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## A Causal Theory of Revolution

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A CAUSAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION

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A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

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by


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1987

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
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


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
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George Grayson



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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine whether certain modern revolutions lend themselves to a causal theory of revolution.

To achieve this a causal theory of revolution was devised, leaning strongly on existing works. A fresh theory was approached, not to break new ground or to disprove others, but to show the similarities between seemingly opposed theorists.

Three modern revolutions were then chosen to test this theory Cuba 1959, and Iran and Nicaragua 1979.

It soon became clear that while factors of my theory existed in all three revolutions their importance varied. With this weighting firmly in mind the theory proved useful for the study of contemporary revolution.

The study concluded by examining the role of the Political Scientist in predicting revolution. The author calls for more study of modern revolution - both successful and unsuccessful. Further study of troubled nations using the same revolutionary criteria is also urged.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Between 1969 and 1983 there have been more than 200 articles about revolution listed in the ABC of Political Science. It is a very widely talked about and emotional subject. While revolution is not commonplace in today's world, it does occur often enough for us to regard it, not as Hobbes would have us believe, as an aberration of the political system, but rather as a part of contemporary political action that is extremely relevant to the modern student of politics.

The following brief tour of the literature concerning revolutions will show us that a good working definition is vital. A revolution is not a coup d'etat, a bread riot, or necessarily, a civil war. Revolution is sufficiently important to be studied in its own right and not just as a level of civil disobedience.

There are five snares of which writers in this field should be particularly aware. First, revolutions are complex events. It is tempting, especially for the political scientist, to advance clear-cut and strong hypotheses to explain revolutions, but one should be extremely suspicious of simple causes that are offered to explain complex events. Second, no society is perfect. There are tensions in every society, be it democratic or non-democratic. Many of the problems presented as causing revolutions can be found in almost every society. There is always discontent. but this does not have to lead to revolution. Third, revolution is never inevitable. Some theorists get so carried away with their work that they believe that certain causes "demand" a revolution. (1) Fourth, we must always be careful to pay close attention to the facts. There is nothing more annoying for a student of politics

than to be confronted with a theory in which the factual foot has been forced into the theoretical shoe. It immediately excites the student's suspicion and detracts from what might be a very worthwhile undertaking. Finally, I see no purpose in dressing a theory up in grandiose terms to make it more scientific. The causes of revolution are not simple; it does not promote understanding to make them more obscure by using esoteric language.

I have been able to include but an extremely small sample of the available literature on revolution. I do not pretend that the works mentioned here are necessarily the only important ones on the subject. I do feel they are reasonably representative and will give the reader a "feel" for the subject. I have divided seven of the ten works that I have studied into four categories; causal, sociological, psychological and economic. The other three works have been used to conclude the chapter by drawing together the main themes so that I can point to ways in which I feel future research might usefully proceed.

#### CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS

Crane Brinton (2) began by outlining some of the problems involved in writing about revolutions. He saw his work as setting the groundwork for others to follow. His introductory chapter made it clear that he feels it is imperative for the historian to have a basic conceptual scheme, rather than just a collection of facts. This lays to rest the fallacy that historians and social scientists need to follow contradictory paths.

Brinton set to look at the causes of the English, French, American and Russian revolutions. While he hoped his findings might be relevant to other revolutions, he was quick to point out his conclusions only apply to those he is studying. He is not writing a general theory of revolution but one dealing with those four revolutions.



Brinton began his analysis of the causes of revolution by looking at the reasons for the decline of the ancient regime. He realized there never has been a perfectly happy society and that the job of the student is to decide whether there is more discontent than normal in a particular society, and whether this discontent is likely to cause a revolution. The first cause that Brinton discussed is that of economic discontent. He maintains absolute economic discontent can add fuel to revolution; yet, as does de Tocqueville, he believes starving people rarely start a revolution. It is those groups that feel that their economic progress is being unfairly hindered that are more likely to rebel. Frequently this latter group is also hindered in social and political spheres. (A widely used example being the frustrated middle class in Bourbon France whose political and social mobility was hindered by antiquated class system).

The other side of the "economic coin" deals with government incompetence. Brinton noted there is no such thing as perfectly efficient government. However, the government, in times of revolution, is usually in particular financial difficulty. It is when an inefficient, repressive government tries to instigate civil war that financial difficulties often cause the government to grant limited reforms which satisfy nobody and give the revolutionaries hope for their goal.

What role do pressure groups play in promoting political instability? According to Brinton this depends on what sort of change the group is seeking and what means it is willing to adopt to bring about such change. If a group merely wants to reform facets of the existing society through constitutional means, its actions are not going to cause a revolution. It is when the group wants to replace the existing society with a totally new one that the chances of revolution increase.

The next symptom of revolution addressed by Brinton is that of the intellectuals deserting the government. Again Brinton stated it

is always the job of the intellectual to criticize the society in which he lives. There is no such thing as a satisfied intellectual. The author here asks us to judge both the level of criticism and the number of intellectuals dissatisfied. Once having deserted the government, the intellectuals help form the revolutionary ideology that makes that government appear a usurper of power.

Brinton then looked to class struggle as a cause of revolution. He stated there is often class struggle in society. The first struggle he looks at is within the ruling class. Inefficient, economically weak, divided and impotently repressive, the "ruling" class presents an inviting target for revolutionary overthrow.

Brinton said there probably has never been a society free of class conflict. When talking about class conflict, Brinton referred to tensions between the middle class and the elite. Members of the working class seldomly articulate their political thoughts so it is very hard to discern working class discontent beyond a certain economic level. (This economic discontent can manifest itself through such events as bread riots, strike and desertion from the army). The student must decide whether there is more conflict than normal in society.

Social mobility is likely to play a large role in class conflict. If members of the middle class see a relatively good chance of entry into the ruling elite through existing mechanisms, they are likely to support that elite. Brinton suggested that, within the societies he studied, there was significant degree of economic mobility, although socially and politically, there was very little movement. This is a very dangerous contradiction because when people's expectations are raised they feel entitled to a political status comensurate with their wealth. Brinton also stated that circulation of the elites stops at particularly sensitive places, such as professions, where

people whose aspirations are particularly strong find their prospects limited.

Brinton concluded his analysis of the causes of revolution by commenting on how difficult it is to predict revolution. One sign of imminent revolution is a great deal of revolutionary talk, but however astute we may be, revolution is nearly always a surprise.

A revolution, Brinton would argue does not start with a bang. It is a long process. In its early stages, it is hard to say a revolution is taking place. While each revolution is, in many ways, different its beginnings evince important similarities because people acting in groups often follow certain procedures. One uniformity in the revolutions he studied was that governments were always trying to raise taxes, a measure which a large section of the people felt to be unjust. A second uniformity is that the early stages of a revolution are marked by the polarization of society into two groups: The battle lines are drawn. A third is the mix of the people involved in the revolution. There is always an alliance, however uneasy, between the mob and the provocateur. The final uniformity discovered by Brinton is a challenge of arms, when the revolutionaries come to the stage where they can openly challenge the government. Many theorists have subsequently agreed with Brinton on this questions. It would seem to be widely accepted that no government will fall until it is militarily weaker than the revolutionaries. This is a factor almost impossible to predict. Brinton summed up the difficulty by using the term "effective force." The government may be in command of a highly modern army, but if that army is not effective in revolutionary combat, the government will collapse.

It has now been 45 years since Brinton's book was first published. Although it has drawn a lot of criticism, modern writers owe a debt to Brinton. There are two of his contributions I would specially like

to stress. First, the book is extremely sensitive. Brinton is well aware of the problems of generalizing. The revolutions he studied actually happened, so it would be all too easy for him to "prove" why they happened and then to generalize rules to explain all revolutions. He recognizes most of the causes of revolution exist to some degree in every society and it would be extremely difficult for a contemporary student to forecast revolution. Second, despite these problems Brinton is not satisfied, as many historians in his era were, just to catalogue facts. He is trying to reach a theory that can be applied to at least four revolutions.

Nonetheless, there are still some criticisms of his work that are relevant to our study. I believe his first mistake is in failing to define what he is studying. As there is some doubt as to what constitutes a revolution, as opposed to coup d'etat or a revolutionary war, we need to know which events we are considering. Was there indeed ever an English or American revolution? Second, there are a few times when Brinton would appear to be making the facts fit his theory. In particular I find this to be the case with the English Civil War. He talked about the Cavaliers as being the ruling class although the conflict cut across borders. Third, Brinton's treatment of the roles of pressure groups and intellectuals is somewhat questionable. There are always pressure groups in society, and to decide when they become particularly influential is extremely difficult. Yet, making this determination is easy compared to trying to fathom whether the intellectuals are more anti-establishment than usual and whether or not their influence is increasing.

My main criticism of Brinton is that he did not weight his causes nor does he place them in any chronological order. When do we start looking for them? Do they come together? Are they all of equal importance, and, if so do they need to follow a certain sequence? I believe Brinton identified a number of appropriate causes, but

I would like to be told something of the relationship among them.

The work of Louis Gottschalk, an expert on the French revolution, differed from Brinton's in that it was intended to be general theory, rather than limited to four revolutions (3).

Gottschalk began with an analysis of the concept "cause". He defines it as "that from which something known as the result proceeds and without which the thing known as the result cannot happen". The cause must be antecedent to, and connected with, the result. The cause must be sufficient and necessary to bring about the result.

Gottschalk divided his causes into two categories: immediate and contributory. The immediate cause is always the single event without which the result cannot occur. Gottschalk used the example of war. The immediate cause of war is "outbreak of hostilities between two or more countries." Knowing the immediate cause is not enough - we must look for the contributory causes. Here Gottschalk argued sensibly that we must make sure our contributory causes are related to the result.

Once the causes have been established, the student must not fall into the trap of saying the result must occur. A revolution is never predetermined. Even the most artfully constructed theories can never take into account the vagaries of human nature. Man sometimes does, and sometimes does not, learn from experience. Having realized this, all that we can do is to say that if certain conditions exist within society one of the outcomes may be revolution.

Gottschalk continued by saying that complex events, such as revolution, demand complex causes. He briefly dismisses the Marxist theory of revolution, not because he perceives it to be wrong, but because he believes that no monistic theory can adequately describe revolution.

He identified five main causes of revolution, which can be placed into three categories. The first two of these are the contributory causes and the last is the immediate cause.

His first category is that of demand. This can be further separated into two causes, the first of which is provocation. People need some reason to want to rebel. The second is crystalized public opinion. For people to start a revolution, they must be convinced of other people's discontent.

Gottschalk's second category is that of hopefulness. This category again embraces two parts. The first deals with a program for reform and the second requires an able leader to draw all the various strands together.

Gottchalk's immediate cause, the third category, is the weakening of the ruling elite. This may come about through a split in the elite, or by the ruling elite losing the support of the armed forces. It is only when the conservative forces are sufficiently weakened that a revolution can occur.

Gottchalk's immediate cause is one which deserves the attention he devotes to it. As Eckstein (4) was quick to point out, too much emphasis has been placed on the revolutionaries and not enough on the weakness of the ruling elite. It may seem a trivial fact but it is worth repeating: A revolution can never succeed until the revolutionary forces are stronger than the ones they are trying to overthrow.

Gottchalk's theory is very useful to the student of revolution. He made three points that must be emphasized. To begin with, he noted that a revolution has complex causes. Furthermore, he pointed to the fact that it is necessary for a theory to fit the facts, not the other way around. Lastly, he recognized that, human nature

being what it is, we can never say definitely a revolution will occur. There are weaknesses in Gottchalk's work. First, he did not specify what constitutes demand for a revolution. It is not enough to say there must be discontent. We need to know the type of discontent, whether absolute or relative, how much it takes to start a revolution and what framework in which to put it. While Gottschalk is correct in saying there must be a weakening of the elite, I think he needs to say more about the way in which the elite handles the initial discontent. The way in which the elite deals with unrest can have much to do with whether or not that discontent leads to a revolution. To say there must be solidified public opinion is another point with which I disagree. It is not very often that a revolutionary movement, at least at its onset, enjoys mass support. Finally, is there really need for a program for reform? A revolution might well be fought to make an unpopular ruler leave, rather than bring a new ruler to power. The revolution in Nicaragua was fought out of hatred of Somoza, rather than love for the Sandinistas.

If Gottschalk's theory is to be used to predict revolution it needs certain modifications. We must know what we are looking for, how much, and when. The types of discontent have to be specified and we require a framework in which to place them. Gottschalk's theory is very useful but must be refined.

SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

One of the most widely read writers on revolution is Chalmers Johnson (5). He sees revolution as an extreme form of social change, and then questions the causes of social change. To answer this question he sets up a model society. This society is in equilibrium. What, he asks, would upset this equilibrium.

If one component of the system does not work as it should Johnson called this dysfunction. If this dysfunction is not rectified, the whole system will move out of equilibrium. The social system suffering from dysfunction is very much like the human body suffering from cancer. Therefore he defines social change as "action undertaken to alter the structure of the system for the purpose of relieving the condition of dysfunction". (6)

What makes revolution different from other forms of social change? First, revolution occurs when peaceful reforms are not forthcoming. Revolutions are major changes. This is not to say that major changes are necessarily revolutions. There must also be violence, which usually takes place as the result of multiple dysfunction. There is a level of dysfunction within the social system below which revolution would not be an appropriate form of social change.

Revolution will not occur when the ruling elite is able to isolate and deal with challenges to the system. For a revolution to occur, the "cancer" must spread to more than one "cell" within the social system. Johnson states that there are three "accelerators" which act on the dysfunction to cause revolution. These are the rise of a messiah, the birth of a revolutionary political party, or defeat in a foreign war. I have five main problems with Johnson's work. First, I have trouble in accepting his limits of dysfunction. His ideal type model is useful, but it leaves us in danger of reducing his propositions on dysfunction to the level of the tautological.



If we say revolution does not occur when society reacts non-violently, we must be able to set some sort of tolerance levels. If we do not, we are reduced to saying that because there was a revolution society was unable to adapt non-violently. Second, his use of defeat in a foreign war as a catalyst of dysfunction is too limited. He must take into account elite weakness as a whole. Third, I want to know more about the sources of dysfunction. I need to know whether all three carry the same weight and how many are needed to cause a revolution. Fourth, I feel that he is too deterministic when he says certain conditions demand a revolution. Finally, I feel revolution is not just an extreme form of social change, but that it is a separate phenomenon and its causes need to be treated as such.

Barrington Moore present another theory of revolution (7) from studying eight countries Moore identifies three forms of political development. (8) The first of these is the capitalist path of democracy, Moore states that Britain, France, and the United States took this path, the second path is that of a strong capitalist ruling class giving way to a weak liberal government which, in turn, gives way to Fascism. The third route is that of the Communist Revolution. Moore sees the prime factor in deciding which route was taken as the method of modernization within the society. To be more exact, he sees the method of extracting the surplus from the peasants by the lords as being crucial. (9)

Moore would say while no society is immune to revolution, some are more prone than others. If the traditional peasant village stays intact, that society is more susceptible to revolution than one in which the peasants have already been driven from the countryside. The lords will try to extract more out of the peasants in order to keep up with the elites in other, more modern countries. The peasants will not only resent this, but their respect for the lords will be further reduced if the central government takes over the

lord's function of protector and lawmaker.

On one hand, the peasants will have to suffer economic discontent and, on the other hand, their traditional value systems will come under fire from the central government. Thus, Moore said the society in which the peasants communities subject to modern pressures and influence is the most vulnerable to revolution.

