," deferred to Kakowatchiky, who simply wished to thank "Brother Onas" [Governor Thomas] for his "good Will and kind Love to

the Indians & the white People." Sachsidowa then said to the Shawnees:

You believe too many Lies and are too forward in action. You shall not pretend to Revenge our People that have been killed in Virginia. We are the chief of all the Indians. Let your Ears and Eyes be open towards us and order your Warriours to stay at home as we did ours.³⁰

After lengthy negotiations, with Weiser playing an integral role, some two dozen Iroquois chiefs and more than two hundred other Indians gathered at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on June 22, 1744, for a treaty with Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. This treaty "brought the latter two provinces into the chain of friendship with the Six Nations and Pennsylvania."³¹ Amidst a discussion of various causes of friction and arrangements to alleviate such, Governor Thomas asked, "[W]hat was the Reason that more of the **Shawanaes**, from their town on **Hohio**, were not at the Treaty?"³²

The "Shawanaes" on "Hohio" were fast becoming a common problem for Pennsylvania. At a council on August 24, 1744, Thomas told the Delawares that "having heard some of the Shawnese from Hohio had been with them and Invited them to remove from Shamokin to Hohio, he was desirous to know the truth of it." Quidahicqunt, speaking for the aged and ailing Sassoonan (Allumapis) said, "[T]he Shawnese at Hohio had indeed invited Cacawichiky and the Shawnese Indians at his Town to Hohio, and that they had removed thither . . . but that the Shawnese had never Sent any such Invitation to the Delawares, and if they had they would not have Accepted it; for they knew them [the Shawnees] to be a false people and to have ill minds."³³

Of these "ill minds," the Delawares--and the Pennsylvanians and

Virginians--found the most ill to be that of Peter Chartier. Born sometime between 1695 and 1707 to the French trader Martin Chartier and his Shawnee wife, he was both an Indian trader and a Shawnee leader. At first he had limited his trade to the Shawnees of the Susquehanna Valley, but by 1730 he had begun to trade west of the Allegheny Mountains. In 1734 he had relocated to what became known as Chartier's Town (near present Tarentum in Allegheny County); by 1737 he had been joined by twenty-one Shawnee men and their families, including that of Lapechkewe, son of Opessa.³⁴

While Chartier traded (and occasionally interpreted) out of Chartier's Town, Shawnee tempers grew short over Iroquois arrogance and white settlement on Shawnee lands. By the mid-1740s, English traders who worked the Ohio and Allegheny Valleys were well aware of Shawnee discontent, and they were loath to return to the area until they received Six Nations assurances of their safety. When they did return, the Shawnees were waiting. In the spring of 1745, two traders, Peter Tostee and James Dunning, were ascending the Allegheny with a load of furs; near Chartier's Town, they met four hundred armed Shawnees, led by Peter Chartier himself, who took them prisoners and robbed them of their goods, which they valued at £1600.³⁵ Chartier and his Shawnees then headed down the Ohio River.

The Governor and Council of Pennsylvania were outraged by this treatment of their traders. They dispatched Conrad Weiser to Onondaga to present the Iroquois Council with a message concerning the incident:

At the same time our Traders that used to Trade in Ohio were present, and having placed a great deal of Confidence in what you had said, went immediately to Trade again to Ohio, thinking

themselves secure from being molested either by the French or Indians; but they have since found themselves mistaken, having been Robbed and taken Prisoners by a large Party of French & Indians with Peter Chartier at their head. . . . The Shawnees are in your Power and so is Peter Chartier, who is turned from a subject of the King of Great Britain a Rebel against him. You will therefore see . . . Justice done against that Rebel Peter Chartier and compell the Shawnese to make restitution of the Goods and Prisoners taken by them.³⁶

The next afternoon, the Iroquois speaker Tocanuntie (the "Black Prince") responded: "We are sorry to hear what has happened to Your Traders at Ohio by that treacherous man Peter Chartier through the influence of the French. . . . [D]epend upon it that the French shall make restitution of Men and Goods if it be their doings, otherwise the Shawonese shall." Later that evening, at dinner, Weiser overheard "several discourses among themselves [the Iroquois] about the Shawonese; against whom they seemed to be very much exasperated. . . . They seemed to expect nothing less than War with the Shawnese. . . ." ³⁷

The Iroquois were not far wrong. King George's War, begun on the European continent in 1740 as the War of the Austrian Succession, reached North America in 1744. The disruption of diplomatic relations between Britain and France severely hindered Pennsylvanian efforts to make the Shawnees pay for their attacks on traders. In October 1745, the Onondaga chief Canasatego reported to the colonial government during a treaty negotiation, "We have spoke to the Governor of **Canada**, concerning **Peter Chartier**, and the Robbing of your **Indian** Traders; the Governor of **Canada** said, He knew nothing of the Matter. . . .

He added, Your Traders go very far back into the Country, which we desire may not be done, because it is in the Road of the **French**."³⁸

As the war dragged on, Indian relations grew more troublesome for the British colonies. In October 1747, Shikellamy told Conrad Weiser that even the Iroquois were divided amongst themselves: the Senecas and Cayugas favored the French; the Mohawks strongly favored war **against** the French; and the Onondagas, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras were determined not to desert the Mohawks. Weiser, using what Shikellamy had told him, wrote to Richard Peters, "The Zisgechroona [Missisaugas] or Jonontadyhagas [Wyandots] or both, jointly have sent a large Black Belt of Wampum to all the Delawares and Shawnese Indians Living on the Rivers Ohio and Sasquehanna to invite them into the War against the French. . . ." ³⁹

The Anglo-French war for empire went on. Weiser and Shikellamy reported to the Provincial Council in April 1748, "The Speaker of the Ohio Indians . . . told them that those Indians had not taken up the Hatchet, nor wou'd not do it without consulting with the Six Nations to which they belonged." One tribe, most likely the Missisaugas, had "began Hostilities," but none of the other Ohio Indians "had join'd with them nor wou'd do it till the Sentiments of the Council at Onondago shou'd be fully known." As a result, the colonial Council "determin'd not to send Mr. Weiser to Ohio till after the arrival of the Onondago Deputys."⁴⁰

In the meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Council received a letter dated June 4, 1748, from "Loggs Town," the multitribal village on the south side of the Ohio, some seventeen miles below the future site of Fort Duquesne. It was signed by the "Shawonese & some of the Six

Nation Indians," including the Shawnee chiefs Tomenebuck (Tammany Buck), Big Hominy, Lawacquaqua, and Pala Kishaw, "purporting that some of them were coming down to present the Cheifs of the Twightwees [the Miamis], a Nation lately come over from the French into the interest of the English." They wanted someone to meet them along the road and escort them to Lancaster, where "they wou'd be pleas'd to kindle a Council Fire."⁴¹ The Council sent Andrew Montour, whom they had newly employed as an interpreter and messenger (upon Weiser's recommendation), to meet the party. (Montour, whose Seneca name was Sattelihu, was the son of Roland Montour, a Seneca, and Catherine, the mixed-blood daughter of a French nobleman in Canada; he would serve as an interpreter at many Indian conferences in both Iroquoian and Algonquian tongues, often in conjunction with Conrad Weiser or George Croghan.)⁴²

In late July, Weiser reported back to the treaty commission that several Shawnee chiefs, including "Neucheconno" and "Kekewatcheky," had thus addressed themselves to the Delawares and Six Nations in Ohio:

We the ~~Shawonese~~ have been misled, and have carried on a private Correspondence with the **French**. . . . We travell'd secretly thro' the Bushes to **Canada**, and the **French** promised us great Things, but we find ourselves deceiv'd. We are sorry we had any Thing to do with them. . . . We earnestly desire . . . that we may be permitted to be restored to the Chain of Friendship and be looked upon as heretofore the same Flesh with [the English]."⁴³

(A note in the original document explained:

Some of the ~~Shawonese~~ were seduced by **Peter Chartier**, a noted **Indian** Trader . . . at the Beginning of the **French** war, and remov'd from their towns to be nearer the **French** Settlements on the

Mississippi. Some time after, several of these Deserters returned, of which **Neuchecunno** and his Party were some; these . . . together with **Kakewatcheky**, the old **Shawonese** King, and his Friends, who had withstood the Sollicitations of **Chartier**, joined together, and apply'd in this submissive Manner to **Scarrowyady** [Scaroyady, called by the Shawnees "Monacatootha," an influential Oneida leader in the Ohio country, who especially concerned himself with the Shawnees].)⁴⁴

This situation presented the Pennsylvania Council with a problem. It had been more than two years since Governor Thomas (since replaced, due to ill health, by James Hamilton) had offered, through **Kakowatchiky** "and a few other **Shawonese**, who had preserved their Fidelity," a pardon to any Shawnees who would "Return to the Town they had deserted" and go to Philadelphia to acknowledge their repentance. "[B]ut as they did not do it, what can be said for them?" The Council then told the Iroquois to "chastise **Neuchecunno** and his party in such Terms as shall carry a proper Severity with them . . . then tell the delinquent **Shawonese**, that we will forget what is pass'd. . . ." However, **Kakowatchiky** and his friends, "who had Virtue enough to resist the many fine Promises made by the Emissaries of the **French**," were sent a wampum belt and "a Present of Goods."⁴⁵

At the same council, Tomenebuck said that "the **Shawonese**, sensible of our ungrateful Return for the many Favours we have been all along receiving from our Brethren the **English** . . . have been a foolish People, and acted wrong. . . . We are sorry for what we have done, and promise better Behaviour for the future." He then produced a 1739 treaty renewing Pennsylvania's friendship with the Shawnees and asked

that it be signed afresh. Significantly, the Commissioners refused, saying that the Shawnees "were forgiven on Condition of better Behaviour for the future; and when they shall have performed that Condition, it will be time enough to apply for such Testimonials."⁴⁶

On September 18, 1748, Andrew Montour delivered a speech to the Shawnees in their own language, saying that "News came from over the Great lake that the King of Great Britain & the French King had agreed upon a Cessation of Arms for Six Months & that a Peace was very likely to follow. . . . A French Peace is a very uncertain One, they keep it no longer than their Interest permits, then they break it without provocation given them. . . . All Nations in Europe know that their Friendship is mix'd with Poison & many that trusted too much on their Friendship have been ruin'd."⁴⁷

French efforts to prevent the inroads of British traders into the Ohio country had been unsuccessful before and during King George's War. During the war, a naval blockade by the British had stopped the flow of French goods into Canada, forcing up the prices of goods sold to the Ohio tribes: British traders could offer the Indians better prices and more adequate supplies of trade goods. Furthermore, few French traders had been licensed by the French authorities to go to Ohio, possibly because they might have dealt with British traders rather than Indians, or, even worse, because they might have become traders for the British colonies. The British financial advantage in the Indian trade had also improved in 1742, when the French adopted a new system of auctioning trading posts, a policy which increased costs.⁴⁸

After the war, the French moved more aggressively to re-establish their dominance of the Ohio Indian trade. The French now saw three

distinct threats to their claims to the Ohio country: the success of Pennsylvanian and Virginian traders; the expansion of Pennsylvania by recent Indian purchases; and the formation of the Ohio Company of Virginia, with plans for settlement there. When the Marquis de la Galissonière sent Pierre Joseph Céloron, sieur de Blainville, and his 250 French and Indian troops to the Ohio country in 1749, it was undoubtedly "a move to assert French ownership of the Ohio country and to counteract the influence of English traders on its native inhabitants."⁴⁹

Céloron's expedition took his troops to the Allegheny River through Lake Chautauqua and Conewango Creek, then down the Ohio River and up the Miami. It was at the mouth of this creek where Céloron posted a sign bearing the French royal coat of arms and buried the first of several lead plates "renewing" the possession of the Ohio country by the French King. As he traveled, Céloron began by warning the Indians not to have anything to do with the British; he eventually ordered them not to allow any British traders to come. The tribes replied that this would cause hardships unless the British were replaced by French traders and smiths. A reminder that the Indians had lost land in eastern Pennsylvania to the British, and a warning that they might soon lose the lands they now held, similarly brought little response.⁵⁰ French control of the Ohio country could not be bought for the price of one non-military expedition.

