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An Examination of "The Jackson Doctrine": Jesse Jackson's Foreign Policy

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AN EXAMINATION OF 'THE JACKSON DOCTRINE:'
JESSE JACKSON'S FOREIGN POLICY

A Thesis
Presented To
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Vincent Janney

1991

APPROVAL SHEET

**This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

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"Where we love is home,
Home that our feet may leave, but not our hearts."
Oliver W. Holmes

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Helen and Joseph W., and my brothers, Joseph A. and Dominic, whose constant love, support and understanding have made my life enjoyable and have helped me get to where I am today. To you, I am eternally grateful and forever indebted.

"A faithful friend is a strong defense: and he that has found
such a one has found a treasure."
Ecclesiasticus 6:14

I also wish to express my appreciation to the rest of my family, my friends and my fraternity who have been by my side through good times and bad times for many, many years. Your faithful companionship has been invaluable.

"A teacher affects eternity; he can never
tell where his influence stops."
Henry Adams

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"Friends depart, and memory takes them
To her caverns, pure and deep."
T.H. Bayly

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine "The Jackson Doctrine," Jesse Jackson's foreign policy. The study focuses upon three regions of the world which Jackson has consistently gone to great lengths to mention and discuss in his speeches and writings: the Middle East, Central America and Africa.

From Jackson's foreign policy leanings with regard to the three aforementioned regions, a theory of what constitutes the underlying principles of Jackson's foreign policy is drawn.

The underlying principles of Jackson's foreign policy are that it puts emphasis on the need to promote human rights and to further human fulfillment and well-being. It also puts emphasis on the need to consider the interests of **all** nations and to be consistent in its application. Also, it is not based upon a foundation as shaky as the fear of communist advancement. Jesse Jackson argues for a U.S. foreign policy which is balanced and consistent and is part of a global struggle for true and total equality.

**AN EXAMINATION OF 'THE JACKSON DOCTRINE:'
JESSE JACKSON'S FOREIGN POLICY**

I

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the foreign policy stances taken by Jesse Jackson before, during and after his presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1988. According to Aaron Wildavsky, the nature of the American political system encourages the president to assume a dominant role in foreign affairs. Presidents tend to get their way in the foreign policy realm far more often than in the domestic one.¹ Knowing that Jesse Jackson represents the first viable black American presidential candidate, and that the President of the United States is pre-disposed to achieve a dominant role in foreign affairs, an examination of Jackson's foreign policy stances is warranted.

In his writings, speeches and debates, Jackson has often taken the time to discuss foreign policy. This thesis will begin with a brief biographical sketch of Jesse

¹ Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," in Wildavsky, ed., Perspectives on the Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975.), 452.

Jackson. It will proceed to examine the three regions of the world which have been the primary foci of Jackson's foreign policy discussion: 1) the Middle East; 2) Central America; and 3) Africa. Then a theory of what constitutes the underlying principles that guide Jesse Jackson's foreign policy will be presented.

JESSE JACKSON: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:

Jesse Louis Burns was born on October 8, 1941. His mother, Helen Burns, was a teenager; his father was Noah Robinson, a married man and father of three who lived next door to Burns. Jesse Burns became Jesse Jackson when he was two years old and his mother married Charles Jackson.³

Jackson grew up in segregated Greenville, North Carolina where he learned that he was expected to be subservient and inferior to whites.⁴ He began to question the need to separate the races at a very young age, about the same time that he learned the meaning of white supremacy.

Two of Jackson's childhood experiences taught him the meaning of white supremacy. When he was six years old he entered a neighborhood store to buy some candy. The grocer

³ Anna Kosof, Jesse Jackson (New York: Franklin Watts, 1987), 17-19.

⁴ Ibid., 19.

was waiting on customers at the time; Jackson, who was in a rush, whistled at the grocer to get his attention.

Suddenly Jack (the grocer) wheeled around, reached under the counter for a gun, and pointed it at Jesse's face. "Don't ever whistle at a white man again as long as you live," he said.⁵

The second experience of Jackson's childhood which taught him white supremacy was a boxing match. The bout was between a black champion, Joe Louis, and a white man. Jesse and his friends listened to the match at a cigar store, but they did not show emotion. They were too scared to cheer for a black man who was beating up his white opponent because it would have angered the white shopkeeper and his friends.⁶

Another of Jackson's childhood influences was his grandmother, affectionately known as Aunt Tibby. Among the lessons she taught the young Jesse were the importance of literacy, books and education and the need to avoid violence.⁷ The most important lesson she taught Jesse, though, was:

"(i)f you fall, boy, you don't have to wallow. Ain't nobody going to think you somebody, unless you think so yourself. Don't listen to their talk, boy; they don't have a pot to pee in or a window to throw it out. For God's sake, Jesse, promise me you'll be somebody. Ain't no such thing as *cain't*, *cain't* got drowned in a

⁵ Dorothy Chaplick, Up with Hope (Minnesota: Dillon Press, Inc., 1990), 14.

⁶ Barbara Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: the Man, the Movement, the Myth (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), 26.

⁷ Chaplick, 15.

soda bottle. Don't let the Joneses get you down. Nothing is impossible for those who love the Lord. Come hell or high water, if you got the guts, boy, ain't nothing or nobody can turn you around."⁸

Sports also had a major impact on his early development. Jackson was a star athlete in football and baseball at Sterling High School in Greenville. Upon graduation he was offered \$6,000 to play for the American League's Chicago White Sox, but he turned the offer down when he learned that an inferior white ballplayer was offered \$90,000 by the club.⁹

Instead of playing major-league baseball, Jackson accepted an athletic scholarship to attend the University of Illinois in Chicago. Jackson was appalled to learn that he could not play quarterback because that was a position reserved for whites. Having experienced racism in the North, and being generally unhappy with the racial division at the University of Illinois, Jackson transferred to the black Agriculture and Technical College of North Carolina at Greensboro where he became a star quarterback, won numerous academic honors, began active involvement and leadership in the civil rights movement and met his future wife, Jacqueline Davis.¹⁰

⁸ Reynolds, 28.

⁹ Kosof, 24.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Once in Greensboro, Jesse joined the Congress of Racial Equality and began to lead sit-ins, picket lines and mass demonstrations in the fight for the integration of blacks and whites. He was arrested at various times for his involvement with the protests, but his leadership helped end racial segregation in Greensboro. In fact, "to honor his achievement, the governor of North Carolina appointed him to the state's student council on human rights."¹¹

At a march in Selma in 1965, Jackson assumed an active leadership role. His enthusiasm, energy and effectiveness so impressed Ralph Abernathy that he encouraged Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to hire the young man. Jackson was put in charge of Operation Breadbasket, the economic arm of King's Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC).¹²

Through Jackson's initiative, Operation Breadbasket undertook Operation Boycott. Under this operation, if companies did not hire a significant number of blacks, did not deal with companies owned by blacks and did not have blacks in management positions, Jackson's followers would boycott them and would no longer purchase goods or services from them. Operation Boycott, aimed at the pocketbooks of companies, had substantial influence and success, particularly in Chicago.¹³

¹¹ Chaplick, 29.

¹² Ibid., 31.

¹³ Ibid., 31-32.

Two years after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jackson left the SCLC to form his own organization. The organization was named PUSH or People United to Serve Humanity. The program of PUSH was intended to fight for economic rights for blacks since the battle for basic civil rights had already been won. The new program called for better jobs, good medical care, quality education, improved living conditions and more opportunities for black businesses to grow and prosper.¹⁴

Throughout the 1970s, Jackson became increasingly visible as a leader of and spokesman for black America. He toured and spoke both in the United States and elsewhere in the world, always attracting listeners with his impressive oratory skills and his populist messages, while simultaneously attracting attention to his causes and to himself. Despite never holding public office, by early 1983 it became evident that Jackson was going to run for the 1984 presidential nomination of the Democratic Party. And run he did, both in 1984 and again in 1988.

Jesse Jackson was, and still is, the first viable African-American candidate for the office of the President of the United States. Although a few black candidates had run for President previously, for many he "represented the first Black American whose candidacy for president had to be

¹⁴ Kosof, 63.

taken seriously."¹⁵ Jackson's "effort to secure the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988 were the first serious presidential campaigns mounted by an African-American candidate."¹⁶ For the first time in American history, a black candidate could and would play an influential role in a presidential election.

¹⁵ Katherine Tate, "Bloc Voters, Black Voters, and the Jackson Candidacies," paper presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8.

¹⁶ John Bruce and Charles Smith, "Jesse Jackson's Impact on the 1988 Nomination Process," paper presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1.

II

THE MIDDLE EAST

INTRODUCTION:

Jesse Jackson has never been at a loss of words when it comes to the Middle East and U.S. Middle East foreign policy. His actions in, and comments about, the region have been numerous, he met with Yasir Arafat in the 1970s, was responsible for getting issues from the region onto the agenda in his campaigns to secure the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988 and has taken every opportunity to discuss Middle East foreign policy in the media. This section will examine four factors which lead to an understanding of Jesse Jackson's Middle East policy: 1) his relationship with the American Jewish community; 2) his views on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 3) his attempts to secure the freedom of hostages being held in the Middle East; and 4) his evaluation of U.S. Middle East policy.

JESSE JACKSON AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY:

In examining Jesse Jackson's views of the Middle East, one needs to begin by looking at his relationship with the American Jewish community. Jackson's relationship with the Jewish community has been profoundly affected by the Middle East policy which he advocates. This relationship is particularly important to examine when considering the deleterious effect the lack of Jewish support had on his 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns. Was Jackson's Middle East policy formed by or affected by his need to generate a wide base of support in the Democratic primaries?

First of all, it should be noted that there has been a historical conflict between the African-American and Jewish communities in the United States. This African-American/Jewish conflict comes from two main sources: "(1) competition within the professional apparatus of social administration; and (2) black encroachment - via extension of the logic of affirmative action as an elite mobility strategy - on enclaves of relative Jewish privilege in education and elsewhere."¹⁷ Black activism in the 1960s created the contraposition of African-Americans as clients of service agencies and institutions and Jews as professional service providers. This relation was exacerbated by the tension created by upwardly mobile blacks

¹⁷ Adolph L. Reed, Jr., The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 94-95.

seeking to carve out niches for themselves in the public service apparatus, which threatened the positions of the relatively entrenched Jews.¹⁸

This is not to say that blacks and Jews are always on opposing sides, however. As is commonly known, coalition-building makes for interesting bedfellows. Jews and African-Americans have often come together with a shared commitment to positions of democratic principle which have worked to further the interests of both communities. For years, it was a very close relationship on social issues. The African-American and Jewish populations worked together, for example, to break down prejudicial attitudes and barriers which confronted the communities in America. However, as the interests of the black elite have become more and more uncoupled from those of the Jewish elite, the foundation of the alliance has become more and more unsteady.¹⁹

The perception of Jackson's anti-Semitism became one of the major issues in his campaign to secure the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party in 1984. In what has been termed the "most difficult gaffe" for Jackson in that campaign, the candidate made reference to Jews as "Hymies"

¹⁸ Ibid., 95.

¹⁹ Ibid., 98.

and New York as "Hymietown."²⁰ In what he considered to be off-the-record comments to two black reporters, Jackson made the reference to "Hymies." One of the reporters, Milton Coleman, included Jackson's comments in an article he wrote for *The Washington Post*.²¹ Although Jackson first denied ever making the reference, he came out with a public apology for the remarks towards the end of the campaign.²² He stated that "(i)n private talks we sometimes let our guard down and we become thoughtless. It was not in a spirit of meanness, an off-color remark having no bearing on religion or politics ... however innocent, it was wrong."²³ The "Hymie" incident magnified the underlying tensions and antipathies between the African-American and Jewish communities over matters such as affirmative action programs as well as policy issues relating to Israel.

In addition to his reference to Jews as "Hymies," a photograph appeared in the *New York Times* showing Jesse Jackson embracing Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat.²⁴ Jesse Jackson's meeting with Arafat, leader of the Palestine

²⁰ Lucius J. Barker and Ronald Walters, eds. Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 240.

²¹ Bob Faw and Nancy Skelton, Thunder in America (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1986), 48-49.

²² Tom Morgenthau, "Jackson's Albatross," *Newsweek*, 23 April 1984.

²³ Faw and Skelton, 52.

²⁴ Barker and Walters, 240.

Liberation Organization, further led "many Jews to express the view that he was anti-Semitic."²⁵ By meeting with Arafat, Jackson was depicted not only as pro-Palestinian, but also as anti-Israeli, which did not endear him to the American Jewish community.

Further adding to the tension between Jackson and the Jews was his acceptance of Arab money in the form of campaign contributions.²⁶ The Arab League, an organization of Arab nations aimed at promoting closer political, economic, cultural and social relations among its member countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and a few others, had contributed over \$100,000 to Jackson's Chicago organizations in 1981 alone.²⁷ In a span of three years, the Arab League contributed over \$200,000 to Jackson's campaign.²⁸ The fact that Jackson was the recipient of financial contributions from Arabs served to call his loyalties into question, once again, decreasing his popularity with the American Jewish community.

Jesse Jackson's relationship with Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan was another controversial aspect

²⁵ Paul Taylor, "Jackson Interview Aims to Heal Rift With Jews, but Some See More Controversy," *Washington Post*, 15 October 1987.

²⁶ Reed, 102.

²⁷ Thomas Landess and Richard Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race (Illinois: Jameson Books, 1985), 207.

²⁸ Michael Kramer, "What to Make of 'New' Jesse," *U.S. News and World Report*, 16 November 1987.

which came to the forefront of his 1984 campaign.²⁹ Jesse Jackson was unwilling to repudiate or to disassociate himself from Minister Farrakhan, one of his earliest and strongest supporters. Farrakhan openly warned Jews that there would be retaliation if they harmed "this brother," Jesse Jackson. In a broadcast made on March 11, 1984, Farrakhan stated: "the Jews don't like Farrakhan, so they call me Hitler. Well, that's a good name. Hitler was a very great man." One month later Farrakhan again referred to Hitler saying that "(h)e was indeed a great man, but also wicked - wickedly great."³⁰ Farrakhan also made reference to Judaism as "a gutter religion."³¹ These views, openly expressed by Farrakhan, deeply upset the American Jewish community, which was further angered by Jackson's failure to repudiate the Muslim leader. Jackson, however, was in a unenviable position. If he did repudiate Farrakhan in hopes of getting Jewish support, he might have been perceived as selling out to whites, which would have caused him to lose the support of blacks whose votes he desperately needed.