Moore's theory is in danger of being tautological. He said those countries which follow the capitalist path to democracy do so because their peasant have been driven off the land at an early stage. He then said countries that developed along this path are those that forced the peasants off the land. Moore also framed his facts to support his theory; he attributes both the English Civil War and the Amercian Revolution to purely economic factors. He stated the second path ends in Fascism. He used Germany as an example, even though German Fascism lasted for only 12 years. Finally, even if we accept Moore's work, it is of no use to us in predicting the course of future events, as he himself admitted it is highly unlikely that any more countries will follow his first two paths.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES

One of the best known authors in the field of psychological approaches to revolution is Ted Robert Gurr (10). Gurr identified revolution as a type of civil disobedience. He said we now know enough about the sources of human violence to ask what disposes man to collective violence. According to Gurr, there are three traditionally recognized forms of human aggression. The first of these is innate, the second environmentally produced, and the third is a result of aggression, and instinctive response bought on by frustration. Gurr sees the last as being the most fruitful source for further inquiry. Men act violently because they are frustrated and angered in trying to achieve value goals. Once this anger has been raised, it acts

on its own. Any type of violence is an outlet for this anger. This, then, is Gurr's basic idea: for a revolution to occur there must be anger, which is created through the frustration of value goals.

Gurr stated this theory by using 11 propositions. These he divides into three categories. Category I focuses on instigating variables to determine the amount of anger. Category M deals with mediating variables which determine the likelihood and magnitude of violence provoked by this anger. Category F indicates the type of civil violence which is likely to occur.

Gurr's first proposition, I.1., deals with relative deprivation. He defined relative deprivation as the "actors perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and the environment's apparent value capabilities". (11) Gurr pointed out it is not enough for the actor to be deprived he must also perceive himself as being deprived. Civil violence occurs when a substantial number of people feel deprived. The more widespread the perceived deprivation, the more widespread the violence. The inability to reach value goals is not the only cause of deprivation. Deprivation is also caused when people anticipate losing what they already have.

Gurr's next propositions I.2., I.2A., and I.2B., deals with intensity of the anger people feel when they suffer relative deprivation. The more committed people are to a goal, and the closer they perceive themselves to be to that goal, the more anger they will feel when they cannot attain that goal.

Proposition I.3., deals with the legitimacy of the authorities when they prevent people from reaching a goal. If people feel the authorities are acting legitimately, they will not be as angry as they would if they felt that the authorities were not acting legitimately.

The environment in which people are striving for goals is the subject of Gurr's propositions I.4., and I.5. The level of violence depends on the degree of interference with goal attainment and the number of attainment opportunities which are interfered with.

Propositions I.1. to I.5. deal with the strength of anger felt by those who suffer relative deprivation. Propositions M.1. to M.5. are mediating propositions which deal with the amount of violence which manifests itself as a result of this discontent.

Gurr's first mediating propositions, M.1. and M.1A. state the amount of civil violence is proportional to the anticipated reaction of the authorities. If people feel the authorities will react with strong repression, the level of civil violence is likely to be low.

The level of civil violence is also dependent on the time factor. Propositions M.2. and M.2A. state that if anger is repressed, that anger will rise. If repression eases, then violence will increase. If repression continues over a long period of time, the amount of violence will decrease as people adapt their expectations to the new environment.

Frustration needs to be stimulated. This occurs through cultural experiences and through ideology. These experiences clarify the situation and give the deprived a target for their aggression. In proposition M.4. and M.4A., Gurr declared that while frustration is still required for violence, the level of frustration required to cause a revolution declined when there are these cultural experiences which can stimulate aggression.

Gurr's last mediating proposition, M.5., is concerned with the individual acting as a part of a crowd. There are three factors of crowd action that affect the individual's disposition towards violence. The first is the normative aspect. The individual is more likely to

act violently if he believes his fellows feel the same way he does. The second related to the protection a crowd offers through anonymity, potential force, and the existence of highly visible leaders who will assume responsibility for the crowd's action. The crowd also provides the individual with a cue for violence.

Gurr's last proposition, F.1. and F.1A., deals with the different types of violence. He separates civil violence into two categories; turmoil and revolution. He then divides revolution into categories, internal wars, which typically include civil and guerilla warfare; and conspiracy, which includes plots and mutinies. One way to deciding which type will prevail is to look at the group suffering the discontent. A combination of mass and elite discontent will lead to internal war, while elite discontent is more likely to promote conspiracy.

Gurr's theory was based on the thesis that civil disobedience is caused by frustration, which comes about when people are prevented from reaching value goals. The way in which this frustration manifests itself as civil violence depends to a large extent on the reaction of the existing regime.

The strength of Gurr's theory lies in bringing together information from two areas of social science. Nevertheless, there are three problems that I have with his work. How relevant is a lot of the information used by Gurr? It is debatable whether laboratory experiments, occasionally performed on animals, can have a direct relevance to the causes of revolution. Gurr must also be very careful in his use of historical evidence. His treatment of both the Plug Riots and the Luddities leaves a good deal to be desired. Gurr is correct in saying that people's perceptions are important, but if his theory is to be used to predict revolution, we need to be able to measure the strength of this perceived deprivation. Finally, does anger always manifest itself in violence, and if it does, under what circumstances does this violence seek to bring down the regime?

My point here is that anger sometimes does not produce violence. Even when it does it often seeks to remedy a particular grievance, rather than to bring down the whole regime. A good example of this would be an industrial dispute.

### ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS

Perhaps the most famous and influential of all revolutionary theorists is Karl Marx. Many contemporary "Marxist" states would appear to be anything but revolutionary. This should not distract us from the fact that Marx was, above all, a revolutionary theorist. (12)

Marx specified two strands of revolution, the social and the human. What then did Marx believe was the social revolution? Marx saw man as essentially a producer. The history of society could be divided into stages, each characterized by its own mode of production. The asiatic stage was characterized by slave labour, the feudal by serf labour, and the capitalist by wage labour. Within each stage there was a split between those who owned the means of production and those who did not. A new technology developed, the existing mode of production became outdated, and the ruling class was replaced by those who controlled the means of production.

The history of society can be seen in terms of class conflict. This is for two reasons; because the producing class see their own standard of living decreasing as a result of exploitation they are suffering for the ruling class; and, more important, because the working man is prevented from reaching his full productive capacities. The socio-economic order prevents man from developing new economic capabilities.

As technology advances, the capitalist mode of production will become obsolete. The controllers of the new mode of production, the people, will take power as a communist revolution comes about. The rise in technology will create so much wealth, that greed will disappear.

To Marx, man is a complete human being. Under the present mode of production, such specialization takes place as to prevent him from being so. The division of labour must be replaced if man is to reach complete freedom. This will happen within the communist revolution, as machinery will take over the productive role. Machinery will then be so advanced that any man will be able to fulfill any productive role for all he had to do is to work the relevant machine. The use of machinery will also leave man with more free time to perform such non-productive roles as art and writing.

The communist revolution will be the last revolution. When greed has been removed and the whole of society owns the means of production, there will no longer be a class system. Without class tension there will be no further revolution.

There are three main criticisms that can be made of Marx's theory. One, even if we agree that economic causes are important, we are unlikely to accept them as the only ones. It would be hard to find a revolution in which economic discontent did not play a role, but equally, it would be difficult to find a revolution where political unrest was not present. Cuba provides an example of a revolution started by a class which was not suffering economic hardship. Two, for Marx to be correct, there needs to be a high degree of class consciousness, this does not exist in contemporary society.<sup>(13)</sup> Three, it would seem that the world is not turning out the way Marx said it would. There is no evidence to suggest that capitalism is floundering.

Another economic treatment of the causes of revolution was put forward by J.C. Davies with his "J" curve analysis of relative deprivation. <sup>(14)</sup> The basic hypothesis advanced by Davies stated that revolution occurs, not when people are starving but rather, when a period of economic growth is followed by a sharp reversal. People's expectations rise when the standard of living rises. These expectations continue to rise even when there is sharp economical reversal, which frustrates

them. This frustration is normally manifested in the face of an intransigent elite who will not give way to the frustrated peoples social petitions. They need hope to rebel; and they are too busy trying to stay alive to give it much thought.

Davies looked at his theory in the light of Dorr's rebellion in 1842, the Russian revolution of 1918, and the Egyptian rebellion of 1952.

Dorr's rebellion, Davies contended, was the first to occur in the United States as a result of the Industrial Revolution. This, and its date, puts it in the same genre as the Chartist revolts in Britain. Due to the Industrial Revolution, Rhode Island was urbanized, which led to a greater dependance on wage labour. From 1807 to 1815, there was an economic boom. From 1834 to 1842, there was a depression. During this time, those who relied purely on wage income were particularly affected. It was this group whose expectations had risen especially high during the boom years, and with the economic expectations came political expectations. In 1841 the suffregists demands were turned down. In 1842 they held elections and declared a people's convention. The authorities stated this to be undemocratic and a month of widespread rioting followed. This seems to dovetail with Davies's theory that a period of economic prosperity, bringing with it higher expectations, will be followed by a depression. These frustrated people were confronted by an intransigent elite.

Davies pinpointed the start of the upsurge toward the Russian revolution at the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. He saw the growing population rate and the new high wages in the factories as evidence for rising expectations.

There were also, he maintained improvements in the legal system that were to provide hope for more changes. Expectations continued to rise until 1905, which Davies say as the point of no return for the Russian revolution. The strikes of that year had the effect of polarizing people. The defeat of Russia in the 1904-05 war with Japan also had two outcomes: It brought home many disillusioned



troops, and it shook the confidence of and severely weakened, the ruling elite. Davies sees the period of 1905 to 1917 as one of deepening despair. In 1910 there was a period of economic prosperity that raised hopes which were dashed again in the first years of the war.

Davies said the start of the Egyptian upsurge occurred in 1922, Nationalistic and economic hope rose in 1945. The post war depression hit, but there was no revolution due to nationalistic upsurge following the outbreak of war with Israel. Defeat in that war was to weaken the government severely. The Korean war, and the subsequent cotton boom, again raised people's expectations, only for them to be dashed with the collapse of 1952.

Davies continued to consider more cases that fit in with his analysis. He then looked at a case one might have expected revolution and yet it did not occur. The United State in the 1930's would seem to be a good candidate for revolution. Davies said one did not take place there because of a solidified elite that seemed to be trying to relieve the problems of the poor.

I disagree with Davies on a number of points. Despite reassurances, I find it hard to operationalize people's expectations. Is it enough to say that because people's living standards are rising, that all their expectations are rising too, and at the same rate? If indeed they are, how long does it take for these expectations to adjust? Davies's analysis of the Russian revolution is one with which particularly I disagree. It is not enough to say that the living standard of the serfs rose in 1861 just because the population rose. In many poorer societies the rising population can be attributed to people trying on one hand to provide for their old age, on the other, trying to ensure that as many children as possible would survive owing to the high infant mortality rate.

The first problem arises out of the question of definition. Some social scientists, such as Gurr and Eckstein, would say that we should talk about a wider concept, such as internal war. All forms of civil disobedience, including revolution, use violence, so it makes more sense to talk of these collectively, rather than to distinguish revolution. Studied this way it will be easier to formulate theories. Historians, such as Brinton and Stone, would disagree. To them the concept of internal war is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it talks of all forms of internal violence which are by no means comparable. It is too narrow because the concept of internal war is only applicable in non-violent societies.

The next question is whether we look at events and try to draw theories out of these, or do we look at behavioural theories dealing with why people act in a certain way. Gurr would argue it is people's perceptions that really count. We could point to many different events with similar causes and then ask why they came out differently. There is a good deal of truth in this. Yet, it is hard to measure perception. We must take their perceptions into account but must be willing to change our theories if the facts prove us wrong.

Do we look for a general theory or do we limit our theory to the cases we actually study? There can be little doubt that the former course is the more attractive. Indeed, there would seem to be no point in working over the same old revolutions again and again in the light of some new historical twists. This makes for interesting historical analysis but gets the social scientist nowhere in accounting for the present, let alone predicting the future. This is not to say that we would not analyze some more modern revolution and to see if standard "causal" theories are applicable.

My final point in this section is that there is a good deal more agreement here than many theorists admit. Some factors, such as relative deprivation and elite incompetence, are mentioned in almost

every theory I have evaluated. There is even a good deal of agreement that theories on revolution should be based on preconditions and precipitants. One specific example of two, seemingly opposite, theorists agreeing, is the work of Gottschalk and Gurr. Both accept the important influence of the crowd on individual behaviour, but they approach it from different angles.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

- . See for example, Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1964. Reprinted in Clifford T. Paynton and Robert Blacker, Why Revolution, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971.
2. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, New York 1965
3. Louis Gottschalk, "Causes of Revolution", The American Journal of Sociology, vol L, no 1 (July 1944), pp1-8
4. Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War", History and Theory, vol IV, No 2. Taken from Paynton and Blackey.
5. Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System
6. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the making of the Modern World, Boston, 1966
8. The countries which Moore studied were England, France, U.S.A., Japan, Russia, India and less comprehensively, Germany.
9. Moore is concerned here with the relationship between the agrarian upper class and the peasantry and the political consequences of this relationship. He recognizes that the U.S.A. never had a massive peasant class but points to various characteristics within its culture which might distinguish a peasantry. Hence, Moore claims, the 1960's southern sharecropper could be regarded as a peasant. Moore, p 111
10. Ted Robert Gurr, Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, ed Ivo K. Feierbend, Rosalind L. Feierbend, and Ted Robert Gurr, Anger Violence and Politics, pp31-57, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972.
11. Inbid, p37
12. A good deal of the presented discussion draws heavily from, Robert C. Tucker, "The Marxian Revolutionary Idea", ed Carl J. Friedrich, Revoluton, New York, 1965. Taken from Paynton and Blackey.
13. Even in Great Britain an estimated 40% of voters do not see themselves in any social class. What is even more important is that 69% of those who do consider themselves to be in a class do not harbour any resentment to those in the other class. Richard Rose, Politics in Britain, London, 1976.

14. James C..Davies. Toward a Theory of Revolution, The American Sociology Review, vol 27, no 1 (February 1962), pp5-19.
15. The three sources used to conclude this chapter were, Eckstein, On The Etiology of Internal War, Lawrence Stone, Theories of Revolution, Work Politics, Vol XVIII, no 2 (June 1966), 159-175, and John Dunn, Modern Revolutions, Cambridge, 1972.

CHAPTER II  
A CAUSAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION

I should now like to suggest tentatively my own theory of revolution. My purpose in so doing is not to attempt to break new theoretical ground. I do not forecast any new discoveries, because I believe that if a number of political scientist look at similar events, they are likely to come up with similiar theories.(1) However, there are three reasons why I feel this work to be important. To begin with, there has been little or no attempt to try to fit modern revolutions into a causal model. A weakness of causal theorists is that they draw their evidence from the "classical" revolutions.(2) This reservation may well disarm the criticism of a new theory that it has no contemporary relevance. In addition, while this is a causal theory, it will draw heavily on psychological and sociological work. Lastly, even though this theory is not exactly the same as other causal theories, conclusions emerging from this work may be relevant when looking back at earlier studies. There is enough in common with studies such as those of Gottschalk and Brinton for us to be able to say whether the nations studied here lend themselves to a causal explanation of revolution. My reason for outlining my own theory is not to disprove the finding of others. I am more comfortable working with such a theory, and, I hope, it will prevent my misrepresenting the facts.