While Céloron was traipsing through the Ohio country, the Shawnee had persuaded a group of Miamis to establish a new town, Pickawillany, on the upper waters of the Great Miami River. By 1750, Pennsylvania traders were supplying this town. More importantly--and more

threateningly, to French eyes--these British traders were "penetrat[ing] farthest into the French trading territory, even carrying trade goods north to a winter hunting base at the juncture of the Maumee and Auglaize rivers in northwest Ohio in the very hinterland of Detroit." In 1750, the French responded to this impertinence by arresting these British traders.⁵¹

While Shawnee relations with the French grew more tenuous, those with the British seemed to grow stronger. In response to a 1751 treaty with Pennsylvania, in which George Croghan delivered a statement to the Shawnees from Governor Hamilton "to remove any Misunderstanding that should have happened between us," the Shawnee speaker, Kishequeatama, said, "[W]e assure You our Brothers the English our Hearts are all good and true towards You."⁵² Then, in February 1752, Governor Hamilton received a letter from several Shawnee chiefs, including Lapechkewe, which stated:

All the Nations settled on this River Ohio, and on this side the Lakes, are in Friendship, and live as one People; but the French, who are directed by the Evil Spirit, and not God, trouble us much, they have often cheated us with their advice, and as we wont listen to them any more, they threaten to cut us off, and have killed thirty of our Brothers the Twightwees [Miamis], and we now acquaint you that we intend to strike the French, and not suffer ourselves to be insulted any more by our deceitful Fathers and Brothers.⁵³

Hamilton, however, was troubled enough by friction within the Pennsylvania colony: the frontier folk (mostly Scotch-Irish farmers) of western Pennsylvania wanted stronger measures to protect them against raids by Indians and French, while the colonial assembly,

dominated by pacifist Quakers from the eastern part of the colony, refused to institute military measures or even provide funds to purchase arms and ammunition. Finally, on April 24, 1752, Hamilton sent this message to the Shawnees:

[T]he Counsellors and Commissioners for Virginia will be better enabled on the Spot to judge of what shall be proper for you and the other Indian nations to do, and will I doubt not give you good and faithful advice. . . . These People and We are all subjects of one Great King, and have the same Interests and the same Affections for the Indians our faithful and good Friends, so that I am perswaded they will . . . give you such Council as they shall judge most for your real Interest, and for the Benefit of all his Majesties Colonies.⁵⁴

Virginia's concern with the Shawnees was borne out by the Virginians' almost immediate request for a conference. Virginia Commissioners Joshua Fry, Lunsford Lomax, and James Patton met the Shawnees at Logstown, some eighteen miles south of the forks where the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers joined to form the Ohio. The two parties conferred from May 28 to June 13, attempting to clarify the status of the territorial agreements of the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, which first involved Virginia and Maryland in the Chain of Friendship. The need for this conference had resulted from the activities of the newly organized Ohio Company of Virginia, which held claims along the Ohio River and which had sent Christopher Gist to reconnoiter the area in 1750 and 1751.⁵⁵

The Commissioners acknowledged that "[Y]our Nation [the Shawnees] has suffered much by French Devices by which you have been dispersed.

We exhort you that remain, that you keep firm hold of the great Chain of Friendship between us, the Six nations and their Allies, which is the likeliest Method to retrieve your Loss, and again to make you a happy People." Shawnee representatives, along with those of the Delawares and other western allies of the Six Nations, "confirmed the territorial cessions of the Lancaster treaty of 1744 for lands south and east of the Ohio River, but their confirmation was subject to final approval by the Onondaga Council." (The Onondaga council never ratified the territorial agreements, partly because of French activity along the Ohio; as a result, the land cession remained uncertain.) The tribes also reluctantly acquiesced in the right of the Ohio Company and the English to build a fort at the forks of the Ohio.⁵⁶

The proposed building of a fort there indicated that the British once again felt the ominous presence of the French. On a "Mission to the Twightwees" (Miamis), Captain William Trent learned that the Shawnees also felt a storm brewing. On August 4, 1752, Trent recorded in his journal that some Shawnees had shown him black wampum from the Miamis, "acquainting all nations in alliance with them that they had but one heart with them, and though it was darkness on the westward, yet toward the sun-rising it was bright and clear." The Shawnees then brought out a string of mostly black wampum, which meant that the Miamis "[had] the hatchet in their hands ready to strike the French and their Indians and they desire all their friends to assist them."⁵⁷

Not only the west was dark: Trent also recorded the visit to Lower Shawnee Town of six Cherokees who came from the south to make peace with the Six Nations and their allies. These Cherokees, having been accused of killing English traders, said, "[W]e are sensible that there

has been a great many traders killed, but we have not done it. You know that it is the French Indians that have killed them. . . ." Finally, Trent wrote, "While we were at the lower Shawanees town, there came a messenger from the Six nations to order the Indians there to keep themselves together, and to acquaint them there was an army from Canada arrived in the lakes."⁵⁸

The news of this army spread quickly. Under the leadership of Charles Michel de Mouet Langlade (a French-Ottawa trader from Michilimackinac), a mixed force of French troops and Ottawas from northern Lower Michigan captured the British traders at Pickawillany. As an example, they "made a broth" (and ate it) of the local Miami leader Old Britain, also known as La Demoiselle. The Miamis returned to their former residences on the Wabash River--and to their former alliance with the French. Almost simultaneously, French and Indian forces struck far south of the Ohio River at the British trading post at Eskippakithiki on Lulbegrud Creek in the Kentucky country. (The location had been occupied beginning in 1745 by part of Peter Chartier's band of Shawnees.)⁵⁹

By early 1753, there were uneasy rumors of French preparations to invade the Ohio country. On May 7, the traders at George Croghan's Pine Creek trading post heard of French forces at the Niagara portage preparing for a major expedition to the Ohio Valley; this rumor was confirmed the following day by runners from the Onondaga council. On May 12, John Harris arrived with similar intelligence from Governor Hamilton, Governor George Clinton of New York, and Indian Superintendent Sir William Johnson. That same day, Scaroyady dispatched messengers "to the Logs Town &ca., to the Delawares and Shawonese to invite them

to the Council" which was to be held as soon as possible.⁶⁰

In early June, Andrew Montour carried this message to the Six Nations Council from Richard Peters of Pennsylvania:

The French have invaded your Lands on the Ohio and are building Forts there. The Indians of your Nations settled there, with the Delawares and Shawonese, Twightwees [Miamis] and Owendats [Wyandots] are terrified, and desire our assistance, which We are willing to afford them, but want first to know in what Manner You will desire We shall give them Assistance, and what you would chuse We should do to prevent the Country and Them from falling into the Hands of the French.⁶¹

Even as Montour carried this message to the Onondaga council, Scaroyady and "Head Men of the [Ohio] Six Nations, the Twightees [sic], Shawonese, and Delawares" were heading south to meet with Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia. Through a small party of Mingoes and Delawares, they heard that there were "Three Hundred French Men and Ten Connewaugeroonas [Caughnawagas, or Kanawakes, French Catholic Indians, mostly Mohawks and Oneidas] within Two Days' Journey" of Logstown. Immediately Scaroyady requested that Dinwiddie "send out a number of your People . . . to meet us at the Forks of Mohongeaalo [the Monongahela], and see what is the reason of their coming, for we do not want the French to come amongst Us at all. . . ."62

The Virginians (and the Pennsylvanians) were reluctant to take such reports at face value. Peters had told Governor Hamilton "he could not depend on any accounts from Ohio, as there were but some Indian Traders . . . who were too partial, ignorant and too much concerned for their own Interest to give true or intelligent Accounts";

furthermore, "the Indians [told] so many stories & the Traders [were] so senseless & credulous, that no confidence can be placed anywhere."⁶³ But the Virginians and Pennsylvanians did not have to take Peters's word: the Shawnees themselves were telling so many different stories to so many different people that it was nearly impossible to know which story was closest to the truth.

In his account of the proceedings at Logstown, William Trent wrote that, on August 22, the Shawnees (and the Delawares) affirmed that "they looked upon [the Six Nations] as their Rulers, and that they were ready to strike the French whenever they bid them."⁶⁴ A month later, at Winchester, Virginia, Nuckegunna and Tomenebuck privately showed William Fairfax a copy of their friendship agreement with Governor Thomas of Pennsylvania; they and Fairfax reaffirmed "the said Chain of Friendship, inviolable, strong, bright, and lasting, which We . . . will likewise keep and maintain so long as the Sun Moon and Stars shall give their light."⁶⁵

Meanwhile, a similar scene was being enacted on the far side of the Ohio River. The Shawnees, and the other Indians at Logstown, seeing the French expedition down the Ohio, had inquired as to the status of the lands they currently occupied. Paul Marin de la Malgue, commander of the expedition, announced, "The establishments I am making and will continue to make along the Belle Riviere are built on what unquestionably belongs to the King [of France], since M. de La Salle took possession of it when it was inhabited by the Cha8oinons with whom the Iroquois were constantly at war, and who have always been our friends." In short, he said, "All the Land and waters on this (western) Side **Allegheny Hills** are mine, on the other side theirs;

this is agreed on between the two Crowns over the great Waters."⁶⁶ Evidently this reply satisfied the Shawnees, for their speaker then told the French, "[W]e are going to tell you what our true feelings are. . . . [W]e beg you to tell our father Onontio [the Governor of Canada] . . . [that] We shall be as glad to see you in our villages as you seem to be to hear us speak."⁶⁷

While the Shawnees were opening their hearts to the French, they were opening their shot-pouches to the English. In October 1753, George Croghan reported that "the Ohio Indians had received from the **Virginia** Government a large Number of Arms . . . [and] a suitable Quantity of Ammunition [which was] . . . to be lodged for them in a place of Security, on this [eastern] Side the Ohio, which was committed to the care of three Persons . . . [Christopher] **Guest** [Gist], **William Trent**, and **Andrew Montour**, who were impowered to distribute them to the **Indians** as their Occasions and Behaviour should require."⁶⁸

The Ohio tribes also professed a great concern with the safety of English traders, for they instructed Scaroyady to request that people from Pennsylvania and Virginia "forbear settling . . . over the **Allegheny** Hills . . . lest Damage should be done." At the same time, Scaroyady asked that the governors of those two colonies call back the majority of their traders because "they spread themselves over our wide Country, at such great distances, that we cannot see them, or protect them." Rather, "only three Setts of Traders [should] remain . . . in three Places, which we have appointed for their Residence, viz. **Logs-Town**, the Mouth of **Canawa** [the Kanawha River], and the Mouth of **Mohongely** [the Monongahela River]." This affirmation of friendship was prompted by a rumor that the French intended to drive the English

and the Shawnees from the Ohio country.⁶⁹

Scaroyady then prepared to depart for Carolina to "Sollicit the release of some Warriors of the ~~Shawonese~~ Nation" who were being held at under suspicion of carrying off some of Carolina's "Friendly Indians" (Cherokees). The Pennsylvania commissioners convinced Scaroyady "that the Release of these Prisoners will be sooner and more effectually procur'd by the joint Interposition of the Governors of **Pennsylvania** and **Virginia**"; at Scaroyady's prompting, the Shawnees grudgingly accepted this offer.⁷⁰ Lieutenant Governor James Hamilton of Pennsylvania promptly "interceded for the Enlargement of the Six Shawonese detained in the publick Prison at Charles Town."⁷¹

As Hamilton related to Scaroyady (in a message written December 5, 1753), two of the Shawnees were sent to Philadelphia, along with a letter from the Governor of Carolina. He wrote that "Some of the Shawonese Indians have been formerly here, and . . . have carried off some of our Friendly Indians. . . . [The remaining four Shawnees] will be returned to their Friends upon restoring all the Prisoners they have taken of us, and upon their engaging to You [Hamilton] not to permit any of their People to come into this Province for the future." Hamilton also told Scaroyady that the other four Shawnees had escaped from Carolina. After asking Scaroyady about any Carolina Indians in Shawnee towns (and receiving a reply that there were none), Hamilton then wrote of his expectation that none "of the Shawonese, or any other of our Friendly Indians will ever go into the inhabited Part of Carolina," and instructed John Patten to deliver the two Shawnees to their people in the Ohio country.⁷²

Patten, however, had a twofold mission. He was "not to let it

be known that [he had] any other Instruction than to deliver the Shawonese," but was in fact to "make all the Enquiry possible of what the French are doing or propose to do": Hamilton wanted the numbers of French troops, the names of French commanders, the locations of proposed forts, and any other military information Patten could obtain. Patten was also instructed to obtain the numbers of men in each Ohio tribe, as well as "how many of them incline to the French and how many to the English, that it may be known who are to be depended on and who not."⁷³ (This action may well have been prompted by a comment which Richard Peters made to Thomas Penn in early November: "[I]t appears to me that the Ohio Indians are a debauched People, and severall of them will go over to the French, notwithstanding their warm Professions, however, a little time will show it better.")⁷⁴

When officials in London heard there were French troops in the Ohio country, they asked the colonial governors not to take any military action "before sending a warning to the French that they were trespassing on British territory." George Croghan, James Patten, and Andrew Montour swiftly reached Logstown on January 14 with a message to that effect from Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania; a French military detachment arrived shortly to relay the message to the Marquis Duquesne, governor of New France. While they awaited a response from the French, Croghan and Montour received word that the French-allied Ottawas had asked the Wyandots to join them in attacking the Shawnees at Lower Shawnee Town; the Wyandots had refused and informed the other Ohio tribes of the situation (of these tribes, only the Miamis had actually returned to the French fold, according to Scaroyady).⁷⁵