In his address before the Democratic National Convention in 1984, Jesse Jackson made a plea for forgiveness hoping to end the tension created by such unfortunate incidents as his "Hymietown" comment and his

²⁹ Barker and Walters, 101.

³⁰ Kramer.

³¹ Taylor.

relationships with Arafat and Farrakhan. This plea, however, fell on deaf ears as spokespersons from such organizations as the American Jewish Congress, the Synagogue Council of America and the Anti-Defamation League chose to remain unsympathetic.³²

Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination met with opposition from the American Jewish community on three levels. Adolph Reed defines the three levels of the "anti-Jackson diatribe" in this way:

Most overt was castigation of his anti-Semitic statements and his link to Farrakhan. Then his association with Arafat and receipt of Arab money simultaneously reinforced the image of black support of genocide against Jews and the notion that criticism of Israel equals anti-Semitism. Finally, and invariably, came reaffirmation of Jewish opposition to affirmative action quotas.³³

The rift between Jackson and the Jewish community persisted even after the conclusion of the 1984 campaign. As late as 1987 Jackson was still trying to heal this division. In October of 1987 Jackson gave an in-depth interview to the liberal Jewish magazine *Tikkun*. Through the interview, the once-again Democratic presidential hopeful intended to "mend his troubled relationship with the

³² Reed, 103.

³³ *Ibid.*, 102.

Jewish community."³⁴ To do so, he reaffirmed his stances on the nation of Israel. Jackson stated:

America has a special relationship with Israel. This relationship must continue. America helped to found Israel. America helps to sustain it with outright annual grants. America's interest and will to protect Israel is substantial and seems unequivocal.³⁵

However, Jackson was also quick to point out that the United States had other interests in the Middle East as well.

Jackson also reaffirmed his belief that the Israelis had a right to the land they occupied. He said:

The Jews had need of a homeland, and the political settlement was reached. I accept the political settlement as reality.³⁶

He also went on, though, to speak on behalf of the Palestinians. He argued that the failure to "work out an accord on getting a homeland for Palestinians" was a "crisis that lingers."³⁷

In the interview Jackson did criticize such things as Israel's provision of military and economic aid to South Africa. He also avoided directly repudiating black Muslim leader Louis Farrakhan, a repudiation most Jews wanted.

³⁴ Taylor.

³⁵ "A Dialogue with Jesse Jackson," *Tikkun*, 27 October 1987, 36.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

However, Jackson did state that Farrakhan "(c)alling Judaism a gutter religion is wrong."³⁸

The response of the Jewish community to the Jackson interview was varied. Some Jewish leaders felt this offer of friendship was genuine, while others cited Jackson's ambivalence and ambiguities on certain issues. Other Jewish leaders saw Jackson making a concerted effort to "sensitize himself to the Jewish perspective;" these leaders accused Jewish people of responding with "insensitivity and harshness" to the overture. Of the first six published Jewish responses to the interview, three were critical of Jackson and three were supportive. For Jackson, this represented "progress" because he felt that in 1984 the Jewish community would have been unanimously critical.³⁹

The Jackson interview in *Tikkun*, along with his pronouncements that Louis Farrakhan would not be a part of his 1988 campaign, were intended to decrease Jewish opposition and to increase Jewish support for him as he once again tried to secure the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party. On June 22, 1988, Democratic parties in seven states called for self-determination for the Palestinian peoples, many urging the creation of a separate Palestinian state. These moves were reportedly prompted by

³⁸ Ibid., 41.

³⁹ Ibid.

the presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson.⁴⁰ This sparked a re-emergence of Jewish antagonisms towards the Jackson campaign and Jackson himself.

Ira Silverman, executive vice president of the American Jewish Committee, in response to the actions of the seven states, commented: "We're deeply troubled by any outcropping of the kinds of views we are seeing in some of these states. But I am confident they do not reflect American opinion in general, nor the mainstream of the Democratic Party."⁴¹ The black/Jewish antagonisms that were a part of Jackson's 1984 campaign were reopened through the debate over the Palestinian issue.

On May 30, 1988, Jackson made an appeal for Jews and African-Americans to find common ground in their "histories of suffering." Jackson, recalling that black soldiers were the first to reach and liberate Jews in the Nazi concentration camps, said that Jews and blacks had a historic bond in that they "met each other, in a very real sense, at the door of the concentration camps."⁴² Jesse Jackson was still trying to mend the differences between blacks and Jews, differences which his 1984 and 1988 campaigns helped to bring into the public eye.

⁴⁰ William E. Schmidt, "Democrats Back Palestinians At 7 State Party Conventions," *New York Times*, 23 June 1988.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Karen Tumulty, "Jackson Urges Blacks, Jews to Find 'Common Ground,'" *Los Angeles Times*, 31 June 1988.

In early January, 1990, Jackson once again found himself in trouble with the American Jewish community. In a prayer service for New York Mayor David Dinkins, Jackson "mentioned the unmentionable: Peace meets brutality in the Middle East. The birthplace of Jesus the Christ is under occupation."⁴³ Jewish leaders were infuriated that Jackson took the occasion to attack Israel by making such statements. Others questioned why Jackson needed to bring up the issue at all.⁴⁴ The Jewish community and Jackson remained on opposite sides.

It is obvious that Jesse Jackson's policy stances, beliefs and actions concerning the Middle East were uninfluenced by his need to generate the support of American Jews in his quests to secure the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988. His views have remained constant despite the fact that they have proven detrimental to his campaigns by alienating the politically active and influential Jewish members of the Democratic Party. Although the antagonisms between Jackson and the American Jewish community, which are rooted in part in an historical conflict between the blacks and the Jews, have continued, Jackson has made numerous attempts to heal the rift. These attempts have proven unsuccessful, partly because Jackson's

⁴³ Richard Cohen, "What Jesse Jackson Said," *Washington Post*, 9 January 1990.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

opinions concerning events in the Middle East have remained constant. As long as Jackson fights for the rights of Palestinians, a fight which includes an implicit critique of Israel, he will have great difficulty generating the support of the American Jewish community.

JESSE JACKSON AND THE PALESTINIANS:

The Palestinians are a people without a home. In 1948, Israel took the land that was to have comprised a Palestinian state. Although many Palestinians have left the area which was incorporated into Israel, others chose to remain.⁴⁵ The occupation of what was to be Palestinian land by Israel has produced a Palestinian-Israeli conflict and, in a broader sense, an Arab-Israeli conflict.

Jesse Jackson has long been a vocal supporter of the cause of the Palestinians. This was evident when, in 1979, Jackson met with and embraced Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.). At a time when few nations or people were willing to recognize the P.L.O. as anything other than a terrorist group, Jackson met with Arafat as if he was the spokesman of a legitimate people with a legitimate claim to their homeland.

On March 13, 1987, Jackson called for an international peace conference on the Middle East that would include the

⁴⁵ James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (Glenview: Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990), 325.

United States, the Soviet Union and Israel. The agenda of this proposed conference, according to Jackson, would include discovering measures which would guarantee a sovereign state for the Palestinians as well as a guarantee of the security of Israel within internationally recognized boundaries. In the words of Jackson: "We must never lose hope that the Palestinian people will become a sovereign state and a Palestinian citizen will have a passport from his own country."⁴⁶

On December 22 of that same year Jesse Jackson called for a change in American policy in the Middle East. He stated that the current U.S. policy left Israel with only false security and the Palestinians with no security at all. Jackson stated the need for a new "Middle East peace formula" which would require mutual recognition on the part of Israel and the Palestinians. Jackson argued that "Israel must be guaranteed security within internationally recognized boundaries, and Palestinians must have the same rights as all others to self-determination and a homeland or state."⁴⁷

In an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor* on March 2, 1988, Jesse Jackson stated that if he became President of the United States, the first thing that he

⁴⁶ James Dickenson, "Middle East Peace Talks Proposed by Jackson," *Washington Post*, 14 March 1987.

⁴⁷ "Jackson Makes Plea On the Middle East At Holiday Season," *New York Times*, 23 December 1987.

would do to unravel the problems in the Middle East would be to try to solve the Palestinian-Israeli problem. He would hope to accomplish this by convening the leadership of, and opening discussion between, the two sides which he perceived as "locked in a death grip," bound by mutual fear, distrust and hatred and on the road to mutual annihilation.⁴⁸ By stating that the Palestinian issue was his number one priority in the Middle East, Jackson was showing his immense concern for the Palestinians as well as illustrating his belief that the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the first step to solving the problems of the entire region.

Later that same month, Jackson once again displayed his sympathy and concern for the Palestinians. He called for mutual recognition between the Israelis and the Palestinians so that they could live side by side "as opposed to one living on the other."⁴⁹ Jackson, it should be noted, was quick to assure both sides of the conflict of his concern.

In June 1988, despite the fact that law prohibited the United States from speaking to or negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization, Jackson stated that sooner or later the U.S. would be forced to speak with the

⁴⁸ Tom Hughes, "Jesse Jackson: the Overlooked Front-Runner," *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 March 1988.

⁴⁹ Wolf Blitzer, "Israel's Reliance on U.S. Prompts Interest in Presidential Race," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 March 1988.

P.L.O. After once again stating his support for the Palestinian state, Jesse Jackson argued that "the P.L.O. is by far the most representative organization of the Palestinian people."⁵⁰

A few days later Jackson argued that the United States had lost any ability to influence events in the Middle East by not meeting with the P.L.O. He stated that "in the case of the P.L.O. we have opted not to talk. Since we can't talk we can't act, and if we can't act, we can't influence."⁵¹

As previously mentioned, Jackson's campaign in 1988 compelled seven Democratic state party conventions to voice their support for the Palestinians and a Palestinian homeland. The state parties of Illinois, Vermont, Washington, Maine, Oregon, Texas and Minnesota not only called for Palestinian self-determination, they also hoped to make this concept one of the planks of the national Democratic Party platform.⁵²

In December of 1988, Jackson wrote that, even though there was not yet peace in Bethlehem, there was for perhaps the first time the hope for peace. This hope came from the fact that the Reagan Administration had agreed to engage in

⁵⁰ "Jackson's Views: Excerpts From an Interview," *New York Times*, 16 April 1988.

⁵¹ Robert Shogan, "U.S. Stance on PLO Limits Mideast Role, Jackson Says," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 April 1988.

⁵² Schmidt.

substantive discussions with the P.L.O. following the P.L.O.'s decision to recognize Israel's right to exist. Jackson applauded this step as courageous. According to Jackson, the peace formula would have to include Palestinian self-determination and security for Israel, "two sides of the same coin." He wrote that

[a] new olive branch has been raised. Its tender shoots must be nourished if they are to grow strong and verdant. Peace is not the work of a few - it is a calling for all who are inspired by its promise. Let us act now so that someday soon the bells will ring again in Bethlehem, so that peace will heal the land.⁵³

In just one year's time, Jackson's 'new olive branch' lay withered and trampled because peace-promoting activities failed to materialize. In a column for the *Los Angeles Times*, Jesse Jackson wrote that there was still no peace in Jerusalem and the Israelis and Palestinians remained tangled in a conflict promoting mutual destruction. He wrote that, on average, "one person - an Israeli or a Palestinian - is killed every day, someone's son, daughter, father, mother, brother, or sister. That means one family tragedy every day in the occupied territories."⁵⁴

Jackson went on to state that the U.S. can provide the means and the impetus for breaking the death grip. He suggested that the best way to do this would be for

⁵³ Jesse Jackson, "In Bethlehem, Hope for Peace," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 December 1988.

⁵⁴ Jesse Jackson, "For A Season of Peace, Call on a Man of Peace," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 December 1989.

President Bush to appoint former President Jimmy Carter as 'special ambassador to the Middle East.' Jackson noted that Carter had been actively "mediating conflicts all over the world in the past few years," as well as the fact that it was Carter who brought the sworn enemies Egypt and Israel to the negotiating table and helped to forge a peace between them at Camp David.⁵⁵

From his early meeting with Yasir Arafat right up through his suggestion to name Jimmy Carter as a special ambassador to the Middle East, Jesse Jackson's views of the Palestinians and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have remained constant. He has continually supported the right of Palestinian self-determination; it is important to state that he has always also argued for the security of the nation of Israel. This continuity is quite remarkable considering that his stance on the Palestinians has been part of the problems between himself and the American Jewish population which have hurt his campaigns for the Democratic presidential nominations.

JESSE JACKSON'S CONCERN FOR AMERICAN HOSTAGES:

Jesse Jackson has been able to shine in the spotlight of the Middle East at various times by attempting to secure the freedom of hostages being held in the region. Jackson has been able to get publicity in the United States; his

⁵⁵ Ibid.

successes have illustrated that, in some parts of the Middle East on some issues, the Reverend Jackson carries clout.