All theorists of revolution must start with a definition. At this point many theorists will either enter into a thesis-long discussion on the subject or give up writing. My definition of a revolutionary movement is a mass movement seeking to bring about radical political, social, economic, and cultural reform through violent means. This definition does not set out to be watertight, but rather, a working definition

Before outlining my theory, I would like to point to its limitations (3), I believe we can never be in a position to say revolution

is inevitable. We can only point to certain factors and state that, if they occur in a given sequence, one of the possible outcomes is revolution. Furthermore, any conclusions drawn from this work will apply only to the revolutions studied, but this is not to negate an earlier point. I believe it is necessary to compile case studies which are related to one approach to the subject. While similarities may appear, definite conclusions may not follow. One of the reasons for the "comparative" weakness lies with differing methodologies, but, I believe, the main reason lies with human nature and circumstances. People never react in exactly the same way. All my theory can do is to recognize some of the factors that cause revolution, and to state that where these factors occur, a revolution may follow.

Revolutionary causes appear to fit into three stages. These are the preconditions, the precipitants that bring about the revolutionary situation, and the culmination of all these factors that leads to the revolutionary spark. This spark may or may not lead to a revolution. There are also a list of observations which, although they do not betray any category, give us a valuable insight into the working revolution.

At this point I would like to introduce an analogy which might make the rest of this work, a little clearer - that of the fire. To start a fire you need firewood, a precondition. If the wood is strewn all over the ground, it is of very little use. The firewood must be gathered and shaped until a stack is created. This shaping is done by the precipitants. The stack is a revolutionary situation. A spark is then needed to set the fire, or revolution. Once the fire has started it will burn more and more fiercely until it all but burns out, with only the embers still glowing, while we fashion the wood in any shape we wish, we cannot be certain about the direction the fire will eventually take. Other factors, such as the wind and the rain, may come along and change our plans. The same is true of revolutions. We know that there is a revolution taking

place in Iran and Nicaragua and, although we may try to predict the outcome, factors other than preconditions and precipitants may well intervene to alter our predictions.

### PRECONDITIONS

What then are the preconditions for a revolution? Preconditions are the reasons for discontent within a country. They account for the willingness of people to rebel. They **do not** have to be immediately antecedent to the revolution; they can have existed for some time. They do not have to occur simultaneously but must be cumulatively sufficient to promote discontent. Even if all exist we cannot say that a revolution must take place; all that we can say is that preconditions are the most common forms of discontent. Without them, there is little chance of revolution. Unlike certain other students of revolution, I find that it helps our understanding if we list these "frustrations".

Perhaps the most important precondition of all is that of economic discontent. This must be present for a revolution. It is not necessarily the most important factor, but there has been no revolution in which it played no part whatsoever. People are extremely concerned over economic matters and, to put it bluntly, they would rather eat than vote. (4) There are two forms of economic discontent which are of interest to us here: absolute and relative deprivation. In the last chapter, I noted that theorists such as Gurr, de Tocqueville, and Davies disagreed with Marx when he stated it is absolute deprivation which makes man rebel. I would add that it is not a question of either absolute or relative deprivation. A revolution is caused by a coalition of people, some driven by absolute deprivation, and some by relative deprivation.



Most people, at some time or other, perceive themselves to be deprived. Yet the remedy is seldom revolution. How do you decide when deprivation is strong enough to lead men to rebel? Measuring absolute deprivation is comparatively straight forward. Here we need to look at harvest records, mortality records, and accounts of discontent caused by lack of food, such as bread riots. Relative deprivation is not so easy. In this case we are dealing with perceptions. We can tell if a man is not getting food. However, we cannot tell if he perceives himself to be getting less food than he deserves. There are two angles from which we might consider this question. Davies had a point when he said one method would be to measure people's living standards. It is a reasonable suggestion that if living standards rise, as measured by per capita income, ownership of consumer durable goods (such as television, etc) housing conditions, death rates, illiteracy rates etc they will be expected to continue. If living standards do not continue to rise in line with expectations, people will feel deprived. Yet, this is only one way of looking at the question. I believe that it will differ between cultures as to how much expectations rise, and how quickly they will adjust to a reverse. People who have suffered reversals in the past will be much better able to adapt than those who have not (5). I think, therefore, we must also analyze carefully the literature produced by those suffering discontent and try to discover from these works why people are discontented. If people act because of their perception, they also write because of them. In this way we will have a better understanding of the causes of rebellion.

If a revolution were caused by economic discontent alone, the world would be in a state of constant revolt. Political discontent also plays a key causal role. The existing regime must use its repressive capabilities - namely the military, the police and legal system, and propaganda, to prevent effective political opposition. If the regime allows opposition, there is a good chance that this opposition will work for reform. A possible revolutionary situation will therefore

be diffused. By allowing the opposition a say in the decision-making process, the regime is working at the root of possible discontent. If the regime allows no opposition, pressure for revolution will build.

The chances of revolution in modern America or Britain remain slim as long as there remains abundant opportunity to voice discontent, and reasonable access to the decision-making process. In nations such as feudal France, Batista's Cuba and 20th Century Iran, such opportunity was not present. This gave those discontented with the governing regime no alternative but to revolt.

My third precondition is that of ideology. By ideology I am referring to a collection of beliefs and values which hold the various strands of the revolutionary movement together. For this ideology to be revolutionary, it must be contrary to the ideology of the ruling elite. Ideologies are extremely important because they give people something around which to unite. The most important role of ideology is that of legitimizing the revolt and converting into a moral struggle. People who believe they are fighting for what is right are far more likely to be willing to sacrifice their lives than are those interested solely in economic gain. Ideology has played a vital part in revolution: Marxism in the Russian revolution, religion in the Iranian revolution, and humanism in the French revolution.

#### PRECIPITANTS

There will be no revolution without precipitants to transform the preconditions into a revolutionary situation. I see the precipitants, effective leadership, ineffective reaction of the regime to existing discontent, and inability of the regime to hold on to power through physical force.

Leaders have a crucial role to play in precipitating a revolution. They are needed to organize the revolution movement and to articulate the ideology. In the cases where the movement is fragmented, leaders are needed to bring the fractions together through coalitions, giving the people a united front to support. The crucial role of the leaders is to give the people hope, a vital part of the success of any revolution. People need to know that they are not fighting alone and that the sacrifices they are making will not be in vain. A classic example of the role of leadership has been seen in Cuba. While it is undeniable that there was considerable economic and political discontent in Cuba, without Fidel Castro's involvement the revolution might not have taken place. Batista may well have been weak; but without someone to challenge him he could well have stayed in power.

Once it has been established that there is economic and political discontent in a country, the way in which the regime reacts to the discontent is crucial to the outcome of the revolution. If it attacks the preconditions, the chances of revolution are reduced. However, there are three approaches the government might select, or a combination of all three, that are likely to increase the chances of revolution. First, the government may try to repress mercilessly the movement. This repression is usually highly indiscriminate, and there is no attempt to discern between the revolutionaries and the population at large. Second, a government may tend to ignore the unrest and try to carry on as usual. Third, the government may grant piecemeal reform that does not resolve the problems at hand. The third approach is the least likely to work in diffusing a revolutionary situation. The only real answer for the regime is to try and deal with the causes of discontent and attempt to create a power base within society.

(6)

A regime will fall if it has no legitimacy, and relies purely on military means for survival. The length of time it stays in power

will depend on the effective strength of its military and police. Put simply: the regime will fall when it is weaker than the forces trying to overthrow it. The strength of the revolutionary forces is clearly important but there will be no revolution unless the conservative forces are weakened. This weakness is impossible to measure. All we can do is look for signs, such as economic and political discontent among the military; low morale, poor training and equipment, and lack of combat experience.

Weakening of the regime can take place in a number of ways. The government may have been involved in overseas wars that have devastated the economy and provoked discontent. Prime examples are Russia and Portugal. Economic problems may have lead to each regime's inability to buy off political discontent. This often happens when the bourgeoisie has been willing to tolerate a denial of political power in return for economic benefits. When there benefits are withdrawn, the middle class will withdraw its political support from the government. Revolutions are often started by a politically alienated bourgeoisie and an example of this is the French Revolution. This group has the political knowledge to make their protest effective, the regime might also be further weakened by dependence on a foreign power which then withdraws its support. Examples here would be the withdrawal of U.S. support from the Shah's Iran and from Gemayel's Lebanon.

Gottschalk, with good reason, pointed to the repressive capability of the regime as the key factor in bringing about a revolution. Even if all the other preconditions and precipitants are present, the regime will not fall if it is militarily strong enough to retain power. The present-day government of Afghanistan, for example, will not fall as long as it is supported by the military might of the Soviet Union.

## CONCLUSIONS

When these preconditions and precipitants converge, we can say we have a revolutionary situation which may or may not turn into a revolution. If it does, there are specific events that indicate a revolution is taking place. One such of these was the flight of the Shah of Iran from Teheran in 1978. This is not to say that the revolution will necessarily succeed, but rather that it is underway.

There are some additional points which are pertinent to our discussion. If, when the old regime is toppled, there is no mass movement, it is not a revolution. It is merely a circulation of elites, perhaps a "palace coup". In this respect, I would say the English Civil War was not a revolution because society was still dominated by the same class. Further, revolutions are unlikely to take place in urbanized, industrialist, pluralistic democracies. The political institutions in these states are too well established and considered too legitimate for the regime to fall. Any discontent is channeled through these institutions, avoiding a potentially dangerous situation. Even if discontent manifests itself by other means, the regime is unlikely to fall, because the state possesses such powerful repressive regulatory mechanisms as the socialization process, the media and the military, with which to counter a revolutionary organization. If the state is forced to rely on such mechanisms, it might eventually fall. To maintain long term stability, the state must enjoy legitimacy. Whilst recognizing that revolution seldom occurs in modernized states, I must also point out that they are unlikely to occur in primitive states. In such states people are more concerned with staying alive than with revolution. It is on those countries undergoing change and in which fundamental values are being challenged that revolution is most likely to occur.(7) It was during this phase that Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua underwent revolution. It was during modernizing phase that Britain came closest to revolution.

Finally, you cannot have revolution through reform. To achieve a revolution, you must exterminate those groups within society that oppose you. This can either be done by expelling dissidents or by eradicating them through a reign of terror. By attempting to achieve revolutionary goals through existing power structures, you are continuously fighting vested interests that will eventually get in your way. A good example of where a revolution failed for just this reason is Chile. By having to work through conservative politicians and not being able to reform the military, Allende faced a difficult task. I began this discussion by asking whether a theory of revolutions is possible and concluded that it is. My theory states that to bring about a revolutionary situation, you need economic political and ideological preconditions. These are then acted on by the precipitants of leadership, the reaction of the existing regime to unrest within society and the military strength of that regime.

My theory does not indicate if all the factors outlined are present there must be a revolution. All it says is that if these factors are present, one of the possible outcomes would be a revolution. It is also true that no single revolution is exactly the same as another. This means no single theory can explain every facet of every revolution without being so vague that it means nothing. I do think revolutions have enough in common for us to tentatively postulate a theory of revolution.

This theory has enough in common with other causal theories to be labeled as such. As a consequence, the purpose of this paper is to look at the revolutions in Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua to see, not only whether or not they fit my theory, but also to see whether they fit causal explanations in general.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. The course of study mentioned in this chapter was completed at Keele University under Dr. Rosemary O'Kane. I am deeply indebted to Dr. O'Kane for her thoughts on an earlier draft of this paper.
2. When I refer to the "classical" revolutions, I am talking of the American, French and Russian Revolutions.
3. This theory is meant very much to be a working theory, as are the definitions used.
4. As the English agitator, Cobban, is refuted to have said, "I defy you to make man rise up on a full stomach".
5. Take, for example, the present economic climate. When times get bad older people are much likely to adapt than younger ones, for older people have already been through a depression.
6. I take a power base to be an influential group within society which recognize the government as legitimate and is willing to support it.
7. E. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti", The American Science Review, No 2 (1970) p 1131-1149.

CHAPTER III  
THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE

There are, as Goldenberg pointed out, a number of fallacies circulated concerning the Cuban revolution.(1) The purpose of this chapter is to expose some of these fallacies and to determine the compatibility of the Cuban experience to my theory. However, at the onset there is a problem concerning data, which is the case with most Latin American Countries.(2) The most recent "reliable" pre-revolutionary statistics are those of the 1953 census. These must be taken into context in as much as 1953 was not a good year for the Cuban economy.(3)

Another problem is deciding with which countries to compare Cuba. The question is whether to compare Cuba with the rest of Latin America, or with its neighbour, the United States. A good example of this dilemma can be seen when looking at literacy figures. In 1953, 76.4% of Cuban's people over 10 years of age were literate. This would have put Cuba fourth among Latin American States, yet this figure would be unsatisfactory when compared with the United States.(4) Even if we decide to concentrate on Latin America, we have problems concerning which countries to compare Cuba with, and which factors to choose for such a comparison.(5)

Which, then, are the fallacies I would like to expose? The picture has been given of Cuba as a slave-based colony of the United States, centered totally on sugar. The exploited peasants of this underdeveloped nation rose to overthrow the tyrant, Batista.(6) This was simply not the case.

It would be hard to argue that Cuba was making the best of its potential, but this is not the same as saying it was underdeveloped. Sugar was extremely important to the economy, and culture, but less than 25% of the population made a direct living from growing sugar. As Theodor



Draper asserts;

In short, a social interpretation on the Cuban revolution must begin with a view of Cuban society that is far more urban, far less agrarian, far more middle class, far less backward, than it has been made to appear. In Castroist propaganda and the speeches of Castro himself, one of the most complex and advanced Latin American countries has been flattened out into a one-dimensional, hopelessly backward, agrarian fantasy that "has not developed economically or technically for dozens of years".(7)

There can be no doubt that conditions for the peasants in the mountains were hard.(8) Yet to focus on this is to miss the point. There conditions were typical and there never was, until just before Batista's fall, a large peasant army. Cuba, like all nations had its problems, but it is only with hindsight that we can see how they led to revolution. It was not clear until Batista fled the country that there would be a successful revolution.

Not only was it not clear that there would be a revolution in Cuba, but, it was also not clear that Fidel Castro would lead it. Given the role that Communist played in the revolution, it is even more surprising to note their role in post-revolutionary Cuba. By examining the causes of the Cuban revolution, the following analysis seeks to put these questions into perspective.

There are three questions we need to consider if we are going to shed light on the causes of the Cuban revolution. To begin with, which class accomplished the revolution? One side of the argument would term it a middle-class revolt, while the official party line would say it was a peasant-oriented agrarian revolt.(9) Moving on, what exactly was the economic position within Cuba before the revolution?

Finally, what was the extent, and the effect, of U.S. involvement in Cuba? I hope to answer these questions in the following analysis.

I would like to begin by repeating my definition of a revolutionary movement; "A revolutionary movement is a mass movement seeking to bring about

radical, political, social and economic change through violent means". How well does the Cuban experience fit this definition?

To answer this question by stating that Fidel Castro's forces in the Sierra Maestra were the revolutionary movement in Cuba, would be taking a very simplistic point of view. To begin with, Castro's group was not a mass organisation. We do not know the amount of tacit support given to Castro. We do know his "army" never exceeded 800 men.(10) It might be argued that Castro was the leader of a much larger movement. To be sure, there were many other such groups but they were in no way subordinate to Castro.(11) Despite attempts at unification, these groups were very much autonomous units.