The overwhelming French presence in the Ohio country forced the

Indians to admit that they did want Pennsylvania and Virginia to build forts along the Ohio and to assist them in resisting the French advance. On February 2, 1754, the Ohio Indians again requested military assistance from the English, "that You and We may secure the Lands of Ohio; for there is nobody but You our Brethren and Ourselves have any Right to the Land." When this elicited no military support, Scaroyady and Tanaghrison (an Oneida who resided at Logstown, recognized by the English as the Indians' "half-king," or spokesman) bluntly told the governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania, "[N]ow if you do not come to our relief we are gone entirely."⁷⁶

The response was certainly not what the tribes had anticipated. Pennsylvania had no armed force, and the Assembly, dominated by eastern Quaker pacifists, would authorize no military measures. Virginia did only slightly better, in the estimation of the Indians. In early 1754, the Ohio Company of Virginia sent a small work party under William Trent to build a stockade at the forks of the Ohio. Governor Robert Dinwiddie, a shareholder in the Ohio Company, also sent a small force of Virginia militia, under the command of twenty-two-year-old Lieutenant Colonel George Washington, to order the French to quit lands claimed by the British crown. On April 18, shortly after they had begun work on a stockade, Trent's party was compelled by a large French force to surrender their post; upon completing the stockade, the French named the post Fort Duquesne. Washington's party, however, had somewhat better luck: after an embarrassing "victory" over French troops at the "Great Meadows" just east of the Monongahela River, the Virginians began the construction of Fort Necessity (near present-day Uniontown).⁷⁷

Unfortunately for the Virginians--and for the Shawnees--they soon

lost what tenuous hold they had on the forks of the Ohio. On July 4, 1754, Washington and his Virginians were forced to surrender Fort Necessity to an army of French and Indians. To the Shawnees' further misfortune, Washington signed a statement of capitulation and agreed that the Virginians would leave "territory belonging to France." Not a single English flag now flew west of the Alleghenies.⁷⁸

Only five days later, the Ohio Indians were dealt another blow, this time by their own "protectors." On July 9, the Six Nations sold to Pennsylvania "land south of a line starting a mile north of the mouth of Penn's Creek and extending northwest by west to the colony's western boundary." In exchange for this land, the Six Nations--not the tribes who dwelt there--received £400, and would receive a similar payment when the lands beyond the mountains were settled. (To placate the dispossessed tribes, "the 6 Nations reserved the lands at Shamokin & Wyoming as hunting grounds and as a place of refuge for Ohio Indians.")⁷⁹

Washington's surrender at Fort Necessity, and the subsequent French occupation of the forks of the Ohio and the establishment of a chain of four forts from Fort Presque Isle (near current Erie, Pennsylvania) to Fort Duquesne, disrupted the lives of many Ohio Indians. Scaroyady burned Logstown, and Tanaghrison's pro-British followers fled from the Ohio country to George Croghan's trading post at Aughwick (present-day Shirleysburg, Pennsylvania). Those who chose to remain loyal to the British then moved on to the Iroquois country in New York; a significant number (mostly Shawnees and Delawares) who remained uncertain which side to take, lingered at Aughwick. On September 3, Conrad Weiser recorded the following message from the Shawnee Wabadikisy

(Little Johnny): "[L]east you may think we are in the French Interest, because we were not engaged in the Skirmish some of your People had with the French some time ago [presumably Washington's mission]; We assure You . . . that We are still your Friends and Brethren as We have always been. . . . We hope You will always look upon us as your good and true Brethren; We earnestly desire it of You because We know that our Lives, the Life of our Wives and Children and those yet unborn depends upon it."⁸⁰

That the Shawnees remained staunch "Friends and Brethren" of the British was not obvious to everyone. On September 6, Scaroyady and Tanaghrison told Conrad Weiser of a message which the Miamis had carried to Lower Shawnee Town: "Brethren the Shawonese, You know that the French has invaded our Country on all Sides, why do You set so still, will You be Slaves to the French, and suffer them to be Masters of all the Land and all the Game, rise up and take the Hatchet and follow our Example. We have killed not long ago fifty French Men, all warriors, and in one day five other Nation have joined Us, and if You and your Grandfathers the Delawares will but stir, the French will soon be forced to fly." Scaroyady also reported the Shawnee reply: "We are surprized at your Request, the Six United Nations have desired Us to sit still and not mind the French . . . [and] We desire you will spare Us and leave our Town before the French hear of You, and come and Kill you here, and plunge us into the War before the Six Nations begin it." The Miamis had gone home in disgust; Scaroyady and Tanaghrison, "out of humor" with the Shawnees for not consulting them on a response, came to Weiser at Aughwick.⁸¹

Weiser soon "found that the Shawonese and Delawares [were] very

strictly united together, and that the French made them large Presents, desiring them to stand their Friends or Neuter, they the Shawonese and Delawares made them no answer at all, but sent these Men about twelve in Number [including Scaroyady and Tanaghrison] to see their Brethren the English . . . and to renew their Friendship with them." Scaroyady himself took a belt of wampum representing a friendship agreement between Pennsylvania and the Shawnees and Delawares "to the Six Nations . . . intend[ing] to tell them how kind [the Pennsylvanians] have been to them and all of us on the Ohio."⁸²

While the Shawnees professed friendship with the Six Nations and the British, they were growing anxious for some action to be taken. On December 19, 1754, Jagrea (a Mohawk and Scaroyady's son-in-law) received a message which had been delivered to the Shawnees at Logstown and to "a Mohock Indian called the Song," who was to have carried it to the Six Nations and the English. The Turtle, a Miami chief, exhorted them: "Be strong and strike the French, and drive them from these Waters. . . . The Twightwees [Miamis], Piankishaws, Waywawjachtanows [Weas], and Muskoos [Mascoutens], and all the Indians to the West, desire you to be quick and strike the French, cut them down now whilst they are Young and Tender, do not suffer them to grow to be large Trees." The Shawnees had replied that "they could do nothing till they should hear from the Six Nations and their Brethren the English, who had requested them to keep still and do nothing against the French till they should hear further from them."⁸³ Despite their cautious reply, the Shawnees, beleaguered by British promises of friendship, and beset by French offers of brotherhood, were beginning to think their best protection would not be a council fire, but a hatchet.

CHAPTER II

KINDLING THE FIRE: THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND PONTIAC'S MOVEMENT

The Seven Years' War began in earnest on the North American continent with the resounding defeat of Major General Edward Braddock's British expedition against Fort Duquesne in mid-1755. The garrison of French soldiers and Canadian militia drew major support from a large multitribal force of Indian allies. In defeat, the British army lost nearly two-thirds its strength to casualties (including Braddock himself); the British also suffered great losses of horses, provisions, and supplies. With this demonstration of French might, the Shawnees--and several other Ohio tribes--were compelled to join the French for (as they claimed) their own safety.

The Shawnee decision to side with the French came as a great blow to the British. As late as March 1755, Conrad Weiser wrote to Governor Robert Hunter Morris of Pennsylvania that "a good number of Indians, Chiefly of those that came a way last year from Ohio [in response to Morris's invitation]," had made a winter visit to Aughwick, "because of the invasion of the French, whom they hate, and will not live in their neighbourhood." This included a group of twelve Shawnees, who, with nineteen Six Nations Indians led by Jonathan Cayenquilloqua (Weiser's foster-brother), intended to make a town on the West Branch

of the Susquehanna at Otstuagy (present Montoursville).¹ Later that month, Scaroyady told the Shawnees and Delawares to still "consider themselves under the Protection of the Six Nations. . . . [B]e quite easy and still, nor be disturbed at what is doing--nor meddle at all on any side, till they see or hear from them [the Iroquois]."²

The Shawnees were not comforted by Scaroyady's words. In early October, an Indian friend warned George Croghan that the Ohio Indians were preparing to attack frontier settlements: first they would persuade the Indians living near the settlements to move to the Ohio country, and then they would begin their raids (indeed, they had already begun on the Virginia frontier). They would not, however, "attack Pennsylvania until all their people had moved from the Susquehanna Valley to the Ohio." Croghan wrote to his friend Charles Swaine at Shippensburg; Swaine then wrote to Governor Morris that, according to a prisoner taken and escaped from these Indians, "they are known to be the Shawnese & Delawares, under the command of one Shingo [Shingas, a Delaware village chief], who, & most of his Company were at the Carlisle Treaty [in October 1753, professing friendship for Pennsylvania]." True to the warning, on October 16, 1755, Shingas's Indians attacked the farms which had recently been settled near the mouth of Penn's Creek; they killed or carried off as prisoners more than twenty men, women, and children. Significantly, these farms were located on the very edge of the Albany Purchase of 1754--lands which the Six Nations had sold from beneath the Ohio tribes.³

One of these captives, Charles Stuart, later related the Indians' reasons for siding with the French. Stuart wrote that Shingas had been one of a delegation of six western Pennsylvania Indians (two each from

the Delawares, Mingoës, and Shawnees) who had met Braddock on the road to Fort Duquesne. The delegation intended to see if peace would be possible if the British conquered the French, and they pleaded with Braddock not to take Indian lands. "'Gen^l Braddock replied,' said Shingas, 'that the English Should Inhabit & Inherit the Land.'" Shingas then asked "'whether the Indians that were Freinds to the English might not be Permitted to Live and Trade Among the English and have Hunting Ground sufficient To Support themselves and Familys.'" Braddock's reply? "'No Savage shou^d Inherit the Land.'" Despite this, Shingas said, "'the Greater Part [of the Ohio tribes] remained neuter till they saw How Things wou'd go . . . and were still in hopes that the English wou'd Be Victorious . . . but after the French had ruined Braddocks Army they immediately compell^d the Indians To join them and let them know that if they refused they wou'd Immediately cut them off, on w^{ch} the Indians Join^d the French for their Own Safety.'"⁴

Major General Edward Braddock, commander in chief of the British Army in North America, had set out in June 1755 with a column of some twenty-two hundred men (including nine companies of George Washington's Virginia militia, for whom Braddock had nothing but contempt) from Fort Cumberland, on the Potomac. His objective was to take Fort Duquesne from Captain Pierre de Contrecoeur and the French garrison. On July 9, about ten miles from the fort, a French force under Captain Daniel de Beaujeu was joined by Delawares, Shawnees, and other Ohio Indians under half-Ottawa Charles Langlade; together this army cut Braddock's force to pieces. The victorious French had only 3 officers and cadets killed and 4 wounded, out of a total of 35; of the 72 French regulars and 146 Canadian militiamen, only 9 were killed or wounded; their Indian

allies lost no more than 35 or 40 out of 637. For the British, however, the losses approached the catastrophic. Sixty-three of the 86 officers (including Braddock himself, who died on July 13, as his army retreated across the Monongahela) had been killed or severely wounded. Of the 1373 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, 914 had been killed or wounded. Though it remained undeclared, there could be no question that, once again, the French and the British were at war.⁵

The British defeat at Fort Duquesne left the western frontier open to France's Indian allies, and raids such as those led by Shingas forced British settlers to withdraw as much as a hundred miles eastward. This "wholesale defection of the [Ohio] Valley Indians from the English cause" astounded the British, so much so that the Pennsylvania Assembly inquired of Governor Morris whether he knew of "any disgust or injury the Delawares or Shawanese have ever received from this Province & by what means their affections can be so alienated."⁶

In a letter to former Pennsylvania governor James Hamilton, George Croghan discussed one possible explanation for the behavior of the Ohio tribes. Croghan wrote that "the Six Nations, Dalaways, Shannas, Wandotts, and Twatwees, has had a Grand Council, in which it was Determined that the four Latter tribes should Ingage the fruntiers of Verginia, Merreyland & Pensylvania, this Winter, and Drive the Inhabitance over the South Mountain." Croghan also suggested that Iroquois neutrality was in reality "a carefully worked out plan to balance the French against the English and prevent either nation from taking over the Ohio country." While the Six Nations stood officially neutral, they would "make all the intrest they can with the Southerd Indians, to draw them to their Intrest"; they would also "make peace

for the other Indians in return for getting English help in expelling the French from the Ohio country."⁷

A more obvious reason for the current alienation arose from "Whether the Chiefs of the Shawanese did not, in 1753, complain to this [Pennsylvania] Government, that Satisfaction had not been made to them by the Proprietaries for a large Tract of Land . . . and whether they were not then promised, that Application should be immediately made to the Proprietaries in their Behalf to obtain the Satisfaction they desired." A three-man commission (Robert Strettell, Joseph Turner, and Thomas Cadwalader) then applied to Richard Peters, who had been involved in the Carlisle Treaty of 1753. Peters replied that he remembered nothing of "any such Complaint" being made, or "any [such] Promise" being given, and that he "never understood that the Shawanese had or could have any Right to the said Land, or any other Land in this Province." Furthermore, he reminded them, Scaroyady and Andrew Montour

attributed [the Shawnees'] defection wholly to the Defeat of General Braddock, and the Encrease of Strength and Reputation gained on that Victory of the French, and their intimidating those Indians, and using all Means by Promises and threats to seduce and fix them in their Interest; and to the seeming Weakness and Want of Union in the English, and their appearing unable or unwilling to protect them, and particularly this Government [of Pennsylvania], who had constantly refused to put the Hatchet into their Hands.⁸

The British were further confounded by messages such as the one received by Governor Morris on December 8, 1755. Charles Broadhead, a trader who had settled on the upper Delaware River, wrote that the Shawnees, Delawares and Minisinks of the Wyoming Valley were "very true

to the English Interest at this time tho' how long they may so continue without receiving the Hatchet from us is hard to Determine." Broadhead suggested that arming the Indians might give the British an advantage: the Indians might "intirely protect the Settlements from Delaware to the West Branch & perhaps to Schuykill ranging to the Valey between the Kittatny Hills, and the second Mountain."⁹

The general opinion, however, was that the Shawnees **had** gone over to the French. This view was reinforced by the fact that the Shawnees continued to dwell in the Ohio country--in a new village which the French had built for them on the ashes of Logstown. With the Shawnee defection in mind, Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia had specific instructions, designed to ensure the continued allegiance of the southern tribes, for Peter Randolph and William Byrd, treaty commissioners with the Cherokees and Catawbas. Dinwiddie directed them to make special mention of the French prevailing "on the Delawares and Shawnese, to do Mischief when they pretended to be our Friends." Dinwiddie also prepared a special message to be delivered to the Catawbas: "Lately many of the French joined with the Shawnese came into our Country, and murdered many of our Brethren. . . ."¹⁰ Dinwiddie gambled that the thought of Shawnee treachery--and the threat of French invasion--would be enough to keep the southern tribes on friendly terms with the British.