On December 6, 1983, Lieutenant Robert Goodman's airplane was shot down over Lebanon while he was conducting a reconnaissance flight. The black Navy flier was taken prisoner and was being held in a Syrian prison camp. Soon afterwards, Jackson went to Syria to negotiate directly for the release of Goodman.⁵⁶

The announcement that Jackson was going to go to Syria met with very little encouragement, either from the media or from the White House. Even though Jackson stated that it was to be a strictly humanitarian, moral mission, the media and others ridiculed it as a plot to help his upcoming campaign for the presidential nomination. Jackson likewise received absolutely no sympathy from the White House as President Reagan refused to answer his repeated phone calls.⁵⁷

After negotiations with President Assad, Jackson successfully won the release of Lt. Goodman. When Jackson returned with him to the U.S. on January 4, 1984, first stopping at Andrews Air Force Base, there was a rousing welcome. Shortly thereafter, the two were invited to the White House for an 'official' welcome. The success of the

⁵⁶ Lucius Barker, Our Time Has Come (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 57.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

mission, the publicity it generated and the credibility it bestowed upon Jackson would have been the envy of any politician. As Senator Edward Kennedy put it: "Surely ... this personal initiative by Reverend Jackson will rank as one of the finest achievements by a private citizen in the history of international relations."⁵⁸

In June 1988, Jackson would once again try to secure the freedom of American hostages in the Middle East. On June 29 Jackson announced an initiative aimed at freeing nine Americans believed to be being held captive in Lebanon. Jackson asserted the need to keep the "plight of the American hostages high up on our consciences, and to reach out to elements and allies in the region to negotiate their release."⁵⁹

One month later it became obvious just which element Jackson would be reaching out to in the Middle East. Jackson tried to arrange a meeting between himself and Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister of Iran. At this meeting Jackson wanted to open discussions on securing the release of the American hostages.⁶⁰ He felt Velayati could be instrumental because it was widely believed that the nine American hostages were being held by Islamic

⁵⁸ Ibid., 59.

⁵⁹ Karen Tumulty, "Jackson Tells Plan to Free U.S. Hostages in Lebanon," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 June 1988.

⁶⁰ Robert Pear, "Jackson is Seeking Talk With Iranian to Free Hostages," *New York Times*, 28 July 1988.

fundamentalists who received both money and guidance from Iran.

Once again, Jackson got little support from the White House. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater stated that President Bush's position was that "official channels are the place to conduct foreign policy."⁶¹ Sheila Tate, the press secretary for George Bush when he was Vice President, said that Bush continued to see Jackson as a "loose cannon" who could endanger American foreign policy interests.⁶²

Unlike his previous success negotiating for the release of Lt. Goodman, Jesse Jackson was unable to secure the freedom of the nine hostages in Lebanon as he was never able to arrange a meeting with Velayati. Despite this failure, Jackson was willing once again to jump into the spotlight by attempting to get hostages freed when the Persian Gulf Crisis erupted in the latter half of 1990.

In August of 1990, Jesse Jackson announced plans to make a trip to Iraq. He was to travel as a journalist representing his new television program. Jackson stated that there was pressure applied from "high levels" of the U.S. Government to discourage his trip to interview the leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein.⁶³ On August 30, the

⁶¹ E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Views Split on Jackson Hostage Offer," *New York Times*, 30 July 1988.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Gwen Ifill, "Jackson Plans Trip To Iraq despite 'Some Pressure' from U.S.," *Washington Post*, 22 August 1990.

official Iraqi News Agency reported that Jackson met with President Saddam Hussein to discuss the Persian Gulf Crisis.⁶⁴

While in Iraq, Jesse Jackson also met with Americans and other Westerners being held at strategic military and civilian installations. After discussions with Saddam Hussein, as well as "continuous negotiations in Kuwait," Jackson secured the release of many Westerners being held captive. Along with the several hundred women and children Saddam Hussein was permitting to leave, Jackson negotiated for the additional release of many male captives who were sick.⁶⁵ Even though Jackson was unable to obtain administrative approval for his mission, he at least received the gratitude of those whom he helped to freedom. One of the sick hostages, upon his return to the United States, stated that he was free "by the grace of God and Jesse Jackson."⁶⁶ It should be noted, however, that Saddam Hussein also had a lot to gain by allowing the hostages to leave because, such an action, could improve the opinion that the nations of the world had of him.

⁶⁴ "Jesse Jackson Meets Hussein On Gulf Crisis, Iraq Reports," *New York Times*, 31 August 1990.

⁶⁵ Mark Fineman, "Women, Children Airlifted to Freedom from Iraq," *Washington Post*, 2 September 1990.

⁶⁶ Walter Goodman, "Jackson on Assignment in Iraq: Reporter Becomes the Story," *New York Times*, 5 September 1990

Although Saddam Hussein benefitted from allowing the hostages to leave, Jesse Jackson also benefitted because he had once again found the spotlight in a hostage mission. Once again he was able to negotiate with a leader of a nation in the Middle East and help secure the release of hostages. Jesse Jackson has at times proven to be successful in endeavors aimed at securing the release of hostages, with little help from official Washington, when other "official" diplomatic channels have proven fruitless.

JESSE JACKSON'S CRITIQUE OF U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY:

In the 1984 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, one of Jackson's greatest accomplishments was his ability to raise unpopular policy issues and to discuss national priorities. Among these unpopular issues and national priorities were the rights of Palestinians and the need for an "evenhanded" policy in the Middle East.⁶⁷ When Jackson was able to place Middle East issues on the campaign agenda, it was evident that he was very critical of American Middle East policy.

Jackson's position concerning U.S. foreign policy in his 1984 campaign was that it was both "inadequate and reprehensible."⁶⁸ This inadequacy and reprehensibility was

⁶⁷ Patricia Gurin, Shirley Hatchett and James Jackson, Hope and Independence (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989) 164-166.

⁶⁸ Barker and Walters, 155.

nowhere as apparent; according to Jackson, as it was concerning the Middle East. The Middle East plank of the Jesse Jackson platform was the most divergent of his positions from the plank supported by the Democratic Party. The following chart provides a brief, but incomplete, illustration:

-Jackson plank-	-Democratic plank-
1. Called for the creation of a Palestinian homeland	1. Called for a resolution of the Palestinian issue
2. Called for readjustment of relationships in the Middle East to more "balanced" proportions	2. Supported the principle of peace in the area centered around continued strong U.S. support of Israel
3. Supported the security of Israel within internationally recognized boundaries	3. Supported the existence of Israel with secure and defensible borders ⁶⁹

As this chart shows, Jesse Jackson was against a U.S. Middle East policy that considered Israeli interests exclusively; he was more attuned to Arab interests and grievances than was the Democratic Party. He supported a more balanced, equitable approach to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, an approach which "acknowledged the legitimacy of interests other than Israel's."⁷⁰ In fact, Jackson "boldly advocated a Middle East policy that would include the entire region, considering the interests of both Israel and her Arab neighbors."⁷¹

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Reed, 101.

⁷¹ Barker, 104.

Aside from Jackson's concern for a more "balanced" Middle East policy, he was also very critical of unilateral action taken by the United States in the region. When Jackson proposed an international peace conference on the Middle East in March 1987, he expressly stated that "(u)nilateral action by the United States is not the key to peace in the region."⁷² Rather, he saw, and continues to see, the need for cooperation by the international community.

When Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down over the Persian Gulf in July 1988 by an American warship, Jackson was once again very critical of unilateral action. Jackson argued that there was no evidence that the U.S. ship was under attack by the Iranian jet. He also stated that the blame for the incident, which killed hundreds of Iranian civilians, did not rest on failed technology, but rather on a "failed and vague policy for the region."⁷³ Jackson argued that the United States should not have been in the region unilaterally; the U.S. should only have been in the Middle East as one part of a multilateral United Nations peacekeeping effort which would have as its prime objective a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war.⁷⁴

⁷² Dickenson, my emphasis.

⁷³ Robin Toner, "Candidates for President Express Differing Views on Downing of Jet," *New York Times*, 5 July 1988.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

Jackson was overtly critical of unilateral action by the United States in the Middle East, stating the detrimental effect it had, particularly with regard to any future U.S. action in the region. When the Persian Gulf Crisis erupted in 1990, Jackson once again was openly critical of U.S. action; Jackson was highly critical of the Bush Administration for not working harder to free the Western hostages being held captive in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Although Jackson was implicitly critical of the Iraqi government, he was overtly critical of the U.S. government for not working harder to find "common ground," a peaceful solution to the problem.⁷⁵ He stated that it was "time for the congressmen, senators and leaders in other countries to work through diplomacy instead of beating the drums of war."⁷⁶

It should be noted, however, that although Jackson was always urging the Bush Administration to work through diplomatic channels to solve the Persian Gulf Crisis, he was also supportive of military action in the region if **necessary** "to secure an end to the military aggression by Iraq."⁷⁷ Jackson said of Saddam Hussein: "He must know he has pushed us over the line and that his insistence on the

⁷⁵ Goodman.

⁷⁶ Fineman.

⁷⁷ "Jackson Urges U.S. Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 4 August 1990.

occupation of Kuwait and the threat against Saudi Arabia is an extreme act of provocation that would be met with force."⁷⁸

In fact, the same Jesse Jackson, who was previously highly skeptical of and dead set against unilateral action of any form by the United States in the Middle East, changed his tune during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Jackson stated that the United States had to drive Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi forces "back to the borders." He also said that the U.S. had to be prepared to "use military force, multilaterally or unilaterally."⁷⁹ Although he obviously preferred the multilateral use of force, Jesse Jackson was not against the use of force unilaterally by the United States if it was necessary.⁸⁰

This inconsistency in his Middle East perspective can be attributed to Jackson's concern for human rights. Jackson believed that Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi forces had taken away the human rights of the Kuwaiti peoples; he felt that if unilateral military action by the United States was needed to restore the Kuwaitis' human rights, then so be it. By his numerous arguments for such unilateral action

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Post-Cold War Consensus backs U.S. Intervention," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1990; my emphasis.

⁸⁰ *New York Times*, 4 August 1990.

during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Jackson clearly showed that his concern is, first and foremost, for human rights.

In the column that Jesse Jackson writes for the *Los Angeles Times*, he showed support for the Bush Administration by stating that it had acted correctly during the Persian Gulf Crisis. He stated that "Bush's actions have been prudent, skillful and in proportion. In other words, he has been fundamentally right." Yet Jackson was also quick to point out that "[i]n the final analysis, might may be used as a deterrent from aggression, but right must be the justification for acting. Bush is weakened by inconsistency in the application of these principles."⁸¹

According to Jackson:

Hussein was wrong when he violated Kuwait's right to self-determination and broke international law by invading a sovereign country. He is right, however, and gets a strong hearing in the Arab world, when he says that Israel is wrong for occupying the West Bank and Gaza and denying Palestinians their human rights and self-determination.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should not ignore the message (even though the messenger may be flawed) from many of their fellow Arabs about the grave disparity between the rich Persian Gulf states and the masses of poor in the region.

The United States should practice the democratic principles it preaches, even as it backs them up with economic and military strength. Then, we must act, we will have the moral authority to gain the backing of the world community because we are right, and not just because we have might.⁸²

⁸¹ Jesse Jackson, "Use Might in Service of Right," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 1990.

⁸² *Ibid.*

Following the success the United States enjoyed in handling the Persian Gulf Crisis, Jackson was proud of the armed services. But he also criticized the United States government. He stated that even though the United States had spent billions of dollars fighting the war in the Persian Gulf, it had not been able to secure peace and stability in the Middle East.⁸³ For Jackson, this represented a failure for the United States. The U.S. forces had been successful in driving the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, but this represented merely putting a band aid on a cut that required stitches - it may have stopped the bleeding temporarily, but sooner or later the bleeding will continue. The Persian Gulf Crisis, in Jackson's opinion, was symptomatic of the real problems of the Middle East, the absence of stability and the lack of peace, and the U.S. had not been able to cure the disease simply by alleviating one of the symptoms.

Jackson has often taken the opportunity to voice criticism of U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Middle East. His criticisms have centered around the fact that the U.S. policy is not "balanced" and needs to include the interests of the entire region rather than merely the interests of Israel. He has also been critical of unilateral action taken by the United States in the Middle

⁸³ Robert Boyd, "Jackson Brings Democrats' Divisions Out Into The Open," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 9 June 1991.

East, only breaking from this systematic opposition to unilateral action during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Jesse Jackson is, and has been, highly critical of U.S. Middle East policy because of its inherent contradictions which have severely limited the ability of the United States to take a further role in the region.

CONCLUSION:

Jesse Jackson's Middle East policy positions can be attributed to his strong devotion to human rights as well as the need to further human fulfillment and human well-being. This devotion is evidenced by the causes of his problems with the American Jewish community, his views concerning the Palestinians, his attempts to release hostages from their Middle East captors and the views he expressed concerning the Persian Gulf Crisis. Jesse Jackson's view is that U.S. Middle East policy needs to be balanced and consistent and work to secure the rights of all. He feels the same concerning U.S. Central America policy.

III

CENTRAL AMERICA

INTRODUCTION:

Jesse Jackson has never been at a loss of words or ideas concerning Central America and American policy towards that region. He has been successful at getting issues from that region placed upon the agenda in his 1984 and 1988 campaigns to secure the Democratic presidential nomination and has taken every opportunity to discuss Central American issues in the media. This section will examine three factors which lead to an understanding of Jesse Jackson's Central America policy: 1) his views concerning the situation in Nicaragua; 2) his humanitarian actions taken in the region; and 3) his evaluation of U.S. Central America policy.

JESSE JACKSON AND THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA:

Of all of the countries and occurrences in Central America, Jesse Jackson has given the situation in Nicaragua the most attention in his speeches and writings. To

comprehend fully Jackson's views concerning Nicaragua, one needs to examine briefly what constitutes the 'situation' in that country. On July 19, 1979, the Somoza dictatorship was overthrown by the Sandinist Front of National Liberation. The Somoza regime fell to the "determined guerilla operation backed by a united civilian population."⁸⁴ The Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN) became the first social revolutionary government in Central America since the ascent of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Some of the followers of the Somoza regime have refused to accept or acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sandinist government. These people, known *en masse* as the Contras, have persistently launched attacks against the Sandinist government and its citizens from strongholds in places such as Honduras and Costa Rica. Fighting between the Sandinistas and the Contras has been one of the major defining characteristics of the Nicaraguan experience over the past decade.