Was there a mass movement? When Batista fell, the mass of the people were content with this overthrow. As evidence for this statement I would point to the celebrations which met, and the lack of resistance to, the defeat of Batista. The size of Castro's army, put by most observers at fewer than 1,000 men, would seem to indicate there was no mass movement actively seeking Batista's overthrow. It is more likely that while only a small number of men led the fight against Batista, they were representing a majority of the people in their wish to see him depart. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest there was mass movement trying to overthrow Batista, only that the revolutionary movement had at least tacit support.

The next question is whether this movement pursued radical reform. There would be two good reasons for saying it did not: The statements of the revolutionary leadership point to nothing more radical than a wish for the reinstatement of the 1940 constitution. (12) Furthermore, two groups supporting Castro, the younger middle class and the peasants from the Sierra Maestra, did not want radical reform. Elements within the bourgeoisie supported Castro because they felt the Cuban economy was stagnant, due to cumbersome labour laws and government corruption.

While they wanted these obstacles removed, they certainly did not want nationalization of industries. The peasants who supported Castro wanted agrarian reform, but not of the genre later provided by Castro. They wanted to own their own land and had little enthusiasm for the collective farms instigated by Castro.(13)

The reforms instituted by Castro, once he had assumed power, were evidence enough of how radical he truly was.(14) His moderate pre-revolutionary stance can be ascribed perhaps to both his immature political philosophy and his need to gather widespread support for his movement. However his swift replacement of moderate members of his cabinet is a further indication of where his sympathies lay. (15)

In 1958 there was a considerable group who advocated the overthrow of Batista. There were also leaders who wanted to see radical reform, but this is not to say that all those sought the overthrow of Batista agreed with all that Castro did after the revolution. This was very much an anti-Batista rather than a pro-Castro movement.

PRECONDITIONS

Was there sufficient economic discontent in Cuba to cause a revolution? In dealing with Cuba it is important to notice the very close tie between economic and political discontent. It is also necessary to link those who suffered with those who rebelled. It is not enough to point to suffering as a cause of revolution unless it is the people who suffered who also revolted.

There are three angles from which I would like to approach this problem. In the first place, I would like to ask how much absolute deprivation there was in Cuba, and whether this helped the revolutionary movement. I would then like to consider how much relative deprivation there was on the island. Finally, I shall look at some of the nation's problems that led to a weakening of the economy.

Cubans can be divided between those who worked in the city and those who worked on the land. For the purpose of this discussion, I am going to concentrate on the rural population. According to the census of 1953, 817,000, or 42% of the working population worked on the land. The sugar industry employed 474,053 of these. Work in the sugar industry was seasonal, and at harvest time the unemployment was a bearable 8%. When it was not harvest time, unemployment rates reached 32%, or more than the U.S. unemployment rates during the great depression.(16) The majority of workers were tenant farmers. In the 1930's, legislation had been passed to give them security of tenure at a very low rent. Those who were especially badly hit by seasonal trends were the squatters. While they accounted for only 8% of the agricultural population, they were centred around the Sierra Maestra.(17)

Even Castro agreed that during Batista's term income was being more evenly distributed in Cuba. He wrote

Since 1933 Cuban distributive policy has, as the result of wage increases, the introduction of the eight-hour day

paid holidays, social insurance etc, brought about a juster distribution of the national income.(18)

In certain rural districts of the country there was still abject poverty. (19) It was in these regions, especially the Sierra Maestra, that Castro gained, at least tacit, support. Yet if we are looking for a revolution caused by absolute deprivation this is not the place to turn.(20) Cuba was, on a Latin American scale relatively prosperous. (21) Though it is undoubtably true that Castro gained support from the poor this was not his only, nor even main, recruiting ground. We must look further for an adequate economic interpretation of the Cuban revolution.

The question of relative deprivation is, as I commented in my introduction, a tricky one. It is hard to work with people's perceptions. The most active groups in the Cuban revolution were the students and the younger members of the middle and professional classes.(22) How far can we point to relative deprivation as a reason for this discontent? There are two forms of economic frustration which are of interest here. While the older members of the middle class made money from farming and business, and were therefore quite happy with the Batista regime, their sons were being drawn into the liberal professions and to the government bureaucracy. However, the economy could not support so many in these fields. These young graduates, whose expectations were raised through their university education, faced limited chance of professional employment, and a corrupt government bureaucracy. Those who were technically trained became increasingly disillusioned with Cuba's fast stagnating economy, and became more and more attached to the idea of replacing Batista.(23)

Cuba was an Island with great economic potential. More than 70% of its land was fertile and 50% of it was arable compared with only 6% in Nicaragua, and 8% in Iran.(24) In addition Cuba had plentiful labour and capital.(25) The problem was not that Cuba was backward,

but, rather, that it had failed to make the most of its opportunities, as Draper cited.

Although Cuba's potentials for development clearly have not been fully utilized, these comparisons show that it is a mistake to think of Cuba as a seriously underdeveloped country.(26)

What then were the main problems with the Cuban economy? Firstly the Cuban economy was still centered around sugar. While it is a mistake to think of Cuba as a one-crop economy, sugar accounted for 80% of the nation's export earnings.(27) There were two reasons for this: First, the climate and soil were perfect for sugar growing. Second, the United States provided an extremely lucrative market. This had three main consequences: high unemployment due to the seasonal nature of the industry, restricted diversification into other fields and a reliance on world market forces outside Cuba's command.

The second economic problem involved Cuba's dependant relationship with the United States. The question is whether Cuba lost or gained from its close links with its northern neighbour? On the credit side must be placed the massive U.S. investment in Cuba. North American firms invested, by 1960 \$1,000 million. More than 160,000 people were employed by these firms, 90% of whom were Cubans. In 1957 American firms spent \$70 million in taxes - 20% of the Cuban budget.(28) On the debit side were American pressure on Cuba to develop sugar and the quota system which the United States later employed. On the whole, Cuba gained from its relationship with the United States. This did not stop the revolutionaries from complaining about "economic slavery". What was really needed was a strong Cuban government which could negotiate with the United States use Cuba's resources to diversify and modernize.

The third major problem with the Cuban economy was the top-heavy inefficient beauracracy. In 1950 nearly 80% of the budget was used to pay officials and holders of sinecures. In the same year, approximately 11% of the working population, half the number employed in the sugar industry, was employed by the government.

Cuba was not economically underdeveloped. Some of its peasants suffered dire hardship largely due to underemployment, but this was not really the cause of revolution. However, the economy was stagnating. This was particularly frustrating to the generation of students and young middle-class professionals. The United States made a perfect scapegoat, and Batista's handling of the situation did nothing to improve matters.

It must be with this last point in mind that we turn our attention to the political unrest which existed in Cuba. There can be little doubt that the economic discontent in Cuba, on its own, was not enough to cause a revolution. While it is difficult to draw the line between economic and political discontent, it would seem to make sense to identify political discontent as more important than economic. For the purpose of this section I would like to look at who revolted and why. I would also like to consider the political background against which this took place. The United States has a long history of intervention in Cuban affairs. By the 1890's Americans had \$30 million invested in the Cuban sugar industry, with the result that 10% of Cuban sugar was processed by American Mills. In 1898 the United States intervened in Cuba's wars of independence with Spain. In 1902 Cuba received independence, and the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the legal right of intervention in Cuban internal affairs.(30) On August 13, 1933, President Gerardo Machado fled the country in the midst of serious unrest, the result of which was the coming to power in 1935 of Fulgencio Batista. Batista instituted free elections for a national constitutional assembly which drew up the progressive 1940 constitution. Surprisingly, in 1944, Batista's appointed successor, Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, was defeated by the Autenticos party, which was to hold the Presidency until Batista once again seized power in 1952. The brief introduction to Cuban political history demonstrated both the U.S. influence in Cuban affairs and the lack of a stable political culture.

Against this background, what sparked the political unrest that led to Batista's overthrow? When Batista took power on March 10, 1952,

he was running third, behind Dr. Robert Agramonte and Dr. Carlos Hevia in the polls for the upcoming presidential election. To put it simply, he took power illegitimately. Batista obtained cooperation from the army and police, thanks to considerable pay increases. The demands of the economic rather than political urban working class were satisfied, mainly by the social benefits granted by Batista.(31) Their lack of political protest is summed up by their refusal to strike on April 9, 1958.

Two main groups opposed Batista, and forced an uneasy alliance which was to cause his ultimate downfall. These were the bourgeois remnants of the Autentico and Orthodox parties, and students, mainly from the University of Havana. (The two revolutionary groups coming out of the Autentico Party were: the Friends of Aureliana (AAA), and the Autentico Organisation (OA).)

The student opposition to Batista started as soon as he took power. Castro himself instigated a case in the Supreme Court which sought a judicial finding that Batista's takeover was unconstitutional. Needless to say, this effort was treated with disdain. On May 20, 1952, a mass meeting at the University called for resistance to Batista. This opposition did not stop until the overthrow of Batista. The cause of political discontent, at least, is clear: Batista's illegal capture of power.

How prevalent a role did ideology play in the Cuban revolution? To answer this question we need to look at the importance of ideology before and after the revolution took place.

There is very little trace of ideology before the revolution. Draper argued that "during the struggle for power and for about a year or two after power had been won, Castroism seemed to be a movement without theory or ideology".(33) Two factors buttress this conclusion: First, it was in Castro's interest to be ideologically vague. In this manner, he could promise everything to everybody and not attract criticism



because of an ideological stance. Second, Castro was a man of action not of theory.(34) It was Che Guevara who was to become the main theorist, after the revolution was successful.

Guevara began his formulation of Castroism in January 1959. Castroism is basically Cuban, but can be applied in principle to the whole of Latin America, according to Guevara. The theory revolves around, and glorifies the role of the peasant fighter. Deemed the vanguard of revolution,(35) because of his commitment to the overthrow of illegitimate institutions, Guevara was fighting for agrarian reform. It was not necessary for favourable conditions to pre-exist, they could be created.

How much is this theory based on the struggle to overthrow Batista, and how far was it intended to justify Castro's political fight after Batista's fall? There can be little doubt that the rudiments of this theory came out of the Sierra Maestra. The early part of Guevara's work appeared in early 1959, and most of it could be drawn from speeches that Castro made around the same date. Due to the split in the revolutionary alliance between the former underground resistance and the rebel army, it is clear that it was in Castro's interest to emphasize the role of the peasant fighter in the struggle to overthrow Batista. While Guevara denied it strenuously, a good deal of his theory on guerilla warfare would appear to have influenced by Mao's work on the same subject.(36)

Guevara must have learned many of his lessons through practical experience. However, even if his theory was original, we cannot place too much emphasis on a piece of work formulated after an event. I am skeptical as to how much effect a non-formulated theory would have on revolutionary morale.

PRECIPITANTS

The first of my precipitants is the role of leaders in a revolutionary struggle. What is Castro's role in this model? No doubt that charismatic young lawyer played a central part in the overthrow of Batista just as he continues to play the leading role in contemporary Cuba. A discussion of his personal attributes and rise to power, though a fascinating subject, lies beyond the scope of this paper. Could anyone have succeeded when he did? The best way to answer this question is to ask why Castro won power when so many other failed.

The Cuban revolution was not inevitable. Moreover, it was not certain that Castro would lead the movement to overthrow Batista. Why then, did the competing organizations fail?

Three reasons help account for the failure of these organizations. To begin with, there was a lack of coordination between groups. Even when they did work together, as in the Montreal accord of June 2, 1953, the results were unsatisfactory (37) Second, while the students were enthusiastic, their plans were often badly conceived, as exemplified in the abortive March 1957 attempt on Batista's life.

Finally, these other groups faced one more problem; Castro himself.(38) Not only did he want Batista overthrown, Castro was determined to be the one to do it. He never gave up his commitment to the revolution nor his conviction that a successful revolution could take place. His ability to inspire, and perceived concern for those around him made Castro one of Latin America's great leaders. It would be impossible to overemphasize the role Castro played in the Cuban revolution.

As we have seen, Batista ignited the political discontent through his illegitimate seizure of power in 1952. How did he deal with this discontent? Though nobody really knows the result of the Batista terror, it would seem that official reports of 20,000 dead are far

from accurate.(39) It was an inefficient and indiscriminate affair. (Army mopping-up campaigns probably did the best job of recruiting peasants into Castro's army). Batista was still trying to maintain the facade of a semi-democratic nation, but by allowing a degree of press freedom and by granting the "Moncada Amnesty", Batista was promoting his downfall. Legends of Batista's working 16 hours a day were untrue. It is said that when he should have been organizing a campaign to defeat Castro, he was too busy playing Canasta.(40)

Batista fled the country on December 31, 1958. The "army" with which Castro confronted him numbered fewer than 1,000 men. Batista's regime collapsed with the minimum amount of pressure from Castro. Without denigrating the role of Castro, the Cuban revolution is the story of the fall of Batista rather than the rise of Castro.

Batista had never managed to legitimize his power. The working class and the peasants were, at best, apathetic. Student groups and other elements of the middle class constantly agitated against him because they felt that he had seized power illegally. This seizure and the stagnation of the economy was resented by professional sections of the Cuban bourgeoisie.(41) Batista did not even have the unconditional support of his generals. In the days before Castro took power, his senior officers were negotiating with Castro to save themselves at Batista's expense.

Even had it remained loyal, Batista's army could not have kept him in power. The upper echelons of his officer corps, including Tabernilla, was staffed by his friends and relatives, rather than by able officers. This had the further effect of alienating the very soldiers who might have been able to save Batista. The peasant soldiers were abominably paid and had no wish to stand and fight. They often retreated even before contacting the rebels.(42) To make matters worse, Cuba's army had virtually no military experience. The withdrawal of U.S. support damaged army morale even further.(43)

## CONCLUSIONS

Cuba resists inclusion in any revolutionary model. Guevara stated there were factors exceptional about the Cuban revolution but that it constituted a model which Latin America could follow. It does, however, make sense to talk about the revolution as a Cuban experience. It is interesting to note that in countries where Castro has encouraged revolution, such as Nicaragua, he has done so along the lines most suited to that individual nation.