A great deal of British speculation was put to rest at a council held at Carlisle in mid-January 1756. George Croghan reported that the Beaver, brother of Shingas, told him that the commandant of Fort Duquesne had repeatedly offered "the French Hatchet" to the Shawnees and Delawares, who had just as often refused, saying that they would do as the Six Nations advised. Finally, in April or May 1755, an

Iroquois war party in the company of some Kanawakes and Adirondacks (French allies) had stopped at Fort Duquesne on their way south, "and on these the Governor of Fort Duquesne prevailed to offer the French Hatchet to the Delawares and Shawonese who received it from them, and went directly against Virginia."¹¹

Croghan reinforced this story by telling William West that "a party of Delawares and Shawnese from Ohio had Scalp'd and taken prisoners several of the Inhabitants of Patterson's Creek [a Virginia tributary of the Potomac], and afterwards some of that party . . . destroyed the great Cove [the vicinity of present McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania]."¹² After a private conversation with the Iroquois Silver Heels, and after hearing several other accounts, Croghan was "well assured . . . that the Delawares and Shawonese acted in this hostile Manner by the Advice and with the Concurrence of the Six Nations." He also concluded "that the French had stirr'd them up . . . in order to drive off the Back Settlers so as to make it more difficult for [the English] to Supply an Army in a future Expedition against Fort Duquesne."¹³

As the council went on, the Iroquois presented their version of the story. A Six Nations speaker said that they "had learnt that the French had prevailed upon the Shawonese . . . and upon the Delawares . . . to enter into a separate and private Treaty with them, by which they the Shawonese and Delawares had agreed not only to permit the French to take Possession of the Country upon the Ohio, as far as they would; but to assist them against the English, if their Aid should be found necessary in the Contest which the taking Possession of that Country should occasion." Furthermore, the Shawnees "indeed pretend[ed] that the Imprisonment of some of their Chiefs in South Carolina is the Cause

of their Conduct."¹⁴

Whatever the cause of their conduct, the fact remained that at least some of the Shawnees had gone over to the French: some Shawnees had aided in the defense of Fort Duquesne, had moved deeper into the Ohio country (and closer to the French), had raided along the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers. With this in mind, Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia authorized the Sandy Creek expedition in February 1756. Led by Major Andrew Lewis, some 250 Virginians and 100 Cherokees were to march down the Big Sandy and move against the Shawnees on the Ohio River. But heavy rains, supplies lost crossing swollen streams, and large-scale desertion by Virginia soldiers prevented the expedition from ever reaching its destination.¹⁵

Whatever the cause of their conduct in the months following Braddock's defeat, the Shawnees, and the other Ohio tribes who had gone over to the French, grew disillusioned as time wore on. Either the French did not have the resources--troops, supplies, and money--to defend the Ohio Valley, or they refused to send them. Because they could not obtain from the French even the most basic supplies and support they needed, the Indians suspected that the former was true. When the French again called for assistance to defend Fort Duquesne in the early fall of 1758, the "Lakes" Indians [Huron, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi] defeated the advance detachment of the British attacking force in September, but then returned--empty-handed--to their villages.¹⁶ With empty bullet pouches and empty bellies, the Shawnees and several other nations approached the British.

In October 1758, more than five hundred Indians from the Six Nations, the Shawnees, and nine other tribes met with the governors

of Pennsylvania and New Jersey at Easton, Pennsylvania. Military pressures along the northern frontier had made it difficult for the French to support and supply their Indian allies; the Easton conference only completed Indian disaffection from the French cause. The British agreed to redress "the outstanding grievance of the Delawares and Shawnees over lands belonging to them beyond the Alleghenies which had been sold by members of the Six Nations," pledging that "no white people should make plantations or settlements on the lands to the westward of those hills."¹⁷ Both the British and the Indians had made a remarkable reversal of position in the three years since the Shawnees and Delawares first repeated their complaint.

The news of the Easton Treaty reached Kuskuski, the Iroquois capital on the upper Ohio (near present New Castle, Pennsylvania), on the morning of November 20. That afternoon, Christian Frederick Post, a Moravian missionary in the service of the Pennsylvania government, read a message from Governor William Denny, informing the Indians--mostly Iroquois, Shawnees, and Delawares--of the treaty. That evening, according to Post's journal, a French officer from Fort Duquesne arrived and told the Indians, "The **English** are coming with an army to destroy both you and me. I therefore desire you immediately, my children, to hasten with all the young men; we will drive the **English** and destroy them." He then offered them a belt of wampum. One chief replied, "I have just heard something of our brethren the **English**, which pleaseth me much better. I will not go." A Delaware chief, Tollema (whom the French called Captain Pierre and the English called Red Mink) would not even take the wampum, but kicked it from the officer's hands, picked it up on the end of a stick, then flung it away into a corner. He told the

Frenchman, "Give [the belt] to the **French** captain [Ligneris, commandant of Fort Duquesne], and let him go with his young men; he boasted much of his fighting; now let us see his fighting. We have often ventured our lives for him, and had hardly a loaf of bread, when we came to him; and now he thinks we should jump to serve him. **But we will not.**" Catahecassa (Black Hoof) and Shemeneto (Black Snake) of the Shawnees, and Shingas and Beaver of the Delawares, promised Post that word of the Easton treaty would be spread amongst the Ohio tribes. Four days later, the British flag was raised over Kuskuski.¹⁸

The British were busy raising flags that day. Brigadier General John Forbes was determined not to repeat what he considered Braddock's greatest mistake: marching through the wilderness, cutting a road as he went and encumbering himself with a long supply train for the entire distance. Forbes chose to move in stages, building fortified supply depots every so often, until he was within striking distance of Fort Duquesne. Unable to assemble the necessary Indian support when the main body of Forbes's army arrived in November (the threat of starvation had forced Ligneris to send the greater part of his men back to Montreal or Fort Niagara), the French garrison burned the fort and fled up the Allegheny River. On November 24, the British army took over the site, renaming the place Pittsburgh and the military post Fort Pitt, both in honor of Prime Minister William Pitt.¹⁹

When the British occupied Pittsburgh, another wave of western migration swept through the Shawnee nation. The largely Shawnee population left the trading center of Logstown, only eighteen miles below Pittsburgh on the Ohio River; Shawnees also left Wyoming, on the Susquehanna River in eastern Pennsylvania. Both groups headed for the

Ohio country. As the Shawnee population in Ohio grew, so did village locations change. The people of Upper Shawnee Town (at the mouth of the Kanawha River) had already established a new settlement, Wakatomica, in 1756, at the edge of the new population of Delawares at the headwaters of the Muskingum River. In late 1758, Lower Shawnee Town, at the mouth of the Scioto River, was moved to the plains fifty miles upriver (near present Circleville, Ohio). The Shawnees had come home again.²⁰

The Shawnees, as well as the other Ohio tribes, felt secure in returning to the Ohio Valley, for they fully expected the British to leave as the French had done. As the Delaware village chief Beaver confided to Christian Frederick Post only four days after the British occupation of Pittsburgh, "All the nations had jointly agreed to defend their hunting place at **Alleghenny**, and suffer nobody to settle there . . . if the English would draw back over the mountain [the Alleghenies], they would get all the other nations into their interest; but if they staid and settled there, all the nations would be against them."²¹

The British, however, had a plan to bring the Shawnees and the other Ohio Valley tribes "entirely over to the British Interest." This tripartite plan had grown out of instructions from Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to George Croghan, his deputy in the West, and from the military commander-in-chief, General Sir Jeffrey Amherst (or his immediate subordinate, Brigadier General Robert Monckton), to commandants of western posts. The first part of the plan acknowledged the necessity of expelling the French from Detroit and the Wabash-Maumee area. To do so, the British were to establish peace with tribes in the area already reconquered, with gifts of guns, ammunition, and clothing, and with promises to restore normal trading

conditions. This was to be accomplished by erecting military posts throughout the Northwest, where private traders might carry on commerce under rules and regulations--and protection--of both the Indian Department and military authorities. Then councils would be held with sections of tribes as necessary, "to make clear to the Indians what was expected of them and what they in turn had a right to expect." The plan also required that the Indians return all white captives taken since 1755.²²

From the beginning the plan was full of holes. To most area tribes, the British conquest of the Detroit area was offensive: that area had always been under French territorial and trade control. Furthermore, the British lacked adequate supplies to present the tribes with sufficient gifts. The plan also restricted traders' access to Indian country, since all trade was to be conducted only where there were established British military posts (some tribes also complained that the prices of furs and skins were too low because of excessive regulation). Finally, although British officials insisted on full restoration, many white captives simply preferred the Indian way of life and had no desire to leave their adopted peoples.²³

In October 1759, General John Stanwix, along with George Croghan, Andrew Montour, and William Trent, met with representatives of the Shawnees, Delawares, Mingo, Miamis, and Wyandots, in the first meeting of the Ohio Valley tribes with a British general. Montour announced the fall of Quebec in September and reported that the construction of Fort Pitt was progressing. Stanwix then reminded the tribes that not all white captives had been delivered to the British.²⁴ (The failure to surrender all captives was only one sign that the Indians did not

entirely believe that the French were gone for good. Rumors still circulated that French soldiers were en route from New Orleans or eastern Canada, and forty lodges of Shawnees from the Scioto River had gone to Fort Ascension, a post which the French had established on the Ohio in 1757.)²⁵

The British had concerns other than the French: on the Virginia and Carolina frontiers, the Cherokees had taken up the hatchet. In mid-1760, George Croghan outfitted a party of a hundred Indians, mostly Shawnees, to fight against the Cherokees. While it appeared to be a show of good faith on the part of the Shawnees, the action was more remarkable because Croghan had outfitted the Indians at the expense of the British government, but without any orders except those of the Fort Pitt commandant.²⁶ This was only the first instance in which the actions of the Indian Department would conflict with the wishes of the British military.