The Somoza regime, when in power, had cultivated a 'friendship' with the United States and the foreign policy stances it took were obsequiously 'pro-American.' When the War of Liberation ended causing the demise of the Somoza dictatorship and the coming to power of the FSLN, the social configuration of political power in Nicaragua changed

⁸⁴ Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 81.

abruptly. Unlike the Somozas, who had based their power in a corrupt, foreign-trained military establishment and a small economic elite, the Sandinistas drew their strength and their revolutionary mandate from the mass of the people.⁸⁵

No longer was the Nicaraguan government strongly tied to the U.S. government; the Sandinistas did not need to cultivate the friendship of the United States because they did not rely on Washington to stay in power: they possessed the backing and support of the masses. Nicaragua no longer needed to follow the American lead; its foreign policy no longer had to be, and was not, obsequiously 'pro-American.'⁸⁶ In fact, when Nicaragua adopted a nonaligned foreign policy, its foreign policy came into conflict with U.S. foreign policy on such issues as Afghanistan and Cuba.⁸⁷

When Ronald Reagan became president, the U.S. began to send aid to the Contra forces as they fought to overthrow the Sandinist government. Such things as Nicaragua's socialist form of government and its close ties to Cuba, coupled with Reagan's fear of the spread of communism, led the Reagan Administration to feel at odds with the FSLN and to support the Contras. At a rally in Washington D.C. in

⁸⁵ Ibid., 17-20.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 20-21.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 72.

early December 1983, Jackson stated that it was "in so many ways a dark hour" for the United States as its President was "embracing a movement to overthrow a government in Nicaragua; a legitimate government in Nicaragua."⁸⁸

Jackson sees the Ortega regime, the Sandinist government, as a legitimate government because it symbolizes an expression of the popular will because the regime came about due to a revolution which had a wide base of support in the Nicaraguan population.

The reasons that Jackson felt the Reagan Administration's stances towards Nicaragua created such a 'dark hour' for the U.S. came out clearly in a speech he presented at the *Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico* in Mexico City on May 28, 1984. Jackson criticized the government for supporting and financially backing the "hated Somoza contras" to aid in their attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government and for planting mines in the harbors of Nicaragua.⁸⁹ In the address he gave to the Democratic National Convention in 1984, Jackson stated similar sentiments arguing that the U.S. was "at its worst" when it was dealing with the occurrences in Nicaragua.⁹⁰ According

⁸⁸ Harrison Donnelly, "The Jackson Mystique: Emotion, Ambition," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. 7 January, 1984, 10, my emphasis.

⁸⁹ Jesse Jackson, *Straight From The Heart* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 247.

⁹⁰ Barker, 221.

to Jackson, Reagan had it all wrong. The problems of Central America in general, and Nicaragua specifically, were poverty and disease, not communism.⁹¹

In an interview in the June 1984 issue of *Playboy* magazine, Jesse Jackson provided advice to the Reagan Administration on how to deal with Nicaragua. He stated:

We should recognize Nicaragua, we should open up dialogue with its leaders, we should stop supporting the rebels' military, because we're losing the war and losing prestige. We are losing that war and losing credibility throughout the Third World because we're engaging in that war. We ought to be more patient with Third World nations in their transitions for development.

... And we ought to help stabilize that government, help correct through diplomacy and trade the wrongs that are there and not disrupt the people of that government with an attempted military overthrow.⁹²

Jesse Jackson continued to argue against American involvement in Nicaragua in the following years. On March 17, 1988, Jackson publicly assailed the decision made by the U.S. government to deploy troops to Honduras to help the Contras. The Contras in Honduras had come under attack from Sandinist forces, so the Reagan Administration decided to send American troops to Honduras to back the Contra forces. Jackson stated:

The sending of troops to Honduras is not necessary. Honduras is not threatened by the alleged Nicaraguan raids made in hot pursuit. It appears the administration is once again trying to divert attention from a scandal (the Iran-Contra affair) using the

⁹¹ Faw and Skelton, 177.

⁹² "Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson," *Playboy*, June 1984, 76.

military expedition to shift focus. These expeditions have been going on for 19 days. Why is it only now that we respond?⁹³

Jackson clearly advocated a "cessation of hostilities against a Communist Nicaragua"⁹⁴ stating that the money the Reagan Administration spent funding the Contras should have been spent trying to alleviate the problems of poverty and ignorance prevalent in Central America and elsewhere.⁹⁵

In the speech he presented to the 1988 Democratic National Convention, much like the one he gave at the DNC four years earlier, Jackson again specifically called for an end to the "illegal war on Nicaragua" and called, instead, for the U.S. to join "the regional peace process that offers dialogue and hope."⁹⁶ Even when Jackson's presidential campaign ended in 1988, his condemnations of the U.S. involvement in Nicaragua continued. The condemnations continued because the Bush Administration, like the Reagan Administration before it, supported the Contra cause.

In an article he wrote for the *Los Angeles Times* on November 2, 1989, Jackson stated that the peace process for Nicaragua hinged upon the demobilization of the Contras. He

⁹³ Paul Taylor, "Democratic Presidential Candidates Assail Troop Dispatch," *Washington Post*, 18 March 1988.

⁹⁴ Landess and Quinn, 252.

⁹⁵ Ron Harris, "Jackson to Talk with Officials in Mexico on Debt, Development," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 May 1988.

⁹⁶ Jesse Jackson, "A Call to Common Ground," *Black Scholar*, January/February, 1989, 17.

further stated that the United States was undermining that process by continuing to supply aid and support to the Contras. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega had attempted to secure a truce, but Contra violence continued and Ortega was forced to announce the resumption of fighting. Jackson called for the U.S. government to get over its "mad obsession with keeping the Contras in business" and to convince the Contras to demobilize so as to stop the bloodshed. He wrote:

As they (the Contras) step up the killings of their countrymen, the folly of this policy (supporting the Contras) becomes obvious. The Contras are implicating us in their violence and shameful actions every day. Congress must pull the plug on them, and the Administration must offer its full support to the Central American peace process.⁹⁷

In March 1990, Jackson once again criticized the American government for its involvement in Nicaragua. However, this criticism included a new topic as Jackson chastised the Bush Administration for helping to finance one of the candidates in the Nicaraguan presidential elections. Jackson's statement was:

During the decade of the 1980s, the United States spent billions to carry out the war in Central America. Thirty thousand Nicaraguans lost their lives. We imposed economic sanctions until the economy was in shambles. We mined their harbors in violation of international law, then thumbed our nose at the World Court when its decision went against us. Finally, we openly financed the political campaign of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

⁹⁷ Jesse Jackson, "Two Sides Can't See Peace Staring Them in the Face," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 November 1989.

If a country we depended on - say, Japan - were to cut us off economically, finance terrorist attacks against us and fund one party in an election campaign, we would be outraged at the violation of international law and treaties. We would hardly call the elections free and fair.⁹⁸

Jesse Jackson has been consistently opposed to the United States government's stances concerning Nicaragua since the 1979 revolution that brought the Sandinist government to power. This opposition has occurred on various levels. One level is that the aid that the Contras have received from America has helped to prolong the fighting and increased the death count, while simultaneously undermining any attempt at forging a peace between the two sides. On another level, Jackson condemned the economic sanctions placed upon the communist Nicaragua ruled by the Sandinist government, sanctions which crippled the Nicaraguan economy and harmed many people.

On a third level, Jackson criticized the initial U.S. decision to violate international law by mining the harbors of Nicaragua as well as the U.S. decision to compound the wrong by ignoring the World Court ruling when it found the United States guilty of violating international law. Jackson, on yet another level, opposed the U.S. involvement and intervention in the Nicaraguan elections.

Each of these levels of opposition and criticism can be traced back to a similar root - Jesse Jackson's devotion to

⁹⁸ Jesse Jackson, "Selling the Human Spirit," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 March 1990.

the concept of self-determination. Not unlike his arguments for the need to give Palestinians the right to self-determination in the Middle East, Jackson views the Sandinist government as the expression of the preference that the Nicaraguan people have as to what type of government they wish to live under, an aspect of their right to self-determination. The Nicaraguan people have expressed their right to self-determination, but the United States, through its policy concerning Nicaragua, has tried to undermine and take away that right because Nicaragua has chosen to implement a system of government which is not 'democratic' in the American sense of the word. In Jackson's view, supporting anti-government rebels in Nicaragua represents denying that country its right to self-determination.

JESSE JACKSON AT WORK IN CENTRAL AMERICA:

At various times Jesse Jackson has taken an active role in Central American affairs and has often made humanitarian appeals concerning events in the region. He has tried to help the cause of Haitian refugees and peasant laborers in Mexico. He has worked to secure the freedom of hostages and has visited the sites of natural disasters to comfort those displaced by the forces of nature.

As part of an essay Jackson wrote for *Universal Press* in 1982, he criticized the American treatment of Haitian

refugees. He wrote that "American military ships, under executive order, roam the high seas to intercept boats carrying Haitian refugees seeking political asylum and to turn them away from our shores without due process - a violation of human rights."⁹⁹ He went on to state that those Haitians who did reach the United States "(we)re held in what amount to criminal detention centers without criminal charges - another violation of human rights."¹⁰⁰

What infuriated Jackson was that, while the Haitian refugees were being treated so harshly, Polish dissidents and diplomats were being welcomed into America as political refugees seeking asylum. Besides the inhumane treatment accorded to the Haitians, Jackson opposed the hypocrisy of United States policy. Such a double standard for measuring human rights, according to Jackson, decreased the moral authority possessed by the United States and hindered its ability to influence world public opinion.¹⁰¹

When natural disasters occurred, ravaging portions of Central America, Jesse Jackson often visited the devastated regions. Such visits were intended to let the people know that others cared. When Hurricane Gilbert hit Jamaica in September 1988 leaving thousands of Jamaicans without food,

⁹⁹ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 74,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

shelter or work, Jackson travelled there to view the damage.¹⁰²

Jackson told the Jamaicans:

We're here because we care. We're here to let people know that just because they're homeless they need not be hopeless. They're not helpless because they have friends.¹⁰³

Besides trying to ease the pain and hardship caused by Gilbert, Jackson also hoped to bring the plight of the Jamaicans into world view. He stated that he and the other American dignitaries would try to mobilize the conscience of people around the world so that the Jamaican people could get the supplies they needed to repair the damage caused by the hurricane.¹⁰⁴

When Hurricane Hugo hit the Caribbean, Jackson the 'humanitarian' once again travelled to the ravaged region. Much like his purpose thirteen months earlier in Jamaica, Jackson wanted to let the peoples of the Caribbean know that other people cared, as well as hoping to place the plight of the Caribbeans before a world-wide audience. Jackson's message this time included the fact that some positive things could come out of the disaster. He stated:

The flip side of the destruction caused by Hurricane Hugo is opportunity. ... Now we need to seize the

¹⁰² "Jackson Views Jamaica Damage," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 September 1988.

¹⁰³ Joseph Treaster, "Jackson Visits Homeless Jamaicans," *New York Times*, 19 September 1988.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

moment and begin to rebuild these homes, schools and hospitals. The youths who live on these islands need to be trained to become brick masons, glazers, roofers and plumbers.¹⁰⁵

In the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, Jackson saw the opportunity to train the victims in the skills needed to rebuild their homes, their communities.

Jesse Jackson, aside from comforting those harmed by natural disasters, also worked to secure the freedom of prisoners being held captive in Cuba. Much as he had for Lieutenant Goodman in Syria and numerous individuals in Iraq, Jackson tried to get into the spotlight by working to get people freed from their captivity.

In June 1984 Jesse Jackson had various discussions with Fidel Castro. In an eight hour meeting between the two men held at the Palace of the Revolution, Jackson was able to secure the release of twenty-two Americans being held in Cuban jails.¹⁰⁶ He was also able to secure the release of twenty-six Cuban political prisoners.¹⁰⁷ In one brief trek to Cuba, Jackson was able to secure the freedom of forty-eight people being held in prison. While Jackson was able to get publicity, Castro also gained from the prisoner release. He "got rid of some people he didn't need in

¹⁰⁵ D. Michael Cheers, "Train Caribbean Victims in Skills Needed to Rebuild Their Homes, Jackson Says," *Jet*, 23 October 1989.

¹⁰⁶ Faw and Skelton, 182.

¹⁰⁷ Barker and Walters, 122.

return for some declarations that couldn't be enforced,"¹⁰⁸ declarations in the form of a ten-point statement issued by both Castro and Jackson.

Jesse Jackson has also argued for the cause of peasant laborers in Mexico. In April 1991 he wrote an article for the *Los Angeles Times* in which he vehemently argued against a free-trade agreement between the United States and Mexico. He wrote that the free-trade zone would be disastrous for Mexican workers because:

U.S. and Japanese multinational companies would move to Mexico to avoid tougher U.S. environmental, health and safety, and minimum-wage laws.

This is not a false alarm. It is already happening in Mexico's border export zone, where foreign corporations pay Mexican workers about 60 cents an hour. A flood of U.S. firms have moved to the Mexican side to escape our labor and environmental laws.

... Corporate pressure keeps wage rates in the export-zone plants lower than in the rest of Mexico. We export jobs and import goods made with poisons we have banned, by labor paid less than we allow, working in conditions beneath what we accept. Mexico gets jobs without hope, a poisoned environment, an impoverished work force eager to come this way.¹⁰⁹

Jackson feels it is necessary to raise the standards for the Mexican workers and not to lower those of the United States.

Jackson agrees with Cuahtemoc Cardenas, the Mexican presidential candidate who was 'robbed' in the 1988 election, that the United States and Mexico need to forge a social compact. The goal of the compact would be to grant

¹⁰⁸ Faw and Skelton, 184.

¹⁰⁹ Jesse Jackson, "Free Trade: a Fast One on the Fast Track," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 April 1991.

Mexican people minimum wages, health and safety guarantees, environmental and consumer protection and child-labor restrictions comparable with those enjoyed by the citizens of the United States. The U.S. role in the compact would be to help Mexico help its workers by fulfilling the aforementioned goals; the U.S. would use inducements in the form of 'substantial debt relief.' The debt relief provided to Mexico by the United States would allow both countries to grow together.¹¹⁰

Jesse Jackson has often answered the calls of the needy in Central America: he has secured the freedom of prisoners, he has gone to bat for Mexican laborers and Haitian refugees and he has brought the plight of victims of natural disasters into the public eye. Jackson has been devoted to helping the poor, the needy, the unrepresented, the dispossessed; he has consistently fought to give all people the rights they deserve.