How germane then is the Cuban experience to that presented in the previous chapter? The Cuban revolution is not a precise example of my theory in practice. There was neither deep-seated economic discontent nor serious ideological content. However, while not strong, these preconditions were present. What is important to note is that my theory states some preconditions are stronger than others. The weighting of these conditions depends on the particular nation. It would have taken a very sensitive analysis of Batista's Cuba to predict the revolution. When you bring together the strength of the political discontent, the force of Castro's personality, and the real, not apparent weakness of the Batista regime, it would be possible to foresee the revolution. The first step is to appraise realistically the preconditions and the precipitants. The next step is to recognize the differing strengths of these factors, not to attribute false strengths and weaknesses. The last step is to see whether the case study fits, by a careful balancing of the first two steps. It would, therefore, have been possible to predict the Cuban revolution, but extremely difficult.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

- (1) Boris Goldenburg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America. New York, 1965, p120
- (2) Ibid, p143
- (3) See Table 1
- (4) In 1953 the Cuban illiteracy rate was 23%. In the United States this rate was 3%, whilst in Haiti it was 90%.
- (5) For a full discussion of this question, see Reverend Roger Vekemans and J. Segundo, Essay of a Socio-Economic Typology of Latin American countries, in, Unesco. Socio Aspects of Economic Development in Latin American Countries, Paris, 1963 and Pedro C.W. Teichert, Analysis of Real Growth and Wealth in Latin American Republics, Journal of Inter-American Studies, vol1 no 2 (April 1959) p173-202
- (6) See Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, London 1969
- (7) Theodor Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, New York 1965 p10
- (8) Notice the large discrepancies between the urban and rural figures in Table 3
- (9) For the official line see the speech of Fidel Castro in Havana, October 26, 1959, cited in Leo Huberman and Payl M Sweezy, Cuba Anatomy of a revolution New York, p79 For the view that it was basically a middle class revolt, see Goldenberg, p149
- (10) For various estimate of Castro's fighting force, see Hugh Thomas, The Cuban Revolution, New York, 1977,p260 Herbert Matthews, Revolution in Cuba, New York 1975, p122
- (11) The groups involved are discussed later in this chapter
- (12) Goldenberg p152
- (13) Ibid p146
- (14) Ibid p178 Huberman and Sweezy p92-113
- (15) Thomas p446
- (16) Ibid p393
- (17) Draper p72
- (18) Fidel Castro, Political, Economic and Social Thought of Fidel Castro Havana 1959 p153 Cited in Goldenberg p123

- (19) See Huberman and Sweezy Chapter one
- (20) Revolutions, it would seem, seldom occur where poverty is at it's worst. Out of 75 countries listed by Pedro Teichert, Haiti was 63rd, whereas Cuba was 27th. See Teichert p176-7
- (21) See Table 4
- (22) Draper p60
- (23) Thomas p330
- (24) 51% of Cubas's land was agricultural, Teichert p180
- (25) Goldenberg p127
- (26) A New Estimate of the National Income and Product of Cuba in 1953 Stanford: Food Research Institute Studies, vol 2 no 9 (November 1961) p213-27
- (27) Draper p102
- (28) Investment figures, see Goldenberg p141. For Quota details see Goldenberg p138.
- (29) Ibid p130
- (30) Under the Platt Amendment the United States intervened militarily three times in Cuban affairs; in 1906, 1912 and 1917. See Huberman and Sweezy p13-16
- (31) Goldenberg p112
- (32) Ibid p147
- (33) Draper p58
- (34) Ibid
- (35) Guevara
- (36) Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerilla Warfare, London 1961
- (37) Despite much discussion, all this meeting achieved was an agreement to press for a restoration of the 1940 constitution
- (38) Goldenberg p158
- (39) Ibid p144
- (40) Thomas p5

(41) Goldenberg p142

(42) Thomas p259

(43) Goldenberg p162

## CHAPTER IV

### REVOLUTION IN IRAN

In 1972 Iran became part of the "Nixon Doctrine." The object of this policy, following the recent debacle in Vietnam, was to use key sympathetic nations to further U.S. interests without deploying American troops. President Nixon believed Iran sufficiently strong and stable to play such a role. While Presidents came and went, this doctrine remained. The unrest in Tehran during 1978 came as a surprise to many.(1) Though events are only inevitable through hindsight, the causes of the disturbance on September 8, 1978(1), can be traced through Iranian history.(2) Any student of violent unrest needs to decide when relevant causes begin. If he chooses a date that is too early, he is likely to focus on many irrelevant factors. If the date he chooses is too late, he is likely to overlook many important causes. In the context of this analysis, I will be looking at Iran from 1963 to 1979. I am aware that 1906(3) and 1953(4), could be selected as suitable starting dates, Any dates must be arbitrary; however, I believe that the dates on which I have decided proved a comprehensive historical background, whilst focusing on those events which were directly relevant to the revolution.

From 1962 to 1979, a number of problems beset the seemingly peaceful Iranian state. This chapter emphasizes three of these: the conflict between a modernizing state and the Islamic culture; the political expectations of the middle class; and the economic inadequacies of the regime.

The objective of this chapter is to determine the relevance of the Iranian Revolution to my theory. In pursuing this goal, I will



look at whether the Iranian revolution was inevitable. I want to determine if the difficulties involved in bringing about a peaceful transition from a backward state to a modern industrialized nation could have been overcome. Was the revolution a product of these tensions or did it come about through the shah's incompetent handling of the 1978 crisis?

Before proceeding, we must establish whether there was revolutionary movement in Iran. In answering this question, I am taking no account of what happened after Ayatollah Khomeini(5) came to power. I am reviewing the movement that forced the shah to leave Iran in 1979. There can be little doubt that a large number of people wanted a radical change in how Iran was being governed. The demonstrations, strikes and other protests, indicate the number of people involved.(6)

In contemplating the change desired by the movement we must examine its leadership. As with most large organizations, the movement which sought the overthrow of the shah was a coalition of many smaller groups. The movement consisted of religious fanatics, students, politicians, professionals and guerillas. They shared a desire to see the end of the shah's political control.(7) These leaders could not agree on the type of society they wanted; they could only agree on the society they did not want and they were well supported by the discontented masses.

#### PRECONDITIONS

Was there sufficient economic discontent to spark a revolution in Iran? There are three angles from which to approach this question. To begin with, I will consider the economic discontent in the countryside, the shah's agrarian reform and the effects of this discontent on the revolution. Next, I will examine the economic weaknesses of the regime itself.

What were conditions like in the countryside? How did the shah's government deal with the situation? What did all this have to do with the revolution? One of the chief problems in Iran was the lack of arable land. Only 5%, 8 million hectares(8), were cultivated on a regular basis. Before the "White Revolution", the basic unit of land ownership was the village. A group of 400-(9) 450 families owned more than 60% of this land, with the result that only 5% of the peasants owned the land on which they worked.

Various means of sharecropping were used to extract the product from the land. The most common of these was to divide the crop into five inputs-land, labour, water, animals and seed.

Landowners automatically received 20% of the product, the few animal owners share 20%; the workers with a share in the product divide 20% among themselves; and the landless labourers worked for whatever the landowners would pay them. This resulted in a village hierarchy of landowners, animal owners, those entitled to the traditional labour share, and casual workers.(11)

The shah launched his program in January 1962 under the slogan of "land to the tiller". There were three stages to his plan. Under the first, the government undertook the redistribution of land from landowners to peasants, with restrictions on the amount of land that any one owner could hold. This stage reached 30% of Iranian villages and had the effect of giving the land to the relatively well-to-do peasants. The second stage started in 1965, and covered land not already affected by the first stage. Landowners were now given five ways in which to transfer land to the peasants; the principle one being to lease the land. This was intended to reach more than 80% of the peasants. The third phase, designed to increase agricultural production, encouraged the recipient peasants to participate in the state run agri-corporations.

Major economic consequences came from this programme of land reform,

even though those who had nothing before it began continued to have nothing as a consequence. A new class, the wealthy bourgeoisie, was created. Many landowners sold land and moved into the cities to invest their money in industry. Many of these new agri-corporations did nothing to increase food production and, by forcing the peasants off the land, caused increased unemployment. Through these measures the shah was also able to increase his control over the countryside.(12)

There is very little evidence of agrarian unrest in Iran, and that which there was tended to be sporadic. Whatever the conditions of the peasants before or after the revolution, it was the cities from which the shah faced a threat and not from the countryside. In this respect, it is the third phase of the agrarian reform, that is important. First, the unemployment caused by agri-business spurred migration into already swollen cities. Second, this stage failed to produce enough food for the rapidly expanding economy. The importation of food led to ever-spiraling prices: Prices rose 250% between 1969-1978.(13)

Iran's sustained growth rate was remarkable. The gross national product rose by 8% per annum in the 1960's, by 30.3% in 1973-1974, and by 42% in 1974-1975. The GNP grew from \$17.3 billion in 1972 to \$54.6 billion in 1978. The per capita GNP rose from around \$500 in 1972 to \$2400 in 1978.(14)

There was economic unrest in urban Iran, not because of absolute deprivation, but because people failed to obtain the goods they expected. Only certain groups in society gained from Iran's economic growth. It was mainly those in heavy industry who prospered. The many who did not had to put up with serious over crowding as Tehran's population rose from 2.5million in 1970 to 5 million in 1977, with rents soaring as high as 70% of income and high inflation rates. While the people's living standards were not rising, their expectations

were: the new marble-fronted apartment buildings; the 900,000 cars in the city with no public transport system; and the expensive western goods in the shops, enable people in northern Tehran to see how the rich were prospering from Iran's oil wealth.(15) The shah's claims that that within 10 years Iran would be one of the five wealthiest nations in the world, and his limited socio-economic reforms of April 1975 gave the working class hope their expectations could be fulfilled.(16)

In 1975 Iran's exports fell by 10%. Even though oil sales abroad were to recover in 1976-77, this did nothing to boost the confidence of the Iranian business community. As Eric Rouleau said, "This had not dissipated the disenchantment noticeable in Iran's business community, a disenchantment matching the expectations born of the 1974 boom".(17) For Iran to develop economically, it had to use its oil revenues to promote economic diversification. The reverse was happening; Iran's non-oil exports declined from 22% of imports in 1959 to 5% of imports in 1978.

I would now like to look at the difficulties faced by the Iranian State. Even with its huge oil wealth, to begin with, American reports put the waste factor in Iranian industry as high as 40% for a number of reasons: the emphasis on artisanal labour with lack of large firms; the inefficiency in even large Iranian corporations; the relatively high cost of labour; and the high tariffs that diminished the need to compete.(18) Another economic problem in Iran was the degree of military spending. Under the 1973-1975 5-year plan, Iran spent an estimated 31% of its revenue on defense.(19) Iran's infrastructure was sadly lacking; there were simply not the resources to transport imported goods. The long lines at the Iranian-Soviet border and the rotting cargoes at the port of Khorramshar were public signs of this problem. Not only did the military absorb 31% of the government budget, but it also worked against private enterprise in the taking of other valuable resources such as skilled manpower.

The high level of government spending, financed by oil revenues, increased domestic demand and sent prices rising.

The shah's attempt to use Iran's oil wealth to "modernize" his nation was unsuccessful. He failed to increase agricultural production, with the result that 1977 Iran was net importer of \$2,500 million in food (10% of its income)(20) In addition, non-oil production stagnated. Some of this wealth was skimmed off by the shah's family, or went to compensate the middle classes for their lack of political power. As long as the shah had sufficient economic wealth to make his promises credible, he stood a chance of keeping the bourgeoisie's loyalty. Few powerful political appointments went to the bourgeoisie, so as soon as they felt economically threatened, they began to withdraw their support.(21) The reforms passed by the shah in April 1975 led many in the business community to conclude that the shah had deserted them. Rouleau quoted one prominent businessman as saying "the shah's revolution is no longer a white revolution, it is a pink one".(22)

The Iranian political system was highly centralized. Until 1975 the Majlis, or lower house, consisted of two parties, the Iran Novin and the Mardom. The Iran Novin Party served as the loyal opposition. In 1975 these two parties merged into one - the National Resurgence Party. The shah banned all other political parties and encouraged all Iranians to join the new organization.

Political activity was to be channeled through either the right or left-wing of this one party. Those who wanted to remain politically active either had to join the Party or "face the consequences".

From 1963-1977, the shah successfully managed this system through economic incentives and repression. His main instrument in this repression was his State security organization, SAVAK. However, there was no way the shah could stop the rising economic social and political expectations of certain groups. He could control

them for a while, but he could not prevent them. In 1977 Iran's oil revenues reached a plateau.(24) The shah refused to reduce his military spending, which limited his room for maneuver. In response to foreign pressure, especially President Carter's human rights policy, the shah was forced to relax his political stanglehold. It was at this time that political tension burst into the open.

The political opposition was divided into two sections - secular and clerical. The secular opposition consisted of two main parties - the Liberation movement of Iran and the National Front. The National Front, revived in 1977, was the successor to the National Front of Mossadeq's time. This Tehran-based party advocated major political reforms, largely grounded in the 1906 constitution.

It's leaders organized and addressed many large rallies and, while it had a good deal of sympathy with the clergy, it was purely secular. There was to be much friction between the National Front and the clergy after the revolution. The other secular party, the Liberation Movement of Iran, favoured more intimate links with the clergy. This party made good use of the Mosque network, and its leader, Mehdi Bazergan, became Khomeini's first prime minister. Their position was one which fused nationalism to Islam. While Bazergan was to resign as prime minister in response to the taking of the American hostages in 1979, close links remained between this party and the clergy.

Politically, the clergy was important for three reasons: their alliance with the Bazeris brought huge crowds to the streets in 1978; they gave the revolutionary movement its ideology; and, most important of all, they provided the opposition with an alternative communications network. Speeches and messages were transferred from one town to another without using established media channels.

An in-depth study of human rights violations in Iran is beyond the

scope of this paper. What needs to be considered is how this repression had a bearing on the political system. Amnesty International stated: "The total number of political prisoners has been reported at times throughout the year (1975) to be anything from 25,000 to 100,000".(25) The treatment of these prisoners has been well documented, and is not only an indictment of the shah's regime, but also the whole western world whose economic interests in Iran overshadowed any morale obligations.

What effect did SAVAK have on the Iranian people? Even though the shah claimed that the SAVAK had only 4,000 members, its policies were meant to make the people feel that they were always being watched. (26) This led to distrust. A source cited by Marvin Rois expressed this feeling:

The people....are distrustful. If you want the truth the people have lost confidence in everybody and everything. This distrust begins with the people themselves. People are no longer sure of their own ideas, beliefs, attitudes, or even their decisions. This distrust in oneself, gained through actual experience, extends naturally to other too. They no longer trust everyone. They have heard so many lies, have seen so much creeping and crawling... whom can they trust? The people don't even trust the "people"(27)

The above passage is very important. This distrust led to a distrust of anything political. When the shah's political control mechanism began to fail, there was no way he could recapture support from a disbelieving population, many of whom bore the scars of SAVAK brutality.

The shah tried to modernize his nation, while maintaining complete political control. This was not possible. By depriving all others of any important part in the political decision-making process, he alienated himself from the population. He came to power through the armed forces and, by failing to establish his governments legitimacy, increasingly relied on wealth and repression to keep that power.

What role did ideology play in the Iranian revolution? Fred Haliday would say it is wrong to think of what happened in Iran as an Islamic revolution,(28) his rationale being that it took a united front to overthrow the shah. This is true. It is also true that there is a chance the shah might have averted the revolution if he could have reached a compromise with the more moderate members of the middle class and clergy. In this way, he might have isolated the more radical members of the clergy. However, we must not underestimate the role of Islam in this more limited context.

The shah and his father, Reza Khan, had undertaken a policy of weakening the clergy's social and political standing. The clergy's influence over education and law, two fields in which they were traditionally very strong, had been considerably diminished by legislation passed in the 1950's and 1960's. At the same time the clergy lost their religious endowment lands, which embraced 2% of all land before the shah's "White Revolution". the shah also perpetrated attacks on the major theological colleges such as Gom, in 1963 and 1975.

More than 80% of Iranians are Shia Muslims. There are different schools of thought. These can basically be divided into fundamentalists, led by Khomeini, and reformists, led by Shariati until his death. The reformists Islamic theory appeals to students and intellectuals, and is an attempt to bring Islam into line with modern world.

The Islamic teachings of Khomeini are much more traditional. He sees himself as a defender of the faith, and uses emotional language and images to mobilize his followers. He exploits messianic yearnings and while never claiming to be returning Iman, he does nothing to dispel such sentiments. His opposition to the shah concentrated on three points, primarily, the shah's autocratic rule. Khomeini believes he himself alone can rule autocratically because he is acting in the name of Allah. The shah was acting against the will



of God. This was also a good point to unite the opposition factions, as it appealed to the middle class. Second, Khomeini opposed the shah's close links to the United States. Third, he did not like the relaxation of morals which had occurred during the shah's reign.