As 1760 went on, Croghan was quite active. In August, he held a council at Pittsburgh to win the friendship of tribes who had supported the French. There he entertained over a thousand Indians: Mingoës, "Huron (henceforth called Wyandot by the British)," Delawares, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Miamis, Kickapoos--and Shawnees. Then, in November, Croghan accompanied the advance occupation force to Detroit "to council with Indian leaders and arrange the exchange of prisoners."²⁷

Even as Croghan labored, the British army was making great strides in the battle for empire. The final battle of the Seven Years' War in North America had been the French defeat at Montreal on September 8, 1760. Included in the terms of capitulation was the surrender of all military posts in French Canada. By November 1760, the British

had established posts at Venango and Presque Isle. Rapid communications between Presque Isle, Pittsburgh, and Niagara made it possible for the troops of Major Robert Rogers to occupy Detroit; on November 29, Captain Bellestre, the French commandant at Detroit, surrendered the fort and palisaded town of eighty houses to the British. Almost immediately, one detachment was sent to take over Fort Ouiatenon on the Wabash, which had been the southernmost post in French Canada; Lieutenant John Butler set out with another detachment to replace the French at Fort Miami (later Fort Wayne) on the Maumee River. With Butler went Alexander McKee, whom Croghan had sent to remove French traders from the Shawnee country. Ice in the upper Great Lakes prevented immediate reoccupation of Fort Michilimackinac, the most important post in the region, until the fall of 1761. Then British troops landed at Michilimackinac and continued on a circuit of Lake Michigan, constructing a new defense post, Fort Sandusky, on the south shore of Sandusky Bay.²⁸

As the French traders were ousted, Croghan began to allow British traders into the Ohio country to fill the void. Early in 1761, Colonel Henry Bouquet (currently commanding at Fort Presque Isle) put an end to this practice. In a letter from March 23, 1761, Bouquet announced to General Robert Monckton, "To prevent differences with the Indians, I have not permitted any Traders to deal at any other Places but where we have Posts." Bouquet purported that the reasons for keeping traders out of the Indian towns were that some tribes (especially the Shawnees) were "not delivering the Prisoners & continuing to steal our Horses." On August 24, Monckton fully endorsed Bouquet's policy: "You doo verry Right in not permitting the Traders to go to the Shawanese, & other Towns, that Steal our horses, till they leave it off; & bring in some

of our Prisoners; for they will never doo it till necessity [lack of trade goods] Obliges them."²⁹

By May 1762, Croghan was reporting great distress: every British post registered Indian complaints of shortages of powder and other supplies. Furthermore, Croghan wrote, all the tribes on the upper Ohio were growing uneasy: "Y^e Most Sensable of them ask Me what is y^e Reason that we allways was Calling them to Council During y^e Wars & giveing them presents & Now Take No Notice of them. They say y^e French was butt a poor people but they allways Cloathed any Indians that was poor or Naked when they Come to see them." By December, Croghan was hearing rumors of war plots among the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingoos, which rightly troubled him: "[I]f y^e Sinecas [Ohio Iroquois, or Mingoos] Dellaways & Shawnas Should Brake with us it will End in a ginerall Warr with all y^e Western Nations tho they att present Seem Jelous of Each Other."³⁰

But it was not only the shortages of trade goods and the inaccessibility of traders that troubled the Ohio tribes. As Bouquet wrote to Governor Francis Fauquier of Virginia on February 8, 1762, "For two years past these Lands [the Monongahela-Ohio Valley] have been over run by a Number of Vagabonds, who under pretence of hunting, were Making Settlements in several parts of them." Bouquet had sensed the gravity of the situation since at least March 1761, when he asked Monckton for leave to issue a proclamation which would forbid whites from hunting or settling west of the Alleghenies.

Monckton did not immediately authorize Bouquet to make such a proclamation; he authorized Bouquet to expel any settlers from western lands. In April, Sergeant Angus MacDonald, commandant at Fort Burd

(near Redstone--later Brownsville--Pennsylvania), received orders to drive off these intruders, but he could do nothing. On October 25, he reported to Bouquet:

Here Comes Such Crowds of Hunters out of the Inhabitence as fills those woods at which the Indians seems Very much Disturbed and say the white People Kills all there Deer yet those hunters Keeps so far from the fort That I Cannot See Them nor Can I send after Them. . . . If your Honour would be pleas^d to Send an Advertisement which I Could Set up at the Great Crossings to give them Notice Then I Could Handle them more Ruffer if they Should Come again.

Upon receiving this report, Bouquet immediately issued his proclamation on October 30, 1761, forbidding hunting or settling west of the mountains and ordering all officers discovering violators of this proclamation to deliver the culprits to Fort Pitt for trial by court martial.³¹

Not surprisingly, Bouquet's proclamation had little effect but to make the "hunters" more wary. As James Kenny commented, "It Greives y^e Indians to see y^e White People Settle on these lands and follow Hunting or Planting, especially in Virginia side & off y^e Road too." The Mingoos were particularly affected by white encroachment, and, in November 1762, Kenny learned from Alexander McKee "that y^e Mingoos has a War Belt & bloody Tomhock now offering to y^e Shawanas, requesting thier help as they are Going to Strike y^e English & drive them off their lands."³²

But the Shawnees could muster little support for the Mingoos. A "plague" (most likely measles or smallpox) swept through the Ohio villages in mid-1762, cutting the Shawnees down by the score. James Kenny heard reports that the Shawnee dead numbered close to "150 men

besids [sic] Women" and children, and when Croghan's deputy, Thomas Hutchins, visited the Shawnee country in September, he found the people "Sick and Dying every day."³³ Still, for the Shawnees, worse was yet to come.

By early 1763, the western tribes had become less than enamored of the British for three fundamental reasons. First of all, British officers--at the behest of Amherst--had discontinued the generous French practice of giving out gifts, mostly powder and ammunition needed for hunting (Amherst suggested that the Indians were "not to be bribed, but punished when they failed to submit"). The British also showed every intention of taking over the whole country rather than being content with their widely separated military and trading posts (witnessed by MacDonald's woes with the Redstone hunters). Finally, and perhaps most insulting to the Indians, were the arrogance and hatred of Indians so obvious in the attitudes of many British officials, most notably that of Amherst. When he heard news of the most recent Indian assaults, the British commander-in-chief instructed his subordinates that the Indians were to be treated "'as the vilest race of beings that ever infested the earth, and whose riddance from it must be deemed a meritorious act, for the good of Mankind.'"³⁴

Thus it was that Pontiac, an Ottawa leader living on the Detroit River, became the dominant figure in a season of Indian warfare, May through October 1763. His immediate objective--shared by the Shawnees, Delawares, Seneca, Miamis, Ojibwas, and Missisaugas--was to eliminate the British presence in the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region.³⁵ What came to be called "Pontiac's War" or "Pontiac's Uprising" (which, in fact, it was not, since "such an act has to be against duly constituted

authority, and this the British had not then established") was actually a "pre-emptive strike by the Indians to defend their lands from invasion and occupation by the Anglo-Americans."³⁶

On June 24, 1763, as fighting raged on the frontier, the Delawares brought word of the fall of three northern Pennsylvania forts to Fort Pitt. They also advised Captain Simeon Ecuyer, the post's commandant, that he would be wise to surrender rather than face a large Indian army. Unknown to the Delawares, the fort, recently reinforced to 338 men, was strong enough to withstand Indian attack despite an outbreak of smallpox. Recently, too, Amherst had instructed his field commander, Bouquet: "'Could it not be contrived to send the small pox among the disaffected tribes?'"³⁷ Despite Bouquet's reply that he would make an attempt, whether he actually instigated Ecuyer's response to the Delawares' demand is not known. However, Ecuyer (like Bouquet a Swiss mercenary) replied to the Delawares with a "present" of two blankets and a handkerchief from the fort's smallpox hospital. An epidemic raged through the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo towns of Ohio until the following spring. Although the epidemic may have begun before Bouquet received his orders (as witnessed by Kenny's and Hutchins's reports in mid-1762), it nevertheless had the effect for which Amherst had hoped: "to spread the disease among tribes involved in Pontiac's uprising . . . and thus to diminish their military power."³⁸

The siege of Fort Pitt, begun by the Delawares on May 29, continued. But the "season of warfare" caused violence far beyond the scenes of military engagements. On the Virginia frontier, a party of some eighty Shawnee warriors, led by their principal chief, Hokolessqua (better known to the English as Cornstalk), and their war

chief, Pucksinwah (who, five years later, would father a son named Tecumseh) crossed the Ohio River and pressed up the Kanawha River, deep into present West Virginia, to strike the settlements on the Greenbrier. Similar raids by other bands of Shawnees and Delawares into the border country of Maryland and northern Virginia prompted the raising of a thousand Virginia and seven hundred Pennsylvania militia to try to protect the frontier folk. Before the raids were over, the Anglo-Americans would lose more than four hundred men (the intertribal raiding parties lost less than one hundred); by late summer, Pittsburgh and Detroit were the only British-held forts in Ohio Indian country.³⁹

Meanwhile, on July 18, Bouquet had set out from Carlisle with an army to relieve the besieged Fort Pitt. On August 6, as the expedition drew within twenty-six miles of Pittsburgh, it was attacked by a war party of Shawnees, Delawares, and Sandusky Wyandots, near a small stream called Bushy Run. Although the Indians slightly outnumbered the British, Bouquet managed to force the Indians to retreat into the forest, at a cost of 110 British casualties. The expedition continued on its way to Pittsburgh, and Fort Pitt was never again severely threatened.⁴⁰

The "disaffected tribes" were becoming disheartened: without aid such as they had previously received from the French, they simply could not support a lengthy campaign against the British. Through a vision, the Delaware prophet Neolin urged the tribes to continue their attempt to drive out the British and to return to a traditional lifestyle which was not dependent on European trade goods. However, at a council near Detroit, spokesmen for the Shawnees and Delawares

pointed out that Neolin "had said not to harm their French brothers, and the war was bringing hardship to the French inhabitants" of Detroit, because Pontiac was requisitioning supplies from area farmers and taking over fields for corn to feed his warriors. By fall, fighting had been suspended, and individual leaders from most tribes came to make peace with the commandant at Detroit, Major Henry Gladwin. On October 30, 1763, a messenger from the French at Fort Chartres arrived with the news: England and France were at peace, and all the Indians should cease their fighting (actually this was a response to Pontiac's appeal, in September, for French aid). Most tribes had already begun to disperse to their winter hunting grounds, and for them the war was over.⁴¹ For the Shawnees, it had only begun.

CHAPTER III

STRIKING THE WAR POST: PEACE AND WAR, 1765-1775

The Treaty of Paris had officially ended the Seven Years' War in February 1763. The North American phase of the war had drawn to a close with the French surrender of Montreal in September of 1760, though the fighting and the intrigue continued. Spain had been drawn into the conflict on the side of the French in 1761, and a secret treaty ceding trans-Mississippi Louisiana from France to Spain became part of the final settlement in Paris. However, French Canada and the portion of Louisiana east of the Mississippi--with the exception of New Orleans and its suburbs--were ceded to Great Britain; the British also acquired East and West Florida as remuneration from the Spanish.

The changes in territorial sovereignty brought about by the Paris treaty also compelled Great Britain to reorganize its North American colonies. The Boundary Line of 1763 defined the western borders of the Province of Quebec at Lake Nipissing and officially restricted Canadian settlement to that province. More importantly, the line established by the Proclamation of October 7, 1763, officially confined white settlement to the lands east of the crest of the Appalachian Mountains.¹ This was to be a final peace.

But Paris and London were a long way from the Ohio Valley. The

resident French, who had finally surrendered their hold on the Ohio country, and the British, who had seemingly won the lands they had long desired, knew nothing of the declaration of peace--nor did the Indians who had always dwelt and hunted on these lands.

As a result, hostilities continued, despite British attempts to bring tribal leaders into peace councils and to get permission to reoccupy forts lost during the recent "uprising." In August 1764, General James Bradstreet and twelve hundred men set out from Fort Niagara for Detroit. En route, they encountered, at Presque Isle, Shawnees and Delawares who convinced Bradstreet they were peaceable. These Indians then hurried in advance of Bradstreet's representative to the Maumee settlements; although the British officer received permission from Pontiac to proceed up the Maumee River and was accompanied by an Iroquois delegation which included the distinguished Oneida leader Thomas Kin, he was nevertheless seized at the Maumee villages and forced to turn back.²

Anti-British sentiment remained strong amongst the western tribes. The French commandant at Fort de Chartres, Captain Louis St. Ange de Bellerive (recently transferred from Fort Vincennes in the Illinois country) attempted to curtail Indian aggression in the spring of 1764 by distributing only limited quantities of gunpowder and ammunition. Besides the local Illinois and Pontiac's Ottawas, St. Ange had to deal with delegations of "militantly anti-British" Shawnees, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis during that summer. Independently, leaders of both the Shawnees and the Illinois traveled to New Orleans to seek assistance from the French governor.

When by the autumn of 1764 the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingo

of Ohio failed to deliver all their white captives to Sandusky on September 8 in accordance with the promise made to Colonel John Bradstreet on August 14, Colonel Henry Bouquet set out with fifteen hundred troops from Fort Pitt to subdue the tribes and bring back the prisoners of war. Bouquet's army reached the town of Tuscarawas on October 13; on October 20, Bouquet demanded that the tribes were to deliver up "all the Prisoners in [their] Possession, without any Exception, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Women, and Children, whether adopted in [their] Tribes, married or living amongst you, under any Denomination, or Pretence whatever." The threatening size of Bouquet's army, and the presence of a large number of relatives of some captives, convinced the Ohio Indians to come to terms at a council held at the site of Conchake, a former Wyandot town on the Muskingum River (opposite present Coshocton, Ohio). By November 9, Bouquet announced that he was satisfied with the Indian return of some two hundred captives--and the promised return of nearly a hundred more from Shawnee towns--and he returned to Fort Pitt.⁴

While Bouquet was forcing the return of white captives, George Croghan was attempting to resurrect the Ohio Indian trade. Croghan traveled to London and became the most influential figure in hammering out a temporary policy of "managing" the tribes rather than using economic means to control them, the method favored by Amherst, Monckton, Bouquet and other militarists. When consulted by the British cabinet, Croghan advised them to guarantee to the tribes permanent ownership of their hunting grounds and to establish Indian trade on a basis which was agreeable to both the British trading interest and the Indians.