JESSE JACKSON'S EVALUATION OF U.S. CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY:

In the 1984 and 1988 campaigns for the Democratic presidential nomination, one of Jesse Jackson's greatest accomplishments was his ability to raise unpopular issues and to discuss national priorities. Among these unpopular issues and national priorities were the wars being fought in Central America and relations between the United States and

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Cuba. When Jackson was able to place Central American issues on the agenda, it was evident that he was very critical of American Central America policy.

Jackson's position concerning U.S. foreign policy in the 1984 campaign was that it was both "inadequate and reprehensible."¹¹¹ This inadequacy and reprehensibility was, according to Jackson, very apparent concerning the U.S. government's positions in Central America. He placed blame on the Reagan Administration and Ronald Reagan specifically stating:

President Reagan would have the people of the United States believe that the struggle in Central America and Latin America is a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. He would convince our people that this is a life-and-death struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness - that all those who love freedom must be willing to commit endless military and financial resources to the government of El Salvador, to turning Honduras into an American military base, to financing the contras seeking to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. He seeks to make the isolation of Cuba one of the chief goals of United States Central America policy.¹¹²

Whereas Reagan saw Central America as a playing field for competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., Jackson saw the region as an area with various problems such as disease, poverty and human rights violations, problems which American policy was contributing to rather than helping. In fact, no issue better illustrated the distinction between Jackson and his opponents in 1984 than Central America. Rather

¹¹¹ Gurin, et. al, 164-166.

¹¹² Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 247.

... than condemning the liberation movements in the region, Rev. Jackson effectively argued that such movements were the inevitable result of oppression and exploitation and that the United States had historically far too often consciously supported its perpetrators.¹¹³

One specific issue which Jesse Jackson often criticized was the stance that the United States has taken towards Cuba. There is no other country in the hemisphere, no other leader, about which American perceptions are so influenced by myth, stereotype and unabashed propaganda as Cuba and Fidel Castro. Americans know pitifully little about this island nation, its people and its leader. Jackson was, and is, convinced that propaganda is not the kind of element upon which the United States foreign policy should be based. When Jackson made his much publicized trip to Central America during his 1984 campaign, Cuba was included as one of his stops.¹¹⁴

One of the themes of Jackson's visit to Cuba, as well as his meetings with Fidel Castro, was that "all of the presidential administrations of the past thirty years, Democratic as well as Republican, had failed in their management of foreign policy because they had neglected to make the simplest sort of overture to a benign and misjudged man (Castro)"¹¹⁵ When Jackson secured the release of the

¹¹³ Barker and Walters, 115.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Landess and Quinn, 229.

Cuban prisoners on that trip, he stated that the prisoner release was a sign from Castro that he wanted to normalize relations with the United States.¹¹⁶

During that visit, Jackson and Castro signed a ten-point statement, a document which Jackson labelled as "historic." Part of the document stated that "the Cuban government would consider letting some of the so-called Cuban boat-people who had illegally emigrated to the United States - and who are now sitting in Florida jails - come back to Cuba."¹¹⁷ The document also included the fact that Cuba was willing to consider exchanging ambassadors with Washington.

Jackson has consistently criticized the fact that, despite such overtures by the Cuban government and Fidel Castro to normalize relations between the two nations, the U.S. government has chosen to view Cuba as an enemy, a communist threat perched on the back porch of Florida. Jesse Jackson has argued for the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba, relations which need to include both diplomatic ties and trade.¹¹⁸

Aside from his condemnation of the official U.S. stance towards Cuba, Jackson also has been highly critical of American policy concerning El Salvador. In the early part

¹¹⁶ Faw and Skelton, 182.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 183.

¹¹⁸ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 247.

of the 1980s, Jackson criticized the fact that taxes collected in the United States had gone to support the "repressive military junta" in El Salvador.¹¹⁹

According to Jackson, the U.S. government was wrong in its support of the Duarte regime in El Salvador. That support had been in the form of military aid which America had been providing to the Salvadoran forces against guerilla forces trying to overthrow President Duarte. Jackson felt that such aid served only to prolong the fighting between the Salvadoran government and the FDR-FMLN.¹²⁰ Aside from the prolonged bloodshed brought about due to the American military aid, Jackson was also appalled because the aid was going to a regime which he considered to be repressive.¹²¹

Jackson has argued for the establishment of normal relations between the United States and Cuba, has criticized the aid given by America to the repressive Duarte regime in El Salvador and has opposed the support the U.S. government has provided to the contra forces trying to overthrow the Sandinist regime in Nicaragua. As stated previously, Jackson viewed giving aid and support to the Contras as a violation of the Nicaraguan people's right to self-determination. Much of Jackson's criticisms center on the United States' military involvement in Central America.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Barker and Walters, 120.

¹²¹ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 247.

Thus, when the United States invaded Panama late in the 1980s, Jackson was a critic of the decision.

Before the actual invasion of Panama by American forces sent to extradite Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, Jackson was opposed to the treatment the U.S. was according to Panama. The economic sanctions that America had placed on the country in an attempt to force Noriega out of power, according to Jackson, were "causing tremendous suffering among the common people of Panama."¹²² Jackson stated that the "common people are being starved, the common people are going without medicine, are in great anguish and pain, and Noriega is insulated by his wealth and his military."¹²³ Jackson argued for the United States and its allies to send humanitarian aid to Panama through the Red Cross.¹²⁴

Jackson was critical of the decision to impose economic sanctions against Panama, but what added to his anger was the hypocrisy of the U.S. For a long time General Noriega was 'in bed' with the United States government. According to Jackson: "(t)o be sure, our CIA was involved with Noriega for a long time. We've known of his dealings in drugs and guns for a long time."¹²⁵ He questioned,

¹²² Richard Berke, "Jackson Urges Noriega to Quit," *New York Times*, 5 April 1988.

¹²³ Robert Gillette, "Jackson Asks Aid for Panamanians," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 April 1988.

¹²⁴ Berke.

¹²⁵ Gillette.

also, the relationship between Noriega and American officials which played a role in providing arms to the Contras circumventing bans imposed on such activity by Congress.

Once the U.S. had invaded Panama and Noriega was seeking refuge in the Vatican compound, Jackson still remained critical of the action. In fact, he titled an article he wrote concerning the Panamanian invasion for the *Los Angeles Times* on December 28, 1989: "In Moral Terms, A Stunning Defeat." In the article Jackson reiterated the fact that Noriega was once on the U.S. payroll, but he fell out of favor and became America's 'arch-enemy.'

Jackson was critical of the loss of human life due to the Panamanian invasion as twenty-three American soldiers lost their lives and three hundred and thirty others were wounded. Two hundred and ninety-seven Panamanian soldiers lost their lives in the altercation as well as hundreds of Panamanian civilians.¹²⁶

Of the invasion Jackson wrote:

The loss of America's moral authority has been great. Most nations in the world, including our allies, have condemned our intervention as a violation of international law and national sovereignty.

... we have undermined the global movement toward peaceful democratic change and respect for the rule of law. We have revived a long history of imperial interference in Central America.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Jesse Jackson, "In Moral Terms, A Stunning Defeat," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 December 1989.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

A week later, Jackson once again authored an article criticizing the Panamanian invasion. This time, he condemned the action as immoral because the United States was militarily occupying a sovereign state and had killed hundreds of innocent people when our forces bombed densely populated civilian areas. He also chastised the media for not discussing the five other American interventions in Panama in the 20th Century.¹²⁸

Jesse Jackson has often taken the opportunity to voice criticism of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Central America. However, he has also gone to great lengths to articulate plans to solve the crises of instability and fighting which are at the root of the problems in Central America. Jesse Jackson has six goals for American foreign policy in Central America. Those goals are:

- 1) To end the war waged on Nicaragua so that the U.S. could help the country build a more just society, develop democratic institutions and develop health and literacy programs.
- 2) To dismantle the military complex in Honduras and to end American exercises there.
- 3) To start negotiations between the two sides of the conflict in El Salvador aimed at ending the violence and developing a government in which all parties can freely participate. To do this, the U.S. can no longer send military aid to the El Salvadoran government and must condition any future economic aid on whether or not the Duarte regime engages in serious negotiations with the FDR-FMLN. The negotiations must work toward peace through justice.

¹²⁸ Jesse Jackson, "Watchdog Wasn't Leashed, It Was Playing Cheerleader," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 January 1990.

- 4) To cut off all military assistance to the Guatemalan government because of its repressive policies toward its own people.
- 5) To support the masses in Costa Rica who have marched against the militarization of their country by contra forces supported by the United States. We must stop pressuring Costa Rica to give up its position of neutrality and must create a mutually beneficial relationship based upon trade.
- 6) To normalize relations with Cuba. We must recognize Cuba as a neighbor and not a communist threat. The U.S. needs to encourage trade and economic, cultural and social exchanges between the two countries.¹²⁹

The policy which Jackson has sought for Central America is one aimed at promoting economic, cultural and social development in the region that would benefit all of the people and not just a handful of wealthy elites. He would like to see a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor in the region brought about by governments which are chosen by and supported by the people, whether communist or democratic, with help provided by the United States.

CONCLUSION:

Much like the foreign policy which Jesse Jackson argues for in the Middle East, his Central America foreign policy is rooted firmly in his devotion to human rights, human well-being and human fulfillment. This devotion is prevalent in his evaluation of U.S. involvement of Nicaragua, his missions to comfort those displaced by

¹²⁹ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 248-249.

natural disasters and to release political prisoners as well as his criticisms of U.S. Central America foreign policy.

Jackson feels that the United States needs to withdraw its military forces and advisors from the region and work towards establishing a peace process. Rather than viewing Central America as a place where the United States must undermine communism, American foreign policy should be aimed at fighting the real problems in the region: poverty, disease and human rights violations. Jackson has similar views concerning U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.

IV

AFRICA

INTRODUCTION:

Jesse Jackson was the first viable African-American candidate for the office of President of the United States. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that he has kept a keen eye on U.S. foreign policy concerning Africa, the continent from which his ancestors came. Jackson has made Africa an issue which received attention in his 1984 and 1988 campaigns. This section will examine four factors which will lead to an understanding of the foreign policy he espouses for Africa: 1) his evaluation of the situation in South Africa; 2) his advocacy of both American trade and American aid for the nations of Africa; 3) his views concerning Liberia; and 4) his evaluation of U.S. Africa policy.

JESSE JACKSON ON SOUTH AFRICA:

Long before Jesse Jackson launched his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination of 1984, he openly

criticized the apartheid system in South Africa. In September 1979, after he made a seventeen-day visit to South Africa, Jackson testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations concerning apartheid. His testimony was a pointed indictment of American involvement in the country:

One could say, "Well, this is bad, and we oppose it, but what does this have to do with U.S. foreign policy?" The U.S. involvement with that racist regime - the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and cultural ties between our government and the apartheid regime of South Africa - constitutes a partnership of serious import.

The United States has official diplomatic relations with the South African government. This legal cover allows 350 U.S. business corporations to operate there. The highest returns in the world in foreign investment are in South Africa, and 15 to 17 percent of total U.S. foreign investment is there. ... These 350 U.S. corporations employ about 60,000 blacks - mostly in menial, low-paying jobs with no union - and another 40,000 whites, mostly in upper-salary, white-collar occupations and managerial positions.

These circumstances put the U.S. government and our corporations in an uneasy partnership with South African apartheid. Sixty thousand black jobs and no union or citizenship rights cannot serve as a trade-off or a buffer for the quest for full and equal citizenship rights for 20 million black people in South Africa. The partnership between the United States and South Africa is an uneasy one because it represents the most blatant violation of President Carter's human rights policy.¹³⁰

Jackson's testimony focused on the fact that such American involvement was immoral because of the way black South Africans were treated under the apartheid regime. He stated that blacks were not recognized legally or

¹³⁰ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 234.

economically, they were classified as "untouchables" socially and labelled "an error" religiously. According to Jackson, apartheid represented a moral illegitimacy that all must fight.¹³¹

In July 1980 Jackson began to urge the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. He called for the U.S. to stop vetoing proposals made in the United Nations to implement such sanctions. Jackson suggested that America was in 'partnership' with the South African government; he criticized American companies for locating in and investing in South Africa, opposed the fact that the U.S. was selling military equipment to the apartheid regime and condemned the nuclear collaboration between the two countries. Jackson stated that "(s)uch action is immoral, it is economically unfeasible, it is politically dangerous, and it threatens our national interest."¹³²

When Jesse Jackson made his presidential address at the annual convention of Operation PUSH (People United to Serve Humanity) one of the topics of his address was South Africa. He condemned the United States for having two sets of rules concerning democracy: "majority rule in America where whites are a majority and minority rule in South Africa where whites are a minority."¹³³

¹³¹ Ibid., 239.

¹³² Ibid., 291.

¹³³ Ibid., 50.

Jackson went on to reaffirm PUSH's stance concerning South Africa. He stated:

(W)e stand unmoved and immovable in reiterating our unconditional stand on the question of human and political rights in South Africa. The issue is really very simple - one person, one vote, for our brothers and sisters in South Africa and immediate independence for Namibia.¹³⁴

PUSH was against the fact that the South African government was maintaining colonial rule and influence over Namibia, refusing to grant that country its freedom.