The 1960's and 1970's were decades of great social change in Iran. When people are confronted by such change, they often fall back on traditional values. This is not mere speculation. A brief look at the tremendous upsurge in religious activity in this period will confirm this. In 1976 there were 48 publishers of religious books in Tehran alone. Twenty-five of these sprang up in the 1965-75 period.(29) In 1976-77 3.5 million people visited the holy shrines of Moshad, whilst ten years before they had only been 332,000. There are four ways in which Shia Islam was of importance to the revolution: To begin with, it furnished the opposition movement with a set of values. Next, it provided a moral banner behind which the opposition could form. Furthermore, it gave the movement an organization which was based outside of the state apparatus, and beyond the direct control of the shah. Finally, it gave the movement a charismatic leader.

#### PRECIPITANTS

The first of my precipitants is that of leadership. An alliance of various groups formed the opposition. Each of these groups had leaders, some more important than others, nevertheless it is important to understand Ayatollah Khomeini was not the only leader. The religious leaders did play a critical role in the revolution. It was their emotional appeal, as well as their moral "strength" that persuaded many to come into the streets in opposition to the shah. The great moral fervor they employed, and their reluctance to negotiate with secular authorities, could not have been stimulated by a purely secular movement.

Khomeini was not the automatic choice for a religious leader. There were other important ayatollahs, such as Shariatmadei and Taleqai, who were religiously and socially very strong. Two main reasons explain why Khomeini came to the position he did. First, his move from Najaf in Iraq, where he had been since 1965, to Neuple-Chateau near Paris, in October 1978 gave him better access to the media than he had enjoyed in Iraq, enabling him to construct a well-crafted campaign that put him at the forefront of the revolution. Second, Khomeini refused to negotiate with the shah or his ministers. If, at a suitable time, the shah had been able to negotiate with the moderate opposition leaders he could perhaps have isolated, and defeated Khomeini. The shah did not initiate good faith negotiations, but rather responded to violence by making concessions. When it became clear that no compromise could be reached, battle lines were drawn. It was only natural that Khomeini, who had never damaged his reputation by talking to the shah would become leader of the opposition faction.

The reaction of the regime to popular unrest is critical to any understanding of the revolution. I would like to separate this question into two sections. Briefly, I would like to discuss the shah's reaction to opposition before 1977, then, in a little more detail, consider his response to the unrest of 1977-78.

There was very little manifest unrest between 1963 and 1977.(30) What little there was, such as activity by the Mojahidin, student unrest, or industrial strikes, was brutally suppressed. There was no viable threat to the shah's authority, and he felt that there could be no compromise. He felt that he needed to exercise complete control in order to fulfill his mission and westernize Iran.

In 1977, things changed. It is important to note there was no cohesive policy on how to deal with this change. There are a couple of points that are often neglected and are relevant to our discussion. In the first place, the shah had recently lost many of his old friends

and key advisors. Examples of those lost are court minister Asadollah Alam and former prime minister Manuchehr Eqbal. The shah's health was also important. First diagnosed in 1974, the lymphomas cancer and the treatments used to contain this condition must have reduced the shah's ability to deal with the trying conditions of 1978.

The liberalization policy of the shah was a question of "too little, too late". This policy, forced on him by worsening domestic conditions and pressure from the United States, enabled the opposition to organise effectively. March 1978 saw a number of demonstrations in which all opposition groups participated.

The shah made more extensive concessions in response to strikes and demands. These included Islamic reforms, freedom of the press, and the promise of free elections. These evoked no response, and on September, 8 the shah imposed martial law. The opposition continued to test the shah and, on that same day, the massacre at Jaleh Square seemed to dissolve any hope for peaceful settlement. These concessions by the shah not only failed to appease the opposition, they also shook the confidence of those who supported the monarch. His supporters began to wonder how strong the shah's commitment to them really was.<sup>(31)</sup> In November the shah put the country under martial law, and the stage was set for the flight of the shah on January 17, 1979. On February, 11 the revolution had begun.

We must view the events of 1978 in the context of the rest of the shah's rule. Centralizing control through a policy of cultivating distrust led to his not being able to consolidate support in 1978. The question here is whether the tensions in Iran could be diffused, or whether revolution was inevitable. There are, I feel, two options the shah had if he was to diffuse this discontent, at least in the short term: to give up political power, or to use physical force to crush the unrest at whatever cost.

The shah did not want to relinquish his political power, He never initiated discussions on power sharing. By the time he instituted important reforms late in 1978 it was too late. Even if the opposition leader had believed his promises, they had no reason to compromise because they now expected to take full power. The only other alternative open to the shah was to employ full military force to crush to rebellion. This was basically the tactic used in 1963. The reason the shah was unwilling to adopt this option was an uncertainty at the American response. Another explanation was that his whole country was solidly against him and his army was beginning to disintegrate under the pressure of competing loyalties.(32) There is of course no guarantee that either of these options would have been successful. Indeed, by January 1979 they had ceased to exist. His erratic policy of limited liberalization and outright repression did nothing to appease the opposition, it merely frightened those who would have supported him.

Central to my thesis is the idea that no regime will fall unless it is physically weaker than the opposition. There are two steps to this process. First, the government, stripped of any power base in society, relies increasingly on the military. Second, this military force becomes effectively weaker than those forces opposing it.

The shah centralized authority to such a degree that there was no group in society with its own political power base.(33) His policy of "divide and rule" meant that there was nobody for him to turn to for support. He depended entirely on the military to remain in power. The shah claimed his legitimacy came from 2,500 years of imperial rule. This was not a valid point. The shah had no intentions of devolving power to an elected parliament and made no attempt to legitimize his rule. He was isolated from the rest of society.

The shah spent the whole of his rule building up the armed forces. His senior officers were fiercely loyal to him. Why then, could they not keep him in power? There are three explanations for the collapse of the military. To begin with, the abdication of the shah and the arrival of the American General Huyser caused confusion among the officer corps. They did not know whether Huyser had come to support Bakhtiar's government, or whether he was in Iran to negotiate a peaceful handing over of power to Khomeini. Furthermore, the army had no roots in society but was an isolated pillar of support for the shah. Also, despite its massive arms procurement, the Iranian army had never fought a serious war. Finally, the senior officers were not prepared to launch a full-scale counter offensive. With the shah gone and the Americans negotiating with Khomeini, the officers were in no position to take effective measures. Militarily the army could have held Tehran. In the light of political circumstances the military was not prepared to inflict heavy casualties on the civilian population.(34)

The job of the shah was not an easy one. In Chapter 2, I said revolutions tend to happen during the country's modernizing stage. In Iran this stage was particularly awkward. The shah wanted to convert Iran from a traditional Islamic state into a modern western state in a brief period. What he failed to understand was that for a country to be socially and economically developed, it also has to be politically developed. He needed to create political safety valves so that the rising middle class would support, not oppose him.

The shah failed. Economically, he failed both to increase agricultural and industrial output. Socially, he failed to do much for illiteracy or health care.(35) Politically, he gave the middle classes no room for expression, so they took hold of the opportunity to join with the clerics in ousting the shah. The shah tried to modernize Iran without giving it the tools to do the jobs. For him to be

successful, it would have taken more talent or luck than the shah possessed.

There are many differences between Cuba and Iran. Yet my theory indicates that, despite their differences, they can be grouped together. The preconditions of economic and political discontent and ideology were present. They were acted on by the precipitants of leadership, inefficient reaction by the regime and an ultimate weakness of physical repressive capabilities. The result was revolution.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

- (1) I am refering to the riots at Jaleh Square
- (2) The author is aware that the state of Iran is a modern entity. For the sake of an historical perspective I am equating contemporary Iran with Persia.
- (3) 1906 was the date of the Iranian Constitution. This document was often quoted by secular opposition movements.
- (4) The date the shah took power
- (5) This is to defuse the argument that there was no revolution in Iran on the grounds that Khomeini's rule was autocratic as the Shah's.
- (6) Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton, 1980 p193-195
- (7) Some of the opposition groups did not, at first, require the shah to leave
- (8) Fred Haliday, Iran: Dictatorhsip and Development, London 1979 p106
- (9) The so called "White Revolution" was a reform package, under a constitutional monarch, meant to appeal to both conservative (White) and radical (Revolution) elements. See Saikal, p79
- (10) Haliday, p106
- (11) The landowners often received the water share in addition to their 20% land share.
- (12) Those who prospered were often the animal owners.
- (13) For urbanization, and inflation rates, see Table 2 in the Appendix following this chapter. There are very few unemloyment figures for Iran and those that there are tend to count seasonal workers as being employed.
- (14) Haliday, p138
- (15) E. Rouleau, Iran: The Myth and Reality, the Guardian Weekly, October, 24, 1976. (This article was published in two parts, the concluding half appearing in the same paper on October, 31, 1976)

- (16) The April 1975 reforms included giving 4% of the shares in 320 firms to the workers, and 99% in state run firms. Rouleau, October, 31, p12
- (17) Rouleau, October, 24, p12
- (18) Haliday, p159
- (19) Ibid, p70
- (20) Saikal, p184
- (21) Haliday, p305
- (22) Rouleau, October, 31, p12
- (23) Although there was no direct pressure on people to join the party, all government personnel had to join and anybody who did not was seen as being anti-shah. See John Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 1981, p35 Saikal, 9189
- (24) Iran's oil revenue fell from 20,000m dollars in 1976 to 17,000m in 1978. Haliday, p143
- (25) Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Canibals: Writing on Repression in Iran, New York, 1977, p7
- (26) There is considerable debate as to the correct number of SAVAK agents. Both Reza Baraheni and William Butler, chairman of the International Commission of Jurists Executive Commission, put the figure around 200,000. Saikal, p190
- (27) Saikal, p190
- (28) Haliday, p134
- (29) Said Amir Arjomand, Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution, Government and Opposition, vol 16, no 3 (Summer 1981), p311
- (30) The army was not once used during this period to restore order, Haliday, p51
- (31) Rouleau quotes two prominent industrialists, Habib Elchanin and Habib Sabet, as being disillusioned with the Shah. His anti-corruption drive, during which he jailed 8,000 businessmen did nothing to bolster confidence within the business community.
- (32) A military coup in Iran was always an option, however, the potential cost in human lives and the split in the officer corps made it more and more remote as time went by.



- (33) The Shah made all the important decisions, and political power stemmed from him, see Stempel, p18
- (34) Besides, a largely rural conscript army could not be relied upon to continually open fire upon their countrymen.
- (35) Haliday, p286

## CHAPTER V

### OVERTHROW OF SOMOZA

It is difficult to decide on relevant causes for the Nicaraguan revolution. The presence of U.S. troops in the country from 1909 to 1933, the assassination of General Augusto Cesar Sandino in 1934, and the rise to the presidency of Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1936 are all relevant to the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979. This chapter will indicate the importance of these events while concentrating on events that occurred in the 1970's, such as the Managuan earthquake and the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. These events are extremely important and must be seen as directly relevant to the Nicaraguan revolution rather than symptoms of the revolutionary process.

The first problem we have to deal with is whether there was a revolutionary movement in Nicaragua. There was no single, rigidly organized, revolutionary group, enjoying mass support which sought to overthrow Somoza.(1) Does this refute my theory? I believe not. As with the revolutions in Cuba and Iran, there were many groups which sought to overthrow Somoza. There were also many people in Nicaragua who, without belonging to any formal organization, were looking for an opportunity to voice their discontent with the Somoza regime. As Richard Fagen points out;

Fed up with more than four decades of tyrannical and brutal rule, the citizenry had revolted. Inspired, but not necessarily directly led by the Sandinistas, thousands of young men and women had taken up whatever arms were at hand. Hundreds of thousands of other nicaraguans helped in what way they could: by closing their shops and by sheltering and supplying the multitude of muchachos heroicos or simply by passing information or aiding in the myriad of other tasks necessary to keep the struggle going.(2)

Examples of the hatred felt against Somoza were the 120,000 people who paraded at the funeral of Chamorro and the almost pregnant general strike of January 1978.(3)

There is no doubt there was a movement seeking to overthrow Somoza. This on its own is not enough to label those people as revolutionary. We need to look for evidence of radical policies. The five-person Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN), which succeeded Somoza, could not be considered extremist. A majority of this group, consisting of two conservatives (Violetta Chamorro and Alfonso Robello), two social democrats (Sergio Ramierex and Daniel Ortega), and one leftist (Moises Hassan), favored moderate policies which committed the new government to a pluralist society guaranteeing private property. The reason for this stance is clear: The Sandinistas realized that, given the shattered state of the Nicaraguan economy, they had to encourage private enterprise and foreign investment. The best way for them to do this was to present a moderate front. While the real strength lay with the Sandinista Nation Liberation Front (FSLN), the bourgeoisie had been important in the earlier stages of the revolution, and the Sandinistas wanted to weaken gradually the bourgeois position yet keep and international image of internal unity. The real political power rested not with the JGRN, but with the nine-man Sandinist National Directorate (DNC), whose members were more extreme than those of the provisional government(4).

Though there had always been guerillas dedicated to overthrowing Somoza, it was not until 1974-77 that this became a mass movement. This movement became revolutionary, when its leadership was transferred to the F.S.L.N. When this happened, the movement's political goals crystalized and became more radical.(5)

### PRECONDITIONS

With an area of some 57,143 square miles, Nicaragua is a little larger than the state of Wisconsin.(6) In 1970, 47% of its 2 million people worked in agriculture.(7) Its main crops are coffee and cotton, although sugar is also important. Nicaragua underwent modernization accomplished through light industrialization and import substitution. Between 1960 and 1970 manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 10.5%; investment increased in both private and public sectors (from 4.4% and 10.2% of GDP respectively in 1960 to 6.6% and 13.2% in 1970); and the Nicaraguan GDP rose at an annual rate of 6.9%.(8)

Despite this industrialization, Nicaragua was still predominantly a producer of primary products. By the 1960's and 1970's the terms of trade were distinctly unfavourable to coffee and cotton. The 1974-75 recession hit Nicaragua, along with the other primary producers, extremely hard.(9) The increase in light industry led to an influx of equipment resulting in the rise of capital imports from 18.5% of total imports in 1960 to 21.2% in 1976. The import of intermediary products also resulted in worsening terms of trade, and the techniques led to an increase in rural unemployment, resulting in a migration of peasants into already overcrowded towns.(10)

What were conditions like in the Nicaraguan countryside and what effect did this have on the revolution? In 1975, 78.2% of Nicaraguans owned 17.4% of the land. (11) Those peasants who owned small plots of land engaged in subsistence farming, growing corn, beans and rice. During the harvest months, November to February, they would join with the landless labourers in working the coffee and cotton harvests. This resulted in many people being able to work for only four months to support their families for the entire year. The illiteracy rate in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was around 70%, with the rates in the countryside hovering around 90%. Only 16.1% of

the houses had potable water and scarcely 8% boasted sewerage facilities. The infant mortality rate was one of the highest in Latin America, standing at some 102 deaths out of 1,000 live births. (12)

Conditions in rural areas were, by any standard extremely poor. No doubt many peasants provided at least tacit support for the Sandinastas. However, Somoza's problems did not stem from this area. It was urban unrest which was to start the 18-month civil war that brought down his government.(13)

There are two forms of discontent in the towns: bourgeois and proletarian. Somoza treated the urban working class paternalistically, granting workers a social security system and an annual bonus of one months pay. This was not enough to compensate for high unemployment rates and poor working conditions. Members of the working class were extremely conscious of the wealth enjoyed by Somoza and his entourage. Much of this came from the relief funds meant to benefit the disaster victims. The scraps that Somoza threw to the working class did nothing to soften the blow of rising inflation (the annual inflation rate rose from 1.7% before 1970 to 11% in 1977), and brutal National Guard repression.(14)

The bourgeoisie had allied itself closely with the Somoza dynasty. In return for being politically quiet, they had been given a stable environment in which to accumulate considerable wealth. After the 1972 Managua earthquake, things changed. Somoza appropriated relief funds for himself, alienating members of the middle class and scaring away foreign investment.(15)

By 1978 there were grave economic problems. These were further aggravated by 18 months of civil war. It is estimated that 50,000 people were killed and a further 100,000 wounded. Direct damage to infrastructure was around \$480million. There was also capital flight of approximately \$1.5 billion. Hundreds of millions of dollars

worth of crops were either not planted or destroyed. The damage was so bad that by the end of 1981, real per capita income was 25% less than it was before the war started.(16)

For the initial political unrest in Nicaragua, we must look to the bourgeoisie. Whatever the position of the FSLN in the coalition that finally overthrew Somoza, we must agree with Alfonso Robello when he argues that it was the middle class who started the revolution going: "We were the center of the opposition to Somoza: Without us the Sandinistas would not have had their victories".(17)

Before 1972, the middle class was reasonably happy with the political power structure in Nicaragua.(18) As well as receiving economic privileges, they enjoyed a political role, albeit limited, through the opposition Conservative party. The last agreement between the Conservative party and the ruling National Liberal party allowed for a handing over of presidential power to a triumvirate between 1972-74.