The Board of Trade took up Croghan's Indian proposals, and Croghan

wrote triumphantly to Sir William Johnson that the Board had agreed on "a plan for y^e futer Manidgement of y^r Departments & the Indian Trade." This plan was an elaborate affair which centralized Indian management in the hands of the superintendent and his deputies. There were to be thirteen trading posts in the northern department (which included the Ohio Valley), at which all trade was required to be carried on under the supervision of an interpreter, a gunsmith, a commissary, and a deputy, who was to visit and inspect each post at least once a year; the prices of all goods were to be set by the superintendent and enforced by the commissary. More significantly, the plan made "managers" (the superintendent and his deputies) completely independent of military officers—"no small mortification to some people," Croghan suggested, as military officers were not to deal with the Indians at all except through Indian Department officials.⁶

Croghan returned to the North American colonies in late 1764, filled with what some people saw as "an enthusiasm that [probably] had more to do with his hopes for participation in the land and fur business in the Illinois country than it did with the hopes for the improvement of the upper Ohio Valley Indians." He arrived at Fort Pitt on February 28, 1765, with £1200 worth of gifts and £2000 in cash. By holding back these gifts during March and April, he effected the May 10 return of all white captives earlier promised by the Shawnees. Then, on May 11, Croghan presented the first gifts in over two years to chiefs of the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingoos, and the Ohio trade was formally re-opened.⁷

The Shawnees who received Croghan's gifts had not been at the signing of the original treaty with Sir William Johnson on May 8 which

put an end to the fighting. They had been assembling in a camp across the river from Fort Pitt; on May 10, they came across the river in canoes with all their British captives. Once in the council house, the Shawnee speaker "Lawoughqua" (Lawacquaqua) told Bouquet:

Father, Here is your Flesh and Blood, except . . . a few that was out with some of our hunting parties, & those will be brought here as soon as they return. They have all been tied to us by Adoption, and altho' we now deliver them up to you, we will always look upon them as our Relations, whenever the great Spirit is pleased that we may visit them. . . . We have taken as much care of these Prisoners as if they were our own Flesh and Blood; they are now become unacquainted with your Customs and manners, & therefore, Fathers, we request you will use them tenderly & kindly, which will be a means of inducing them to live contentedly with you. . . . Here is a Belt [of peace] . . . [and] we hope that neither side will slip their hands from it so long as the Sun and Moon gives light.⁸

That many of the returned "captives" preferred life with the Indians was clear to both the Shawnees and the British. Only three days after Bouquet had made his original speech to the Ohio Indians, he had advised Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier of Virginia that all returning captives "'ought to be treated by their Relations with Tenderness and Humanity, till Time and Reason make them forget their unnatural attachments, but unless they are closely watch'd, they will certainly return to the Barbarians."⁹ The ensuing reluctance of many captives to return to white society--and the escapes and attempted escapes of some back to the Indians--proved the wisdom of both Bouquet's and

Lawacquaqua's assertions.

The return of white captives was not the only aspect of the council which troubled the Shawnees. In the treaty to end Pontiac's "season of war," the Six Nations had ceded to the British lands beyond the mountains: the treaty specifically stated that the western tribes would "abide by whatever Limits shall be agreed upon between the English and the Six Nations, and shall never disturb His Majesty's Subjects on that Account." Sir William Johnson recognized that this would mean loss to the Shawnees of their hunting grounds south of the Ohio, and he warned the Iroquois, "As what you have proposed about the Boundary is your own free proposition, and since you say you are the Owners of all the land you spoke about, I expect never to hear any grumbling about it." The Iroquois replied that the entire confederacy had agreed to the cession and that all tribes concerned would be told of it "at a Publick meeting in the Shawanese Country, where all the Western Nations often hold their Councils." But there would be grumbling: the western tribes, particularly the Shawnees, were angered not only by the loss of their Kentucky hunting grounds, but also by the fact that the Six Nations had pocketed all proceeds from the sale of the land.¹⁰

The grumbling grew louder. Indian runners reported that the British were planning to organize the southern Indians against the northern tribes; at the same time, a French trading boat from New Orleans reached the Old Northwest with large supplies of ammunition and gunpowder--and a (false) report that the French were about to declare war on the British again. These rumors may have contributed to an incident which took place in June 1765. George Croghan and an

escort party of Shawnees and Delawares (mistaken for Cherokees) were attacked by some Illinois Indians, just below the mouth of the Wabash River. Two whites and three Indians were killed in the ensuing skirmish; Croghan and the remaining wounded were taken as prisoners to Ouiatenon and were eventually released.¹¹

Fear of retaliation by the Ohio tribes was a factor in Croghan's securing the Wabash tribes' consent to the re-establishment of British forts; Croghan reached this agreement during a conference at Ouiatenon, which was attended by Pontiac and his Ottawas, and representatives of four Illinois tribes, as well as deputies of the Shawnees, Delawares, and Senecas. In August, Croghan held a full council at Detroit. There Pontiac and the others agreed to peace with the British, then sent a peace pipe to Sir William Johnson, who was headquartered near Fort Stanwix (Rome, New York). The Indians had accepted peace with two important conditions. First, the British could occupy former French forts, but they had no permission to settle western lands. More importantly, the French were **tenants**, not owners, of these lands, and they could not transfer this territory to the British: Indian hunting grounds were to remain undisturbed.¹²

During the summer of 1765, Captain William Murray, commandant at Fort Pitt, held the Indian trade under strict control, in keeping with an order from General Thomas Gage (who had replaced Amherst as commander-in-chief) not to let any traders go into Indian country. With the news of Croghan's favorable reception in the Wabash and Illinois country, and of Captain Thomas Stirling's impending occupation of Fort de Chartres, Sir William Johnson decided to put the Board of Trade's plan into complete operation at Fort Pitt. Johnson appointed

Alexander McKee commissary, as well as appointing two permanent interpreters and a gunsmith. Similar arrangements were made at Forts de Chartres, Detroit, Niagara, and Oswego. When Fort de Chartres was given over to the British in October, Captain St. Ange and his garrison merely moved across the Mississippi River to St. Louis, a town which had been established by French settlers of Illinois in 1764; here he continued in charge of Indian affairs and local government until the permanent Spanish commandant from Upper Louisiana arrived from New Orleans in 1769.¹³

In 1766, Johnson held a formal peace council at Fort Ontario because the western tribes simply refused to go as far inland as the superintendent's residence, Johnson Hall, at Fort Stanwix. Still, British traders were sporadically attacked along the Ohio River and in the "dark and bloody ground" of Kentucky: most tribes wanted traders to come to their country, and British military forces were not strong enough to stop traders from fulfilling Indian wishes, despite Gage's order to the contrary. In July 1766, Croghan wrote to Gage from the Shawnee country on the Scioto that he had been obliged to send the Shawnee a consignment of goods "'as they [com]plained of the Distance to Fort Pitt . . . and our not suffering any French [to] come amongst them.'" This "consignment" had included permitting a trader connected with the Philadelphia mercantile house of Baynton, Wharton and Morgan to go to the Shawnee country and erect a store. Pittsburgh traders who had set up their own stores in conformity with regulations were not only embarrassed (as was Gage) by this flouting of the rules, but also felt threatened by the unfair competition. After much uncertainty, and a timid inquiry to Johnson, Gage simply let the matter drop.¹⁴

Meanwhile, Anglo-American colonists were settling on tribal lands without the authorization of the British ministry, the colonial governments, or the native occupants. Twice between May 1766 and June 1767 the Shawnees, Mingoes, Delawares, and Wyandots complained to Croghan of "squatters pouring into their lands unhindered by Pennsylvania proclamations to stop such settlement." A third council in April 1768 included the Iroquois and the Mahicans. As Croghan reported to Gage, "As soon as the peace was made last Year [1765], contrary to our engagements to them [the Indians], a number of our people came over the Great Mountain and settled at Redstone Creek & upon the Monongahela, before they had given the Country to the King." Proclamations for the removal of all settlers were made by Captain Murray at Fort Pitt, Governor John Penn of Pennsylvania, Governor Fauquier of Virginia, General Gage, and even Lord Shelburne, the British secretary of state for the southern department. The effectiveness of such proclamations was illustrated by Fauquier's December 11, 1766, letter to Penn: "I find with you, no Regard is paid to Proclamations, and I can expect no great good from them."¹⁵

Keeping the traders out of the Ohio country was becoming as difficult as keeping squatters out. In the fall of 1767, Croghan reported that traders "went from this [place] last Winter to trade in the Indian Countrys unknown to Cap^t Murray . . . [and] are still amongst them." On December 18, John Campbell, a Pittsburgh agent of Baynton, Wharton and Morgan, complained to Croghan of a "Number of Lawless persons . . . [who] have lately forced a Settle[ment and opened] a Trade at one half the Rates agreed upon by the Com[missary of] Indian Affairs and the chiefs of the Indian Tribes." These outlaws were

supposedly led by Colonel Michael Cresap of Maryland. Upon considering this and other practices of traders, both English and French, from St. Louis, Gage told Lord Shelburne:

[The Board's scheme of trade] would be a good Plan if it could be executed universally, but the Posts cannot be multiplied to the Degree Necessary to compleat it. . . . [T]he traders complain that they are prevented from getting the Quantity of Furrs, they could procure from Nations who live at a great Distance from the Posts, were they not restrained from going to them; which gives the French Traders an advantage over them who go and reside amongst such Tribes. . . . It is also so contrary to the old Custom of Trade . . . and they [the Indians] find so much more Trouble than formerly to procure their Necessaries, that the Indians are in general very averse to the Plan; are desirous that all Traders should come amongst them, and encourage them to act contrary to their Regulations.¹⁶

Gage was correct. Parliament was not inclined to appropriate money for the expenses of establishing such posts, especially since those funds in use had not produced the expected trade boom in the western country; the American colonies were averse to any and all taxation by Parliament and were not disposed to tax themselves effectively to support such a venture. On April 15, George III issued official orders to abandon control of the Indian trade in the form of lengthy communications to General Gage and to all the governors of the American colonies, informing them of His Majesty's pleasure in turning such control over to them. He also suggested that it was his "royal consideration and generosity" which had led him to protect

the colonies against the Indians since 1763, when they might have taken care of their own affairs "'at no other Expence than the temporary Abandonment of a few stragling Settlements upon the Frontiers.'"¹⁷

No colony except New York appropriated a penny to assume this burden of self-protection. When Gage suggested to Governor Penn that Pennsylvania replace the commissaries, interpreters, and gunsmiths who were about to be dismissed, Penn referred the matter to the Assembly. On May 24, the Assembly replied, "We . . . are cheerfully disposed to give the utmost Attention to maintaining and preserving the Peace . . . and where our Laws for regulating the Trade . . . appear to be deficient, to alter and amend them; but as our attempting to extend the Laws of this Province beyond the Limits thereof, would be vain and ineffectual to regulate and restrain the Traders from the Adjacent Colonies, We conceive it is not in our Power to apply a Remedy adequate to the Occasion." Even Captain Murray's detachment's trip to Redstone to order settlers out, where, in an unorthodox move, he resorted to having the Indians (Shawnees and Delawares) tell the settlers what would happen if they remained, had no effect. By late 1767, frontiersmen fully expected war. On September 25 Croghan wrote to Johnson, "Allmost [every]Body in this part of the Country Expect Indian Warr Next Spring Except y^r hono[ur] Can prevent itt." A month later, he wrote, "Nothing now, will in my opinion prevent a War [except] taking a Cession from them [the Indians], & paying them for their Lands."¹⁸

By 1768 the greater part of the Shawnee tribe was clustered in the Scioto River Valley between the modern towns of Chillicothe and Circleville, although a few would remain among the Delawares in the

eastern Ohio country until 1774. There were also some Mingoes (independent splinter groups from the Iroquois towns in eastern Pennsylvania who had rejected the authority of the Onondaga longhouse and moved to the Ohio country) living in the Shawnee towns. The tribe hunted south of the Ohio River in the Kentucky country and along the Great and Little Miami Rivers west of the Scioto, rarely venturing further east. Still, when ten eastern Pennsylvania Iroquois were murdered near Middleburg by Frederick Stump, the Shawnees and Delawares were incensed. As Alexander McKee reported from Fort Pitt on February 13, 1768, "They were [suspicious] enough of us before, and very discontented; but this [affair] of Stumps, has made the Warriors of the different [western] nations [jealous]"--"jealous" enough that some settlers in the Monongahela Valley, fearing an Indian war, immediately began to abandon their settlements.¹⁹

While settlers fled the Old Northwest, the colonial governments still asserted their authority over the western land (and its native inhabitants). In a surprising move in early 1768, the Pennsylvania Assembly passed a law and issued a proclamation ordering the evacuation of the Indian country by the Monongahela squatters on penalty of death, and commissioners were dispatched to order them off. The Assembly also appropriated £1200 to be sent to Pittsburgh to be distributed by special commissioners to the Shawnees, Delawares, and Ohio Iroquois, while £1300 was sent to the Iroquois as a "present of condolence." On February 29, George Croghan was sent to Fort Pitt to meet with the area tribes (Johnson himself would deal with the Iroquois). The treaty council at Fort Pitt, which lasted from April 26 to May 6, brought over eleven hundred Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots, Iroquois and Mahicans