In an essay he wrote for *Universal Press* on January 3, 1982, Jesse Jackson criticized the Reagan Administration for its continuing relation with the South African government as well as its failure to impose economic sanctions against the country. Despite the continued violation of the human rights of black South Africans by the white minority, the U.S. government, according to Jackson, "has drawn closer to the South African government and expanded trade relations."¹³⁵

Jackson's condemnation of the 'partnership' between the Reagan Administration and the repressive, racist South African government persisted. What further infuriated Jackson was that by 1983, despite the flagrant racial

¹³⁴ Ibid., 60.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 75.

inequality present under the apartheid regime, the U.S. had become South Africa's "number-one trading partner."¹³⁶

Jackson became a leading spokesman against apartheid. All across the United States he urged Americans to give up business dealings with South Africa. By hurting the apartheid regime financially, Jackson was sure that the government would have to change its racist attitudes. He led rallies in front of the South African consular offices in Chicago and New York and at the South African embassy in Washington, D.C. He also took part in anti-apartheid demonstrations in England and West Germany.¹³⁷

As Jackson mounted his campaign to secure the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984, he consistently brought up South Africa and kept the issue on the agenda. When Jackson was invited to speak at the United Nations by the ambassadors to the U.N. from the African states on January 27, 1984, he spoke on what he considered the 'crisis' in South Africa. He stated:

This is 1984. For the people of Namibia, 1984 means one hundred years of colonialism. For decades the U.N. has attempted to negotiate the independence of Namibia with the Republic of South Africa. Never before has the world come so close to achieving a solution as in Security Council Resolution 435. But the government of South Africa continues to place stumbling blocks on the road to Namibia's independence. The government of South Africa introduces conditions that must be solved prior to addressing Namibia's independence. The government of South Africa is delaying the independence of Namibia.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 21.

¹³⁷ Chaplick, 80.

The United States must not find itself a party to South Africa's obstructionist plan. We must not find ourselves supporting a government that violates the basic principles of the U.N. charter.¹³⁸

Jackson once again criticized the inhumanity, immorality and injustice of apartheid as well as South Africa's failure to give up its colonial rule over Namibia. He, likewise, continued to condemn the U.S. for being 'a party to' the process.

In a debate between the top three democratic presidential hopefuls on April 1, Jackson "came down hard for tougher sanctions against South Africa - and demanded that Mondale and Hart do likewise."¹³⁹ One month later Jackson wrote an article in *Africa Report* which outlined the relationship that would exist between the United States and Africa if he were to become President. He stated that under a Jackson Administration the U.S. would no longer be an "active partner in maintaining the immoral apartheid system" and would work to eliminate the apartheid system in South Africa as well as trying to secure independence for Namibia.¹⁴⁰

During the 1984 Democratic National Convention, Jesse Jackson worked hard to make his positions concerning U.S. and South Africa relations part of the Africa plank of the

¹³⁸ Ibid., 227.

¹³⁹ Faw and Skelton, 126.

¹⁴⁰ Jesse Jackson, "The United States and Africa Under a Jackson Administration," *Africa Report*, May/June 1984, 7.

Democratic platform. Jackson was highly successful in achieving this goal, partly because his positions were those held by the vast majority of those present, as some of his specific proposals were adopted into the Democratic platform. Among the proposals were for America to:

- 1) exert maximum pressure on South Africa to hasten the establishment of a democratic unitary political system.
- 2) ban all new loans, sale or transfer of sophisticated computer and nuclear technology.
- 3) withdraw landing rights to South African aircraft.
- 4) progressively increase sanction against South Africa until it grants independence to Namibia.

At that same convention, when it came time for Jesse Jackson to make his address, he included a brief discussion of South Africa. He stated that, "at its worst, our Nation will have partnership with South Africa. That is a moral disgrace."¹⁴¹ The United States, however, relied heavily on South Africa for much-needed natural resources, thus the government was not easily willing to change its position toward the nation.

On January 15, 1986, at Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Rev. Jackson again criticized the Reagan Administration for its continued relationship with the South African government and its president, F.W. de Klerk. In his sermon he argued that by "support(ing) state terrorism in South Africa,"¹⁴² the United States was losing its moral

¹⁴¹ Barker, 221.

¹⁴² Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 127.

authority in the U.N., the Middle East, Central America and elsewhere.

In February 1988 the South African government detained many black religious leaders, among them Bishop Desmond Tutu, for leading demonstrations in Cape Town. Jesse Jackson was outraged at the "renewed arrogance and boldness"¹⁴³ of the apartheid system and voiced this outrage in a thirty minute meeting he had with South African Ambassador Koorhof.

On March 16, Jackson accused his rivals for the Democratic presidential nomination of being passive in their disapproval of the South African government. He stated that "(t)he other candidates have taken a nonaggressive posture relative to South Africa. They must take a stand to end apartheid, not just be against it."¹⁴⁴ Jackson's plan to end apartheid included the withdrawal of all American corporations from South Africa and removing South African forces from adjacent Namibia.¹⁴⁵

As the Democratic National Convention drew near, Jackson continued to assail his foes, particularly Michael Dukakis, for being too passive concerning the issue of South

¹⁴³ Douglas Jehl, "Jackson Voices Protest with S. African Envoy," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 March 1988.

¹⁴⁴ David Rosenbaum, "Jackson Assails Foes on South Africa," *New York Times*, 17 March 1988.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Gillette, "Jackson Tells Plan to End Apartheid," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 April 1988.

Africa. Jackson vowed that he would take the issue to the floor of the convention and fight it out until Dukakis agreed to declare South Africa a 'terrorist state,' a declaration which carries with it stiff economic and diplomatic sanctions.¹⁴⁶

When Jesse Jackson addressed the Democratic National Convention in 1988, his speech contained a message concerning South Africa. His suggestions were much more pointed this time, as opposed to the remarks he made at the 1984 DNC. He stated:

We must have freedom in South Africa. Enforce comprehensive sanctions against the terrorist state. Get South Africa out of Angola, free Namibia, support the frontline states in their struggle against South African aggression.¹⁴⁷

In December 1988 a nonaggression accord was signed between the de Klerk government and the South African guerrillas. The treaty provided for U.N. supervised elections in, and then independence, for Namibia. Yet, this was not the end of Jackson's criticism towards South Africa. In October 1989 Jackson told the United Nations Assembly, despite efforts to bar his speech undertaken by the governments of the United States, Britain and France, that a "reign of terror" existed in Namibia because the U.N. had allowed a climate of South African intimidation in the

¹⁴⁶ Karen Tumulty, "Jackson Vows He'd Take Issue of South Africa to a Floor Fight," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 June 1988.

¹⁴⁷ Jackson, *Black Scholar*, January/February 1989, 17.

territory which gave South Africa the ability to influence Namibian elections.¹⁴⁸

In an article Jackson wrote for the *Los Angeles Times* in January 1990, he raised the question of whether freedom from apartheid for black South Africans would be the next step in the process as democracy emerged from the shell of tyranny all over the Earth. He saw hope in the possibility, writing:

There is so much damage to be undone. The apartheid system has brutalized and degraded the black majority ... (but) South Africa's isolation during the 1980s has helped turn around the thinking of its leaders, who now recognize that the course of democratic change is irresistible and inevitable.

... A new South Africa will be a place of hope, where those who have had the advantage see the light and those who have been kept down finally share in the bounty of the nation.

... It will rejoice in the splendor of all its peoples, their creativity, passion and brilliance. It will triumph not through violence and hatred but through peace and justice. Democracy will replace tyranny in South Africa and equality will take the place of domination.¹⁴⁹

When President Frederick W. de Klerk announced that he was lifting restrictions on black nationalist groups, Jackson responded with cautious optimism stating; "We've heard an emancipation proclamation speech, but the proclamation was the easy part. Now we want to see the

¹⁴⁸ Ethan Schwartz, "Bid to Bar Jackson Speech Fails," *Washington Post*, 20 October 1989.

¹⁴⁹ Jesse Jackson, "Will Freedom From Apartheid Be Next?" *Los Angeles Times*, 22 January 1990.

emancipation."¹⁵⁰ He was also quick to point out that it was much too early to lift the economic sanctions which the American government had finally levied against the South African government.

When Nelson Mandela was released from South African prison in February 1990 after twenty-seven years of detainment, Jackson was again cautiously optimistic. He stated that the release brought joy and hope, but simply because Mandela was free did not mean he was living in freedom. Jackson pointed out that even though Mandela was out of prison, he was still being treated like a second-class citizen, as all blacks were treated under apartheid. He stated that Mandela could not vote, could not run for public office and did not possess any citizenship rights.¹⁵¹

Although Jackson applauded de Klerk for giving South Africa a much-needed 'face-lift' through the implementation of some reforms, he continued to condemn the apartheid regime because, in many ways, it was still up to its 'old tricks.' For example, while granting Namibia its political independence, South Africa retained economic and military

¹⁵⁰ Glenn Frankel, "Jackson Cautious on S. Africa," *Washington Post*, 5 February 1990.

¹⁵¹ Jesse Jackson, "He Is Free But Not Living In Freedom," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 February 1990.

influence in the country;¹⁵² the oppressive laws of apartheid had not been lifted as the death count continued to rise, the innocent remained languishing in dungeons and people were detained without charges or trials.¹⁵³

According to Jackson, the character of the apartheid system had **not** changed because:

(t)he pillars of apartheid still stand - the laws that exclude blacks from voting, those that enforce segregation and racial exploitation, those that give the police emergency powers for brutal repression.¹⁵⁴

Jackson had consistently condemned the oppressive apartheid system of South Africa and he also criticized the U.S. government for having ties to the government of that country. After the United States cut its ties and imposed economic sanctions on the de Klerk regime, Jackson argued for the U.S. to keep all sanctions in place until all aspects of the apartheid system were abandoned and **all** people, regardless of race, were treated equally and accorded the same rights.

JESSE JACKSON: ADVOCATE OF TRADE AND AID:

Jesse Jackson has consistently argued for American aid to the needy individuals and nations of the African

¹⁵² Jesse Jackson, "Apartheid Regime Is Up To Its Old Tricks," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 March 1990.

¹⁵³ Jesse Jackson, "No Rewards Before Real Change," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 June 1990.

¹⁵⁴ Jesse Jackson, "Why Then Embrace De Klerk?" *Los Angeles Times*, 27 September 1990.

continent as well as the expansion of trade between the U.S. and African nations. He has stated that America should provide aid to African nations and establish trading relations with African nations; neither trade nor aid, by itself, would be sufficient to establish a fair foreign policy towards Africa.

In 1974, as part of a movement undertaken by Operation PUSH, Jackson tried to use his influence to establish trade between American blacks and, by extension, American businesses, and Africa. He stated: "It is high time for the nearly 30 million American blacks, who have a gross national product of some \$42 billion, to start moving from lip service to ship service with Africa, which means black Americans buying products made in Africa."¹⁵⁵ He defended such a concept because he felt the trade would bring much needed revenue to the African nations as well as causing a lively exchange of skills between the peoples of Africa and the U.S.

One of the distinguishing features of Jackson's 1984 campaign was his ability and conviction to corner and discuss issues which the other candidates dare not touch. One such issue was that of trade between the United States and the nations of Africa.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Reynolds, 281.

¹⁵⁶ Faw and Skelton, 208.

According to Jackson, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa needed to include **both** trade and aid. In January 1984 Jackson stated:

The United States should seriously encourage and expand free trade with African nations instead of sparingly feeding African nations teaspoons of pitiful aid with strings attached as compared to what the U.S. gives to nations on other continents.¹⁵⁷

As part of the Africa plank of the platform espoused by Jesse Jackson in 1984, the issue of trade was explicitly discussed. The plank called for America to "develop mutual economic strategies, commodities pricing and other treaties of international trade with nations on the African continent."¹⁵⁸ As part of his address to the DNC that very year Jackson stated that "(w)e [the U.S.] must fight for trade with Africa, and not just aid to Africa."¹⁵⁹

Jackson's support for establishing mutually beneficial trading ties with Africa continued through his 1988 campaign and persist to this date. After Jackson visited various African nations in 1988, he called for the Bush Administration to create an aggressive policy towards Africa, a policy based upon joint venture which included trading ties as a way to promote the economic development of

¹⁵⁷ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 230.

¹⁵⁸ Barker and Walters, 156.

¹⁵⁹ Barker, 221.

the African nations.¹⁶⁰ However, Jackson failed to provide a clear meaning of what he meant by 'trade' and did not provide any specific trade policy suggestions.

Jesse Jackson also called for more American aid to Africa, aid in the form of loans, the exchange of technical capabilities and the provision of food and medical supplies for the ailing peoples of the African continent. When the countries of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Nigal, Senegal and Upper Volta were suffering from a five-year drought in 1973, Jackson called for American aid. Jackson criticized the hypocrisy of the U.S. government because "(u)nlike America's urgent response to Israel during the Mid-East crisis, the government was strangely sluggish in shipping supplies to the African nations where more than 10 million people were threatened with starvation and sickness."¹⁶¹

This condition of hypocritic imbalance of American aid had not become any better by 1984. Jesse Jackson called for the cessation of such hypocrisy stating:

The United States should provide aid to Africa for productive economic development programs and projects of the same magnitude provided to Israel and for the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War. More money is provided to Israel alone in aid, grants, and loans than provided all black African nations combined. More loans are made to Mexico and Brazil than to all black African nations combined. This imbalance is unfair and creates an atmosphere uncondusive to peace

¹⁶⁰ D. Michael Cheers, "After Visit To African Nations, Jackson Urges Joint Partnership," *Jet*, 30 January 1989, 12-13.

¹⁶¹ Reynolds, 282.

because it perpetuates poverty, disease, ignorance, fear, hate, bitterness, international terrorism, and unrest in the world.¹⁶²

What Jackson overlooks is the African causes of the poverty, disease, ignorance, fear, hate, etc. which persist throughout the continent. Although he goes to great lengths to mention the natural forces and American policy which have a hand in the problems of Africa, he does not mention such things as civil wars in Liberia, Ethiopia and Sudan and dictatorial regimes elsewhere on the continent which also play a role in causing and perpetuating the problems of Africa. He, likewise, fails to mention that aid from America will not be able to affect these African factors nor the problems which they cause.

Jesse Jackson voiced criticism of the Reagan Administration for reducing American contributions to the International Development Association and the United Nation's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, organizations which Africa relied on heavily to implement many of its development programs. In 1984, according to Jackson, African nations would lose five hundred million dollars in much-needed aid.¹⁶³

Aside from the uncertainty of the flow of concessional aid, the drought situation in 1984 posed another critical problem for African nations. More than one hundred and

¹⁶² Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 230.