The middle class was willing to go along with Somoza for as long as it was in their interests to do so. The bourgeoisie saw its interest threatened, with Somoza's renegeing on the 1972 agreement, his handling of the earthquake relief operations, and his encroachment into fields of operation traditionally enjoyed by the middle class. The moderate opposition grouped around the anti-Somoza editor of "La Prensa", Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. In 1974 Chamorro organized seven political parties, and two labor confederations into the Domestic Liberation Union (UDEL).

These politicians could hardly have been called revolutionary. They tried to put pressure on the United States to persuade Somoza to give up most of his political power. This did not occur and proved one of the main reasons for the failure to reach a moderate settlement.

The Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a centrist organization, was founded in May 1978 after the assassination of Chamorro. This was the last chance to keep the movement to oust Somoza in moderate hands. The bourgeois opposition lost the initiative during the crucial months of May-August 1978. They spent their time waiting for U.S. pressure to force Somoza from office, while the radical FSLN spent this time grabbing popular imagination with such actions as the capture of the National Palace on August, 22, 1978.(19) The United States did not react to the pressure put on it by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie and angered many moderates by sending a telegram to Somoza congratulating him on his improved human rights records. With the tecerista faction of the FSLN willing to negotiate with the moderate factions, there was really no other path for the movement to take.(20)

What role did ideology play in this revolution? Although the FSLN was to play an important part in leading the movement, the revolution was, to some degree, a spontaneous uprising against Somoza, sparked by such incidents as the assassination of Chamorro. Bearing this in mind, there would seem to be very little part for ideology to play. It did not play the same role as Islam did in the Iranian revolution, but it was important. If we look at the leaders of the revolution, we can identify an ideology among them, and we can see what effect it had on their actions.

This ideology was a mixture of Marxism and Sandinism. What then is Sandinism? Taking its name from the guerilla leader Cesar Augusto Sandino, it is a mixture of Socialism and Nationalism. To quote Henry Weber:

With Sandino's guerilla activity, a new political force, hostile to both factions of the Nicaraguan oligarchy made its appearance on the historical arena in a form of petty-bourgeois nationalism, tinged with utopian socialist and spiritualist ideology.(21)

Sandinism is as Carlos Fonseca Amador pointed out "a distinctly Nicaraguan experience, Socialist and National demands are combined in the Sandinist People's Revolution. We identify with Socialism whilst retaining a critical attitude to the socialist experience".(22)

I doubt whether ideology had the direct effect on Nicaraguans that it had on the Iranian people. It did have an effect on the FSLN leadership. It is interesting to see, how events in contemporary Nicaragua show this influence.

#### PRECIPITANTS

The FSLN did not instigate the huge demonstrations and the 90% general strike that shook the Somoza regime.(23) It was the moderate political opposition that started the protest and the FSLN merely endorsed it midway through. Within one year the FSLN seized control of the revolutionary movement that overthrew Somoza. The role of the FSLN is crucial to any study of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The FSLN was founded in 1962. It sprang up with many other guerilla groups following the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba. It was to hit the international headlines in 1974, when it conducted a raid on a society Christmas party in Managua, taking hostage 12 members of Somoza's inner circle. The FSLN was again quiet, following the National Guard's counter-insurgency program until 1977. As William Leo Grande points out, the FSLN was not a threat to the Somoza regime at the beginning of 1978.(24) The FSLN used the assassination of Chamorro to seize the leadership of the opposition movement. It was able to do this for three important reasons: First it caught the popular imagination with such activities as the August raid on the National Palace. Second, it offered a radical alternative to the poor and did not compromise its position by giving ground to the United States. Third, and most important, it gave hope that Somoza could be overthrown. If Somoza were to go, the population



knew he would have to be defeated militarily. The FSLN provided hope that this could be done, causing many to believe in the struggle against Somoza.(25)

Somoza himself played an important part in bringing about the revolution. He did this in four main ways: To begin with, his instigating of the brutal National Guard repressions of 1974-77 and September 1978 sowed seeds of revolution in an already disillusioned population. Next, his relative relaxation of repression in 1977, following moves by President Carter, enabled the FSLN to resume military operations. Furthermore, his cover up of the murder of Chamorro did not reduce suspicions that he had been behind the assassination. Finally, his failure to take seriously negotiations which might have meant his stepping down from the presidency prevented any real chance of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

Between 1974 and 1977, the National Guard launched a counter-insurgency campaign. This campaign was aimed at the northern departments of Zelay, Matagalpa, and Segouva, where the FSLN had been the most active.(26) Sections of the population were uprooted and sent to resettlement camps. Somoza believed that his efforts had been successful, but they were not. Within his own country, it brought cries of indignation from such conservative groups as the Roman Catholic bishops, who were outraged at the "humiliating and inhuman treatment ranging from torture and rape to summary execution", perpetrated by the National Guard on fellow Nicaraguans.(27) Internationally, there was such an outcry that even the United States had to reduce military aid. The counter Insurgery campaign's main effect was on the Nicaraguan people themselves. This terror made it safer for many people to join the FSLN, than it was to stay in their own homes.(28) It also conditioned people to violence, and made them more dedicated to seeing the removal of Somoza. As one old man in Managua put it, "We've had weeks of bullets. Bullets

for breakfast, bullets for lunch, bullets for dinner, and bullets before going to bed. But after they bomb you, bullets mean nothing".

(29)

Somoza did not follow Batista's lead and flee the country before his regime was really threatened, but stayed to put up a struggle. Yet, if a revolution is to succeed, there must be a time when the revolution forces are stronger than the conservative ones. This usually takes place in two stages: the isolation of the regime from any power base in society; and the weakening of the armed forces which are then keeping the regime in power.

Cuzan and Heggan made the point that the strength of any government depends on three things: its legitimacy, the scope of its operations, and its coercive strength.(30) Before 1972, Somoza enjoyed a fair degree of political support, this was to change following the Managua earthquake. At the same time, he was intent on increasing the scope of his government operations by 28%. Interestingly enough, he also reduced his coercive capabilities. (Between 1965-75 the number of National Guard soldiers per 1,000 of population fell by 40%). The fighting capability of those remaining was open to question. Somoza so feared a coup he rotated his officers in command and encouraged widespread corruption so that guardsmen would owe their allegiance only to him. In concluding this section, I must agree with Cuzan and Heggan when they said

...had Somoza given away proportions of his wealth and power and adopted democratic procedures, he could have acquired enough legitimacy to persuade the population to recognize the authority of his government and reject the appeals of the Marxist revolutionaries.(31)

The revolution in Nicaragua could have been avoided as late as 1978. The best chance of such a move seemed to be through U.S. pressure

on Somoza to reach an agreement with the more moderate elements of the opposition. Nevertheless, it seemed that the United States was always one step behind what was really going on. As Richard Fagen points out, "History has also reaffirmed the seemingly infinite capacity for the U.S. government to misread and mismanage the situation".(32) When America first started negotiations with the oppositional bourgeoisie through the FAO in 1978, it wanted to keep Somoza in power. This was not possible and all these negotiations did was damage the credibility of the FAO. The United States then realized that Somoza had to resign. Having seemingly made a crucial step forward, they then wanted to keep the FSLN out of any Nicaraguan government at a time when the Sandinastas were leading the revolutionary movement. When the FSLN was on the brink of military victory, the United States tried to put pressure on them to add two more moderates to the provisional government. There was no longer any room to negotiate.

Not all the blame for the handling of the Nicaraguan situation must be put on President Carter. Carter first had to deal with Somoza's stubbornness. When given the choice between a dictator and a communist, the President did not have a lot of room for manouvers. Yet even if Carter had seen the need to force Somoza to go, he still would have faced a strong pro-Somoza lobby on Capitol Hill. After the National Guards mopping up campaign of September 1978, U.S. Reps Charles Wilson (D-Texas), and John Murphy (D-NY) were threatening to hold up legislation if Carter moved against Somoza.(33)

The preconditions for revolution existed in Nicaragua. What is very interesting to note in this respect is the way in which certain events acted as catalyst on this discontent, and how the FSLN was able to use the resultant unrest to take control of the opposition movement. My theory allows for the fact that not every factor will hold the same weight in every revolution. Ideology is a good example. Whilst I feel that the study of ideology is important for a full

understanding of the Nicaraguan revolution, I don't think it was as important as it was in Iran.

I believe that no historical event is inevitable. All that one can do is say that given a certain set of factors, one of the possible outcomes of those factors could be a certain event. This works extremely well with the Nicaraguan revolution.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

- (1) There were many groups who sought Somoza's overthrow. These included; COSEP (The employers union), the Roman Catholic Church (Especially at the parish level), La Prensa (The nations largest selling newspaper), and the United Peoples movement (a FSLN sponsored group). These groups formed a part of the opposition umbrella movements (such as UDEL and FAO), which are mentioned in this chapter.
- (2) Richard R Fagen, The End of the Affair, Foreign Policy, no 36 (Summer 1980), p178
- (3) The general strike was called by COSEP (the employers union), on January 13, 1978. Henry Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution, London 1981
- (4) The nine men were made up from three factions of the FSLN, the Protracted People's war tendency, the Proletarian tendency, and the Terceristas. For a full discussion on how the DNC took power, please see Stephen M Gorman, Saninasta Chess: How the Left Took Control, Carribbean Review (Winter 1981) p14-17
- (5) James Nelso Goodsell, Nicaragua: An Interim Assessment, Internation Journal, XXXVII (winter 1981-82) p95
- (6) See Table 9
- (7) Investment figures are taken from Weber p24
- (8) In 1975 GDP fell to 2.2% (Which, when taken with the rise in population means a fall in real terms).
- (9) The percentage of Nicaraguans living in towns of over 20,000 people rose from 23.1 in 1960 to 31.0 in 1970
- (10) Weber, p27
- (11) Doris Tijerno, Inside the Nicaraguan Revolution, Vancouver 1981, p11
- (12) Beginning with the January 13 general strike called by COSEP
- (13) See Tijerino, especially p132, for an example of how long workers agreements came to reach.
- (14) Most authors seem to agree that Somoza made huge profits out of the 1972 earthquake relief operations, angering all other

sections of Nicaraguan society. William Leogrande, The Revolution in Nicaragua, Another Cuba?, Foreign Affairs, vol 58, no 1, (Fall 1979), p31 Robin Naverro Montgomery, The fall of Somoza: Anatomy of a Revolution, Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, vol 10, no 1 (March 1980), p51 Fagen End of the Affair, p181

- (15) Somoza was also encroaching on the traditional preserves of the bourgeoisie, Weber, p33. Thomas Walker, The Sandinist Victory in Nicaragua, Current History, vol 78, no 454, (February 1980), p57-61
- (16) Richard Fagen, The Nicaraguan Crisis, Review of the Month, vol 34 no 6, (November 1982), p4
- (17) I take as evidence for this statement the fact that there was very little anti-government unrest before 1972. Certainly nothing on the scale of that sponsored by the UDEL.
- (18) The FSLN was made up of the following three factions: The Proletarian Tendency, the Protracted People's War Tendency and the Terceristas.
- (19) The terceristas were the only faction of the FSLN who sought to compromise with the middle class.
- (20) Weber, p12
- (21) Ibid, p21
- (22) Leogrande, p33
- (23) Ibid, p32
- (24) Gottschalk, for the importance of hope to a revolutionary
- (25) Fagen, End of the Affair, p186
- (26) Leogrande, p31
- (27) The indiscriminate nature of the executions meant that it was often safer for people, especially young men, to follow the FSLN than it was to stay at home.
- (28) Fagen, End of the Affair, p186
- (29) Alfred G Cuzan and Richard J Heggen, A Macro-Political Explanation of the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution, Latin American Research Review vol 17, no 2, (1982), p156-170. All figures in this paragraph are taken from Cuzan and Heggen.

- (30) Cuzan and Heggen, p166
- (31) Fagen, End of the Affair, p166
- (32) Leogrande, p135
- (33) Ibid

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

First I would like to look at some of the discussion points raised by my examination of existing theoretical work. Second, how successful has my theory been in answering the questions raised by the the three case studies, and what throwbacks has this had on to the initial discussion? Third, I hope to provide some pointers for the direction of future research.

Revolution is a topic worthy of attracting research because of its widespread political, economic and social consequences. Modern research into revolution has provided very few conclusions. I believe the time has now come for us to use contemporary revolutions to test existing theories, rather than developing new theories to explain classical revolutions.(1) This contemporary work will enable us to fine tune our theories, or revert to discovering new ones, and will stop us from trying to force the factual foot into the theoretical shoe.

The modern student of politics knows too little about the causes of revolution to judge whether they can be studied in the same context as other forms of collective violence. It may be that an industrial stike can be analyzed in much the same way as revolution, but until we know more about the causes of revolutions it makes more sense to focus on the complex series of events which make up a revolution. This definition need not hold the political scientist up definitely as all that is required is a working definition which will help us to focus on the matter at hand.

If pre-1959 Cuban society had been flawless it would have been easy to identify the causes of the Cuban Revolution. However, there has never been, nor will there be, a perfect society. The social



scientist must decide when levels of discontent within a country both absolute and perceived, are unacceptably high. He then needs to consider the government's response to this unrest and whether it is likely to result in revolution. It is easy to highlight discontent with hindsight but not as easy to predict. It is the social scientist's duty to develop a theory capable of predicting revolution.

My definition states that there must be a mass movement seeking to bring radical economic, political and social change through violent means. In the Iranian, Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions this movement was held together by a desire to see the end of the existing regime. The revolutionary leadership tended to be more radical than the mass membership. This conflict of interest caused tension after the revolution had succeeded, at which point it became extremely difficult to reconcile differences within the movement. Present day Iran and Nicaragua are good example of this tension.

There was then, in all three case studies, a mass movement seeking change by violent means. However, it was the revolutionary leadership that provided the ideology to focus the need for radical change.