(not counting their women and children) to treat with commissioners John Allen and Joseph Shippen, Jr. After exchanging condolences and airing grievances--especially Shawnee grievances--the Indians received over ±1000 in gifts. The commissioners then announced that white messengers would proceed to Redstone to order off the squatters if four Indians would accompany them and order the squatters off in the name of the Iroquois. The Iroquois, who dominated the council, declined to send any Indians; they suggested that they did not want to incur the settlers' ill will, because if the settlers were removed they would simply return to their settlements "when the English have purchased the Country" from the tribes. The Indians dispersed to their hunting grounds, the treaty commissioners returned to eastern Pennsylvania, and the Redstone settlers remained where they were.²⁰

Lord Shelburne's notice of January 5, in which George III authorized the purchase of land from the Indians, had arrived in New York on April 18; this was most likely known to the Indians at Fort Pitt by the end of the council. Yet the Iroquois firmly disavowed any expressions of discontent among their "protectees." In fact, on May 4, the Iroquois speaker Thonissahgarawa publicly rebuked the Shawnees for mentioning their desire that there be no British forts in the western country; Kyashuta followed with another rebuke against the Shawnees for requesting that there be no more expeditions like those of Croghan and Stirling to the Illinois country. The Shawnee speaker Kissinaughthta responded, "Though you say we were the only Nation that has mentioned this to you, we know that all other Nations of Indians wish, as well as we, that there were no Forts in this Country." Greatly disappointed by the treaty, the Shawnees and

Delawares sent delegates among the Wabash and Illinois tribes to seek encouragement against the Iroquois.²¹

In what would be the opening session for the largest treaty council held by the British in North America, some thirty-four hundred Indians met on October 24, 1768, with colonial government officials, military personnel, British traders, land speculators and missionaries, all with their own special interests to promote. (For instance, Samuel Wharton and William Trent represented the "suffering traders" of Pennsylvania in requesting land in western Virginia as compensation for their losses during Pontiac's "season of war"—land which they eventually secured--while some Virginia commissioners sought from the Iroquois land south of the Ohio River in the western frontier of their colony.) The attending tribes included the Six Nations and their "refugee minorities" of Nanticokes, Conoys, Tuteloes, and Saponis; the Seven Nations of Canada (constituting the mission communities around Montreal), and the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingoies of the Ohio country.²²

In short, the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, signed on November 5, established the Ohio River as the intended permanent border between the northwestern Indian country and white settlements on the colonial frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The line defined in the treaty ran from a point a few miles west of Fort Stanwix south to the Delaware River, then along West Branch Susquehanna and the Allegheny, following the Ohio River from Pittsburgh to the mouth of the Tennessee River. By extending the borderline down the Ohio past the mouth of the Kanawha, Johnson altered the boundary prescribed by the British Board of Trade in 1765. Johnson's action also confused

the results of a concurrent southern Indian congress held in South Carolina. On October 14, in the Treaty of Hard Labor, the Cherokees had ceded land south of the Ohio River with a western boundary drawn directly from the head to the mouth of the Kanawha River, leaving the Kentucky country west of the Kanawha still part of Indian territory. The boundary achieved by the Treaty of Hard Labor had been intended to connect at the mouth of the Kanawha with the boundary being approved at Fort Stanwix. Johnson's insistence on the Six Nations' right to cede lands they had conquered--but never used--south of the Ohio River in Kentake (Iroquoian for "prairie land," which the English corrupted to Kentucky) made this connection impossible.²³

In the final negotiations, the Six Nations sachems acted as proprietors of all territories involved, and they were the only Indian signatories, despite the fact that the cession covered western Pennsylvania lands used chiefly by Mingoes and Delawares, Shawnee hunting grounds in Kentucky, and part of the Cherokee country in Tennessee (the Six Nations declared that the Tennessee River had always been their boundary with the southern Indians). Predictably, the Shawnees and Delawares were displeased not only with the land cession but also with the decision that the Iroquois would receive all monetary rewards of the treaty, amounting to over £10,000. Nevertheless, they accepted the treaty line as a guarantee of protection to their remaining tribal lands.²⁴

What the Shawnees and Delawares did not know was that, immediately after the treaty, General Gage had advised Johnson that British troops were insufficient to force settlers (or hunters) to abide by the Fort Stanwix line. Daniel Boone, a Pennsylvania frontiersman, struck up

a partnership with Indian trader (and fellow Pennsylvanian) John Findlay, whom the Shawnees had guided to the great Kentucky salt licks in 1752. Findlay's recollections of thousands of deer and buffalo enticed the two to return to Kentucky in 1769, envisioning huge profits from the sale of skins. After seven months in the Kentucky River Valley, hunting and curing and packing hides, Boone's party was surprised by a band of Shawnees, led by Captain Will, who were returning from a fall hunt along the Green River. Boone was captured. He made several attempts to warn the guards of the outlying camps, but, one by one, each camp was surprised, and the "pelts, guns, ammunition, horses, and all other appurtenances of this forbidden business" were either destroyed or confiscated by the Shawnees. After thwarting the expedition's purpose, the Shawnees "'dismissed their captives, presenting each with two pairs of moccasins, a doe-skin for patch-leather, a little trading gun, and a few loads of powder and shot, so that they might supply themselves with meat on their way back to the settlements.'" In a firm statement of the Shawnee view on white invasion of their hunting grounds, Captain Will advised Boone and his party, "'Now, brothers, go home and stay there. Don't come here any more, for this is the Indians' hunting ground, and all the animals, skins and furs are ours; and if you are so foolish as to venture here again, you may be sure the wasps and yellow-jackets will sting you severely.'"²⁵

Such attacks prompted the Cherokees, in late 1769, to propose a union with the Six Nations "to attack several of the Southern & Western Nations who had acted as Enemies to both." The Cherokees also tried to gain British support by citing recent attacks by western tribes

(namely, the Shawnees) on British traders (namely, Boone and Findlay). In July 1770, in a congress held at German Flats (in upper New York), Sir William Johnson convinced the Iroquois and Cherokees that "war should never be carried on with any Nation without very sufficient reasons, and until all other measures have proven ineffectual." The Six Nations and the Cherokees agreed to send a message, carried by Shawnees, to the western tribes, reprimanding them for treatment of British traders: "[Y]ou are not in your senses. Wherefore we now take you by the head, and shake you so, as to bring you to them, and also take that hatchet out of your hands which you run about with, doing Mischief."²⁶

But the Shawnees carried another message southward. As John Stuart, the Indian Superintendent for the Southern District, wrote to Lord Millsborough, the Secretary of State for the North American Colonies, on November 28, 1770, "[T]he Shawanese Messengers, were running through the southern Nations, and endeavoring to ingratiate themselves with them, and . . . attempting to draw them into a Confederacy on the principle of defending their Lands against encroachments." In addition, the Seneca chief Gaustarax, sympathetic to Shawnee desires for disavowal of the Fort Stanwix cession, had secretly sent belts among the western nations, hoping for a revolt against the Iroquois. George Croghan finally confirmed such actions in early 1771: some Shawnees at Fort Pitt informed him that the Six Nations--or part of them--were "concerned in exciting the Shawanese, Delawares, & many others to make war upon us."²⁷

Upon hearing Croghan's report, Sir William Johnson directed the Six Nations to assemble at the Scioto plains, in the heart of Shawnee

country, all nations involved, and to collect and destroy all belts sent out by Gaustarax. The western tribes refused to attend such a council in the summer of 1772 and once again in the spring of 1773. Johnson realized that if the Six Nations could not tame the western tribes, they could not be tamed; furthermore, conquering the Ohio Valley would be fruitless because most of the Indians would still be under the influence of French traders from Louisiana. Therefore he ordered the Iroquois to take stronger action:

There is no necessity of your using so much delicacy with people, who so little deserve favor from your hands, as you are in a great measure accountable for the actions of those who have always been deemed your dependants:--and perhaps it were better that you brought them to reason, than by tollerating their depredations to expose them to the powerfull arm of the English, who will certainly no longer suffer them to Act as they have done with impunity.²⁸

At this point, an Indian war was inevitable. But by leaving the Wabash and Illinois tribes to the French influence, and by expertly manipulating the Iroquois and their "dependents," the British could leave the Shawnees without friends to the west or to the east.

For colonial security, the British kept Shawnee representatives at Fort Pitt from late 1773 to early 1774, that they might be privy to any rumors of war. Word was spreading on the frontiers that Colonel William Preston, county surveyor for Fincastle County, Virginia, and Captain John Floyd, his deputy, would soon take a surveying party into Kentucky, and that settlement parties under George Rogers Clark and Michael Cresap were heading for Kentucky. On March 8, 1774, the

Shawnees at Fort Pitt complained to commissary Alexander McKee that, although the king's order had prohibited settlement beyond the Great Kanawha River, their hunting grounds were being overrun by white settlers. The Shawnee elders disapproved of the young men's attacks on settlements but were powerless to prevent them, "for when [the young Shawnees] are disappointed in their hunting, and find the woods covered with the White People . . . they are foolish enough to make reprisals without waiting to apply to the great men that shou'd redress their complaints and regulate the conduct of their White Brethren towards them."²⁹

John Murray, Earl of Dunmore and royal governor of Virginia, was called on the carpet by the Earl of Dartmouth for permitting and even encouraging settlers to violate the agreement which prohibited settlement west of the Great Kanawha. Dunmore blamed such violations on the nature of "Americans" rather than on his own actions and beliefs:

My Lord I have learnt from experience that the established Authority of any government in America, and the policy of Government at home, are both insufficient to restrain the Americans; and that they do and will remove as their avidity and restlessness incite them. . . . [T]hey do not conceive that Government has any right to forbid their taking possession of a Vast tract of Country, either uninhabited, or which serves only as a Shelter to a few Scattered Tribes of Indians. Nor can they be easily brought to entertain any belief of the permanent obligation of Treaties made with those People, whom they Consider, as but little removed from the brute Creation.³⁰

Since he could not prevent settlers from occupying Indian lands, Dunmore

saw only three alternatives: he could "Suffer these Emigrants to hold their lands of, and incorporate with the Indians," "permit them to form a Set of Democratical Governments of their own, upon the backs of the old Colonies," or (as he finally chose) "receive persons in their Circumstances, under the protection of Some of His Majesty's Governments already established."³¹ In short, he would not stop them.

Dunmore's implicit approval of white occupation of Indian lands, and perhaps a more general attitude towards Indian treaties, was articulated by none less than George Washington. Washington had backed the survey and settlement of Kentucky since at least 1767, when he expressed an interest in securing land west of the mountains. As he wrote to William Crawford, a frontier land speculator working in northwestern Virginia for Washington's interest, he still wished to obtain western lands, "notwithstanding the proclamation which restrains it at present . . . for I can never look upon that proclamation in any other light (but this I say between ourselves) than as a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians."³²

By the spring of 1774, friction between whites and Indians had created a spark in the area between Pittsburgh and Wheeling. As Lord Dunmore wrote to Captain John Connolly, commandant at Fort Pitt, "I entirely approve of the measure you have taken of building a Fort [Fort Fincastle] at Wheelin[g]." The disgruntled Mingo, who had been living at Mingo Bottom on the north bank of the Ohio (near present Steubenville, Ohio), moved to form two new towns in the upper Scioto Valley north of the Shawnee settlements: Pluk-kemeh-notee (called "Pluggy" by whites), a Shawnee-Mingo subchief, established a village on the Olentangy River, while another group settled at Old Shawnee

Salt Licks near the junction of the Olentangy and the Scioto. The Mingoes then joined the Shawnees in protesting such activities as the surveying party of William Crawford (agent for George Washington) and the settlement projects near Wheeling promoted by George Rogers Clark.³³ But until April 1774, the fire only smoldered.

Then, on April 30, a flame was ignited. Jacob Greathouse led a group of some thirty men from the surveying party of Colonel Michael Cresap to a camp near the mouth of Yellow Creek (two miles downstream from present Wellsville, Ohio, just off the Ohio River). There, without provocation, they killed thirteen family members--including the father and the pregnant sister--of the Mingo leader Captain John Logan. Logan (also known as Talgayeeta), son of the Cayuga chief Shikellamy, was a well-respected man of French-Cayuga heritage who had lived in Philadelphia during a portion of the Seven Years' War; he had refused to participate in either that conflict or Pontiac's revolt, but had become a noted peacemaker during both.³⁴ And now who was there to mourn for Logan? As he said himself, "Not one."

Although the Ohio tribes were outraged by this atrocity, the Shawnees found it especially offensive because Logan had been married to a Shawnee woman. At a council meeting at Wakatomica, the elders urged preservation of peace despite the murder of Logan's family. Cornstalk even wrote to George Croghan and Captain Connolly at Fort Pitt to inform them of the killings of several Shawnees and Delawares, as well as those of Logan's family, "All which Mischiefs so close to each other, Aggravated our People very much."³⁵ Although the council decried it, some Shawnees eagerly joined Logan in revenging the deaths of his people--and their own.