¹⁶³ Jackson, Africa Report, 4.

fifty million people in over twenty African countries were threatened by death by starvation, and the U.S. contributed only eleven percent of the estimated need for the affected nations. According to Jackson, this represented "a meager sum when the U.S. historically has provided about 50 percent of the emergency food aid in similar cases."¹⁶⁴

When Jackson addressed the Democratic National Convention in 1988, he argued for increased aid to the African nations. He stated that the U.S. could act to end the desperation that burdened Africa,¹⁶⁵ desperation caused by disease, drought and poverty which continued to plague the nations of Africa.

In 1989 Jackson again criticized the imbalance of aid provided to other countries by the United States. He cited the fact that "(h)alf of all our foreign aid goes to Israel and Egypt, and half of the U.S. defense budget, \$150 billion, goes to Europe and Japan. Africa is too rich (in natural resources) to be so poor,"¹⁶⁶ illustrating further his belief that Africa deserved its fair share of American aid. He failed to mention that while some African nations have abundant natural resources which can be used to obtain wealth, others have very few resources. Jackson, nevertheless, saw the opportunity for mutually beneficial

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Jackson, *Black Scholar*, January/February 1989.

¹⁶⁶ Cheers, *Jet*, 30 January 1989, 12-13.

relations between the U.S. and Africa. African nations could get the aid they desperately needed; America could get access to the natural resources abundant in many African nations.

According to Jackson, in a column he wrote in February 1990, America seemed to have plenty of money for war, as evident by its contributions of money, weapons and resources to rebel groups throughout the world. Yet, the U.S. seemed to have little money to counter the destitute and destruction caused by poverty, drought and civil wars in Africa. Jackson wrote that even though America was spending substantial amounts of money to support rebel groups engaged in warfare, it had sent a pitiful fifty million dollars of aid which was to be distributed throughout Africa where hundreds of thousands of people were dying each year from such maladies as malaria, yellow fever, influenza, tuberculosis and starvation. Jackson blamed that reality on racism present in U.S. foreign policy, arguing for the need to make black African lives mean as much as white European lives in foreign policy.¹⁶⁷

Jesse Jackson's view of U.S. Africa policy is that it must include both trade and aid. Aid is needed to help the African nations get on their feet and overcome the problems of starvation, disease and drought as well as promoting

¹⁶⁷ Jesse Jackson, "Erase the Dirty 'R' Word from U.S. Foreign Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 February 1990.

economic development. Trade is necessary to help the African nations become self-sufficient.

JESSE JACKSON ON LIBERIA:

Liberia is a unique nation on the African continent, unique particularly concerning its relationship with the United States. It was founded in the 1820s by a small group of American blacks who left the United States because of racial discrimination and oppression.¹⁶⁸ The slaves were transported back to Africa as part of a movement to end slavery in the U.S. and to remove blacks from white society. Liberia became a republic in 1847, at the prodding of the American Colonization Society. Prior to World War II, the United States helped Liberia construct a large shipping port and air base under the provision that the facilities could be used by America in a time of crisis or war. America also built a large hospital in Liberia; the shipping port, air base and the hospital were used by Allied forces in World War II. The U.S. then provided extensive aid to Liberia to fix the damage caused by the war.¹⁶⁹

When Harvey Firestone opened up his rubber factory in Liberia, American economic interests became a part of that country for Firestone's factory provided the United States

¹⁶⁸ Hassan B. Sisay, Big Powers and Small Nations: A Case Study of United States-Liberian Relations (Boston: University Press of America, 1985) vii.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., viii.

with a much-needed rubber source.¹⁷⁰ Liberia was founded by black Americans, it was given military equipment in return for use of facilities by the U.S. during a crisis, it contained an important American economic interest and was often given both military and economic aid by the United States.

It is very interesting to examine Jesse Jackson's opinions concerning an African nation with such a unique tie to the U.S. On November 20, 1972, Jackson led a PUSH delegation to Monrovia, Liberia, a trip designed to develop a plan whereby American blacks could acquire dual U.S. - Liberian citizenship. Jackson hoped this could be accomplished because a similar arrangement was enjoyed by American Jews in Israel.¹⁷¹

Under Liberian law at the time, only citizens could own real estate. Formalization of the proposed dual citizenship pact would have enabled black Americans to own property in the African state. Although the pact drew a "warm reaction" from the liberian leader, President William Tolbert, and his cabinet, it was never to become a reality. The forces in Washington, although never publicly denouncing the idea, did not put any effort into passing the proposed dual-citizenship initiative.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 180.

¹⁷¹ Reynolds, 281.

¹⁷² Ibid., 282-283.

In 1982 Jackson once again was working to better the way that Liberia was treated by the United States. He condemned the U.S. treatment of political refugees stating that the "refugees - bankers, diplomats, and other former government officials - who only a few years ago were staunch allies of the United States today cannot even get a green card to work in this country."¹⁷³ Jackson's condemnation was rooted in what he considered to be racism and hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy.

When the civil war erupted in Liberia in 1990, the United States, in Jackson's opinion, could not figure out how to respond or what measures to take. In August of that year Jackson wrote that despite the massacres of many innocent Liberians, the U.S. responded weakly condemning such acts and urging a cease-fire between the two sides. According to Jackson, the American response could have been much stronger because of the 'special relationship' between the two nations, over 400 Americans were in the country and could not leave because all roads were blocked and the airport closed, American economic interests - such as the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company - were at stake and innocent human beings were being killed. Yet, America chose not to intervene.¹⁷⁴ Although Jackson is opposed to

¹⁷³ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 74.

¹⁷⁴ Jesse Jackson, "Lacking a Cold War, U.S. Draws a Blank," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 August 1990.

unilateral action taken by the U.S. in a foreign nation to further American interests while simultaneously denying the population of that country its right to self-determination, such as his condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama, he supports unilateral action taken by the United States if it is necessary to protect the lives and rights of the masses, such as his support of unilateral intervention by the U.S. in Kuwait during the Persian Gulf Crisis and in Liberia during its civil war.

Jackson wrote that the decision not to intervene more strongly was made:

(b)ecause human decency, special relationships and American business interests aside, Liberia is an early sacrificial lamb to the end of the Cold War. The basis of the Cold War was fear of the spread of communism. Now that the scare of communism in Africa is largely gone, Liberia no longer has strategic value to the United States.¹⁷⁵

Jackson saw the Bush Administration, no longer having the fear of communism on which to base foreign policy, as not capable of figuring out an alternative policy. When faced with the Liberian civil war, the U.S. government "drew a blank and froze."¹⁷⁶

Although favoring unilateral action by the U.S. in this case, he always considered multilateral action as a better alternative. Thus, Jackson urged the Bush Administration to convene an emergency session of the United Nations Security

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

Council. At this session, Jackson hoped that those involved would send U.N. Security Forces to Liberia to stop fighting and to re-establish order and stability. He felt that the forces should remain in Liberia to protect the citizens until the country regained its self-governing capability. He also called for the United States, due to its 'special relationship' with Liberia, to be prepared for an enormous emergency relief effort to soften the tragic blows suffered by Liberia.¹⁷⁷

Jesse Jackson has used the special relationship which binds the United States to Liberia to defend a more balanced and fair foreign policy concerning the nation. Underlying the special relationship argument is a humanitarian concern and a condemnation of hypocrisy, racism and opportunism prevalent in U.S. Africa policy.

JESSE JACKSON'S EVALUATION OF U.S. AFRICA POLICY:

Long before Jesse Jackson entered into politics, it was evident that he was highly critical of U.S. foreign policy concerning the nations of Africa. As early as 1969 Jackson publicly denounced the U.S. government because, even though the United States had the resources necessary to solve the problems of sickness and starvation in Africa, it did not.¹⁷⁸ However, Jackson did not tell how American

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ "Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson," *Playboy*, 1969.

resources could solve the problems of sickness or starvation when they were caused by civil war or a dictatorial regime. When Jackson decided to throw his hat into the political arena by running for the democratic presidential nomination of 1984, his criticisms of U.S. Africa policy not only continued, they became more intense.

In his 1984 campaign, Jackson stated that Africa held a low priority in U.S. foreign policy. He cited three reasons for the "low priority given to African issues in foreign policy formulation:"

- 1) priority was given to strategic and geopolitical factors aimed at containing communism,
- 2) African leaders took a nonaligned posture in the 1960s which allayed the fears of U.S. policymakers who had thought that the Soviet Union was going to seize Africa from Western control,
- 3) racial calculations by U.S. policymakers who tried to steer clear of Africa so as to escape any possible racial blunders which would 'add fuel to the fire' of the already intense civil rights movement.¹⁷⁹

During the campaign Jackson, citing the low priority accorded to Africa in U.S. foreign policy, questioned why America had chosen not to make a greater impact in Africa. He wondered:

(w)hy is there no single state in Africa that this country can show to the nations of the world, and to herself, as a shining example, a very beautiful demonstration, and an excellent model of American rugged capitalism, of the free-enterprise system in a democratic society?¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Jackson, *Africa Report*, 4.

¹⁸⁰ Jackson, *Straight From The Heart*, 228.

Jackson, it became apparent, advocated a U.S. foreign policy which put much greater emphasis on Africa and African issues.

The U.S. foreign policy which did involve Africa, however, came under serious scrutiny from Jackson. He saw U.S. policy towards South Africa as immoral and inhumane when America was in 'partnership' with that country's apartheid regime. He condemned the U.S. for its imbalance of aid which accorded much less aid to Africa than it did to Europe and selected countries in the Middle East such as Israel and Egypt, while simultaneously arguing that the U.S. foreign policy did not go far enough in establishing trading ties between the United States and the nations of Africa. Jackson was also highly critical of the way that U.S. policy embraced Liberia when it needed that country, but soon after turned its back on the nation.

Jesse Jackson offered criticism of U.S. Africa policy, but he was also quick to offer suggestions on how to improve upon it. Jackson stated that, when developing a policy for Africa, policymakers needed to remember some basic principles. First and foremost was that not all U.S. citizens were European descendants, many were African descendants. Second, Africa had to be considered as important to the United States, as much a part of the heritage of the United States and as much a part of U.S. foreign policy as were the European nations, Israel, Japan,

Canada, etc. Third, the U.S. government could capitalize on the significant strides it had made concerning race relations and civil rights since the 1960s and use them as a foundation on which to base relations with African nations.¹⁸¹

Fourth, the United States government should accord the same preferential treatment with respect to economic and military ties to friendly African governments as it does to friendly European governments, Canada, Japan, etc. Fifth, America should provide similar amounts of aid to African nations through the African Development Bank as it did to other nations through the Inter-American Development Bank. Sixth, the United States should work out a treaty with Africa concerning cultural and social exchanges.¹⁸²

If these principles were considered by U.S. policymakers when constructing policy concerning Africa, Jackson felt that a fair, egalitarian policy could be created. For Jackson, a fair, egalitarian U.S. Africa policy needed to fulfill various objectives:

- 1) cut all ties with the de Klerk regime and help put an end the apartheid system,
- 2) help Africa make effective use of its human and material resources,
- 3) give full support of the American values of freedom, justice and self-determination,
- 4) encourage egalitarian distribution of land,
- 5) promote multilateral aid to be used for African development,

¹⁸¹ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 229.

¹⁸² Ibid., 229-230.

- 6) share technology and information on how to solve the problem of the desertification of Africa,
- 7) allow the U.S. to be a mediator in regional disputes,
- 8) negotiate for peace in the sections of Africa which are devastated by war and conflict.¹⁸³

In Jesse Jackson's view, the U.S. Africa policy of the past, including the Reagan years, and persisting under George Bush is not based upon the correct principles and is not aimed at appropriate objectives. Thus, he has been, and will continue to be, highly critical of American foreign policy concerning Africa.

CONCLUSION:

Much like his foreign policy opinions with regard to the Middle East and Central America, Jesse Jackson's Africa policy has, as its foundation, a dedication to the preservation of human rights and the furthering of both human fulfillment and human well-being. Such a foundation is clearly present in Jackson's fight to end the oppressive and racist apartheid system of South Africa, his advocacy of both American trade and American aid to improve the lives of Africans, his condemnation of the United States for not taking a more aggressive posture when innocent Liberians were slaughtered during the civil war of 1990, and his critique of various aspects of U.S. foreign policy concerning the nations of Africa.

¹⁸³ Jackson, *Africa Report*, 8.

Much unlike his foreign policy stances concerning the Middle East and Central America, Jackson's Africa policy is substantially devoid of specific suggestions. He chooses to use the general terms of 'trade' and 'aid,' but does not mention any specific trade policy suggestions nor does he go into detail concerning how the U.S. would decide which African nation gets how much aid or who will distribute the aid. He also does not discuss the fact that many of Africa's problems are rooted in things, such as civil war, which neither U.S. aid nor trade will be able to remedy.

Jackson promotes the idea that the United States to take a much more active role in Africa and to put Africa into a more prominent position on the American foreign policy agenda. But Jackson does not consider the fact that many African nations may be against having U.S. 'Big Brother' imperialism present in their countries. Nations may shy away from American trade and aid because of the 'strings,' whether explicit or implicit, attached to the gesture. Jackson also fails to take into account that other countries in the world may not look favorably upon American influence throughout the African continent.

CONCLUSION

THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF JACKSON'S FOREIGN POLICY:

Jackson's foreign policy stances are rooted in his dedication to human rights and the furthering of human fulfillment and well-being. This should come as little surprise given Jackson's background. As a civil rights activist, he promoted a domestic policy which placed a very high value on the rights of all people living in the United States. Having experienced blatant racism in his youth, he decided to fight against racial segregation and white supremacy; he strove to make the phrase 'all were created equal' as applicable to blacks as it was to whites.