Economic discontent was prevalent in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua. The problem here is that nearly all countries suffer from discontent, in some shape or form, yet not all these experience revolution. We need to ask whether or not there were abnormally high levels of discontent in these societies, who suffered it, and what consequent effect did this deprivation have on the revolution. It is not enough to say that just because there was deprivation, the deprivation caused the revolution. We must be able to show the effect of deprivation on those people who perpetrated the revolution, if we are going to label economic deprivation as a revolutionary cause.

By Latin American standards Cuba was prosperous nation.(2) However, there were two types of economic discontent in the country: "absolute", in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, and "perceived" in the major cities. (3)

One of the poorest parts of Cuba was the mountaineous region of the Sierra Maestra. It was in these mountains that Castro was able to hide from Batista's Army and to finally establish his "Foco".(4) While it is probably true that Guevarra and Castro have subsequently overemphasized the role of the peasant in the Cuban revolution, there can be little doubt that this role was a crucial one.(5)

Many theorists have argued the importance of perceived deprivation. It can be pointed to, but is extremely difficult to prove as we are dealing with people's feelings. What is interesting in the three case studies is that it was not the people who suffered absolute deprivation who sparked off the revolution. This is because it is not those who are starving who revolt, but those who, though agrieved, have hope for something better. Even Cuba, where the revolution was nurtured in the Sierra Maestra, it was caused by young intellectuals and not starving peasants.

It was among the revolutionary leadership that political discontent was acutely felt. They had political expectations which were not met due to intransigence, either real or perceived, on the part of the existing regime. The revolutionary leadership attempts to use the economic discontent as fuel to challenge the existing regime through mass violence. While the degree of political discontent differs; the concept holds true for all three case studies. In Cuba, Castro and his followers were enraged by the manner in which Batista seized power. They held this seizure to be illegitimate, and this resentment was the driving force behind the Cuban revolution. In Iran there was discontent focused on the way the Shah was trying to monopolize the political process. In Nicaragua the middle class

was unhappy about Somoza's refusal to share his power, a scenario which came to a head with his reneging on the 1974 agreement. It was this middle-class discontent which was to spark off the revolution.

In Havana, the split between the rich and poor was particularly apparent. The wealth of the Americans and the Cuban upper classes were especially resented by the graduates churned out of Havana University.

When combined with the political resentment felt by both students and political emigres at Batista's illegal seizure of power, this perceived deprivation, goes a long way towards explaining the urban revolutionary faction that played a vital part in the Cuban revolutionary struggle.

The rapidly expanding city of Tehran was undoubtedly the center of the Iranian revolution.(6) Perceived economic discontent was prevalent in a city which boasted 900,000 private cars but did not enjoy a public transport system. One half of the city shopped in modern western stores while the other half scraped by on the bare necessities.(7) The filtering through of the massive Iranian oil wealth went even further to fuel this discontent.

The perceived economic discontent in Iran was certainly felt by those who fought the revolution.

In Nicaragua there was both absolute and perceived deprivation. Predominantly a primary producer, Nicaragua suffered badly during the world recession of 1974-75. Urban Nicaragua also suffered from high unemployment and soaring inflation.(8) The final economic straw was to devastate the nation's infrastructure. While his people suffered, Somoza's riches multiplied. His mismanagement of the Managua earthquake relief funds further incensed both the middle and working classes in Nicaragua.

Ideology played a part in all three case studies. However, the importance of ideology as a revolutionary precondition varies greatly. In Cuba and Nicaragua the aim of the revolutionary movement was to overthrow the existing regime and not to worry over what was to be put in its place. The revolutionary leadership formulated an ideology which grew in significance as the revolution progressed, but only really became apparent to the mass membership after the revolution had been successful. In Iran, the ideology was one of the key revolutionary preconditions and was used to great effect by the revolutionary leadership. By trying to modernize Iran single-handedly, the shah took influence away from the traditional power source; the clergy. In times of radical change people cling to traditional values. An upsurge in religious activity in the 1970's gave the self-styled defender of the faith, Khomeini, a base from which to launch his attack on the shah.

The role of leadership as a catalyst in provoking revolution is an interesting one. In all three case studies there was no automatic choice for revolutionary leader. In Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua there was a great deal of competition for the post. In each case the successful leaders acted to make themselves the only viable alternative to the existing regime. They also refused to be a party to any negotiations with the leaders they sought to overthrow, so when these talks failed, they were not discredited. Khomeini's position at the center of his international communications network, Castro's work and broadcasts and subsequent capture of the Santa Clara gun train and the Tercerista faction of FSLN's raid on the National Assembly, caught the people's attention and set these leaders up as viable alternatives to the existing regimes.

The next of my precipitants is that of the existing regimes reaction to the initial discontent. The preconditions for revolution can lie dormant in society for many years. (A discontent in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, and the modernization of Iran were not overnight

phenomena). The government's handling of initial problems is crucial to future events. Despite the record unemployment rates of the 1930's the contemporary government were seen to be trying to alleviate the discontent. Perhaps even more important, the legitimate power structure was kept in place which allowed people to manifest their discontent through the ballot box.

In Iran, Nicaragua and Cuba, instead of helping its people, each government seemed to be repressing them through the use of indiscriminate terror. This terror serves to make men join the revolutionary movement because they are just as likely to suffer reprisals whether or not they do so. Good examples of this terror can be seen in the work of SAVAK in Iran and the National Guard in Nicaragua. With the National Guard's counterinsurgency campaign, it is said to have been safer to join the FSLN than to stay in the villages. Tied in with this repression is the unavailability of the political process to those seeking redress. This combination leads to all those not actively aligned with the regime placing their allegiance elsewhere.

The question of how a government deals with economic discontent is not straightforward. There are times, such as Nicaragua, where the government is able to help those who are suffering but chooses not to. In other cases the government may be well aware of the problems but be unable to do much about them. Two good examples here would be the present day Angola and Sudan. In still other cases the government may perceive the problem and be trying to do something about it but their attempts are misguided and not appreciated by the suffering people. The shah of Iran was trying to bring his country into the twentieth century but all his people saw was an attempt to erode their traditional power structure.

My final precipitant is the effective military strength of the existing

regime. I agree with Gottschalk when he said this strength is the key to whether or not a revolution will be successful. There are two stages to the disintegration of any regime: The withering away of any power base within society; and the inability to hold on to power through merely military means. The rest of this thesis has been devoted to describing the alienation program which the regime follows, this precipitant deals with how long they can hold on to power when they have become isolated from the society in which they govern.

When talking about military weakness it is easy to be tautological. If we propose revolutions take place because of military weakness it is not enough to quote as our evidence examples of revolution which have taken place because the military was not strong enough to prevent them. To present a theory capable of predicting revolution we must be able to foresee military collapse. All three of our case studies show this to be extremely difficult. In pre-revolutionary Cuba, Castro's army of 800 men was up against Batista's well equipped, modern fighting force. In both Iran and Nicaragua the revolutionary forces were faced by western-trained and equipped military machines. While it is easy to predict with hindsight, there were pointers to the regime's military weakness which were available before the revolution was successful. All three of the armies were isolated from their societies, because it was a common policy for soldiers to serve away from homelands. None of the armies had a great deal of experience under battle conditions. The weapons supplied by the United States were highly technical and required a certain expertise not available in these armies. These weapons were also often not applicable to the type of fighting that needed to be done. Senior officers were appointed out of political loyalty and not because of military expertise. Not only did this lead to the wrong man getting the job but it also alienated the capable young officers whose services were badly needed. Batista, Somoza and the shah all rotated general's command's so that they could not establish

an independent power base within the military. It is also difficult for even the best trained military men with the highest morale to fire upon crowds of their own countrymen.

If the military is weak there are two factors which will determine how long the regime will stay in power. First, there needs to be a strong revolutionary movement trying to overthrow it. However, even if there is such a movement the regime can be kept in power through foreign intervention. Such interventions can only be a stop-gap measure. In present day Afghanistan the Kabul government is unlikely to fall so long as it is supported by the military might of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, should the USSR withdraw its support, the Afghan government would face a fresh challenge from the rebel forces.

Through testing this theory it soon becomes clear that while all the factors within my theory do exist in each of the case studies, their importance varies from revolution to revolution. Ideology was particularly important in Iran, yet in Cuba that part was played by political discontent. I believe with this weighting in mind my theory is extremely useful when adopted as a causal framework for the study of contemporary revolutions.

Finally, I would like to consider some directions for future research. Despite the high cost of revolution, both in financial and human terms, these three case studies would seem to point to the inability of the western world both to predict and prevent revolution.(9) It is the responsibility of the social scientist to prove the tools for predicting revolution. This will not be done by twisting the "classical revolutions", providing another revolutionary theory to be refuted by still other social scientists. What must be done is to decide on a theoretical approach, be it psychological or casual or both, and to actively test it against contemporary revolutions. We also need to consider those revolutions which have failed so

that we can identify those factors which prevent them from being successful revolutions. Finally, we need to use the same criteria to study troubled nations over a number of years so we can identify trends which could lead to a revolution. This will not enable us to state that a revolution will take place but will tell us that a revolutionary situation is possible. We are much more likely to uncover this information using the same criteria over a number of years than by undertaking spasmodic subjective studies using the theory deemed to be the most popular at the time.

It is very easy for the social scientist to concentrate on revolutions which are well past. There is plenty of data on them and they are now safely non-controversial. However, we live in a contemporary, controversial society and we all fail that society if we do not use the lessons learned through history to try and predict, and prevent revolution.



ENDNOTES - CONCLUSION

- (1) By "classical" revolution I am referring to those in the French and Russian genre whilst "contemporary" revolutions I see as being those post 1950
- (2) See table 3
- (3) The difference in living standards between rural and urban Cuba was marked.
- (4) The "Foco" is the base for guerilla activity. Special attention is given to it by both Mao & Giap
- (5) After the Cuban revolution had been successful there was much argument over which faction rural or urban had done most to bring about the collapse of the Batista government. Both Castro & Guevarra supported the peasant fighters.
- (6) The population of Tehran rose from 2.5 million in 1970 to 5 million in 1977
- (7) See E. Rouleau  
Iran: The myth and reality. The Gaurdian Weekly, October 24, 1976
- (8) See table 7
- (9) See R. Fagen, The End of the Affair  
Foreign Policy No 36 (Summer 1980) p 178 for a discussion on America's seemingly inability to predict revolution

TABLE 1  
THE CUBAN ECONOMY 1950-1957

YEAR	POPULATION	GNP (million dollars)	PRICES (Price Index Using 1953 as base)
1950		1692	
1951	5.639	1946	
1952	5.775	2007	
1953	5.879	1794	100
1954	6.000	1808	97
1955	6.127	1859	96
1956	6.259	2015	97
1957	6.388	2294	100

TABLE 2

THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE IN 1953

ILLITERACY (percentage of the population over ten who are illiterate)	CALORIE CONSUMPTION (per person per day)	HOSPITAL BEDS (people per per bed)	DOCTORS (per thousand)	ELECTRICITY PIPED WATER INSIDE TOILETS  Percentage of houses enjoying these services
23.6	2730	300		28.0
				42.8
				3.0
				35.2
				54.6
				2.4
				58.2
				87.0
				9.1

TABLE 3  
RANKING ACCORDING TO PER CAPITA  
INCOME AND AVERAGES OF PHYSICAL INDEXES

1953 Per Capita Income		1939 Per Capita Income
2	Argentina	1
5	Uruguay	10
7	Chile	2
4	Cuba	3
15	Costa Rica	6
8	Mexico	9
9	Brazil	16
16	Peru	7
1	Venezuela	4
6	Colombia	5
3	Panama	8
10	Dominican Republic	11

This Table is taken from Teichart, p185

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TABLE 4

IRAN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1960-1979

	GDP (Billion \$'s)	GDP (Dollars)	Exports (Billion \$'s)	Goods (Billion \$'s)	Capital (Billion \$'s)	Intermedi	Percentage of GDP(H) generated from Manufacturing Mining
1960	4.74	204					
1963	5.33	210	-	-	-	-	
1969	10.59	-	2.28	.24	.36	1.05	
1970	12.04	388	2.84	.21	.44	1.18	113.7 140.7
1971	14.49	-	4.14	.23	.71	1.31	138.1 212.6
1972	17.3		4.37	.32	.84	1.60	171.5 264.0
1973	26.58		6.07	.41	.86	2.34	231.9 587.5
1974	45.14	-	20.84	.82	1.33	4.21	312.9 14 416.0
1975	51.27	1 427	19.52	1.57	3.62	6.1	382.8 13 758.0
1976	66.98	1 607	23.58	-	-	-	490.1 17 414.0
1977	-	-	24.45				-
1978			22.57				
1979			19.12				

TABLE 5

STANDARD OF LIVING IN IRAN FROM 1969-1978

	Population Millions	Wages in Manufacturing Industries taking 1970 as a base year	Inflation, Tehran, using 1970 as a base year	Agriculture
1970	28.66	100	100	160.6
1971	29.61	107	105	172.7
1972	30.40	120	112	201.8
1973	31.22	138	125	234.4
1974	32.04	-	144	303.3
1975	32.87	-	157	339.9
1976	33.66	-	175	430.1
1977	34.27	-	222	-
1978	35.64	-	248	-

	Percentage of houses Urban/Rural	Percentage of the population over six who are illiterate	Inhabitants per Doctor	Hospital beds per hundred thousand
1969	-	66.6	-	-
1970	-	-	3 330	499
1971	-	63.1	3 297	508
1972	-	-	3 145	519
1973	-	-	3 039	-
1974	-	-	2 757	535
1975	-	-	-	-

TABLE 6

A COMPARISON BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING & OIL INCOME FROM 1970-1978

	Defence Budget \$ million	Oil Income \$ million
1970	880	1 093
1971	1 065	1 870
1972	1 375	2 308
1973	1 525	5 600
1974	3 680	18 523
1975	6 325	18 871
1976	8 925	20 488
1977	9 400	-
1978	-	17 000

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TABLE 7

NICARAGUAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1960-1978  
(Measured in percentage growth per annum)

	<u>Per Capita</u> <u>GDP</u>	<u>GNP</u>	<u>Export Growth</u>	<u>Goods</u>	<u>Import Growth</u> <u>Capital Goods</u>
1960-65	10.1	6.9	16.8	16.6	18.5
1965-70	3.8	0.8	4.6	4.2	24.9
1960-70	6.9	3.8	10.5	10.2	24.0
1970-75	5.5	2.1	16.2	21.1	23.0
1976	5.2	1.8	37.3	4.2	21.2
1977	5.5	2.1	18.8	28.8	26.7
1978	-3.0	-6.2			



TABLE 8

STANDARD OF LIVING IN NICARAGUA BETWEEN 1970-1978

	<u>Population in Million</u>	<u>Percentage of people aged over 15 who are illiterate</u>	<u>The number of people per doctor</u>	<u>Hospital Beds per thousand people</u>	<u>Piped Water</u>
1970	1.970	42.5	2570	2.3	100/11
1971	2.033				
1972	2.100				
1973	2.170				
1974	2.243				
1975	2.318		1727	2.4	
1976	2.396		1540	2.2	
1977	2.476				
1978	2.559				

TABLE 9

THE EFFECT OF URBANIZATION ON AGRICULTURAL & INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT

	URBANIZATION Percentage of the population in towns 20,000 or over	PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN Agriculture	Industry
1950	15.2	67.7	13.5
1960	23.1	57.4	15.4
1970	31.0	47	19.8

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