As more sparks flew, Cornstalk sent his brother Silverheels to guide Pennsylvania traders in the Ohio Valley safely back to Pittsburgh. This Shawnee rescue party narrowly escaped assassination by angry colonists, and may have prompted Connolly's order of "marching [Fort Pitt troops] unto the Shawanese villages." The atmosphere at Fort Pitt remained volatile, as British troops had been evacuated just two years earlier, leaving only the colonial forces to deal with frontier troubles. The Pennsylvania and Virginia governments also continued their argument over the Ohio Indian trade and the boundary between the two colonies, which made organization of any force to extinguish the Indian fire on the frontier well nigh impossible. In fact, one of the few expeditions into Ohio, in which Major Angus McDonald and four hundred Virginia militia burned the five Wakatomica towns of the Shawnees west of the Muskingum, only fueled the fire.³⁶

In late August, less than a month after McDonald's Virginians burned the Wakatomica towns, Lord Dunmore himself traveled to Pittsburgh, hoping to avert a general Indian war by holding a council with the Shawnees, Mingo, and Delaware. The Shawnees refused to attend, but they did indicate some possibility of meeting him farther down the Ohio. Dunmore then led an expedition to the Lower Shawnee towns on the Scioto; he also ordered a second body of Virginia militia to fortify the mouth of the Kanawha River (the former site of Upper Shawnee Town). By October, Dunmore's force had established a base at the mouth of the Hocking River.³⁷ From here Dunmore hoped to forestall (by council or by cannon) the anticipated aggression of the Shawnees and their allies who were angered by the continued white encroachment into their homelands and hunting grounds.

While Dunmore was erecting a "fortification" (actually only a cattle stockade and a storage building) at the Hocking and waiting for a council with Shawnee leaders--and making a side expedition to burn the Mingo town at Old Shawnee Salt Licks--the second group of Virginia militia, commanded by Colonel Andrew Lewis, had established a camp at a triangular point bordered by the Great Kanawha on one side and by the Ohio on the other. In the early morning hours of October 10, 1774, some 900 Shawnees and Indian allies, commanded by a reluctant Cornstalk, attacked the 1200 Virginians at Point Pleasant. As the sun slowly rose, the battle raged fiercely on the tiny point, with both sides trying to push the other back--the Virginians to lengthen and weaken the Indian line, the Indians to hamper the Virginians' maneuverability by trapping them at the river junction. By noon the Shawnees learned that the final detachment of Lewis's force was approaching from the rear; gathering their wounded and whatever dead they could carry, they withdrew into the woods as night fell. Lewis did not pursue them, although (at least according to Dunmore's reports in December 1774) his losses were relatively light: the Virginians lost 49 killed, and "about 80" wounded, while the Shawnees had 30 killed and "some wounded."³⁸

After this unsuccessful assault, Cornstalk took the lead in proposing peace to Dunmore. He had never really wanted war, and when he found that his allies--and his own people--were not inclined to make further war, he went to make peace. After averting a full-scale assault on the Shawnees by Lewis (who had moved his force north from the Kanawha into the Ohio hill country), Dunmore was ready to deal with the Shawnees. Only some six miles distant from Cornstalk's town

on the north shore of Scippo Creek on the Pickaway Plains, Dunmore had established Camp Charlotte in anticipation of talking peace. Now the camp would fulfill the purpose for which it had been established.

In the provisional Treaty of Camp Charlotte, Shawnee leaders agreed to recognize the Ohio River as the boundary between Indian and white settlement. Dunmore demanded hostages and a promise that the Shawnees and Mingoese would cease hunting on "our [Virginia] side," or the southern side of the river; in turn, he promised that Virginians would cease encroachment on the "Indian," or northern, side of the Ohio. (When Logan refused to attend the council, Dunmore sent a force to attack Salt Lick Town again, where five Indians were killed and fourteen, mostly women and children were taken prisoner.)³⁹ Another season of war had ended.

As a result of Dunmore's War, the Shawnee population in Ohio shifted quickly. The former inhabitants of the burned Wakatomica towns left the Muskingum Valley for the Shawnee communities on the Scioto River; some may have even been the first Shawnees on the Mad River, as a Wakatomica town existed there as early as 1778. "Old" Chillicothe in the Scioto Valley was partially evacuated by the establishment of "New" Chillicothe in western Ohio (near present Xenia). This left only the Delawares and Moravians as the eastern Ohio Indian population. The Shawnees simply wanted to be as far from the whites as they could and still remain in their beloved Ohio country.⁴⁰

With the confusion at the outbreak of the American War for Independence, the preliminary peace established at Camp Charlotte was not completed until the Treaty of Pittsburgh was signed in October 1775. There commissioners from the new Revolutionary government of

Virginia and the Continental Congress, along with representatives of the Shawnees, Delawares, and Six Nations, agreed to the Ohio River as the line which would separate regions of Indian and white settlement, in effect ratifying the boundary established by the British Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. Still there were those who could not fault the Shawnees for protecting their country. Richard Butler, who later became an Indian commissioner and agent, then the first Superintendent of Indian Affairs, for the new United States of America, had been a trader in the Shawnee country and had suffered severe losses because of Dunmore's War. Yet in 1774 he wrote, "These facts I think was sufficient to bring on a war with a Christian instead of a Savage People, and I do declare it as my opinion that the Shawanese did not intend a War this Season, let their future Intentions be what they might. . . ."41

FOLLOWING THE TRAILS

Though another season of war had ended with the Treaty of Pittsburgh, the Shawnees were not at the end of their struggle to remain in the Ohio country. Following the American Revolution, white surveying parties and settlement groups pushed westward from the old British colonies, looking for newer and better lands in the Ohio and Kentucky countries. The Shawnees, under leaders such as Blue Jacket and Tecumseh, fought to maintain their lands in the Old Northwest, attempting to gain wide support for their struggle, just as they had done in the past by sending runners to far-flung tribes. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Tecumseh tried to convince nations as geographically and culturally diverse as the Osages of the Lower Great Plains and the Creeks of the Lower Southeast to unite against the ongoing encroachments of white settlers.

Never a chief, but always a leader, Tecumseh attempted to unify the tribes in "an alliance whose members would sell no more land to the United States."¹ His brother Tenskwatawa, the self-proclaimed "Shawnee Prophet," preached a nativistic movement (similar to that preached during Pontiac's "season of war") supporting Tecumseh's goal. William Henry Harrison, the American governor of the Indiana Territory, recognized Tecumseh (and Tenskwatawa) as a serious threat. In 1811, while Tecumseh was on a mission to convert the southeastern tribes,

Harrison led an army to the Shawnee village at Tippecanoe in the Wabash country. Although the ensuing battle was inconclusive, it destroyed Tenskwatawa's credibility and severely undermined Tecumseh's movement. Undaunted, Tecumseh commanded the British-allied Indians during the War of 1812 until he was killed at the Battle of the Thames in 1813.²

Without Tecumseh's strong leadership, the Shawnee nation again splintered under the pressure of white settlement. As Allan W. Eckert said, "He [Tecumseh] had a chance to unify the Indian nations. But it would have been a stopgap only for a very short time. Westward expansion was going to be unstoppable."³ By the 1830s, most of the Shawnees had left Ohio--but not all of them. As Neeake (Fred Shaw), a tribal storyteller, related in 1991, "Three hundred of us who spoke English fluently [mostly Chalagawtha and Mekoche], changed their clothes and moved to another part of the state and passed as Americans. If they didn't speak English fluently, they took German names and passed as Germans." (Neeake explained the ease of this for the Shawnees by noting that most Shawnees did not fit the stereotypical Indian appearance; most had more slender faces and ruddy (rather than brown or bronze) skin, and some even had hazel eyes: "We started intermarrying with the white man in 1670, and not all of us have black hair.")⁴ Most of the Thawikila division lived among the Creeks during the late eighteenth century; a peace faction, consisting mostly of the Kispoko and Pekowi divisions, left Ohio during the Revolution and settled in southeast Missouri near Cape Girardeau, where they were granted land in 1793 by the Spanish authorities.⁵

By the mid-nineteenth century, the Thawikila Shawnees who had lived among the Creeks had rejoined their Kispoko and Mekoche brothers

west of the Mississippi; they eventually moved to the Canadian River Valley in central Oklahoma, and, in 1854, were formally designated the Absentee Shawnees--"those who were not residents of the Shawnee reservation in Kansas when it was allotted." In 1825, the United States government had liquidated the Shawnee grant in Missouri and had established a reservation for the tribe in the Kansas Territory; except for the Remnant Shawnees who took on white ways, the Ohio Shawnees, including Tenskwatawa and his family, had moved to the Kansas reservation between 1832 and 1835. This settlement was torn by conflict between the Missouri group, the Black Bob band, and the Ohio Shawnees; when American western movement forced them to Indian Territory (Oklahoma), the two groups separated. The Ohio Shawnees formally joined the Cherokee Nation in 1869 and settled on Cherokee lands under the name Cherokee Shawnees, while the Black Bob band merged with the Absentee Shawnees. Another group, the Mixed band of Shawnees and Senecas, moved directly from Ohio to Oklahoma in 1831; when the Shawnee portion separated from the Senecas in 1867, it took the name Eastern Shawnees.⁶ Internal relations of the Shawnees had begun to outstrip external relations in their complexity.

Distant as they were, splintered as they were, the Shawnees still regarded Ohio as their homeland, a belief which was strengthened by a prophecy made just after the death of Tecumseh. "[T]here was a prophesy [sic] just after the death of Tecumseh (in the Battle of Thames in Ontario, Canada) that the seventh generation will have a homeland in Ohio again," Neeake said, "and mine is the seventh generation." Remarkably, the prophecy was fulfilled in 1990, when the Shawnees acquired 52.5 acres of land outside Urbana, Ohio, for a tribal

headquarters and ceremonial land.⁷ The ever-circling years had once again brought the Shawnees home.

As scholars have suggested, it was undoubtedly the extensive migrations and exceptional fragmentation of the Shawnee tribe which caused the Shawnees to develop such complex and inconsistent relations with other Indian groups--and with the newcomers to the North American continent, the French and the English. While the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 officially ended the Anglo-French hostilities of Queen Anne's War, it left the actual French and British boundaries in the western territories of North America open to dispute. Still, it was the "Beaver Wars" of the Iroquois which provided the basis for both English and French official claims for the Ohio country. Whatever the factors which contributed to their extensive removals and returns to the Ohio Valley, the Shawnees found the struggle for their loyalty--and their lands--to be at the heart of any relations they had with the English and the French.

The years between 1730 and 1775 could be further divided into two distinct periods. The early period, from 1730 to the Seven Years' War, began with the return of large numbers of Shawnees to their Ohio homeland (after more than a century of nomadic existence) and ended with the elimination of the French as a significant imperial power in North America. The later period, from 1763 to the coming of the American Revolution, began with the consequences and effects of the Seven Years' War (and, ultimately, the Proclamation of 1763) on Shawnee external affairs and ended with the precarious situation in the Ohio Valley on the eve of the Revolution. As rapidly as Shawnee relations with the English, the French, "American" colonists, and other native

tribes and groups changed during this half-century, they were unquestionably part of a recurring and recognizable cycle of migration and return which marked and molded Shawnee relations throughout the tribe's history.

NOTES

In citing works in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

AGLIH Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed. Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.

CFUO Randolph C. Downes. Council Fires on the Upper Ohio. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1940.

EAID Alden T. Vaughan, gen. ed. Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789 (20 volumes). Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1979-. The three volumes used in this work are specifically cited in the notes (for example, Vaughan, EAID, 2:267, signifying Volume II, page 267).

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[Notes to pages 7-12]

19. Fernow, Ohio Valley in Colonial Days, 41-43.
20. Howard, Shawnee!, 7.
21. William A. Hunter, "History of the Ohio Valley," in The Handbook of North American Indians, ed. William C. Sturdevant, Vol. 15, The Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger (Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 591.
22. Howard, Shawnee!, 8; Alden T. Vaughan, ed., Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, Volume 1, Pennsylvania and Delaware Treaties, 1629-1737, ed. Donald H. Kent (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1979), 84.
23. Howard, Shawnee!, 8.
24. Howard, Shawnee!, 8; Callender, "Shawnee," 630; Vaughan, EAID 1:84.
25. Callender, "Shawnee," 630, 622.
26. Vaughan, EAID 1:97.
27. Vaughan, EAID 1:107.
28. Howard, Shawnee!, 8.
29. Howard, Shawnee!, 8.
30. Howard, Shawnee!, 9.
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32. Fernow, Ohio Valley in Colonial Days, 72-73.
33. Hunter, "History of the Ohio Valley," 590.
34. Vaughan, EAID 1:261.
35. Vaughan, EAID 1:262.
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1. Alden T. Vaughan, ed., Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, Volume 1, Pennsylvania and Delaware Treaties, 1629-1737, ed. Donald H. Kent (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1979), 308, 316.
2. Vaughan, EAID 1:336-337.
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6. Vaughan, EAID 1:363.
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