As a member of the SCLC, a leader of PUSH and the founder of the Rainbow Coalition, Jackson worked to advance the interests of blacks, at first, and all people as time progressed. He sees human rights as being guaranteed to people regardless of such things as the color of their skin, the religion they practice and their sexual preference. Jackson pictures his 'coalition' as including Arabs and

Jews, blacks, lesbians, gays, American farmers, American Indians, Asian-Americans, Hispanics and whites;¹⁸⁴ his is a 'coalition' for all which embraces "a spectrum of people of different colors: whites, browns, reds, yellows and blacks."¹⁸⁵

Jackson wanted to, and still wants to, improve the living condition of all Americans. His domestic goals included such things as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked and setting the captive free.¹⁸⁶ Jackson viewed the civil rights struggle as a war not between blacks and whites, but as a war between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' of America.¹⁸⁷ In fact, one of his critiques of the Reagan Administration was that under it, the "gap between the haves and the have nots has widened."¹⁸⁸

At the annual convention of Push in 1980, Jackson stated that the civil rights movement had international implications and was not merely a national concern.

According to Jackson:

PUSH is a controversial organization because it consciously identifies with the poor, the rejected, and

¹⁸⁴ Barker and Walters, 49; and Barker, 214.

¹⁸⁵ John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 143.

¹⁸⁶ Reynolds, 352.

¹⁸⁷ Phillip Drotning and Wesley South, Up From the Ghetto (New York: Cowles Book Co., Inc., 1970), 40.

¹⁸⁸ Jesse Jackson, "When All That Glitters Is Not Gold," *Newsweek*, 9 January 1989.

the oppressed, and any organization that so identifies itself will have mixed views about it. PUSH consciously seeks social, economic, political and legal justice and is striving for a more humane and peaceful nation and world in which to live ...

PUSH, as a national human rights organization with national and international concerns, is concerned with the quantity and quality of our lives and refuses to be limited solely to so-called black or ethnic concerns. ... We want to share and participate at every level in the burdens and the responsibilities of helping to create a new national and world order.¹⁸⁹

When Jackson decided to run for President, he brought the civil rights movement to a higher plane.¹⁹⁰ He hoped to enlarge the civil rights movement so that it would become a war between the haves and have nots of the world rather than merely those in the United States. Jackson's campaigns, therefore, were intended to accomplish many of the same goals and objectives as the civil rights movement, this time in an international setting.¹⁹¹

In essence, Jackson has merely exported this domestic policy overseas and over borders, using it as the basis for his foreign policy. In fact, he sees a direct relationship between foreign and domestic policy; according to Jackson, a "separation between foreign and domestic policy is a false distinction."¹⁹² Jackson sees all people as citizens of the world rather than of specific nations and argues for the

¹⁸⁹ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 289.

¹⁹⁰ Newsweek, November/December 1984, 52.

¹⁹¹ Barker, 39.

¹⁹² Jackson, Straight From The Heart, 294.

advancement and furthering of human rights, human fulfillment and well-being for all.

When Jackson evaluated U.S. foreign policy, he based his evaluations upon the human rights implications of the policy as well as how well the policy furthered justice in the world. Jackson was a staunch advocate of furthering human rights abroad.¹⁹³ For him, one of the primary emphases of his foreign policy was "to measure human rights by one yardstick,"¹⁹⁴ and this was what he expected of U.S. foreign policy. Jackson argued for consistency in the application of democratic values abroad, stating:

We can't define democracy as majority rule in North America and as minority rule in South Africa. We can't impose economic sanctions in Poland because of martial law and then become South Africa's number-one trading partner. We just want the game played by one set of rules.¹⁹⁵

Jackson saw grave consequences in what he considered the 'double standard' for measuring human rights in U.S. foreign policy. He stated that such a standard affected American interests because the inconsistency would hinder the United States from having the moral authority required to influence world public opinion. According to Jackson, "(t)he real U.S. 'window of vulnerability' is not our lack

¹⁹³ Jesse Jackson, "A Chance to Serve," *Black Scholar*, March/April 1988.

¹⁹⁴ Jackson, *Straight From The Heart*, xiv.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

of military preparedness, but the lack of a consistent human rights policy."¹⁹⁶

Through his protest activity, Jackson played an integral role in ending the segregation in Greensboro in the 1960s, thereby hoping that the U.S. domestic policy would insure that the human rights of Americans, both black and white, would be measured using the same 'yardstick.' This background obviously led Jackson to want the same 'one yardstick' approach in the international arena. This is evident through many of Jackson's statements and positions on issues.

Jackson argued for allowing Palestinian self-determination while simultaneously guaranteeing Israeli security. He wanted to see Palestinians given the same human rights as were afforded to the Israelis and others. Jackson also argued against the support provided to the Contras by the United States because such support represented aiding rebel forces in an attempted overthrow of a legitimate regime which had the support of the Nicaraguan masses.

One critique Jackson had of U.S. Africa policy was of the 'partnership' which existed between the U.S. government and the government of South Africa, a criticism based in the fact that the South African apartheid regime was racist and repressive. Jackson was also highly critical of the Reagan

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 75.

Administration's decision to invade Panama and to forcibly detain that nation's leader, Manuel Noriega.

All of the above examples illustrate that Jackson evaluates foreign policy based upon human rights and advocates a foreign policy rooted in human rights. He supported granting the Palestinians, Nicaraguans and Panamanians the right to self-determination and giving black South Africans the same rights as those held by the minority white population of that country.

Aside from human rights, Jackson also evaluates foreign policy on the basis of justice. He "fastens to justice as the touchstone for policy evaluation."¹⁹⁷ Jackson began by fighting the injustice of racism in America, but later expanded his sights to fight injustice wherever it existed,¹⁹⁸ and that is a goal he also sees as vital to U.S. foreign policy.

Jackson argued for a more 'evenhanded' U.S. Middle East policy, a more just policy which considered and included both Arab and Israeli interests. He likewise argued that American foreign policy needed to treat African nations justly by treating them as it treated Canada, Japan and European nations.

¹⁹⁷ June Jordan, "Next Time the Rainbow," *New Statesman*, 6 January 1989.

¹⁹⁸ Drotning and South, 33.

The importance of justice for Jackson was also present when he was speaking on behalf of Mexican laborers. He wanted the U.S. government to work with the Mexican government to help the situation of Mexican workers. He wanted to insure that Mexican laborers were not forced to work under conditions which were unacceptable by American standards. He was opposed to the fact that U.S. and Japanese firms were locating in Mexico to avoid tougher environmental laws, unions and labor restrictions, and simultaneously paying unfairly low wages. Jackson also criticized the use of economic sanctions by the U.S. government in Panama because they crippled the economy of the country and unjustly hurt the masses.

Besides being rooted in human rights and justice, Jackson's foreign policy stances were also based in the need to further human fulfillment and well-being. When Jackson went to Syria, Iraq, Cuba, etc. to help negotiate for the release of hostages or prisoners, he was working to regain peoples' freedom so that they would be able to live their lives in a fulfilling manner at a safe place. When Jackson went to Jamaica, the Caribbean, Armenia and other places where natural disasters had occurred, one of his reasons for going was to get aid for those affected by the disasters by providing a much larger audience for their plight. Although the publicity Jackson received from such trips benefitted

him, he was also genuinely interested in trying to further human fulfillment and well-being.

When Jackson advocated American trade and aid for African nations, he did so hoping to make the nations self-sufficient. Through self-sufficiency, Jackson thought the nations would be better equipped to help their populations lead fulfilling lives in a secure environment. The peace processes in the Middle East, Central America and Africa to which Jackson was so devoted also would provide, he hoped, a stable and secure environment in which the people could grow.

Might does not make right in the realm of foreign affairs, in Jackson's view, and he was highly skeptical of the use of U.S. military force to accomplish its goals internationally. A good example of this was his condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama; Jackson criticized the invasion because the U.S. had used its military muscle to take a ruler from his country. Jackson's opposition was to the end at which the Panamanian invasion was aimed. According to Jackson, might can and should effectively be a part of U.S. foreign policy only if used in the pursuit of the right goals, if used in the service of right.

Jackson wanted the U.S. to be 'right' in its actions in the world so that it could have moral authority. And, U.S. foreign policy was not right in many cases in Jackson's

opinion. To be right it needed to be consistent and persistent in the pursuit of human rights, human fulfillment and human well-being everywhere. For Jackson, the U.S. could make itself right by helping the Palestinian people get a homeland, working to dissolve the great disparity between the rich and the poor of Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, no longer supporting Contra forces and striving to end the apartheid regime of South Africa.

Jackson's foreign policy proposals emphasize respect, talk and negotiations over confrontation, gunboat diplomacy, big-stick diplomacy and military adventurism.¹⁹⁹ Jackson favored "peaceful diplomacy abroad"²⁰⁰ and placed a high priority on negotiation as a tool in foreign affairs. As Jackson proved in his negotiations with President Assad of Syria for the release of American hostage Lieutenant Goodman, negotiation can be effective. In fact, his negotiations with Assad, the Sandinistas, Castro and other leaders in the Middle East, Central America and Africa have established the precedent for future negotiations in the world.²⁰¹

Although Jackson was wary of using U.S. might and gunboat diplomacy, he did see it as a viable option in

¹⁹⁹ Jackson, Straight From The Heart, xiv.

²⁰⁰ Roger Wilkins, "On Being Uppity," *Mother Jones*, June 1990, 8.

²⁰¹ Landess and Quinn, 153.

service of the right ends. The use of the United States Armed Forces to liberate the country of Kuwait from Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf Crisis was supported by Jackson because, after channels of negotiation and peaceful diplomacy were exhausted, might was used in the service of right.

Another important principle of U.S. foreign policy for Jesse Jackson is that it should not be based upon a war against the spread of communism. The nations of the world, in his view, were not to be used as a battlefield for a war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; to stop the spread of communism was not a sufficient reason to intervene in other regions of the world. Jackson did, and does, not see communism as the enemy or the cause of all of the world's woes;²⁰² in fact, he criticized the Reagan Administration for using the need to thwart the threat of communism as a foundation for American foreign policy.

Therefore, Jackson opposed U.S. support given to the Contras solely because the legitimate Sandinista government is a socialist form of government. He also sought to open up and to establish relations between the United States and communist Cuba.

In fact, Jackson has used Liberia as an example of what happens when foreign policy is based upon the threat of communism. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s,

²⁰² Faw and Skelton, 177.

the U.S. no longer needed to use Liberia as a roadblock to Soviet intervention on the African continent. Thus, when a civil war erupted in that country, the U.S. drew a blank on how to deal with the situation. This, for Jackson, is a clear illustration of what can occur when U.S. foreign policy is not rooted in proper objectives.

Jesse Jackson's foreign policy leanings also illustrate that he is a Third World advocate. In his address to the 1988 Democratic National Convention he argued for the need to change U.S. policy towards the Third World so that it was consistent with U.S. policy elsewhere.²⁰³ His support is for the rights of Third World nations, particularly their right to self-determination.

Implicit within his advocacy for the Third World was a simultaneous condemnation of the Reagan Administration for its narrow vision and its perception of the threat of communism. Jackson stated:

The Reagan Administration has viewed the Third World as a chessboard in which a struggle for pawns and positions is played with the Soviet Union. "The Soviet Union," President Reagan said, "lies behind all the trouble spots in the world."

... But the Reagan Doctrine is based on a fundamental misconception of the world. The countries of the Third World are not drawn to communism. They struggle against unimaginable poverty, against the legacy of colonialism, against underdevelopment, malnutrition and hunger. They contend with the mighty currents of nationalism and

²⁰³ Jackson, *Black Scholar*, January/February 1989.

religion. They tend towards non-alignment, for they seek aid and investment wherever they can find it.²⁰⁴

Jackson has argued for the need of the United States to redefine its relationship with the Third World; he has promoted a new foreign policy doctrine which he regards as being grounded in a more sensible view of the world, the Jackson Doctrine.

Jackson outlined this new doctrine in an issue brief he prepared for his 1988 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination. In that brief he wrote that the Jackson Doctrine is based upon four principles:

- 1) Support and strengthen the 'Rule of International Law;'
- 2) Respect the right of self-determination;
- 3) Promote human rights; and
- 4) Support international economic justice and development.²⁰⁵

As a global power with diverse interests, Jackson sees the U.S. as having 'the greatest stake' in respecting and strengthening the rule of international law. According to Jackson, "(i)f our interests abroad are seen as legitimate, they will be protected by the society involved. If they are seen as an intrusion, there is no military force in the world strong enough to protect them."²⁰⁶ He condemned the

²⁰⁴ Jesse Jackson, Keep Hope Alive (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1989), 189.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 195-196.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

U.S. for not accepting the World Court decision when it found the U.S. guilty of violating international law by mining the Nicaraguan harbors, stating that the U.S. needed to respect and strengthen such institutions as the World Court and the United Nations.

The Jackson Doctrine also contains the need to respect the right of self-determination. Jackson realizes that the countries of the Third World will have varying social and political experiments, but, in his opinion, "(t)hey have the right to choose their own destiny - to find their own ways to cope with poverty, illiteracy and political representation. We must respect that right, confident that democracy and freedom are spreading in the world."²⁰⁷ This idea came through when Jackson voiced his support of Palestinian and El Salvadoran self-determination.

The third principle of the Jackson Doctrine is to promote human rights. This principle finds itself at the root of Jackson's evaluation of U.S. foreign policy as well as his own foreign policy stances.

The final principle of the Jackson Doctrine is the support of international economic justice and development in the Third World. Jackson argued that "growth and prosperity in the United States requires raising the standard of living in the Third World, not lowering our own."²⁰⁸To fulfill

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 196.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

this task Jackson saw the need to create a new capital fund for development projects, the provision of debt relief, promotion of self-reliance and the equitable distribution of resources and a code of conduct for American multinational corporations.

The Jackson Doctrine provides the basic framework for what Jackson considers to be the principles upon which U.S. foreign policy should be based as well as the objectives it ought to seek to attain. It puts emphasis on the need to promote human rights, to further human fulfillment and well-being, to consider the interests of **all** nations and to be consistent in its application. Also, it is not based upon a foundation as shaky as the fear of communist advancement. Jackson argues for U.S. foreign policy to be balanced and consistent and to be a part of the global struggle for "true and total equality."²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ Jesse Jackson, "A Challenge to the New Generation," *Ebony*, August 1990, 135.

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